Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Alhassanain (p) Network for Islamic Heritage and Thought

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IBN RUSHD

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE INTELLECT IN THE WORKS OF IBN RUSHD:

FROM PHILOLOGICAL EXAMINATION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

JAMAL Al-DIN Al-`ALAWI

Source:Jayyusi ,Salma Khadra , ed. The Legacy of Muslim Spain, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994, vol.2pps (804-829). www.brill.nl/mcataloguesub6id2866.htm

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 3

I 6

1.1 Al-Mukhtasar on psychology 6

1.2 The Talkhis (Middle Commentary) of De Anima 10

II 13

Introduction 13

11.1. The Ibn Bajja-Alexandrian stage or the Ibn Bajja-Alexandrian Ibn Rushd 13

11.2. The Rushdi stage; or the Rushdi Ibn Rushd 19

Conclusion 24

BIBLIOGRAPHY 25

NOTES 26

INTRODUCTION

Scholarly study has failed, as yet, to explore the full range and significance ofIbn Rushd's philosophy, and this adds to the difficulties of providing a precise and satisfactory treatment of the subject within such a brief paper as this. I have therefore felt it appropriate to focus on a single theme inIbn Rushd's writings, and to attempt to establish, around this, the preliminary outlines of a new strategy for studying theRushdi corpus and the philosophical system contained within it.

Several aspects ofIbn Rushd's thought might have served as such a focus. Of particular interest, for example, would be an examination of his metaphysical writings in the light of his evolving perspectives on any one of the philosophical problems in these works; or a consideration of his works on logic with respect to the development of a theory of knowledge and demonstrative proof. This paper, however, is concerned with the evolution of the problem of the intellect, a subject selected on account of its prominence in the history of medieval philosophy, and also because of the increasing interest now also felt by present-day writers in a subject clearly likely to give rise to fruitful research. This will further permit us to evaluate other related types of philosophical questions which have hitherto escaped the attention of ancient and modern scholars.

The question of the intellect occupies an obviously important place both in the general history of philosophy and in the particular context of the historical study ofIbn Rushd . No other aspect of theRushdi discourse, indeed, has such a unique and distinguished history behind it; and while other aspects have failed to leave lasting reverberations, this one led on to the crucially important intellectual current subsequently known as LatinAverroism .

I should like, from the very outset, to stress this twofold aspect: we have to consider, on the one hand, the intrinsic question of the problem of the intellect in theRushdi corpus; and, on the other, the place this question assumes within the history of medieval philosophy among theLatins . The latter aspect should not, however, lead us to overestimate the significance of the problem itself, nor should one stretch the problem beyond its own natural context by seeing it exclusively in terms of its role as an axis ofAverroism . Still more importantly, the problem should not be seen as the defining element for comparingIbn Rind's philosophy with other philosophical systems; to do so would be to give the reader the impression that otherRushdi topics and questions are insignificant, and thatAverroism in its entirety can, in the final analysis, be reduced to a theory of the intellect. No doubt the problem of the intellect was a central feature, if still not the most important one, of LatinAverroism , but it was not a key element withinIbn Rushd's original Arabic writings, or within the historical context in which he lived. As such I believe we must first develop a reading of the problem of the intellect as embedded in theRushdi corpus itself. I do not intend, here, to undertake a critical review of work carried out in this area, but rather to establish a different framework for consideringIbn Rushd's heritage, focusing, to this end, on a single theme in his psychological writings.

In a previous work' I set out a general strategy for the reading of theRushdi corpus based on a comparative survey ofIbn Rushd's writings, particularly those in the original Arabic. It was maintained that there exist different yet correlating levels in the corpus, these correlations involving aspects of the following selected writings: Al-Mukhtasarat (the Epitomes), Al-Jawami (the Short Commentaries), Al-Talakhis (the Middle Commentaries) and various other commentaries and treatises. At this point I should like to re-examine2 this thesis, in order toanalyse how far the development of the definition of the intellect inIbn Rushd's writings can in fact be determined.

