Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Volume 6 Number 2

©The Author(s) 2004

Computer Use in Preschools: Directors' Reports of the State of the Practice

Sharon A. Lynch & Laverne Warner

Sam Houston State University

Abstract

For a number of years, authorities in the field of early education have questioned whether computers should be used in classrooms of young children. In response to the controversy surrounding computers and young children, this study investigated directors' reports of the use of computers in Texas child care facilities. Directors of licensed child care programs responded to a survey of 12 questions about computer use in their centers. Results from the majority of respondents indicated that preschool children begin using computers in child care centers between ages 2 and 4 years, regardless of socioeconomic status. Directors responded that the most important goal in children's use of computers was to extend concepts learned in the classroom. The preferred method of instruction in computer use was individual instruction; the most common form of supervision was an adult monitoring a specific classroom zone. The most common placement of computers was in a special learning center in the classroom.

Introduction

Philosophically, computer use with young children has created debate among early childhood educators and other professionals for decades. Since the time computers were introduced into America's school settings 25 years ago, questions such as, "Doesn't computer use with young children create passive learners?" "Shouldn't children have concrete objects for learning?" or "Don't children have difficulty manipulating computers?" have plagued experts. Controversies over the question of the role of technology in young children's learning have polarized the field, and the role of technology is still debated.

A number of early researchers found that computer use by young children had positive learning benefits. Cochran-Smith, Kahn, and Paris (1988) posit that children's writing abilities are enhanced with technology. Their only concern is that some children use the keyboard ineffectively and have misconceptions about how print should appear on the page. Hess and McGarvey (1987) note achievement in mathematics, problem solving, and scientific skills among children. Research completed by Weir, Russell, and Valente (1982) suggests that computers facilitate the education of children with disabilities.

Other early educators doubt the value of technology's usefulness with young children. Wardle (1999) believes that computers do not need to be part of children's foundation for learning. She asserts that the early years are necessary for establishing a foundation for success later in life, and computers have limited value in doing so. Cordes and Miller (2000) report that an international group of physicians, scientists, and researchers called for a moratorium on computers in preschools and early elementary grades. They believe that computers interfere with healthy physical and mental development. Hohmann (1998) recommends that computers not be used with children younger than 3.

Others tout the benefits of computer use with young children. Clements (1999) maintains that "Technology can change the way children think, what they learn, and how they interact with peers and adults" (p. 1). He also recommends technology as a tool for improving children's learning through exploration, creative problem solving, and self-guided instruction (Clements & Samara, 2003). Haugland (2000a, 2000b) supports teacher implementation of technology in classrooms with children 3 and 4 years old if they are allowed plenty of time to experiment and explore.

The overarching issue appears to be whether computer use with young children is developmentally appropriate. The National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) has defined developmentally appropriate computer use with young children. In their position statement "Technology and Young Children-Ages 3 through 8," NAEYC (1996) notes that professional judgment is required by teachers to determine whether technology is age appropriate, individually appropriate, and culturally appropriate for the children in their care. NAEYC recommends the integration of technology into the learning environment as one of many options to support children's social and cognitive abilities but cautions that computers should not replace other valuable learning centers, such as blocks, art, sand or water play, books, dramatic play, or exploratory areas in the classroom.

NAEYC calls for all children to have equal access to technology but recommends that teachers ensure that technology experiences are monitored to avoid exposing children to stereotyping of groups and violence. NAEYC suggests that teachers work with parents to advocate for more appropriate technology applications for children. NAEYC also recognizes and supports the value that technology adds to early childhood professional development.

Mark Ginsberg (2001), executive director of NAEYC, presents guidelines to teachers and parents for protecting young children from hazards associated with computer use and access to the Internet: Children need supervision and advice about computer use; rules should be developed for computer use; and adults should be present when the computer is used, to promote interactive discussion about what children are viewing. Ginsberg's perspective is that the computer is a tool that must be used just like any other classroom material or equipment, with judgment and moderation.

A number of studies have examined how technology affects children with special needs. Malone and Langone (1999) provide evidence that computers promote a virtual play environment for children with special needs. Software is now available that provides computer experiences compatible with the characteristics of play (nonliterality, positive affect, flexibility, means over ends locus, and spontaneity). Mioduser, Tur-Kapsa, and Leitner (2000) recognize the potential for instructing children with learning disabilities in early reading skills (phonemic awareness, word and letter recognition). Bush, Huchital, and Simonian (2002) report that research initiatives at the STARBRIGHT Foundation support computer technology with young children with special health care needs. Their technology is designed to help children with chronic health conditions (such as cystic fibrosis) cope with and manage their treatment regimens.

A three-year project at the Center for Best Practices in Early Childhood Education at Western Illinois University (Hutinger & Johanson, 2000) provides additional support for using computer technology with young children with disabilities. Their study emphasizes access to computers as an avenue to social interaction among children, working cooperatively, gaining confidence in themselves, controlling their environments, and making gains in language and communication. Hutinger and Johanson, supported by research by Clements (1999), point out that the enabling component of computers assists children in transforming concrete ideas into symbolic form.

Fischer and Gillespie (2003) describe their research in a Head Start classroom. Their findings suggest that (1) open-ended software programs encourage children to explore and extend beyond their thinking, (2) computers are just another option in the classroom, (3) computers help bridge concrete and abstract thinking, and (4) technology stimulates cooperative behaviors among children. They also report that the teacher encourages children to help others who may be struggling with computer use.

Given the disparate views regarding the wisdom of using computers with young children philosophically, this study investigates directors' reports of actual practice in using computers in child care. The purpose of this study was to determine how widely computers are used in licensed child care centers in Texas. A survey was mailed to directors of licensed child care facilities in Texas with a return envelope to encourage response from directors. Questions asked about the ages that children begin using computers, the ratio of computers per child, the type of computer instruction provided to children, supervision of children, access to computers by children with disabilities, availability of assistive devices, Internet access, classroom placement of computers, the goals of computer use in centers, and whether children had access to computers at home.

Method

Participants

Data from the Texas Department of Human Services was provided through a file of 8,003 licensed child care facilities in the state. Surveys were mailed to a sample of 800 child care directors. Participants were selected randomly within a stratified sample, with every tenth facility within a zip code area selected for participation. Eight hundred surveys were mailed to child care directors, with 257 surveys returned. Forty-six (5.8%) of the surveys were received with "Return to Sender" indicated, and 211 (26.4%) were completed and returned. Zip codes of surveys that were returned were a representative sample of regions in Texas. The distribution of income in returned surveys was similar to that of the state; however, fewer participants had annual incomes over $100,000. This difference likely reflects the low use of child care centers by families with annual incomes over $100,000.

Based on the demographic data from zip codes of participants returning surveys, 63.3% were classified as "In Urbanized Area," 23.5% were classified as "In Urban Cluster," and 13.1% were classified as "Rural" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). These data can be compared with the population data of Texas. In Texas, 71.0% of the population were classified as "In Urbanized Area," 11.6% were classified as "Outside Urbanized Area," and 17.51% were classified as "Rural" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). In the survey sample, participants classified as "In Urbanized Area" were somewhat underrepresented, and those classified as "In Urban Cluster" were overrepresented in comparison to the state of Texas. All classifications are based on population density according to the U.S. Census Bureau.

