Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

3. Belief and Other Propositional Attitudes

Should one believe a proposition for which one lacks evidence if doing so promises to have beneficial consequences foroneself or for others? Should one abstain from believing a proposition for which one has a considerable amount of evidence if believing that proposition would have pernicious consequences? Questions of this sort have been pursued under the rubric "the ethics of belief".[ 28] Although philosophers have vigorously debated the ethics of belief, they have not similarly debated "the ethics of regret" or "the ethics of fear". We should note though, that conflicts closely analogous to those which fuel the ethics of belief debate can arise with respect to other propositional attitudes as well. I want to illustrate this fact, by means of examples, with respect to the propositional attitudes of regret, fear, and desire.

I am presented with a rare opportunity to achieve a lifelong dream, but I foolishly squander that opportunity. In these circumstances, I have strong reasons to regret that I squandered the opportunity; regret is, in this respect, the normatively appropriate response to the situation in which I find myself. That I regret having squandered the opportunity, however, might very well havebad effects on the whole: hopelessly distracted by my regret, I am severely hindered in the pursuit of my present projects. I find myself confronted by a wild beast that has been known to viciously attack and kill human beings. In these circumstances, I have strong reasons to fear that the beast will attack; fear is, in this respect, the normatively appropriate response. However, I know that this particular species tends to "smell fear" and is more likely to attack if it senses that it is feared. It would thus be greatly advantageous if I was not afraid.

A final example is due to DerekParfit [ 29] :

I have an important interview the next day, and I know that I will only perform my best if I get a full night's sleep this evening. Lying awake in bed the night before the interview, I strongly desire that I fall asleep as quickly as possible. However, the fact that I desire to fall asleep as quickly as possible might interfere with my ability to fall asleep as quickly as possible. If I lacked this desire, I would be better off.

In the preceding section, I suggested that the expected consequences of holding a belief cannot rationalize that belief because beliefs, unlike actions, cannot be based on practical considerations. Although the basing relation is typically discussed as a relationwhich holds between reasons and token beliefs or token actions, we can, I assume, also make sense of it as a relation which holds between reasons and propositional attitudes other than that of belief. Thus, we can ask whether my desire to consume a certain food is based on my belief that doing so will contribute to good health, or rather on my belief that the food in question is delicious. Similarly, we can ask whether my regret over having squandered the opportunity to meet some famous person is based on my belief that

(1)if I had met this person, I would have been able to ask her some personal question (whose answer only she can provide and which I desperately want to know) or (alternatively) on my belief that

(2)if I had met this person, I would be more entertaining at cocktail parties or on some third possibility.

Either (1) or (2), I think, might be the reason on which my regret is based. Suppose however, that I often foolishly squander opportunities. Moreover, that I continue to squander opportunities is due in large part to my failure to feel regret over past squandered opportunities. If I regret my failure to meet this famous person, this would make me less likely to squander similar opportunities in the future.

Given these facts, I might be, on the whole, better off if I feel regret. That I would be better off is something that others might recognize about me, or which I might recognize about myself. That is, I might believe that

(3) If I regret not having met this person, I will be better off.

Nevertheless, (3), unlike (1) or (2), cannot constitute the basis for regretting that I did not meet this person. (Although it might very well constitute the basis for regretting that I do not regret not having met this person.) Aware of my self-destructive tendency to squander opportunities, my girlfriend might attempt to make me regret this most recent squandering, in the hope that this will lead to greater opportunism in the future. In attempting to induce regret she will attempt to make me understand how much I have lost by not availing myself of this opportunity; she will not attempt to convince me of how much better off I would be in the future if I felt more regret about the past. This is because she recognizes that, if and when I do come to regret having squandered this most recent opportunity, my regret will be based on a more vivid appreciation of what has been squandered, and not on a belief about the expected consequences of holding the relevant attitude itself.

