CHAPTER 4: Yahweh, Allah, and the Triune God
For Orientation: A Dialogical and Confessional Pursuit of God
The famed Harvard University scholar John B. Carman is daring to announce that he is “choosing to follow what some might consider an old-fashioned type of comparison: the comparison of ideas concerning the nature of God,” now that for many scholars of religions and theologians this approach has given way to the phenomenological, ritual, and social study of religions.
It is comparative theology that continues pursuing that line of questioning, namely, carefully assessing, comparing, and reflecting on the ways the living faiths embrace the notions of the divine. But even a casual acquaintance with world religions raises the question of whether comparing notes on the divine is an appropriate and useful way of assessing religions in light of the fact that Buddhism, in particular, may not be built on divinity. In support of the comparison, however, can be mentioned that while Theravada Buddhism - unlike Mahayana and particularly its branch, the (Japanese) Pure Land - intentionally seeks to shift the focus in religion away from the deities to highlight the primacy of each person’s ethical pursuit towards enlightenment - the Buddhist view does not entail atheism in the way the term is understood in the post-Enlightenment Global North. There are very few, if any Buddhists - and certainly Gautama would not belong to that group - who deny theexistence
ofdeities
à la modern/contemporary Western secular/scientific atheism.
At the heart of comparative theology is the acknowledgment of a deep dynamic tension concerning religions. On the one hand, “[r]eligions
generate infinite differences.” Attempting to water down or deny real differences among religions, as the “first generation of pluralism” seeks to do, is a failing exercise on more than one account. In this context, just consider how useless and uninteresting a task it would be to compare two items that are alike! On the other hand, “there is a tradition at the very heart of [many living] .
. faiths which is held common. It is not that precisely the same doctrines are believed, but that the same tendencies of thought and devotion exist, and are expressed within rather diverse patterns of thought, characteristic of the faiths in question.”
Add to this the obvious fact that religions are living processes that develop, re-shape, and re-configure over the years and that within any major living tradition differences and diversities are sometimes as dramatic as between some religions.
With this dynamic in mind, for the comparative theological inquiry into the nature and existence of God to be meaningful it must be dialogical and “conversational,”
an honest mutual encounter that also may lead to “mutual transformation,” as John B. Cobb has famously argued.
Dialogical, however, does not mean that therefore - after comparativereligions
- a disinterested, “neutral” investigation is attempted. Theology is confessional by nature, on all sides. “Dialogue must permanently shape the whole theological environment, but dialogue is not the primary goal of theology, which still has to do with the articulation of the truths one believes and the realization of a fuller knowledge of God (insofar as that is possible by way of theology). Both within traditions and across religious boundaries, truth does matter, conflicts among claims about reality remain significant possibilities, and making a case for the truth remains a key part of the theologian’s task.”
Hence, following the Catholiccomparativist
Clooney, this project envisions “Theology as an Interreligious, Comparative, Dialogical, andConfessional
Enterprise.”
That kind of task can only be attempted in the spirit of hospitality. Thepostcolonialist
feminist Mayra Rivera reminds us that “[we] constantly fail to encounter the other asOther
. Time and again we ignore or deny the singularity of theOther
- we don’t see even when the face stands in front of us. We still need, it seems, ‘eyes to see and ears to hear’ - and bodies capable of embracing without grasping.”
What makes hospitality such a fitting metaphor for interfaith relations is that it “involves invitation, response and engagement.”
True hospitality helps us avoid “bearing false witness.”
Hospitality reaches out, makes room,facilitates
dialogue. Even more: “Hospitality is important to all the great world religions today.”
Hence, there is a common denominator. Even though it is true, as mentioned, that often religions may not appear to be hospitable, it is also as true that all living faiths seek hospitality and dream of it.
Something else, however, needs to be added here: while hospitality is a common denominator - in terms of invitation for mutual engagement - it also represents complexity. “It is hard to underestimate the complexity of the task of religious conversation and dialogue, with its interaction of the global and local, the pluralist, the inclusive and the exclusivist strands, the fluctuations between essentialist and changing elements.”
Only a careful attention to details of investigation, respectful honoring of the Otherness of other traditions and their representatives, as well as bold but humble arguing for one’s deepest convictions, in the hopes of being both enriched and being able to share a convincing testimony, makes such a multifaceted enterprise feasible.
Again in this chapter, the order and selection of interfaith encounters vary. The most extreme monotheism of Islam will be engaged first; thereafter, in many ways going to the other extreme, the apparently polytheistic Hinduism will be invited for dialogue, to be followed by Buddhist traditions. There will be no separate focused investigation of Christian-Jewish dialogue because the most burning issue related to Trinity, namely Christology, is discussed in some detail in the volumeChrist and Reconciliation
and the somewhat parallel problems related to the unity of God are investigated in relation to Islam. Furthermore, throughout the investigation, where relevant, Judaism, as the closest monotheistic religion, sharing part of the same Scripture, will be engaged in relation to other faiths.
Allah and the Father of Jesus Christ
Islamic “Classical Theism”
While deeply similar to older monotheistic “cousin” faiths, Judaism and Christianity,
it can be said that “[n]o religious community puts more emphasis on the absolute oneness of God than does Islam.”
