Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Chapter II: Hermeneutics of the Religio-Intellectual Project and the Relationship between Intellect and Revelation

Introduction:

By the time ‘Ali Naqvi rose to social prominence, in the early 1930s, Muslim India was already in midst of a period of intense political and social activism. The preceding chapter showed that ‘Ali Naqvi was quite aware of these sociopolitical developments. It also explained that among the various crises - and there were many, ranging from political and communal to social and economic - faced by the South Asian Shi’i community, it was the religious crisis that concerned ‘Ali Naqvi the most. His audience included, on the one hand, Muslims who had abandoned any active affiliation with Islam, and on the other, those haplessly caught between the criticisms of Islam and religion (both from within and from without), and unable to intellectually respond to these censures. The latter situation had forced many to waiver in their religious beliefs and practices.From ‘Ali Naqvi’s writings, the preceding chapter also delineated a detailed account of the underlying anxieties that motivated this religio-intellectual project. This religious crisis occupied his intellectual energies for the rest of his life.

Presenting an articulation of these issues in his own words, the chapter also discussed how he examined and understood the contours of this crisis of religion, and why he saw a careful response to this crisis as essential to his role as a religious leader. ‘Ali Naqvi’s multi-faceted writings and intellectual career are, therefore, a response to this religious dilemma. Beginning in this chapter then I turn to ‘Ali Naqvi’s response to the religious crisis.

Before turning to that however, let me recapitulate the picture that emerged from his perception of the religious crisis. Early in his intellectual career ‘Ali Naqvi was witness to harsh criticisms of religion, claims such as “religion corrupts society”, “hinders its progress”, especially because “it is dogmatic and irrational”. Based upon these opinions, many among the Indian Muslim political and economic elite had sought to eradicate religion from society. Though he accepted many of the criticisms made against religion, ‘Ali Naqvi disagreed with the overall diagnosis of the problem, as well as the suggested solutions to it. For him, religion was society’s greatest asset and must not be conflated with its false and corrupt imitations. As the greatest source of peace and islah, it deserves to be cherished and protected simultaneously from its false imitations and misplaced criticisms.

In engaging his secular interlocutors (those who had abandoned religion altogether or those who were skeptical of religion’s ability to meaningfully contribute to society) it is this concept of islah that he finds his best hope of convincing them. Since islah of society was a major concern of his time and shared even by modernists and the secular western elite, it is through this idea ‘Ali Naqvi sought to find common ground with them. In Religion and the Intellect1 , for example, ‘Ali Naqvi invokes islah and reminds these interlocutors that human nature is comprised of two powerful forces, animality and ignorance on the one hand, and the intellect (‘aql) and knowledge on the other. Suspended between these two, it has always been religion’s foremost function to employ the latter to overcome the former. Religious ideas such as accountability and reward/punishment in the hereafter are nothing but ways to accomplish this and to suppress destructive forces of animal passions and sentimentality within human reality.

Furthermore, he argued, irrespective of any religion, the intellect has itself acknowledged the naturalness of this method of accountability and this need for overcoming human animality. Therefore, the proponents of islah of the Indian Muslim society should not downplay these religious concepts and must reckon religion their ally in the islah of the human society.2 It will then be ‘Ali Naqvi’s burden to prove to these interlocutors why religion is necessary for social reform and indispensable for a healthy society.3

Turning now to ‘Ali Naqvi’s response, it is pertinent to describe, albeit in a summary fashion, the lines upon which it was formulated. For ‘Ali Naqvi the effectiveness of this response rests upon its ability to penetrate and persuade the new Muslim mindset. If the core of the problem is his audience’s complete fascination with the western ideas and scientific achievements, then the intellectual response could barely ignore it. A relevant passage where ‘Ali Naqvi most clearly expresses this concern has already been cited.4

And what constitutes this mindset? It demands reasonableness of faith-based commitments and practices, and is skeptical of religion’s ability to meet this criterion any longer; it is so because for this mindset religion stands for nothing more than agesold withered dogmatism: “They say that religion is a combination of superstitions (kharafat) and illusions (auham)”, noted ‘Ali Naqvi in his early writings.5

This widespread opinion about a natural conflict between the intellect and religion meant that no meaningful effort to revive religion could avoid attending to it. In the formative years of his intellectual life ‘Ali Naqvi would tirelessly return to it - mostly by addressing it directly, but sometimes as a note on the side too - clarifying the meaning of religion and the intellect, and arguing for their inherent compatibility and complementarity. In fact, his discussion about the relationship between religion and the intellect is the groundwork upon which the task of theological reconstruction will be carried out. More pertinently, ‘Ali Naqvi’s resolution of the debate surrounding the relationship between the intellect and revelation became the cornerstone of his entire intellectual corpus: the inherent compatibility and mutual necessity of revelation and the intellect was not simply stated and argued for to silence criticisms of “irrational religion” from “progressive intellect”, but thoroughly enacted in his writings. Unless the interlocutor or the nature of argumentation explicitly demanded textual proofs, ‘Ali Naqvi invariably provided intellectual arguments in support of his point, followed then by the textual proof. In consistently following this method of argumentation, there is an explicit privileging of the intellectual arguments over the textual ones. Being a permanent feature of his writings that shaped the way response to the religious crisis was articulated, and given the pivotal significance of this hermeneutical aspect of the theological project, it is best to begin the discussion of his response to the crisis of religion with it. A proper understanding of this hermeneutic foundation upon which this religio-intellectual project was carried out will not only provide a clearer understanding of this project, it will also enable the comparison of ‘Ali Naqvi’s project with that of Muslim intellectuals of his contemporaneous era and beyond.

Relationship between the Intellect and Mazhab (Religion)

The Indispensability of the Intellect:

In our discussion of the religious crisis, I noted ‘Ali Naqvi’s positing the problem of distinguishing between a true reformer (muslih) and a mischief-maker (mufsid). In La tufsidu, ‘Ali Naqvi admits straightforwardly that the task of discerning corruption from reform is quite onerous: First, it is not always possible to separate the spheres of sincere reform and corruption since both are carried out in the same domains, both attempt to change the status quo (whether it be social, economic, political or religious); for example, killing a person could be simultaneously an act of reform or corruption depending upon the point of view from which it is viewed. Second - and this follows from the first - that a reformer is usually blamed for being an instigator of mischief and every mischief-maker presents himself to the world as the true reformer with a positive cause. Third, both reformers and the corrupt use the same methods and techniques to persuade people to their program, for example, “preaching and counsel (va‘z va nasihat), chastisement and reproach (zijr va taubikh), and admonition and criticism (sarzanish va malamat)”; finally, even when a mischief-maker knows in his heart that his program is to bring corruption and mischief, he would never accept that he is mischief-maker. He will always defend himself saying, “I want to stop this world from following its wrong ways and make it tread upon the right way. That is why I am not a mischief-maker but a true reformer.” Therefore, ‘Ali Naqvi notes, “Every mischief-maker can be seen as a true reformer and vice versa…” It becomes extremely difficult for those who are unaware of the intentions of a true reformer and a mischief-maker to form an opinion about the veracity of their respective agendas.6

Yet that is not all. Making reference to the Qur’anic verse, “When it is said to them do not [spread] corruption in the world, they say indeed we are sincere reformers.

