Chapter II: Essence
Although essence possesses no ultimate reality like existence, nevertheless it is real in a sense, because it occurs in the mind and, further because there is something in external reality which causes it to arise in the mind, even though it is secondary to existence. Now, essence is sometimes defined as that which is an answer to the question with reference to something, “What is it?” In this sense, essence is only a general notion existing in the mind and need not refer to something exisetnt which can be known only through sense-perception. When, however, essence is defined as that “which makes or renders a thing what it is,” it covers both the mental and the existential. This distinction has an Aristotelian basis, but it seriously modifies Aristotle, since, according to the Stagirite, only existential objects possess an essence or a real definition, while in the case of fictional or imaginary objects, only the meaning of the term can be given, not a proper essence.
In Sadra, however, essence in any case has only a semi-reality; while according to Aristotle, an essence must exist in order to be a proper essence.
An essence, taken by itself, says Sadra (following Ibn Sina), is neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular.
Neither is it existent nor nonexistent by itself. This is because existence and non-existence are meaningful only within the context of real existence, where they assume a mutually exclusive character, not with reference to an essence by itself. If, therefore, the question is asked, “Does man [as an essence, i.e., manness] exist or not?”, the proper reply would be, “neither the one, nor the other.”
Since an essence is not by itself a universal, in one sense it is “a nature spread out among particulars” and, so long as one particular exists, this essence will exist for ''its relation to different particulars is not like the relation of a single father to different children, but rather like the relation of different fathers to different children,” i.e., a one-one relationship.
At this level it is called “a natural universal”(Kulli tabiì)
.
But essence at the second level where it comes to exist “in the mind” does become a universal. The exact nature of this universal, the mode of its existence “in the mind” - indeed, whether it does so at all (since Sadra holds that rather than “existing in the mind” the universal is perceived by the mind) - will be more fully discussed later when we treat his theory of knowledge.
But its relationship to objects will be dealt with presently, when Sadra affirms the existence of the Platonic Ideas.
Sadra defines the universal as “something representative and cognitive which does not exist independently in the world and is a kind of shadow.”
The question, however, arises as to whether a mental image cannot fulfill these requirements. The answer is that a universal is shorn of all particularities; that is why it applies and is related to all objects of a class equally.
An image cannot do this (as al-Ghazali and later Berkeley contended),
for images themselves have to be subsumed under a universal. Also, an image can have an original, independent existence in the mind, like the existence of external objects in the world, but the existence of the universal is derived from and secondary to the primary existents - be they external objects or mental images.
What is the nature and constitution of the individual? In his answer to this question, Sadra disapproves of the doctrine that matter or other differentiating factors can constitute an individual. The individual, for him, is nothing but the unique mode of existence which is the reality(haqiqa)
of every individual. Individuality is not the same as distinction. Even a thousand distinguishing factors taken together cannot constitute an individual, although it is possible that distinctions produce the capacity for individual existence in a thing
and, further, since existence itself cannot be captured by the mind, conglomerates of distinguishing conditions can serve to locate an individual. But identification is not the same thing as identity. In his doctrine of the identity of the individual as existence, Sadra invokes the support of al-Farabi,
but not of Ibn Sina, who is the first philosopher to have introduced the distinction between essence and existence and to have affirmed that the existence of a thing cannot be derived from matter and form. The reason is that Ibn Sina had characterized existence as an “accident” of the essence, while for Sadra existence is the primary - indeed, the sole - reality and, if anything, essence may be an “accident” of existence.
Indeed, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, essence is a negation of existence.
Sadra then proceeds to criticize and interpret all previous doctrines of individuation so as to reduce them to his own way of thinking. First of all, he notices the failure of al-Suhrawardi to resolve the problem. The Master of Illumination rightly rejected the view that distinguishing factors can produce an individual for all distinguishing factors, taken severally, are universals, and conglomerates of universals can not result in an individual. But he equally rejected the reality of existence and upheld the reality of essence alone, which is not individual but universal.