Affirmed everywhere in Islamic theology, the shortsura
112 of the Qur’an putsits
succinctly, taking notice also of the fallacy of the Christian confession of the Trinity:
Say: “He is God, One.
God, the Self-Sufficient, Besought of all.
He neither begot, nor was begotten.
Nor is there anyone equal to Him.”
Hence, the basic Muslim confession ofshahada
: “There is no god but God, andMuhammed
is the apostle of God.” So robust is the belief in the unity of God that for some Muslim philosophers and mystics the principle of unity also applies to reality itself.
An essential aspect of the divine unity is Allah’s distinction from all else. The common statement “God is great” (Allahakbar
) means not only that but also that “God is greater” than anything else. Hence, the biggest sin isshirk
, associating anything with Allah.
Importantly,shirk
means literally “ingratitude,” in other words, “that there is only one divine Creator who should be thanked and praised; no other being is to be given the thanks due only to God.”
In that light it is understandable that, unlike modern forms of Christianity, the Muslim faith encompasses all of life. “Faith does not concern a sector of life - no, the whole of life isislam
”
(submission). Hence, the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayers, alms-giving, fasting, and pilgrimage) shape all of life.
Muslim theology of God includes the built-in dynamic between the absolute transcendence of God, because of his incomparability and uniqueness, on the one hand, and on the other hand, his presence andrulership
in the world, which is a call for total obedience.
Unlike Christian theology in general and ClassicalPanentheism
in particular, Muslims “tend to speak of God’s presence in terms of ‘presence with’ rather than ‘presence in’.”
The most celebrated Muslim theologian Al-Ghazali’s
small, but very important studyThe Niche for Lights
- an extended comment on one verse of the Qur’an (24:35), which speaks of the “likeness of His [Allah’s]Light .
. as a niche wherein is a lamp” - at first reading sounds like as an affirmation of monism because it says that everything “other thanAllâh
is, when considered in and by itself, pure not-being. .Therefore, the God-aspect is the sole thing in existence” (1.6).
That, however, is not monism but rather the linking of everything to God, making the created realitydepend
on Allah, similarly to Qur’an 40:68: “He it is Who gives life and brings death. So when He decides upon a matter, He only says to it ‘Be!’ and it is.”
And yet, there is a monistic tendency of a sort - which is understandable in light of Al-Ghazali’s
Sufi background: “Therefore ‘There is no deity but
ALLAH’ is theMany’s
declaration of Unity” (1.7). The same kind of dynamic is not unknown in either Jewish or Christian theology as well, although it can be said that classical theism is an important way to negotiate it.
In his transcendence and incomparability, says Al-Ghazali
, Allah is “infinitely” greater: “The meaning is rather that he is too absolutely Great to be called Greater, or Most Great, by way of relation or comparison - too Great for anyone, whether Prophet or Angel, to grasp the real nature of His Greatness” (1.6), so much so that he “transcends all relations” because “to bear relationship to what is imperfect carries with it imperfection” (2.2). These kinds of statements are meant to secure the total transcendence of God. They of course raise the question of whether “Ghazzali
goes so far in stressing God’s utter difference from all finite things that it becomes increasingly difficult to say how Allah is related to the world as Creator and Judge at all.”
Gleaning from Sufi mysticism, but staying still within the orthodox mainstream (Sunni) tradition, Al-Ghazali
builds a case for different levels of trying to reach this utterly transcendent divine reality, ladders of ascent,
as it were, culminating in those who go beyond mere obedience to the Creator or conceptual understanding to some kind of mystical union and perfection, as described in the ending paragraphs (3.4) ofThe Niche for Lights.
Rightly Keith Ward observes that, similarly to the Jewish Maimonides, regarding Al-Ghazali
we “find that when he presses the quest for understanding the nature of God, he comes to a place where concepts fail of application, but where it seems to make sense to speak of a possible object of experience, knowledge, and bliss.”
One of the most well known ways in Islamic theology to imagine God is the listing of the 99 Beautiful Names of God.
Interestingly, there is no unanimity concerning whether “Allah” belongs to that number or is the hundredth one. Be that as it may, that foundational name is attached to a number of other designations, thus, for example,al-Malik
(the King),al-Salam
(the Peace), andal-Muhaymin
(the Vigilant).
The naming of the divine is more important for Islamic theology than for Christian.
Illustrative here is the beginning of each of theQur’anic
suras
(save one) with the description of God as the “Compassionate, the Merciful.”
As in the Bible, there are occasionally anthropomorphic metaphors of Allah such as the “face of God” (Q 2:115; 92:20) or the “hand(s) of God” (48:10; 5:64), although in general Islam is of course much more cautious about not picturing Allah.
When it comes to major themes in the Qur’an’s teaching about Allah, along with transcendence and mercy, the following seem to be dominant: first, God as creator and origin of everything; second, the divine unity, mentioned above; and, third, the dual emphasis on Allah’s omnipotence and benevolence.
Furthermore, the theme of Allah’s justice and judgment looms large in the Qur’an, and of course - similarly to Christian and Jewish tradition - must be linked with mercy.
