Conceptual Background
Madrassa
institution (Islamic school) of Pakistan is facing international scrutiny after the event of 9/11 in United States. Western media connected this event of terrorism with Islamic militancy; and possibly, thousands of articles published in news papers that projectedmadrassa
as a main source of Islamic militancy and extremism. However, academicians and scholars have been curious to understand the actual functioning of this institution in society; and while striving to understand the phenomenon, they have developed a polarized opinion.
One group of scholars understoodmadrassas
as jihad factories having less to do with education and more to do with political indoctrination; incubators of Muslim terrorists; origins of conservative violent ideologies, and thus, a security threat to the modern world (Stern 2000; Singer 2001; ICG 2002, 2007;Alexiev
2003;Doumato
2003; Loony 2003; Colson 2004;Fandy
2007; Fair 2008; Brookings 2009;Imtiaz
2011;Kazmi
andPervez
2011).
The other group of scholars presentsmadrassa
playing peaceful roles in society; like, increasing literacy rate, spreading religious morality and human values, giving space to marginalized class of society, discourage criminality, and thus, maintain a social order (Rehman
2000, 2004, 2005; Knapp 2003; Ahmad 2004; Khalid 2008, Khalid andFayyaz
2006;Andrabi
et al. 2005; Bergen andPanday
2006; Nelson 2006; Cockcroft et al. 2008;Bano
2007, 2009; Ali 2005, 2009;Rana
2009; McClure 2009; Winthrop and Graff 2010).
Traditionally, in Islamic notion, ‘state’ and ‘religion’ have been two adjacent entities; and Islamic state had a religious recognition (Khalid 2008). Accordingly, Muslims had a holistic vision of education; and almost in all Muslim societies, education was imparted without discrimination of secular or religious knowledge, through a singular educational system_madrassa
(Anzar
2003). Thus,madrassa
produced many renowned scholars and experts in various fields including natural sciences (Rehman
2004).
For centuries,madrassa
played a central role in serving society and state (Talbani
1996). For society, it has been instrumental in preserving, sustaining and transmitting Islamic tradition over the generations. The tradition of Islamic learning has been core in reproducing Islamic culture, ideological goals and social control (Noor
,Sikand
andBruinessen
2008). Various other studies has also shown a positive association between religiosity andprosocial
behaviour
of individuals in society (Ahmad 2009; Tan andVogal
2008; Johansson-Stenman
, Mahmud, andMartinsson
2008; Ruffle andSosis
2006; Randolph-Seng
and Nielson 2007).
The Muslim states had also been relying onmadrassas
in acquiring human resource to run government machinery, and to seek political legitimization (Talibani
1996). Since, educational sites across the world has been centrally involved in propagation, selective dissemination, and social appropriation of the discourse (Ball 1990); therefore, the ruling elite in Muslim countries have been actively engaged with official functions withinmadrassas
, like appointments of teachers, recruitment of students, and orientation of curriculum (Nashabi
1980). Financial patronage was also one of the primary tools to maintain state’s control over this institution: the ultimate goal was to control religious scholars, and through them, to the masses (Maqdisi
1961). In this regard,madrassa
was also a source of legitimization of power structure of society (Noor
,Sikand
andBruinessen
2008)
Under the influence of modern political thoughts in seventeenth century, when ‘state’ and ‘church’ began to be recognized as two distinct entities, and church began to loosen its grip over state in Europe: the Muslim states also could not save themselves from this social change. In the changed atmosphere,madrassa
institution began to lose its significance in state-affairs; and gradually, it confined its role to religion only. Now, the re-defined functioning ofmadrassa
was just reproducing religious leadership for rest of society (Jamal 2008). This historically peaceful function ofmadrassa
has been widely recognized across international scholarship (Singer 2001; ICG 2002; 2007).
Suddenly, the event of 9/11, 2001, in United States, raised a high degree of controversy on institutional functioning ofmadrassa
. Political activism and transnational linkages ofmadrassa
were widely asserted in number of studies (Loony 2003; Colson 2004;Fandy
2007; Fair 2008). The centuries-old institution of Islamic learning was projected as political entity, rather than a social entity (Bano
2007); and thus,madrassa
was largely misperceived (Malik
2008). This confusion was hoisted by multiple factors: like sensational propaganda of Western media, unscientific researches based on anecdotal accounts, and investigative journalism (Ali 2005; 2009).
Normally, two fundamental objections are made onmadrassa
system. One, the currentmadrassa
-curriculum is invalid in economic market of society: therefore,madrassa
does not impart market oriented education. Rather, it darkens the economic future of its graduates, and they become economic burden on rest of society (Malik
2008). And two, it imparts radical socialization to Muslim youth (Brookings 2009). It is also assumed that the blend of economic constraints and radical socialization results in vulnerability ofmadrassa
students/graduates for adventurism in religious extremism (Imtiaz
2011).
