Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

MULLA SADRA’S REALIST ONTOLOGY OF THE INTELLIGIBLES AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

IbrahimKalin

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

[Introduction] 3

Being and Quiddity 4

The Primacy and Gradation of Being 7

Knowledge as a Mode of Being 11

Intelligibility, Disembodiment and Knowledge 15

The Simple Intellect and the Intelligible World 19

Notes 24

[Introduction]

Sadra’s concept of knowledge is based on two fundamental premises of his ontology. These can be stated as the primacy (asalah ) and gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud ).Sadra’s relentless effort to define knowledge as a mode of being (nahw al-wujud ) represents rather a new perspective within the Islamic intellectual tradition and requires a close study of his metaphysical ontology. I use the phrase ‘metaphysical ontology’ to emphasizeSadra’s primary interest in questions of being: for him, the study of being is not a mere investigation of the properties of things or existential propositions. It is rather founded upon a quest for what Rudolph Otto has called “saving actualities”.[1] Sadra’s ‘transcendent wisdom’ (al-hikmat al-muta’aliyah ), an expressionSadra uses exclusively and proudly for his path of thinking, is not merely a philosophical system grounded in abstract considerations of being but a ‘doctrine of salvation’. This view of metaphysics is predicated upon the idea that being (al-wujud ), the most central concept ofSadra’s thought, is ultimately God’s face turned to the world. The study of being is thus a step towards uncovering an aspect of the Divine, which, forSadra , is the ultimate source of all being and knowledge.

Keeping this peculiar nature ofSadr a’s thought, this essay will focus on how Sadr a works from his metaphysical ontology towards a concept of knowledge which claims to transcend the binary opposition of subject and object on the one hand, and places intellection within a context of ‘spiritualized epistemology’, on the other. Since Sadr a’s thought is centeredaround being and its modalities, a proper discussion of his view of knowledge is impossible without first analyzing his concept of being. Sadr a develops a rigorous ontology of the intelligibilia ( al-ma’qulat ) whereby the intelligible forms ( al-suwar al-ma’qulah ) are defined as ontological actualities that reside in the world of the Forms as separate and disembodied substances. In this essentially Platonic view, knowledge (al-‘ilm ) and intellection ( ta’aqqul ) are no longer defined as a property of the knower or inherent states of the mind but rather as an ‘effect’ of being. This view finds its expression in Sadr a’s elegant formulations of the unification of the intellect and the intelligible ( ittihad al-‘aqil wa’l-ma’qul ) – a view that has a long and controversial history in Greek and Islamic philosophy. [2]

Sadra’s realist ontology of intelligible forms explains why he has not taken the subjectivist turn of modern philosophy at the hands of Descartes, who wasSadra’s contemporary, and the extent to which his concept of the soul (al-nafs ) and the intellect (al-‘aql ) has remained thoroughly non-subjectivist, placing the self within a larger context of meanings and relations beyond the individual self. The first part of the essay will give a brief description of howSadra’s ontology provides a basis for his defense of intelligibility as an intrinsic attribute of being. I shall then turn toSadra’s concept of knowledge with a special focus on the definition of knowledge in terms of being and its modalities as opposed to knowledge as a property of the mind and/or the knowing subject.

Being andQuiddity

Following the Peripatetic philosophers,Sadra asserts the self-evidentiality of being (al-wujud ) by saying that being can neither be defined nor described. When we say ‘there is a tree here’ or ‘stars exist’, we have an intuitive grasp about the meaning of these statements: a tree, a horse, stars, my neighbor, and the school building down the block ‘exist’. Put in a simple language, they are within the realm of concrete existence detectable by empirical evidence based on seeing, smelling, etc., or by a priori intuitions that lend themselves to independent verification. When we want to give a logical definition of the words ‘is’ and ‘exist’, i.e., the copula, however, we are faced with a formidable task. First of all, the copula, as Kant would later elaborate, does not furnish us with any new knowledge about our subject other than asserting its existence in the external world. But we hardly think about the copula when we speak of things or look at them. In short, we gain nothing by ruminating about the copula. Secondly, we can know something unknown to us only by comparing it to better-known and familiar concepts – a procedure we follow all the time intuitively if not methodically. But there is nothing intuitively more familiar and evident to us than being. This is where the difference between what we know and what we can clearly demonstrate becomes particularly evident. That is whySabzawari ,Sadra's great commentator, says that “its [i.e. being’s] notion is one of the best-known things, but its deepest reality is in the extremity ofhiddenness ”.[3]