But they are indeed mischief-makers but they are not aware,”7 and the example of Imam Husayn, ‘Ali Naqvi further argues that the task of discernment between a mischiefmaker and a sincere reformer becomes even harder due to the accusations and propaganda of the former against the latter. The mischief-maker employs every opportunity to discredit the sincere reformer, as it happened in the case of Imam Husayn throughout the Karbala episode who was accused of “insinuating chaos and stirring up disturbance within a peaceful environment.”8

Yet notwithstanding the difficulty entailed in the process of discernment, ‘Ali Naqvi insists that given how crucial it is for the wellbeing of a healthy society - that corruption be separated from reform - it is both desired and obligatory for a society to carry it out with patience and diligence: “If intimidated by this mental struggle [of distinguishing between a sincere reformer and a mischief-maker] a human being refuses to ponder altogether [this matter], and deems the calls of a sincere reformer untrustworthy (because they can be those of a mischief-maker) …[then] the aim of the world’s reform will die out.” But how does one accomplish this task of discernment? For ‘Ali Naqvi, the litmus test of this discernment process is whether the claimant of reform invites thinking and careful reflection over his or her claims, or simply demands blind adherence to the proclaimed agenda. If it is the latter, for ‘Ali Naqvi, it is definitely the voice of a mischief-maker:

Remember! This is a great criterion of a sincere reformer’s veracity. If a sincere reformer asks of the world to close its eyes and ears and accept what is said out of intimidation then understand that there is a defect in that islah. And if a sincere reformer presents his plan of action by saying, “Carefully think about what I say, ponder over it, and then if you are willing to accept it, accept it” - that is to say, [the sincere reformer] awakens the powers of the intellect, and lifts the veils of doubts - it will mean that he trusts his truthfulness and he is sincere to people, not disingenuous. Now it is up to the world to ponder over his teachings and guidance and to seek signs of reality in it. On the other hand, if there is a group that has attempted to silence the voice of this plaintiff of islah and barred people from thinking, he will be the sincere reformer and these people, the mischief-makers.9

In brief, navigating the competing claims of those claiming the status of sincere reformer requires proper application of one’s intellectual resources, namely the intellect itself.

The chapter on religious crisis also brought to the fore the crisis of religious authority. Here we turn to explore this issue in more detail. For ‘Ali Naqvi the ‘ulama’ are part of the third division of fasad’s four-fold division, the third being constituted by peoples or groups responsible for perpetuating fasad. ‘Ali Naqvi’s arguments to emphasize the significance of the religious authority of the ‘ulama’ parallel his arguments for religion itself. Similar to his comments about true religion and its false imitations, he makes a distinction between the real ‘ulama’, and those who appear in their guise but are undeserving of this title; just as one needs to disband mischief from sincere reform (while they may both appear in the same guise) sincere ‘ulama’ need to be distinguished from their fake imitators. It is through the hands of these phony ‘ulama’ that mischief occurs and religion and religious scholarship is discredited.10 In any case, according to ‘Ali Naqvi, since religion is indispensable, religious scholars are indispensable as well. Therefore, argues ‘Ali Naqvi, the real ‘ulama’ are absolutely needed: “If religion is needed then there will certainly be a group that is knowledgeable of its rulings, and others who are not. In this case, it is necessary that those [ignorant of religious rulings] consult with those who are knowledgeable… [People of] the latter group are called imitators (muqallid) and [those of] the former, jurists (mujtahid)”.11

Similarly, for ‘Ali Naqvi the burgeoning suspicion of ‘ulama’s sincerity is due to the presence ofcharlatans( claiming to be ‘ulama’). Contrary to this widespread opinion, their presence and ability to influence society only proves how crucial a role ‘ulama’ have played throughout Islamic history: more valuable and important something is, more frequent and dangerous will be its false imitations. It follows from that that if religion and religious scholars were powerless and of negligible import, their imitations could hardly cause any harm to the cause of sincere reform.12

But the same problem presents itself again: how does one distinguish the sincere and real ‘ulama’ from their fake imitators? Again, ‘Ali Naqvi’s answer emphasizes the centrality of the intellect in the process: instead of blindly following a religious scholar, one should employ one’s intellect to assess the character of these scholars and their juristic abilities, in other words, their knowledge and practice. ‘Ali Naqvi further argued that even ‘ulama’ have never claimed that following a religious scholar should be a blind process in which one should withhold one’s critical and analytical faculties. It is only after careful assessment and upon assurance of confidence in a religious scholar’s knowledge and right practice that one should follow him. One cannot entrust responsibility of one’s practice to someone without first developing trust in that person’s abilities, a trust which can only occur through careful deliberation and research (tahqiq). Islam that forbade blind imitation of popular fads and social trends would also forbid such undiscerning attitude.

Therefore, the decision to follow the opinion of someone more qualified in a particular domain of expertise is possible only after the intellect has carefully weighed and consented to the reasonability of the judgment. This claim that one cannot follow anyone simply because others follow him is a result of Islam’s emphasis on employing one’s God-given faculty of the intellect. No human can be completely relieved of using this gift in a proper manner and satisfying the criterion set by it in intellectual matters.

‘Ali Naqvi notes:

Remember! This is not a religion that blinds your eyes, and snatches away your powers of thinking and reflection [or] asks you to discard your mind and intellect. Instead it has defined the limits and has put conditions to encourage critical understanding and discussion. Before they decide to say an enthusiastic “yes” to someone’s call, Islam has invited people to utilize their intellect carefully, and to see [for themselves] who is a sincere reformer and who a mischief-maker.13

‘Ali Naqvi gave the intellect an even more crucial role in resolving confusions that had arisen due to the widespread missionary activity, and ever-growing awareness of religious communities presenting competing truth-claims. Every religion claims itself to be the absolute truth calling all others false, sees itself as the true reformer and others as mischief-maker. For ‘Ali Naqvi, there is but only one way to judge the veracity of these religions: careful weighing of all these religions with the intellect, and ongoing research in understanding one religion fully. In any case, “[t]urning away from research and helplessly saying goodbye to all [religions] because of the anxiety caused by the multiplicity of paths is intellectual laziness, whose consequence could never be satisfactory”.14

If the benchmark of the veracity of an islahi program is its invitation to open examination of this program (and not demanding blind submission to it) then it has to be true for these religious claims as well. Only a religion that invites human beings to reflect on its claims and freely examine its teachings could truly be the source of reform of a society. This idea of freedom of the intellect in general, and vis-à-vis competing religious truth-claims is an important facet of his treatise The Sagacious Life [prescribed by] Islam (Islam ki hakimanah zindagi)15 that was written a couple of years before La tufsidu fi al-‘arz. The treatise not only devotes separate chapters on the subject [e.g., under the titles of “World Religions and Human Progress” (mazahib-i ‘alam aur insani taraqqi) and “Islam and the Autonomy of the intellect” (Islam aur hurriyat-i ‘aql)], but presents it as the central theme of the whole text. Consistent with his previous arguments, here again ‘Ali Naqvi calls upon his audience to examine whether a particular religion invites research and reflection or demands blind following of the beliefs and practices of that religion. A religion that is uncomfortable in lending itself open to assessment and forbids its adherents religious conversations is one which is insecure in its foundations and realizes that it would fail to uphold its grounds upon such examination. ‘Ali Naqvi argued that all other religious traditions especially Christianity have always kept their adherents in darkness as to their scriptures, restricting access to a select few only.

In contrast to these other traditions, ‘Ali Naqvi presents the intellect as the hallmark of Islam. Briefly put, this text is ‘Ali Naqvi’s argument for Islam’s sagacious teachings for human wellbeing and overall a healthy individual and communal life.