Echoing the Christian teaching, Al-Ghazali
reminds us that “My mercy is greater thanMy
wrath,” but that is not a pretext for complacency, as if, “Well, whatever we do, God is merciful.”
Also important, Islam affirms the idea of the freedom of will among humans differently from some Christian traditions. “God would be neither just nor good if He punished people for acts for which they were not responsible,” consequently, human beings must have been created human beings with the ability to choose between wrong and right.
That, however, is not to deny some kind of view of divine predestination, based on Allah’s omniscience and omnipotence; that affirmation does not negate human responsibility and, unlike Christian tradition, has no original sin doctrine behind it. The all-determining power of Allah comes to the fore in the theology of al-Ashari
:
It is always towards God that his thoughts move. God is all in all; everything is in His hand; and since He is the Merciful and the Compassionate, the proper attitude toward Him ispatience .
. in the face of His judgments and loyal obedience to His commands. It is clear that al-Ashari
is a determinist, but it is just as clear that his determinism is throughout pervaded with the thought of God.
Similarly to Christian tradition, Islam moved towards “classical theism” early on. To take an obvious example: the adjectivescompassionate
andmerciful
were transformed in later theology into the more fixed and analytic nounscompassion
andmercy
as attributes of Allah. Importantly, this development began not only in early Islamic theology but has its precedent in the Qur’an itself.
This is what was argued above about the “seeds” of classical theism in the NT. The rise ofkalam
theology was the culmination of this development, as evident in the masterful work of the tenth-century (c.e
.) al-Ashari
. Not unlike in Christian tradition, there was a continuing debate between the traditionalists who wished to retain the verbatim biblical account and theMu’tazilites
, the rationalists, who were drawn to systematic explanations, which in many ways paralleled Christian scholasticism.
“A Short Creed by Al-Ashari
” reads like a Christian confession, yet also obviously rebuts itstrinitarian
claims: “Webelieve .
. [t]hat God is One God, Single, One, Eternal; beside Him no God exists; He has taken to Himself no wife (sahiba
), nor child (walad
).”
The creed lists basic beliefs in God as creator, powerful, providing, and as eschatological consummator.
Similarly to Christian scholastics, theAsharites
, followers of al-Ashari
kalam
theology, engaged in highly sophisticated disputes about, for example, how to understand the attributes of God in relation to God’s essence and so also entered debates with theMu’taziles
. Whereas theMut’tazilites
were not willing to attach the attributes to the essence of God, but rather to his actions, theAsharites
- as well as Al-Ghazali
, as discussed below - linked some attributes to the essence and others to his actions.
A noted debate had to do with the proper conception of the most important attribute of Allah, namely, the speech ofGod, that
God had spoken and revealed himself. TheAsharites
considered the speaking contingent since it obviously had happened in time, whereas forIbn
Hanbal
, God’s speech, the Qur’an, is part of God’s eternal being. That debate in turn has to do with the dispute over whether the Qur’an is created or uncreated.
Furthermore, Muslim theologians of old delved deeply into the debate of God-language, for example, in terms of how to best understand the anthropomorphisms present in the Qur’an.
While there is hardly a classified typology of attributes in Islamic traditions - although many contemporary Islamic theologians familiar with Christian tradition find the classification into “communicable” and “incommunicable”
attributes meaningful - traditionally thirteen attributes mentioned insura
59:22-24 feature first in the list.The most well known listing of attributes, as presented by Al-Ghazali
, includes knowing, powerful, living, willing, hearing, seeing, and speaking,
followed by four “properties”: existence, eternity, unity, andknowability
. Unlike the attributes, which “are not [God’s] essence” - these four properties are part of God’s essence, whereas the seven attributes are “superadded to the essence.”
Similarly to some aspects of Christian theology of God that take a paradoxical approach, the listing of attributes may follow the logic of polarities: “doublets having both a correlative and a paradoxical sense,” such as “Restrainer” and “Expander” or “Creator of Life” and “Creator of Death.”
Luther’s theology of the cross comes to mind here.
While Muslim theology is not in general favorable toward personal characteristics of Allah, in order to highlight the absolute distinction between the Creator and creature, they are also not totally missing from the tradition. Al-Ghazali
may at times say that “God is more tender to his servants than a mother to her suckling-child,” referring this statement to the Prophet Muhammad.
Similarly, there are a few instances of linking human knowledge of self to the knowledge of God, an idea well established in Christian tradition (Augustine), although - for reasons mentioned previously - that is also a theme handled with great care in Islam. Al-Ghazali’s
opening statement inThe Alchemy of Happiness
states boldly: “Knowledge of self is the key to the knowledge of God, according to the saying: ‘He who knows himself knows God’ and, as it is written in the Koran, ‘We will show themOur
signs in the world andin themselves
, that the truth may be manifest to them.’”
Early Muslim theology’s relation to pagan philosophy was not much different from that of Christian tradition. There was a great appreciation and liberal borrowing from the greatest masters of antiquity, including Plato and Aristotle, and at times, reminders of the inadequacy of philosophy alone, apart fromQur’anic
authority, to establish divine truths.