Before presenting brief conclusions on the subject, derived from discussions and from my own research,3 I should like to draw attention to a centrally important principle which is often overlooked: namely, that the foundations of theRushdi corpus have to be properly established before we are in a position toanalyse Ibn Rushd's thought. An appreciation of this will set the present study on a proper footing, and will also shed critical light on the current state ofRushdi scholarship. Present-day students ofIbn Rushd are all too ready to apply the "synthetic approach" (al-nazar al-tarkibi ) to his writings, or to probe his philosophical depth and ideological intention, withoutrealising that much more fundamental textual work still needs to be done. While not wishing to curb the legitimate aspirations of such scholars, I feel that their work is really premature; that the present state ofRushdi studies firmly precludes systematic analysis of this kind.4

Clearly, then, several difficulties have to be met. First, there is the particular difficulty of determining what, in the writings ofIbn Rushd , the problem of the intellect actually is, the barrier here being a linguistic obscurity which at times makes the author's intended meaning impossible to discover -all the more so when we are working with the translation of a lost original text, as is the case with the main textual fragment forming the basis of the theory of the intellect in his writings, i.e., Al-Sharh al-kabir (the Long Commentary) of the De Anima (Kitab al-nafs ). Still more problematic is the fact that the surviving primary sources,Ibn Rushd's psychological writings themselves, exist in manuscripts which still remain unedited byrecognised standards of editions-a discipline which requires the researcher first to undertake the work of the philologist. To this end the text and its manuscripts must be compared with the aim, on the one hand, of establishing a sound text and, on the other, of criticallyanalysing the variants between the manuscripts. Such work is a prerequisite both for a general study ofIbn Rushd and for a specific examination of the problem of the intellect.

This, then, must be our starting point for any serious study of the question; and until this first phase is accomplished, none of our efforts will achieve fully satisfactory results, if indeed they achieve any worthwhile results at all. While it is no inalienable rule that philological and historical examination should precede philosophical examination, it is nonetheless our task, as students of the history of philosophy, to lay the proper groundwork for the study of philosophy and philosophical theory; and this will only be possible if we first focus on improving and correcting the primary tools of research. It is essential, in this case, that we assemble all the manuscripts at our disposal and verify their authenticity.

This first section of the paper will investigate a group of texts which form the basis ofIbn Rushd's psychological studies, and will attempt to clarify long-standing obscurities and confusions surrounding it. The examination will be restricted to those texts preserved in the original Arabic, namely, Al-Mukbtasar (the Epitome) and Al-Talkhis (the Middle Commentary) (Al-Sharh al-kabir (the Long Commentary) will be examined in a subsequent section, where an attempt will be made to assess the influence ofAverroism on the subject). Only the relevant chapters in the texts, namely those concerned with the question of the intellect, will be considered, and these will be examined as if with a view to publication according to the scientificallyrecognised principles of editing. In the second section I shall attempt to assess what developments, if any, may be discerned between the positions advocated byIbn Rusted in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talklis and those in Al-Sharh al-kabir . Our re-reading of the original texts in the first section will, therefore, prepare us for the analysis provided in the second; and it is for this reason that the subtitle "from philological examination to philosophical analysis" has been chosen for this paper.

I

1.1 Al-Mukhtasar on psychology

Al-Mukhtasar (the Epitome) on psychology has a special significance as against the other Al-Mukhtasarat (Epitomes) and Al-Jawami ? (Short Commentaries). In addition to being an analysis of Aristotle's De Anima, it examines the entire peripatetic heritage on psychology, thus also introducing themes present in Al-Jawami`;6 forIbn Rushd had intended the latter to be an inventory of Aristotle's scientific statements as extracted from the dialectical arguments dispersed through the latter's writings. However, thisMuliftasar does notendeavour to deduce demonstrative proofs from De Anima: the prime motive behind the text is not, as is the case in Al-Jawami ` al-tabi`iyya , to provide an abstract of Aristotle's opinions, but rather to defend his position concerning the problem of the intellect.? This intention is reiterated at several points in the text and will become more evident in the course of our analysis. Yet, having established the thematic relationship of this text to Al-Jawami `, we are now precluded from seeing it as part of theMukhtasarat ; for the Mufftasarat were all written prior toIbn Rushd's study of Aristotle and thus the text-contrary to what I previously affirmed in my study Al-Matn al-Rushdi -is an anomaly.

With this established, we should now be in a better position to approach the work; and I hope, indeed, to return to the whole question in another study of the "Problematic of theRushdi Text". What I wish to do here is to point out the difficulties involved in the reading of the text.

