• Start
  • Previous
  • 18 /
  • Next
  • End
  •  
  • Download HTML
  • Download Word
  • Download PDF
  • visits: 5000 / Download: 3073
Size Size Size
Ownership in Islam

Ownership in Islam

Author:
Publisher: Islamic Thought Foundation
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

Services

Are Services The Origin Of Ownership!

A careful analysis reveals that we are the rightful owner of our labor, be it production work or a service. Entitlement of an individual to his labor constitutes the pith of all kinds of ownership. So far as his productive work continues to be there, he is the rightful owner of the same. Likewise if his work entails formation of an object manifesting his accumulated labor, he is also considered to be its owner.

But if a person is engaged in a sustained work and it does not exist in a crystallized form, then what type of claim does he have?

Would it be correct to say that a doctor who treats a patient can claim to be the owner of the patient's health? Is a tailor who transforms a piece of cloth given to him into a garment, entitled to a share? If you take your darling children to a doctor for treatment, can he put forth a similar claim and say that he should have a legitimate share of the children? Obviously not, because a person is not another person's property and therefore the interpretation of the term "ownership" is impertinent here.

However in the "service sphere", it would be correct also to say that person engaged in such activities is the owner of the same and no demarcation line is drawn. In both the spheres of "services" and "productive work'', the individual's efforts act to constitute ownership.

However, the qualities of tangibility and crystallization cannot be ascribed to the former in the manner they exist in the case of the latter.

What would happen if a baker claimed to be the owner of the bread so baked, and refused to give bread toother. A doctor offers a service similar to that of a chemist, except that the chemist can produce and present the embodiment of his labor in the form of drugs.While a doctor cannot crystallize his work in an object. Although one can say that medical instructions can be considered to be productive. However, can a doctor's work be considered as productive if it is utilized to treat a retired old man, who is not productive to the society and is merely a consumer?

The stance adopted by socialistsvis -a-vis wage system is a hostile one, advocating its complete liquidation. To further reinforce the conviction, they attribute the concept of alienation to it and go on to reason out that an individual, under the wage system gauges his personality in accordance with the level of his wage. In this bid, all other noble aspects of humanity, such as achievement of perfection, are eclipsed by his overwhelming consideration for monetary gains.

Therefore, to rid mankind of this evil with all its dangerous implications, wage system must be abolished from the sphere of economic activities, and treat the individual's labor value instead of wages as a proper remuneration to be paid to him.

However one can foresee that a person, with a lust for self-aggrandizement, under the conditions of a wage system or otherwise, will continue his relentless efforts in accumulating more wealth. For example, a switch-over from the wage system to a non-wage system would not guarantee the cessation of the mode of thinking of aself­sufficient carpet-weaver. He may furnish all his rooms with various carpets woven by him, instead of giving priority to or having no consideration for his society's needs for the same. In other words, his concern for his own self overshadows all other important aspects of a social life. Moreover, can you recall any practical socialist government under which the issue of wage system may have been abolished or become non-existent?

The Motive to Work

A full-fledged Marxist system is governed by the motto of putting unlimited goods and services at the disposal of the citizens. An individual worker is under no direct constraints with regard to the volume of his production and contribution to the state economy. While his entitlement to a share from the aggregate available goods and services are a discretionary matter for him. He is not obliged to maximize his production efforts. This is meant to drive out the concept of economic alienation from the socio-economic sphere, and thus render it clean of the injurious element.

The parochial attitude on insulating the economy from the concept of greater productivity as a means to achieve greater consumption levels, and to have an alienation-free society, will in the long run, cause degeneration of the economy through lethargy and sluggishness.

As a counter-argument it is contended by Marxists that under the conditions of a Marxist system, an individual, having attained the highest level of development, is spontaneously gravitated towards work and greater activity, while being utterly repulsive to laziness and inactivity. Therefore, an individual rendered jobless one way or the other would inescapably tend to view his joblessness as a factor limiting his progress towards perfection.