Islam’s open invitation and challenge to think, reflect, and investigate are evidences of Islam’s refusal to demand blind adherence from its adherents. It is also by the same token proof of Islam’s veracity as a religion. For ‘Ali Naqvi, there was no other religion that had put so much stress on the freedom of thinking and reflection or had taken this freedom as the basis for religious commitment itself: “…Islam did not come to the world and just say, “Accept whatever is said to you”. Instead it said, “Understand what I say” (40, emphasis added).16

The same argument is more fully developed in another text. Here Naqvi maintains that for centuries Christianity and Judaism (and modern religious movements such as Baha’ism) have actively discouraged intellectual reflection on their scriptures and religious doctrines. He concludes that: “In fact, it is only Islam that can honestly claim that as a religion it has invited the world to tread the path of knowledge. Go examine every religion of the world; nowhere will you find encouragement [in the gaining] of knowledge [like that] which is found in the Qur’an and hadith. Hence, no other religion can compete with Islam in the way that it is a true guide for progress in [the field of] knowing the world.”17

At a time when religious, political and social activism had swept India from all corners, the task of unraveling laudable activism from one shallow and destructive had become all the more taxing and decisive. Indisputably, this intense activism owed much to the deep predicament in which Muslims had found themselves - confronted with criticisms of Islam from both within and without, economic and political disempowerment and marginalization. But above all this activism was taking place in a milieu in which skepticism about religion’s prestige and service to society and demise of traditional religious authority was undermining their religious worldview. In the face of this unprecedented situation, ‘Ali Naqvi insisted that his Muslim audience think through these issues very carefully, make cautious choices that should grow out of a careful application of the God-given intellectual faculties. In his process - and in all three cases, discerning true religious scholar from a fake one, a sincere reformer from a mischiefmaker and true religion from a false one) - ‘Ali Naqvi accords the intellect a pivotal role.

In stressing the centrality of the intellect he did not even spare something as fundamental as his own juridical authority (vilayat al-faqih) upon which rests any Shi’i jurist’s social influence and power (and often economic base as well). To determine whom to follow as one’s source of imitation (marja‘ at -taqlid) ‘Ali Naqvi categorically posits the responsibility of careful rational deliberation on the part of a lay Shi’i Muslim.

Why Intellect, Whenceits Centrality?

Enough has been said already to demonstrate the pivotal role ‘Ali Naqvi assigns to the intellect in meeting the various challenges confronted by the Shi’i community in the modern period.But why intellect? According to ‘Ali Naqvi its origin lies within Islam’s central emphasis on knowledge whose foremost source is the intellect, as mentioned in the Qur’an on numerous occasions. Even more important is the Qur’anic understanding of human reality in which the intellect emerges as the distinctive mark of being human.

It is the intellect that separates humankind from the rest of creation. ‘Ali Naqvi makes this point often in his treatises written during these years.

However, a more lucid understanding of the intellect’s reality and significance becomes apparent only when the intellect is situated within the broader context of the meaning and purpose of human life. The whole text of Islam ki hakimanah zindagi [The Sagacious Life [prescribed by] Islam] is geared towards addressing this issue. Given the central role of the intellect in ‘Ali Naqvi’s hermeneutics and his reconfigurationproject, let me present an outline of this text.

Since the text is an exposition of the sagaciousness of Islamic teachings about human life, ‘Ali Naqvi opens the discussion with the meaning of life and death: it is only after the meaning of life and death in their most general senses is comprehended - as they apply to everything in existence - that this meaning could then be applied to human life and death. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, within its created limits everything in existence has been endowed with its potential perfection and striving for and realization of that potential is what constitutes life for that existent:

For an exposition of [the meaning of] life and death, it is important to keep in mind that in the limited nature of every [created] class [of living beings]18 (jins), nature has kept certain abilities (salahiyatain). Each one of these [abilities] has an acme of perfection. By passing through the various stages of these abilities the class [of living beings] can reach that point. Insofar as a [living] thing is a possessor of this perfection set by nature, or in the process [of acquiring this]… that thing is alive. When it loses these capabilities or becomes bereft of perfection then it is dead.19

If this is the definition of life and death, then applying it to human life would entail determining what is true human perfection, and in turn, what a human being is to begin with?20 Thus begins the following section titled “Reality of a Human Being” (Insan ki haqiqat) where he attempts to define human reality and the meaning of human life and death by way of discussing his natural ability and perfection.

For ‘Ali Naqvi, human life is not altogether different from the rest of the created order. Just as attributes of excellence in inanimate bodies (jamadat) are already contained within vegetative bodies (nabatat), and those of inanimate bodies and vegetative bodies within animals (hayvanat), in a human being, the crown of God’s creation (ashraf al-makhluqat),the attributes of excellence of all three are already contained. It is because, ‘Ali Naqvi notes, a human being is a sum composite of the whole universe. Furthermore, not only a human being possesses all the attributes of excellence (sifat-i kamal) of these lower orders of existence, since it is the crown of creation, in him these attributes are also elevated to higher perfections. In other words, “a human being is in reality a composite of perfections of [all the] possible genera.” Yet, convergence of all these orders of existence within the human reality is the reason why it becomes difficult to understand it: “What is the outcome [of this idea]? It is that the more the elements were conjoined in [forming] a human being, the more ambiguous became his reality. This is a [universal] principle that the more parts (ajza’) [something]has , the more difficult it will be to understand.”21

‘Ali Naqvi notes that this complexity of the human reality and the fact that it contains various elements are reasons why people are misled in their judgment regarding who he is essentially. Some are led to believe that a human being is simply an inanimate body; others see him as a vegetative being; and then there are those who reduce him to the level of animals. It is rare that a human being is not reduced to these individual lower elements or seen in his true light, as a ‘human’ being. Consequently, the view of ‘human life’ is contingent upon the vantage point with which he is viewed: if he is an animal the means of discovering and assessing human life (and its quality) will be akin to those employed to assess the life of animals; if just matter, it will be interpreted from the material point of view. From ‘Ali Naqvi’s point of view, this assessment will be partial, only encompassing the respective animal or material dimensions of human reality and therefore erroneous.

Extending his analysis of the human reality, ‘Ali Naqvi argued that even when a human being is reckoned to be simply matter - and his life therefore only material - one never comes face to face with it: “even when we look at a mirror we see our bodies, their color and shape.” We observe only the accidents of corporeality (jismaniyat); the matter qua matter escapes our sensory experience. The same is true for all beings of lower orders of existence - the vegetativeness of the vegetative bodies and the senseexperience and movement of an animal will evade plain sensory observation. If this is true for vegetative and animal domain, how could one understand human reality then by simply employing empirical observation?

Furthermore, ‘Ali Naqvi notes that if the human being is the crown of creation, it cannot be so vis-à-vis the material, vegetative or animal aspects of his makeup. When compared to mountains in material greatness, it falls way short; if growth is the criterion then a plant takes a much shorter span to reach its full blossoming; and if it is by virtue of sharpness of sensory perceptions then many animals would outdo human beings in these domains. ‘Ali Naqvi notes the example of newly born animals which in many cases possess perfections of movement and self-sufficiency much greater than a human child who is completely dependent upon his mother. At the time of birth, a human child cannot even control his eyes, hands or feet. In sum, in all these domains a human being falls short of the beings in these other orders of existence.

Yet, a human being remains the crown of creation. That is why one will have to admit that human perfection and excellence originate from elsewhere, some quality or substance that is other than his body, growth or senses possessed by him and not by other creatures. A further consequence of this analysis is that if a human being was simply a sum-composite of all these elements and nothing more, his life would entail preservation of these elements, and his death simply their scattering. Since his life is more than simply sum-composite of these elements, preservation of it would also entail something else besides rescuing these elements.

In the light of these observations ‘Ali Naqvi begins to formulate his hypothesis about the subject in the following words: “To the extent that I have pondered over it, I have come to realize that the distinctive perfection of a human being is his self-willed advancement in knowledge and deeds (khud ikhtiyari ‘ilmi va ‘amali taraqqi). This is that [unique] thing due to which a human being has a superior merit, not only over the inanimate bodies, vegetative bodies and animals, but also over angels”.22

Having established the superiority of human beings to other orders of existence ‘Ali Naqvi now compares human beings to angels who according to the Islamic teachings are sinless and infallible. Although angels were accorded great status by God due to these and other reasons, nevertheless, in their very constitution God has protected them from sin. In other words, committing sin is not even a possibility for angels: “When the capacity to sin and the emotions that cause sin are not even created in them, their infallibility does not carry [the burden of] fighting oneself (jihad bi annafs)”.