As early as the ninth-century (c.e
.) work of the famous philosopher-theologian Al-Farabi
, we see significant Platonic and Aristotelian influences. Consider his listing of the attributes of God under the rubric “Metaphysical Theology”; they could easily come from a typical Christian manual: simplicity, infinity, immutability, unity, intelligence, “God Knows All Things through Knowledge of Himself”; “God is Truth”; “God is Life.”
As mentioned above, Muslim theologians also engaged the “proofs” for the existence of God borrowing from Aristotle.
Similarly to Christian and some other living faith traditions, including Hindubhakti
traditions, the mystically oriented Sufi traditions were less drawn to philosophical and conceptual clarifications of the attributes and instead majored on a prayerfulapophatic
attitude and spiritual vision. Importantly - and differently from much of Christian asceticism, which tended to be somewhat isolationist, but similarly to much of Buddhist monastic life - these early Muslim ascetics sought to live out their faith in the midst of the common people and thus helped disseminate Sufi spirituality at the grassroots level. If obedience - unreserved submission - to Allah is the hallmark of much of mainline Islam, then love of God, similarly to, say, Hindubhakti
traditions, is the defining issue of Sufism.
At times deemed heretical, Sufism also was deeply integrated into the fabric of Muslim faith and in many cases its followers played significant roles in the missionary work. A shining example is the greatest Islamic theologian, al-Ghazali
of the eleventh century, who was both Sufi and a great intellectual, even philosophical, mind. In him the best of early Muslim spiritual, mystical, philosophical, scientific, and theological influences coalesced.
The Unity of God and Christian Confession of Trinity
The Qur’an absolutely and unequivocally affirms the oneness of God. According to Al-Ghazali
, on the one hand, that “God isone .
. means the negation of anything other than He and the affirmation of His essence.” On the other hand, oneness means the denial of plurality in God: “He does not accept divisibility, i.e., He has no quantity, neither definition nor magnitude. It also means that He has no equal in rank and absolutely no equal in any manner.” Similarly to Christian tradition, the unity also includes the unity of God’s existence and essence.
The leading contemporary Muslim theologian, active also in the “Common Word” project,Seyyed
Hossein
Nasr, notes that the traditional Christian creedal confessioncredo inunum
Deum
materially repeats the affirmation of the Muslim confessionlā
iāha
illa
’Llāahā
.
TheQur’anic
teaching categorically rejects any notion ofthreeness
of God as set forth in the classic passage, 4:171, according to which Jesus is “merely God’s messenger and HisWord .
. and a spirit from Him”;
indeed, thetrinitarian
confession is nothing less than blasphemy (5:76). A foundational reason for the strict rebuttal of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity includes the absolute exaltedness of Allah and the sheer absurdity of the idea of God having a child by a woman.
(What is remarkable about this rebuttal of the Trinity is that ironically it gives Jesus a high status, as he is called the “word” and “spirit,” whatever the precise theological meanings in Islam were!)
Muslims reject the Christian concept of “God in Christ” on the ground of God’s glory and greatness (takbīr
). For them, it is unworthy for a sovereign God to be human. In his essay, “‘Greater is God,’ ContemporaryTakbīr
: Muslim and Christian,”
KennethCragg
seeks to find a connecting point between the Islamic notion oftakbīr
and the ChristianMagnificat
. His argument is that the concept oftakbīr
is a shared reality between the two religions. He insists that as the concept oftakbīr
(Allāh
Akbar
) is crucial in Islam, the ChristianMagnificat
(magnify the Lord) is essential to Christians and runs through the whole Bible. Again, as the termislām
(submission) conveys that the core of Islam is to make God to be all in all, in Christianity God’s being “all in all” is what NT Christology is all about. But “the crucial question has to do with the nature of the ‘greatness’ we affirm.”
In that light, from a Christian perspective it can be suggested that the incarnation or thekenosis
of God does not necessarily oppose God’s greatness. On the contrary,Cragg
argues, it is in Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, that what Muslims desire to assert regarding God’s greatness is effected: it is in Jesus Christ, “God in Christ,” that God achieved his intention toward humanity. “For is that sovereignty truly sovereign if it fails to take action against the empire of ignorance and evil in humankind?”
Again, this is a statement by and from a Christian theology and should be presented as an invitation for mutual dialogue.
Another major reason for the categorical rejection of Trinity in Islamic theology is that it representsshirk
. On this issue, we need to clarify “what Christology isnot
, whatShirk
is, and what isnot
Shirk
.” When the Qur’an gives “Praise to God who took not up a son” (17:111, 19:35, 19:92; 25:2), it has to be noted that statement is also affirmed by Christians as it is not a statement about incarnation but rather ofadoptionism
.Cragg
suggests that instead of speaking of incarnation in terms of “taking up,” we should rather think oftanāzul
(descending). “Deification inittikhādh
[“taking up”]is all human and chronically misguided. Intanāzul
the initiative is all God’s and blessedly compassionate,” he notes. A way to help Muslims grasp this idea is to establish the connection between Christ’s preexistence and that of the Qur’an.