Instrumentation

Questions on the survey were based on a review of the literature and interviews with local child care directors. The literature on the use of computers with preschoolers addresses the age of beginning computer use, placement of computers in centers, and learning from peers (Haugland, 2000b). Questions regarding computer use by preschoolers with disabilities were included because of the legal requirements for equal access in the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) and the requirement to provide assistive technology in public schools in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Assistance to States, 1999). Other questions were included based on the investigators' observations of practices in local preschool programs. Questions were developed to probe the following areas: (1) demographic variables, (2) age at which children begin to learn computer use, (3) the extent to which computers are available, (4) instructional arrangements for computers, (5) placement of computers in the classroom, (6) use by children with disabilities, (7) the goals of computer use, and (8) preferred software.

A pilot questionnaire was developed and mailed to a sample of 10 local directors, who made suggestions for improvement. Initially, all questions required one answer; several directors recommended that the survey provide for multiple answers for some items. When examining the goals of computer use, directors recommended adding the following options: "to teach basic skills needed in school and life" and "to extend concepts taught in the classroom." A question regarding the ratio of staff to children was omitted based on the feedback from several directors that this question was unclear; state requirements stipulate different ratios of supervision for different age groups. Additionally, the term "software" was suggested rather than "computer programs." Finally, several directors recommended that the survey be restricted to one page, front and back, because directors are very busy with the management of their centers. The survey instrument is shown in the appendix.

Procedures

Following revisions of the pilot survey, the survey was mailed to the random sample of 800 directors of licensed child care centers in the state. The database of licensed child care facilities was sorted by zip code, and every tenth center was selected for the survey. Results of returned surveys were entered into the database for the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Pearson product-moment correlations were used to determine the relationship between family income and the age of beginning computer use of children in child care centers, the ratio of computers to children, and the percentage of children using computers at home. In this case, the predictor variable was mean family income, and the criterion variables were age of beginning computer use, ratio of computers, and percent using computers at home. Alpha was established a priori at .05. All data were analyzed using SPSS.

Finally, descriptive statistics were used to describe the goals of using computers, methods of teaching computer use, methods of supervision, placement of computers, use of computers by children with disabilities, and the use of computers at home. Additionally, programs preferred by boys, programs preferred by girls, and programs preferred by both boys and girls were tallied for descriptive data on preferred software.

Results

When examining mean family income as a predictor of computer use, only one significant correlation was found. Mean family income was a predictor of computer use in the home (r = .562, p < .001), but it was not a predictor of the age at which children began using computers in the center (r = .085, p = .113) or the ratio of computers per child in the center (r = .068, p = .196).

Results of analysis of variance yielded no significant differences between income levels in the child care center in relationship to directors' goals for children using computers. Mean family income of children within the center did not appear to be related to directors' ratings of the importance of various goals in using computers within the center. Directors rated the goal of extending concepts taught in the classroom highest when comparing means of the six goals rated in this study. The second most important goal was allowing children to explore and play with technology. Next in importance was teaching basic skills needed in school and life. The means of each of these top three goals were rated as "important." The mean of the goal to provide appropriate use of free time was rated as "important." Finally the means of increasing enrollment for the center and rewarding good behavior were rated as "somewhat important." Of these, the goal rated lowest was to reward children for good behavior.

The preferred methods of teaching children to use computers were through individual instruction, followed by learning by observing other children. The third most frequent method of instruction was peer instruction, followed by group instruction. The least-used methods for teaching children to use computers were learning by observing adults and through tutorial software.

Directors reported two methods of supervision of computer use most frequently: adults visually monitoring the zone where computers are used and independent use of computers in centers. The third ranking method of supervision was with adults beside the children as they used computers. The vast majority of child care centers (88%) in this study reported that Internet access was not available to children at the center. The few that did provide opportunities for Internet access for the children did so with an adult monitoring a group of children. Four directors reported that children used the Internet with a filter, and three directors reported Internet use with one-to-one supervision. Finally, no one reported that children were allowed to use the Internet without supervision or a filter.

Computers were most often placed in learning centers within the classroom and occasionally in a room separate from the classroom. Most of the directors (62.8%) reported that there were no children with disabilities at their centers; when children with disabilities attended a child care center, they most often used computers in the same way as other children. Only four directors reported that computers had been adapted for children with disabilities. No directors reported that children with disabilities did not use computers. The most frequent age for beginning computer use in child care centers was between the age of 2-3 years (39.5%), followed by 3-4 years (17.6%), less than 2 years (16.6%), and 4-5 years (4.9%). Also worthy of note in this study is the fact that 21.5% of the child care centers do not provide for computer use at all.

Although most child care centers in this study provide computers for young children, these computers generally were shared with a large number of children. Most centers (47%) reported that there was one computer for more than 30 children; 38.75% reported having one computer for every 20 to 30 children. Only 7.5% reported having one computer for every 5 to 10 children, and 6.25% had one computer for every 10 to 20 children. The remaining directors (.5%) were unsure of the ratio in their centers.

Directors completing the survey responded to a question regarding the percentage of the children in their centers who used computers at home. Results were fairly evenly distributed. Fifty-nine directors reported that 25-49% of their children used computers at home; 52 reported that 50-74% of their children had access to computers in the home. Fifty directors reported that 75-100% of their children were able to use computers at home; 41 directors estimated that 0-24% of their children had this access. Three directors did not answer this question.

Few directors reported differences regarding genders when asked to list software preferred by boys and software preferred by girls. Four directors listed Tonka Construction as "preferred by boys"; five listed art/drawing programs as "preferred by girls." The top programs listed as "preferred by both genders" were Jumpstart programs (17) and Reader Rabbit (18). Most directors did not answer this question, leaving it blank, perhaps because of the administrative nature of their role, rather than direct supervision of the content of the programs used by children.

Discussion

Implications

Regardless of the controversy of whether computers are appropriate for preschool classrooms, computers are being used in the majority of child care centers that were surveyed. Although some authorities in the field of early education believe that computer use interferes with development, the child care directors that responded to this survey did not adopt this position.

Recommendations about computer use with preschoolers clearly state that children should be monitored while they are on the computer (NAEYC, 1996). The survey of Texas child care center directors suggests that monitoring is a common practice in their classrooms, with adults visually monitoring where computers are used. Only a few of the child care directors reported that Internet access was available to children in their centers, and those centers that did have Internet access allowed children access only when an adult was present.

Mean family income was a predictor of computer use in children's homes, but it was not related to the age at which children use computers in child care centers. This result suggests that personnel in child care facilities are taking the leadership role in enabling children to access technology that otherwise might not be available in the home. For children from low-income families, the access to computers in preschool classrooms provides them with skill acquisition unavailable in their homes. The directors' goals in providing classroom technology were not related to family income of children in their centers.

The primary goals listed by directors were more aligned with developmentally appropriate practice as recommended by NAEYC. The most important goals were (1) extending concepts, (2) promoting exploration and play, and (3) teaching basic skills needed in school and life. Rated of lesser importance were: (1) using computers for free time, (2) increasing center enrollment, and (3) rewarding good behavior. The directors generally favored developmentally appropriate use of computers for children's cognitive development. Classroom computers were not viewed as public relations tools or electronic babysitters. The fact that software showed few gender differences is likely because software for preschoolers is not designed to be gender specific. Also, most directors left this item blank, so the sample was small.

