CHAPTER V: THE LATER WRITINGS AND ‘ALI NAQVI’S ISLAH OF THE SOCIETY
Introduction
In the preceding chapters we have seen how in the first two decades of his intellectual career ‘Ali Naqvi articulated his understanding of the multiple crises faced by his Shi’i and the broader Indian Muslim community. We noted that for him, especially in his capacity as the religious leader of the community, the crisis of religion was paramount among the many pressing contemporary problems. In regards to the religious crisis, he pointed out the underlying intellectual currents, prevalent misunderstandings that had led to the relegation of religion to the private sphere, and concerns among his interlocutors regarding what relevance religion could have in fixing the sociopolitical problems of the day. During these years, he also began to formulate a comprehensive response to this crisis in which he attempted to overcome various prevailing dichotomies such as din/dunya (Religion/the Hereafter), dunya/akhirah (life of the world/the Afterlife), ‘aql/mazhab (intellect/revelation) and ‘aqidah/’amal (faith/works).
The ultimate aim of these writings and speeches was to restore religion to its pivotal status within Indian Shi’i society, by continually emphasizing and demonstrating to his audience religion’s comprehensive scope and nature. The picture that emerged from these writings is that of unity of life and religion: religion is not a sphere of life but embraces its every aspect and dimension. He endeavored to prove to his skeptical audience the underlying wisdom of Islamic teachings in establishing a peaceful and vibrant society. In other words, for ‘Ali Naqvi, religion, in the grandest sense, is the sagacious ordering of human life and communities.
At this juncture it is relevant to explain at length
the basis for the early-later distinction we have employed throughout this study. It is with Masa’ilva
dala’il [Problems and Proofs] ((1944) that the first phase of ‘Ali Naqvi’s religion-intellectual project formally closes. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, this is the period during which he lays out the various crises facing the Indian Shi’i community, the most critical of which was the crisis of religion, while also responding systematically to this crisis. In a series of writings that begin with La tufsidu fi al-‘arz (1935) and end with Masa’ilva
dala’il (1944), he formulated a comprehensive response to the various challenges posed by the Indian cultural and intellectual context that were undermining religion’s status in the Indian society. All the various crises he listed in La tufsidu, a series of lectures, were already addressed by 1944, within less than a decade. In other words, the first phase of ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual career is geared towards reconfiguring the foundations of Islam along intellectual lines that would be persuasive to his skeptical audience, demonstrating to it that at its core, the religious vision is sagacious and absolutely indispensable for the wellbeing of society. It is only after the basic foundations of religion are clarified and systematized that ‘Ali Naqvi chose to speak about a more extensive role that religion should play within a society. In view of these challenges, in the early years ‘Ali Naqvi endeavored to reformulate Islam’s fundamental principles, creed, and practices in order to make them intelligible and palatable to contemporary Muslims, especially those who were under the influence of Western thought and culture.
The middle of the 1940s inaugurated the second phase of ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual career that would last until his death in 1988. During this phase he lectured unabatedly and authored many works. While constantly elaborating and clarifying many of these themes from the earlier phase, during this period, he also broadened the scope of his subjects by branching out to address more directly the sociopolitical issues fiercely debated in the Indian milieu. In incorporating issues as varied as Islamic history, Islamic political philosophy, and Islamic principles, ‘Ali Naqvi’s vision of the comprehensive meaning and function of religion (as posited by him during the earlier phase) remained decisive and remains, moreover, crucial to our understanding of his later writings: If nothing is outside the ambit of an all-embracing religious viewpoint, then every human sphere at an individual or communal level is a religious sphere. There is no human space independent of religion where religion does not have something to offer.
A logical corollary of his religious viewpoint is that his later writings, especially those on sociopolitical subjects, must not be portrayed in some secular light, but rather as part of his broader religious project. In other words, ‘Ali Naqvi’s writings on topics as wide as history, political philosophy, culture, economics, and everything in between are at best simply an extension of this religious vision onto these spheres. They are, furthermore, his demonstration to his audience regarding how as a comprehensive code of life, Islam does not leave any sphere of life unattended and unaccounted for. Having restituted the “basic foundations” of the Islamic religion, the writings from these later years were intended as an extension of his religious vision of Islam to the realms of economics, social life, culture, and politics to arrive at what he saw as Islam’s comprehensive teachings and vision of a human society. More importantly, in these writings he draws a direct correlation between the foundations of Islam, that is religious faith and practice (usul and furu‘), and these other teachings. As asserted in the early years by him, this way of presenting these teachings is a necessary consequence of his assumption that Islam is an interconnected unity, a whole. It is also significant that while extending his thought to these new intellectual territories, he does not carve any novel trajectories. In other words, the basic outline of his thought discussed in the previous chapter hardly witnesses any change: His usul-furu‘ scheme
, and other categories worked out in the early years remain definite for the later period as well, with no noticeable shift or modification.
The same period also witnessed clarification and further development of many themes from the formative period. Besides these writings, there are many others which, although seemingly resistant to a neat and simple classification, bring to the fore a host of themes and topics. The range of topics he took up during his later intellectual career displays much more diversity and seemingly belies any claims of unity for his religiointellectual project. It will be the burden of this chapter to show that, on the contrary, these later writings are very much part of one holistic view of religion and are clearly related to his earlier works.
By way of a review of his later writings and their prominent themes, the present chapter provides an overview of his later intellectual career and how it relates to what we have thus far called the formative years of his religio-intellectual thought. I will highlight the reasons he chose certain topics during this period and his method of argumentation and presentation.
PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF ‘ALI NAQVI’S LATER WRITINGS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EARLIER WRITINGS
To clarify the underlying unity of the intent and purpose of ‘Ali Naqvi’s corpus, especially the relationship between the earlier and later phases of his religio-intellectual project, it is best to begin with an overview of ‘Ali Naqvi’s later intellectual career. To accomplish this most efficiently, I have used a certain classification based at once on ‘Ali Naqvi’s intent in authoring certain treatises and their respective subject matter.
There is, however, an obvious challenge for this scheme: whereas the diversity of seemingly unrelated subjects about which he wrote belies any claims for the underlying unity of these works, his intent in choosing those particular topics and way in which he argues his positions display patent overlaps among these writings. Consequently, one treatise could simultaneously be classified under several categories. While I am attentive to the limitations of this scheme, this classification still provides an effective way of situating his writings in their proper intellectual context, in elaborating how they relate to one another, and especially how they relate to his earlier works. In other words - –and this is most crucial after all - the classification elucidates the deeper unity that underlies ‘Ali Naqvi’s diverse writings.
Continuities
As noted earlier, many of the themes highlighted in the preceding chapters regarding ‘Ali Naqvi’s response to the crisis of religion continue unabated till his death.
These include the elaboration of the crisis faced by the community, the challenges posed by Western thought, the clarification of the true relationship between religion and reason, the underlying wisdom of religious and Shari’ite teachings, providing an intellectual justification of the Islamic faith (usul) and practices (furu‘), the allencompassing ambit of religion and, finally, the theme and symbolism of the Karbala episode which he unceasingly employed in elaborating the Islamic vision of human life and community.
Having sufficiently explicated the crisis of religion, he returned to the unique challenges faced by Muslims during his time, the problem of growing atheism and materialism, for example, in Khuda parasti aur maddiyat ki jang [The Battle between Worship of God and Materialism] (1959) and Khuda aur mazhab, [God and Religion] (1970)
, and the question of pluralism in essays such as Islam aur vahdat-i adyan [Islam and The Unity of Religions] (1973).
Regarding religious faith and practice, during these later years, if, on the one hand, ‘Ali Naqvi provides a summary overview of the Islamic religion in treatises such as Mazhab shi‘ah aik nazar main [Shi’i Religion: An Overview] (1970), Usul va arkan-i din [Principles and Branches of Religion], on the other, he also continued to penetrate into the inherent wisdom of particular religious doctrines and practices in writings such as Zat va sifat [Divine Essence and Attributes] (1960), Divine Justice ‘Adl [Divine Essence and Attributes] (1959), Ma‘ad [“Return to God/the Final Judgment”] (1954), Jabr va ikhtiyar [“Predestination ad Freewill”] (1962), Namaz [“Canonical Prayer”] (1959), and Hajj [“The Pilgrimage”] (?). For example, in a text we have already cited, Ibadat aur tariq-i ‘ibadat [Worship and Manner of Worship]
, which is key to ‘Ali Naqvi’s exposition of the meaning and purpose of religious rituals enjoined upon its followers,
he brought to fore the importance of human intention in religious practice.
The key distinction is between the manner of worship and the Object of worship. The Object of worship pertains to human intention and informs the human mindset which is much more effective than simply following a particular manner of worship. There are obvious benefits of performing worship-rites in a proper manner; fasting purifies the physical body, while prayer is an excellent exercise for the human body. These benefits, however, are limited to the act itself, and to the parts that perform them. It is intention that takes the benefits beyond the act itself, transforming other aspects of human life in the process.
Furthermore, in these writings, almost invariably, his analysis tended to underscore the universality of the message of Islam and its teachings and prescriptions.
This point is confirmed further in his works such as Qur’an kay bayan al-aqvami irshadat [Universal Directives of the Qur’an] (1976), ‘Alami mushkilat ka hal [Solution to the problems of the world] (?), and Qur’an-i majid kay andaz-i guftagu main ma‘yar-i tahzib va ravadari [“Criterion of Civility and Tolerance in the Manner of Speech of the Glorious Qur’an”] (1976).
Similarly, he continued to explicate the Husayni-islah paradigm by pondering over the various aspects of the events of Karbala, and the lives of the holy Shi’i Imams.
