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Zawahir al-Qur'an: The Authority of the Book's Literal Meanings

Authors(s):Ayatullah Sayyid Abulqasim al-Khui

Translator(s):Mujahid Husayn

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

Zawahir al-Qur'an: The Authority of the Book's Literal Meanings 3

Arguments against the authority of the Zawahir 7

1. The understanding of the Qur'an is limited to a selected few 7

2. The prohibition of tafsir bi al-ray 8

3. The mystery of the meanings of the Qur'an 9

4. The knowledge that the literal meaning is not intended 9

5. The prohibition of following the mutashabihat 10

6. The occurrence of tahrif in the Qur'an 11

The Methodology of Tafsir 13

The Sources of Tafsir 14

Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Qur'an by Khabar al-Wahid 16

Doubts and Opinions 16

Notes 19

Zawahir al-Qur'an: The Authority of the Book's Literal Meanings

The author is one of themaraji (legal authorities) of theShi'i world and one of the most eminent figures in the world of contemporary Islamic scholarship. The translation given here is that of two chapters from his work onQur'anic exegesis, al-Bayan fi tafsir al-Qur'an: “hujjiyat zawahir al-Qur'an,” (the authority of theQur'anic zawahir ), and “usul al-tafsir ” (the principles of exegesis).

Two terms need to be understood in regard to theQur'anic meaning:nusus (sing,nass ) andzawahir (sing.zahir ). Bynusus is meant thoseQuranic texts which are absolutely clear, being of a single meaning, about which there is no ambiguity whatsoever. The termzawahir refers to those meanings which are the most obvious, although the text may have another, less probable, meaning besides its apparent sense. Althoughzawahir has been translated here as 'literal meanings' which applies tonusus as well the difference betweennusus andzawahir should be noted.

There is no doubt that the Prophet (S) did notinnovate any special method for conveying his message; he spoke to the people by applying the modes of expression to which they were habit­uated. He brought the Qur'an to them that they may understand it, contemplate over its verses, follow its commands and refrain from what it prohibits. This message often recurs in the verses of the Qur'an:

أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ أَمْ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبٍ أَقْفَالُهَا

“What, do they not contemplate over the Qur'an? Or is it that there are locks upon their hearts?” (47:24)

وَلَقَدْ ضَرَبْنَا لِلنَّاسِ فِي هَٰذَا الْقُرْآنِ مِن كُلِّ مَثَلٍ لَّعَلَّهُمْ يَتَذَكَّرُونَ

“Indeed we have struck for the people in this Qur'an every manner of simili­tude; haply they will remember. “(39:27)

وَإِنَّهُ لَتَنزِيلُ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ نَزَلَ بِهِ الرُّوحُ الْأَمِينُ عَلَىٰ قَلْبِكَ لِتَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُنذِرِينَ بِلِسَانٍ عَرَبِيٍّ مُّبِينٍ

“Truly it is the revelation of the Lord of all Being, brought down by the Trust­worthy Spirit upon thy heart in a clear Arabic language, that thoumayest be one of thewarners . “(26:192-195)

هَٰذَا بَيَانٌ لِّلنَّاسِ وَهُدًى وَمَوْعِظَةٌ لِّلْمُتَّقِينَ

“This is an exposition for mankind, and a guidance and admonition for the God-fearing. “(3:138)

فَإِنَّمَا يَسَّرْنَاهُ بِلِسَانِكَ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَذَكَّرُونَ

“Thus haveWe made it easy on your tongue, that haply they may remember. “(44:58)

وَلَقَدْ يَسَّرْنَا الْقُرْآنَ لِلذِّكْرِ فَهَلْ مِن مُّدَّكِرٍ

“AndWe have made the Qur'an easy for remembrance. Is there any one that will remember? “(54:17)

أَفَلَا يَتَدَبَّرُونَ الْقُرْآنَ ۚ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِندِ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ لَوَجَدُوا فِيهِ اخْتِلَافًا كَثِيرًا

“And what, do they not contemplate over the Qur'an? And had it been from someone other than God, they would have found in it much inconsistency.” (4:82)

Apart from these verses, there are other verses as well which prove theobligatoriness (wujub ) of acting in accordance with the contents of the Qur'an and the necessity of accepting the literal meanings of its verses.