Therefore, under such a social set-up, individuals are activated to work out of an intense love for the system rather than the remunerations promised by it. Hitherto, we have neither witnessed nor come across such an example in the world except in case of some outstanding individuals. Under the existing social institutions, whether capitalist or socialist, there are observed innumerable cases of servility of individuals. In certain cases, it may be more overt, and in others more subtle and covert. While in the former case, companies and individuals are the exploiters, in the latter, the State itself becomes the exploiter.

The idea that all individuals should possess capital and equipment so as to engage in the tasks of sowing and reaping, and thus provide their own food is fallacious. The services extended by a teacher or a doctor have nothing to do with the above-mentioned activities. They have their own distinct intrinsic usefulness, and their dispensation should meet all the relevant wants of the society. It is right that the principle of "from each according to his will, to each according to his wish" reigns supreme, and therefore the element of "alienation" is done away with.

It's right that the society abounds in its needed goods and services, owing to the twin factors of plentitude and the cultivated sublime quality of due self-restraint in consumption. This is supreme and can do away with alienation and all other evil repercussions of the wage system, but before having access to such human beings and such societies a mere shift from one system (socialism) to another (communism) is of no use. Because under any system, there are certain types of beneficial efforts, which ought to be paid wages so as to encourage a venture into the same. At the same time, any attempt at delimiting the individual's needs under communism, will raise a reversion to the conditions of socialism with all its concomitant limitations. Under such conditions an individual is prompted to engage in greater activity for higher gains subject to government's definition of the individual's level of needs.

In a bid to satisfy his social needs over and above what is initially dictated, an individual will have to engage in extra work, the remunerations of which are likely to be confiscated by the government. Meanwhile, systems different from socialism, have been more successful in production; and this is substantiated by facts.

No doubt economics plays a very crucial role, but it cannot possibly occupy the sacred place rightfully accorded to ethics as an infrastructure in human lives. The prime motive must be to mould individuals imbued with all the sublime qualities of "justice" and "integrity". Here we do not attempt to ignore the vital bearings of an individual's economic milieu on his morality and functions in the society. In other words, due importance is attached to the factors of morality, economy, spirituality and materialism interacting upon one another in the process of formation of an individual's entity.

Work constitutes the origin of ownership. Of course, if one allows public ownership on public property as it was discussed, then we would have ownership with no labor. There are, however, cases oflaghateh which means that you find something which is not claimed by anyone. Such items are treated as common properties, and the act of picking it up and bringing it into one's possession is nothing butHiazat . Therefore,laghateh means the act of coming into possession of a thing which has previously had an owner but for the moment is not claimed by anybody and it bears a price.

Now let us suppose that a person gives us a pen in whose production we were not involved at all. How can we treat such a case? This is a transfer, and constitutes a second-grade ownership.The original owner, whether the person who gave it to us or the previous owner, ought to have worked for it, and therefore the pen can be legitimately accepted.

Mr. A's father dies and he inherits his father's property. This too is treated as second-grade ownership because the inherited property is assumed to have been acquired through labor.

Therefore, we can conclude that labor is the platform where the concept of ownership originates and is molded, be it productive work or service ofHiazat .

Basis of Ownership

To sum up our previous discussions we can attribute three types of ownership to man. He is the owner of himself and therefore the owner of his current labor, the part of his labor crystallized in an object and he is also the owner of nature jointly with other human beings.

When we say man is the owner of himself, we are considering a human beingvis -a-vis other human beings, and the idea of God, the Supreme Owner of the universe, does not come into the picture.

Here we are following innate logic that all human beings or, on a larger scale, all living beings, have a share in nature. An animal, preying upon other animals, can be considered to have its share in nature; just like human beings. However, the term "ownership" has applicability and pertinence only to human beings, and therefore animals are excluded. However, a man's action in separating his share from nature has to be governed by certain norms which act as safeguards to the rest of humanity's share.

All schools of thought have, invariably acknowledged human beings' dependence on nature, and the issue of ownership, its various kinds and degrees, has interspersed their history. Historical evidence testifies to our claim that ownership and its ensuing demarcation lines always dominated the relationship of an individualvis -a-vis another individual, group or groups of people.