In this regard, one may mention the following writings: Husayni iqdam ka pahla qadam [The First Step of Husayn’s Endeavors] (1953), Maqsad-i Husayn [Husayn’s Objective] (1956), Ashk-i matam [Tears of Mourning] (1957), Karbala ki yadgar payas [The Memorable Thirst of Karbala] (1959), Din panah ast Husayn [Husayn: The Protector of Religion] (1956/1959), ‘Aza-yi Husayn ki ahamiyat [The Significance of Husayn’s Mourning] (1959), Karbala ka tarikhi vaqi‘ah mukhtasar hay ya tulani? [Whether the Historical Event of Karbala isShort
or Long?](1960), Yad aur yadgar [Remembrance and Memorial] (1968), and Mi‘raj-i insaniyat [The Pinnacle of Humanity] (1969).
Besides the figure of Husayn and the event of Karbala, ‘Ali Naqvi also continued to introduce the lives of the other holy figures of Shi’i Islam, including the Prophet, in works such as, Rahbar-i kamil: Savanih-i ‘Ali [The Perfect Guide: Life of ‘Ali] (1961) and Rasul-i Khuda [The Prophet of God] (1961).
Among the themes that have remained uninterrupted between the two phases of ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual career are, on the one hand the defense of Islam against criticisms from non-Muslim interlocutors (i.e., from the Missionary-Orientalist complex
) on many issues, including the status of women in Islam
, the basis of women’s veiling
, and the defense of Shari’a rulings regarding marriage and family law
; on the other, the defense of particular Shi’i doctrines and practices against the recurrent polemical criticisms from Sunni scholars and intellectuals.
These latter works correspond to his earlier writings on similar subjects such as Mut‘ah aur Islam [Temporary Marriage and Islam] (1933) and Usul-i din aur Qur’an [Principles of Religion and the Qur’an] (1930).
In classifying the above-mentioned works as apologetics, a defense of Islam, or its Shi’i interpretation, I do not intend to preclude thematic or methodological overlaps with his other writings; this classification is based on ‘Ali Naqvi’s primary motive in choosing to write on a specific subject. Moreover, not only do ‘Ali Naqvi’s apologetics address more than one subject or theme in a treatise, they also reveal a shared hermeneutical approach. For example, unless his interlocutor leveled an objection on purely textual grounds, therefore demanding text-based arguments from him, no matter what subject he takes up, he argues, first and foremost, on intellectual (‘aqli) grounds.
My discussion of ‘Ali Naqvi’s hermeneutics and the central role accorded to ‘aql
in his religio-intellectual project should make it clear why intellectual arguments were given primacy in his exposition. That is why, even when responding through text-based arguments, he would turn to support those via logical, historical, and/or intellectual proofs. This overlapping of “the rational” and “the textual” here, like elsewhere, is a hallmark of his method and was applied universally in his writings and lectures, regardless of the nature of the debate or his interlocutor/audience.
Besides these works there is one more theme that has been consistent throughout ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual career, writings that would be classified as those authored for purely religious purposes, to provide guidance on juridical, religious, and spiritual matters. These include a compilation of his religious rulings,Tuhfatul ‘avam (1962), an explanation of basic religious practices and obligations such as the already mentioned ‘Ibadat aur tariq-i ‘ibadat [Worship and Manner of Worship] (?), and other writings such as Khums [Shi’i Religious Tax] (1956), and Safar namah-yi Hajj [The Journey of Pilgrimage] (1977), and finally, a discussion of virtues, either independently, or by way of reflection on the lives of the Shi’i holy figures. In this regard one may mention Haqiqat-i sabr [Reality of Patience] (1964), Mujassamah-yi insaniyat [Embodiment of Humanity] (1961), Nafs-i mutma’innah [The Content Soul] (1968),Va‘dah
-yi jannat [
Promise of Heaven] (1979), Mi‘raj-i insaniyat: sirat-i rasul aur al-i rasul ki roshni main [Pinnacle of Humanity in Light of the Exemplary Models of the Prophet and his Household] (1969), Shuja'at kay misali karnamay [Exemplary Deeds of Bravery]( 1954
) and Rahnumayan-i Islam [Exemplary Deeds of Bravery] (1962). The latter is in fact, a compilation of shorter essays on the lives and moral examples of each of the fourteen holy figures of Shi’i Islam, those written during the latter half of the 1930s and early 1940s. All these works were later additions to the body of literature that was intended to provide religious and juridical guidance, for example, Sahifah al-‘amal [The Book of Religious Practice], 1939), a compilation of particular prayers and practices associated with the religious occasions within the Islamic calendar. ‘Ali Naqvi carefully reviewed this compilation from another scholar and wrote an attestation of its contents (tausiq) and an endorsement of its importance.
In sum, many of the themes and concerns that had motivated ‘Ali Naqvi’s writings during the early years continued through later years as well. Yet, this is only half the story: the later phase of his intellectual career saw him undertaking new projects and exploring novel intellectual avenues, the domain to which I now turn.
The Qur’anic Commentary
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Two works stand out in this regard: ‘Ali Naqvi’s seven-volume Qur’anic commentary Fasl al-khatab [The Decisive Discourse]
and four-part account of the early Islamic history Tarikh-i Islam. While preoccupied with responding to the crisis of religion, ‘Ali Naqvi began the commentary project during the early years of his intellectual career. As was noted in chapter 1, the Qur’anic commentary project was part and parcel of the broader defense of Islam, especially what he saw as “the day-to-day objections (i‘tarazat) leveled against the Qur’an, [responses to which were] available in books in the Arabic language but remained inaccessible to lay people.”
In 1940, he wrote a 270- page long Prolegomena to the Qur’an (The Decisive Discourse) which discussed critical and much-debated issues such as the nature of the Divine revelation (vahy), the miracle of the Qur’an (i‘jaz al-Qur’an, subsidiary to which was an elaboration of the concept of miracle itself) the history of the compilation of the Qur’anic text, clarification of the Sunni suspicions regarding the Shi’i view of the Qur’an
, various recitation-styles of the Qur’an, principles of Qur’anic exegesis and a century-by-century account of the major exegetical works written in the Islamic intellectual history. Prolegomena was intended to be followed by a complete commentary on the Qur’an. The project, however, came quickly to a halt after he completed the first volume. For over 30 years then ‘Ali Naqvi did not return to it. As preceding chapters have shown, some more pressing concerns had kept him occupied during these decades. He needed to remove the intellectual barriers that had made it impossible for his Muslim audience to take its sacred scripture and its teachings seriously. By 1950s, however, the situation had changed: as I have argued thus far, he had responded to most of the “new objections” in his writings. That is why, in 1972, when the project is completed and was published, his preface no longer situated the commentary in terms of the defense of Islam or the Qur’an, but as the “religious need of the time”: for the Muslim masses to have any meaningful relationship with the sacred scripture, there was a strong need for a Qur’anic commentary in the Urdu language. In the preface of the 1972 edition ‘Ali Naqvi explains his intention behind the project: in the past Muslims had a majority that had mastery over Arabic and then everything was in Arabic. That is why in those days, religious scholars wrote everything in Arabic. With Persian becoming a popular language, religious scholars inaugurated writing in Persian and also transferring intellectual heritage from Arabic into Persian. With the decline of Persian and rise and maturation of Urdu as a language, it was only natural that now religious scholars would do the same: religious knowledge will now be propagated through Urdu. It is important to point out that unlike the 1940 edition where ‘Ali Naqvi is much concerned about defending Islam and the Qur’an from attacks, here his foremost concern is transference of religious knowledge and learning. The preface also makes clear that by this time ‘Ali Naqvi had realized that finishing the Commentary-project along intended ambitious lines was impossible given his age; he was already in his sixties at the time (Preface, 4- 5). Yet the need had persisted and therefore he completed the rest of the commentary in a summary fashion, highlighting important points. As a result, what was projected to be a 30-volume project in 1940 eventually published in seven volumes.
Notwithstanding the reduction in size and scope of this project, ‘Ali Naqvi’s Qur’anic commentary is extremely significant for our understanding of his thought. This significance owes much to the very format in which a Qur’anic commentary is traditionally written: a verse-by-verse layout forestalls a preordained topic and systematization so characteristic of ‘Ali Naqvi’s other writings; and an immensely broad range and variety of issues that the Qur’an speaks of forces the exegete to express his views on almost every subject of human concern, whether of metaphysical, theological, juridical, polemical, or sociopolitical import. In this way then a Qur’anic commentary divulges – albeit in a non-synthesized form – an exegete’s entire viewpoint, from which, in principle, nothing could really be left out. This inevitability of comprehensiveness that is part and parcel of a Qur’anic exegetical exercise is also witnessed in ‘Ali Naqvi’s commentary. In it converge, therefore, almost every theme and topic that he had dealt with (and would afterwards) in his various writings, and could therefore be reckoned as a compendium of his religio-intellectual thought. In other words, in light of the immense possibilities presented by the vast scope of Qur’anic verses in their thematic focus, Fasl al-khatab [The Decisive Discourse] encapsulates the full breadth of ‘Ali Naqvi’s thought. Besides the familiar themes discussed in this study thus far, his commentary on verses that presented fresh intellectual questions stretched his thought even further, with the result that his opinions on a whole host of intellectual and social issues are scattered throughout this commentary.
A few comments are also called for in regards to ‘Ali Naqvi’s method of exegesis. If, as we have noted above, it conforms to the traditional verse-for-verse style, in many ways it also departs from certain traditional methods: for example, in simplifying the language, avoiding lengthy and tortuous discussion of grammatical nuances (nuance is subordinated instead to the transmission of what he saw as the intended message), accuracy in translation (by way of sifting through various contemporary translations, and employing classical sources when inevitable), and finally, a succinct exposition of the essential message contained within the verse.