Often behind the Muslim charge ofshirk
may also be an Arian heretical notion according to which Christ is “associated” as closely as possible with God, but is not God.
But that view was categorically rejected by Christian creeds. Now, what isshirk
? It is “plural worship,” but it is not “the manifold ‘association’ that exists between Creator and creature, between Lord and servant.”
In other words, God’s gracious relation or association with humanity, the eternal Word becoming human, is notshirk
. Muslim tradition also, of course, speaks freely and robustly of God’s “association” withnondivine
realities, in creation, providence, prophecy, and law. In all Semitic faiths, we find that “God can be known by man only in conjunction with the human situation.”
“In each faith, there is ‘God and. . .’ In Judaism, the central ‘association’ ispeoplehood
and covenant - ‘God and His People.’ In Islam, the central ‘association’ isprophethood
- ‘God and his Prophet.’ In Christianity, the central ‘association’ is Christ - ‘God in Christ.’”
In response to the charge ofshirk
, recall the statement byPannenberg
that “beyond the unity no more can be said about God. . Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity is in fact concrete monotheism in contrast to the notions of an abstract transcendence of the one God and abstract notions of a divine unity that leaves no place for plurality.”
Rather than three gods, in Christian theology “[t]hetrinitarian
persons .
. are simply manifestations and forms - eternal forms - of the one divine essence.”
That was affirmed not only by some of the earliest Christian theological writings on the Trinity, such as Gregory of Nyssa’sOn “Not Three Gods”
in the Christian East or Augustine in the West, but even in the most authoritative creeds. Just consider theAthanasian
creed
, one of the earliest ones: “That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit.
But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co eternal.”
Rightly, the medieval Cardinal Nicholas ofCusa
reminded us that the oneness of God is prior to the plurality,
and hence, “When you begin to count the Trinity you depart from the truth”
because the three “persons” make one God!
(In that light, Nicholas’s material affirmation of the classic notion of the “simplicity of God” should not be hastily dismissed by contemporary theologians who see it as a way of undermining thetrinitarian
communion!) Similarly to Muslim theology, Nicholas ultimately appealed to revelation: when the Bible tells us that God is love, it means that there must be an internal distinction in the one godhead to allow for the “lover” to show love to “another”
- an argument presented by other Christian theologians as well (Richard of St. Victor). Furthermore, by the same logic, God’s self-revelation - a premise affirmed by both traditions - for the cardinal required that there be the “internal” Word in God who alone, as incarnate, can reveal God to us.
Only God - an “insider,” if we may say so - can unveil to humans God.
What about incarnation? Isn’t that necessarily a statement about plurality in the Christian understanding of God: one God “up there in heaven” and the other one “down here on earth”? Christian tradition negotiates that dilemma with two ancient concepts, namely, the “Augustinian” rule according to which the works of the Trinityad extra
(in relation to creation) are undivided,
andperichoresis
, the principle of mutual indwelling of Father, Son, and Spirit.
Consider the prologue to John’s Gospel, which speaks of the Word (Logos
) that became flesh (1:14) as not only beingwith
God butbeing
God (1:1). Similarly, consider theJohannine
Jesus’ saying that “The Father is in me and I am in the Father” (10:38).
Hence, Christianity affirms that “[i
]n worshipping Jesus one does not worship anotherthan
God; one simply worships God,” as difficult as that statement is in light of its Christological ramifications, namely, that Jesus, the human person, is considered to be divine.
Nor is Christian theology or the Bible ever affirming what the Qur’an claims to be a Christian statement: “Behold, God is the Christ, son of Mary” (Q 5:72).
Christian faith, rather says that Christ is God.
What if Muslim and Christian theologians took these affirmations of the unity of God from the Christian side as guidelines when working towards a common understanding without artificially ignoring the differences?Could then the promise by the Muslim thinkerSeyyed
Hossein
Nasr be redeemed at least to some extent: “Every question regarding the Trinity can be resolved between Christianity and Islam by a truly metaphysical penetration into the meaning of the fundamental polarization of the One.”
All in all, in engaging another radically monotheist faith, whether Jewish or Islamic, Christian faith can also help clarify its own core beliefs and teach its members about the correct way of negotiating unity-in-diversity/diversity-in-unity.
Do Muslims and Christians Believe in the Same God?
The Muslim theologianSeyyed
Hossein
Nasr puts the question of the relationship between Allah and the God of the Bible in perspective:
There are already those on the Christian side who assert that the Christian God is not the same as Allah, who is an Arabic lunar deity or something like that. Such people who usually combine sheer ignorance with bigotry should attend a Sunday mass in Arabic in Bethlehem, Beirut, Amman, or Cairo and hear what Arabic term the Christians of these cities use for the Christian God. Nor is God simply to be identified with one member of the Christian Trinity, one part of three divinities that some Muslims believe wrongly that Christians worship. Allah, or God, is none other than the One God of Abraham, Isaac, Ishmael, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad.
Now, what is at stake in this debate? Brieflyput,
both peace and theological integrity. “A deep chasm of misunderstanding, dislike, and even hatred separates many Christians and Muslims today. Christian responses toAllah .
