Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Migration To Medina

Before migrating to Medina, the Holy Prophet (S) sought assistance from the Arab tribes during the Haj (pilgrimage) season so that he could succeed in propagating his message. At that moment, he came across a group from the tribe of Khazraj, which had come for Haj from Medina and invited them to Islam. This group, which had heard from the Jews the prophecy of the last Prophet’s (S) advent, recognized the Prophet (S) and accepted Islam.

Moreover, while returning to Medina, they gave news about the Prophet (S) to the people of Medina and thus, gradually, Islam spread in Medina. In the subsequent year, a group from Medina came for Haj and there, paid allegiance to the Prophet (S). The Holy Prophet (S) dispatched “Mus.’ab-ibn-Umair“ from amongst the Muslims to accompany them so that he could preach Islam and the Quran to the newly converted Muslims of Medina and lead them in the congregational prayers.

Thereafter, Islam spread rapidly in Medina until in the third year, more than seventy Medinites came to Mecca for Haj. There, they swore allegiance to the Prophet (S) promosing to establish the Islamic government if the Prophet came to Medina. When this group returned to Medina, they established the congregational prayers under the leadership of Mus.’ab and Islam was recognized as the official religion.

At that very moment, the Holy Prophet (S) issued an order to the Muslims residing in Mecca to migrate secretly to Medina. No Muslim remained in Mecca save Ali (a.s.), and a few other Muslims who were imprisoned by their parents and relatives.

On the other hand, the infidels among the Quraish, who now feared from the increasing number of the Muslims in Medina, gathered for consultation. At the end, they agreed that one person from each tribe should be selected for the task of killing the Prophet (S) and that overnight they should enter the Prophet’s (S) house and kill him so that Islam is uprooted once and for all.

Jibraeel, the Archangel informed the Prophet (S) about their (evil) intention and on behalf of Allah, ordered him to migrate to Medina.

The Prophet (S) charged Ali (a.s.) with four duties:

Firstly, to prepare the required mounts for this journey

Secondly, to sleep on the Prophet’s (S) bed for that night so that the killers would be under the impression that the Prophet (S) is lying on the bed and hence, he (S) could leave Mecca safely.

Thirdly, to return the things, which the Quraish had deposited with the Prophet as trust and to repay his debts

Fourthly, to take along with himself the Prophet’s (S) household members to Medina.

Later, the same night, the Prophet (S) left Mecca along with Abu Bakr and together they hid themselves in the cave of ‘Thaur’, situated outside Mecca. Ali (a.s.) slept on the Prophet’s (S) bed. The Quraish, among them Abu-Lahab (the Prophet’s uncle), besieged the house with the intention of killing the Prophet (S). From behind the wall (which was of a low height in those days), they fixed their eyes over the Prophet’s (S) bed so that with the approach of dawn they would kill the Prophet (S). They reckoned Ali (a.s.) who was lying on the Prophet’s bed to be the Prophet (S). But at dawn, when Ali (a.s.) got up from his bed, they realized their folly. When the infidels recognized their mistake, they searched for the Prophet (S) almost as far off as the cave of Mount Thaur.1

At that moment, Abu Bakr was very scared. The Prophet (S) said, ‘Do not grieve, for Allah is on our side..’2

The Quraishites returned from the cave. Ali (a.s.) purchased a camel for the Prophet (S).3 A camel was brought for Abu Bakr along with Aamer-ibn- Fahira, the slave of Ayesha’s stepbrother.4

They also took along with them a guide by the name of Abdullah ibn Areeqah, a non-Muslim from the tribe of Bani Dail.5

The Prophet (S) migrated from Mecca along with these three fellow travelers until they reached the village of Quba, which was situated two miles from Medina. They remained there until Ali (a.s.) returned the things which the Quraish had deposited with the Prophet (S) and then joined the Prophet (S) in Quba along with his family members.

This news reached the Muslims in Medina. Consequently, they would come out of Medina every morning and await the Prophet’s (S) arrival until the end of the day. This continued till Monday, the eighth or twelfth of Rabiul-Awwal when the Prophet (S) finally arrived in Medina along with his companions.

The Prophet’s (S) camel halted at a place in the centre of Medina. The Prophet (S) bought this place and built there, the mosque of Medina, with bricks and mud and covered its ceiling with branches of date trees. On the rear side of the mosque, he constructed a small shed named “Junhah” and made the homeless “Muhajirs” (the Immigrants) reside in this place.

Similarly, he built houses alike the structure of the mosque for each of his spouses adjoining the mosque. Seven months after migration, he married Ayesha. Thereafter, he got his daughter Fatimah, his daughter from Khadijah (s.a.), married to his cousin Ali, the son of Abu Talib, and constructed a house (which looked similar to his own house) near his own house for Fatimah (a.s.)

The Foundation of the Islamic Society

As such, the Prophet (S) founded the first Islamic society. He created brotherhood between every two persons from the Muhajirs (immigrants) like Abu Bakr and Omar. Moreover, he set every Muhajir as a brother to every Ansar (Helpers) like in the case of Abu-Bakr with Kharejah ibn Zubair Ansari and Omar-ibn-Khattab with Etab-ibn-Malik Ansari.

On both these occasions, he called Ali (a.s.) as his brother and addressed him as such,

“You are my brother in this world as well as the Hereafter “6

Similarly, for the sake of safeguarding this small society, he entered into a peaceful coexistence treaty with the Jewish tribes of Medina who were financially sound and wealthy. Moreover, the Prophet (S) signed a pact of cooperation with them (in particular, the tribes of Bani-Qainaqa who were tradesmen and usurers and the two tribes of Bani-Nazir and Bani-Quraizah, whose professions were farming, gardening and cattle-rearing) to fight against anyone who wanted to attack Medina. In this pact, they had implicitly acknowledged the Prophet’s (S) authority and rule in Medina.7

After concluding these agreements and gaining confidence in the internal security, the Prophet (S) turned his attention to the enemies of Islam (i.e. the Quraish in Mecca). This was while hundreds of Muhajirs existed who had left their entire wealth in Mecca under the occupation of the Quraish and were now living in utmost hardship, with the assistance of the Ansars.

To solve this problem, the Prophet (S) would dispatch warriors to overcome the trade caravans of the Quraish who would pass near Medina on their way to Mecca. On one occasion, they gained control over a small trade caravan belonging to the Quraish and the Prophet (S) distributed the spoils amongst the indigents.

The battle of Badr

This state of affairs continued until the month of Ramadhan2 A.H. when it was reported to the Prophet (S) that a big trade caravan belonging to the Quraish was on its way from Syria to Mecca. The Prophet (S) persuaded a few Muslims to move out of Medina to keep watch over this trade caravan. For this purpose, one hundred and thirteen men set out of Medina until they halted near a place called “Badr “. The valley of “Badr “ is situated seven stops from Medina.

The big trade caravan of the Quraish, under the leadership of “Abu Sufyan “, received news of this event. Abu Sufyan informed the Meccans about this entanglement but he managed to escape.

The Quraish set out from Mecca with a thousand well-equipped men for encountering the Prophet (S). A few men from Bani Hashim too had accompanied this army, albeit reluctantly, and amongst them were Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle and Talib (Ali’s brother). The Quraish rebuked them and as a consequence, Talib managed to escape and returned to Mecca.

The Prophet (S) became aware of this event. A great portion of the Islamic army was formed by the Ansars (the helpers) who in their allegiance to the Prophet (S) in Mecca had promised to assist the Prophet but only during his stay in Medina. Thus, now that they were outside Medina and they had also not set out of Medina for the purpose of war, it was not out of place for the Prophet (S) to inquire whether they reckoned themselves to be obliged to fulfill their promise or not under the present circumstances.

For this reason, the Prophet (S) gathered together his army for consultation and informed them about the flight of the trade caravan and the approach of the equipped army. He addressed them, “Let me have your opinion.

What should be done “?

At this moment, Abu Bakr and Omar suggested,

“O Prophet of Allah! We swear by Allah that these are the Quraish who have come forward with all their might and splendor.

We swear by Allah that from the time the Quraish have gained power and splendor, they have never been defeated and humbled.

We swear by Allah that from the day the Quraish have turned infidels they have not brought faith.

We swear by Allah that the Quraish will never forsake their power and splendor and will fight against you. So be prepared for a battle. “8

The Prophet (S) did not pay heed to these two and their intimidating sayings.9

After them, Miqdad said, “O Prophet of Allah! Act according to the divine command as we are on your side. We shall not repeat the statement of Bani Israel who said to their Prophet (S), ‘You go along with your Allah and fight while we shall remain here.’. But, we say, ‘Fight against them. We are on your side and we shall fight against them. I swear by the One who sent you by the truth! If you go as far as the shores of the sea we shall follow suit. “

The Prophet (S) sent blessings on him and repeated his earlier statement and said, (O people let me have your opinion).

The Ansars became aware that the Prophet (S) wanted to know their response. Sa.’d-ibn-Ma.’z, an Ansar chief, stood on his feet and said, ‘O Messenger of Allah. It appears that you want our reply?’

The Prophet (S) replied in the affirmative.

Sa.’d said, “I give my response on behalf of the Ansars and say, ‘O Prophet!