The case of a human being is different however. Caught between the powers of the lower self (nafs al-‘ammarah) on the hand, and the divine gift of an inherently good intellect, he is always in a state of inner battle to consciously choose a side. In this constant struggle one who chooses the path of the intellect to overcome his lower self is really the one who is victorious. For ‘Ali Naqvi, in fulfilling divine commands angels are not confronted with - as is the case with human beings - desires or emotions that present difficulties. Therefore, in comparison with angels whose success owes to their constitution - not to their effort - a human being earns his victory. The comparison between the two, however, does not end here. According to ‘Ali Naqvi in the case of angels, both their knowledge and devotion are limited to what has been bestowed upon them. Fulfillment of duties does not alter either their knowledge or their devotion. In the case of human beings, however, “when a human being earns something, then through his capacity to act he augments it”. In other words, a human being is able to add to his knowledge and devotion through his will and effort. His progress in life is “self-willed progressed” (khud ikhtiyari taraqqi). This is what distinguished a human being from all other creation and can be reckoned as his essence: “Thus we learn that a human’s “selfwilled progress” is really the thing that gives him merit over the angels… In this way the merit of a human being is proved: everything advances but that advancement is not self-willed. In all things other than a human being, this progress is created [for them] (takvini), while that of a human exists through his own hands, his own will and choice (iradahva ikhtiyar)”.23

Furthermore, in comparison with human beings all other things in existence have a certain limit to their progress. In other words, every other creature in existence can only go so far in its progress. Inanimate bodies after accomplishing their own perfections, if attempt a further step (e.g., growth), they will already be outside their own constitution and enter the domain of vegetative bodies. Same is the case with other realms of existence. The higher realms of existence put a limit on the progress of the lower domains. For human beings there exist no such limits. Being the crown of creation, it can extend his progress to the farthest limits of possibilities:

It is the human being alone who carries out an unlimited progress. This is because he is the pinnacle (nuqtah-yi akhir) of the possible world. No telos is beyond his reach. That is why the door for [unlimited] development is wide open for the human being. His advancement does not stop at any particular point. It is so because there are no limits to the possible world and a human being is at its [farthest] end. Since the limits of possibility are joined to necessity and the latter is without limits, the meaning of the end of possibility will be that if it is raised [just] one more level, then it will be the level of necessity.

Concluding his discussion on the life and death of human life, Naqvi posits his final word on human life in the following words:

So what is human life then? To be situated at higher stations of knowing and deeds, seeking to attain those, or striving for them. And what is his death? The destruction of these pathways of development, the closing of his mind in such a way that he becomes content with ignorance, and the deep-sleeping of his conscience so much so that he becomes satisfied with his lowly character. It is easier now to see what [religious or intellectual] framework24 has the ability to become a complete regulatory code (zabitah-yi hayat) for [this vision of] the human life.25

Therefore, the true life of a human being is in the advancement in knowledge and deeds.

In ensuing pages, ‘Ali Naqvi devotes separate chapters to the subjects of the advancement of human knowledge and human deeds. According to Naqvi, in the human quest for the former,26 the intellect, is the human being’s foremost resource and companion: “for advancement in knowledge, nature had bestowed the substance of the intellect to the human being.”27 He further argues that the Qur’anic narrative of human beings’ victory over angels was precisely on the grounds of knowledge for which the intellect was human beings’ primary instrument. The Qur’anic narrative proves further, argues ‘Ali Naqvi, that to forbid seeking knowledge or using the intellect in this process is absolutely against the nature of things: “if it was more appropriate for human beings to keep their eyes shut, why has nature bestowed upon them eyes?”, he asks.28 In sum, according to ‘Ali Naqvi, it is up to human beings to use this gift of the intellect bestowed by nature to accomplish the self-willed progress. The proper use of the intellect further means that one could no more blindly submit to old habits, ways of the forefathers, or to one’s desires and emotions that violate the discerning judgments of the human intellect. In sum: “The kernel of a human being’s humanity (insaniyat) lies precisely in employing intelligence and acumen and in recognizing the right path…Those who had put restrictions on human beings, saying “Don’t use your intelligence,” that “faith is one thing, intelligence another,” and that “the intrusion of the intellect [in faith] is a sin” … those are the ones who have tried to demolish the intellect.”29

So how does the intellect aid in the human flourishing of knowledge, and especially of religious knowledge? It is so because all religious doctrines are based on rational principles. According to ‘Ali Naqvi Islam’s foundational creed, for example, belief in One God and prophethood are first and foremost vouched by the intellect:

Religious principles are in fact grounded in the intellect. If that were not the case then how could we have faith in God’s existence? Could we have searched for God in the Qur’an? Until the belief in God is proven what could [the status of] the Qur’an be? … Could we have believed in the prophecy of the Prophet [Muhammad] by simply hearing him [speak]? In truth, the first affirmer of prophecy is the intellect. Had it not been for the intellect the voices of the prophets and messengers would have been tired of calling [people towards religion], [their voices would have] fainted, and the world would not have heeded. It is the intellect that brings the world towards a prophet; every reality of the world is proven by it. [The opinion of] those who say that we base our knowledge upon the sensesis wrong: senses can never lead us to reality, unless the intellect makes its contribution in the process.30

To establish this claim of the intellect’s absolute indispensability in human advancement in knowledge (and especially as it pertains to religious knowledge) ‘Ali Naqvi had to do more than simply state it as a self-evident truth. It required exposition and clarification at many levels, including answers to questions such as what is meant by the term ‘religion’ (mazhab) and ‘the intellect’ (‘aql). Connected to this discussion is also the question of the relationship between the intellect and religion (for example, how religious creed such as belief in one God, in the institution of prophecy and Imamate, and the Final Judgment are perfectly acceptable for the intellect), and what are the intellect’s limits, if any. ‘Ali Naqvi has much to say about these matters and Islam ki hakimanah zindagi extensively discusses these issues. The task is clearly laid out by him: it is to demonstrate that Islam is perfectly competent in speaking to and guiding human beings on their quest of advancement in knowledge. In principle, Islamic doctrinal foundations are quite consistent with the judgments of the intellect. If with advancements of knowledge truths of Islam had become less acceptable, the fault then is of Muslims’ and Muslims’ alone: they have failed to demonstrate to others that the true appeal of Islam is in its grounding in knowledge and consistency with the demands of ‘aql. It is also because Muslims have not been attentive to the task of seeking knowledge and research.31

A fuller account of the same argument would follow soon. To deal with these interrelated questions at length and the various arguments first outlined here, ‘Ali Naqvi wrote a treatise Religion and the Intellect (Mazhab aur ‘aql, 1941)32 which was followed by [Intellectual] Issues and Arguments [for Those] (Masa’il va dala’il, 1942), the latter text being a response and clarification of the questions and criticisms raised against the former. It is to these texts that I turn now.