Limitations

Although this study indicated that computers are widely used in child care centers, a number of issues need to be considered. Although Texas is a large state with a diverse population, computers may not be as widely used in other states with different demographic, economic, or cultural variables. The sample in this investigation was representative of the economic strata in Texas and the sample was randomly drawn, but the sample size was small in comparison to the more than 8,000 licensed child care centers in the state. Although socioeconomic status and parental educational level are highly correlated (Krieger, Williams, & Moss, 1997; Sewell & Hauser, 1975), the study did not probe the mean educational attainment of the parents of children in child care centers. Other variables that were not addressed in the survey were the NAEYC accreditation status of centers, receipt of federal funds, the curriculum used in centers, the percentage of children in centers from underserved populations, and whether or not centers were affiliated with a franchise. Additionally, there is a possibility that the directors of centers where computers were not used did not return the survey. Finally, the survey is based on directors' perceptions and reports, which may differ from actual classroom practice.

Recommendations

A national survey of child care centers would be helpful for understanding the degree to which computers are used in the United States, as well as other issues surrounding how they are used in preschool classrooms. Some of the variables that could be included in future surveys include parental educational attainment, center accreditation status, receipt of federal funds, the curriculum used in centers, the percentage of children in centers from underserved populations, and whether centers were affiliated with a franchise.

Interviews with child care directors and staff can increase the body of knowledge of how computers are used by preschool children. Qualitative research with parents and teachers of young children is needed to assist in understanding their goals and beliefs about computer use with preschoolers. Actual observations of children in child care centers would reveal how computers are actually used, as opposed to their use as reported by directors. Finally, longitudinal research is needed to investigate the effects of early computer use on children's social and cognitive development.

References

1- Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (West 1993).

2- Americans with Disabilities Act requirements: Fact sheet. (1990). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

3- Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, Final regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 34,048 (June 24, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).

4- Bush, Joseph P.; Huchital, Jordana R.; & Simonian, Susan J. (2002). An introduction to program and research initiatives of the STARBRIGHT Foundation. Children's Health Care, 31(1), 1-10.

5- Clements, Douglas H. (1999). The effective use of computers with young children. In Juanita V. Copley (Ed.), Mathematics in the early years (pp. 119-128). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. ED 440 786. (Also available:http://investigations.terc.edu/relevant/EffectiveUse.html [2004, November 18].)

6- Clements, Douglas H., & Sarama, Julie. (2003). Young children and technology: What does the research say? Young Children, 58(6), 34-40.

7- Cochran-Smith, Marilyn; Kahn, Jessica L.; & Paris, Cynthia L. (1988). When word processors come in the classroom. In James L. Hoot & Steven Silvern (Eds.), Writing with computers in the early grades (pp. 43-74). New York: Teachers College Press.

8- Cordes, Colleen, & Miller, Edward. (Eds.). (2000). Fool's gold: A critical look at computers in childhood [Online]. College Park, MD:Alliance for Childhood. Available: http://www.allianceforchildhood.net/projects/computers/ computers_reports_fools_gold_contents.htm [2004, September 11]. ED 445 803.

9- Fischer, Melissa Anne, & Gillespie, Catherine Wilson. (2003). Computers and young children's development. Young Children, 58(4), 85-91. EJ 676 583.

10- Ginsberg, Mark. (2001). Computers and young children. Early years are learning years [Online]. Available: http://www.naeyc.org/resources/eyly/2001/01.htm [2004, September 11].

11- Haugland, Susan W. (2000a). Computers and young children. ERIC Digest. Champaign, IL: ERIC Clearinghouse on Elementary and Early Childhood Education. ED 438 926.

12- Haugland, Susan W. (2000b). What role should technology play in young children's learning? Part 2. Early childhood classrooms for the 21st century. Using computers to maximize learning. Young Children, 55(1), 12-18. EJ 603 939.

13- Hess, Robert D., & McGarvey, Linda J. (1987). School-relevant effects of educational uses of microcomputers in kindergarten classrooms and homes. Journal of Educational Computing Research, 3(3), 269-287. EJ 358 371.

14- Hohmann, Charles. (1998). Evaluating and selecting software for children. Child Care Information Exchange, 123, 60-62.

15- Hutinger, Patricia L., & Johanson, Joyce. (2000). Implementing and maintaining an effective early childhood comprehensive technology system. Topics in Early Childhood Special Education, 20(3), 159-173. EJ 614 771.

16- Krieger, N., Williams, D. R., & Moss, N. E. (1997). Measuring social class in U.S. public health research: Concepts, methodologies, and guidelines. Annual Review of Public Health, 18(1), 341-378.

17- Malone, D. Michael, & Langone, John. (1999). Teaching object-related play skills to preschool children with developmental concerns. International Journal of Disability in Development and Education, 46(3), 324-336. EJ 593 179.

18- Mioduser, D. H., Tur-Kapsa, H., & Leitner, I. (2000). The learning value of computer-based instruction of early reading skills. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 16(1), 54-63.

19- National Association for the Education of Young Children. (1996). Position statement: Technology and young children-ages three through eight. Young Children, 51(6), 11-16. EJ 531 257. (Also available: http://www.naeyc.org/about/positions/pdf/PSTECH98.PDF [2004, November 18].)

20- Sewell, William H., & Hauser, Robert M. (1975). Education, occupation, and earnings. New York: Academic Press. ED 116 041.

21- U.S. Census Bureau. (2000). Census 2000 geographic definitions [Online]. Available:http://www.census.gov/geo/www/geo_defn.html [2000, August 25].

22- Wardle, Francis. (1999). Foundations for learning: How children learn: The latest on ways to maximize children's learning and development. Children and Families, 18(3), 66. EJ 623 694.

23- Weir, Sylvia; Russell, S. J.; & Valente, J. A. (1982). Logo: An approach to educating disabled children. BYTE, 7, 342-360.

Author Information

Dr. Sharon Lynch is an associate professor in the Department of Language, Literacy, and Special Populations at Sam Houston State University, where she teaches courses in assessment, inclusion of young children with disabilities, and behavior intervention. Her career includes positions as a speech-language pathologist, special educator, educational consultant, and university educator. She received her doctorate in special education/educational psychology from the University of Houston in 1992, her master's in special education from Sam Houston State University in 1982, and her bachelor's in speech pathology and audiology from the University of Houston in 1978. This article grows out of her ongoing interest in technology as a tool to promote inclusion of children with disabilities.

Sharon A. Lynch

Department of Language, Literacy, and Special Populations

Sam Houston State University

Box 2119

Huntsville, TX 77341-2119

Telephone: 936-294-1122

Fax: 936-294-1131

Email: edu_sal@shsu.edu

Dr. Laverne Warner is coordinator and professor of early childhood education at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas. Her Ph.D. in early childhood education was awarded in 1977 from East Texas State University in Commerce, Texas. Dr. Warner has held association positions at the national, state, and local levels, and she is currently serving on the Board of Directors for the Southern Early Childhood Association. She is a past president of the Texas Association for the Education of Young Children. This article is written because of an interest by the authors in preschoolers' computer use in the state of Texas.