Perhaps you have set out of Medina for some particular task and now, you have received a divine command for another task. O Prophet! We have brought faith in you and have testified in you. We have also vowed to be obedient and submissive before you. You may act as per the divine command. I swear by the One who sent you by the truth, if you head towards the sea we (too) shall head for the sea even if only one amongst us may remain alive. You may establish relationship with whomsoever you wish and severe relationship with whosoever you desire. You may take from our wealth whatever you wish. If you take from our wealth we will be happier, than if you refuse. “

After Sa.’d’s speech, the Prophet (S) said, ‘You have the blessings of Allah who has promised me victory. At the moment, I can see the destruction of the infidels..’

Thereafter, he showed them the killing spot of each of the eminent ones from the Quraish10 .

The Prophet’s (S) army descended upon Badr. They prepared a shady place for the Prophet (S) and then put guards near it. Abu Bakr went near this safe spot and remained there till the end of the battle.11

The army of Quraish arrived, all decked up and ostentatious. And on the seventeenth of Ramadhan, the famous battle of Badr came to an end between the Muslims and the infidels.

From the Prophet’s (S) army, Ali (a.s.) and Hamza (a.r.) exhibited their valour more than anybody else and killed the chiefs and champions amongst the Quraish.12 Amongst the Ansars too, the valiant battled fiercely. The few men from the Hashimites who had come to Badr by force, did not assist the polytheists in their fight against the Muslims.

In this war, the Muslims emerged victorious. Amongst them, fourteen achieved martyrdom, six from the Muhajirs and eight from the Ansars. Amongst the polytheists, seventy got killed and another seventy were taken as captives.

Amongst those killed were Utbah, Shaibah and Hanzalah, Hind’s father, brother and son respectively, and Ali (a.s.) and Hamza (a.r.) killed them all.13

On the day of Badr, the Prophet (S) declared as prohibited the killing of certain figures amongst the Bani-Hashim as well as a few others. These people were those who had either come with the Quraish involuntarily, like the Bani-

Hashim, and a few others, or had devoted some kind of service to Islam and had defended the Prophet (S) during his stay in Mecca like Abul Bukhtari, who was amongst those who had cooperated and torn apart the pact of the Qurasih against the Muslims.

In particular, the Prophet (S) announced the name of Abbas and said, ‘Do not kill him as the Quraish have brought him by force’.

At that moment, Abu Huzaifa, the son of Utbah said, “Should we kill our fathers, sons, brothers and near ones but leave Abbas unharmed? I swear by Allah that if I see him, I will pierce my sword in his body “

The Prophet (S) turned to Omar and said, ‘Do they wish to strike the Prophet’s paternal uncle with the sword?

Omar retorted, ‘O Prophet, allow me to severe his head with the sword. I swear by Allah that he has revealed his dissension.’14

The Prophet (S) did not give him permission.

Disagreement in Distribution of the Spoils of War

When the Quraishite army faced defeat and turned its back in the battle-field, a group of Islamic soldiers pursued them in the desert and whoever was caught, was either killed or taken as captive. Another group stormed the enemy’s tents and seized their belongings. A few others guarded the Prophet’s (S) place lest the enemy finds an opportunity and attacks the Prophet (S) when the Islamic soldiers were away.

After the termination of the battle, a dispute arose between these three groups over the distribution of the spoils of war. The group that had brought the booties along with themselves reckoned they were the sole owners and believed that others had no right over them.

The group that had pursued the enemy said, ‘We swear by Allah that you do not deserve this booty more than we do. Had we not pursued the enemy and kept them busy in fighting, they wouldn.’t have allowed you to seize their wealth.

Moreover, the group which was on duty guarding the Prophet (S) said, ‘We saw the enemy’s belongings without any caretaker but resisted from collecting the booty, lest the enemy might see the Prophet’s place unguarded and hence return and attack the Prophet. Thus we remained in our position and guarded the Prophet and so you are not as worthy as we are in acquiring this booty..’

Under such circumstances, a revelation descended upon the Prophet (S) according to which he earmarked this wealth as that belonging to Allah and His Messenger (S). The Prophet (S) commanded all those who had taken these spoils of war to return them back and assigned one of the Ansars to collect and safeguard them. Thereafter, he set out from the land of Badr towards Medina until he reached a territory named “Seer “ near Medina. He halted at this place and issued a command for the equal distribution of the spoils of war amongst all.15

The effect of the battle of Badr on the people of the Arabian Peninsula

Amongst all the tribes in the Arabian Peninsula, the most respected and affluent one was the tribe of Quraish in Mecca and its awesome presence was felt by one and all. In contrast, the most helpless people in the Arabian Peninsula were the Muslims of that time where a group amongst them fled to Ethiopia due to fear of torture and persecution by the Quraish while another group got scattered and secretly sought shelter in Medina. Amongst this helpless group, “one hundred and thirteen” unarmed men set out of Medina for the purpose of laying hands on the trade caravan of the Quraish. And in contrast, “one thousand well-armed and fully equipped men “ from the Quraish set out of Mecca with the aim of destroying the Muslims.

These two groups, with all the differences that existed in their forces, battled fiercely in the land of Badr. Eventually, seventy men (amongst who were Quraishite chiefs) got killed and seventy men were taken as prisoners and this helpless group took with themselves the tents, horses, camels, warring equipment and other belongings of the Quraish to Medina. The survivors fled from the battlefield and retreated towards Mecca. This astonishing phenomenon moved these stonehearted men and altered their assessment on Islam and the Muslims.

With the Prophet’s (S) entry into Medina and the conclusion of a security treaty between the tribes of Ansars and the Jewish tribes, Abdullah ibn Ubai’s wishes came to a naught. (The same Abdullah ibn Ubai who before the Prophet’s migration to Medina was a candidate for being its king and the people had prepared the royal throne for him). Just before the battle of Badr, he passed his days and nights praying for the Prophet’s (S) defeat. But after the battle of Badr, he gave up and accepted Islam along with all his followers.

On the other hand, the Jewish tribes, who had no consideration for this helpless group of new-entrants to Medina, realized their error after the battle of Badr. With the progress of Islam in Medina, they were losing their own factors of advancement, superiority and lordship. For, the Jews always thrived in undisciplined, aimless and chaotic societies and engaged in usury and wealth accumulation.

With the advent of Islam in Medina, the disorder was done away with. The tribes of Aws and Khazraj (whose futile arguments would lead to bloody wars, where each tribe would take on rent, the war-tools from different Jewish tribes and hence provide them the chance of engaging in usury) had now pronounced the formula of brotherhood with each other. They were now living in a society abounding in peace, calmness, purity and stability where no stranger had any influence on it.

After the battle of Badr, the Jews became alert and started engaging in the sabotage of the Islamic affairs and creation of hatred amongst the Muslims. In this subversion, the most arrogant amongst them was the tribe of “Bani- Qainaqah “. Ibn Hisham writes, “The Prophet (S) gathered them in the market of Bani-Qainaqah and addressed them in this manner thus, ‘O Jews!

Fear Allah and accept Islam, lest you suffer the same fate as the Quraish. You are aware that I am the divine Prophet. My prophet hood has been mentioned in your heavenly books and Allah has taken a promise from you regarding my prophet hood. “

The Jews replied, “O Muhammad! Do you think we are like your tribe, the Quraish? Do not become proud as you encountered (and got victory) over a nation that lacked the knowledge of warfare. By God! If we engage in a battle against each other, you will realize our identity (i.e. if there are worthy humans, it is only us!).

The First Encounter with the Jews

The Jews continued their subversive activities and treason until one day the wife of one of the Ansars (the Helpers)16 visited a jeweler shop in the market of Bani-Qainaqah. They forcefully demanded her to uncover her face but she refused. Taking some tool in hand, the goldsmith raised her skirt till her waist and when she stood up, her nakedness was manifested. The Jews had a hearty laugh. When the lady cried for help, a Muslim stepped forward and killed the goldsmith.

A mob of Bani-Qainaqah gathered and killed the Muslim. They broke their pact with the Prophet (S) and gathered in their castles and fortifications and prepared themselves for a war.

The Prophet (S) laid a siege on them for fifteen days i.e. from the 15th Shawwal, 3 A.H. till 1st Zilqad. Eventually, they surrendered before the Prophet (S).17

Amongst those who surrendered were seventy warriors. The Prophet (S) dispatched all of them to the land of Azaraat in Syria and took away their wealth as spoils of war. This wealth did not include their farms and palm groves. They were tradesmen and possessed abundant war tools as well as goldsmith tools.

The Prophet (S) took one-fifth of the war booty and distributed the rest amongst the Muslims.18

After the battle of Badr, the Meccans were mourning for their dead for almost a year and were now preparing for avenging their murder. Finally, they headed for Medina with three thousand soldiers, three thousand camels, two hundred horses and a well-organized army.

The battle of Uhud

Uhud is the name of a mountain situated one mile from Medina. In the year 3 A.H., the Quraishite infidels marched towards Medina under the leadership of Abu Sufyan with a well-equipped army and on Wednesday, 12th Shawwal of the same year, they set up tents near Mount Uhud.

Abu Sufyan had brought along with his army the two idols of the Quraish, Laat and Uzzah. Moreover, fifteen of the Quraishite chiefs.’ wives too, headed by Abu-Sufyan’s own wife (Hind) had joined his army with the aim of encouraging the soldiers.

The Prophet (S) consulted the Muhajirs and the Ansars whether they should remain in Medina and fight the Quraish in hand to hand combat in the streets of Medina, with which the Quraish soldiers are unacquainted, and the women and children attack them from roof-tops? Or, they set out of Medina and fight the Quraish in the desert?