. will either widen that chasm or help bridge it. If for Christians Allah is a foreign and false god, all bridge building will suffer,” notesMiroslav
Volf
, who reminds us that “[t]he stakes are high. Muslims and Christians together comprise more than half of humanity.”
While this practical reason alone would substantiate rigorous and widespread common work on this topic, there is also a deep and foundational theological issue at stake. The question at hand has to do with even more than just interfaith hospitality; in the words of the Jewish theologian John D.Levenson
, “no monotheist can ever accuse anyone - certainly not another monotheist - of worshipinganother
God, only (at most) of improperly identifying the one God that both seek to serve.”
Currently, it is a commonplace scholarly consensus that the termallah
predates the time of Muhammad. It is also a consensus that - against the older scholarly view and still a regular popular opinion - the name did not originate in the context of moon worship in Arabia (even though the crescent became Islam’s symbol and moon worship was known in that area).
The term derives from Aramaic andSyriac
words for God (elah
,alah
).
In that light it is fully understandable that even among Christians in Arabic-speaking areas the term Allah is the designation for God.
However, to say that both etymologically and theologically both Muslims and Christians refer to the same God when they speak of the Divine is not yet to settle the issue ofwhat kind
of God that is. In other words, “The real difficulty lies not in identifying the ultimate referent of the word ‘God,’ but knowing how to respond to the dizzying array of predicatesabout
God that sometimesseem
contradictory.” That is important to note since “[n]o Muslim orChristian .
. worships ageneric
God or the mereconcept
of God in some vague, philosophical mist.”
Both Islam and Christianity claim to be based on divine revelation and seek to ground their understanding of the God whom believers worship, and to whom they devote their lives, on Scripture. While those Scriptures and the subsequent theological reflection and tradition share a lot in common, significant differences also complicate our clarifying the extent and meaning of the foundational consensus on the same referent of the term itself.
This issue is not new to either tradition. As early as in the seventh Christian century, John of Damascus, the most celebrated theologian in the Christian East with firsthand knowledge of the Muslim faith
delved deeply into it in the last chapter of hisDeHaeresibus
(On Heresies
) - an encyclopedic investigation of all sorts of heresies, past and current, altogether no less than 101 in number! The Damascene’s assessment of Muslims is harsh and terse, considering them “idol worshippers.”
On the constructive side, John makes the important point, citing thetawhid
confession, “He [Muhammad] says that there is one God, creator of all, who is neither begotten, nor has begotten,” in other words, robustly supporting the shared doctrine of the unity of God, which he also exposits in more detail inDe FideOrthodoxa
(1.5), importantly under the heading of “On the Holy Trinity”! Subsequently, in the rest of the tract he responds to typical Muslim charges, includingtheshirk
,
and also engages in counterattack in terms of Muhammad’s family and other similar Christian criticisms.
Subsequently debates continued, reaching no consensus.
A highly important paradigm of the Christian approach to Allah comes from Nicholas ofCusa
, who testified to the horrendous disaster in the capital of the Eastern Christian Church, Constantinople, as the forces of the Ottoman Empire under the leadership ofMehmed
II in 1453 violently and brutally conquered the city. Following the end of May ransacking of the holy city, in September of the same year the Catholic cardinal penned the highly influentialDe PaceFidei
(On the Harmonious Peace of Religions
) which, instead of supporting Pope Nicholas V’s call to another crusade against the infidels, sought to summon a conference “in Jerusalem,” under the auspices of the Heavenly King of Kings between rival religions to achieve a “harmony among religions” and “perpetual peace.”
Even with the horror of the devastated city in his mind - which may remind us of the events of 9/11 in New York City - Nicholas asserted that all people, including the Muslims, worship one and the same God “in everything they are seen to adore” and that if they fail to do so, it is because of ignorance.
That is because, as his most famous dictum puts it,una
religio
invarietate
rituum
,“
one religion in a variety of rites.”
Not thatCusa
was anything like current pluralists to whom all deities are but human interpretations of the same Ultimate Reality (Hick). The cardinal believed firmly that the biblical view of God is the truest and correct one and that other religions, including Islam are beset with errors.
In his subsequent treatiseCribratio
Alkorani
(Shifting of the Qur’an
), Nicholas was not soft on the perceived mistakes among Muslims concerning the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and Christology, and he also issued a call for the Muslim leader to have God “open youreyes .
. and grant this [enlightenment] to you.”
All in all - particularly in light of the catastrophic events and the prejudices of his times - “[f]rom
a Christian perspective . his strategy can be seen as an exercise in charitable interpretation,”
inCusa’s
words, he, “presupposed not a faith that is other but a faith that is one and the same.”
While the Protestant Reformers were certainly not known for interfaith hospitality,
surprisingly Luther clearly assumed the common deity of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam even when seriously undermining and critiquing the deficiency of their faith: “All who are outside this Christian people, whether heathen, Turks, Jews, or false Christians and hypocrites - even though they believe in and worship only the one, true God - nevertheless they do not know what his attitude is toward them.”