Laverne Warner

Department of Language, Literacy, and Special Populations

Sam Houston State University

Box 2119

Huntsville, TX 77341-2119

Telephone: 936-294-1120

Fax: 936-294-1131

Email: edu_lxw@shsu.edu

Appendix

Survey of Computer Use in Texas Child Care Centers

Please complete the following questions regarding computer use in your center:

1. At what age do children begin to use computers in your center?

a. under 2 years

b. 2-3 years

c. 3-4 years

d. 4-5 years

e. not available-please skip to question 11

2. What is the ratio of computers per child in your center?

a. 1 computer for every 5-10 children or fewer

b. 1 computer for every 10-20 children

c. 1 computer for every 20-30 children

d. 1 computer for over 30 children

e. not available

3. How are children taught to use the computer at your center? (please circle all that apply)

a. Observing other children

b. Observing adults

c. Tutorial software

d. Group instruction

e. Individual instruction

f. Peer instruction

4. What is the most common form of supervision of children using computers?

a. adults visually monitor zone where computers are used

b. adults are beside children as they use computers

c. children use computers independently in centers or the classroom

5. How are computers placed in your center?

a. in learning centers in the classroom

b. in a separate room from the classroom

c. other (specify): _______________

6. How do children use the Internet at your center?

a. with 1-1 adult supervision

b. with adult watching a group of children

c. independently with an Internet filter

d. independently

e. Internet access not available to children

7. How are computers used in your center with children who have disabilities?

a. used in the same way as other children used computers

b. computers have been adapted for children with disabilities

c. computers are not used with children in our center who have disabilities

d. no children with disabilities are enrolled at our center

Please return survey in stamped envelope today.

Thank you!

THE PERIOD OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

I. INTRODUCTION

The period of Christian thought extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the end of the fifteenth has come to be known as Scholasticism, a name taken from the school of philosophy of the University of Paris.

Background

Patristic philosophy reached its climax in the system of Augustine; it was the last great product of classical-Christian civilization. When the Roman empire fell, the only institution that was capable of standing for law and order was the Church. The Goths sacked Rome but respected the Church and offered it protection. The literature and culture of Greece and Rome became almost extinct; the barbarous tribes initiated the Dark Ages. The only philosophy that survived was that which filtered through the writings of the Church Fathers. From Augustine to the ninth century learning consisted of an ecclesiastical dogmatism which was spiritually lifeless and it did little better than preserve the traditions of past; Plato and Aristotle were only partially known.

Scholastic philosophy means an organized system of truths which are distinct from the dogmas of faith but not opposed to them. This separation and coordination of reason and faith is not found in all Scholastic philosophy, but only during the period of its greatest splendor achieved under Thomas Aquinas. Scholastic philosophy, then, may be divided into: The formative period, extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth; The period of maturity, extending a little more than half a century and covering Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus; The period of decadence, extending from the death of Scotus to the end of the fifteenth century.

The Carolingian Revival of Learning

During the period of decadence, following the fall of the Roman empire, culture was restricted to ecclesiastical schools. There were of three types: Monastic schools, whose purpose was the formation of monks; Episcopal schools, whose purpose was the formation of priests, and occasionally of laymen; Parish schools, which were for the instruction of the faithful in respect to the reception of the sacraments.

It is to Charlemagne's credit to have undertaken the program for the establishment of schools. He summoned the monk Alcuin and entrusted him with the work of organizing the schools. Alcuin reformed the program of studies by establishing the divisions known as the trivium (comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). He established the "scola palatina." Other schools following the program of Alcuin were opened at Tours, Laon, Orleans and Fulda. This cultural movement had no development of any importance after the death of Charlemagne.

On the Internet Texts and Archives of Scholasticism

II. The Formative Period Of Scholastcism

The formative period of Scholasticism (the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth centuries and the first half of the thirteenth century) developed under the influence of St. Augustine's thought. During this period, because of the prejudice of illumination, it was impossible to have a complete separation of reason from faith. Both mystics and dialecticians consider the intellect as unable to reason without being enlightened by God. With the help of illumination the intellect will be able to penetrate the content of the mysteries of faith. This period can be divided as follows: The ninth and the tenth century (John Scotus Erigena and the problem of universals); The eleventh and twelfth century (mystics and dialecticians); The first half of the thirteenth century (the question concerning the works of Aristotle).

a. The Ninth and Tenth Centuries

1. John Scotus Erigena (815? - 877): Scotus Erigena wrote "De Divisione Naturae," a Neo-Platonic work. According to Erigena, Unity (God) descends into multiplicity, and multiplicity returns to Unity. The degrees of reality are the following: (1) creating, non-created Nature -- God, the Father; (2) created and creating Nature -- the Son; (3) created and non-creating Nature -- the sensible world informed by the Holy Spirit; (4) non-created and non-creating Nature -- God Himself as final cause. The first and fourth degrees coincide with God.

2. The Problem of the Universals: What is the value of concepts, which are universal, in relation to real things, which are particular? Four solutions were attempted: Transcendent realism (the Platonic solution); Immanent realism ( the Aristotelian solution); Conceptualism (the concepts are mental signs without basis in reality); Nominalism (the concepts are names, speech).

See also Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty's essay on The World of Universals.

b. The Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

At the beginning of the eleventh century the Churchmen showed a renewed interest in a better understanding of the truths of religion. The thinkers of that time are divided into mystics and dialecticians. Both feel the influence of illumination, and hence consider knowledge a gift of God. Faith is thus presupposed and is considered superior to reason. Nevertheless thinkers disagree in determining what is the contribution that reason can make to faith. The mystics see in philosophy a remnant of paganism and the danger of heresy. St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines are mystics. The dialecticians, on the contrary, think that once the understanding of religious truths is required reason can be invoked to penetrate the very content of the mysteries of the faith. St. Anselm and Peter Abelard are dialecticians.

St. Anselm (picture) is well known for this ontological argument for the existence of God, as presented in the "Proslogium": The concept which everyone has of God is that of a most perfect being; Greater being cannot be conceived; Consequently, God must also really exist; otherwise He would no longer be that most perfect being, for He would lack real existence.

This argument, however, marks an illicit passage from the concept to reality. But, granted the doctrine of illumination, it would be valid. Abelard is the most complex personality of this time. He attempted to penetrate the mysteries of faith through reason, and found in St. Bernard his strongest opponent. In the question of universals, Abelard is considered a nominalist; but he possibly may not be such, as his vocabulary is not absolutely clear.

On the Internet "Proslogium" by Anselm Anselm: Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God More about Peter Abelard "History of My Calamities" by Peter Abelard.

c. The First Half of the Thirteenth Century

1. The Establishing of Universities: As a consequence of the interest in studies, some ecclesiastical schools were reinvigorated and rose to great fame. This is the origin of many universities; the most celebrated of them is the University of Paris, then Oxford University. While the universities were being organized, two religious Orders -- namely, the Franciscans and Dominicans -- obtained the faculty to teach in them, and made a large contribution to the development of Scholastic philosophy.

2. The Discovery of the Works of Aristotle: The major factor in the development of Scholastic was the discovery of the works of Aristotle, which happened during the first half of the thirteenth century. These works first reached the universities through the commentaries of Jewish and Arabian philosophers.