As far as strategy was concerned, the Prophet (S) personally thought it to be more prudent to stay in Medina and fight. Abdullah-ibn-Abi Manafiq, the leader of the Aws tribe, held the same view. But, most of the warriors including Hamza said, ‘If we don.’t go outside Medina to face the enemy, then defeat is certain..’

The Prophet (S) thought it wise to accept the opinion of the enthusiastic Islamic soldiers and confront the Quraish outside Medina because, if he stayed back in Medina, the Islamic soldiers.’ morale (for achieving martyrdom) which was accompanied with fervor and excitement would be shattered.

The Prophet (S) left Medina with a thousand soldiers and amongst them were Abdullah ibn Ubai and his followers. On the way, Abdullah ibn Ubai addressed his followers as such, “The Prophet acted upon the opinion of the youngsters while he disregarded our views. “ Saying this, he returned to Medina with three hundred of his followers.

The Prophet (S) reached near Mount Uhud with seven hundred soldiers and there, they came face to face with the Quraish army. The battle began on Saturday 15th of Shawwal and ended on the same day too. Array of troops on both sides

The Prophet (S) marshalled seven hundred Islamic soldiers in front of Mount Uhud in such manner that Mt. Uhud lay behind them. He placed fifty archers headed by Abdullah ibn Zubair behind the army for the purpose of guarding the mountain slope, so that if ever the Quraish horsemen thought of attacking the army from the rear, the archers would drive them away.

Abu-Sufyan appointed “Khalid-ibn-Walid “ to lead the two hundred Quraishite horsemen and handed over the army banner to the heroes from the tribe of Bani Abdud Dar. Hind and other women, who accompanied her, walked behind the rows of the polytheist army and played the tambourine. They encouraged the soldiers by reciting epic verses. When they reached behind the heroes from the tribe of Abduddar and the standard bearers of Quraish, the ones reciting the epic verses recited as such:

“Behold O men of Bani-Abduddar!

Behold O the heroes supporting the army and guarding the rear side of the army! Strike by your naked swords. “

In the Quraishite army was a black and fearless slave called Wahshi, who from a far distance would take aim at the champions with his sharp weapon and inflict effective blows. Hind said to him, ‘If you kill Muhammad, Hamza or Ali in this battle, you shall be set free; either Muhammad or Hamza or Ali..’

Wahshi said, “I can neither kill Muhammad nor Ali. As for Muhammad, a group of soldiers are guarding him and as for Ali, he attacks like a lion while fighting although at the same time he is vigilant on his left, right and all other sides. However, I can kill Hamza because, even though he advances like a roaring lion, he is not careful on his left or right side. “

The Commencement Of The Battle

Talha ibn Uthman, the standard bearer of the polytheist army, who was called “Kabshul-Katibah “ (indicating the hero of the army) started the battle and cried out, ‘O champions of Muhammad! Do you think that God will send us to Hell by means of your swords and will send you to Paradise through our swords? Is there anyone amongst you whose sword can dispatch me to Hell or that my sword will dispatch him to Paradise?!

Ali (a.s.) approached him and said, “I swear by the One to Whom I owe my life, I shall not depart until you step into Hell by means of my sword or I enter the Paradise by means of your sword. At that very moment, Ali (a.s.) struck him with his sword. He lost one of his legs and fell on the ground with his private part exposed.

At that moment, Talha said: “O cousin! For the sake of God and our kinship, let me free..’ Ali (a.s.) left him unharmed and the Prophet (S) cried, “Allah- O-Akbar” (Allah is the Greatest).

When Ali (a.s.) went back to his position, the companions said, ‘Why didn.’t you kill him?.’ Ali (a.s.) said, ‘When my cousin’s private part was exposed, he swore by our kinship and (so) I felt ashamed..’

At that very time, the battle between the two armies began. Ali (a.s.) displayed such magnanimity that he destroyed the standard bearers of Quraish. When one would fall, the other would raise the flag on his shoulder. The battle continued in this manner until ten amongst them were killed. Thereafter, the freed one amongst them carried the flag. Ali (a.s.) killed him as well. At this moment, the Quraishite flag fell on the ground.

When the Quraish witnessed this scene, they began to flee. Hamza, Abu Dajjaneh Ansari and other Muhajir and Ansar warriors too exhibited their valour. The Muslim warriors pursued the Quraishite soldiers until they reached their camps. The Quraish fled from their tents as well and headed for the desert.

The Prophet’s (S) army went inside the Quraishite camp and became busy in collecting the spoils of war.

When the men guarding the mountain slope saw this, they felt that the battle had come to an end. Amongst them, forty disobeyed their commander and abandoned their duty and joined the Islamic soldiers in plundering the Quraishite tents.

Observing this scene, Khalid ibn Walid took advantage of this opportunity and appeared from the rear of the mountain with two hundred horsemen and killed Abdullah ibn Jubair and a few of his associates. Thereafter, he attacked the rear side of the Prophet’s (S) army from the mountain-peak. He entered the battlefield and attacked the Prophet’s (S) soldiers who were now in disarray.

Under these circumstances, a man from the Quraish picked up the Quraishite flag from the ground. When the Quraishite army found the situation changed and witnessed their flag raised once again, they returned from the desert and attacked the Prophet’s (S) army from another side. The Prophet’s (S) army found itself sandwiched, being attacked by the Quraishite army from two sides. A fierce battle took place.

At this moment, Wahshi found Hamza unguarded and flung a spear at him. Hamza fell on the ground and was martyred. A group amongst the Prophet’s (S) army was martyred.

The polytheists attacked the Prophet (S) from all sides, when Nasibah Mazniah, a lady from the Ansars who had come to the battlefield for providing water to the injured19 saw this situation, rushed to defend the Prophet (S). She received injuries and became weak as a result of the battle.

The news spread in Medina. Men from the Ansars who were in Medina came to the battlefield and got martyred. Under such circumstances, a polytheist flung a stone at the Prophet’s (S) face. The Prophet’s (S) blessed forehead and tooth broke. His nose received injuries and blood flowed down his face.

At this moment, one group after another from the Quraishite heroes attacked the Prophet (S) from all sides with the aim of killing him. The Prophet (S) cried out to Ali, ‘O Ali! Repel this group..’ At this time, Jibraeel (a.s.) addressed the Prophet (S) thus, ‘O the Messenger of Allah, this is what is called self-sacrifice.’ The Prophet (S) retorted, “Ali is from me and I am from Ali. “

Jibraeel (a.s.) said: “ And I am from you two. “

Thereafter, they heard a cry:

‘There is no sword but Zulfiqar (Ali’s sword) and there is no stalwart but Ali.’

Under such circumstances, a polytheist killed Mu’sab-ibn-Umair, one of the Prophet’s (S) companions and thinking that he had killed the Prophet (S), he cried out, ‘I have killed Muhammad..’

This cry spread on both sides of the army and had a disastrous impact. The Islamic soldiers fled in all directions from the battlefield. Ya.’qubi says, ‘No one remained near the Prophet (S) save Ali, Talha and Zubair..’

A group of deserters, who had climbed on Mount Uhud, assembled together and said, ‘We wish someone would go and request Abdullah ibn Ubayy to seek protection for us from the Quraish..’

The Prophet (S) himself saw a few fleeing from the battlefield. He called them one by one by names. A few amongst them returned until they became fifteen in number and they rallied around him (S). Moments later, they took the Prophet (S) on top of Mount Uhud. Ali (a.s.) brought water and washed the Prophet’s (S) wounds.

The battlefield became devoid of Islamic warriors. Hind brought her female accomplices to the battle arena and personally cut off Hamza’s and other martyrs.’ noses and made a necklace and an anklet out of them. She then wore them and gave away her own necklace and anklet to Wahshi. Her accomplices too did the same. Hind split open Hamza’s stomach and extracted his liver. She tried to chew the liver but it fell off from her mouth.

Abu-Sufyan came over Hamza’s corpse and while striking Hamza’s face with the tip of his spear, said, ‘Taste it for you have broken off ties of kinship..’

Halees, the chief of the Ahabeesh tribe (an ally of the Quraish), was a testimony to the entire scenario. He cried out: .‘O tribesmen see what the Quraish chief is doing to the lifeless body of his cousin!.’ Abu-Sufyan said to him, ‘Excuse me! It was an error!.’

Thereafter, Abu-Sufyan cried out, ‘Is Muhammad (still) alive?.’ His people replied in the affirmative.

Once again Abu-Sufyan cried out, “Exceed in superiority O Hubal! Exceed in superiority O Hubal!

The Prophet (S) replied: “Allah is most High and Glorified. “

Abu-Sufyan yelled, “We are having the idol Uzzah with us while you do not! “

The Prophet (S) said: “Our Master is Allah whereas you do not have a Master! “

The battle of Uhud ended with sixty-eight Muslims dead. On Prophet’s (S) command, the dead were buried in that very mountain slope and all returned to Medina on the same day.

A Brief Comparison

In this battle, Ali’s (a.s.) behavior with the standard bearer of Quraish is worthy of attention in contrast to Abu-Sufyan and Hind’s (Muawiya’s parents) behavior with Hamza, the chief of the martyrs. Similarly, the behavior of one Ansar woman (Nasibah) in connection with her love and self-sacrificing attitude towards the Prophet (S) and the behavior of one Quraishite woman (Hind) in connection with her hatred against the Muslims are also noteworthy.