Mazhab aur ‘aql is much more than simply a straightforward defense of the Islamic creed: it is conceived with a much broader purpose: as a text it was intended to rectify the widespread confusions about religion that had led to harsh criticisms and rejection of Islam. If on the one hand, Mazhab aur ‘aql was geared toward spawning a religious understanding which would return to religion its true islahi function of remedying these decadent theologies and praxes, and defending religion against criticisms of backwardness and irrationality, on the other, it was intended to demonstrate to its audience an inherent alliance between religion and the intellect in the task of human self-willed advancement and excellence, both in the domain of his intellectual and practical life. In content, it systematically presents religious creed, the most fundamental religious principles, and an explanation of how they are quite consistent with the conclusions of careful rational deliberations. In the preface ‘Ali Naqvi notes:

… A casting off of wrong doubts with respect to beliefs, and a rectification of harmful customs are needed. That is why [in this text] the reality of the established practices (marasim) and the knots of the wrong interpretations of beliefs have been untangled. This [opening of knots] is a guard against the seditiousness (mufsidah pardazi) behind the veil of “reform” (islah), a rebuttal to the challenge of the covetous criticizers, an answer to the notice from the hypocritical belle-lettres, and an ultimatum for an exchange of views with those claiming wisdom.33

‘Ali Naqvi’s intentions with this treatise are even clearer in remarks that follow:

Although the specific topics under discussion are the relationship between faith and the intellect and an intellectual defense of religious convictions and creed, they are actually in the service of reforming society through a revival of religion itself, which is for ‘Ali Naqvi, the most indispensable source of social harmony and interests.34 Read this way, the natural progression of his thought from La tufsidu to this text and the underlying unity of his religio-intellectual project are unmistakable:

Without doubt those practices which go against intellectual judgments and have become established simply out of custom, changing those, destroying those, and breaking [those] habits is necessary. Everyone must be ready for this revolution and should seek it. Indeed, reforming the society vis-à-vis these customs is necessary in order to make one’s life pleasant. This is no time to waste in unnecessary fetters, nor a place to be ruined in [irrational] practices. That is why [we have] pointed to the true reality of the beliefs and the errors of practice.35

Yet before the task of reforming praxis and social customs could be addressed the dichotomy of religion and ‘aql had to be overcome. The structure of the treatise and Naqvi’s argumentation reveals that his intended audience includes those who have completely rejected religion and seek its eradication from society, with the claim that it can no longer achieve the task of reforming society. To a mindset that sees an inherent tension between the intellect and revelation - often carving independent spheres for each - religion could hardly be reasonable.36

It is only after this objection is addressed that ‘Ali Naqvi turns to religious praxis and social customs. Naqvi reiterates many of the claims already posited in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, foremost being the symbiotic relationship between religion and the intellect.37 This issue is addressed immediately in the introductory remarks of Mazhab aur ‘aql. Here ‘Ali Naqvi notes how he intended this text to rebut the imagined opposition and dichotomy between religion and the intellect “about which so much fuss is made.”According to ‘Ali Naqvi the intellect guards religious beliefs and the true reality of religious wisdom and truths manifest themselves in the mirror of the intellect.

Yet for this witnessing to occur properly the mirror of the intellect needs to be cleansed and polished, otherwise the image formed will be distorted. Although the fault would be theintellect’s , it is religion that will be reproached.

It is [therefore] desired that religion be discussed in the light of sound intellect so that pure (pakizah) Islam is relieved of wrong accusations (tavahumat), [so that] false objections (i‘tarazat) [may] not appear true and flawless, and [so that] the imagined discord (tafarruqah) between the intellect and religion may be put aside. It is so because the intellect and religion are absolutely interdependent:38 religion calls for the intellect and the intellect proves religion.39

As noted in the emphasized passage, in convincing the audience of the mutual necessity of religion and the intellect, ‘Ali Naqvi’s task is two-fold: to show ways in which religion depends on the intellect, just as the intellect depends on religion. In these earlier writings such as Islam ki hakimanah zindagi, the former receives more emphasis. In fact, ‘Ali Naqvi’s definition of religion itself incorporates reference to the intellect: “an aggregate of firm realities (to whose truth the intellect has borne witness to), accepted by [human] mind, and essential for cultural reform (tamadduni islah) of the world, is true religion.”40 Truereligion meets the criterion of a sound and discerning intellectual judgment. It is reasonable, thoughtful and invites careful assessment and reflection upon its truth claims. The intellect however is defined without any reference to religion.

According to this definition the intellect is “the name of the faculty (quvvat) that reflects, passes judgment on matters unseen with [the help of] those seen, [comes up with] big universals and on the basis of these universals, and draws conclusions.”41 In other words, intellectual judgment begins with what it knows through experience and then proceeds with the assistance of that knowledge entering into the domain of the unknown. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, this movement of human intellect from the known to the unknown is also unique to the human race; the encounter of Adam and angels demonstrates that Adam was able to go beyond what he was taught while the angels submitted that they only knew what they were taught.42

It is because of this [faculty] that a person has a taste for seeking (jostaju), and with this striving then increases his intellect. Then with the blessings of the intellect he increases his pool of knowledge: [through] conversations with those present, learning lessons from the old books, thus including his own voice in the midst of voices from a thousand years, and desiring that it may reach out to a thousand years to come.43

In sum, the essence of true human life is willful progress in knowledge and deeds in which the intellect plays the most pivotal role.

Despite the unique contribution and essential role of the intellect in human life, for ‘Ali Naqvi, there were widespread confusion in his time regarding the reality of the intellect and intellectual doubts (wahm) had replaced judgments of the intellect.

Wearing various deceptive guises, doubts have misled the intellect from its path.

Although the conflict between doubt and intellect was ages old, there was something novel about contemporary doubts: in the old days, doubts occurred due to ignorance (jahalat) and thus it was easier to remove those. The contemporary doubts however are “a result of epistemological arrogance (‘ilmipandar ) of the ‘new light’ (na’i roshni).Because science has progressed much, the coating [of these doubts] is quite thick”44 .

Therefore, it was crucial to separate the doubts about religious matters from true judgments of the intellect regarding religion. In other words, doubts of the new age were a threat to both religion and true intellect, and circumstances demanded a renewed understanding and clarification of what intellect is (or is not), what religion is (or is not), and the true relationship between the two:

For this reason, true judgments of the intellect and religion about God, the Prophet, the Book, the Spirit, beliefs and established practices (marasim) are presented [here] so that doubts are denied the opportunity to enter into intellectual matters (ma‘qulat). Without doubt, certain customs (ravasim) that have gained currency through imitation of the close by nations are today emitting [things] that are polluting the air, obstructing progress, harming religion, and robbing the intellect. It is necessary to change that.45

Limitations of the Intellect

Until this point the intellect appears to be a self-sufficient entity that does not require any help from religion. The issue, however, is not that straightforward. Knowing his audience whose confidence in the intellect far exceeded that in religion, ‘Ali Naqvi perhaps wanted to establish common grounds acceptable to his interlocutors. He attempted this by acceding to the intellect’s centrality first: after lauding the excellence of the intellect, tirelessly arguing about how it is the essential attribute of a human being, and drawing attention to the intellect’s absolute indispensability for religious understanding, he turns then to note the intellect’s limitations, which according to ‘Ali Naqvi, the intellect will itself frankly admit. The very fact that human beings have come so far in their cultural, intellectual, and civilizational achievements is evidence that they are still moving forward and only future will reveal how much or how little human beings have covered in their understanding of things. An intellect that is aware of these basic facts cannot but be humble. It would acknowledge that given the shortsightedness and other limitations, the intellect cannot be absolutely confident of its current state of knowledge and understanding. The intellect must also be aware that the history of human progress in knowledge is also marred with errors and instead of moving forward has often been held back. So while always taking positive strides in fulfilling the task of self-willed excellence in deeds and practice, these observations of the intellect should ensure that human intellect is aware of its limitations, and it does unnecessarily extend its claims beyond its sphere of understanding. In fact, “[human] intellectual excellence (‘aqli kamal) is precisely in his acknowledgment of the limitedness of his knowledge.

That is why in many matters the intellect refuses to provide any ruling and deems those matters beyond its scope.”46

Within the intellect vs. revelation debate, the status of miracles constituted perhaps the most persistent and thorny issue in ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual milieu. How could religious claims for miracles (mu‘jizat) of the prophets be understood on intellectual grounds - let alone endorsed or defended. In the texts and speeches made during the early years of his life, he often turns to the issue of miracles.47 Here as well, the relationship between the intellect and religion boils down to the settlement of this debate. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, the intellect entrusts many issues to hearing (sama ‘).