Among the famous commentators on Aristotle in Spain were two Jewish philosophers, Avicebron (died about 1058), and Maimonides (died 1204) (picture). The Arabian physician Avicenna (picture) enjoyed greater fame. He attempted to reconciled Aristotle with the religion of Islam, and hence affirmed the immortality of the soul.

The most famous commentator was the Spanish-Arabian philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) (picture). He too was a physician and Thomas Aquinas gave him the designation "The Commentator."

Later what was called the "translatio nova" of Aristotle, made directly from the Greek, was attempted. The attitude of thinkers in regard to the works of Aristotle was threefold: Some thinkers advocated the integral acceptance of the system of Aristotle -- the most representative of this group was Siger of Brabant; Others accepted Aristotle's opinions when these were not opposed to St. Augustine -- the most representative of this group is St. Bonaventure; Yet others -- among them, Thomas Aquinas, who accepted the system of Aristotle critically -- discarded the theories of the philosopher in those points which were not in accord with Christianity.

Siger of Brabant (died about 1281) in his work "De Anima Intellectiva" holds the theory that the world is eternal, denies providence, and admits the existence of the acting intellect as something separate and the same for all men. Siger defended himself by having recourse to the principle of the double truth.

III. The Godlden Age Of Scholastic Philosophy

St. Bonaventure (1221 - 1274)

St. Bonaventure (picture) wished to theorize on the life of St. Francis, and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. Bonaventure, therefore, is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle; but his preference is for St. Augustine, in whose doctrine, as in the practical life of St. Francis, the external and the internal world speak to us of God.

Doctrine

1. Theory of Knowledge: Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: Knowledge of the particular, of sensitive objects; Knowledge of ideas, which come from illumination; Contemplation, the understanding of divine things.

2. Metaphysics: Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter has its own form, and contains the seeds of all determinations; there is corporeal matter as well as incorporeal matter. The existence of God is proved a priori (argument of St. Anselm). In every finite being there is a plurality of forms. In cosmology, Bonaventure holds that creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory; God, when He created matter, placed in it the seeds of all determinations. In psychology, Bonaventure's thesis is that the union of the soul with the body is extrinsic, because the soul is a complete substance in itself. In ethics, Bonaventure defends the priority of the will over the intellect.

On the Internet More about Bonaventure

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274)

For a more advanced & comprehensive discussion, see: The Philosophical System of Thomas Aquinas, by Maurice de Wulf.

Philosophy and Theology

Thomas Aquinas (picture) does not accept the Averroist principle of the double truth. Philosophy and theology are distinct but not opposed, and what reason shows to be true is absolutely true in theology also. Moreover, Aquinas does not accept Augustinian illumination, the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. For Aquinas the intellect is able to reach concepts through abstraction. The proper object of the human intellect is this visible world; our intellect cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith. Nevertheless, the most important religious truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are both the object of reason and the object of faith.

Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge is obtained through two stages of operations, sensitive and intellective, which are intimately related to one another. The object of sensitive knowledge is the particular thing, while the object of the intellect is the "intelligible," which is arrived at from the particular by abstraction. The intellect has three operations: abstraction, judgment and reasoning.

General Metaphysics: Aquinas accepts the general principles of Aristotle's metaphysics, in which being is a created composite of potency and act. The general principle of potency and act, applied to those beings in which it is already existent, is specified in a second principle, the principle of matter and form. The principle of individuation is "matter signed by quantity."

Theodicy

Aquinas does not admit supernatural Augustinian illumination, and hence refuses to accept any proof a priori of the existence of God (argument of St. Anselm). The arguments for the existence of God must be a posterior, and they are solidly certain. Aquinas has presented five different ways in which the intellect can prove the existence of God; each of them consists in a fact of experience, which can be justified only by the existence of the transcendent Being (God). Thus: The fact of motion induces the mind to affirm the existence of the immovable Mover; The fact of the production of a new reality demands the existence of the uncaused reality; The fact of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary Being; The fact of the existence in things, to a greater or lesser degree, of the good, the true, and the noble, implies the existence of "absolute perfection"; The Fact of the order of the whole universe implies the necessity of an Intelligence which is the cause of this order.

Cosmology

In cosmology, Aquinas departs from the dualism of Aristotle; matter is created by God. The whole universe was created by an act of the free will of God, and what happens in the universe finds its counterpart in the wisdom of God.

The Soul: When the form in matter is the origin of immanent actions, it is called soul. Hence there is a vegetative soul, a sensitive soul, and an intellective soul. The human soul is directly created by God, and it is the true form of the body; it therefore performs both organic and inorganic activities. The intellect is an inorganic power of the individual soul. The agent intellect is not one and the same for all but is the human soul itself in so far as the soul is intellectual in nature. As such it is able to abstract the intelligibles from material conditions. Since the human soul is able to perform inorganic operations, it is immaterial, spiritual and immortal.

Ethics and Politics

In opposition to the voluntarism of St. Augustine, Aquinas upholds the primacy of the intellect over the will. Aquinas extends this law even to God; the foundation of creation is the Divine Essence, which is rational; the present order of creation has been willed by God because it was rational. All created beings must follow the natural law, and for rational beings, including man, it is the law of reason. Man is free, and he can abuse his freedom; but every abuse of freedom is an irrational act.

Aquinas

departs from Augustinianism also in his doctrine on the state; society is natural to man, and not a consequence of the original fall, as the Augustinians believed. The first step to society is the family and the end of society is the common material good of men. Civil society, therefore, must recognize another superior society, that is, the Church, to which has been entrusted the spiritual good citizens.

John Duns Scotus (1265 - 1308) "The Subtle Doctor"

John Duns Scotus (picture) is the champion of Franciscan Augustinianism. Nevertheless he abandons certain theses of the Augustinian tradition, in favor of the new contributions of Aristotelianism.

Theory of Knowledge

Scotus does not admit Augustinian illumination. He distinguishes between the "proper" object of the intellect, and the object in "state of act." The immediate object of the intellect is the quiddity (essence) abstracted from material conditions; but the "proper" object is "being as being." In regard to abstraction, Scotus holds that the phantasm (sense image) concurs as a concause in the formation of the concept.

General Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, but to these two elements he gives a different interpretation. Prime matter as such can exist; moreover, matter is a constitutive element of every being, even of those of spiritual nature, such as the angels. The principle of individuation, instead of being matter, as Thomas Aquinas taught, is form, in the opinion of Scotus. The determination of the form in the act of individuation is called "haecceitas." Moreover, the concept of being is not analogical, as Aquinas held, but univocal.

Theodicy

Scotus holds, in opposition to traditional Augustianism, that there is no intuition of God. His existence must be proved and Scotus proves the existence of God first a posteriori, by the traditional argument of change. But he admits also the validity of the ontological argument of St. Anselm, to which he gives a new interpretation by introducing into it another principle; that is, that the concept of infinite being is not contradictory, and hence the infinite Being exists. For Scotus the fundamental attribute of God is His infinity.

Cosmology

In this field Scotus accepts the common doctrine of Scholastic tradition. However, according to his principle of the primacy of the will over the intellect, he holds that creation is first an act of will. In consequence of this voluntaristic doctrine, many truths which for Thomas are demonstrable with certainty, are not so for Scotus.