The battle of Hamrah-ul-Asad

On their return journey to Mecca, the Quraish consulted with one another and said, ‘After the defeat of Muhammad’s army, why didn.’t we make an assault on Medina so that Muhammad’s affairs would come to an end!.’

The Prophet (S) received this news on the first night after his arrival from Mount Uhud. The next day, Sunday, 8th of Shawwal, he commanded his army to set out of Medina with the aim of pursuing the enemy. For this task, he permitted only those who had fought and received wounds to participate. This itself was a severe admonition for those who had deserted the battlefield. On the same day, the soldiers who had suffered injuries left Medina and moved forward until they reached Hamrah-ul-Asad, situated at about eight miles away from Medina. The soldiers halted at this place and two persons were dispatched in the direction of the Quraishite army for the purpose of collecting information.

A man belonging to the tribe of Khazah (an ally of Bani-Hashim) gave news of this event to Abu Sufyan and in an elegant poem, warned him of the aweinspiring army of the Prophet (S).

Fear-struck and scared, Abu-Sufyan commanded the Quraishite army to move in the direction of Mecca and dispatched someone to warn the Prophet (S) not to pursue the Quraish. After staying in Hamrah-ul-Asad for three days and receiving news of the Quraishite army’s departure to Mecca, the Prophet (S) returned to Medina.20

Notes

1. Seerah Ibn Hisham vol.2, p.127

2. It is in reference to the blessed verse: إِذْ يَقُولُ لِصَاحِبِهِ لَا تَحْزَنْ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ مَعَنَا

3. Muruj az-Zahab - Masoudi; Chapter of “Migration “

4. Uyoon al-Athar 1/181

5. Uyoon al-Athar 1/184 and Murooj az-Zahab, Chapter of “Migration “ 2/279

6. Refer to Uyoon al-Athar 1/200-201.

7. Refer to Uyoon al-Athar 1/197.

8. The references for this statement as well as the Prophet's (S) consultations with the companions will appear in the next reference.

9. About the Prophet's (S) heedless behaviour towards these two figures, one can refer to Sahih Muslim; Book of Jihad and As-Sair; Chapter of Badr.

10. Refer to the incident of the battle of Badr in “Maghazi “ of Waaqedi, Oxford publication; 1/48-49 and “Emtah al-Asmah “ of Muqrizi; 1/74--75.

11. Refer to Seerah Ibn Hisham 2/267.

12. Refer to the incident of the battle of Badr in Seerah Ibn Hisham. In this book, Ali’s name has been mentioned seventeen times in the list showing the killers of the Quraishite infidels.

13. Refer to Seerah Ibn Hisham 2/365.

14. Refer to the word "…" in Mu'jam al-Buldaan and Seerah Ibn Hisham 2/281.

15. Refer to the word "Seer" in Mu'jam al-Buldaan.

16. Waaqedi has narrated that the lady was the wife of one of the Ansars.

17. The history of this event was narrated from “At-Tanbih wal Ashraf” of Masoudi.

18. Refer to the battle of Bani-Qainaqah in Maghazi of Waaqedi 1/176-180 and Seerah Ibn Hisham 2/426-428.

19. Anyone, who bleeds profusely, becomes severely thirsty. In the past, it was the practice to appoint a few people in the battlefield for the job of providing water and first aid to the injured. Nasibah fulfilled this responsibility in the battle of Uhud. Those who set forth Nasibah’s participation in the battle as the proof for permissability of women’s participation in other such activities should take note of the following:

Firstly, this war took place only a mile away from Medina and did not involve travelling. Secondly, Nasibah had entered the battlefield for the purpose of providing water to the injured and when she saw the polytheists attacking the Prophet (S), she hastened to defend the Prophet (S) and defending the Prophet (S) is obligatory upon every Muslim. However, this affair cannot be taken as a proof for permissibility of women’s participation in all other fields.

20. The battle of Hamrah-ul-Asad has been mentioned in “Maghaazi “ of Waaqedi 1/334 and Seerah Ibn Hisham 3/52.

Domains of Logic

The Subject Matter of Logic

Al-Farabi, in his Ihsa' al-'ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), defines logic as an instrumental, rule-based science aimed at directing the intellect towards the truth and safeguarding it from error in its acts of reasoning. He states:

The subject matters (mawdû‘ât ) of logic are the things for which [logic] provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles.

He defends the need for such a science of reasoning on the grounds that it is possible for the mind to err in at least some of its acts, for example, in those in which the intelligibles sought are not innate, but are rather attained discursively and empirically 'through reflection and contemplation'. Al-Farabi compares logic to tools such as rulers and compasses, which are used to ensure exactness when we measure physical objects subject to the errors of sensation. Like these tools, logical measures can be employed by their users to verify both their own acts of reasoning and the arguments of others. Indeed, logic is especially useful and important to guide the intellect when it is faced with the need to adjudicate between opposed and conflicting opinions and authorities.

Al-Farabi's view of logic as a rule-based science which governs the mind's operations over intelligibles forms the foundation for Ibn Sina's later refinements. In the opening chapters of hisal-Madkhal (Introduction), the first logical book of his encyclopedic workal-Shifa' (Healing), Ibn Sina describes the purpose of logic as one of enabling the intellect to acquire 'knowledge of the unknown from the known'. He defends the need for logic by arguing that the innate capacities of reasoning are insufficient to ensure the attainment of this purpose, and thus they require the aid of an art. While there may be some cases in which innate intelligence is sufficient to ensure the attainment of true knowledge, such cases are haphazard at best; he compares them to someone who manages to hit a target on occasion without being a true marksman. The most important and influential innovation that Ibn Sina introduces into the characterization of logic is his identification of its subject matter as 'second intentions' or 'secondary concepts', in contrast to 'first intentions'. This distinction is closely linked in Ibn Sina's philosophy to his important metaphysical claim that essence or quiddity can be distinguished from existence, and that existence in turn can be considered in either of its two modes: existence in concrete, singular things in the external world; or conceptual existence in one of the soul's sensible or intellectual faculties.

Inal-Madkhal , Ibn Sina argues that logic differs from the other sciences because it considers not conceptual existence as such (this would be psychology), but rather the accidents or properties that belong to any quiddity by virtue of its being conceptualized by the mind. These properties, according to Ibn Sina, include such things as essential and accidental predication, being a subject or being a predicate, and being a premise or a syllogism. It is these properties that allow the mind to connect concepts

together in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown; they provide the foundation for the rules of reasoning and inference that logic studies. They are moreover formal properties in the sense that, as properties belonging to all concepts in virtue of their mental mode of existence, they are entirely independent of the content of the thought itself; they are indifferent to the intrinsic natures of the quiddities which they serve to link together.

In theIlahiyyat (Metaphysics) of al-Shifa', Ibn Sina introduces the terminology of first and second 'intentions' or concepts in order to express the relation between the concepts of these quiddities themselves - which are studied in the theoretical sciences - and the concepts of the states and accidents of their mental existence which logic studies: 'As you know, the subject matter of logical science is second intelligible intentions (al-ma'ani al-ma'qula al-thaniyya) which are dependent upon the primary intelligible intentions with respect to some property by which they lead from the known to the unknown' (Ilahiyyat Book 1, ch. 2,). For example, the second intentions of 'being a subject' and 'being a predicate' are studied in logic independently of whatever first intentions function as the subject and predicate terms in a given proposition, for example, 'human being' and 'rational animal' in the proposition 'a human being is a rational animal'. The logical second intentions depend upon the first intentions because the first intentions are the conceptual building blocks of the new knowledge which second intentions link together: but logic studies the second intentions in abstraction from whatever particular first intentions the logical relations depend upon in any given case.

Secondary Intelligibles

A more careful statement is provided by Avicenna. Concepts like “horse”, “animal”, “body”, correspond to entities in the real world, entities which can have various properties. In the realm of the mental, concepts too can acquire various properties, properties they acquire simply by virtue of existing and being manipulated by the mind, properties like being a subject, or a predicate, or a genus. These are the subject matter of logic, and it seems it is only mental manipulation that gives rise to these properties:

If we wish to investigate things and gain knowledge of them we must bring them into Conception (fî t-tasawwur ); thus they necessarily acquire certain states (ahwâl ) that come to be in Conception: we must therefore consider those states which belong to them in Conception, especially as we seek by thought to arrive at things unknown from those that are known. Now things can be unknown or known only in relation to a mind; and it is in Conception that they acquire what they do acquire in order that we move from what is known to what is unknown regarding them, without however losing what belongs to them in themselves; we ought, therefore, to have knowledge of these states and of their quantity and quality and of how they may be examined in this new circumstance.

These properties that concepts acquire are secondary intelligibles; here is an exposition of this part of Avicennan doctrine by Râzî:

The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as it is possible to pass by means of them from the known (al-ma‘lûmât) to the unknown (al-majhûlât) not in so far as they are intelligible and possess

intellectual existence (an existence) which does not depend on matter at all, or depends on an incorporeal matter).. The explanation of “secondary intelligibles” is that man Conceives the realities of things (haqâ'iq al-ashyâ’ ) in the first place, then qualifies some with others either restrictively or predicatively (hukman taqyîdiyyan aw khabariyyan ). The quiddity's being qualified in this way is something that only attaches to the quiddity after it has become known in the first place, so it is a second-order [consideration] (fî d-darajati th-thâniya ). If these considerations are investigated, not absolutely, but rather with respect to how it is possible to pass correctly by means of them from the known to the unknown, that is logic. So its subject matter is certainly the secondary intelligibles under the consideration mentioned above (Râzî (1381 A. H.) Mulakhkhas 10.1-10.8).