Regrets, like beliefs, cannot be based on beliefs about the expected consequences of their being held. And it is because of this that the expectedconsequences of regretting that such-and-such is the case cannot rationalize regretting that such-and-such is the case. For parallel reasons, practical considerations do not rationalize desires or fears.

Are there any propositional attitudes which can be rationalized by practical considerations? The answer to this question, I think, is "Yes". Here is my candidate for a propositional attitude of this kind: the propositional attitude of supposing. Imagine that it is relatively unlikely that some particular possibility will obtain, but that, if this possibility does obtain we will be saved from utter disaster only if we have previously undertaken extensive measures to counter its effects. In such circumstances, we might decide to suppose that this possibility will obtain, in our deliberations about how to prepare for the future. Whether it is rational for us to make this supposition depends, I think, on the expected consequences of making the supposition.[ 30]

Of course, even though practical considerations do not rationalize desires (or regrets, or fears), practical considerations might make it rational to act so as to acquire a given desire. Moreover, the relevant course of action might be intended to result in the acquisition of the desire by means of acquiring genuine reasons for the desire, reasons which do rationalize the desire. In this way, the expected consequences of holding a given desire might make an indirect difference to whether it is rational to hold that desire. We noted above that, often, the most effective strategy for deliberately acquiring a desired belief is to act so as to acquire (epistemic) reasons for that belief. An analogous point holds with respect to desires and other propositional attitudes: often, the most effective strategy for acquiring a desired desire will be to act so as to acquire reasons for holding that desire. Consider, for example, the desire to lose weight. One might have good reasons for desiring to lose weight: if one lost weight, one would be in better health, have a better self-image, and so on. In addition to considering such reasons, one might also evaluate the expected consequences of desiring to lose weight. For example, having this desire might cause one to feel a certain amount of anxiety (a negative consequence); on the other hand, having this desire might make it much more likely that one does lose weight (a positive consequence). Suppose that, on the whole, the expected consequences of having the desire are better than the expected consequences of not having the desire, and therefore (one concludes) it would be better to maintain the desire. One knows, however, that one's desire to lose weight tends to wane over time. In these circumstances, one might attempt to manipulate one's desires by deliberately acquiring additional reasons for the relevant desire. One might, for example, arrange to automatically forfeit a significant sum of money to one's most disliked political group or organization if one fails to lose weight. By making such an arrangement, one deliberately acquires an additional reason to want to lose weight (in addition to being in better health and feeling better about oneself, one can avoid subsidizing political causes that one regards as odious or pernicious) and thereby makes it more likely that one will continue to desire to lose weight. In fact, many weight reduction programs employ exactly this strategy.[ 31] Tactics such as these are simply analogues of the tactic of acquiring epistemic reasons in order to maintain or acquire desired beliefs.

4. TheConsequentalist Mistake

Because the expected consequences of performing an action bear on the rationality of that action, there is a persistent tendency to mistakenly assume that the expected consequences of holding certain propositional attitudes bear on the question of the rationality of those attitudes. We might call this TheConsequentalist Mistake. TheConsequentalist Mistake has, I think, been committed by philosophers both early and late. Thus, some Stoics and Epicureans held that it is irrational to desire political power or great wealth.[ 32] Their grounds for this were the following. Whether one is able to successfully achieve political power or great wealth typically depends on countless contingencies that are outside of one's control. And inasmuch as this is so, there is too great of a chance that one will become miserable in virtue of having one's desires frustrated. To be rational in one's desires is to desire things which one need not rely on Fortune to attain. The person with rational desires thus achieves her good in virtue of having his or her desires satisfied. If I am right, this line of thought rests on a fundamental confusion. It is not the expected consequences of holding a desire that determines the rationality of that desire. The fact that one would learn much by being a Professor at Oxford is a reason to desire an Oxford Professorship; the fact that if one was a Professor at Oxford one would have to leave one's home and friends is (perhaps) a reason not to desire an Oxford Professorship. But the fact that if one desired an Oxford Professorship, one would most likely end up disappointed is no reason not to desire an Oxford Professorship. And this is because one's not-desiring an Oxford Professorship cannot be based on a desire to avoid disappointment, in a way that it can be based on a desire not to leave one's home.[ 33]