Following arguments prove the authoritativeness (hujjiyyah ) of the literal meanings of the Qur'an as comprehended by the Arabs.

1. The Qur'an's revelation as a proof ofprophethood and the Prophet's (S) challenge to all mankind to bring a singlesurah of its kind, both imply that the Arabs used to understand the literal meaning of the Qur'an. Had the Qur'an spoken in riddles, it wouldn't have been correct to challenge them regarding it, norits miraculous character would have been proved to them, because they could not have understood it. It would have also contradicted the purpose for which the Qur'an was revealed and its invitation to mankind to believe in it.

2. There are ample traditions commanding adherence to `the two Weighty Things' (al-Thaqalayn , which are the Qur'an and theAhl al­Bayt ,) that the Prophet (S) left behind for the Muslims. Here, evidently, the meaning of adhering to the Qur'an is to grasp its message and to act in accordance with it, and there is no other meaning apart from this.

3. There aremutawatir traditions (i.e. traditions narrated by so many different chains of transmission as to establish their authenticity beyond doubt) which order that traditions be checked against the Qur'an; those which contradict it should be rejected as invalid or false, as those whose acceptance is prohibited, because they are not the words of( the Prophet [ S ] or) the Imams (A).

These traditions categorically prove the canonical authority of the literal meanings of the Qur'an, i.e. the meanings as understood by the ordinary speakers of the language familiar with the literary (fasih ) Arabic language. To this category also belong those traditions which order the correlation of contractual condi­tions with the Qur'an and rejection of those opposing it.

4. The arguments of the Imams (A) regarding some rules of theShari'ah , as well as other things, in which they have argued by applying the verses of the Qur'an. Following are some examples.

a. There is the exposition of al-'Imam al-Sadiq (A) whenZurarah questioned him, “How do you understand that mash, (the ritual wiping, of the head or the feet duringwudu ') of (only) a part of the head is required?” The Imam (A) replied, “From theba ',” in theverse . وامسحوا بروئسكم

b. Anotherexample, is his prohibitingHisham al-Dawaniqi from accepting a slanderer's report, because such a person is afasiq (evildoer), and the Qur'an says:

إِن جَاءَكُمْ فَاسِقٌ بِنَبَإٍ فَتَبَيَّنُوا

“If an ungodly (fasiq ) person comes to you with a tiding, verify it ...” (49:6)

c. Among the arguments is his (A) warning a person who had prolonged his stay in the toilet to listen to prohibited music, on the excuse that he had not intentionally come for listening to it, by observ­ing, “Have you not heard the words of God Almighty,

إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَٰئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا

“Surely the hearing and sight and the heart will all be questioned?” (17:36)

d. Another instance is the Imam's telling his (A) son,Isma'il , “When believers give evidence before you, endorse its verity,” quoting as a proof the verse:

يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَيُؤْمِنُ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ

“He (the Prophet (S) believes in God and believes the believers. “(9:61)

e. Concerning the validity of a slave being amuhallil for a woman divorced thrice, he (A) observes: “He is considered (fit to be) ahusband, and God Almighty says in the Qur'an:

...حَتَّىٰ تَنكِحَ زَوْجًا غَيْرَهُ ...

“... Unless she marries another husband ....” (2:230)

f. Another such argument is where the Imam (A) observes that a triple divorcee will not becomehalal again (for the husband who di­vorces her) through a temporary marriage (mut`ah ), because God Almighty says:

فَإِن طَلَّقَهَا فَلَا جُنَاحَ عَلَيْهِمَا أَن يَتَرَاجَعَا

“Thus if he divorces her, there is no blame on the two if they reunite.” (2:230)

And there is no divorce inmut`ah

g. Similarly, concerning a person who had tripped and lost a nail and then bandaged the toe, he (A) said: “A person's duty in this and other similar instances is known from the Qur'an, which declares:

وَمَا جَعَلَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ مِنْ حَرَجٍ

“God has not ordained any hardship for you in the religion.” (22:78)