In identifying the secondary intelligibles, Avicenna is able to place logic within the hierarchy of the sciences, because it has its own distinct stretch of being which is its proper subject matter.

So much for the first problem in Alfarabi's formulation of what the subject matter of logic is; finding it to be secondary intelligibles preserves the topic-neutrality of logic. Avicenna also has a view on the second problem, the question of whether or not expression is essential to a definition of logic and its subject matter.

There is no merit in what some say, that the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning the expressions insofar as they signify meanings… And since the subject matter of logic is not in fact distinguished by these things, and there is no way in which they are its subject matter, (such people) are only babbling and showing themselves to be stupid.

Conceptions and Assents

Khûnajî argued in the second quarter of the thirteenth century that the subject matter of logic was Conceptions and Assents:

A thing is knowable in two ways: one of them is for the thing to be merely Conceived (yutasawwara) so that when the name of the thing is uttered, its meaning becomes present in the mind without there being truth or falsity, as when someone says “man” or “do this!” For when you understand the meaning of what has been said to you, you will have conceived it. The second is for the Conception to be [accompanied] with Assent, so that if someone says to you, for example, “every whiteness is an accident,” you do not only have a Conception of the meaning of this statement, but [also] Assent to it being so. If, however, you doubt whether it is so or not, then you have Conceived what is said, for you cannot doubt what you do not Conceive or understand… but what you have gained through Conception in this [latter] case is that the form of this composition and what it is composed of, such as “whiteness” and “accident,” have been produced in the mind. Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them; denial is the opposite of that.

Note that an Assent is not merely the production of a proposition by tying a subject and predicate together; “Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them.” All knowledge, according to Avicenna, is

either Conception or Assent. Conception is produced by definition, Assent by proof. All Avicennan treatises on logic are structured in accordance with this doctrine: a first section deals with definition, which conduces to Conception, a second with proof, which conduces to Assent.

Later logicians in the line of Fakhraddîn ar-Râzî made Conceptions and Assents the subject matter of logic. We know that Khûnajî was the first to do this thanks to a report in the Qistâs al-Afkâr of Shamsaddîn as-Samarqandî (d. c. 1310). Samarqandî says:

This is the view adopted by the verifying scholars (al-muhaqqiqûn), but Khûnajî (sâhib al-kashf ) and the people who follow him differed from them and said: Logic may investigate the universal and the particular and the essential and the accidental and the subject and the predicate; they are among the questions [of the science]. You [Avicennan logicians] are taking the subject matter of logic as more general than the secondary intelligibles so that the secondary intelligibles and (especially) the secondary intelligibles you have mentioned and what follows after them may come under it as logic. It would be correct for you to say that the subject matter of logic is known Conceptions and Assents (al-ma‘lûmât at-tasawwuriyya wa-t-tasdîqiyya ) not in so far as they are [what they are] but in so far as they conduce to what is sought (al-matlûb ) …

Two logicians who followed Khûnajî on this were Abharî and Kâtibî. Here is Abharî's statement:

The subject matter of logic, I mean, the thing which the logician investigates in respect of its concomitants in so far as it is what it is, are precisely Conceptions and Assents. [This is] because [the logician] investigates what conduces to Conception and what the means [to Conception] depends upon (for something to be universal and particular, essential and accidental, and such like); and he investigates what conduces to Assent and what the means to Assent depends upon, whether proximately (like something being a proposition or the converse of a proposition or the contradictory of a proposition and such like) or remotely (like something being a predicate or a subject). These are states which inhere in Conceptions and Assents in so far as they are what they are. So certainly its subject matter is Conceptions and Assents (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.14-20).

Here is part of Tûsî's rejection:

If what he means by Conceptions and Assents is everything on which these two nouns fall, it is the sciences in their entirety, because knowledge is divided into these two; whereupon what is understood from [his claim] is that the subject matter of logic is all the sciences. Yet there is no doubt that they are not the subject matter of logic…

The truth is that the subject matter for logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as reflection on them leads from the known to the unknown (or to something similar, as do reductive arguments or persuasive arguments [146] or imaginative arguments and the like). And if they are characterised by the rider mentioned by the masters of this craft, Conceptions and Assents are among the set of secondary intelligibles in just the same way as definition and syllogism and their parts, like universal and particular and subject and

predicate and proposition and premise and conclusion (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.21-u, 145.pu-146.3).

It is hard to know precisely what is being disputed. What we can note at this stage is that one point at issue has to do with the claim that Avicenna's identification of secondary intelligibles as logic's subject matter is inaccurate, and too narrow to achieve what he hopes it can.

Arguments aim to bring about Assent; more precisely, when Conceptions have been gained that produce in the mind both the meaning of the terms in a given proposition, and the form of composition of these terms, Assent “occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them…” In fact, different kinds of discourse can bring about one or other kind of Assent, or something enough like Assent to be included in a general theory of discourse..

Since Avicenna had finished explaining the formal andquasi -formal aspects of syllogistic, he turned to its material aspects. With respect to these, syllogistic divides into five kinds, because it either conveys an Assent, or an Influence (ta‘aththur) of another kind (I mean an Imagining or Wonder). What leads to Assent leads either to an Assent which is Truth-apt (jâzim) or to one which is not. And what is Truth-apt is either taken [in the argument] as True (haqq), or is not so taken. And what is taken as True either is true, or isn't.

That which leads to true truth-apt Assent is Demonstration; untrue truth-apt Assent is  Sophistry. That which leads to truth-apt Assent not taken as true or false but rather as (a matter of) Common Consent(‘umûm al-i‘tirâf ) is - if it's like this - Dialectic (jada l), otherwise it's Eristic (shaghab ) which is, along with Sophistry (safsata ), under one kind of Fallacy Production (mughâlata ). And what leads to Overwhelming though not Truth-apt Assent is Rhetoric; and to Imagining rather than Assent, Poetry (Tûsî (1971) Sharh al-Ishârât 460.1-461.12).

Tûsî immediately goes on to lay out grounds for Assent to propositions, for example, because they are primary, or because they are agreed for the purposes of discussion. Propositions to be used as premises for Demonstration make the most irresistible demands for our Assent; premises for lower kinds of discourse make weaker demands.

Logic and Language

Al-farabi explains how logic, grammar and language relate to each other:

And this art (of logic) is analogous to the art of grammar, in that the relation of the art of logic to the intellect and the intelligibles is like the relation of the art of grammar to language and expressions. That is, to every rule for expressions which the science of grammar provides us, there is a corresponding [rule] for intelligibles which the science of logic provides us (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 68).

al-Farabi argues that logic and grammar both have some legitimate interest in language, but whereas grammatical rules primarily govern the use of language, logical rules primarily govern the use of intelligibles.

More precisely, al-Farabi explains that although grammar and logic share a mutual concern with expressions, grammar provides rules that govern the correct use of expressions in a given language, but logic provides rules that govern the use of any language whatsoever in so far as it signifies intelligibles. Thus, logic will have some of the characteristics of a universal grammar, attending to the common features of all languages that reflect their underlying intelligible content. Some linguistic features will be studied in both logic and grammar, but logic will study them as they are common, and grammar in so far as they are idiomatic. On the basis of this comparison with grammar, then, al-Farabi is able to complete his characterization of the subject matter of logic as follows: 'The subject-matters of logic are the things for which logic provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles' (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 74).

Alfarabi adds:

Logic shares something with grammar in that it provides rules for expressions, yet it differs in that grammar only provides rules specific to the expressions of a given community, whereas the science of logic provides common rules that are general for the expressions of every community. This is to say - logic is something of a universal grammar or, more strictly, providing a universal grammar is one of the tasks of logic.

Avicenna recognizes and attempts to deal with the close nexus between language and thought:

Were it possible for logic to be learned through pure cogitation, so that meanings alone would be observed in it, then this would suffice. And if it were possible for the disputant to disclose what is in his soul through some other device, then he would dispense entirely with its expression. But since it is necessary to employ expressions, and especially as it is not possible for the reasoning faculty to arrange meanings without imagining the expressions corresponding to them (reasoning being rather a dialogue with oneself by means of imagined expressions), it follows that expressions have various modes (ahwâl) on account of which the modes of the meanings corresponding to them in the soul vary so as to acquire qualifications (ahkâm ) which would not have existed without the expressions. It is for this reason that the art of logic must be concerned in part with investigating the modes of expressions… But there is no value in the doctrine of those who say that the subject matter of logic is to investigate expressions in so far as

they indicate meanings…but rather the matter should be understood in the way we described.

Ibn Sina criticized attempts to introduce linguistic concerns into the subject matter of logic. In al-Madkhal, Ibn Sina labels as 'stupid' those who say that 'the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning expressions in so far as they signify meanings (ma'ani)'. However, Ibn Sina does not deny that the logician is sometimes or even often required to consider linguistic matters; his objection is to the inclusion of language as an essential constituent of the subject matter of logic. The logician is only incidentally concerned with language because of the constraints of human thought and the practical exigencies of learning and communication. 'if logic could be learned through pure thought so that meanings alone could be attended to in it, then it would dispense entirely with expressions'; but since this is not in fact possible, 'the art of logic is compelled to have some of its parts come to consider the states of expressions' (al-Madhkal, in Anawati et al. 1952: 22-3). For Ibn Sina, then, logic is a purely rational art whose purpose is entirely captured by its goal of leading the mind from the known to the unknown; only accidentally and secondarily can it be considered a linguistic art.