Two problems seem to me to be of central importance. The first of these will be brieflysummarised and the second elaborated in greater detail thereafter.

The first difficulty concerns the actual wording of the text.Ibn Rushd covers a wide range of ideas, leading the reader on from discussions of the theoretical intellect (al-`aql al-nazari ) to a consideration of theoreticalintelligibles (al-ma`qulat al-nazariyya ), then shifting to an expose on the matter and the form of theseintelligibles , and also examining the role of imaginary representations (al-ma`ani 'l-k_luryaliyya ) in the process of intellection (`amaliyyat al-ta`agqul ) and the problem of conjunction (ittisal ) in the light of what had been affirmed byIbn Bajja in his famous epistle on the subject. The course of the discussion may be summed up as follows: he begins with the theoretical intellect, then moves on to the theoreticalintelligibles which serve as the pivot of the problem, and this subject is studied in depth, before he next moves on to a discussion of the active intellect (al-'aql atfa"al ), which is defined and examined in relation to the material intellect (al-'aql al-hayulani ); he then concludes by defining the problem of conjunction within the context of the rational faculty (al-quwwa 'I-nafiga ).

It is important to note that the order of subjects followed byIbn Rusted in this text differs from that established by Aristotle in his investigation of the rational faculty in De Anima-this indicating thatIbn Rushd was not examining the book of the First Teacher (Aristotle) as he had done in theJawami ` texts and in both theTalkhhis of De Anima and Al-Sharh al-kabir (Long Commentary) on it. For this reason the text is unique when set against the other types ofRushdi commentary.

The second difficulty in reading this text arises from the presence of several manuscripts,8 together with different printed editions of the text .9 A comparative analysis of the manuscripts yields its own peculiar difficulties, which will be examined in detail later, but first I should like to point out the related difficulties associated with the printed editions. For example, the Egyptian edition has prepared a text from a synthesis of two very different manuscripts (Cairo and Madrid).10 Yet the difference between these manuscripts is substantial enough to have warranted treating them separately; it would have been more appropriate to choose and print one manuscript, with the text of the other being reproduced in the margins. Preserving the distinctiveness of each manuscript would allow us to differentiate between what was written first and the later additions; and it is in fact these later additions that have convoluted the meaning of the text, thereby further confusing and misguiding the reader in his attempts at interpretation.

It is obvious, then, that the text should be studied in the light of all the different manuscripts at our disposal-only so can we claim to have met the requirements of scientific research and reliability. Moreover, familiarity with the manuscripts brings to the surface differing interpretations which cannot be reduced merely to a matter of identifying common differences; the only way, in fact, to make sense of these differences is to assume that the text, subsequent to its composition, has been subject to revision, modification and augmentation. It is regrettable that the present state ofRushdi studies makes reiterations of this kind necessary. Such matters could simply have been dispensed with had the editors prepared the groundwork properly, and so provided the researcher with accurate and academically verified material.

We may surmise, therefore, that the manuscripts, collectively or individually, do not lend themselves to amalgamation into one, coherent text; attempts to do so will in fact only further remove us from an understanding of the content and aims of the work, and may also distort and exaggerate the force of the questions raised byIbn Rushd . The only sure way of proceeding is, as indicated earlier, to make a scrupulous distinction between the earliest version and later accretions; and the manuscripts should then be read in the light of Al-Talkhis and, in particular, of Al-Sharh al-kabir .

Thus there definitely exists, I believe-especially with regard to those chapters dealing with the problem of the intellect-a first version of the book, in whichIbn Rushd drafted his initial thoughts, and within which a set of specific amendments and additions was later incorporated in the light of his subsequent writings, particularly Al-Sharh al-kabir . This would appear to provide the most probable explanation for the differences, in spite ofIbn Rushd's own assertion, in one of the Madrid manuscript copies, that he had not deleted anything he had originally written about the material intellect-a statement made in the context of certain other changes he had made in that manuscript on the subject of the rational faculty. I believe that the amendments in question were indeed made, but went unacknowledged, possibly because they were incorporated long after the time of the work's initial composition. An examination of the extant manuscripts yields specific clues enabling us to differentiate between the first version and the later additions. II Some editors have been aware of variants among the manuscripts, and of the distinction between an earlier and a later version, but they have not fully grasped the intellectual significance of these variants, with the result that the latter have hitherto remainedunanalysed .