Even a cursory review of this work makes it clear that ‘Ali Naqvi intended to provide, via reflections upon the Qur’an Holy Book, religious guidance to an audience whose intellectual and religious needs were quite specific, and pertained to a particular socio-intellectual and historical milieu. In other words, Fasl al-khatab [The Decisive Discourse], like everything else ‘Ali Naqvi penned, was sensitive to “the needs of its times”, and attempted to address them fully. That is why almost every theme listed under the section “Continuities” (see above) finds ample space in this work. Let me illustrate this point with an example: in elaborating on verse 3:14 (“Decked out fair to men is the love of lusts - women, children, heaped-up heaps of gold and silver, horses of mark, cattle and tillage. That is the enjoyment of the present life; but God - with Him is the fairest resort”), ‘Ali Naqvi writes:
By itself love of worldly goods is not a bad thing. In fact, it is a natural necessity of a human being. But when there is a collision between interests of this world and the hereafter, then the faith demands that God’s servant should prefer gains of the hereafter over the gains of this world. In the case of this verse, there is no harm even in viewing God as the agent (fa‘il
) of making [these worldly things] captivating (dil avayz). It is so because imprinting
of desires for these things within human nature is a means for achieving communal and civilizational interests. But if [a human person] is so overwhelmed by these delights that he overlooks the interest of the hereafter,then
it will be a satanic act.
One is immediately reminded of ‘Ali Naqvi’s rebuttal of the din/dunya (this life/hereafter) divide discussed in chapter 3. As evident, his opinion of the correct relationship between the two is quite consistent with his earlier formulation of the solution; he was simply reiterating what he had stated in other texts, for example, Tijarat aur Islam [Commerce and Islam] (1933). Many other examples could be cited from the commentary to demonstrate the recurrence of familiar themes from his writings. In sum, in observing ‘Ali Naqvi’s choices of issues to underscore in his exposition, one quickly gleans the essential link between this commentary and his other writings. Further, the characteristic features of simplicity, directness, and avoidance of unnecessary technicalities so common in his earlier works are also present in the commentary Fasl al-khatab, thus proving that in composing it ‘Ali Naqvi had largely in mind the Muslim masses, not the specialists.
Rethinking Islam’s Sacred History
Later years also saw ‘Ali Naqvi writing a four-volume Tarikh-i Islam (History of Islam), an account of the sacred history of Islam leading up to the death of the Prophet. I call it “sacred history” for specific reasons: first, what is predominantly a work on the life of the Prophet opens with the creation story, under the section Aghaz-i afarinash (Beginning of creation). Throughout the text ‘Ali Naqvi assumes (and at times makes a case for it) that the perennial religion has always been Islam. Under the section “Islamic History and its Beginning” he cites the Qur’anic verse, “The religion with God is Islam,”
noting that although the term ‘Islam’ was first employed by the Qur’an for Abraham,
still from the first prophet Adam through Noah and the last Prophet, the religion has always been Islam
. Since for ‘Ali Naqvi Islam is a perennial religion, in fact, the only religion according to the Qur’an, therefore, an account of “Islamic history” cannot but begin with creation, not with the Prophet of Islam in the 7th century. That is why early sections of the book trace Islamic history from Adam through Abraham, and then, Abraham through to the Prophet of Islam. Jewish and Christian prophets and revelations are, therefore, an integral part of this “sacred narrative.” In like manner, particular events of Islamic history proper
are situated within this larger “sacred history” that sets the backdrop for the question of the meaning of these events. That is, the discussion of “history” and its “meaning” are not entirely disjointed in his account, but do overlap in profound ways. In tracing the history of Islam from Adam to Abraham, and in greater details when dealing with the period between Abraham and the Prophet of Islam, Islamic history is presented as a unified whole, one in which history and meaning are intimately intertwined. Moreover, this strong sense of the underlying unity of Islam’s historical narrative is a result, not of historical analysis itself, but the theological framework that sets its backdrop.
Both points lead to the same conclusion: In setting up Islamic history along these lines, the “historical” has been subordinated to the “theological”. In other words, the historical narrative of Islam, in ‘Ali Naqvi’s historical thought, is determined by its theological vision. This has not, however, debarred him from being “critical” in his analysis of the particular historical details. In fact, the hermeneutical scheme of “Historicizing Mythology” and “Mythologizing History” witnessed in his other writings, especially on the theme of Karbala, are also strongly at play here.
In other words, he attempted to ground his account of history in the early sources to eliminate opinions that had no basis in those. In sum, it is through his theological understanding of Islam’s sacred history that ‘Ali Naqvi approached the formal history; and the conclusions drawn from his critical historical analysis were then applied to the “theological” domain.
One more point needs to be made regarding this intertwining of the theological and the historical: the overarching theological vision that provides parameters and criterion for historical analysis exhibits an unmistakable Shi’i coloring. To put it differently, the theological frame of reference by which particular events of history are assessed and commented upon displays a clear Shi’i bent: The history of Islam (including of all previous prophets) is the history of an oppressed and suffering community. This view of history can be contrasted with the usual Sunni version of a triumphant and victorious Islam. Quite early in the text, while discussing the lives of the previous prophets, he laid out this contrast which would then inform his choice of historical events worthy of discussion as well as the explication of their meaning.
Finally, ‘Ali Naqvi’s sources for historical analysis bring to light important insights vis-à-vis how this text is an extension of his thought from the earlier years. For example, Tarikh-i Islam (History of Islam),
is not history for history’s sake. It is not intended as a text that would simply lay out a detailed account of “what happened”.
Akin to his other works, moral and spiritual lessons are intricately weaved into the historical narrative. Moreover, he employs the Qur’an and hadith-reports as proofs for historical analysis, which shows that the text was written for a Muslim audience who were already convinced of the centrality of Islamic sources.
Let me illustrate the above-mentioned points through the work itself. Commenting upon Nimrod’s tyranny toward Abraham which led to his emigration, the Qur’anic verse 21:68, (“They said, “Burn him [Abraham], and help your gods, if you would do aught”) ‘Ali Naqvi remarks that Divine wisdom did not intervene at this stage and waited further to let the oppression and brutality of the oppressor and oppresedness and patience of the oppressed may both reach their final limit. The Divine Wisdom let events take their course to a point where the oppressor could not argue that “We did not intend to burn, we were simply threatening”, or the oppressed Abraham’s patience shaken by the terror of fire. Human choices were not obstructed but were allowed to be exercised fully so there is neither confusion nor doubt as to the brutality of the oppressor and the trial of the oppressed. It is only after Abraham was thrown into fire that the Divine Will intervened and saved Abraham. Since God had other aims for Abraham he did not become a martyr. A perfect embodiment of the sacrificing ethos of Islam’s foremost guides and exemplars, Abraham in this exposition becomes the first person to have made sacrifice for Islam. With Lot and Sara, he also becomes the first emigrant of Islamic history. For ‘Ali Naqvi the story of Islam begins with trials, suffering sacrifice, and patience.
Note that the Qur’an is employed again and again to buttress claims about the pre-Islamic history and the word Islam extended to all the previous prophets. Furthermore, although humans do make choices in history that have good or bad consequences, history is not independent of the divine plan. Abraham was needed for execution of the divine plan.
Islamic history of afflictions, sufferings and sacrifice continues with the succeeding prophets. A few moments later, ‘Ali Naqvi discusses the prophetic career of Lot, noting how Lot suffered in the hands of his community which had refused to follow the divine injunctions and eventually drove him out of the area. He writes:
These are the earlier traces (nuqush) of Islamic history that have turned events of afflictions (masa’ib), pains (takalif), torments [from others], homelessness and exile into a treasure. That is why the Prophet of Islam said, “The beginning of Islam was with exile”. How then could it be apt for Muslims that they are troubled, or lose hope with the occurrence of afflictions (masa’ib) or extremities (shada’id).
They should understand these things as part of their communal character and should always be prepared to bear them (emphasis added).
‘Ali Naqvi’s reminder to his community that as the prophetic community, suffering is only destined for them, and faced with it they should not lose heart, is clearly to cater to the anxieties and deep angst that turbulences of the colonial era had afflicted upon it. In tying the sacred history with the contemporary situation, ‘Ali Naqvi attempted to make it come alive in the contemporary Muslim consciousness replete with meaning and hope.
At this juncture, the narrative of Islam as a religion of suffering and the oppressed is made even clearer when ‘Ali Naqvi discusses Abraham’s pleading with God in the context of Lot’s story. Not only that the guides of Islam had always suffered in the hands of their community –community rebelled and disobeyed them – they never cursed them or took revenge from them. Instead they always tried to protect them through prayers and interceded on their behalf. When the Divine wisdom found no room for reforming Lot’s community it sent angels to punish them but Abraham argued with them and with God to protect them.
Yet, Abraham’s act of dissent is his special privilege as the intimate friend of God, and therefore a friendly and frank quarrelling that only friends could do. A little later, while discussing Hagar and Ishmael’s difficulties and loneliness in the desert, ‘Ali Naqvi’s account of the deeper currents that define and make sense of the historical unfolding of the perennial religion of Islam through time is stated in clearest terms: “This was the foundation of Islam’s center in whose account helplessness, exile, emigration, hunger, and thirst are clearly perceptible.
The same intensity and pain would become the preamble for the happiness and prosperity (farrakhiva
khush hali) that was to come. “So truly with hardship comes ease, so truly with hardship comes ease (Qur’an 94:6).”
‘Ali Naqvi’s subtle and repeated stress that “Islam is a religion of the oppressed” in these early pages is, in orientation, quite clearly Shi’i. In underscoring the theme of suffering in the history of “pre-Islamic Islam” he projected the Shi’i sensibilities back onto history. If the message of the various prophets is one with the message of the Prophet of Islam, they also share a common fate: that they will be misunderstood, their teachings will be forgotten by most, and the prophets would always suffer in the hands of their communities. It is obvious how this particular lens with which ‘Ali Naqvi looked upon history could easily be extended to the life of the Prophet on the one hand, and the household of the Prophet on the other. It is also clear how ‘Ali Naqvi would tie this view of history to the sufferings of Husayn and his companions on the planes of Karbala.
Like the episode of Abraham, the events of Karbala revealed the extent of the Umayyad oppression and Husayn’s forbearance in the face thereof.