Then he (A) said: “Perform the mash over it” (the bandage).

h. The Imam (A) brings proof regarding the permissibility of marriage with a certain woman by quoting this verse from the Qur'an:

وَأُحِلَّ لَكُم مَّا وَرَاءَ ذَٰلِكُمْ

“And other than those mentioned (as prohibited) have been madehalal for you.” (4:24)

i . Of such arguments is the one of the Imam (A) concerning the invalidity of a slave's marriage, because the Qur'ansays:

عَبْدًا مَّمْلُوكًا لَّا يَقْدِرُ عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ

“An owned slave having no authority over anything ....” (16:75)

j . The Imam (A) cites the following verse from the Qur'an as a proof of the permissibility of (eating the flesh of) certain species of animals:

قُل لَّا أَجِدُ فِي مَا أُوحِيَ إِلَيَّ مُحَرَّمًا عَلَىٰ طَاعِمٍ يَطْعَمُهُ

“Say: I do not end in that which has been revealed to me anything forbidden for an eater to eat ....” (6:145)

There are many other similar arguments of the Imams (A) that are based onQur'anic verses, and these are scattered through the different chapters offiqh and other subjects.

Arguments against the authority of theZawahir

A group oftraditionists have rejected the authority of the literal meanings of the Qur'an, refusing to act on them for following reasons.

1. The understanding of the Qur'an is limited to a selected few

They argue that the ability to understand the Qur'an is limited to those who have been addressed by it. The protagonists of this view rely as their proof on a number of traditions concerning this issue, such as themursal tradition ofShu`ayb ibn Anas narrated from al-'Imam al­Sadiq (A), reporting that the Imam (A) said to AbuHanifah :

أنت فقيه أهل العراق؟ قال: نعم. قال عليه السلام: فبأي شئ تفتيهم؟ قال: بكتاب الله وسنة نبيه. قال عليه السلام يا أبا حنيفة تعرف كتاب الله حق معرفته، وتعرف الناسخ من المنسوخ؟ قال: نعم. قال عليه السلام: يا أبا حنيفة لقد ادعيت علما - ويلك - ما جعل الله ذلك إلا عند أهل الكتاب الذين أنزل عليهم، ويلك ما هو إلا عند الخاص من ذرية نبينا صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم: وما ورثك الله تعالى من كتابه حرفا

“Are you thefaqih of the people of Iraq?” He replied: “Yes, I am.” The Imam (A) said: “On what basis do you pronounce your fatwa for them?” He replied: “On the basis of the Book of Allah and theSunnah of His Prophet.” The Imam said: “O AbuHanifah , do you comprehend the Qur'an the way it should be comprehended, and do you recognize thenasikh and themansukh ?” He replied, “Yes.”

The Imam (A) said: “O AbuHanifah , you certainly profess having knowledge! Woe to you! God has not kept this knowledge except with the people of the Book and they on whom it has been sent down (i.e. theAhl al-Bayt ). Woe to you! This knowledge is with none except the chosen of our Prophet's (S) progeny, and God has not bequeathed a word to you from His Book.”

The following tradition is narrated byZayd al-Shahham in this relation:

وفي رواية زيد الشحام, قال :

دخل قتادة على أبي جعفر، فقال له: انت فقيه أهل البصرة؟ فقال:هكذا يزعمون. فقال عليه السلام بلغني أنك تفسر القرآن. قال:نعم إلى أن قال يا قتادة إن كنت قد فسرت القرآن من تلقاء نفسك فقد هلكت وأهلكت، وإن كنت قد فسرته من الرجال فقد هلكت وأهلكت، يا قتادة - ويحك - إنما يعرف القرآن من خوطب به

Qatadah visited AbuJa'far (A) and the Imam (A) asked him: “Are you thefaqih of the people ofBasrah ?” He replied: “This is what they think.” The Imam (A) then said: “I have come to know that you expound (tufassiru ) the Qur'an.” He replied: “Yes, I do.”