While doing that it relies on its judgment regarding logical possibility (imkan) and logical impossibility (mahal) of an issue. Once the intellect settles that a particular phenomenon is not “logically” impossible - the fact that it appears unusual or exceptional will be irrelevant - it is then no longer settled through intellection but rests on the reliability of the source from which the claim is heard. If understood this way the intellect should not have any qualms accepting the miracles of the prophets:

Much of that which simple imagination has not seen with its own eyes, the intellect called impossibility (ghayr mumkin), thus its refusal to accept the miracles of the Prophets. But the intellect that has lifted the veils of materialism and broken the shackles of the world in its quest for reality has distinguished between occurrence (vuqu‘) and possibility (imkan), and has created distinctions for habitual impossibility (mahal-i‘adi) and intellectual impossibility (mahal-i ‘aqli). It reckoned possible events that seem unusual (ghayr ma‘muli) and different from regular order and laws. [With that] it [also] validated the miracles of the prophets.

In support of his distinction between logical/intellectual impossibility and impossibility perceived due to unusualness of the occurrence of a particular event, ‘Ali Naqvi reminds his reader that modern inventions would have appeared to ancients as intellectual impossibilities. Yet these things are indeed normal for a contemporary person.

Accomplishments of modern science are way beyond the imagination of the ancients and in that way carry the weight of miracle for their limited understanding. In other words, modern developments in science and technology far from discrediting miracles in fact provide an opening for those who uphold religious claims for prophetic miracles:

“These workings have not turned prophetic miracles to dust; instead they have proventhem.…How [then] could a human have a right to assume the impossibility of something simply because it happens to be beyond the domain of his observation (mushahadah)? This is human prejudice (sukhan parvari) that he sees these realities, yet calls prophetic miracles stories”.

‘Ali Naqvi notes many examples regarding how human intellect has been wrong in its findings: “There used to be a lunar era, and idols were [deemed] gods, now it is a solar era and cosmic order rests on attraction among bodies, and light from moons.

Before, the heavens were in movement, and the earth static (sakit)48 ; now the heavens have disappeared and the earth is a whirlpool.”49 If the human intellect is true to its constitution and self-aware of his strengths and limitations it has no option but to be patient and persevering in its research, and not confuse logical impossibility with what appears to be impossible simply because it comes across as unusual and out of the ordinary.

According to ‘Ali Naqvi, in the debate of religion and the intellect, delusive conjectures (tavahhumat) have always been arrayed against religion. But religion through the help of the world of nature and the intellect has always been able to overcome these doubts. Although nothing in existence remains static - from weathers, seasons, and crops to forms, faces, and stature of things, the world is in a constant state of flux - the basic realities of religion comprehended and vouched by the intellect had always remained firm. For ‘Ali Naqvi “Islam’s advocacy is precisely for these realities.”50

Yet, if left to side with the lower self and brutish nature, human beings turn anything into their god. In doing that they fall short of their dignified status, worshipping in error, sometimes even their fellow human beings. They may fall further and worships trees, stars, mountains, or fire. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, in the modern world materialism had become the new deity: “Now that he is a claimant of progress, he considers matter (maddah) to be everything and worships the hidden forces of the world.”51 If he remains true to his calling, employs and listens carefully to the counsels of a sound intellect, hewould not disbelieve in the unseen world (ghayb), the existence of a metaphysical God (ma fauq at-tabiyat khuda) who sends His prophets to guide humanity and validates their mission with special arguments and signs called miracles.

The intellect should not have a problem in accepting those.52

The limitations of the intellect were also addressed in Islam ki hakimanah zindagi. There ‘Ali Naqvi addressed a question that was in wide circulation among his Muslim audiences: “the people of the world who invented airplanes and trains, and many other things [many among them] did not accept the existence of God, so did they not have the intellect? Why don’t they accept [God]?”53 ‘Ali Naqvi’s response is as follows: the power of a faculty, in this case the intellect, is dependent on how much it is put in use and to what domain it is consistently applied. Like every other human faculty, the more it is put to use, the stronger it becomes. Furthermore, every faculty has a spectrum of functions that it performs and depending upon which particular function(s) it is most consistently applied it would excel in that domain. “…The power of a thing is with respect to what it has been applied to. A wrestler may be so powerful that he will overcome very powerful wrestlers, but it does not follow from this that he could stand on a stage and deliver a long speech.”54 Western people employed their intellectual resources to materialistic pursuits and therefore made much progress in that domain.

They did not extend their intellectual pursuits, however, to spiritual questions and therefore the progress in that domain remained quite minimal.

‘Ali Naqvi extends this argumentfurther, claiming that underdevelopment of the intellect is only one reason why those who have progressed in science and technology have not acceded to the belief in God. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, a related and more profound cause for this is the particular point of view with which the intellect approaches the world of nature. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, “the point of view [with which] a human being approaches something alters the conclusions [reached about it].” He cites the example of a mirror: if in looking at a mirror the person focuses on his own face, he will learn about the contours of his face. The more time he spends on this, the clearer his perspective will be about his looks. If the same person looks at the same mirror, but this time not at himself, rather concentrating on the make of the mirror, his analysis will be more insightful regarding the mirror. About his looks however, he would not learn much. According to ‘Ali Naqvi the case of the natural world - mirror that it is of the divine realities - is barely any different: a scientist’s witnessing is concentrated on understanding the object of inquiry but with little attention to its divine roots:

The same is true for natural realities. In these things there is a dimension which is qua their natural and material [makeup]; then there is one which sheds light on them about their creator. If the eye of the beholder is fixated on the beauty of the mirror and is lost in it, then it cannot see this [other] reality which is hidden in it.

Such is the situation today: a human being is so entangled in his material desires that he cannot see this light that is so shimmering from these natural existents.

He saw these things and saw them with close attention, but by only looking at their particular natural attributes. That is why this beauty that was hidden in them remained invisible.55

It is clear from these excerpts that to tackle the perceived divorce between religion and the intellect (and of demonstrating the reasonableness of religion), the first step had to be carving an opening for a belief in the Unseen (ghayb), upon which could rest then the most fundamental religious belief, the idea of an Almighty God. All other faith commitments would only come later. Here, therefore, ‘Ali Naqvi argues with the upholders of the intellect (who reject religion) on their own turf; he contends that a careful application of the intellect upon theoretical and historical data would inevitably confirm that, far from being a self-sufficient and autonomous entity, the intellect seeks assistance from without. And that help inevitably comes from religion. If this much is conceded by the other side, then the floor is open to debate God’s existence, to which ‘Ali Naqvi could now turn.56

Concluding Remarks on the Relationship between Religion and the Intellect

If, as ‘Ali Naqvi contends, “true religion and the intellect are united [in their claims],” it must be concluded that “the religious God and the God of the intellect are not separate.”57 The question still remains: in exactly what ways are they connected? If the intellect is simultaneously so central and so marred with limitations, what would its correct functioning look like in a religio-intellectual project like ‘Ali Naqvi’s? In other words, if the essential relationship between the intellect and religion is that of symbiosis and mutual cooperation, then how do they actually work together?