Finally, let me cite a passage from these early sections that clarify how Tarikh-i Islam (History of Islam) was also intended to edify its audience in ethical and religious matters. The context is Abraham’s building of the House of God in Mecca:
This building of the Ka‘bah was in fact the building of a center for the Islamic religion, which is a source of success and salvation for the whole world. Both father and son got busy in erecting it: the father was constructing it while the son was doing the hard labor. Though the tribe of Jurhum had already settled in Mecca, the Creator desired that the house be built by father and son alone. In this way, this concept that there is no harm in labor and hard work was established forever for the followers of Islam. It is so because our great religious and spiritual ancestors were [themselves] employed by the Creator for this task. (emphasis
added)
Concluding Remarks (Part I)
The foregoing discussion showed the interrelatedness of two phases of ‘Ali Naqvi’s intellectual career. It illustrated that ‘Ali Naqvi’s later thought was an extension of his religio-intellectual project as it was worked out by him during his early years. It was also shown that why and in what ways the earlier phase had priority over the later one.
Perhaps the best elucidation of all these claims, in conclusion, I turn now to ‘Ali Naqvi’s Muharram lectures in Pakistan.
These lectures were delivered towards the end of his life (1980-1984, spread over a period of 5 years), and later compiled as Majmu‘ah-yi taqarir (Collection of speeches).
As the compiler notes in his prelude, ‘Ali Naqvi had returned to Pakistan after a period of almost
years (his last visit occurring in 1956). The structure and order in which ‘Ali Naqvi chose the topics for his speeches reveal a certain underlying purpose regarding what he deemed most essential for his audience. The order of lectures also exhibit a consistency of vision that corresponds, almost systematically, with the two phases of his intellectual thought.
In 1980, on the occasion of the very first series of lectures, ‘Ali Naqvi chose to speak on the Qur’anic verse, “The true religion with God is Islam”
. Notice how he begins his discussion:
Surely, the true religion with God is only Islam. One of the various questions asked about religion [these days] is that religion takes away our freedom. A human being is born free and should stay free. Religion, however, implements rules which is why religion should be abandoned.I plea that although the eminence of freedom cannot be denied, the only question is [whether it is] freedom of every kind and from every bond (qayd)?
To the extent that I have come to think [about this I have resolved that] so long as a human has a bond to life absolute freedom cannot be one’s destiny.
The question raised and the response is reminiscent of the earlier days. It is obvious that in choosing to speak about the contemporary doubts vis-à-vis religion, ‘Ali Naqvi is catering to his audience in Pakistan who had not been exposed to his writings and speeches the same way that his Indian listeners had been so far. He dedicates over five speeches to this problem of human freedom that had led many to abandon religion.
Again reminiscent of the earlier years, it is only after clarifying these prevalent objections toward the “concept of religion” that in later speeches ‘Ali Naqvi began to explain Islam itself as a religion. The rest of the volumes follow the lead of his religiointellectual project (as has been described in this study thus far) and the way it was executed throughout his life: clarifying the grounds for religion first, then turning to the religious doctrines (usul ad-din), followed by practices (furu‘ ad-din) and a discussion of the virtues necessitated by religion. This plan is executed in these lectures in the following manner: lectures of 1981 (volume 2) explain the necessity of following the divine will and many doctrinal issues including the Imamate and Prophecy; 1982 (volume 3) extend the discussion from 1982 to enter the domain of religious practices, virtues and human action; 1983 (volume 4), a continuation of the topics from the previous year, such as the need for Shari‘a and other virtues; 1984 (volume 5) where he responds to the challenge of religious pluralism and asserts the truthfulness of Islam visà- vis other religions. Although not entirely systematic, the underlying reasoning mirrors the manner in which he had approached the crisis of religion throughout his life.
In concluding our overview of the later phase of ‘Ali Naqvi, it must be emphasized that during these years several of his earlier writings went through various editions, continued to be published and re-published, and therefore complemented these later writings. Additionally, he traversed unmarked territories and provided intellectual responses to the exigent problems of the day by diagnosing the nature and degree of the crisis within the Indian Shi‘i society. Finally, the contemporary rejoinders to it provided a foundation from which he could extend his religio-intellectual project to incorporate other urgent issues. In this regard, mention must also be made of his treatises that he intended as précis of his writings on the principles and branches of Islam (usul vafuru‘ ad
-din), for example, Usul va furu‘ ad-din (Religious doctrine and practices) and “Shi‘at ka ta‘rruf” (Introduction to Shi’ism). His further exposition of the various burning theoretical issues surrounding the role of religion in the Indian society (as noted above) and this co-presence of writings from both phases ensured that he could entertain issues that were significant, yet “subordinate” to those he dealt with in the earlier phase of his intellectual career.
In the final analysis, both phases completed the theoretical and the practical aspects of the role of religion in creating a harmonious and vibrant human society:
Without drawing the full import of the underlying intent of Islam in transforming a human society through its religious and theological vision, the project of reconfiguration would have been left incomplete. More importantly, it would have failed to convince ‘Ali Naqvi’s demurring interlocutors that “religion, especially Islam, is the greatest source of a society’s islah”. This survey of ‘Ali Naqvi’s later writings, therefore, turns to this final aspect of his thought: his exposition of Islam’s sociopolitical vision for a human society, subordinate to which is his attempts to reform Muslim culture and social practices, in other words, his social reform (islah).
PART II: ‘ALI NAQVI’S SOCIAL REFORM
Why Social Reform?
A prominent theme from ‘Ali Naqvi’s earlierwritings was
the all-encompassing scope of Islam that leaves out no dimension of human life and society. For ‘Ali Naqvi to assert it fully, he had to apply this vision to all spheres of human life. In reconfiguring the foundations of Islamic religious doctrines and practices, he had to show that the teachings of Islam pave the way for a prosperous and healthy human society. And to persuade his audience of this claim, he had to confront topics of social and political import head-on. Although providing the theoretical basis for why such a claim is legitimate from the Islamic point of view, during the earlier years, he did not demonstrate it by way of discussion of concrete sociopolitical issues. Yet, the intention was always there, and precursors to the trajectory that he took in later years were clearly disclosed in the earlier writings. For example, Commerce and Islam (1933) was as much a work of social reform, to help the economic cause of the Muslim community, as it was an exposition of the all-encompassing nature of Islam.
During these later years, therefore, the sagacious order of Islam now needed to be brought to the fore in its fullest breadth and depth. His essay Islami culturekia
hay? (What is Islamic culture?)provides
an excellent venue for the discussion of the Islamic vision of a human society, in which ‘Ali Naqvi lays out his vision of a well-ordered society as well as the general principles to be followed to reform human culture.
Reminiscent of his assertion of Islam’s comprehensiveness, here again he begins by noting that “Islam is not a kind of religion that remains aloof from communal life.” Just the way it has its own law and constitution (a’in), it also possesses its own perspective on political order (mulki nizam) and culture. Islamic governance and culture are based not on authorities of a person, a tribe, a political party, or people’s will in the form of democracy or material progress, but on the principles of simplicity, peace (salah)
, and God-wariness (taqvá). Only a government and culture that propagate these values could be called Islamic governance or Islamic culture. It does not matter, ‘Ali Naqvi emphasizes, whether those ruling are Muslims or not: “If the government is of Muslims, but its constitution and order is not in conformity with this [Islamic] government, then it will be a non-Islamic government; and if its behavior, traits (adat va khasa’il) and social life (mu‘asharat) include elements which are different from this [Islamic] culture then it will be a non-Islamic culture, even when those [responsible for] choosing it are Muslims”.
Furthermore, because they are founded upon local, racial or communal tastes, temperaments, and dispositions, compared to Islamic culture all other cultures have limited scope and application. Since Islamic teachings are comprehensive and prescribe limits (quyud) of permissible and forbidden (halalva
haram) for every domain of human life, it is by way of following these limits that Islamic culture is formed. In ‘Ali Naqvi’s view, the “Islamic” content of an Islamic culture is offered by the concrete Shari’ite teachings, and Islamic culture formed through adherence to these directives regarding permissibility or non-permissibility of actions. To the extent cultures, nations, and countries follow and implement these juridical categories they become Islamic.
In other words, Islamic culture is formed through Shari’ite law and its adherence.
Consequently, it is Shari’a that confers upon Muslims their cultural identity and a basis for reforming their social life.
In the concluding remarks ‘Ali Naqvi makes a significant point regarding how Islamic culture compares with other cultures: “Hence, Islamic culture is not a culture that is in competition with the cultures of other nations and countries. It is rather about shaping all those into a proper mold (salih sancah)” (emphasis added).
Islam in ‘Ali Naqvi’s exposition has a clear vision of its own for a human society and provides guidelines by which to organize a human community at every level. The Islamic vision is based on its own principles laid out in its theology and Shari’ite law; yet, this vision is not something to be implemented from without, or created anew from scratch, but rather a way to reform an already existing human society along these guidelines.
How to Carryout Social Reform?
If Islam intends to reform an existing culture “from within”, how is this task to be accomplished? How does Islam as a religion guide a culture along its path to welfare and prosperity? Again, in the early years, ‘Ali Naqvi did lay out - albeit in a summary fashion - his answer to this question. The text Mazhab aur ‘aql (Religion and reason) includes a section entitled, ‘aqa’id va marasim (Beliefs and practices) on the relationship between religious doctrines and popular custom. In this short section, ‘Ali Naqvi noted the following:
To act solely according to those things that continue for a long time is called custom (ravaj). Belief (‘aqidah) should not be based on customs, but instead on ‘aql and reasoning. Without doubt, practices (marasim) are related to customs. If they are beneficial for God’s creation and have an intellectual basis, then they should remain, otherwise, they should be abolished.
Practices have often gone beyond [their status] to become inherited mental prejudices (damaghi khalal)
. Surely, they require reform (islah). Nature has endowed us with unlimited ‘aql and speech as human beings, so that by the mind things are understood through thinking, by speech they are understood by way of asking, and by the eyes, so that old propositions, previous human beings, and ancient sayings are comprehended in light of the contemporary milieu; ‘aql has been given for islah of understanding and for correct estimation (sahih andazah).
The idea that social practices and customs should not be taken at their face value, but rather, in light of the religious doctrines, requires a continuous reevaluation of the social benefits of these practices, or lack thereof. This process of continual reflection and reevaluation provides ‘Ali Naqvi with a clear principle for social reform (islah). It is with this principle that he would address and navigate every social problem during his later years.