Then there are those who say that the individuality of a thing depends on a mental analysis where existence becomes distinguished from essence, but this will not do because existence is the given.
Those phlisoophers who regard matter as the principle of individuation must be interpreted to mean existence rather than matter, since matter itself has to be particularized by something else. Indeed, matter as such can not only not individuate, it can not even produce distinctions.
When a piece of wood becomes a table, the matter is the same and yet the two things are different. Indeed, all philosophers - e.g., Ibn Sina's pupil Bahmanyar - who speak of individuation by factors like spatial position, time, etc., are not talking of individuation proper but of signs of identification,
just as are those who say that each one of any two things identifies the other.
While affirming the intelligible or mental character of essences, Sadra also affirms the existence of Platonic Forms “in the Divine Realm,”
i.e., as ramifications of Divine Attributes, and equates them, after Ibn 'Arabi, with what the latter calls “The Stable Essence(al-àyan al-thabita)
.” Ibn Sina, however, says Sadra interpreted the Platonic Form as an “abstract essence,” devoid of all particularity. But it is incredible that a philosopher of the sophistication of Plato would not distinguish between an intellectually abstract entity and a separate but concrete and existential order of existence which contains within it all particularities and determinations. It is dear that here Sadra is projecting his own doctrine of the movement and continuous emergence of concrete being into the Platonic philosophy of Ideas.
Indeed, Sadra accuses Ibn Sina of confusing unity-by-abstraction with unity-by-integration and concretization, between which Plato must have distinguished.
Sadra then points to the view of al-Farabi and his followers (including Ibn Sina) - which is based on neo-Platonism and particularly on the later Hellenic amalgamation of Aristotle and Plotinus - according to which Platonic Forms exist either in the mind of God or of separate Intelligences. This view is wrong since Plato's dicta (Sadra actually quotes neo-Platonic texts and even Hermes on this point!) and those of his critics clearly point to the existence of Forms as independent existents, not as the content of a mind - God's or an Intelligence's.
Sadra also quotes and rejects the interpretation of his teacher, Mir Damed, of Platonic Forms. Mir Damad distinguished two levels of existence, the temporal(zamani)
and the eternal(dahri)
: in the temporal realm things exist at different places and times, but in the eternal realm where they become objects of God's knowledge, they exist without spatial and temporal differentiation even though they are not abstract from matter (but matter in that realm does not precede the existence of objects as it does in the temporal realm, rather it is simultaneous with them). Sadra rejects this doctrine - which appears to follow the position held by Nasir al-Din Al-Tusi on God's knowledge of particulars - on the ground that these objects of Mir Damad are individual and do not represent species as do Platonic Forms.
Our philosopher then details the arguments of al-Suhrawardi to prove that every species of existents must have a Lord of Species(rabb al-naw`)
, which is of the nature of Light and is the guardian and regulator of that species and its members; otherwise those species will not be continuous but discontinuous, for example, a non-horse could be generated by a horse and a non-human by man, etc.
Particularly in the case of plants, whose “souls” are held by philosophers to be “accidents,” it is not possible to hold that organic life can be created by mere accidents. Hence, there must exist Lords of different Vegetative Species which organize them and ensure their continuance.
These luminous Lords (of the ancient Persian sages) are identical with Platonic Forms, according to al-Suhrawardi, who also insists on the Principle of Higher Contingency, which lays it down that if a lower order being is found to exist, then a fortiori that being exists in a prior higher order of reality.
Al-Suhrawardi also holds that these Lords of Species represent essences but not extrinsic properties; e.g., essence of man is represented by a Lord, but not man as possessing two legs, two hands, etc. According to al-Suhrawardi, finally, the universality of these essences does not mean that “they are shared in by all individuals,” as is commonly held. Indeed, these essences exist in the higher realm as independent, individual existents. Their universality simply means that their relationship to all individuals of a species is the same.