(The tradition continues until where) the Imam (A) said:”OQatadah , if you have expounded the Qur'an in accordance with your own views, then you have certainly perished and have also caused others to perish, and if you have expounded it in accordance with the views of others, then you have perished and have caused others to perish. Woe to you! No one knows the Qur'an except those who have been addressed by it.”

Answer: The meaning of these and similar traditions is that the comprehension of the Qur'an mentioned in them implies comprehend­ing it completely, knowing both its literal and hidden meanings, along with itsnasikh andmansukh , and this is limited to those who have been addressed by it. The first tradition explicitly conveys this meaning. Thus the question asked in this tradition was about the full comprehen­sion of the Qur'an and about differentiating between thenasikh and themansukh .

The Imam's (A) censure of AbuHanifah was due to his claim of possessing that knowledge. As to the second tradition, it contains the word `tafsir ' which means `unveiling' (kashf al-qina '), and therefore it does not include the acceptance of literal meanings, because they are not concealed so as to require unveiling. This is also borne out by the explicit traditions mentioned earlier that understanding of the Qur'an is not limited to the Infallible Imams (A). Moreover the Imam's statement in themursal tradition (ofShu'ayb ibn Anas ) in which he says:

وما ورثك الله تعالى من كتبه حرفا

God Almighty has not bequeathed to you a word from His Book,

also proves the same, for it means that God has chosen theAwsiya ' (A) of His prophet (S) for inheriting the Qur'an, and this is the meaning of the verse.

ثُمَّ أَوْرَثْنَا الْكِتَابَ الَّذِينَ اصْطَفَيْنَا مِنْ عِبَادِنَا ۖ

“ThenWe bequeathed the Book on those of Our servants We chose ....” (35:32)

Therefore, the knowledge of the Qur'an's reality is exclusively with the Imams (A) and others do not have a share in it. This is the meaning of themursal tradition (ofShu'ayb ibn Anas ); otherwise, would it be reasonable to think that AbuHanifah did not comprehend anything of the Qur'an including and other similar other verses which are explicit in their meaning? Thereis really a very large number of traditions which prove that such complete knowledge is particular to the Imams (A), and some of them have been mentioned earlier.

2. The prohibition oftafsir bi al-ray

It is argued that the acceptance of the Qur'an's meanings is tanta­mount totafsir bi al-ray (interpreting the Qur'an according to subjec­tive opinion), and there aremutawattir traditions, narrated both by Sunnis andShi'ah , which forbid such a practice.

Answer: As said, `tafsir ' implies unveiling, and this does not include the taking of literal meanings of the verses, because such a meaning is not something hidden that has to be uncovered. Moreover, evenof we should consider this astafsir , it is nottafsir bi al-ray for it to come in the purview of themutawatir traditions forbidding it. On the contrary, it is atafsir in accordance with the common usage of words.

Therefore, one who, for example, translates a sermon ofNahj al-balaghah in accor­dance with the ordinarily understood meanings of its words and by using the indications available in the sermon and outside it, his doing so will not be consideredtafsir bi al-ray, and al-'Imam al-Sadiq (A) points this out when he says: “People have solely perished on account of themutashabih , because they could not comprehend its meaning and reality, interpreting its meaning in accordance with their views and seeking thereby to relieve themselves of the need to ask theAwsiya ', who could have informed them.”

It is probable that the meaning oftafsir bi al-ray is independence from referring to the Imams (A) in giving fatwa, although they are companions to the Qur'an in regard to the obligation of adherence to the two and as the ultimate authority.

Therefore, if a person acts in accordance with the general state­ments (al-`umum ) of the Qur'an without accepting the views of the Imams (A) in determining and limiting (taqyid andtakhsis ) the jurisdic­tion of these statements, it will be considered astafsir bi al-ra'y . On the whole, the adoption of literal meanings after a due search for internal and external indications (qara'in ) present in the Qur'an and the tradi­tions, or for a rational proof, can not only be not consideredtafsir bi al ­ra'y , it cannot be considered `tafsir ' as such.

As mentioned earlier, the aforementioned traditions indicate that the Qur'an should be referred to and acted upon, and it is evident that such reference implies the acceptance of its literal meanings. Accordingly, when the relevant traditions are reconciled,tafsir bi al-ray ought to be understood as implying something other than acting in accordance with the literal meanings.