A careful comparative study of the manuscripts leads me to conclude that specific additions stem from his subsequent intellectual development, which saw a profound change in his position on the problem of the intellect; a change that involved a reformulation of his position on the nature of the theoretical intellect, and represented, too, a shift in his position on the nature of the material intellect and its relationship to imaginative forms.Ibn Rushd's psychological theory constitutes a very well defined structure, to the extent that a change in any one of the constituent elements will radically alter the structure as a whole; as such, his shifting positions constitute a reformulation of the entire system, and a careful effort has therefore been made to differentiate those elements within the manuscripts which are traceable to the first version and those which represent later amendments. Let us now consider the distinctiveness of this textvis -a-vis the other psychological writings ofIbn Rushd .

The major distinctive differences between the two versions can best be summed up12 by saying that the first constitutes a coherent and wellorganised text, while the second contains additions to the first which create uncertainties over the actual meaning. Moreover, such uncertainties and dissonances manifest themselves throughout the text, so that it is in fact unintelligible in more than one place. The second part of this study will demonstrate in detail how sense may be made of these incongruities in the light of a perceived evolution inIbn Rushd's own perspectives.

The differences between the two versions may be treated with respect to six specific factors, two of these involving the first version and the others the second.

The peculiar features of the first version are as follows:

(1) The analogy of the tablet is used to define the capacity of the imaginative faculty (al-quwwa 'I-khayaliyya ) to acceptintelligibles , which are represented by the writing on the tablet,13 while the subjective self (al-nafs al-mawdk`a ) of this capacity is represented by the tablet itself. It is clear that parts of this analogy reflect certain perspectives on the material intellect, imaginary representations and the theoretical intellect different from those set out in Al-Talkhis , and significantly different from the conclusions reached in Al-Sharh al-kabir.14 Interestingly, these perspectives are similar to those held byIbn Bajja . The absence or omission of this analogy from the other manuscript copies is the first indication ofIbn Rushd's changing position on the structure of the material intellect (I am not postulating this evolution simply on the basis of one passage in one manuscript, which would be clearly unacceptable: the hypothesis is further supported by another version of the analogy in Al-Talkhis and a third version in Al-Sharh al-kabir ).15

(2) The long chapter discussing the rational faculty is divided into two parts: in the first partIbn Rushd summarises a portion ofibn Bajja's Risalat al-ittisal , while in the second he sets out what appears to be a summary ofIbn Bajja's method-in such a way as to suggest support for it. The conspicuous absence or omission of these passages from later versions can be interpreted as a disavowal, byIbn Rushd , ofIbn Bajja's theory of conjunction. A probable explanation for this is to be found not in Al-Talkhis but in relevant sections within Al-Sharh al-kabir of De Anima,16 with further evidence also to be found in theSharh ma bad al-tabi`a (Commentary on the Metaphysics) under the heading Al-Ta' and Al-um.17

If we now turn our attention to the later manuscript, we find additions and amendmentscharacterised by four features. The first of these is well known, because it is explicitly dealt with in the manuscripts, while the remaining three have been deduced by comparing the text not simply with the manuscript copies, but also with Al-Talkhis and Al-Sharh al-kabir .

The first feature is the amendment with which he concludes the chapter on the rational faculty,18 replacing the sectionssummarising portions ofIbn Bajja's Risalat al-ittisal . In this amendmentIbn Rushd clearly states that his earlier position on the material intellect, as set out in Al-Mujasar , was incorrect, and that his revised opinion can be found in Al-Sharh al-kabir of De Anima-the implication being thatIbn Bajja had been responsible for leading him into error. Although this amendment is so well known, it has not been sufficiently considered by scholars, who have thus failed to conclude thatIbn Rushd , having initially upheldIbn Bajja's position, later relinquished it.

It has already been pointed out thatIbn Rushd's psychological theory is framed within a highly integrated structure, so that tampering with any one of its elements will affect all the other elements of the system; and, as such, the amendments toIbn Rushd's positions on the theoretical intellect and theoreticalintelligibles , and also on the subject of the material intellect and imaginary representations, must be seen as embodying a reformulation of his whole psychological theory. The amendments cited thus far are not in themselves sufficient basis for postulating such a reformulation, but it is hoped that the ensuing analysis of the remaining features will provide further evidence to this end.