The nature of the intellect’s collaboration with religion is best comprehended when seen in the light of ‘Ali Naqvi’s comprehensive definition of religion. In preceding pages we have already noted one definition. Yet that definition lacks specificity. On other occasions, for example in Mazhab aur ‘aql, ‘Ali Naqvi uses the term din for religion and lays out the essential contents of religion (specifically Islam): Din according to him is defined by its principles (usul) and branches (furu‘): in the former he enlists doctrinal beliefs in Divine Unity and Justice, Prophecy, Imamate, and the Returning, while the latter incorporates active religious life involving prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, mandatory charity and khums, and jihad.”58

This usul-furu‘ distinction is crucial to ‘Ali Naqvi’s account of the way the intellect becomes religion’s partner in leading a human being and human society to achieve its goal of willful progress in intellectual and practical matters and social peace and happiness.According to ‘Ali Naqvi, the task of understanding and assenting to the religious doctrines belongs to the intellect. Under no circumstance religious creed should be accepted without careful deliberation of the human intellect. The sphere of religious practice however is different. If true to its calling, here the intellect should submit to the authority of the revelation and the teachings of a divinely guided prophet.

In other words, once the intellect acknowledges the necessity of prophecy, it should not have any difficulty in willfully accepting its prescriptions for human practical life.

The crucial point in this argument is that in the domains of its inapplicability the intellect should humbly accept its limitations. To apply the intellect to something where it does not belong will be against the decision of the intellect itself: “the conclusion reached by using the intellect [in this case] will be a decision that will not be based on the intellect.” So what then are these limitations? ‘Ali Naqvi points out that human intellect deals with the universal principles but is unable to prescribe principles that are particular in their scope. When it comes to legislating for the entire human order that deals with the varying temperaments of different individuals, the intellect finds itself helpless in prescribing an all-encompassing plan of action. Thus aware of its limitedness in figuring out each and every particular detail, the human intellect accepts the necessity of prophecy whose scope embraces the whole of the human order. Applied to the religious domain, the upshot of this analysis is well summarized in the following passage:

…Principal [doctrinal] beliefs are those whose responsibility rests solely on the intellect. These doctrinal beliefs and foundations of religion (mazhab) need to be understood through the intellect. In the [domain of] the branches of religion - in their principles and laws - however, it is not necessary that the intellect is able to arrive at every correct opinion. The intellect has accepted the necessity of the prophecy of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) because for human and social order it is a necessity that a law and constitution is promulgated by someone who truly knows the temperament of the human collectivity and is truly familiar with the human order.

Once the intellect that is conscious of its limitations truly submits to its own calling it then no longer questions the particulars prescribed by the prophet. It no longer asks why the units of prayer in the morning are two and those in the afternoon are four. Since the human intellect has resolved the necessity and criterion for prophecy it happily accedes to the judgments of that prophecy in the domain of law and particular prescriptions.

Akin to the person who understands why there needs to be some formal etiquette and customs in a king’s court and displays it according to the will of the king - without questioning the particularities - a human being who acknowledges the intellectual necessity of prophecy also does not dispute the particularities of the prophetic prescriptions. It accepts those as it is: “If someone acted against these court customs…he would be punished. But what is this etiquette and these customs of the court, this will not be decided by the intellect; the intellect itself acknowledges that these customs and etiquette will be decided by the ruler,” observes ‘Ali Naqvi.59

In sum, religion needs the intellect to establish its truth-claims, its creedal beliefs in the Oneness of God and the necessity of Prophecy and the Judgment Day. In practical matters dealing with proper action (those that fall under the rubric of branches of religion), it is the intellect that is in need of religion, and therefore of prophetic guidance. Understood this way, the intellect and religion complete one another, assisting proper ordering of human life so that the highest and most essential purposes of human life, both individual and collective, are successfully accomplished. In confirming the essential truth-claims of a religion, the intellect provides the necessary intellectual edifice, upon which would rest the detailed prescriptions of religion for practical ordering of human life toward meaningful ends.

I have suggested that for ‘Ali Naqvi religion (ad-din) is constituted by mutually exclusive (yet complementary) content-categories of principles and branches (usulfuru‘), to which correspond exclusive and complementary epistemological categories of intellect-revelation. A careful examination, however, brings to light a more complicated picture in which the intellect plays an important (albeit limited) role even in the branches of religion. The privileged status assigned to the intellect - to the extent that it was called the distinctive mark of human nature - meant that the intellect could not then be made completely aloof to the details of religion; its absolute freedom in intellectual matters also ensures that it could not blindly submit to anything, even if they are prescriptions of extremely specific nature. That is to say, the intellect even while acknowledging that court-customs are result of the ruler’s command and need be obeyed, cannot help but reflect on the underlying wisdom that resulted in this (and not some other) particular set of prescriptions. All the more so because, as ‘Ali Naqvi has contended, the intellect has already determined that the created order is the handiwork of a Wise-Creator: “In the order of existence [nizam-i hasti] there is wisdom which is perceived by the eye, comprehended by the intellect and assented to by the heart. There is a Being which is the nucleus of this wisdom and which is directly related to this order.” In arguing for the existence of God, the argument that ‘Ali Naqvi employs most frequently is the cosmological argument.60 His version of this argument emphasizes the wisdom that underlies all of creation: without much effort and most readily it is the human intellect that best observes the harmony, beauty, and order that underlie the cosmic order. The intellect’s witnessing of this harmony is neither conjectural, nor its assent mental construction (takhliq-i zihin) but its true grasp of the reality itself. The intellect also grasps that this order, harmony, and beauty is not an accident, rather a consequence of the manifestation of the Reality itself that we call God.61 Nature is a signifier not only of its createdness, but also of its measured and sagacious fashioning by an Almighty God. An obvious corollary of the argument is that particular prescriptions and laws revealed by this God could not but be beneficial to human society and attentive to its deepest needs. Without any skepticism, the intellect assents to the same measure of wisdom and order that it witnesses in the world of creation for the laws and principles prescribed by the Wise par excellence for the human order: “None of His actions are without wisdom and guidance. Therefore, whatever injunction He may prescribe, whether it pertains to worship (‘ibadat) or interpersonal dealings (mu‘amalat), there will be in it some wisdom and guidance.” With this theological presupposition one could not but accept that “…therebe wisdom in everything [prescribed by God]. But what it means is that every command that has come from the Venerated One and is proven to us [is from Him], then we should generally agree that there is some guidance in it. If that were not the case, it would not have come to us.”62

The limitations of the intellect pointed out by ‘Ali Naqviimply that there is no guarantee that one who uses it will be able to fully appreciate the underlying wisdom and guidance in these prescriptions. The task of discovering the underlying sagacity of the Divine prescriptions is still worth carrying out, in truth inevitable, given the Godgifted nature of the intellect. Again the modern advancement in knowledge and scientific discoveries prove that human beings are still limited in knowledge and there is much room for improvement. Who can really be certain that the human intellect is not in the state of infancy with still a long way to go? Consequently, human understanding may lag far behind in figuring out the underlying wisdom behind each and every divine command of a God whose knowledge encompasses everything in existence until now, and until eternity. Yet, the human intellect is constituted such that it cannot help but always endeavor to discover that wisdom endlessly. That is only natural and very much in the spirit of the human quest for self-willed progress in knowledge. What is however not called for is rejection of divine injunctions simply because the human intellect is unable to find satisfactory purpose or wisdom behind these commands. In conclusion ‘Ali Naqvi notes:

There should be obedience because [the command] is [from the] Divine, and [there should also be] reflection because it is prescribed by the Wise One. If we understand the wisdom then it is a success of knowledge. That is why the pure Imams explained reasons for laws. The Qur’an also mentions the wisdom alongside its commands in many cases. This is because, on the one hand, we adhere [to these commands] from a practical point of view, and on the other because there is no harm in the progress of knowledge.63