As Sabra says, Avicenna seems to hold that “the properties constituting the subject matter of logic would be inconceivable without the exercise of a particular function of language” (Sabra (1980) 764).

However, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi were concerned to distinguish logic from grammar as many Arabic grammarians - whose linguistic theories were developed to a high degree of complexity and sophistication - were contemptuous of the philosophers for importing Greek logic, which they saw as a foreign linguistic tradition, into the Arabic milieu. This attitude toward Greek logic is epitomized in a famous debate reported to have taken place in Baghdad in 932 between the grammarian Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi and Abu Bishr Matta, a Syriac Christian who translated some of Aristotle's works into Arabic and is purported to have been one of al-Farabi's teachers. Abû Bishr argued that speakers of Arabic need to learn Greek logic. For him Logic comes ahead of Grammar:

"The logician has no need of grammar, whereas the grammarian does need logic. For logic enquires into the meaning, whereas grammar enquires into the expression. If, therefore, the logician deals with the expression, it is accidental, and it is likewise accidental if the grammarian deals with the meaning. Now, the meaning is more exalted than the expression, and the expression humbler than the meaning".

The extant account of the debate is heavily biased towards al-Sirafi, who attacks logical formalism and denies the ability of logic to act as a measure of reasoning over and above the innate capacities of the intellect itself. His principal claims are that philosophical logic is nothing but Greek grammar warmed over, that it is inextricably tied to the idiom of the Greek language and that it has nothing to offer speakers of another language such as Arabic.

Yahya ibn 'Adi, makes his case for the independence of logic from grammar based upon the differences between the grammar of a particular nation and the universal science of logic. He argues that the subject matter of grammar is mere expressions (al-alfaz ), which it studies from the limited

perspective of their correct articulation and vocalization according to Arabic conventions. The grammarian is especially concerned with language as an oral phenomenon; the logician alone is properly concerned with 'expressions in so far as they signify meanings' (al-alfaz al-dalla 'ala al-ma'ani ) (Maqala fi tabyin, in Endress 1978: 188). To support this claim, Yahya points out that changing grammatical inflections do not affect the basic signification of a word: if in one sentence a word occurs in the nominative case, with the appropriate vocalization, its signification remains unchanged when it is used in another sentence in the accusative case and with a different vocal ending.

Concluding Remarks

We have seen that the Greek syllogism underwent a variety of modifications in the Medieval Islamic environment. The involvement of analogical reasoning with syllogistics was an attempt to aid the process of legal reasoning, but it was the a priori metaphysical assumptions which de marcate thinkers most forcefully. AI-Fiiriibi's successfully raised the strength of analogy to that of a first order syllogism thereby insisting that the 'il/a must exist along with a judgment in all inferences. Inevitably, al-Farabi's departure from the a priori interpretation of the Qur'an attracted much adversity from literalists. It is to al-Farabi that thinkers such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya owe their whole point of departure.

In his article, "GhazaI'i's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic", Michael Marmura has stated:

The matter of the syllogism involves the epistemological status of its premises; the form, the rules for valid inference. To take the formal aspect first, the philosopher's logic is the more comprehensive as it includes, for example, the Aristotelian figures which, prior to Ghazali, were not included in nazar. It also included a more precise formulation of analogical reasoning which, for example, Alfarabi reduced to the first Aristotelian figure and which, probably following him, Ghazali urged his fellow theologians to adopt.

AI-Ghazal'i could not deny, at least at the level of social and legal disputation, the auspicious utility of the syllogism, replete with its probable analogies. It is only at the metaphysical level (causality) where al-GhazaI'i becomes uncomfortable with the encroachment of the Greek tools (logic) upon the Muslim texts. If scriptures conflict with the "findings" of the syllogism, then (unlike with Hume and his aversion to religion) the Scriptures are to be assigned metaphorical readings. The dissonance produced by religion and logic is diffused, and the syllogism can remain a welcome addendum to the legal ambiguities pondered by the jurists.

With Ibn Taymiyya we saw that all legitimate definitions proceed from the Qur'an when legal and/or existential conceptions are being formed. His attack on causality and modal logic, employed mainly by philosophers (but also by theologians) places him in a-causal agnostic position where the explication of metaphysics is concerned. One could almost assume that, in relation to logic, analogy and syllogistic proofs, the words of David Hume could be supplanted into the pen of Ibn Taymiyya who resisted all such logical attempts at a definitive metaphysical reconstruction:

But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference from observing the growth of a hair? Can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

And elsewhere:

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is.

Ibn Taymiyya would undoubtedly agree with much of this, but would reject Hume's skeptical ethos by maintaining revealed Qur'anic foundations. Indeed, he would take literally Hume's ambiguous statement, "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe". However, it would not be adverse to state that Ibn Taymiyya was also a skeptic, "a sceptic who was saved by religion", but nevertheless a skeptic. Thus his bid to question identity goes only so far. In the face of outright skepticism, then, comes outright faith.

 There remained the task of determining the proper limits and applications of syllogism so as to define and categorize the termqiyiis (a method of inference).

These discussions were the result of the theologically motivated defense of the concept of divine omnipotence that solely actuated existence, events, miracles and their causal links. It follows, then, that Theologians did not accept the doctrine of natural causation where phenomenal acts proceeded from a thing's quiddity. In their view Causal efficacy resided solely with God's divine will and contingent atoms and accidents were created ex nihilo. Thus, no causal uniformity in nature was inherently possible

For Muslims Greek logic was initially a means to defend metaphysical doctrines but the scope of logic was expanded to jurisprudence and language. All of this was attempted under the questionable notion that logic could remain doctrinally neutral and, at the same time, could be used to the advantage and defense of religion.  Eventually, the supposed neutrality of logic was vehemently called into question.

The use of analogy formed part of the Qur'anically derived juridical system. Complications arose once the syllogism was introduced. Suddenly, metaphysical assumptions were questioned; this gave rise to the ambiguous relationship between analogy and the syllogism especially when attempting to define qiyas. A variety of arguments surrounds this term and its translation into "analogy": "Qiyiis thus cannot be given the fixed definition of analogy. Instead, it should be regarded as a relative term whose definition and structure vary from one jurist to another." Qiyiis, denotes a way of inferring something from another, and is derived from the logical sciences which embrace both the syllogism and analogy. The concern here is to determine the central method by which juridical qiyas was endowed with "a wider definition as to include formal arguments".

Domains of Logic

The Subject Matter of Logic

Al-Farabi, in his Ihsa' al-'ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), defines logic as an instrumental, rule-based science aimed at directing the intellect towards the truth and safeguarding it from error in its acts of reasoning. He states:

The subject matters (mawdû‘ât ) of logic are the things for which [logic] provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles.

He defends the need for such a science of reasoning on the grounds that it is possible for the mind to err in at least some of its acts, for example, in those in which the intelligibles sought are not innate, but are rather attained discursively and empirically 'through reflection and contemplation'. Al-Farabi compares logic to tools such as rulers and compasses, which are used to ensure exactness when we measure physical objects subject to the errors of sensation. Like these tools, logical measures can be employed by their users to verify both their own acts of reasoning and the arguments of others. Indeed, logic is especially useful and important to guide the intellect when it is faced with the need to adjudicate between opposed and conflicting opinions and authorities.

Al-Farabi's view of logic as a rule-based science which governs the mind's operations over intelligibles forms the foundation for Ibn Sina's later refinements. In the opening chapters of hisal-Madkhal (Introduction), the first logical book of his encyclopedic workal-Shifa' (Healing), Ibn Sina describes the purpose of logic as one of enabling the intellect to acquire 'knowledge of the unknown from the known'. He defends the need for logic by arguing that the innate capacities of reasoning are insufficient to ensure the attainment of this purpose, and thus they require the aid of an art. While there may be some cases in which innate intelligence is sufficient to ensure the attainment of true knowledge, such cases are haphazard at best; he compares them to someone who manages to hit a target on occasion without being a true marksman. The most important and influential innovation that Ibn Sina introduces into the characterization of logic is his identification of its subject matter as 'second intentions' or 'secondary concepts', in contrast to 'first intentions'. This distinction is closely linked in Ibn Sina's philosophy to his important metaphysical claim that essence or quiddity can be distinguished from existence, and that existence in turn can be considered in either of its two modes: existence in concrete, singular things in the external world; or conceptual existence in one of the soul's sensible or intellectual faculties.

Inal-Madkhal , Ibn Sina argues that logic differs from the other sciences because it considers not conceptual existence as such (this would be psychology), but rather the accidents or properties that belong to any quiddity by virtue of its being conceptualized by the mind. These properties, according to Ibn Sina, include such things as essential and accidental predication, being a subject or being a predicate, and being a premise or a syllogism. It is these properties that allow the mind to connect concepts

together in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown; they provide the foundation for the rules of reasoning and inference that logic studies. They are moreover formal properties in the sense that, as properties belonging to all concepts in virtue of their mental mode of existence, they are entirely independent of the content of the thought itself; they are indifferent to the intrinsic natures of the quiddities which they serve to link together.