We run into a similar difficulty when we try to ‘make being known’ (ta‘rif ) through logical definition (hadd ) and description (taswir ).[4] A logical definition is comprised of genus (jins ) and specific differentia (fasl ). When we define man as ‘rational animal’ (haywan natiq ), for instance, we refer to its genus, which is 'animal' (haywan ), and its differentia, which is 'rational' (natiq ). This, however, does not apply to being as being has no genus or differentia because to have a genus and differentia means to include something and exclude others.[5] But as we intuitively and logically know, there is nothing outside being, and being, as the ground of all there is, does not leave anything out. It, then, follows that being has no definition.

Nor can it be described, for description is based on more evident and clear concepts than the concept defined. But we just concluded that there is no term or concept known to be more evident and clear than being. Being, then, can be explained only by itself. It is, however, obvious that this is apetitio principi and not a definition because definition of something by itself begs the question. This leadsSadra to the following conclusion: being has neither definition andnor proof (burhan )[6] that can be employed to explain its meaning. It is the most evident notion of all concepts and the basis of ournoetic structure without needing any other proof.

The only access to the reality of being is existential intuition or whatSadra calls ‘illuminative presence’ (hudur ishraqi ) and ‘essential testimony’ (shuhud 'ayni ).[7] As I shall discuss below, such terms as ‘illumination’, ‘presence’, ‘unveiling’, and ‘witnessing’ play two important roles inSadra’s works. First, they emphasize the particularity of the experience of being (wujud ): we experience being through its particular instances or ‘shares’ (khisas ) such as the sun, cause and effect, or my neighbor. In our most natural and primordial encounter with the world, our experiences are always particular. When I look at my daughter playing by my desk, what I see is not ‘humanity’ or ‘rational animal’ but a particular and concrete human being with distinct qualities, complexion, feelings, posture, etc. In this sense, every abstraction is a distortion of the unique nature of beings. Secondly, the experience of being as opening and unveiling establishes a strong link between the knowledge of being ad spiritual illumination – a link thatSadra assumes to be of supreme importance for ‘transcendent wisdom’.

In light of these considerations,Sadra makes a categorical distinction between the concept (mafhum ) and reality (haqiqah ) of being. As a mental concept, being shares the qualities of a universal: it is applicable to a multitude of subjects univocally, remains abstract and generic,does not change from subject to subject, and so on. The reality of being in the extra-mental world, however, defies any such definitions and displays a constant dynamism. Every individual being is a unique existent that participates in the all-inclusive reality of being. Expressed differently, everything is an instantiation and particularization (takhassus ) of being that unfolds itself in an infinite number of ways, modes, states, and colors.Sadra calls this the ‘self-unfolding’ and ‘expansion of being’ (inbisat al-wujud ), which he borrows from the school ofIbn al-‘Arabi .

At this point, a further distinction is introduced between being and essence (mahiyyah ) – a distinction that has a long history in Islamic philosophy. We can analyze this along the following lines. The human mind asks two basic questions about things that exist: is it and what is it? The first question concerns the reality of things in the external world and establishes their existenceinconreto . When I think of the mountain, the first question that I may ask is whether it exists or not. This inquiry seeks to ensure that the object of my thought is not a figment of my imagination but rather a concrete reality in the extra-mental world. And I use a multitude of methods or tools to verify my assertion. The second question pertains to the ‘what-ness ’ (ma-hiya ? ) of things, i.e., what it is that we are investigating. Having established the extra-mental reality of the mountain, my next question will be about its attributes, shared properties, nature, definition, etc., and it is here that we enter the domain of essences orquiddities (mahiyyat )[8] . The distinction between existence and essence is thus established by the fact that we can give a definition of things that havequiddity , viz., meaning and definition in the mind but no existence in the extra-mental world as in the case of the unicorn or square circle.[9]

But existents are not composed of two things, ‘being’ on the one hand, and ‘quiddity ’, on the other, which we antecedently put together and turn into a single unity. It is just the opposite: they are single units that we as knowing subjects divide into compartments. That is whySadr a says that the distinction between being andquiddity is not a real ontological distinction. It is rather a “rational operation of the mind” ( i’tibar al-‘aql ). [10] The distinction is imposed by the mind that can perceive onlyquiddities as the universal properties of things. [11] Said differently, the distinction in question belongs to the order of thought rather than being. Now, Sadr a takes a further step and argues thatquiddities are nothing but various modes and particularizations of being, which the mind constructs as abstract and generic qualities. An important result of this assertion is the ultimate reducibility ofquiddities to being whereby Sadr a ascertains another premise of his ontology: the primacy of being ( asalat al-wujud ).