In other words, Luther deplores the lack of knowledge of the divine grace and love among the non-Christians even though they wish to cling to the right God.
While not often highlighted, it is a well-known scholarly fact that the identification of the Christian and Muslim God - even in the midst of highly polemic debates and mutual criticisms - was by and large the traditional Christian opinion;
in that sense, Luther follows tradition.
A number of important tasks are involved in the consideration of the issue whether Islam and Christianity worship the same God. First, the investigation must begin with an acknowledgment and careful look at the implications for Christian tradition of the fact that Islam speaks of God in universal terms, as “the God of all people,” and therefore, theQur’anic
message “is a message for all people: all people should become Muslims, for God is the sovereign God of all people.”
Related to that is Islam’s nature as a “public faith”
- but such is also the Christian faith.
Differences come to the fore with regard to the fact that Christian theology links God with all peoples, and the rest of creation, in the context and from the perspective of the election of a particular people (first in the OT and then in the NT). For Islam, the idea of the selection of a particular people by God is totally unknown, similarly, the idea of the covenant.
What Islam does is universalize not only Judaism but also Hinduism and Buddhism.
Part of the universalizing tendency is the important promise insura
42:15: “God is our Lord and your Lord. Our deeds concern us and your deeds concern you. There is no argument between us and you. God will bring us together, and to Him is the [final] destination.” It is noteworthy that this samesura
also mentions that “had God willed, He would have made them one community; but He admits whomever He will into His mercy” (v. 8) and that “whatever you may differ in, the verdict therein belongs to God” (v. 10). The important reason, hence, why Muslim theology can unequivocally affirm the identity of the God of Islam and God of Christianity has to do with the principle of continuity - in terms of fulfillment - between the divine revelations given first to the Jews, then to Christians, and finally, in the completed form, to Islam (2:136; 6:83-89; 29:46).
While Christian tradition understands the principle of universality differently, based on its own Scriptures and doctrine of God, materially it shares the same viewpoint: the God of the Bible, Yahweh, the Father of Jesus Christ, is the God of all nations and the whole of creation, “the all-determining reality” (Pannenberg
). Therefore, both faiths also are deeplymissionary
by nature.
Second, an important asset to Christian theology for reflecting on the relation of Allah to the God of the Bible is its relation to Judaism. There are hardly Christians who would deny that Yahweh and the Father of Jesus Christare
one and the same God. Yet the Jews no less adamantly oppose thetrinitarian
confession of faith.
This simply means that Christian tradition is able to confess belief in and worship One God even when significant differences exist in the understanding of the nature of that God - and, indeed, more than that: even when the differences are deeply divisive and seemingly contradictory. Importantly, the Jewish theologian JohnLevenson
concludes: “In the last analysis, the Christian and the Muslim conceptions of the one God have enough in common to make a productive comparison possible, but as in any responsible comparison, the contrasts must not be sugared over.”
To confess one God does not mean requiring an identical understanding of the nature of that God if there are significant, wide-reaching agreements, as there are between Christians and Muslims, including the oneness of God, God as Creator, God’s love, and so forth.
Just consider how widely the views of various Christian traditions may differ from each other. Add to the equation the third monotheistic faith, Judaism, and the differences are real - even when these threeAbrahamic
faiths, having their roots deeply embedded in the Jewish Bible claim the same One God.
In relation to Jewish theologians, contemporary Christian theology reminds them of the possibility of conceiving distinctions in the one God in terms of semi-personified agents such as Word, Spirit, and Wisdom, and concepts such as glory and the name of Yahweh. Would anything like that apply to Islam? What about the eternity of the Word as Qur’an? What about thesentness
of the Prophet(s)?
Recently it has also been suggested that “‘Word of God’ and ‘Spirit of God’ in Christian and IslamicChristologies
” could serve as “A Starting Point for Interreligious Dialogue.”
The third task has to do with the clarification of many misunderstandings on the Islamic side concerning what they (mistakenly) believe the Christiantrinitarian
confessions means. What if it is the case that “[w]hat
the Qur’an denies about God as the Holy Trinity has been denied by every great teacher of the church in the past and ought to be denied by every orthodox Christian today”?
We have already noted most of the typical misconceptions among the Muslims, including the inclusion of Mary along with Father and Son,adoptionistic
andArianist
interpretations, and the blunt charge oftritheism
. Only patient and painstaking mutual dialogue may help correct and clarify these kinds of issues. Again, history provides us useful examples. Just consider Paul of Antioch’s (11th-12th centuryc.e
.)Letter to a Muslim,
in which he sought to correct typical misconceptions and offer a constructive proposal that both defended the unity of God and tried to explain the Trinity in light of Muslim sensibilities.
“By refusing to employ the Christian termuqnum
(hypostasis), and preferring to it the native Arabic and theologically neutral termism
(name), he is apparently attempting to disassociate his explanation from the polemical tradition which preceded him and to present the doctrine in a manner acceptable to Muslims.” Furthermore, he argues that “[a]ll
the names and attributes of God stem from the threesubstantival
attributes .
. of existence, speech, and life,” and speech is related to incarnation andsonship
.