3. The mystery of the meanings of the Qur'an

It is said that the Qur'an contains sublime and mysterious mean­ings and this quality of it is a hurdle in comprehending its meanings and fully grasping its import. To be certain, there are some books of the ancients whose meanings cannot be comprehended except by knowl­edgeable experts; accordingly, how could the Qur'an, which contains all the knowledge regarding both the past and the future, be understood?

Answer: It is true that the Qur'an certainly contains the knowledge of the past and the future, and comprehending it from the Qur'an is doubt­lessly restricted to theAhl al-Bayt (A). However, this does not contra­vene the fact that the Qur'an has literal meanings understandable by anyone acquainted with the Arabic language and its rules, which one may act upon once they become clear after due research for supporting indications.

4. The knowledge that the literal meaning is not intended

It may be said that we know in amujmal way (i.e. without know­ing all the specific details) that there exist restrictive proofs (mukhassisat andmuqayyidat ) which limit the application of the general statements (`umumat anditlaqat ) of the Qur'an. This means that some of its literal meanings are certainly not what are intended, for such general state­ments have been restricted in their jurisdiction.

However, those literal meanings which are not intended are not specifically known so as to enable us to confine us to those particular instances. As a result of this, all the literal meanings of the Qur'an and all its general statements become indistinct (mujmal ) incidentally, though they are not in fact such essential. Consequently, it is not valid to act according to them, as a measure of caution against acting in violation of the real (commands of God).

Answer: Thismujmal knowledge (that there are some general statements whose literal meaning is not the intended one) can act as a hindrance to accepting all the literal meanings when one resolves to act in accordance with them without a due investigation regarding their real import.

But after themukallaf (a person responsible for his religious duties) investi­gates and discovers such instances to the extent of gainingamujmal knowledge of their presence in the Qur'an, the hindrance posed by the priormujmal knowledge is removed, and it fails to have any effect. Thereupon, there remains no hindrance to acting upon the literal mean­ings.

The same thing is true of theSunnah , where we also know that there are proofs which limit the jurisdiction of its general statements. Hence, had themujmal knowledge (regarding thezawahir of the Qur'an) been a hindrance in the way of accepting its literal meanings even after such knowledge is renderedineffective, it would also be a hindrance in accepting the literal meanings of traditions.

Not only that, it would stop us from applying the Rule ofBara'ah (the presumption of absence of duty) in situations where doubts concerning the presence of a duty (al-shubuhat al-hukmiyyah ) arise in theobligatoriness (wujub ) orimper­amissibility (hurmah ) of something. This because everymukallaf knows is amujmal way the presence of compulsory duties in theShari'ah , and thismujmal knowledge (in accordance with the reasoning of the oppo­nents ofzawahir ) could result in applying caution (ihtiyat ) in all doubt­ful cases of duties pertaining to obligations and prohibitions. However, we know for certain that caution is notwajib in them.

It is true that age group oftraditionists have considered cautionwajib in cases of doubts concerning the presence of prohibition (al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah ) ­because they imagined that the traditions ordering restraint and caution prove restraint and caution in cases of al-shubuhat al-tahrimiy­yah . But this opinion of theirs is not based on themujmal knowledge warding the presence of compulsory duties in theShari'ah , because if it were so they would have considered caution obligatory in case of doubt regarding theobligatoriness of something (al-shubuhat al-wujubiyyah ) as well.

However, as far as we know, no one has considered caution compulsory in such cases. The sole secret of caution not beingwajib in these and other similar instances is thatmujmal knowledge is at times `dissolved' as a result of success in acquiring the knowledge (of specifics), and the dissolution of themujmal knowledge renders it ineffective. For a further explanation, the reader should refer to our bookajwad al-taqrirat .