Sadra accepts al-Suhrawardi's position but criticizes him on three counts. First, it is not clear from al-Suhrawardi's account whether these Lords are of the same nature as members of a species or not. I think Sadra's commentator, al-Sabzawari, rightly points out that the Principle of Higher Contingency argues for similarity in nature.
Secondly, if legs, hands, etc., are parts of man why exclude them from the Lord? This, of course, does not mean that the essence of the Lord is material and has literally a body, yet Sadra insists that body cannot be excluded from the essence or the Form since higher includes and transcends the lower, and this is why Sadra criticizes the doctrine of abstraction whenever he sees an opportunity to do so.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Sadra attacks the dualistic nature of al-Suhrawardi's account of reality. The realm of the Lords of Species - the realm of Light - is uniform, according to al-Suhrawardi, admitting only the distinctions of “more and less.” How can this realm create in the material world stereotyped and static essential differences whereby every species is “clearly” marked off from others, according to him? The trouble lies, Sadra believes, in al-Suhrawardi's regarding essences as primary beings and “existence” only as an accident. For Sadra, on the other hand, there is no dualism: there is only one reality, viz., existence, which, by a progression from the lowest rung to the Highest Being - God - gives rise to an infinite multiplicity. But this multiplicity is not of stereotyped essences but of existence which, thanks to its ceaseless flow, gives rise to certain characteristics at each level, which the mind comes to treat as static essences.
We now come to see more clearly Sadra's view of essence and its relationship, on the one hand, with the transcendental reality and the reality of the material world, on the other. Sadra agrees with al-Suhrawardi, then, that Platonic Forms are transcendental beings, each having an individual existence of its own. They are not universals but particular beings. Their universality means simply that, to the mind, they appear universal, i.e., applicable to members of a certain class. At the lower end, there are equally individual but material objects. When the mind looks at these objects, a power is generated in it whereby it is able to look at or contemplate the transcendental, individual Forms.
But since the human mind, still engrossed in the material world, is weak, its vision of the Form is blurred, as is a weak-sighted person's vision of an object in a misty atmosphere; hence it is able to regard a truly concrete, particular, existent reality as a universal essence applicable to a whole number of things.
In reality, however, there is nothing but a continuous flow of existence, just as there is a continuous flow of numbers, say, from one to ten, where each number exhibits different properties to the mind.
Whether the analogy of numbers is quite acurate or not, the sense of the argument is clear. It is clear that, on this view, the epistemological function of Platonic Forms is nullified, which is consistent with Sadra's general doctrine that intellectual cognition cannot capture reality which is pure existence. However, Sadra still wishes to retain the metaphysical function of Forms, which appears to me to be inconsistent with not only his doctrine of the flow of existence but his position on the present issue. If Forms-in-themselves (as opposed to their effect on the mind) are not universal and do not have the character of an essence, how is it that they are creatively (i.e., metaphysically) related to the objects of a class in the material world? Indeed, the whole notion of a pre-existent, superior order of the world contradicts the idea of continuous, evolutionary, emergent movement of existence. This is undoubtedly a case of contradiction between Sadra's pure philosophy and his theological preoccupations, a contradiction which seems to run throughout his system as we shall see in the chapter on movement.
Let us revert to the story of essences. As Sadra pursues his analysis of essence, it ends up in pure existence. The steps in this analysis are: (1) that genus is identical with or parallel to the potentiality of matter, while the differentia is identical with the actualized form; (2) that genus, because of its imperfection and indeterminacy, reqluires and is perfected by the differentia;
(3) that differentia is the only reality, since genus, as a pure potentiality in the nature of matter, cannot form part of actual existence; (4) that, hence differentia equals existence; and (5) that what is called “species” or “specific nature” is nothing but a classification of objects by the mind since actual existents exhibit certain characteristics whereby the mind is able to compare and contrast them and put them in different classes.