The Primacy and Gradation of Being

The word 'asalah ', meaning to be principal and primary, refers to that which is real and gives actual reality to existents in the extra-mental world. The main questionSadra asks is which of the two, being orquiddity , has ‘reality’ in the external world. The philosophical significance of this question cannot be overemphasized for traditional philosophy that considered truthand reality to be intertwined. The Arabic wordhaqiqah can be translated as both true and real, and this is essential for finding that which is the basis of things in truth and reality. Such a thing accounts for ontological affirmation and epistemic credibility – the two qualities really existing beings have. Being (al-wujud ) as the principal reality thus establishes things in concrete existence and saturates them with meaning.[12] Simple as it may seem, though, this idea has a long history in Islamic thought.

Ibn Sin a was content with recapitulating the distinction between being andquiddity since his primary concern was to lay out a tripartite division of existents as impossible ( mumtani ’ ), contingent ( mumkin ) and necessary ( wajib ), and draw a categorical distinction between the last two, i.e., the created and the Creator. [13] Even thoughIbn Sina did not deal with the primacy or non-primacy of being in any clear manner and his discussions can be read to support and oppose either position, the key issue for his medieval interpreters, especially in the Latin West, was his discussion and alleged espousal of theaccidentality of being. The problem had emanated fromIbn Sina’s somewhat recondite analysis of how being is related to essence ( mahiyyah ). St. Thomas Aquinas and other Scholastic philosophers readIbn Sina as arguing that being is an accident conferred upon things antecedently. In simple terms, things exist and theirquiddities require being only as an accident or attribute without which they can survive the abyss of non-existence. Interestingly enough, this (mis )interpretation goes back toIbn Rushd . [14]

Sadra and his followers took a different approach and interpretedIbn Sina as saying that being is a ‘special accident’ in the case of contingent beings (mumkin al-wujud ): the existence of contingent beings is a ‘borrowed existence’ and depends on the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud ) for their subsistence. This implies that contingent or possible beings ‘receive’ their existence from another source antecedently or, to use the language of theology, from high on. Now, we may conceive being as an accident (‘arad ) ‘happening’ to things because their concrete existence is not required by mental abstraction or, as Aristotle would say, by definition. More importantly, being is an ‘attribute’ granted to created things by God who, as the Necessary Being, sustains them in existence. Considered from the point of view of extra-mental existence (al-wujud al-‘ayni ), however, being is not added to thingsa posteriori , otherwise we would have to assume that things take on being as an accident without which they can ‘exist’ – a logically absurd and impossible conclusion.

Suhrawardi , with whomSadra utterly differs on this particular question, foundeda metaphysics of essences when he definedquiddity (al-mahiyyah ) as the sole agent that constitutes reality.Suhrawardi proposed two objections against the primacy of being. First, if we take existence, he said, as a real attribute of essence, then essence, in order to have this attribute, has to exist prior to existence in which case existence would be a quality of something that already exists.[15] Secondly, if existence is considered to be the real constituent of reality, then existence will have to exist before being a constituent of external reality and this second existence will have to exist, and so onad infinitum .[16]

Suhrawardi’s conclusion was a turning point in the history of Islamic thought. His claim that being is only a generic term, a secondary intelligible (ma‘qul thani ), applicable to a multitude of object but to which nothing concrete corresponds in the extra-mental world, heralded the beginning of a long controversy especially in the Persian speaking world.Sadra rejected this deduction by saying that we cannot logically say 'existence exists' just as we do not say 'whiteness is white'. Existence exists by itself. In other words, the actualization of being in the external world occurs by itself and not through something else.[17] When I say that “the tree exists”, I do not take the tree and its existence to be two separate and separable realities. The tree as a particular being and itsquiddity are given in one and the same thing all at once. Therefore being is not something that has existence just as whiteness is not something that has whiteness.[18] Being is that very reality by virtue of which things exist just as whiteness is that by virtue of which things are white.