A few words need to be mentioned regarding ‘Ali Naqvi’s approach towards social reform (islah): First, for him the ‘ulama’ have a huge role to play in carrying out social reform. In fact, he sees it as an essential concern and responsibility of the ‘ulama’.
In other words, in his capacity of being the religious guide of his community, it was his function to point-out those aspects of culture that were in conflict with the teachings of Islam or common sense. It is, however, a different matter that sometimes the ‘ulama’ (like he himself) findthemselves
in a milieu where they are confronted by matters much more significant and fundamental, that social reform becomes of secondary import.
Second, islah for ‘Ali Naqvi is an ongoing affair, a never-ending exercise inherent to the way human societies develop and degenerate.Finally, although incessant, islah of a human society for ‘Ali Naqvi is always gradual, with measured and well thought-out steps.
In positing this gradual and sustained approach to islah of a human society, ‘Ali Naqvi preempts sudden, impatient, and revolutionary approaches toward this cause.
He expresses these points quite clearly in one of his essays on the institution of marriage.
He notes how the ‘ulama’ had always attempted to reform unnecessary social customs, or those opposed to the spirit and teachings of Islam and cites the example of his forefather Ghufran Ma’ab
who was confronted by a community thoroughly immersed in Hindu practices. But Ghufran Ma’ab’s approach toward reform was well thought-out, measured and gradual, in which according to their respective significance, issues were prioritized. He first countered things that were causing unbelief (kufr) and associating things with God (shirk). The example of the guides of Islam and true ‘ulama’ such as Ghufran Ma’ab taught Muslims this proper method of reform:
The [proper] way of islah is that one should always choose [to change things in] gradual progression (tadriji). You know that in Islamic Shari’a this wisdom and good sense has always been kept in view. From the time the Prophet’s mission began, the benefits of prayer and fasting had the same sagacious facets, yet, you know that they were not made obligatory until the first and second Hijra [year of the Islamic calendar]… It is needed that these days we keep in view the customs and manners (adab) of the Shari’a of the Household of the Prophet, for example marriage as a religious custom and refrain from absurd social customs.
This understanding of “steady gradual Islamic social reform from within” was then applied to the concrete social practices. It often lead ‘Ali Naqvi to level devastating critiques against aspects of culture that had neither a basis in religion nor a justification on intellectual grounds, and therefore, were of no benefit to society.
Illustrating ‘Ali Naqvi’s Reform of Shi’i Culture:
In justifying why certain practices demanded reevaluation, ‘Ali Naqvi also provided a sociological and historical analysis of how customs are usually instituted in cultures, and especially how certain practices came into existence in the Indian milieu.
His essay Hamaray rusumva
quyud (Our social customs and [cultural] bonds) is crucial in this regard, where ‘Ali Naqvi refers to these cultural practices and customs as intoxicating. Islam had come with simple and serious principles and teachings but these teachings - although kept intact within certain households - were ignored by most after the Prophet. What spread instead was the culture of power and the powerful, of the courts of kings and rulers. For ‘Ali Naqvi spread of Islam into India occurred under the shadow of the sword. That is why the customs that dominated royal courts were based, not on Islamic principles, but on Turkic, Persian, and other cultures. Furthermore, this experience of Qur’an and the Prophet on the one hand, and obedience to the ruler under the pretext of misinterpretation of the Qur’anic verse “O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority (ulu al-‘amr) among you,”
on the other left a deep mark on Muslim consciousness. Consequently, faithful obedience to the ruler engendered imitation of their ways of life that spread then to the Muslim masses:
The conclusion is obvious: an event and practice that occurred aroundkings,
were imitated by the elites and they took part in spreading it. Through their influence, those who were close to them also chose similar ways. The result, therefore, was that those things are usually considered to be [important] parts of life. [How absurd that] pure religious obligations may be neglected, but these customs cannot be neglected. Over time, these customs were strengthened by superstitions (tauham parasti).
In sum, popular customs and rituals usually result from a “trickledown effect”, in which those in positions of political and economic power play a key role. It is their embrace of certain customs that make possible mindless imitation of these practices by the laity.
‘Ali Naqvi’s Shi’i sensibilities are also on display in this analysis: the seriousness, purposefulness, and simplicity of the Islam of the Shi’i holy figures has been contrasted with the pompous, ostentatious, and opportunistic Islam of the power-hungry. Tracing this contrast back to the early days of the Islamic history
is clearly a juxtaposition of the Shi’i Islam of martyrdom and suffering, and Umayyad Islam of empire-building and lax attitudes toward the teachings of Islam.
But that is not the only factor. Faith in superstitious, widespread in India, complicated the matter even further. Since everything was seen in the light of these superstitions, performance of rituals and adherence to certain customs gained far too much significance than following the principles of Islam and simplicity in religious and worldly life that it had prescribed for its adherents. As a result, Muslims also became much moreritual- and custom-oriented
; certain customs that had status only of preferential came to be seen as mandatory and vice versa. In sum, both these factors - imitation of the ways of the rulers and belief in superstitions reinforced by the Indian ambience - lead to further distancing of Muslims from the simple and vital teachings of their faith.“Eventually, those simple ways that were prescribed by Islam for its adherents were besieged by [these] superfluities and additions, to the extent that their real form was concealed. [In fact,] what was the real thing that was prescribed for us became even harder to know.” For ‘Ali Naqvi this phenomenon of unyielding adherence to social customs was not unique to Muslim communities alone, but rather ubiquitous:
A human being finds himself always caught up in a cultural ambience, aspects of which are based on degenerated practices or the result of political maneuverings, akin to what was found in the way Muslim communities took up much of Hindu customs, despite the fact that they oppose the Islamic emphasis on simplicity in lifestyle. Human societies become such that no matter what, these social customs continue to chain, such that no human being can dare to break-free from; not even with death, since these social customs even surround rituals of death and burial.
Having laid out a sociological account of how these practices were embraced by Muslim laity, ‘Ali Naqvi began to clarify why such practices needed to be opposed and reformed. The motive for that was not simply that they lacked a religious basis (that is, when they are unwarranted in Shari’a), but also because they were causing harm to the economic wellbeing of those involved. If these customs were simply dry and without any harmful consequences, one would not have objected to those. But since they are quite ostentatious and require extensive spending, one should feel compelled to evaluate their necessity, purpose, and lawfulness in the eyes of God and Shari’a. One needs to ask oneself why so much money is spent on rituals and customs that are either without purpose and/or based on superstitions, or outright prohibited by the Shari’a. Economic considerations alone should be enough to discourage Muslims from carrying out these pompous and unnecessary rituals that cause great damage to the economic wellbeing of the community. ‘Ali Naqvi cites various examples of the kinds of rituals and practices that are prohibited by Shari’a or are based only on superstitions: “In adhering to these minute things, the kind of life that is formed preludes our destruction (fana).”
In criticizing these ill-instituted customs, ‘Ali Naqvi also takes to task those who claimed the “new light” (na’i roshni), that is, the enlightened Western-style educated Muslim elite. For ‘Ali Naqvi, they are content with simply pointing out the unreasonableness of these practices without ever trying wholeheartedly to eliminate them from society. Like everyone else, they are also chained by these customs and despite all their rhetoric, they hardly ever breakaway from them. In that, their criticisms were simply lip-service and an expression of a fashionable “enlightened thought” that lacked sincerity in eliminatingthese
harmful customs.
In numerous essays, then, ‘Ali Naqvi would address various prevalent practices that had become deeply ingrained in the culture, but had no justification. In this regard, he paid special attention to marriage, especially the ornate ceremonialism that accompanied it and had become quite widespread within the community. He spoke on the subject on at least three occasions, in the essays Hamaray rusumva
quyud (Our social customs and [cultural] bonds), Shadi khanah abadi (Marriage: building a household) and Nizam-i izdavaj) (Marital order). Although the latter two essays address the subject directly, even the former that was intended as a broader outline of how to reform cultural practices spoke extensively on the subject of marriage and marriage ceremonies. For ‘Ali Naqvi, the rituals and ceremonies of marriage best exemplify the Muslim community’s blind imitation of Hindu cultural norms. This led to a conscious or unconscious neglect of the teachings of Islam which are based on a purposeful and serious vision for a human society. Consequently, for ‘Ali Naqvi, this lack of adherence to Islamic teachings and thought on the part of Muslim’s was wreaking havoc in both Muslim Indian culture and it’s religious practice: “Those ceremonies that continue from the time of our forefathers are considered obligatory, as if marriage is not valid without them. There is no way of determining [good or bad] ceremonies. They change not just with countries, but with cities; not just cities but with [particular] houses. Every house has its own specific ceremonies. Some of these ceremonial rituals are against Shari’a (19)”.
For ‘Ali Naqvi even when these practices are not forbidden from a specific Shari’ite point of view, they still need to be evaluated for their effectiveness and benefits. He pointed out how marriage-ceremonies best illustrated blind imitation of the Hindu ways, pointless wastefulness of economic resources at the expense of enjoying basic necessities of life by all members of the community, and by many avoidance of marriage altogether: “Marriages do not happen simply because there is not enough money to carry out these ceremonies….These absurd ceremonies and this imitation of Hindus, are things that are taking us toward the path of annihilation.”
Reflective of his general approach toward all intellectual topics, whether pertaining to doctrine or practice, in reforming ceremonies related to marriage, ‘Ali Naqvi clarified first the religious meaning and purpose of marriage, and the divine intention associated with it. The synthesis of the various themes, the comprehensiveness of religion, the opposition to the din/dunya divide, the sound basis of the concrete Shari’a prescriptions, and finally, the transformation of a mundane act like marriage into a spiritual act of worship, are all displayed here regarding what marriage is and how it needs to be simplified to conform to the religious teachings. His essay Shadi khanah abadi (Marriage: building a household) begins with the the Qur’anic injunction for establishing marital order (nizam-i izdavaj) recited at the marriage ceremony. He notes that the Qur’anic prescription ensures survival of the human race. No marriage, no human population, he argued. Since Islam is interested in preservation of the human race it encourages human beings to marry and form communities. Therefore marriage, solely responsible for promoting human life, becomes a religious responsibility. Akin to everything else, Divine prescription for marriage creates a religious duty that is not only in human interest itself and vital for human survival, it is emblematic of Islam’s general approach of incorporating mundane and otherwise worldly necessities into religious life:
“It is Islam’s sagacious disposition (hakimanah ravayah) that endowed a spiritual facet even in actions that are purely material, and has provided a fundamental sense of responsibility.”