Perhaps the most important of these is the twofold amendment relating to the material intellect and theoreticalintelligibles . The first version, reflectingIbn Bajja's influence, defines the material intellect as being that potentiality in imaginative forms through whichintelligibles are received. In his amendment, however, he sets out, in the form of an overall summary, a viewpoint similar to that which he had demonstrated in Al-Sharh al-kabir , stating that

he no longer considers the material intellect to be a capacity within imaginative forms, but rather a substance which represents, inpotentia , allintelligibles , but which in itself is not anything. Had he still been in agreement withIbn Bajja , these differences would not have existed. He further confirms the amendments by linking theoreticalintelligibles with two objects: one of them the material intellect, which he regards as eternal, and the other the imaginative forms, which are viewed as a corruptible entity. An examination of Al-Sharh al-kabir reveals a contradiction with the position taken in the earlier version, where he had concluded that theseintelligibles were material, contingent, generating, corrupting, multiple and changeable. The fourth amendment focuses on the conception of Man as possessor of a capacity linked to imaginative forms, which enables Man alone, and no animal, to acceptintelligibles . This amendment, though less valuable than the preceding one, is nonetheless important because it indicates a change inIbn Rushd's position, if only in connection, apparently, with the role played by imaginative forms. The gist of his argument is that imaginative forms are not stationary but in motion, and this leads on to the formulation of what is effectively a new and specific position, in which he proclaims his disagreement with two major schools within the history of Aristotelianism,19 and further states that commenting on these two schools and judging between them will require far more extensive analysis than is possible within the confines of theMukhtasar . This new position is developed in two successive stages, the first represented in Al-Talkhis , and the second transmitted through Al-sharh al-kabir , which will be examined in the second part of this study.

These, very briefly, are the most important deductions from my reading of this unique work, the general conclusion being that it would be an error to regard Al-Mukhtasar as a single well-ordered text, or as a reliable source for establishingIbn Rushd's position on the problem of the intellect. We may further conclude that, with regard to the problem of the intellect, and in particular to the question of the material intellect, he was influenced byIbn Bajja and other commentators on Aristotle-such a position being incompatible with what he writes later in Al-Talkhis and Al-Sharh al-kabir , where he returns to reading the original texts of Aristotle (although, it should be noted that his position in Al-Talkhis is closer to Al-Mukhtasar than to Al-Sharh ).

The parameters of the work will now become clearer to us, and we shall be forced to choose between two alternatives: we can either, when examining the problem of the intellect, focus solely on Al-jarh and use Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talk/is as supplementary works; or, on the other hand, Al-Mukhtasar may be viewed as an initial, fundamental fragment permitting us to examine the evolution of the problem of the intellect in the writings ofIbn Rushd -in which case the three texts will be treated initially as of equal value for our research, with preference given to Al-sharh al-kabir , as the most important, at a subsequent stage.

We might, also, examine the evolution ofIbn Rushd's position, or try to demonstrate the structure of theRushdi system. In this case we would have to rely on Al-Mukhtasar as a primary text, or use it in conjunction with other texts containing similar passages and perhaps even addressing similar questions. I do not, however, believe that such an approach would be warranted by the texts.

1.2 TheTalkhis (Middle Commentary) of De Anima

ThisTalkhis occupies an intermediate position between Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Sharh , exhibiting similarities and differences,vis -it-vis these texts, in both form and content. With respect to form, Al-Talkhis is a commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, being in factIbn Rushd's first commentary on this work20 and its structure differs from that of Al-Mukhtasar , while bearing some similarities to that of Al-Sharh . With respect to content, particularly in itsconceptualisation of the problem of the intellect, Al-Talkhis is closer to Al-Mukhtasar and differs from Al-sharh.21

It is immediately clear that the various positions of Al-Talk his, particularly in its first version, may reasonably be regarded as an extension of those adopted in the minorMukhtasar . The text is of crucial importance, not only because it records a shift inIbn Rushd's position, but also on account of the distinctive style in which it is written. However, the primary consideration of this study is to identify the problems and difficulties the text places before the reader; and these are similar to the ones encountered in the preceding analysis of Al-Mukhtasar .