According toSadra ,Suhrawardi's false conclusion results from confusing the concept and reality of existence. When conceived by the mind, being is a universal concept without a corresponding reality in the extra-mental world. And it is at this level of abstraction that we can take existence as an attribute of something. That is why we can think of essences without their actual existence in the physical world.[19] Said differently, existence as the most general notion in the mind cannot be a basis for the reality of individual existents.[20] The reality of being defies all such conceptualization. Although at the level of conceptual analysis one is allowed to say that existence is 'something that has existence' (shay’lahu al-wujud ) in reality, its basic structure is that it is existence by itself or existentpar excellence (al-wujud huwa al-mawjudiyyah ).[21] Sadra 's conclusion is thus diametrically opposed to that ofSuhrawardi : being is not an extraneous quality imposed upon existents but the very reality thanks to which they exist.[22]

In rejectingSuhrawardi’s essentialist ontology,Sadra reiterates an old issue in Islamic philosophy, i.e., whether being is a predicate or not, the word ‘predicate’ being used here in its logical sense as denoting some property or attribute of actually existing things. As in Western philosophy since Kant[23] , the Muslim philosophers have usually answered this question in the negative but introduced an important distinction between the logical and ontological senses of existential propositions. From a logical point of view, we can analyze the sentence “this table is oak” into a subject and predicate. The subject of the sentence, “this table”, is a noun and the predicate “oak” also a noun and an attribute qualifying the table.[24] Now, we can turn this sentence, composed of a subject and a predicate, into an existential proposition by saying that “the table is”, “the table exists”, or “the table is an existent”. When we look at these sentences from a logical point of view, existence, stated by the copula, turns out to be a predicate and attribute qualifying the table. From the ontological point of view, however, this conclusion is absurd because it assumes the existence of the table prior to its having existence as an attribute. Given that the table in question is a real existent, the moment we say ‘table’, we have already affirmed its extra-mental reality. In light of this, one may say that Descartes’cogito ergo sum argument is flawed because from a strictly ontological point of view, the moment I say ‘I’ in the sentence “I think, therefore I am”, I have already affirmed my existence.

al-Farabi was the first to have noted this philosophical difficulty and proposed two ways of looking at such existential propositions. In the proposition “man exists”, existence, al-Farabi reasoned, is both a predicate and not a predicate. From the point of view of the ‘logician’ (al-nazir al-mantiqi ), the sentence has a predicate because it is composed of two terms, subject and predicate, and is liable of being true or false. From the standpoint of the ‘natural scientist’ (al-nazir al-tabi’i ), which here means the ontological point of view, however, it does not because the “existence of something is nothing but itself”.[25] The most important conclusion thatSadra derives from this analysis is that being is not an attribute conferred upon things antecedently. It is their very reality which makes them what they are, and forSadra , this proves the primacy of being.

Having established being as the primary reality,Sadra turns to the question of how being applies to individual entities which he calls ‘shares of being’ (khisas al-wujud ). Insofar as we talk about things as actually existing, being is predicated of all things that exist. In this most generic sense, being applies to things univocally, signifying their common state of existence.Sadra , however, takes a further step and argues that the predication of being takes place with varying degrees of ‘intensity’ (tashaddud ), which he explains by using the word ‘gradation’ (tashkik ).[26] To give an example, light is predicated of the candle, the moon and the sun univocally in that they all participate in the quality of light, luminosity and brightness. Each of these objects, however, displays different degrees of intensity in sharing the quality of light. Light is the most intense and brightest in the sun and weakest in the reflection of the moonlight on the pool. By the same token, being is predicated of the Creator, the source of all beings, and the created in that they both exist. Their share of existence, however, is not the same because God is ontologically prior and superior to contingent beings. Having the most intense state of existence, God has more ‘being’ than other things, which is another way of emphasizing the ontological discontinuity between the Creator and the created.

The same analogy holds true for cause and effect since cause, by definition, precedes effect in the chain of causation: it causes the effect to be what it is, and this imparts on it a higher ontological status.Sadr a calls this “predication byequivocality ” ( haml bi’l-tashkik ) [27] . Sadr a applies gradation to the entire spectrum of being: things partake of being with different degrees of intensity and diminution, strength and weakness, priority and posterity, perfection and imperfection. [28] What is of particular importance for our discussion is that the same principle is applied to the order of thought as well, and Sadr a explains degrees of knowledge in the same way as he explains degrees ofbeing. As we shall see shortly, this is a crucial step towards formulatinga realist ontology of intelligible substances, to which we now turn.