5. The prohibition of following themutashabihat

The opponents of acting on thezawahir point out that theQur'anic `verses forbid the following of themutashabihat . God Almighty says:

مِنْهُ آيَاتٌ مُّحْكَمَاتٌ هُنَّ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ وَأُخَرُ مُتَشَابِهَاتٌ ۖ فَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ زَيْغٌ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ مَا تَشَابَهَ مِنْهُ

“In it aremuhkam (clear) verses which are the foundation of the Book, and other verses which aremutashabih . As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow itsmutashabih (ambiguous) verses ....” (3:7)

The termmutashabih also includes literal meanings or, at least, the possibility of its including literal meanings makes them incapable of being accepted as authority.

Answer: The wordmutashabih has a perspicuous meaning, and there is no ambiguity or vagueness in it. It means a word having two or more meanings that stand in the same degree of nearness in relation to that word. Thus when such a word is used in a verse, the possibility arises that any one of these meanings may be actually intended.

For this reason, it iswajib to observe restraint in giving ajudgement infavour of any of the meanings unless there is an indication to specify it. Accordingly, a word having a single literal meaning is not consideredmutashabih .

If we condescend to accept that the wordmutashabih is itself ambiguous, and that there exists a possibility ofits including literal meanings, our doing so does not prevent us from acting in accordance with the literal meanings. This is after the practice of rational persons (sirat al-`uqala ) which sanctions the acceptance of the literal meaning of a speech or writing. Therefore, a sole possibility is incapable of pre­venting this practice from being acted upon, for it requires a categorical proof in order to do so.

Otherwise, this practice will undoubtedly be followed. For this reason, a master is able to prove his servant's fault if the latter acts against the literal meanings of the former's speech, and it is valid for the master to punish him for the violation. Similarly, the servant may justify himself vis-à-vis his master if he has acted in accor­dance with the literal meaning of his master's words where it is opposed to his real intent. On the whole, this practice is followed in accepting the literal meanings, unless thereexists a categorical proof against it.

6. The occurrence oftahrif in the Qur'an

The occurrence oftahrif (textual corruption, or loss) in the Qur'an prevents us from accepting the literal meanings because a possibility of there being, alongside the literal meanings, helping indications determi­ning their real intent exists, and these indications might have been lost due totahrif

Answer: We reject the claim of occurrence oftahrif in the Qur'an, and have earlier presented our argument concerning it.1 There we said that the traditions commanding us to refer to the Qur'an are by themselves a proof negatingtahrif . Even if we condescend to presume the occur­rence oftahrif , we are obliged by these traditions to act in accordance with the Qur'an even after the presumption of occurrence oftahrif .

The conclusion that follows from this discussion is that it is necessary to act on the literal meanings of the Qur'an; that the Qur'an is the basis of theShari'ah ; and that the narratedSunnah will not be acted upon when it opposes the Qur'an.

The Methodology ofTafsir

`Tafsir ' means the elucidation of the intent of God Almighty in the Holy Qur'an. Therefore, it is neither permissible in this regard to rely on conjectures (zunun ) or on one's preferences (istihsan ), nor on anything whose validity has not been established by reason or theShari'ah . This is because following conjectures and attributing anything to God without His permission is forbidden. God Almighty says:

قُلْ آللَّهُ أَذِنَ لَكُمْ ۖ أَمْ عَلَى اللَّهِ تَفْتَرُونَ

“Say: `Has God permitted you, or do you forge a lie against God?'” (10:59)

وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ

“And follow not that of which you have no knowledge.” (17:36)

There are other such verses and traditions that forbid acting with­out knowledge, and there are a sufficiently large (mustafidah ) number of traditions from both Sunni andShi'ah sources forbiddingtafsir bi al-ray.

This makes it clear that it is not valid to follow thetafsir of any exegete, irrespective of his being rightful in his creed or otherwise, because it amounts to followingconjecture, and conjecture is not a substitute for knowledge.

The Sources ofTafsir

It is necessary for an exegete to: follow the literal meanings as understood by a linguistically competent Arab (and we have already explained that literal meanings are authoritative), or follow the dictates of sound reason, for reason is an inward authority in the same way as the Prophet (S) is an outward authority (hujjah ), or follow the traditions established to have been narrated from theMu'sumun (the Prophet [S], Fatimah [A] , and the Imams [A] ), because they are the authorities to be referred to in the religion (al-maraji `fi al-Din). The Prophet (S) declared the duty of making recourse to them when he said.