Generally, it is perceived that Pakistanimadrassas
have connections with transnational Islamic militants, who are responsible for precipitate violence and terrorism in the name of religion, and thus, cause a global social disorder (Ali 2005). Particularly, after the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan,madrassas
in Pakistan have been considered supporting Taliban in many ways; like providing them sanctuary, and training of new recruits (Fair 2008). The graduates and the students ofmadrassas
are accused of being active in supporting militant and sectarian activities, and thus, creating a social disturbance within the country and beyond (Noor
,Skind
andBruinessen
2008).
In this regard, for instance, Stern (2004) claimed that global Islamic militancy grows in Pakistanimadrassas
, which are functioning without government supervision, and thus, have become training camps of terrorists.Coulson
(2004) viewedmadrassas
as militant Islamic schools inculcating ideology of intolerance, violence and hate. The 9/11 Commission (2004) reportedmadrassas
as incubators of violent extremism.Khokhar
(2007) observed Pakistanimadrassa
playing a major role in spreadingjihadism
, and posing continues threat of violence to the modern world.Alexiev
(2003) noted that all Islamic terrorist groups around the world benefited frommadrassa
system of Pakistan. Singer (2001) concluded thatmadrassa
played a critical role in sustaining international terrorist network.
The issue has been continuously attracting newspapers headlines and electronic media debates across the world. And, the governments of Pakistan remained under pressure in this regard. Severalmadrassas
in Northern Pakistan have been destroyed through missile attacks and drone bombing by NATO forces present in Afghanistan. Since foreign military actions inside Pakistan also put question on territorial sovereignty of the country, therefore, sometimes, Pakistani forces themselves operate againstmadrassas
and cause many casualties ofmadrassa
students and teachers. Extermination of 82madrassa
students in Bajurh
in October 2006, and several hundred in ‘Jamia
Hafsa
’ Islamabad
in June 2007, are two examples, among others. The ultimate outcome of this process was an emergence of mistrust between the state and a social institution.
The successive governments in Pakistan have been trying to deal with Islamic militancy at two levels: one, encountering militants militarily, as short-term measure; and two, introducing reforms inmadrassa
system, as long-term measure. United States paid money to government of Pakistan for introducing reforms inmadrassas
system, and thus, to eliminate the perceived element of militancy frommadrassa
education (Fair 2008; Ali 2009). Interestingly, the people who paid for creating Islamic militancy during 1980s: now were paying to eliminate the same. And more interestingly, governments of Pakistan, at both the times, accepted money to act accordingly (ICG 2007).
Despite all the efforts so far have been made by the governments, the issue could not be resolved. There is a state of mistrust between the government and themadrassa
establishment. Government offered financial and technical assistance tomadrassas
for their batter role in society. But, clerics perceived it a cost of their sovereignty, and thus refused to accept it (Itehad
Tanzimat
Madris
-e-Dinia
Pakistan 2007). Consequently, important projects of the government, underMadrassa
Board Ordinances 2001, 2002 and (amended) 2005, like ‘Madrassas
Reform Project’ and ‘Madrassas
Education Board’, could not achieve the desired goals. In this context, it seemed important to study this institution scientifically.
The debate on the role ofmadrassa
is multidimensional. Some scholars think that connectingmadrassa
with religious militancy or terrorism is actually a political game (Bergen andPandey
2006), and a misperception created through propaganda campaign against Islamic seminaries (Khalid 2008). In this regard, some parts of the existing literature points out that all the renowned terrorists in the world were high profile people, like engineers, doctors, economists, and military schools graduates, and none of them was qualified frommadrassa
(Bergen andPandey
2006).
Bergen andPandey
(2006) referred five major events of terrorist attacks in the world, and argued that all masterminds behind these events were university graduates who had no concern withmadrassa
. They also highlighted ambiguity in 9/11 Commission’s final report that it had linkedmadrassa
to terrorism without giving any evidence: because it did not mention that which of the 19 hijackers had attendedmadrassa
.Rubani
, as quoted by Khalid (2008) adopted the same line and referred assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, murder of American journalist Denial Pearl, and organizational command of Al-Qaida: and argued that none of the offenders wasmadrassa
-graduate.
This polarization and ambiguity on the social role ofmadrassa
is just because no nationally representative empirical study is available to depict the factual position of this institution. This lack of scientific research is also indicative from the fact that different studies have shown differentmadrassa
-statistics in Pakistan: ranged from 7500 to 50000. In this regard,Coulsin
(2004) observed thatmadrassas
numbers in the year 2000 were shown 7500 by Bragg; 8000 by Asian Times; 10000 by International Crises Group (ICG); and 15000 byBaldu
. Similarly, Looney (2003) averred 20000madrassas
in Pakistan. Stern (2000) and Singer (2001) estimated this figure near fifty thousand (50000).
This lack of empirical research onmadrassa
has made it a blend of myth and reality (Ali 2005). This vacuum in research, actually, suggested the researcher to investigate this institution scientifically, and understand it correctly. To the best of researcher’s knowledge, no study, in Pakistan, was conducted to investigate the opinion ofmadrassa
stakeholders regarding ongoing controversy onmadrassa
. Therefore, the present research intends to fill this research-gap by documenting the perspectives ofmadrassa
teachers regarding different issues related tomadrassa
. This was also important because more than two million children in Pakistan are studying inmadrassa
(Ijazulhaq
2007).