Therefore, the idea of absolute commune contended by Marxists, does not enjoy historical sanction. At least there is no concrete evidence to this effect. Absolute common ownership may have existed only in the case of families. However, outside the family bounds, the social scene must have been rife with ownership-related conflicts.

Such views, because of the fact that they are crystal­ clear and obvious, do not need to be held and expressed unanimously and by all. Therefore, their opposition by a certain group does not invalidate them.

Up to now we have discussed three main origins of ownership. These are followed by three bases of ownership which are corollaries to the former types.

ExchangeOr Barter

Exchange can be described as voluntary disposal of a good or service upon acquisition of a good or service of a different nature, on the basis of mutual consent. Messrs. A and B, both have an object of their own. Mr. A has a fancy for Mr. B's object and vice versa. So, their willingness to engage in the exchange enjoys all the necessary approbation accorded by innate logic. Therefore, in exchange, there is a shift of ownership of objects from one individual to another. I had a kilo of apples which I exchanged for a kilo of melons that my friend had. Through this process, what I possess now is one kg.of melons, and likewise my friend has in his possession one kg.of apples which initially belonged to me.

What constituted my ownership of the apples must have beeneitherHiazat , productive activity or service; and the same thing applies to my friend. This is, however,labelled as second-grade ownership; because my present ownership of one kg.of melons presupposed my having obtained one kg.of apples, either throughHiazat , productive activity or service. And likewise it is a "must" that my friend had to obtain his initial one kg.of melons through the same process. Otherwise, engaging in the barter would not have been rendered legitimate.

In barter, two values are placed against each other, and attainment of one value embodied in an object necessitates relinquishment of another value. However, the prerequisite which warrants transfer ofownership, is the prior acquisition of the object through the usual operations ofHiazat , productive activity or service.

In a village, a doctor may barter his service for a few eggs, or if the patient has no money, the doctor may accept firewood in return for his service whichHiazat has fetched him.

Likewise, a service is likely to be bartered for another type of service. A doctor and a painter may mutually agree that in exchange for treatment given by the doctor, the painter would paint his building. Therefore, the doctor would become the owner of the painter's labor for a specific period of time and according to all the specifications mutually agreed upon. In the latter case, ownership of the painter's labor by the doctor constitutes a second-grade ownership, and any unilateral revocation of the agreement is tantamount to violation. In the light of above examples we are therefore faced with another source for value which is called the exchange value.

Definition of Exchange Value

Proportion of exchange between two items of consumer value is called the exchange value. Determining the amount of this proportion is so intricate in terms of different types of societies that its full discussion demands a detailed account; and it is this proportion which can be just or unjust. Discussion of its constituents, namely energy input, the number of spent hours, quality and quantity of the tools deployed and of the goods or services offered and one degree of their relationship, has been a focal point and an indispensable weight in an unbiased determination of their equitability or otherwise.

An individual, living in a progressive society with innumerable and complex wants, cannot unilaterally meet all his needs throughHiazat , productive activity or service. At the same time, consequent upon his specialized sphere of activities, a surplus of goods or services over and above his individual and family needs is inevitably generated.

Therefore, a spontaneous ground for barter is provided, and it is used by the members of the society. It is noteworthy to mention here that an individual should always be barred throughHiazat from excessive accumulation of a good, which is scarce in nature, and from its barter for goods and services needed by him. This is meant to preclude the possibility of exploitation of others, who are not exposed to that particular good as he is.

Under conditions of primitive barter system confined only to neighborhoods, the possibility of exploitation is precluded. For example, a villager may exchange his surplus eggs for a certain amount of meat with his neighbor. Or he may exchange a glass of superior cow milk for a glass of inferior cow milk plus two eggs with his neighbor. However, if barter becomes professional in nature and is placed in the category of "services", then it ceases to possess its simple characteristics to pose the threat of exploitation.