In the present century, theConsequentalist Mistake has frequently manifested itself in attempts to justify claims that adherence to certain constraints are constitutive of rationality. Consider, for example, the attempt to justify Bayesian constraints on rational belief by appeal to Dutch Book Arguments. It can be shown that, if my degrees of belief do not conform to the axioms of the probability calculus, then (given that I am willing to bet accordingly) I am vulnerable to a Dutch Book: a series of bets such that no matter how the world turns out, I am bound to lose money. Hence, (it is argued) rationality requires that one's degrees of belief conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. As several philosophers note however, this argument seems to conflate the rationality of a belief with the consequences or the effects of its being held.[ 34]

This criticism of the Dutch Book argument is a familiar one; I mention it chiefly for the sake of comparison. For there is a close analogue to the Dutch Book argument with respect to desires or preferences: the "Money Pump" argument that preferences be transitive.[ 35] If I prefer x to y, y to z, and z to x, then (the argument runs) I should be willing to pay some money to move from x to y, and (from there) some money to move from y to z, and (finally) some money to move from z to x. I thus end up where I started, only poorer. Those criticisms of the Money Pump argument that have been put forth thus far claim either that the argument founders on some technical point[36] or that it trades on an illicit assumption[37] . Schick, for example, claims that the money pump argument depends on the illicit assumption that the value of placing several bets together is the sum of the values of the same bets placed separately. However, if the argument of the present paper is substantially correct, then we are in a position to make what is perhaps a more fundamental criticism, viz. that the Money Pump argument simply conflates the rationality of a given preference with the practical consequences of having that preference. Of course, it might very well be that my having intransitive preferences is in fact irrational. But nothing about the rationality of my preferences follows from the fact that they are costly. My preference thata young child not have some terminal disease might very well prove costly in virtue of causing me great anguish when she is diagnosed with that disease. But this hardly shows that my preference is irrational.

The final example of theConsequentalist Mistake that I wish to consider has arisen in connection with certain contemporary debates concerning the rationality of science. Because this is perhaps the most subtle as well as the most widespread manifestation of theConsequentialist Mistake, it is worth examining at somewhat greater length.

In general, a significant portion of the most prominent historical and sociological work on science since the Second World War has presented a picture of scientific development which has made that development seem--or at least, seemto many--less rational or "objective" than it appeared on more traditional pictures. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is undoubtedly the locusclassicus of this genre.[ 38] There, Kuhn presented a picture of scientific change which struck many of his readers as constituting a more or less direct challenge to the rationality of science. In particular, the patterns of belief revision which according to Kuhn had been exemplified by many of the greatest scientists looked a great deal less rational than the conventional account of science would have led one to expect. For example, in a much-discussed passage, Kuhn compared the process by which a scientist abandons belief in one paradigm in favor of belief in a competing paradigm to a (presumablyarational ) process of religious conversion.[39] Many of Kuhn's readers found comparisons of this kind simply scandalous; others found them liberating. But what both groups shared was the assumption that Kuhn was denigrating or impugning the rationality of science.