In theIlahiyyat (Metaphysics) of al-Shifa', Ibn Sina introduces the terminology of first and second 'intentions' or concepts in order to express the relation between the concepts of these quiddities themselves - which are studied in the theoretical sciences - and the concepts of the states and accidents of their mental existence which logic studies: 'As you know, the subject matter of logical science is second intelligible intentions (al-ma'ani al-ma'qula al-thaniyya) which are dependent upon the primary intelligible intentions with respect to some property by which they lead from the known to the unknown' (Ilahiyyat Book 1, ch. 2,). For example, the second intentions of 'being a subject' and 'being a predicate' are studied in logic independently of whatever first intentions function as the subject and predicate terms in a given proposition, for example, 'human being' and 'rational animal' in the proposition 'a human being is a rational animal'. The logical second intentions depend upon the first intentions because the first intentions are the conceptual building blocks of the new knowledge which second intentions link together: but logic studies the second intentions in abstraction from whatever particular first intentions the logical relations depend upon in any given case.

Secondary Intelligibles

A more careful statement is provided by Avicenna. Concepts like “horse”, “animal”, “body”, correspond to entities in the real world, entities which can have various properties. In the realm of the mental, concepts too can acquire various properties, properties they acquire simply by virtue of existing and being manipulated by the mind, properties like being a subject, or a predicate, or a genus. These are the subject matter of logic, and it seems it is only mental manipulation that gives rise to these properties:

If we wish to investigate things and gain knowledge of them we must bring them into Conception (fî t-tasawwur ); thus they necessarily acquire certain states (ahwâl ) that come to be in Conception: we must therefore consider those states which belong to them in Conception, especially as we seek by thought to arrive at things unknown from those that are known. Now things can be unknown or known only in relation to a mind; and it is in Conception that they acquire what they do acquire in order that we move from what is known to what is unknown regarding them, without however losing what belongs to them in themselves; we ought, therefore, to have knowledge of these states and of their quantity and quality and of how they may be examined in this new circumstance.

These properties that concepts acquire are secondary intelligibles; here is an exposition of this part of Avicennan doctrine by Râzî:

The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as it is possible to pass by means of them from the known (al-ma‘lûmât) to the unknown (al-majhûlât) not in so far as they are intelligible and possess

intellectual existence (an existence) which does not depend on matter at all, or depends on an incorporeal matter).. The explanation of “secondary intelligibles” is that man Conceives the realities of things (haqâ'iq al-ashyâ’ ) in the first place, then qualifies some with others either restrictively or predicatively (hukman taqyîdiyyan aw khabariyyan ). The quiddity's being qualified in this way is something that only attaches to the quiddity after it has become known in the first place, so it is a second-order [consideration] (fî d-darajati th-thâniya ). If these considerations are investigated, not absolutely, but rather with respect to how it is possible to pass correctly by means of them from the known to the unknown, that is logic. So its subject matter is certainly the secondary intelligibles under the consideration mentioned above (Râzî (1381 A. H.) Mulakhkhas 10.1-10.8).

In identifying the secondary intelligibles, Avicenna is able to place logic within the hierarchy of the sciences, because it has its own distinct stretch of being which is its proper subject matter.

So much for the first problem in Alfarabi's formulation of what the subject matter of logic is; finding it to be secondary intelligibles preserves the topic-neutrality of logic. Avicenna also has a view on the second problem, the question of whether or not expression is essential to a definition of logic and its subject matter.

There is no merit in what some say, that the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning the expressions insofar as they signify meanings… And since the subject matter of logic is not in fact distinguished by these things, and there is no way in which they are its subject matter, (such people) are only babbling and showing themselves to be stupid.

Conceptions and Assents

Khûnajî argued in the second quarter of the thirteenth century that the subject matter of logic was Conceptions and Assents:

A thing is knowable in two ways: one of them is for the thing to be merely Conceived (yutasawwara) so that when the name of the thing is uttered, its meaning becomes present in the mind without there being truth or falsity, as when someone says “man” or “do this!” For when you understand the meaning of what has been said to you, you will have conceived it. The second is for the Conception to be [accompanied] with Assent, so that if someone says to you, for example, “every whiteness is an accident,” you do not only have a Conception of the meaning of this statement, but [also] Assent to it being so. If, however, you doubt whether it is so or not, then you have Conceived what is said, for you cannot doubt what you do not Conceive or understand… but what you have gained through Conception in this [latter] case is that the form of this composition and what it is composed of, such as “whiteness” and “accident,” have been produced in the mind. Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them; denial is the opposite of that.

Note that an Assent is not merely the production of a proposition by tying a subject and predicate together; “Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them.” All knowledge, according to Avicenna, is

either Conception or Assent. Conception is produced by definition, Assent by proof. All Avicennan treatises on logic are structured in accordance with this doctrine: a first section deals with definition, which conduces to Conception, a second with proof, which conduces to Assent.

Later logicians in the line of Fakhraddîn ar-Râzî made Conceptions and Assents the subject matter of logic. We know that Khûnajî was the first to do this thanks to a report in the Qistâs al-Afkâr of Shamsaddîn as-Samarqandî (d. c. 1310). Samarqandî says:

This is the view adopted by the verifying scholars (al-muhaqqiqûn), but Khûnajî (sâhib al-kashf ) and the people who follow him differed from them and said: Logic may investigate the universal and the particular and the essential and the accidental and the subject and the predicate; they are among the questions [of the science]. You [Avicennan logicians] are taking the subject matter of logic as more general than the secondary intelligibles so that the secondary intelligibles and (especially) the secondary intelligibles you have mentioned and what follows after them may come under it as logic. It would be correct for you to say that the subject matter of logic is known Conceptions and Assents (al-ma‘lûmât at-tasawwuriyya wa-t-tasdîqiyya ) not in so far as they are [what they are] but in so far as they conduce to what is sought (al-matlûb ) …

Two logicians who followed Khûnajî on this were Abharî and Kâtibî. Here is Abharî's statement:

The subject matter of logic, I mean, the thing which the logician investigates in respect of its concomitants in so far as it is what it is, are precisely Conceptions and Assents. [This is] because [the logician] investigates what conduces to Conception and what the means [to Conception] depends upon (for something to be universal and particular, essential and accidental, and such like); and he investigates what conduces to Assent and what the means to Assent depends upon, whether proximately (like something being a proposition or the converse of a proposition or the contradictory of a proposition and such like) or remotely (like something being a predicate or a subject). These are states which inhere in Conceptions and Assents in so far as they are what they are. So certainly its subject matter is Conceptions and Assents (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.14-20).

Here is part of Tûsî's rejection:

If what he means by Conceptions and Assents is everything on which these two nouns fall, it is the sciences in their entirety, because knowledge is divided into these two; whereupon what is understood from [his claim] is that the subject matter of logic is all the sciences. Yet there is no doubt that they are not the subject matter of logic…

The truth is that the subject matter for logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as reflection on them leads from the known to the unknown (or to something similar, as do reductive arguments or persuasive arguments [146] or imaginative arguments and the like). And if they are characterised by the rider mentioned by the masters of this craft, Conceptions and Assents are among the set of secondary intelligibles in just the same way as definition and syllogism and their parts, like universal and particular and subject and

predicate and proposition and premise and conclusion (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.21-u, 145.pu-146.3).

It is hard to know precisely what is being disputed. What we can note at this stage is that one point at issue has to do with the claim that Avicenna's identification of secondary intelligibles as logic's subject matter is inaccurate, and too narrow to achieve what he hopes it can.

Arguments aim to bring about Assent; more precisely, when Conceptions have been gained that produce in the mind both the meaning of the terms in a given proposition, and the form of composition of these terms, Assent “occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them…” In fact, different kinds of discourse can bring about one or other kind of Assent, or something enough like Assent to be included in a general theory of discourse..

Since Avicenna had finished explaining the formal andquasi -formal aspects of syllogistic, he turned to its material aspects. With respect to these, syllogistic divides into five kinds, because it either conveys an Assent, or an Influence (ta‘aththur) of another kind (I mean an Imagining or Wonder). What leads to Assent leads either to an Assent which is Truth-apt (jâzim) or to one which is not. And what is Truth-apt is either taken [in the argument] as True (haqq), or is not so taken. And what is taken as True either is true, or isn't.

That which leads to true truth-apt Assent is Demonstration; untrue truth-apt Assent is  Sophistry. That which leads to truth-apt Assent not taken as true or false but rather as (a matter of) Common Consent(‘umûm al-i‘tirâf ) is - if it's like this - Dialectic (jada l), otherwise it's Eristic (shaghab ) which is, along with Sophistry (safsata ), under one kind of Fallacy Production (mughâlata ). And what leads to Overwhelming though not Truth-apt Assent is Rhetoric; and to Imagining rather than Assent, Poetry (Tûsî (1971) Sharh al-Ishârât 460.1-461.12).

Tûsî immediately goes on to lay out grounds for Assent to propositions, for example, because they are primary, or because they are agreed for the purposes of discussion. Propositions to be used as premises for Demonstration make the most irresistible demands for our Assent; premises for lower kinds of discourse make weaker demands.