For example, a peddler may offer to his village folks two meters of cloth brought from t he city in return for 20 eggs, and thus a little profit is automatically earmarked for him. Now if he gets 2 1/4 meters of cloth for his 20 eggs from another cloth dealer, and exchanges the same for 25 eggs, then in the course of this barter, he has earned 5 extra eggs for consumption by himself and his family. Likewise, a provision store owner may get a profit of 150tomans after 8 hours of work in a day. But if he gets 3000tomans in a day, then it is an indication of exploitation; and the rates and his business activities must, therefore be regulated.

Therefore, we have seen that contrary to its initial stage, the barter system can be transformed into an exploitative affair in subsequent stages after it enters the domain of "services".

A trader, a dairy product shop owner and their like perform a specific role in society, and because of that, they become entitled to remuneration; just like a laborer.1 However, utmost care must be exercised to ensure a just and optimum rate of return rather than unduly exorbitant profits rampant under capitalistic conditions.

Today, all the countries invariably engage in bilateral trade with one another. The capability of a merchant, however, in concluding a useful deal with the outside world, does not justify his action of charging exploitative rates from the people just because he has such acquaintance. Meanwhile, he is entitled only to a modest rate of profit.

Relinquishment: Innate logic has also sanctioned relinquishment of the use of an object as a resultant yield of his labor in favor of another person. In such cases, transfer of ownership is voluntarily affected from one person to another.

Note

1. The scope of the term "labor" is large enough to accommodate terms like “physical” as well as “mental exertions”. The managerial skill of a manager or that to an accountant constitutes a specific type of labor and exertion. However, this differs from that of a construction laborer. An accountant or a manager applies his mental capacities in the form of knowledge of economics.Accountancy, etc., in identifying and determining the value. the opportunity cost and profitability of an investment. Therefore, he automatically qualifies for dividends against the labor put in by him. The pay scale allowed to him may be equal to or two or three times larger than that of a simple laborer, but not 10 or 100 times.

Inevitable Transfer of Ownership

Like Inheritance: As stated earlier, an individual may engage in using and transforming raw materials of nature into other objects of different utility with full entitlement to the same as long as the raw materials are not scarce. This kind of entitlement and ownership could have no limitation.

Likewise, through the instrument ofHiazat , an individual may acquire his and his family's share from the aggregate share in his surroundings. Throughout this process, his actions are prompted by consideration for his family and relatives' needs. Hence, after his death his aggregate wealth, in the form of diverse goods, accumulated by him through productive activities, services orHiazat and receipt of goods, etc., is automatically transferred to his heirs who served as an inspiring factor for engaging in greater activity. Such practice is advocated and defended by innate logic.

The issue of inheritance, following a vicissitude of controversy, has explicitly been given its respective place in the Soviet and Chinese constitutions. Inheritance, so long as it has relevance to the immediate and rightful properties of the deceased, is acknowledged and tolerated. However, if the accumulated property so inherited is of dubious nature and origin, then all the legal enquiries into its origin can be made. We have another type of inevitable transfer, which is distinct from inheritance and in the form of partnership.

If you mix your 50 man (man is a measurement of weight in Iran equivalent to threekgs .) of wheat with your neighbor’s 25, on the basis of mutual consent, then you will get a two-thirds share of the aggregate, against the one-third share going to your neighbor. This situation will persist unless and until you and your neighbor separate previous shares of wheat; and if this is not done, then your respective shares in each seed would be 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. The above principle is perhaps consistent with common jurisprudence.

Thus, we have concluded introduction and discussion of the types of origin of ownership which are in absolute conformity with innate and natural logic.

Notes

Services cannot be bequeathed; but property or money engendered through services can be treated as inheritance.

Nafagheh comes under the category of Exchange of Value. It is the act of obligatory grant of something which is in rightful possession, and thus it is distinctly different from the voluntary donation of goods. It is also different from barter. Wills andinfaga come under the head of bestowal and donation.