Kuhn's response to this common assumption was an extremely interesting one.[ 40] In contrast to all of those who took his empirical, historical research to be relevant to the question of whether scientific practice is or had been rational--or at least, relevant to the question of the extent to which scientific practice is or had been rational--Kuhn himself tended to view his research as revealing what rationality is. As to the question of whether or not science is rational, Kuhn embraced what has been aptly described as "tautological optimism".[ 41] Kuhn did not think much of the suggestion that we possess some independent grasp on theoretical rationality, prior to our investigation of how actual scientists revise their beliefs. In fact, he was inclined to dismiss such suggestions out of hand: "To suppose that we possess criteria of rationality which are independent of our understanding of the essentials of the scientific process is to open the door to cloud-cuckoo-land".[ 42]

Since it was first articulated, Kuhn's view has become increasingly popular among both prominent historians and philosophers of science.[43] Consider, for example, the views of Gerald Holton, a physicist who became one of the most eminent historians of science of the present generation. Holton's historical research has been devoted to determining the conditions that are most hospitable to the advancement of science: both the institutional, social, and political conditions that are most conducive to scientific breakthroughs, and also the habits of mind and traits of character of those individuals who are most likely to achieve such breakthroughs.[ 44] Holton has written at length of the tendency of scientists to engage in what he calls "the suspension of disbelief". Holton uses this term to refer to the believing of favored theories in the face of strong disconfirming evidence. According to Holton, "any discussion of the advance of science that does not recognize the role of suspension of disbelief at crucial points is not true to the activity".[ 45] The suspension of disbelief, he claims, is "an important mechanism in the practice of experimental as well as theoretical scientists"[46] ; Holton lists Einstein, Max Planck, and R.A. Millikan as particularly able practitioners of the art.[47]

One might have thought that, if in fact the holding of beliefs in the face of strong disconfirming evidence is sometimes essential to the advancement of science[48] , then science is sometimes best advanced when great scientists are less than fully rational, or even irrational. An interesting conclusion, to be sure.[ 49] This, however, is not the conclusion drawn by Holton himself. Instead, Holton takes the alleged indispensability of the "suspension of disbelief" as bearing on the question of the rationality of the relevant beliefs. In defending the suspension of belief as rational, Holton echoes Kuhn in writing of "...the emptiness of all attempts to impose external standards of correct thinking on the practice of scientists or to label as 'irrational' scientific work that fails to meet such criteria".[50]

Certainly, our preexisting ideas about the nature of rationality are not sacrosanct and should not be held immune from revision, including (or perhaps, especially) revision which is inspired by reflection on empirical studies of scientific development. Still, there are limits to the malleability of our ideas about rationality. The suspension of disbelief is, after all, the stubborn refusal to abandon a favored theory in the face of strong disconfirming evidence. It is safe to say, I think, that in ordinary life someone who clung stubbornly to a favored theory about (say) politics in the face of disconfirming evidence would quite appropriately be taken to be irrational for doing so. Suppose that, as Holton suggests, the suspension of disbelief is sometimes essential to the advance of science, and that nothing that is essential to the advance of science can properly be considered irrational. Should we then conclude that our ordinary ideas about rationality are incorrect, and that the person who clings stubbornly to his pet theories about politics in the face of disconfirming evidence is, in fact, rational? (Or is the suspension of disbelief only rational inscience, and irrational everywhere else?)

In fact, to draw conclusions about the rationality of a belief from considerations of practical indispensability is, I think, a mistake. Indeed, it is simply another manifestation of theConsequentalist Mistake, or the mistake of supposing that the expected consequences of holding a belief (or the fact that holding a belief is necessary in order to best achieve some desired goal) can rationalize that belief. It is perhaps easy enough to accept the idea that an athlete's overly optimistic beliefs about her abilities are irrational, even if those beliefs tend to promote her goals. It is no doubt more difficult to accept the claim that what are broadly-speaking intellectual or cognitive goals (e.g., the goals of scientific inquiry) might similarly be best promoted when individuals pursuing those goals are occasionally less than fully rational in their beliefs. But the fact that certain beliefs tend to promote the goals of scientific inquiry no more shows that those beliefs are rational, than the fact that an athlete's overly optimistic beliefs tend to promote her goals shows that those overly optimistic beliefs are rational. In each case, it is not the effects of holding the beliefs which determines their status as rational or irrational, but rather the quality of the evidential considerations on which the beliefs are based.[ 51] [52]

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