إني تارق فيكم الثقلين كتاب الله وعترتي أهل بيتي، ما إن تمسكتم بهما لن تضلوا بعدي أبدا

Verily, I am leaving behind two weighty things amongst you: the Book of God and my Family, myAhl al-Bayt . If you hold on to them, you will never go astray after me.2

There is no doubt that the statements of the Imams (A) are established when narrated through a definite chain of transmission free from doubt. Similarly, there is no doubt that they are not proved when narrated by a weak (daif ) chain which does not possess the require­ments of credibility. Aretheir (A) statements proven through a chain creating presumption (tariq zanni ) when supported by a definite proof (dalil qati )? The scholars differ in this regard.

A doubt is raised here concerning the authority ofkhabar al ­wahid (a tradition which is notmutawatir ) narrated by trustworthy narrators from theMa'sumun (A) regarding thetafsir of the Qur'an. The reason offered is that the implication, of the authority ofkhabar al-wahid , or some other proof (dalil ) leading to presumption (zann ), is that it is obligatory to follow it in a case when one is ignorant about the actual law as if the law were known for certain.

Such an approach is applicable nowhere except in regard to ahadith concerning a law of theShari'ah or a subject relating to such a law. This condition is at times not present in akhabar al-wahid narrated from theMa'sumun (A) in regard totafsir (for such traditions may relate to subjects having no relation whatsoever with the laws of theShari'ah , such as doctrines, historical events, etc.).

This objection is contrary to fact. It has been explained in discus­sions onusul al-fiqh that the meaning of the authority (hujjiyyah ) of the proofs that bring only presumption (and not certainty) about the actual fact, is that such presumptive proofs have been made binding substitutes for definite proofs by the Lawgiver (this is called certainty throughta`abbud , i.e. in observance of Divine sanction).

Thus, a channel whose credibility is approved by the Lawgiver's sanction is as good as a source resulting in certainty, despite the fact that it lacks the intrinsic capacity to produce certainty. Hence all the effects of certain knowledge will follow from this channel, and it will be as correct to report (regard­ing non-legal matters) on its authority as it is correct to do so on the basis of actual knowledge; it will not be considered a statement without knowledge.

We are led to this conclusion by the practice prevalent among all reasonable persons (`uqala '). Such persons consider a channel of approved credibility similar to actual knowledge, without making any difference between the effects of the rule.

For instance, the possession, of a thing by someone is regarded as a proof of his ownership by the people, despite the fact that it can give rise only to presumption that the possessor is its owner, and they allow on its basis all the effects of ownership, and report without deserving any blame that he is the owner of that thing. And this common practice has not been disapproved by the Lawgiver.

Of course, it is true that a trustworthy tradition or any other credible channel should possess all the conditions of credibility. Among such conditions is that the tradition should not be of known falsity, because something known to be false cannot reasonably possess the marks of credibility or enjoy the Lawgiver's sanction.

Therefore, those traditions which are contrary to consensus or definiteSunnah , or the Qur'an, or the dictates of sound reason, will certainly not be consi­dered credible, although they may possess other requirements of credi­bility. There is also no difference here between traditions relating to a rule of theShari'ah and those relating to non-legal subjects.

The basis of this argument against the credibility ofkhabar al ­wahid is that however trustworthy a narrator may be, the tradition nar­rated by him is not secure from being contrary to the truth, because there is at least a possibility of his having made a mistake, especially where there are a large number of links in the chain of transmission. Hence, it is necessary to have some grounds establishing credibility that remove such a possibility, making it as if non-existent.

However, in the case of certainty about the falsity of a tradition, which is known to be contrary to the truth, such a certainty cannot be evaded on the basis of the Law­giver's sanction (ta`abbud ), for the intrinsic quality of certainty is to reveal the truth and its validity is established as necessary by reason.

Therefore it is necessary to limit the grounds of the credibility ofkhabar al-wahid to those traditions which are not known to be false or contrary to the truth. The same rule applies to other reliable channels of information. This issue has a bearing upon many other issues of the kind, and on it are based replies to many doubts and criticisms. The reader should understand it well.