Logic and Language

Al-farabi explains how logic, grammar and language relate to each other:

And this art (of logic) is analogous to the art of grammar, in that the relation of the art of logic to the intellect and the intelligibles is like the relation of the art of grammar to language and expressions. That is, to every rule for expressions which the science of grammar provides us, there is a corresponding [rule] for intelligibles which the science of logic provides us (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 68).

al-Farabi argues that logic and grammar both have some legitimate interest in language, but whereas grammatical rules primarily govern the use of language, logical rules primarily govern the use of intelligibles.

More precisely, al-Farabi explains that although grammar and logic share a mutual concern with expressions, grammar provides rules that govern the correct use of expressions in a given language, but logic provides rules that govern the use of any language whatsoever in so far as it signifies intelligibles. Thus, logic will have some of the characteristics of a universal grammar, attending to the common features of all languages that reflect their underlying intelligible content. Some linguistic features will be studied in both logic and grammar, but logic will study them as they are common, and grammar in so far as they are idiomatic. On the basis of this comparison with grammar, then, al-Farabi is able to complete his characterization of the subject matter of logic as follows: 'The subject-matters of logic are the things for which logic provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles' (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 74).

Alfarabi adds:

Logic shares something with grammar in that it provides rules for expressions, yet it differs in that grammar only provides rules specific to the expressions of a given community, whereas the science of logic provides common rules that are general for the expressions of every community. This is to say - logic is something of a universal grammar or, more strictly, providing a universal grammar is one of the tasks of logic.

Avicenna recognizes and attempts to deal with the close nexus between language and thought:

Were it possible for logic to be learned through pure cogitation, so that meanings alone would be observed in it, then this would suffice. And if it were possible for the disputant to disclose what is in his soul through some other device, then he would dispense entirely with its expression. But since it is necessary to employ expressions, and especially as it is not possible for the reasoning faculty to arrange meanings without imagining the expressions corresponding to them (reasoning being rather a dialogue with oneself by means of imagined expressions), it follows that expressions have various modes (ahwâl) on account of which the modes of the meanings corresponding to them in the soul vary so as to acquire qualifications (ahkâm ) which would not have existed without the expressions. It is for this reason that the art of logic must be concerned in part with investigating the modes of expressions… But there is no value in the doctrine of those who say that the subject matter of logic is to investigate expressions in so far as

they indicate meanings…but rather the matter should be understood in the way we described.

Ibn Sina criticized attempts to introduce linguistic concerns into the subject matter of logic. In al-Madkhal, Ibn Sina labels as 'stupid' those who say that 'the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning expressions in so far as they signify meanings (ma'ani)'. However, Ibn Sina does not deny that the logician is sometimes or even often required to consider linguistic matters; his objection is to the inclusion of language as an essential constituent of the subject matter of logic. The logician is only incidentally concerned with language because of the constraints of human thought and the practical exigencies of learning and communication. 'if logic could be learned through pure thought so that meanings alone could be attended to in it, then it would dispense entirely with expressions'; but since this is not in fact possible, 'the art of logic is compelled to have some of its parts come to consider the states of expressions' (al-Madhkal, in Anawati et al. 1952: 22-3). For Ibn Sina, then, logic is a purely rational art whose purpose is entirely captured by its goal of leading the mind from the known to the unknown; only accidentally and secondarily can it be considered a linguistic art.

As Sabra says, Avicenna seems to hold that “the properties constituting the subject matter of logic would be inconceivable without the exercise of a particular function of language” (Sabra (1980) 764).

However, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi were concerned to distinguish logic from grammar as many Arabic grammarians - whose linguistic theories were developed to a high degree of complexity and sophistication - were contemptuous of the philosophers for importing Greek logic, which they saw as a foreign linguistic tradition, into the Arabic milieu. This attitude toward Greek logic is epitomized in a famous debate reported to have taken place in Baghdad in 932 between the grammarian Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi and Abu Bishr Matta, a Syriac Christian who translated some of Aristotle's works into Arabic and is purported to have been one of al-Farabi's teachers. Abû Bishr argued that speakers of Arabic need to learn Greek logic. For him Logic comes ahead of Grammar:

"The logician has no need of grammar, whereas the grammarian does need logic. For logic enquires into the meaning, whereas grammar enquires into the expression. If, therefore, the logician deals with the expression, it is accidental, and it is likewise accidental if the grammarian deals with the meaning. Now, the meaning is more exalted than the expression, and the expression humbler than the meaning".

The extant account of the debate is heavily biased towards al-Sirafi, who attacks logical formalism and denies the ability of logic to act as a measure of reasoning over and above the innate capacities of the intellect itself. His principal claims are that philosophical logic is nothing but Greek grammar warmed over, that it is inextricably tied to the idiom of the Greek language and that it has nothing to offer speakers of another language such as Arabic.

Yahya ibn 'Adi, makes his case for the independence of logic from grammar based upon the differences between the grammar of a particular nation and the universal science of logic. He argues that the subject matter of grammar is mere expressions (al-alfaz ), which it studies from the limited

perspective of their correct articulation and vocalization according to Arabic conventions. The grammarian is especially concerned with language as an oral phenomenon; the logician alone is properly concerned with 'expressions in so far as they signify meanings' (al-alfaz al-dalla 'ala al-ma'ani ) (Maqala fi tabyin, in Endress 1978: 188). To support this claim, Yahya points out that changing grammatical inflections do not affect the basic signification of a word: if in one sentence a word occurs in the nominative case, with the appropriate vocalization, its signification remains unchanged when it is used in another sentence in the accusative case and with a different vocal ending.

Concluding Remarks

We have seen that the Greek syllogism underwent a variety of modifications in the Medieval Islamic environment. The involvement of analogical reasoning with syllogistics was an attempt to aid the process of legal reasoning, but it was the a priori metaphysical assumptions which de marcate thinkers most forcefully. AI-Fiiriibi's successfully raised the strength of analogy to that of a first order syllogism thereby insisting that the 'il/a must exist along with a judgment in all inferences. Inevitably, al-Farabi's departure from the a priori interpretation of the Qur'an attracted much adversity from literalists. It is to al-Farabi that thinkers such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya owe their whole point of departure.

In his article, "GhazaI'i's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic", Michael Marmura has stated:

The matter of the syllogism involves the epistemological status of its premises; the form, the rules for valid inference. To take the formal aspect first, the philosopher's logic is the more comprehensive as it includes, for example, the Aristotelian figures which, prior to Ghazali, were not included in nazar. It also included a more precise formulation of analogical reasoning which, for example, Alfarabi reduced to the first Aristotelian figure and which, probably following him, Ghazali urged his fellow theologians to adopt.

AI-Ghazal'i could not deny, at least at the level of social and legal disputation, the auspicious utility of the syllogism, replete with its probable analogies. It is only at the metaphysical level (causality) where al-GhazaI'i becomes uncomfortable with the encroachment of the Greek tools (logic) upon the Muslim texts. If scriptures conflict with the "findings" of the syllogism, then (unlike with Hume and his aversion to religion) the Scriptures are to be assigned metaphorical readings. The dissonance produced by religion and logic is diffused, and the syllogism can remain a welcome addendum to the legal ambiguities pondered by the jurists.

With Ibn Taymiyya we saw that all legitimate definitions proceed from the Qur'an when legal and/or existential conceptions are being formed. His attack on causality and modal logic, employed mainly by philosophers (but also by theologians) places him in a-causal agnostic position where the explication of metaphysics is concerned. One could almost assume that, in relation to logic, analogy and syllogistic proofs, the words of David Hume could be supplanted into the pen of Ibn Taymiyya who resisted all such logical attempts at a definitive metaphysical reconstruction:

But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference from observing the growth of a hair? Can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

And elsewhere:

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is.

Ibn Taymiyya would undoubtedly agree with much of this, but would reject Hume's skeptical ethos by maintaining revealed Qur'anic foundations. Indeed, he would take literally Hume's ambiguous statement, "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe". However, it would not be adverse to state that Ibn Taymiyya was also a skeptic, "a sceptic who was saved by religion", but nevertheless a skeptic. Thus his bid to question identity goes only so far. In the face of outright skepticism, then, comes outright faith.

 There remained the task of determining the proper limits and applications of syllogism so as to define and categorize the termqiyiis (a method of inference).

These discussions were the result of the theologically motivated defense of the concept of divine omnipotence that solely actuated existence, events, miracles and their causal links. It follows, then, that Theologians did not accept the doctrine of natural causation where phenomenal acts proceeded from a thing's quiddity. In their view Causal efficacy resided solely with God's divine will and contingent atoms and accidents were created ex nihilo. Thus, no causal uniformity in nature was inherently possible

For Muslims Greek logic was initially a means to defend metaphysical doctrines but the scope of logic was expanded to jurisprudence and language. All of this was attempted under the questionable notion that logic could remain doctrinally neutral and, at the same time, could be used to the advantage and defense of religion.  Eventually, the supposed neutrality of logic was vehemently called into question.

The use of analogy formed part of the Qur'anically derived juridical system. Complications arose once the syllogism was introduced. Suddenly, metaphysical assumptions were questioned; this gave rise to the ambiguous relationship between analogy and the syllogism especially when attempting to define qiyas. A variety of arguments surrounds this term and its translation into "analogy": "Qiyiis thus cannot be given the fixed definition of analogy. Instead, it should be regarded as a relative term whose definition and structure vary from one jurist to another." Qiyiis, denotes a way of inferring something from another, and is derived from the logical sciences which embrace both the syllogism and analogy. The concern here is to determine the central method by which juridical qiyas was endowed with "a wider definition as to include formal arguments".