Apart from how convincing or successful the Catholictheologian’s
construction may be, its tactics are admirable, namely, correction and “contextualization.” At least the short tract of twenty-four pages was important enough to inspire what became the most significant Muslim attack ever on Christian tradition and theology, that is,Ibn
Taymiyyah’s
massiveAl-Jawab
Al-Sahih
(“The Correct Answer to Those Who Changed the Religions of Christ”), written around 1320c.e
. While this apologetic works goes far beyond that of Paul’s, it was occasioned by that short writing.
Fourth, we must clarify what and how much can be said about the identity of the two monotheistic tradition’s God. It is significant that while the highly influential interfaith statement “A Common WordBetween
Us and You” did not explicitly state that Christians and Muslims believe in the same God, it quoted from the Qur’an, which unequivocally affirms the identity: “We believe what was revealed to us and what was revealed to you. Our God and your God is one, and to him we submit as Muslims” (Al’Ankabut
29:46). And again: “God is our Lord and your Lord; we have our works and you have your works; there is no argument between us and you; God brings us together; and to him is the final destiny” (AlShura
, 42:15). Both Christian and Muslim signatories commonly endorsed that affirmation. Not surprisingly, some Christian theologians and leaders vehemently opposed that affirmation.
The Roman Catholic Church’s hospitable and theologically astute statement on Islam is a useful starting point for specifically Christian reflections:
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion.
While this statement fromNostraAetate
fails to give a blank affirmation of the identity of Allah and the Christian God,
it seems to be assuming it and, at minimum, affirms wholeheartedly its strict monotheistic orientation in line withAbrahamic
faiths. At the same time, the statement is not silent about Islam’s opposition totrinitarian
confession in terms of Jesus’ divinity.
As said, generally speaking, Muslim theology and theologians affirm the identity of the Qur’an’s and the Bible’s God.
Consider only theQur’anic
passage 29:46. That said, however, the same divine revelation to Muslims, the Qur’an, also categorically condemns Christians for seriously compromising the dearest part of the doctrine of God, God’s oneness!
This means that on the Muslim side, much work has to be done in reconciling these two seemingly contradictory claims. On the Christian side, as even the Vatican II statement illustrates, a continuing carefulnuancing
of the issue - apart from some conservative outright rebuttals - continues. Illustrative is the series of essays “Do Christians and Muslims Worship the Same God?” inChristian Century
in 2004, to which not only Muslim and Christian but also Jewish theologians contributed. While none of the writers denied the same reference point among the traditions’ understanding of God, only the Muslim writer gave an unreserved positive answer. The Jewish theologian affirmed the common basis if differences in understanding of God are not ignored, and the three Christians representing different theological traditions (Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and evangelical) all, albeit somewhat differently, expressed some continuing ambiguity with regard to identification of the faith’s God with regard to character of the Divine.
A growing number of Christian theologians are coming to the conviction that to deny the identity of Allah and the God of the Bible creates more problems than its affirmation.
Miroslav
Volf’s
recentAllah:A
Christian Response
argues for the identity while delving deeply into historical and continuing deep theological divergences with regard to the nature of God.
Having affirmed that Muslims and Christians believe in the same God, the Dutch Christian philosopher of religionHendrik
Vroom “would like to add that Christians, on the basis of the gospel, are betterable
to know God than Muslims are.”
This is not an expression of a puffed-up spirit of superiority but rather a confident call to Muslims from a Christian perspective to consider rich values in the Christiantrinitarian
conception of faith in one God. The same was affirmed by the French Roman Catholic Church in extended exchange with local Muslims. Rather than pushing Trinity to the margins, it was stated that “[t]he Church is committed to dialogue above all because of her faith in thetrinitarian
mystery of the one God . [which] makes us catch sight of a life of fellowship and exchanges in God himself, source of all mission and all dialogue.” Dialogue corresponds to the being of the Triune God and hence the confession of faith in one God as Father, Son, and Spirit; eternal loving communion is an invitation to dialogue and engagement.
The Finnish theologianRisto
Jukko
, expert in Muslim-Christian relations, summarizes thetrinitarian
foundation of the dialogue as it came to expression in the French situation: “It seems that only the concept of thetrinitarian
God can be the basis for fruitful interreligious Christian dialogue with non-Christians .
. [especially] Muslims. Even though the concept is an article of Christiantheology .
. it unites transcendence and immanence, creation and redemption in such a way that from the Christian standpoint dialogue becomes possible and meaningful. It is the hermeneutical key to interpret the religious experiences of non-Christians (as well as of Christians).”
This much can be said even though - as paradoxical as it may sound - the Trinity can hardly serve as the beginning point of the dialogue since the Islamic faith denies it at the outset.
As discussed in the previous chapter, an authentic interfaith engagement is always a give-and-take event in which the Triune God is present. Not only can Christians contribute and challenge the Muslim faith, but so also are they challenged and enriched by theOther
. This is hardly anything new and novel in Christian tradition. Just consider Aquinas’sSumma Contra Gentiles,
which not only argues for the truth of Christian faith against other faiths but also liberally utilizes Muslim (and pagan philosophers’) resources in explicating the biblical faith.
Notes