Psychology

In psychology Scotus admits that in every individual there is a multiplicity of forms. The human soul is a complete being in itself. The proper object of the intellect is being in its entire extension. The proof of the immortality of the human soul rests upon faith rather than upon reason. According to Scotus' principle of the primacy of the will, opposites in the field of contingency do not imply contradiction.

Ethics

Scotus reaffirms his voluntarist doctrine in his ethics; this means that God finds within His will the motives for realizing one series of possibles rather than another. The will of God does not act capriciously, however, for God's will is at the same time the most intelligent act. Thus, all that is essentially bound up with the essence of God is also essentially bound up with the divine will, as, for example, the principle of contradiction and the first three commandments of the Decalogue. What is not necessarily bound up with the Divine Essence is dependent upon the free choice of God. Scotus, with St. Augustine, affirms that virtue is an act of love which directs us to God.

Summary

Dogmas, according to Scotus, are beyond dispute; faith is basic to truth; love is the fundamental virtue; faith and love are based on the will; will is superior to the intellect. Universals exist before things, as forms in the mind of God; and after things, as abstract concepts in the human mind. Universal nature (or essence) is supplemented by individual nature and the principle of difference is individuation. General concepts (universals) finally bring us to individuals (nominals, particulars). Duns Scotus agrees with Aquinas in many points; his major difference is in his emphasis on the will, discounting the supreme importance of the intellect in Aquinas' philosophy; Scotus made the will supreme. This difference between the two concepts of the will led to the Thomist-Scotist controversy.

The positive contributions of John Duns Scotus to the Perennial Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge. Scotus distinguishes between the proper object of the intellect and its de facto object. The proper object of this faculty is "being" -- the entire field of being without restriction ("ens in quantum ens") -- through which the intellect can know immaterial essences, even without the aid of sensations. In the field of fact or in actual conditions and as a consequence of original sin, what moves the intellect is only those things that are presented to sensation ("quidditas rei sensibilis").

Metaphysics.There is a difference between Thomas Aquinas and Scotus regarding the principle of individuation. Aquinas had affirmed that the reason for the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon matter signed with quantity. Scotus does not accpet this solution, but observes that quantity is an accident, that therefore in Aquinas' system individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Thus, according to Scotus, individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. This new entitative perfection, which comes to the species (forma) and which indicates the passage from specific difference to individual determination, Scotus calls "thisness."

IV. The Decadence Of Scholastic Philosophy

During the Middle Ages there two celebrated centers of culture: the University of Paris and Oxford University. While at Paris interest in metaphysics prevailed, at Oxford there was an interest in the sciences, with empirical tendencies. This interest was to give origin to the rise of the positive sciences. But at the same time it was to be one of the motives for neglecting metaphysics and returning to the ancient position of nominalism already disproved in the more advanced teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

a. Roger Bacon (1214 - 1294)

Roger Bacon (picture) was a Franciscan monk at Oxford, a student of mathematics and languages; he regarded these subjects as indispensable to theology and philosophy. Bacon wrote an important book entitled "Opus Major" which initiated the modern scientific movement. According to Bacon, there are three ways in which we acquire knowledge: authority, reason, and experience. The last is the most perfect. Bacon distinguishes a twofold experience: external perception, which brings us knowledge of the sensible world; and internal perception, by which is meant "illumination." Bacon combined Augustinian-Platonic philosophy with Arabic speculations and emphasized the need of observation.

b. William of Ockham (1300 - 1349)

For Ockham concepts do not have objective reality; they exist only in our intellect as a "term" or "sign" of the similarity of many experienced objects. The denial of concepts as a reality bears within itself the denial of metaphysics. Moreover, Ockham defends an absolute predomination of the divine will: The Principle of contradiction is under the free will of God, and, if God wished, it would be a meritorious act to hate Him. Furthermore, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are objects of faith and not of reason. Thus, when faith became weaker, these truths were denied, which is exactly what modern philosophy has done.

On the Internet More About William of Ockham

V. Philosophical and Mystical Knowledge

The proper object of philosophy is the essence of material beings, and the philosopher conceives these essences by means of abstraction from data obtained by the senses, from external objects. Any method of knowledge which bypasses sense experience and is based on intuition is not necessarily false, but it is not philosophical: it is true if based on an actual supernatural gift but it is beyond the means of natural knowledge. Therefore, all theories based on illumination are philosophically excluded because they are beyond philosophy, even though they may lead to deeper truths. Such men as St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure were so used to the supernatural method that they accepted it by mistake as a natural means of acquiring knowledge, not noticing that such method was a personal favor of God and could not be followed by the philosopher who was left to reason alone.

Conclusion

Scholastic philosophy grew step by step as a harmonious accord of reason and faith, which met on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such metaphysics does not know decadence. The decadence occurs in men, when their culture indicates a retrogression to past errors, such as Ockham did with his return to nominalism. Thus in later schools these same errors were to appear again; reason was to take the place of faith and man the place of God.

The positive contributions of Scholastic Philosophy to the Perennial Philosophy Scholastic philosophy, in its laborious ascent to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, utilized the best elements of Greek and Patristic philosophy, and succeeded in constructing a weighty metaphysics, in which a rational solution is found to the two problems at the basis of philosophy as well as theology: God and man.

Scholastic metaphysics is a harmonious accord of science and faith, between philosophy and theology, which, although treading different paths, meet on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such a metaphysics does not know decadence, and for this reason Scholasticism has justly been included in the "philosophia perennis," the Perennial Philosophy, the philosophy of all times and of all places.

The Philosophy of Bonaventure

I. Life and Works

Bonaventure (born Giovanni di Fidanza) (picture) was born at Bagnorea in 1221 and entered the Franciscan Order probably about the year 1243. He studied at the University of Paris, where he was a disciple of Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan master of that university; Bonaventure later succeeded his master in the chair of philosophy. He taught at the university from 1248 to 1255 and took part, along with Thomas Aquinas, in the debate against William of Saint Amour, adversary of the Mendicants.

In October of 1257 the degree of Doctor was bestowed on Bonaventure at the university. Nominated General of the Order in the same year, he left his studies to devote himself to the affairs of the Franciscans. At this time he wrote the new Constitutions of the Order and the biography of St. Francis of Assisi which helped to pacify the various Franciscan currents.

In 1273 he was named Cardinal and Bishop of Alvano. He died in Lyons in 1274 while the Council being held in that city was still in session. Bonaventure has been honored with the title "Doctor Seraphicus." His principal works are: Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; Itinerarium mentis in Deum; De reductione artium ad theologiam; and Breviloquium.

II. Doctrine: General Notions

Bonaventure is the theorist of what, in a practical way, was mirrored in the life of St. Francis of Assisi. Francis had been entirely consumed by love of God and of Christ crucified; and the sacred stigmata, visible in his body, were the manifestation of what had already been verified within the very depths of his saintly spirit. In this mystical union with God and with Christ, St. Francis had found the basis of brotherhood not only with men but also with all beings, and the human and physical world was revealed before his eyes as a sanctuary in which all things spoke to him of God.