The idea that in composite things the genus represents matter, Sadra borrows from Ibn Sina. Composite essences can, according to Ibn Sina, be considered at three levels. If we consider, e.g., “animal” as such and by itself, i.e., on the condition that nothing else, e.g., “rational,” is made part of it(bi-shart la-shai')
, then it will be matter relative to the whole, i.e., “rational animal” and a material constituent to the whole. In this sense, “animal” cannot be asserted or predicated of the whole. But when “animal'' is taken not in this material sense, but without any condition(la bi-shart shai')
as to whether “rational” be part of it or not, then it ceases to be matter and becomes genus and can be predicated of the whole “rational animal.” Thirdly, when “animal” is taken with the condition that “rational” can be part of it(bi-shart shai')
, then it gives rise to a species and it can be predicated of the whole, i.e., we can say “[man is] an animal.”
This shows that genus can be treated as matter or as something potential whose actuality is the form or the differentia. Indeed, Sadra says that just as matter offers the “contingency of potentiality(al-imkan alistìdadi)
” i.e., an actual possibility to become a form, so does a genus offer the “inherent contingency(al-imkan al-dhati)
” to end up in a differentia.
The only difference between the two is that whereas matter refers to something in the real world (although only a potentiality), genus is in the realm of concepts.
But in either case, what concretely comes to exist both in the real world - proceeding from matter - and in the mind - proceeding from genus - is the differentia for both matter and genus “lose themselves” in its concreteness.
If we consider more closely the relationship between genus and differentia, it appears that this distinction is purely mental, for in reality only the differentia exists. This is brought out clearly by a consideration of “simple” differentiae as opposed to composite ones. In the case of “black color,” e.g., what exists is black and apparently there is nothing in reality corresponding to “color.” In view of this, some philosophers have denied that, in the case of colors, there is either a real genus or a genuine differentia. This, however, is a capital mistake. For although the analysis into genuses and differentiae is only a mental operation, there is some warrant in reality to make these distinctions and classifications.
Nevertheless, what this shows is that existential reality is not composed of genuses and differentiae but of modes of existence, i.e., simple differentiae. For, in truth, there is no such thing as a composite differentia in reality; there are only successive modes of existence.
In this context, Sadra asserts that the whole reality is nothing but a succession of differentiae which, in turn, are nothing but successive modes of existence(anha' al-wujud)
.
When an unorganized body becomes a plant, it does so through a simple, differentiating quality. So is the case when plant becomes animal or man. This view, of course, is also taken from Ibn Sina, who contended that real differentiae are not apparently knowable,
and although Ibn Sina did not say that genuses and species are unreal and that their reality is limited to the operations of the mind, nevertheless Sadra's debt to him in developing his differentia-existence equation is immense. We have seen that Ibn Sina had distinguished between the species-aspect and genus-aspect of a thing. For example, plant, when viewed as a species, is a complete and finished product, but when viewed as a genus, remains incomplete and is perfected by the animal form. When genus “plant” is thus perfected, e.g., by the form of man, its characteristics which it had as a concrete species become transformed into a new nature. Thus, the vegetative functions in man are no longer the vegetative functions of a plant; the differentia that is man has entirely transformed their nature. So also do the animal functions - of perception and locomotion - become transformed in man and are no longer animal functions as such. Ibn Sina, therefore, affirmed that man cannot be regarded as a composite or aggregate of three types of functions - of plant, animal, and man - since the human soul or the differentia of man had bestowed upon them a new organic unity which is indivisible. Vegetative and animal functions in man are truly human.
The doctrine is, of course, based on the Aristotelian matter-form formula; but, by transforming it into a genus-differentia formula, the status of the differentia has been assigned a far greater importance in the system of Ibn Sina, and particularly by declaring differentia to be simple and irreducible, it has become allied to the unique and unanalyzable fact of existence.