A very interesting observation follows this passage. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, in understanding the underlying wisdom of the particulars of religion (for example, those laid out in Divine law), even the ‘ulama’ could not claim any certainty. He notes that these days many modern people inquire from the ‘ulama’ regarding the basis and reason for this or that divine injunction. ‘Ali Naqvi replies that ‘ulama’ may wellbe able to discover the divine command correctly but that does not guarantee that they will be equally at home in laying out the divine purpose for instituting that command. One should not be surprised then if the meaning and wisdom of these commands would evade their understanding as well. For ‘Ali Naqvi in this matter all Muslims are on an equal footing. If these ‘ulama’ have any advantage over lay people, it is simply that they are much more learned in the hadith literature which might clarify some of these questions (49-50). Therefore, given the specific nature bestowed upon the human faculty of the intellect, it is inevitable to apply it to all religious matters, theological or practical. On the other hand, it is next to impossible for it to exhaust the wisdom contained in every Divine command, especially those that pertain to the practical lives of human beings. It is Islam’s ongoing invitation to the human intellect to take up the challenge of discovering this hidden wisdom in these prescriptions. Thus ‘Ali Naqvi’s conclusion that: “From the point of view of knowledge the door is open for reflection on these Divine commands. It is so because Islam carries the flag of human advancement in knowledge. It is its call that without the intellect worship is defective because worship only comes alive through intention … and the more perfect the intellect is, the more perfected the intention will be as well”.64

‘Ali Naqvi’s Hermeneutics: Some Concluding Remarks

Throughout his life Ali Naqvi was preoccupied with the task of constant engagement with the injunctions of Islamic Law in order to draw out deeper reasons and wisdom. He would write extensively on subjects related to the various branches of religion, from laws of worship (e.g., purpose of ablution, why prayers are five) to personal law and interpersonal transactions, explaining to his audience what he saw as the sagacious divine purpose in legislating these specific injunctions. The seeds of this hermeneutic are already present in La tufsidu where ‘Ali Naqvi had explained the law of divorce in light of this hermeneutic scheme. There he provides a summary version of the argument about the relationship between religion and the intellect; in the process he argues for the necessity of obeying divine commands, and of expending intellectual energies to discern underlying wisdom.65

Given ‘Ali Naqvi’s hermeneutic commitments - and to be truly consistent with the arguments put forth by him (about the relationship between the intellect and religion) in these early writings - his religio-intellectual project could only be carried out along specific lines: the theological reconfiguration of Islam - those pertaining to the principles of religion - needs to be consistent with the conclusions of the intellect.

This means that although the type of theological argument employed may vary with his intended audience, it must invariably be based on the intellect.

His reconfiguration of Islamic praxis (issues pertaining to the branches of religion) however, was carried out along a very different trajectory: Here, the intellect was given a role - a significant one to be sure - but in no way is it deemed autonomous.

Aware of its limitations - though never giving up its striving - it cannot but seek cooperation of revelation, and seek teachers and role models. Ultimately, for ‘Ali Naqvi, a meaningful religious life is one that results, not from the intellect-religion divide, but through their mutual alliance, support, and symbiosis.

In regards to his hermeneutics, note must also be made of ‘Ali Naqvi’s appropriation of the Shi’i intellectual tradition. First, the usul-furu‘ distinction to which he returns frequently has become standard in contemporary Shi’i traditional scholarship.

In positing it as the core religious faith and practice, ‘Ali Naqvi is clearly drawing from this widely accepted formulation of Shi’i Islam in modern times.66 For example, the religious beliefs for which he makes an intellectual case in Mazhab aur ’aql are respectively the Divine Unity, Justice, Prophecy, Imamate and the Judgment day, a standard list of what are considered core Shi’i beliefs. Similarly, ‘Ali Naqvi nuances regarding the intellect aside, his definition of the intellect and its role in religious life also owes much to the same heritage, especially the usuli synthesis of 18th century through the present.67 The centrality accorded to the intellect in the usuli Shi’i juridical and theological thought made possible for ‘Ali Naqvi to extend its role to discovering the divine intentions behind various legal prescriptions.68

Finally, any discussion of ‘Ali Naqvi’s hermeneutics could not ignore the relationship between the chronology of his writings and his method. This is because the chronology of ‘Ali Naqvi’s writing offers critical insights into his religio-intellectual project and his hermeneutic. More importantly, it reveals his project’s underlying unity of intent and purpose. Familiarity with ‘Ali Naqvi’s reception of the crisis of religion (chapter 1) and his overall hermeneutical method aid in drawing out the hermeneutical significance of chronology.69

Earlier in the chapter we noted that towards the end of the 1940’s, ‘Ali Naqvi had already substantially developed his intellectual response to the religious crisis. In the decades that followed, the main contours of this response (its hermeneutical basis and key contents) would not undergo major alteration. Read this way, his “later writings” (authored between late 1940s and his death) are, at best, an elucidation and systematization of the arguments already set out during this formative period of the early decades. During this period he also delves into other religious sciences such as Qur’anic commentary, early Islamic history (his positing of a careful reading and a continuation of his ongoing reflections to draw out multifaceted dimensions of the events of Karbala), and writings on the sociopolitical issues confronted by his community. It is important to note that read through the lens of his presentation of the nature of the religious crisis (chapter 1), the “later writings” accomplish a task that could only be secondary in import to this more fundamental project of the reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis. These shifts in emphasis, taking up new topics of discussion and fields of study which characterize these later decades, further confirm that by late 1940s the project of the reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis had substantially been accomplished.

In concluding our discussion of the hermeneutics of this religio-intellectual project it is also appropriate to make a few comments about ‘Ali Naqvi’s audience, how it relates to his method, and what role if any it plays in the way he develops his arguments. If the preceding chapter was successful in demonstrating that ‘Ali Naqvi’s analysis of the Indian Shi’i Muslims’ intellectual plight (and its sociopolitical ramifications) had identified an audience which was far from being monolithic, then his method of argumentation would inevitably also reflect that. His awareness of the complicatedness of his audience (and of its sources of confusion about religion) is a critical part of his hermeneutical method and played a huge role in the success of his religio-intellectual project. Explicit identification of this multi-layered audience (examples of which were cited in Chapter 1), deliberate and perpetual shifts in tone, and the types of proofs employed to persuade his audience only confirm this. Nevertheless, despite being quite patent in his works, this hermeneutical dimension evades straightforward presentation or analysis. Certain factors seem to contribute to this situation: First, often there is an intertwining and overlapping of audiences (for example of atheists and those who still believe in God, yet are shaken to core in their religious beliefs). Furthermore, although ‘Ali Naqvi clearly describes the diversity of his intended audience (and nature of doubts that characterize each group within it), in his argumentation the textual transitions from argument intended for one group is not entirely severed from the other; sometimes a single argument is put forth to persuade one, two or all groups of audiences. For example, in his discussion of the proper relationship between the intellect and religion, irrespective of who might have been his intended audience, often intellectual arguments were presented by him as conclusive and without any supporting proofs from the textual sources. So whereas the audiencespecificity of his arguments is unmistakable, almost always intended and therefore crucial to be pointed out, it is not always possible to neatly map his writings (sometimes not even particular arguments) onto this multi-layered audience, or to show how a particular argument corresponds to a particular audience. In view of these observations, to the extent realistic and possible, I have and will continue to examine this dimension of “audience-argument correspondences”. All this implies that in the end my remarks about a particular “audience-argument correspondence” must be read as suggestive, not conclusive.

If an outline of this hermeneutical scheme is patent from the foregoing discussion, it is appropriate now to examine how ‘Ali Naqvi applied this hermeneutic to specific theological and legal topics in his reconfiguration of Islamic theology and praxis. The next chapter is an exploration of this dimension of ‘Ali Naqvi’s religiointellectual project. Furthermore, although in discussing the relationship between religion and the intellect I have attempted to examine ‘Ali Naqvi’s understanding of the concept of the intellect, my discussion of his concept of religion has remained cursory.

Yet, in many ways his discussion of the definition, nature, scope, and function of religion takes us to the heart of his religio-intellectual project. Given the centrality of this subject and its magnitude it deserves to be explored at length. The ensuing chapter is also dedicated to that task.