Bonaventure wished to theorize on the life of the Poverello and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. For this purpose he did not borrow the teachings of the speculative rationalism of Aristotle, but looked to Augustinianism, which already boasted a long tradition in the Church. Its voluntarism, which placed love of God at the center of every activity; its theory of illumination, which made God present to the soul; its analogism, which revealed an image of God and of His attributes in each and every creature -- all of these motives which, outside all speculation, speak to us most vividly of what should be the ideal of the Christian life.

It is understood, then, why Bonaventure is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle, why he even accepts it in part. But his preference is for St. Augustine, and he again works out all the motives of Augustinianism, in which all things, the external and the internal world, matter and spirit, speak to us of God; following Augustine he holds that the apex of all human activity is contemplation or mystical union with God.

In brief, Bonaventure shows the Christian what kind of life he should live if he wishes to attain his destiny. This is the historical function of the mysticism of Bonaventure, which is as important in the spiritual order as the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas in the order of rational philosophy.

III. Theory of Knowledge

Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: The first degree is knowledge of the particular, of the individual. For this first degree of knowledge, sensible experience, corresponding to the physical senses, is indispensable; The second degree consists in knowledge of the universal, of ideas, and of all that we acquire by reflecting upon ourselves. This knowledge does not come from abstraction as suggested by Aristotle and Aquinas, but from illumination. This illumination is for Bonaventure the result of an immediate cooperation of God. The intellect needs this cooperation or illumination in order to know the intelligible.

The third degree is the understanding of things superior to ourselves -- God. This kind of knowledge can be obtained through the eye of contemplation. "The eye of contemplation cannot function perfectly except in the state of glory, which man loses through sin and recovers through grace, faith and the understanding of the Scriptures. By these the human mind is purified, illumined, and brought to the contemplation of heavenly things. These are beyond the reach of fallen man unless he first recognizes his own defects and darknesses. But this he can only do by considering the fall of human nature." (Breviloguium, II, 12.)

IV. General Metaphysics

Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but he wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter, created by God, has its proper form, distinct from all other forms or determinations which may come to it. Moreover, it contains the seeds of all these determinations (the doctrine of "rationes seminales" of St. Augustine).

Nevertheless, it is an essential constituent of every creature, even of those which are said to be incorporeal, such as human souls and angels. The matter of incorporeal substances, on account of the form which it receives, is spiritual matter ("materia spiritualis"), which expresses what is contingent and limited in every finite being. Bonaventure admits in every body a plurality of forms. Thus, besides the form which is proper to the matter, in every body there are as many forms as there are essential properties, all placed in hierarchical order; that is, the inferior forms are subordinate to the superior ones.

V. Cosmology

In his cosmology, Bonaventure does not accept the Aristotelian concepts of the eternity of the world and of matter as co-eternal with God. The world has its origin in the creative act in time; creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory. God, who has created matter, has placed in it the seeds or reasons of all the determinations which it can assume ("rationes seminales").

VI. Psychology

In psychology, Bonaventure departs from Aristotelianism not only in the fact of knowledge, as we have already seen, but also in judging the relationship between the soul and the body and between the soul and its faculties. For Bonaventure the soul is of its very nature form and matter (spiritual matter), and as a consequence is a complete substance, independent of the body. The body in turn is composed of matter and form (vegetative and sensitive form), but it aspires to being informed by the rational form. In this aspiration and coordination the unity of the individual consists.

Without doubt, the unity of the person is not as intimately welded as in Aristotelianism; but Bonaventure's teaching avoids the danger into which Aristotelianism entered with its theory of immanent form, of making the soul dependent on the body even in its destiny. Such a danger cannot exist in Bonaventure, for whom the soul is a substance complete in itself and not indissolubly united to the body.

With regard to the faculties of the soul, Bonaventure, in accord with St. Augustine, distinguishes three -- the will, the understanding and the intellective memory. For Bonaventure the faculties are expressions of one and the same soul, which is endowed with three diverse activities; between the soul and its faculties there is merely a logical distinction. In Aristotelianism the faculties are qualities of the soul and really distinct from it. Bonaventure holds that among the faculties of the soul the will has primacy over the other faculties; therefore it is necessary to love in order to understand.

This law is applied also to our knowledge of God: it is necessary to be united to God through faith and grace in order to know Him and His attributes. The process of this knowledge is described in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum. There are three grades or steps through which the soul ascends to God. The first grade is called "vestigium," which is the imprint of Himself that God has stamped on material things outside ourselves. The second grade is "imago," or the reflection of the soul upon itself, by which, seeing the threefold faculties of the soul -- will, intellect, and memory -- man discerns the image of God. The third grade is "similitudo," or the consideration of God Himself. By considering the idea of the most perfect being, we can conceive the unity of God (the ontological argument of Anselm, which Bonaventure admits as valid); and from the concept of infinite goodness we can reach the consideration of the Trinity. In "similitudo" the soul attains to mystical union, the supreme degree of love between the creature and his Creator.

THE PERIOD OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

I. INTRODUCTION

The period of Christian thought extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the end of the fifteenth has come to be known as Scholasticism, a name taken from the school of philosophy of the University of Paris.

Background

Patristic philosophy reached its climax in the system of Augustine; it was the last great product of classical-Christian civilization. When the Roman empire fell, the only institution that was capable of standing for law and order was the Church. The Goths sacked Rome but respected the Church and offered it protection. The literature and culture of Greece and Rome became almost extinct; the barbarous tribes initiated the Dark Ages. The only philosophy that survived was that which filtered through the writings of the Church Fathers. From Augustine to the ninth century learning consisted of an ecclesiastical dogmatism which was spiritually lifeless and it did little better than preserve the traditions of past; Plato and Aristotle were only partially known.

Scholastic philosophy means an organized system of truths which are distinct from the dogmas of faith but not opposed to them. This separation and coordination of reason and faith is not found in all Scholastic philosophy, but only during the period of its greatest splendor achieved under Thomas Aquinas. Scholastic philosophy, then, may be divided into: The formative period, extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth; The period of maturity, extending a little more than half a century and covering Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus; The period of decadence, extending from the death of Scotus to the end of the fifteenth century.

The Carolingian Revival of Learning

During the period of decadence, following the fall of the Roman empire, culture was restricted to ecclesiastical schools. There were of three types: Monastic schools, whose purpose was the formation of monks; Episcopal schools, whose purpose was the formation of priests, and occasionally of laymen; Parish schools, which were for the instruction of the faithful in respect to the reception of the sacraments.

It is to Charlemagne's credit to have undertaken the program for the establishment of schools. He summoned the monk Alcuin and entrusted him with the work of organizing the schools. Alcuin reformed the program of studies by establishing the divisions known as the trivium (comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). He established the "scola palatina." Other schools following the program of Alcuin were opened at Tours, Laon, Orleans and Fulda. This cultural movement had no development of any importance after the death of Charlemagne.