Dischargingresponsibility
in Islam then is not only fulfillment of one’s responsibility, but simultaneously fulfillment of one’s personal desire. The act of submission to the Divine Will and prophetic Sunna
in marriage not only makes the human being a servant of God; it also helps fulfill one’s personal desire and pleasure.
Akin to the general way Islam turns every mundane action into a religious performance, “if a human being performs a marriage or some other event in a manner that becomes means for forgetting God, then the objective of Islam will not have been achieved” (16).
Once the remembrance of God accompanies it, a worldly action turns immediately into an act of worship.
The argument is simple and reminiscent of ‘Ali Naqvi’s general approach toward questions of practical life: Marriage, like everything else in life, if performed according to the Will of God as laid out in the Shari’a, is an act of worship. Having clearly explained the significance of marriage and the Islamic intention behind the prescription to marry and multiply, ‘Ali Naqvi critically evaluated each and every marriage ceremonial ritual for its conformity to Islamic teachings on the one hand, and purposefulness on the other. In all, ‘Ali Naqvi reminded his audience that Islam approaches life with a serious attitude in which simplicity in the lifestyle and meaningfulness in everything one does are critical principles. Lack of basis in Islamic teachings and economic harm were the criteria he used to reject most of these practices.
Often an intellectual case for reforming these practices is buttressed with an invocation of the lifestyle of the holy figures of Shi’i tradition: As is the case in his other writings, he persistently reminded his Shi’i followers to pay heed to the model set by the Shi’i holy figures, a move we have already witnessed in other contexts: no one is more honored and dignified than the Prophet of Islam. He could have spent millions on the wedding of his daughter but he chose simplicity and economic prudence (kafayat sha‘ari). If the prophet was not ashamed for not spending too much, why should his followers be? He asked: “You should also be content with [arranging for] the [basic] needs of your era. It is according to the simple lifestyle of the Commander of the Faithful [i.e., ‘Ali] and Fatima that the Prophet gave useful things to his daughter and son-in-law. You should as well make a list of useful things according to your lifestyle, in which you should not be thinking about showing off (numa’ish)”.
Often ‘Ali Naqvi contrasted the Shari’ite understanding of what marriage is with its changing conception that had gained currency under the influence of western thought and lifestyle. For ‘Ali Naqvi in the modern age, reform-minded, Westernized, educated, Muslim elite had begun to base marriage on love: Unless one falls in love one should not marry, and one should only marry the one whom one loves. He strongly criticized this view for its non-realistic and impractical implications: “Love is an anxiety generating (iztarab afarin) [unstable emotional] oscillation (tamavvuj) and marriage is a stable building. A firm building cannot be established on a moving wave [of ocean]. That is why the basis of marriage should only be upon prudent foresight [of the future] (hakimanah durandayshi)”. That is why in view of the considerations of a stable future, for ‘Ali Naqvi, the opinions of girl’s parents are much more reliable. That is not to say that parents should not sincerely seek the girl’s consent and willingness (54).
The Issue of Governance
If in ‘Ali Naqvi’s exposition Islam is a complete religion that addresses every facet of human existence, it could not be indifferent to the question of governance. In concluding the discussion of ‘Ali Naqvi’s vision of the human society, I turn to his political thought. ‘Ali Naqvi did not write much on politics beyond the two essays, Qur’an aur nizam-i hukumat (The Qur’an and political order) (1972), and Islami nazriyah-yi hukumat (The Islamic concept of government). If there is any further discussion, it is too scattered to allow a clear picture to emerge. These two essays, however, succinctly summarize ‘Ali Naqvi’s political thought and his views on how societies need to be governed. The former essay was a response to the political writings of a well-known Pakistani religious scholar and political figure, Maulana Kausar Niazi. The first part of the essay is a rebuttal of Maulana Niazi’s standard Sunni understanding of the political ramifications of the concept of consultation (shura)
, according to which the Qur’an does not provide any explicit guideline for governance beyond the principle of mutual consultation.
Consistent with his argument about the all-encompassing scope of Islam, and in a characteristically Shi’i manner, he argued that this comprehensiveness forestalls any claim that Islam or the Qur’an, having provided guidance in the minutest details of life, could be silent on the issue of governance. All the more so, because as history and experience has shown, governance has always had huge and wide-ranging consequences for a society. Islamic silence on the issue will be equivalent to “subordinating it to the unconscious errors of a fallible human’s wants and ignorance.” (6) The intellect cannot accept that such could be the case. Instead, if the Qur’an is indeed silent on the matter then one has to accept that in the Islamic perspective, there is no conception of governance without a religious guide that would watch over it. (6) Consequently, even with division of labor (taqsim-i ‘amal) in administering societies, political appointment and guidance as to how to run affairs have to come from the religious guide. That is why neither the ruler nor the community has any right to their opinions or consultation. This, however, does not preclude the religious guide to consult some people in worldly matters when he deems it fit. For ‘Ali Naqvi, his form of consultation may well be to make people responsible or for uniting them.
If in this essay, ‘Ali Naqvi rejects consultation as the basis for governance, in Islami nazriyah-yi hukumat (The Islamic concept of government),
he outlines a succinct yet comprehensive account of his political thought. The essay begins with the question of why government is necessary in the first place. In ‘Ali Naqvi’s view the necessity of government emerges from the impossibility of absolute freedom for human beings. Lack of absolute freedom means that communal restrictions (quyud) are inevitable: “These communal restrictions (ijtama‘i quyud) are called ‘ways of action and legislation’ (dastur-i ’amal aur qanun), and the power that implements them is called a government (hukumat).”
Furthermore, necessity for government could also be annulled by the existence of individuals who carry a deep sense of responsibility towards fellow human beings and the community. Yet, the possibility that such sense of responsibility exists for all members is quite impossible; it can only occur when these individuals are devoid of errors in their thought or action, in other words, when they are infallible (ma‘sum). When this utopian view is impossible, pursuing it will only be in vain. For ordinary fallible human beings in a communal setting - be it a household, a city or a nation - it is therefore inevitable to define and implement certain limits (hudud) and rights (huquq). The power that implements it and ensures that these limits and rights are adhered to is the government.
After positing the absolute necessity of government, ‘Ali Naqvi employs Aristotle’s threefold division of governance, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, evaluating each for its propriety.
He points out that for over 2000 years and despite all the cultural and ideological revolutions, the forms of government found within human societies had always been from among these three. Yet, for ‘Ali Naqvi, none of these forms of government are correct.
Based on the Islamic theological assumption that all human beings are created equal by God, ‘Ali Naqvi argued that for some one person to rule others, he needs to have some particular excellence over those ruled by him.
Otherwise, this claim to power would be unacceptable. Turning to the particular manifestation of one-person’s rule (i.e., monarchy) he contended that history barely provides evidence for the excellence of kings over their subjects. Rather, monarchs most often employed power and coercion to rule, which could not be construed marks of their excellence: “If a person has established rule through coercion and then the subjects oppose his acquisition of power, how could this be a crime,” he asked.
Extending his analysis to the second and third form of governance, ‘Ali Naqvi observed that if no one person has any particular excellence that would qualify him to rule others, the same would be the case with the rule of a few. With the third case, he argues that the objective of governance itself gets compromised:
It means that the nation itself is the ruler, anditself
ruled. It implies that the purpose of government itself is dissolved: Government was needed so that there is a power among those who are selfish, self-centered, and parochial (kutah nazar) that would make them adhere to the true law. But when law-making is itself given to this group, they would legislate according to their desires. As a result, there would be a continuing push and pull among the various groups: one group would desire to impose their wants upon everyone else and change those [laws] when they begin to threaten their interests.
‘Ali Naqvi continues to identify limitations of the third form of governance. That most of his discussion relates to this third case must be clear from the historical milieu in which he lived. Due to the political transformations in India, the issue of what form of governance is endorsed by Islam and whether democracy has any justification within Islam was - and still is - a pressing question with huge sociopolitical import. In addressing shura (consultation) in the previous essay and democratic governance here, ‘Ali Naqvi was responding to the burning questions of his cultural milieu.
If the first part of the essay, he deals with the necessity and various forms of governance. In the second part he deals with the question of the proper form of “Islamic government”, especially elaborating on the adjective “Islamic” and the circumstances under which it can be associated with the term “government”. ‘Ali Naqvi begins the analysis with a clear statement that Islamic governance can never be identified straightforwardly with Muslim governments, or with governments run by Muslims. For him, intellectually speaking, and as the later section of the essay would show that even on historical terms, they are separate. Looking back at how the question of governance was resolved in the early part of Islamic history, ‘Ali Naqvi identifies certain principles:
Popular opinion about the governments formed by Muslims - that they were based on democratic principle - is entirely wrong. In all these governments, there was always an individual sway (shakhsi farman rava’i), which also did not have a single [underlying] principle: sometimes a ruler was elected in a gathering, sometimes the previous ruler nominated the one after him, sometimes a committee was formed for consultation, sometimes it only took becoming prominent to gain power. As it happened [i.e., just the way question of rule was resolved in history] accordingly were laid out the principles [of governance]: consensus (ijma‘), appointment (istakhlaf), consultation (shura), and force and domination (qahrva
ghalabah).
Without explicitly stating the names, it is obvious that the first three principles of forming a government in ‘Ali Naqvi’s exposition relate respectively to the way the first three caliphs of Islam came into power; and the fourth refers to the Umayyad caliphate.