But differentia, for Ibn Sina, is certainly not identical with existence which in some sense stands outside the matter-form or genus-differentia formula even though the differentia helps bring the genus into an existential situation.
Differentia, indeed, as part of the specific essence (composed of genus and differentia) is subsumable under a genus and is, therefore, part of what Aristotle called “secondary substance.” For Sadra, on the other hand, the differentia is neither a substance nor an accident, since it is identical with individual existence. To support this last proposition, Sadra develops an argument which interprets the genus-differentia formula in accordance with his doctrine of emergent existence or “substantial change” and thus assimilates it to essence-existence principle.
In the progression of reality, we see that the movement is from the potential to the actual where every prior is matter or genus for every posterior: wood, e.g., is matter or genus for a chair.
Now, both matter and form are described as “secondary substances” (as opposed to “primary substance,” which is the finished product of the two as an individual existent) by Aristotle and his followers. In the case of primary matter itself - which, however, does not exist - one can distinguish a quasi-genus and a quasi-form element. For, primary matter is characterized by pure potentiality; hence it is something that has potentiality, where something stands for the genus and has potentiality stands for the form, but of course the conjunction of the two is still a mere potential, without actual existence. Sadra, therefore, insists recurrently that prime matter itself is not a pure genus but a species, since it does possess a differentia and it is thanks to this differentia that it has a positive tendency of potentiality which brings it out of pure nothingness and, further, that this species is restricted to one individual, i.e., that something which has the potentiality of existence.
Just as prime matter has only a potentiality for existence, so is the case with every genus relative to its form or differentia, the only difference between prime matter and other genuses being that prime matter, even with its differentia, is only potential, whereas other genuses become actual when a differentia becomes available. Now, since a genus is only a potentiality relative to its differentia, and since genus at the same time is “secondary substance,” it follows that a secondary substance does not exist. It is a mere “something,” a mere logical subject, not a real subject.
Real subjects are only existential objects, which are the differentiae, not genuses. Further, since the potential is caused and actualized by something real, it follows that genus is brought into existence and actualized by the differentia.
The differentia is the final cause, the perfection of the genus. With the differentia, the genus as such evaporates and is taken up in it. It is not the case that the differentia is simply ''added to” or exists alongside of the genus in a thing; it is the actualized genus; it is the thing. Hence Sadra equates the differentia with existence and pronounces it to be a mode of existence.
In the entire progression of existence, therefore, each preceding mode of reality becomes genus for and “loses itself” in the succeeding differentia: “It has become clear to you from what we have said... that that whereby a thing is constituted and exists... is nothing but the principle of the last differentia wherein all the preceding differentiae and forms which become united in it come to be nothing but potentialities, conditions and instruments for the reality that is the last differentia.”
Thus, in the realm of nature, man is the final differentia. This movement represents a progressive diminution of essence and preponderance of existence until we reach God, who is pure existence without essence. It also lies within man's power to reach the realm of pure existence by contemplating the Intelligible World and leaving the field behind where essences proponderate. To emphasize this point, Sadra quotes a Persian verse: “It is a veritable village, not a mind which is pre-occupied by cows and donkeys, property and land”!