Al-Talkhis does indeed differ from Al-Mukhtasar in two significant ways: in the varying number of extant manuscripts22 and by the fact that Al-Talkhis still only exists in manuscript form. Nevertheless, the difficulties involved in reconstructing the two texts are similar in principle, although they are less evident in Al-Talkhis . It should be pointed out at the outset that, whereas our analysis and conclusions concerning Al-Mukhtasar were based on significant variants among the manuscript copies, the two important manuscripts of Al-Talkbis agree more closely with each other. Yet I have concluded that theTalkhis manuscripts represent two different versions, with one manuscript, particularly in respect of those chapters relevant to this study, representing an earlier version, and the other containing additions and amendments made to the text at a later date. The differences between the two manuscripts will be discussed later in this paper.

The distinction between earlier and later version is indicated in the first and third chapters of the text, where it becomes evident that revision has taken place following the completion of Al-sharh al-kabir . However, this cannot in itself be taken as sufficient confirmation of the differences: we must undertake a detailed examination of the text, particularly of those passages devoted to the problem of the intellect.

I have concluded that Al-Talklis advances two mutually contradictory positions on the nature of the material intellect, which can only be reasonably explained as reflecting a later revision. In his first position one can trace the influence of the Alexandrian school of commentators, which claimed that the material intellect was a potentiality in which nothing exists. Yet it does not appear thatIbn Rushd adopted the position of the Alexandrian school in its totality: rather, 'he simply adopted some of the well-known conclusions of Alexander, the ancient commentator himself. His position can thus be seen as shifting from that of Al-Mukhtasar , in which he follows the school ofIbn Bajja , to that of Al-Talklis , where he inclines towards the Alexandrian school.

As for the second position, this emerges in an important subsequent amendment in Al-Takhhis , which represents a break from his previous view that the material intellect is solely a potentiality. Here, for the first time, he postulates the material intellect to be a separate substance in and of itself, and, in addition, he advocates a doctrine of reconciliation between the opinions of Alexander and those ofThemistius . This doctrine, which he refers to asmadhhab al jam` ("doctrine of synthesis"), will be examined later when considering the amendments from Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Sharh .

These amendments and additions, which I take as evidence of a new position, change the meaning of the text as preserved in the first version. Moreover, they change the definition of important concepts in such a way as to align them with definitions advanced in Al-Sharh . Two additions in particular reflect the influence of the latter.

The first of these, cited in the first chapter, concerns the theoretical intellect and the habituated intellect (al-'aql bi 'I-malaka )23 The amendment conciselysummarises the positions found in Al-,sharh , namely that the theoretical intellect is neither generating nor corrupting, but is rather a corruptible entity due to the matter (mawd &`) which acts within it. The second addition, of less significance than the first, clarifiesThemistius ' stand on "the intellect which is within us''.24

There are two other amendments relating to the material intellect and, to some extent, to the active intellect, although no reference, explicit or implicit, is made to Al-Sharh . The likelihood that they were composed at the same period is heightened by the fact that the second amendment refers to the first and that they both convey his new position on the material intellect. The later amendmentsummarises arguments that the intellect is potential, and is other than a faculty or a capacity, this being clearly contrary to the position expressed more than once in the first version of Al-Talkhis .

All this would suggest that the revision of the text was completed at different periods, the first amendment being added before the completion of Al-Sharh and the second thereafter, and it heralds an enormous change inIbn Rushd's conception of the material intellect. The new position cannot, it is true, be readily equated with that found in Al-Sharh al-kabir , nonetheless, it represents a decisive break with the position advanced in the first version of Al-Talkhis , and also with that of Al-Mukhtasar .

Al-Talklis is, therefore, a text of basic importance for understanding the developing treatment of the problem of the intellect in the writings ofibn Rushd . Al-Talkhis and Al-Mukhtasar , in all their versions, are to be seen as embodying preliminary perspectives which were later superseded by the final version set out in Al-Sharh al-kabir . This is the main conclusion to be reached through an examination of his psychological writings as a whole.26

Let us now, in the light of this conclusion, briefly review the positions articulated in the three texts in question, with a view to laying the foundations (as suggested above) of a new strategy for approaching theRushdi corpus.