‘Ali Naqvi then sifts through each one of these principles and show how they are not unacceptable from both the intellectual (‘aqli) and the transmitted (naqli) points of view. In regards to the principle of consultation (that resulted in Abu Bakr’s caliphate), for example, ‘Ali Naqvi writes:
Does [consultation] mean agreement among all the individuals of the state, or all the people of the capital, or a group among those from the capital, or even further, some among this group who have come to agree? If it is all, then even in this age of electricity and communication and cars and airplanes, it would take months. What about the times when these means for communication did not exist. In those days, this [consensus] was difficult to achieve in months; what to say about a small part of a day. Then on intellectual terms, no matter how big a group it may be, accepting the correctness of their decision rests on the presence of someone who is infallible within the group. If such is not the case, then how could a totality, each part of which is made up of error, be deemed devoid of it?
If it is only some people from the capital, then what right do they have of taking away the freedom of the people from all other parts [of the state], and impose their government upon them?
Since the consensus that gave power to the first caliph could not be justified, ‘Ali Naqvi contends, how could it then justify transference of this power to the next (i.e., ‘Umar) by way of appointment (istakhlaf)?
Having argued for the shortcomings of all four principles, ‘Ali Naqvi then turns to putting forward his own prescription.
He starts off by reasserting the ubiquitous claim about the comprehensiveness of Islamic teachings
and then states how the power to legislate from the Islamic viewpoint rests with God and God alone. It is only God who can ensure that laws are made that would transcend the capriciousness of human egocentrism. According to ‘Ali Naqvi, the government has two functions: first, promulgating the constitution and law, and second, implementing these laws through the use of power and governance. Turning to the legislative function first, ‘Ali Naqvi argued that if Islam was simply a creedal system one could have presumed that Muslims are required to make their own legislation, or could have followed that of another country. But this view is incorrect. Since Islam presents a constitution of life (dastur-i hayat), its teachings legislate for everything that concerns a human being at an individual or a collective level. By accepting Islam as one’s religion, every Muslim has pledged (mu‘ahaydah kiya) to remain, in his individual and collective life, bound by this law. Therefore, one could not claim to be a Muslim while also attempting to make laws that bypass or ignore the Islamic laws.
He further argued that there are many contemporary thinkers in whose opinion impartiality in the legislative process is only accomplished when the law is made not from within the group or nation of people for whom the law is made, but by those who are impartial towards all members of the group or nation. Such impartiality is impossible within human experience of communities and that is why it is perfectly logical to look beyond human legislation and seek the Onewhose
Knowledge and Power encompasses everything and as the Creator of all does not favor one over another. This according to ‘Ali Naqvi is the Islamic viewpoint on governance. In conclusion therefore, “God is both the legislator and the ruler. With [acceptance of] Islam, a Muslim consents to His kingdom alone, after which a monarchy, an oligarchy or a democracy will be identical with taking away God’s right.
After this the three forms of Aristotelian governments have no place. When there is one true ruler, that is God, then monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy are all equally wrong”.
After clarifying the nature of governance and the legislating authority of God in the Islamic perspective, ‘Ali Naqvi turns to the question of the ruling authority, the enforcer of the law: “Now, if the government is God’s, then it is God’s responsibility to appoint his representative in every era. To take this authority in your hands will be putting up resistance to the divine right to rule and against the honor of a Muslim.”
He continues to argue that the Prophet of Islam was chosen by God and ruled by divine right, without recourse to human consultation or appointment. Extending this argument later to early Islamic history ‘Ali Naqvi argues that it is precisely because Muslims chose their own rulers without paying attention to the Divine Will and appointment of the Prophet that differences of opinion began to originate.
Consequently, in denying God’s right of appointment, Muslims made arbitrary choices in political matters and in retrospect employed tenuous principles to unsuccessfully window-dress what was otherwise just the way political events unfolded in history.
It is obvious how the Shi’i view of the Imamate informs every step of ‘Ali Naqvi’s analysis. God appointed the Prophet and the Prophet appointed ‘Ali and so on down through the Imams that came afterward, until the last Imam, who went into occultation. Whether these Imams de facto ruled or not, de jure the right belongs to them permanently. Whereas the political thought of the Sunni Muslims posits material realization as a condition for legitimacy of the political power and seeks consensus or acquisition of power regardless of whether one has a right to it or not, the true Islamic viewpoint is principled and uninterested as to whether it is applied or not: “Even if the whole world rejects him, resolves to oppose him, tries to murder him, or even if he is in isolation, imprisoned or quite poor, if he is the most knowledgeable in Islamic law, a diligent practitioner of it, worthy of being its protector, and appointed by God on this position, then it is “Divine command” and it is obligatory on the world to follow it”.
He further argued that even when deprived of his right to rule, as a follower of the Divine command, it is then up to the divinely appointed ruler to decide when it is time to stay silent on the matter or when to rise up. At times he might come across obedient to the unjust ruler and accepting of his decrees, but it need not be construed as his acceptance of the ruler, rather perhaps his way of preserving higher aims set by God.
In no way does he seek an objective other than the fulfillment of the Will of God, the real Ruler of everything.
It is evident that here ‘Ali Naqvi is defending the modus operandi of the Shi’i Imams who had often remained silent on political matters and did not challenge the ruling authority.
‘Ali Naqvi’s whole discussion of Islamic political philosophy turns, in the final section of the essay,to
address the implications of this viewpoint for the contemporary period. If a divinely appointed ruler is no longer present (referring to the occultation of the twelfth Shi’i Imam), how should Shi’i Muslims respond to this situation? For ‘Ali Naqvi the outward establishment of the rule of the hidden Imam depends on the existence of a significant number of righteous (salih) followers. Absence of such successors of the Prophet is the main impediment for the establishment of the outward rule of the divinely-appointed ruler. The experience of 260 years during which eleven such divinely-appointed rulers lived proves the indispensability of such righteous followers. Until this situation would persist, one could not expect establishment of the divine governance within human societies.
Considering finally the government of the religious scholars who represent the Imam in the realm of religious teachings, ‘Ali Naqvi concludes that in view of the points already made, even they would be unable to create a divine government.
Therefore, “In this situation one should have certainty that no matter what government there is, it will not be divinely sanctioned, whether it is of those from among us [i.e., the Shi’ites] or those who are outsiders.”
.
The closing remarks draw the full import of what all this discussion entails for the Shi’i Muslims who find themselves under governments that are not “Islamic” and ruled by the divinely appointed ruler. ‘Ali Naqvi’s reply could be summed up under two principles: absolute commitment to the divine government which hampers unconditional cooperation with the existinggovernments,
and in the peacemaking spirit of Islam and the example of the Imams, striving for peace in the society:
[For the Shi’ites] beside this divine government, the organization of any form of rule or an unconditional pact of cooperation with an institution are absolutely forbidden; especially when they have a pact with God (that we have to follow Him), then how could we unconditionally accept another group’s [political] order of things (nizam-i ‘amal)
? [All the more because] it is possible that in this political order of things there will be situations when in fulfilling the commands of the divine governance, we might have to oppose it.
[All] this means is that for the sake of general peace [in the society], we must support every government, while remaining free in the awareness of our own sense of duty and by figuring out the right plan of action. Performing actions through adherence to the way of another group, however, is in conflict with adherence to the divine governance, and against the model of the infallible Imams.
The political ideas of ‘Ali Naqviare
quite significant, especially when situated within their historical and sociopolitical milieu. First of all, in addressing the political question, ‘Ali Naqvi was hardly dealing with a mere theoretical problem: as the last section reveals, the matter had serious implications for his Shi’i followers in the way they see Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler (al-Sultan al-adil) in Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
would
orient themselves vis-à-vis the Indian government. Not only did ‘Ali Naqvi attempt to uphold the traditional Shi’i view of the divine governance of the hidden Imam - and the situation with his occultation - but he also addressed the particular challenge of how one who adheres to this vision of political governance could relate to a political order that is not founded on it.
It must also be emphasized that from ‘Ali Naqvi’s point of view, there was absolutely no difference between the governance of Muslims and that of non-Muslims: all governments in the final analysis from the Shi’i vantage point are equally non- Islamic. In clarifying the matter in this manner, he articulated and defended the traditional viewpoint on the one hand, and made possible for his followers to fully embrace their political reality.
Finally, ‘Ali Naqvi’s prescription of “detachedcooperation” (one that would hardly put the religious and political convictions aside) provided Shi’i Muslims with a positive role that would allow constructive criticism of the state and its laws. Shi’i Muslims in this perspective were no passive spectators of the political process; they were rather its overseers, who had at their disposal a critical lens that was fully grounded in a dependable divine framework.
Concluding Remarks
In concluding this discussion that has been spread out over five chapters, let me suggest for one last time ‘Ali Naqvi particular method of islah of his community.
Though the exact date of the publication of his essay ‘Alami mushkilat ka hal (Solution to the problems of the world)
is unknown, it captures in a nutshell his approach:
A person who opened his eyes in an environment as narrow as that in which a religious scholar (maulavi) is trained, and whose information is [therefore] restricted to that limited circle, [such a person] would never have an opportunity to breathe the air outside of his country and would never have exchanged views with a political commentator, to the extent that he would never have had a basic membership of a political party. Why should there be expectations from him that he could present a “solution to the problems of the world”, especially when I neither have knowledge of the opinions of the thinkers and intellectuals of the world, nor have I studied the books of politicians about politics. In this situation, then, I cannot even understand what the problems of the world are in the first place; to prescribe their solution is a matter that would come only after that.
In reality, whatever I will say, it will not be a new thing; instead it will be my repetition to you of the lesson learned from 1400 years ago. Whether the world sees it as my narrow-mindedness, blind imitation, traditionalism (qadamat pasandi), or blame me for backwardness (rij‘at pasandi).