War booty is treated as a reward for service orHiazat . The concept is, in fact, more appropriate in respect of services. It may be determined by the army commander, the government or society whether soldiers can partake in war booty as remuneration for their active service. (Islam prohibits possession of war booty in case of aggression). In Islamic countries where the army is paid a salary by the government, military men are not entitled to a share of war booty.

Islamic wills stipulate that only 1/3 of the wealth of the deceased could, according to his predetermined instructions, go to individuals other than his heirs. In other words, 2/3 of his wealth is automatically apportioned to hisheirs, and only 1/3 of it falls within his discretion with regards to its allocation to others.

EffectsOf Ownership

The First Effect: The right toown, exploit and use a share. A person, following possession of an article, has a right to use it, the sanction for which is extended (apart from Islamic provisions) by innate, natural and rightful logic.

The freedom and its degree in the use of an object owned by a person constitute the axis around which our discussion revolves. Suppose a person plants a tree, and gives it all the necessary care and attention until it reaches the stage of fruit bearing. Can he be considered to be entitled, without any limitations whatsoever, to the entire yield of the tree? Certain limitations emerge here to limit his claims. Do the limitations stem from natural needs or per capita consumption or the minimum level of consumption in the society?

The optimum intake capacity of the owner results from his natural needs with regard to the fruits of the tree. According to this criterion, he can embark upon consuming the fruits as long as the harmful effects arising out of over-consumption are precluded. The term "per capita consumption" implies the quotient obtained from the division of the prospective aggregate amount of the fruits of the tree by the number of people in his society. His share, according to this theory, can thus be calculated.

The criterion of minimum consumption level of the fruits of the tree in the society determines his share to stand at a minimum level of the same.

Here, in this context, no such limitations are however made. His sole proprietary right to the tree overshadows all the above criteria and considerations. It is only his moral obligations which intervene effectively in the matter, thereby determining his due share to be at par with the per capital consumption criterion. If the person uses the fruits of his tree for personal consumption, at a level beyond what is warranted by the per capita level, can he be adjudged to have violated the proprietary right allowed to him? The answer is no. He has not committed any property usurpation. However, he has transgressed the bounds of his moral "principles" in this context. Likewise, if he has a surplus of the fruits of his tree, in defiance of the conditions prevalent in his society, his act is tantamount to breach of his moral duty in economic terms. In the same manner, if you observe that a person standing beside you is naked due to his acute economic condition, while you are wearing fancy clothes over and above your requirements, then you are bound to be moved by your moral obligations to offer your rather redundant clothes to him. However, failure to comply with such an obligation does not entail any prosecution against you.

The delicate point to rememberhere, is that Islam and the current jurisprudence have assigned watertight compartments to violation of religious and moral obligations on one hand, and "legal and canonical" violations on the other hand.

To elucidate the above difference between the two kinds of violations consider; a person with surplus accumulated wealth and property and another person in his vicinity needing some of what he has in surplus. It is one thing to say that the needy man is legally a partner of the wealthy in his wealth, and if the latter takes any kind of possession in the property he has legally committed usurpation; while it is another thing to say that the property legally belongs to its previous owner; nevertheless, if he neglects the needy man, he has ignored his social duty and is liable to ethical penalties.

Legislation enacted in the Soviet Union in 1977, has explicitly recognized an individual's right to possess a house commensurate with his and his family's needs, and treated the same with all the valuables in it as his personal property. Now supposing that in the U.S.S.R., Mr. A and his family own, according to the Soviet standards, a decent three-room house. In the meantime, a Soviet citizen, along with his family, shifts to the new city from some other part of the Soviet Union. Should Mr. A and his family occupy only two rooms and therefore allow temporary use of the third room totis countryman and his family until they manage to construct their own house? No doubt the Soviet rules and regulations have failed to accommodate such cases, but under such circumstances, Islam considers it a moral duty of Mr. A and his family to allow use of the third room by the second family. Nevertheless the ownership of Mr. Aon his third room is not disputable in any case. This forms an integral part of innate, natural logic.