From this account follows the unreality of species, or specific essences. A species is obtained by the mind by combining a genus with a differentia and subsuming the latter under the former. But existentially, the case is exactly the opposite: there the genuses lose themselves in the concrete reality of the differentiae and vanish without a trace; they become simple and unique modes of existence. How does the mind then carry out its analyses and produce definitions with their multiplicity of concepts? According to al-Sayyid al-Sharif, three positions have been held concerning the relationship of this conceptual multiplicity with the external reality, viz., that these conceptual factors exist outside: (1) as both distinct in themselves and distinct existentially so that the external object is an aggregate of them; (2) as distinct in themselves but existentially united (which is the position held by those who believe that essence is constituted prior to its existence); and (3) as united both in themselves and existentially, a view on which it becomes difficult to explain their mental multiplicity, of course. Sadra's reply
to this question is based on his view of the disparate nature of the realms of existence and the logical or conceptual mind, which we discussed in the previous chapter. In the existential world there is existence or modes of particular existence where every existent is basically unique. When, however, these existents are presented to the conceptual mind (as opposed to the true nature of the mind which is a member of the transcendental existential Intelligible realm), the latter extracts from them certain “essential” and “accidental” qualities whereby it classifies them. This classification, although it certainly does not exist in the external world, is, nevertheless, warranted by it for the mind. That is to say, it is only an operation of the mind although not a fictional one: ''The reality and being of the differentiae consists only in particular and unique existences of the essences, which are true individuals. What exists externally is, therefore, only [modes of] existence but, thanks to sense-perception, they give rise in the conceptual mind to certain general or specific notions (i.e., genuses and differentiae), some of which are attributed to their essence and others to their accidental qualities. The mind then attributes these existentially to these objects.”
We may note in passing that his words “of the essences” in “particular and unique existences of the essences” are not quite consistent with his view of the differentiae given above.
The differentia is thus not a secondary substance; it is a primary one in Aristotle's sense, for it is the differentia that exists. It is the mind that makes it a part of the secondary substance by combining it with an extracted genus, constructing a definition in terms of a species and by subsuming that species under that genus. But even then it is only “accidentially” a secondary substance which is really applicable only to the genus and the artifically constructed species. Sadra also seeks to support this view on the basis of traditional Muslim Peripatetism (in essence Ibn Sina) according to which (a) a genus vis-à-vis its differentia is a necessary accident and a differentia vis-à-vis its genus is a property or particularizing quality(khassa)
and (b) a genus equals matter and a differentia equals form. These two propositions taken together prove that differentiae, even when taken as external qualities, cannot be regarded as substances, i.e., they cannot be subsumed under a category of substance as species are subsumable under their genuses. He then declares absolutely that no existential form can be regarded either as a substance or accident, although it may be viewed as a substance only accidentally. These forms are, in fact, simple beings and are to be equated simply with existence.
A question arises about the human soul: the human soul, according to traditional philosophy, is the form of the body, yet it has been established to be a substance. To this question, Sadra gives two answers, one based on his own view, which he shares with that of al-Suhrawardi, viz., that a human soul is a transcendent spiritual reality of the nature of Light, i.e., pure existence, which is neither substance nor accident.
But he attempts first another answer, using concepts of traditional Aristotelian philosophy which has always confounded the two different meanings of substance, viz., a primary individual existent and a specific nature. The gist of his reply is that although the soul is in itself a “particular and unique being,”
yet in its relation to the body it behaves as a form or differentia. It is obvious that this line of thought gravely imperils his view of the differentia, which is for him anyway unique and, indeed, he regards the differentia “rational” as consummating all natural reality, as said before.
This failure arises from confusing two different issues: human soul as differentia in the realm of nature and as a transcendent reality. Another equal weakness in this reply of Sadra is that here he treats of the soul as being something relational to the body in one respect and as being an absolute reality in another respect. This is a repetition of Ibn Sina's view of the soul, which Sadra explicitly rejects in his discussion of the nature of the soul in Chapter I of Part III. Al-Sabzawari is right in saying that this answer is not his own view but is based on traditional Peripatetic philosophy;
but the point is that Sadra's answer is incorrect and appears to violate his own teaching on the differentia. Indeed, not infrequently does he lapse into the notions of traditional thinking, failing to make necessary adjustments that his revolutionary principles require.
The correct reply to the question would be that the human soul, in tile realm of nature, is the consummate differentia and hence cannot be strictly regarded either as substance or accident, but is treated by the mind as a specific nature. But, contrary to other natural differentiae which are destructible, being material, the human soul has also a unique and transcendental existence.
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Author: Dr. Fazlur Rahman