But in my view this world (‘alam) is nothing but in reality the name of a collection of different souls (nufus). That is why to discover the problems of the world does not require exertion from without (bayruni justaju); instead, if there is nothing else, then we can study the psychology of our own self to estimate about the whole world. It is possible that someone would again consider it narrow-mindedness and say that ‘This is [again] like an insect within a wild fig that sees the whole world limited to that wild fig.’ I accept this, but there is a difference between me and this [insect]: the insect sees the world limited to a wild fig while I see my-self (nafs) encompassing (muhit) the [whole] world; that is, I see the macrocosm (‘alam-i akbar) in the microcosm (‘alam-i asghar).
In reality, a collection (majmu‘ah) of individuals is a community (qaum)
, a collection of communities a country, and a collection of countries the world. Now, whatever faults (kharabiyan) are [found] within individuals, these will become the cause of the world’s problems: The same minor faults that are among individuals and are ignored [precisely on the grounds] that they are individual, will be born among communities and will be the cause of the enhancement of the world’s problems. Therefore, if the world’s problems are to be eradicated then there is only one solution: that individual human character is reformed.
In my mind are two verses of the physician of the spirit, Hazrat ‘Ali b.
‘Abu Talib:
Your cure is within you but you do not understand it (dua’uka fikawa
la tubsir) And your illness is within you but you do not realize it (da’uka fika wa la tash‘ur) You presume that you are a small body? (ataz‘amu
annaka jirmun saghir) While within you is hiding a great world (wa fika intawa al-‘alamu alakbar) …The Qur’an has made the Prophet a Mercy for the worlds, that is, it gave him an international status (bayn al-aqvami darjah). The Prophet himself stated his prophetic mission (maqsad-i ba‘sat) in the following words: “I have been sent only to teach the human race the beauty of the morals” (husn-i ikhlaq).
God parenthetically (hasr kay sas) called the Prophet “mercy for the worlds” and the Prophet explained parenthetically
that his Prophetic mission was to teach humanity morals. Combining both, there is only one conclusion: that the solution to the world’s problems is simply that humanity be adorned with the ornaments of morals (30-31).
For ‘Ali Naqvi, in any endeavor of carrying out islah of a human society (or for that matter the whole world), one has to commence, not with institutions or socioeconomic or political structures, but with an individual human person. The more righteous the people are in a society, the better its chances of flourishing, maintaining order and equilibrium. In other words, reforming human beings is reforming the world, and vice versa. Reflecting back on the examination of his writings, it becomes clear that ‘Ali Naqvi’s islah methodically followed this principle.
It is not surprising then that the path of islah he laid out for himself accorded centrality to a human person. During the earlier years, it is this centrality of an individual that led to the project of rethinking and reconfiguring of Islamic theology and praxis. To reform a human person for him was to alter the way a human looks at the world, and understands his place in it. That is why the earlier writings discussed meaning of human life and death, the role of religious beliefs in breathing new life into human existence, and of concrete religious practices in deepening the affects of this renewed life. For ‘Ali Naqvi the wisdom of a religion like Islam is precisely its ability to anticipate all these inherent needs of a human person. By prescribing an unambiguous view of the world and tapping deep into the mysteries of human reality, it simplifies for its adherents the much-needed perspective (i.e., religious beliefs) and ways of conforming to it (i.e., religious practice), which would otherwise remain veiled from his discernment.
Nevertheless, in ‘Ali Naqvi’s view, the twentieth century had posed a special challenge to a religious universe like Islam: it had deprived Islam of this essential role.
Rarely had the role of religion in orienting human life and the ordering of a peaceful and prosperous society come under such severe attack. “New objections” had instated major intellectual and psychological barriers which were preventing his followers from embracing their religious convictions in a meaningful way. Consequently, religion was no longer a source of islah of the human society. Religion’s vital role in reforming an individual, which is the basis for the reform of the society, was seriously threatened.
That is why for ‘Ali Naqvi, convinced of religion’s supreme role in ordering human society, religion itself needed to be preserved and revived. Reform of human society, in other words, depended on the preservation of religion. Since the changing of the social milieu was replete with calls for reform (islah), using this extensive interest as the common ground, ‘Ali Naqvi began to rework and re-present anew the traditional Islamic viewpoint.
Foregoing chapters make it clear that together the writings and speeches from the two phases of ‘Ali Naqvi’scareer were
geared toward a comprehensive islah of his Shi’i community. While also asserting its comprehensive scope, the earlier phase was dedicated to making a strong case for Islam’s sagacious teachings in reforming an individual’s life. In the later phase, he then turns to the social and political teachings of Islam. In other words, commencing with an individual’s islah gradually he branched out to a comprehensive islah of the Indian Shi’i community. Observing the multitude of challenges that had besieged his followers, between the two phases, ‘Ali Naqvi evaluated and prioritized them, responding first to those that seemed more critical,then
branching out to address others. In completing this comprehensive islah, however, Islamic teachings were almost always articulated in universal terms. It is clear from the discussion of chapter 1 why nothing less could have satisfied his audience. It is in view of this wide-ranging scope of his religio-intellectual project that ‘Ali Naqvi lectured and wrote relentlessly throughout his life. His dedication to this project meant that by the time of his death, there was hardly any subject that had not received some attention from him.
In following this trajectory of reforming Islamic society, ‘Ali Naqvi’s islah of his Shi’i community mirrors that of his Indian Sunni counterparts. In other words, it is reminiscent of the revivalism of the “Inward Turn”
championed by various religious movements in the contemporary South Asian milieu. Yet what sets ‘Ali Naqvi apart from these movements (and their ideologues) is his refusal to accept privatization of Islam from the Indian public sphere. The contrast is crucial and deserves some discussion and clear emphasis.
Recent scholarship has posited increasingly privatization of religion in Muslims societies a major phenomenon and has also delineated its genealogy. Note, for example, Zaman (2002)’s comments in his well-known study of the ‘ulama’ of South Asia:
The most important of the categories that have shaped all discussion of the madrasa, as indeed of many other institutions of Indian society, is the notion of "religion". As Talal Asad has argued, developments in modern Europe and especially the impact of the Enlightenment led not merely to the subordination of religion to the state, or the confinement of the former to the spirit of "private" life, but also to "the construction of religion as the new historical object: anchored in person experience, expressible as belief – statements, dependent on private institutions, and practiced in one's spare time. This construction of religion in sure that it is part of what is inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality” (62).
Zaman’s insightful analysis conclusively demonstrates how without really intending to be secular in any way – quite to the contrary it was in fact to resist secularization of Muslim society –that the ‘ulama’ in a roundabout way ended-up internalizing the category of religion, and thus its privatization. In reasserting their religious authority on the one hand, and communal Muslim identity on the other, this internalization of distinctions within the ambit of life not only helped carve a distinct sphere of “religion”, but also shaped their seminary curricula within which became operative categories of religious (dini) and worldly (dunyavi) sciences (‘ulum). Ironically then, it is precisely the fear of relegation of Islam to the private sphere and its outright rejection that led to carving of a religious space independent of other domains of life, and freeing of the latter from the former’s influence.
…[T]he ‘ulama’ who have written on the question of madrasa reform have... insisted that the debate on the madrasa is a debate on the status and future of Islam itself, for the madrasa is both the bastion of Islam and its guardian. This equation between Islam and the madrasa is not just a polemical and, doubtlessly to some, persuasive argument against reform; it is also an argument for differentiating religion from other areas of life and thereby for asserting its autonomy in society. The issue here is not the separation of religion and state, or of society and state – which, some have argued, had come about in Muslim societies from the first centuries of Islam – but rather a recognition by the 'ulama themselves of greater differentiation within society, with religion occupying the distinct, inviolable, autonomous sphere. Inasmuch as the functional differentiation of the religious from others appears is at the heart of secularization in modern societies, the ‘ulama’ might be said to have accepted this facet of secularization. Yet the recognition of this functional differentiation does not derive from any commitment to the idea of secularization itself, but is intended rather to serve as a means of resisting or limiting the encroachments of the modern state (84).
Furthermore, observers of contemporary intellectual trends within the Islamic world have time and again called attention to the inevitability of confronting the challenges posed by modernity on the one hand, and on the other inadequacy of the Muslim intelligentsia in satisfying the religio-intellectual needs of their Muslim audience. The late Hamilton Gibb had pointed that out in his well known essay:
Every religion has necessarily built up its own frames of reference, general structures of thought abstracting from the material world of senses in terms of which it presents its spiritual or ethical message to mankind and defends its basic positions. Insofar as a religious system affirms certain positives, it excludes or denies concepts opposed to or inconsistent with these positions. Every religion today, including Islam, is confronted with searching questions as to the validity of its metaphysics, its ideal constructions abstracted from the material world, and of the resulting frames of reference within which its doctrines are formulated and expounded. The problem which Islam must face is that its traditional formulations necessarily include certain elements of reasoning which are based on intellectual concepts no longer accepted, and that it must be continually adapting its apologetic to more acceptable concepts –some of which it may even have denied in the past –with the penalty of creating a condition of' double-mindedness' among its adherents… Since this challenge comes almost wholly from the outside world, for the great majority of Muslims the old frames of reference have remained completely adequate. If at any time any hint of doubt or questioning seeps through from current philosophies developed in the West, it is immediately and decisively countered in the Muslim mind by the dogma of the 'materialist West', having no grasp of spiritual realities, and therefore deserving no serious attention (3-4).
I hope the discussion thus far of ‘Ali Naqvi’s thought makes it clear how his intellectual life was geared towards avoiding privatization of religion on the one hand, and meeting the particular needs of the modern Muslim mindset. His fame and communal popularity provides ample evidence as to his success in this project.
Until this point the study has largely been preoccupied with the content of his message, barely mentioning the form that it took.Yet, the success of ‘Ali Naqvi’s religio-intellectual project owes as much to the medium, as it did to the message itself.
In fact, his innovations in this realm remained a conscious and critical part of his project. In concluding this study, in recapitulating ‘Ali Naqvi’s religio-intellectual project constituted by the strands of “rethinking” and “reconfiguring” of Islamic tradition, it will be appropriate as well then to examine this remaining dimension: ‘Ali Naqvi’s approach toward the popularization of his message.
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Author: Syed Rizwan Zamir