Suppose, under identical conditions, with regard to the construction of a house, out of Mr. A and Mr. B, the former quickly builds his house, whereas, the latter, due to indolence and Jack of personal enthusiasm, fails to do the same. Now, is Mr. A, under a moral obligation, required to accommodate Mr. B in his house or is he basically faced with a limitation in his ownership rights?

In the discussion ofInfagh (donation) two interpretations can be made:

1. Even though a person has acquired his property through legitimate Islamic means, with an indisputable claim to it, the practice ofinfagh is incumbent upon him. This is the current interpretation of the term by bothShia and Sunni sects.

The property belongs to him. However, he performsinfagh in God's way and the very act does not release the property or object from his possession.Infagh , in spite of being an obligation, does not alter the nature of ownership. If he abrogates this obligatoryinfagh , his relationship with the thing will not cease, rather he will be judged to have violated a religious duty.

2. The second interpretation, however, states that where the act ofinfagh becomes incumbent upon an individual, his ownership link with the object ofinfagh undergoes instability and alteration. For example, if, through a productive activity, I produce, and therefore own an object, I am to be treated as the rightful and sole owner so long as the necessity for an obligatoryinfagh , with respect to the kind of property owned by me, has not arisen. However, once such necessity emerges in the society, I am to be adjudged as the owner of the portion not required to be dispensed with throughinfagh .

In the case ifKhums andZakat too, the above­mentioned views hold true. One view holds that the amount, equivalent toKhums andZakat , cannot at all be treated as personal property, and it is meant to be irretrievably channeled into the usages prescribed by the principles governingKhums andZakat . The other view, on the contrary, admits the indisputable position of the owner with respect to his entire earnings, and interprets the failure to dispenseKhums andZakat as an offense against an obligation. (In Islamic jurisprudence, we have the two explicit terms of legal and prescriptive decrees respectively for the above mentioned concepts.)

The noteworthy point here is that our jurists hold divergent views with regard toKhums andZakat . A majority of our jurists hold that with regard to the category of properties with a proportion of taxes levied on them bysharia (Islamic law), the person cannot treat that portion as his personal property from the beginning, and it is channeled intoKhums andZakat automatically. While in the case of donations other thanKhums andZakat , which do not have a fixed proportion in a person's property, the situation is not the same, and the person owns,defacto , what he has to give away.

Hence, in the case of properties subjected toKhums andZakat , the person at the outset of attaining the property (crystallized result of his labor) is assigned only 4/5 of the total asset. And if he ventures into an investment employing the entire asset, the profit and augmentations accrued to the remaining 1/5 part do not belong to him and he cannot have any claim to it.

However in the case of donations with no fixed proportion, none of our jurists has expressed a conditional ownership status for the owner. In other words, a non-fixed proportion donation, despite being obligatory, does not act to break the ownership link of the person with his property, as soon as the conditions for donation have emerged.

Or, if you like, a person can exercise discretion despite a prescriptive decree, i.e. he can, by defying the decree, commit a sin and disobedience, and at the same time has his legal links with his property assured. More clearly, his defiance of the prescriptive obligation does not sever his legal connection with his property.

Of course, he may be penalized for his wrong performance, but having punishment is one thing and denial of a legal right on a property is another. He may be told that he will be imprisoned if he does not surrender his property. However, that will not act to deter him from the ownership of the same property.

It is most important to see which one of these concepts is more logical and plausible since it plays an important role in the economic arena. It may be deemed fit to have a glimpse of the legal, moral or prescriptive decrees, and establish a difference among them if any. In other words, an attempt is made to determine whether a moral financial obligation is accompanied by relevant legal decrees or not.

Is defying an ethical "must", in a financial decree, tantamount to losing legal ownership or is there no relationship between the two and a person performing his moral obligations through observance of, for example,Khums ,Zakat andinfagh , is invariably adjudged as a pious person? However, there is no legal legislation to detract from his property values if he fails to adhere to his religious obligations.

Both thescience of economics, as well as the schools of economic thought, discuss legal rights and duties with all their respective dimensions. The only difference is that the economic schools of thought discuss what ought to be there, and their general principles. While the science of economics carries out the task of analyzing the persisting economic norms and the methods to be deployed in bringing about appropriate modifications.

The following examples are furnished in order to provide further insight into the concepts. Suppose the schools of thought advocate provision of equal opportunities to everything which would, in turn, be conducive to at least a minimum living standard and spiritual attainment.

The ideal has not materialized yet. Therefore, at this juncture, science can effectively intercede by prescribing certain guidelines to render our ideals feasible. Thus, the science of economics furnishes us with the necessary tools to achieve the ideal propounded by the relevant schools of thought.

If you say, 'I want my child to become active and moving', it has to do with the school side of the issue. However, the methodologies adopted by you in rendering your child active, have to do with the science side of the issue. In the process you may apply directly and thus be benefitted by the methods in vogue or used by your predecessors. For example, would it be appropriate to tell your child to get up and move, or instead create in him the motive to move and therefore get him motivated to move? Can school or science respond to such a necessity?

On the whole, we can say that in the economic context, legal and moral rights and duties may have their respective distinct domains. Many regard moderation­ oriented economic measures as moral obligations only without any legal repercussions.

Therefore, the scope and limits of consumption, as an indication of ownership, constitute an important part of our discussion here. Is the effect of owning an object, the right to its unconditional consumption or are there some limits to this right; and if the second holds good, should it be according to the natural needs of the owner, or the society's per capita consumption level or the does the right persist even if its wastage and destruction are brought about?

A person plants a pear sapling. After intensive care, it comes to the yielding stage and automatically the planter of the tree becomes the rightful owner of its fruits. Will his probable action of leaving the fruits to decay have any justification while his ownership continues? Surely, from an ethical point of view, he is not liable for such a misdeed, but the question here is: Does this moral obligation entail any legal limitation concerning his ownership rights; and generally, to what extent, should moral obligations be enforced by legal sanctions?

The approach to such a delicate issue is two-pronged:

1. The pears belong to the person who has planted the tree and it, therefore, falls within his discretion to let the fruits decay without being used. Such an attitude, though considered to be a sin of extravagance, does not provide the ground for a trespass into the orchard to avail of the fruits, because his ownership link with the pears persists indisputably.

2. Ownership of the pears does not bestow upon the owner the right to let the fruits decay, and therefore if people learn about his intentions, they can effectively intervene and consume the yield. In other words, his ownership right is annulled.

The patronage, extended by innate logic, to consumption as an effect and reflection of ownership, explicitly precludes the concept of wastage and destruction. No tolerance is displayed towards a prospective owner who may resort to squander his procreated produce, and his ownership would accordingly cease.

In the meantime, if his intention become manifest to others, they are granted every justification to effectively intervene and consume the yield to their advantage. The right bestowed upon him by God to benefit from the fruits does not stretch to the extent ofeffecting any abuse or their destruction.

As another example, suppose that a person deliberately dropped a glass from the top floor of a building, another person on the floor below makesan effort and catches the glass in the air. This offence is dealt with in the domains of both legal legislations and moral obligations. The link of the person with his property stands broken. At the same time, the person on the floor below, who was caught the glass in the air emerges as the rightful owner of the object. The offence is dichotomous. He violated his legal and moral duties: innate logic clearly states that remorsefulness does not alter his new position, and the expropriated commodity cannot be returned to him.

Sometimes, countries, with a strong production mechanism, may find it an economic experience to destroy a large quantity of an agricultural product in a bid to prevent a market glut, and therefore maintain price equilibrium. In America, for instance, in one year peach trees yielded fruits in excess of the optimum quantity. The farmers, in an attempt to prevent a market surplus and a consequent price fall, reached consensus to partially pick the fruits and allow the rest to decay and to be turned into fertilizer.

It was also determined that any departure from the consensus would amount to an aggression against the farmers' moral conscience. So the problem could acquire such far-stretched dimensions owing to the entirely different attitude held in this field. Exploitation of one's products through the enumerated approved methods, i.e., the capital, constitutes a fundamental issue which has to be treated with utmost care and precision.