On the Internet Texts and Archives of Scholasticism

II. The Formative Period Of Scholastcism

The formative period of Scholasticism (the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth centuries and the first half of the thirteenth century) developed under the influence of St. Augustine's thought. During this period, because of the prejudice of illumination, it was impossible to have a complete separation of reason from faith. Both mystics and dialecticians consider the intellect as unable to reason without being enlightened by God. With the help of illumination the intellect will be able to penetrate the content of the mysteries of faith. This period can be divided as follows: The ninth and the tenth century (John Scotus Erigena and the problem of universals); The eleventh and twelfth century (mystics and dialecticians); The first half of the thirteenth century (the question concerning the works of Aristotle).

a. The Ninth and Tenth Centuries

1. John Scotus Erigena (815? - 877): Scotus Erigena wrote "De Divisione Naturae," a Neo-Platonic work. According to Erigena, Unity (God) descends into multiplicity, and multiplicity returns to Unity. The degrees of reality are the following: (1) creating, non-created Nature -- God, the Father; (2) created and creating Nature -- the Son; (3) created and non-creating Nature -- the sensible world informed by the Holy Spirit; (4) non-created and non-creating Nature -- God Himself as final cause. The first and fourth degrees coincide with God.

2. The Problem of the Universals: What is the value of concepts, which are universal, in relation to real things, which are particular? Four solutions were attempted: Transcendent realism (the Platonic solution); Immanent realism ( the Aristotelian solution); Conceptualism (the concepts are mental signs without basis in reality); Nominalism (the concepts are names, speech).

See also Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty's essay on The World of Universals.

b. The Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

At the beginning of the eleventh century the Churchmen showed a renewed interest in a better understanding of the truths of religion. The thinkers of that time are divided into mystics and dialecticians. Both feel the influence of illumination, and hence consider knowledge a gift of God. Faith is thus presupposed and is considered superior to reason. Nevertheless thinkers disagree in determining what is the contribution that reason can make to faith. The mystics see in philosophy a remnant of paganism and the danger of heresy. St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines are mystics. The dialecticians, on the contrary, think that once the understanding of religious truths is required reason can be invoked to penetrate the very content of the mysteries of the faith. St. Anselm and Peter Abelard are dialecticians.

St. Anselm (picture) is well known for this ontological argument for the existence of God, as presented in the "Proslogium": The concept which everyone has of God is that of a most perfect being; Greater being cannot be conceived; Consequently, God must also really exist; otherwise He would no longer be that most perfect being, for He would lack real existence.

This argument, however, marks an illicit passage from the concept to reality. But, granted the doctrine of illumination, it would be valid. Abelard is the most complex personality of this time. He attempted to penetrate the mysteries of faith through reason, and found in St. Bernard his strongest opponent. In the question of universals, Abelard is considered a nominalist; but he possibly may not be such, as his vocabulary is not absolutely clear.

On the Internet "Proslogium" by Anselm Anselm: Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God More about Peter Abelard "History of My Calamities" by Peter Abelard.

c. The First Half of the Thirteenth Century

1. The Establishing of Universities: As a consequence of the interest in studies, some ecclesiastical schools were reinvigorated and rose to great fame. This is the origin of many universities; the most celebrated of them is the University of Paris, then Oxford University. While the universities were being organized, two religious Orders -- namely, the Franciscans and Dominicans -- obtained the faculty to teach in them, and made a large contribution to the development of Scholastic philosophy.

2. The Discovery of the Works of Aristotle: The major factor in the development of Scholastic was the discovery of the works of Aristotle, which happened during the first half of the thirteenth century. These works first reached the universities through the commentaries of Jewish and Arabian philosophers.

Among the famous commentators on Aristotle in Spain were two Jewish philosophers, Avicebron (died about 1058), and Maimonides (died 1204) (picture). The Arabian physician Avicenna (picture) enjoyed greater fame. He attempted to reconciled Aristotle with the religion of Islam, and hence affirmed the immortality of the soul.

The most famous commentator was the Spanish-Arabian philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) (picture). He too was a physician and Thomas Aquinas gave him the designation "The Commentator."

Later what was called the "translatio nova" of Aristotle, made directly from the Greek, was attempted. The attitude of thinkers in regard to the works of Aristotle was threefold: Some thinkers advocated the integral acceptance of the system of Aristotle -- the most representative of this group was Siger of Brabant; Others accepted Aristotle's opinions when these were not opposed to St. Augustine -- the most representative of this group is St. Bonaventure; Yet others -- among them, Thomas Aquinas, who accepted the system of Aristotle critically -- discarded the theories of the philosopher in those points which were not in accord with Christianity.

Siger of Brabant (died about 1281) in his work "De Anima Intellectiva" holds the theory that the world is eternal, denies providence, and admits the existence of the acting intellect as something separate and the same for all men. Siger defended himself by having recourse to the principle of the double truth.

III. The Godlden Age Of Scholastic Philosophy

St. Bonaventure (1221 - 1274)

St. Bonaventure (picture) wished to theorize on the life of St. Francis, and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. Bonaventure, therefore, is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle; but his preference is for St. Augustine, in whose doctrine, as in the practical life of St. Francis, the external and the internal world speak to us of God.

Doctrine

1. Theory of Knowledge: Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: Knowledge of the particular, of sensitive objects; Knowledge of ideas, which come from illumination; Contemplation, the understanding of divine things.

2. Metaphysics: Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter has its own form, and contains the seeds of all determinations; there is corporeal matter as well as incorporeal matter. The existence of God is proved a priori (argument of St. Anselm). In every finite being there is a plurality of forms. In cosmology, Bonaventure holds that creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory; God, when He created matter, placed in it the seeds of all determinations. In psychology, Bonaventure's thesis is that the union of the soul with the body is extrinsic, because the soul is a complete substance in itself. In ethics, Bonaventure defends the priority of the will over the intellect.

On the Internet More about Bonaventure

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274)

For a more advanced & comprehensive discussion, see: The Philosophical System of Thomas Aquinas, by Maurice de Wulf.

Philosophy and Theology

Thomas Aquinas (picture) does not accept the Averroist principle of the double truth. Philosophy and theology are distinct but not opposed, and what reason shows to be true is absolutely true in theology also. Moreover, Aquinas does not accept Augustinian illumination, the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. For Aquinas the intellect is able to reach concepts through abstraction. The proper object of the human intellect is this visible world; our intellect cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith. Nevertheless, the most important religious truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are both the object of reason and the object of faith.

Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge is obtained through two stages of operations, sensitive and intellective, which are intimately related to one another. The object of sensitive knowledge is the particular thing, while the object of the intellect is the "intelligible," which is arrived at from the particular by abstraction. The intellect has three operations: abstraction, judgment and reasoning.

General Metaphysics: Aquinas accepts the general principles of Aristotle's metaphysics, in which being is a created composite of potency and act. The general principle of potency and act, applied to those beings in which it is already existent, is specified in a second principle, the principle of matter and form. The principle of individuation is "matter signed by quantity."

Theodicy

Aquinas does not admit supernatural Augustinian illumination, and hence refuses to accept any proof a priori of the existence of God (argument of St. Anselm). The arguments for the existence of God must be a posterior, and they are solidly certain. Aquinas has presented five different ways in which the intellect can prove the existence of God; each of them consists in a fact of experience, which can be justified only by the existence of the transcendent Being (God). Thus: The fact of motion induces the mind to affirm the existence of the immovable Mover; The fact of the production of a new reality demands the existence of the uncaused reality; The fact of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary Being; The fact of the existence in things, to a greater or lesser degree, of the good, the true, and the noble, implies the existence of "absolute perfection"; The Fact of the order of the whole universe implies the necessity of an Intelligence which is the cause of this order.

Cosmology

In cosmology, Aquinas departs from the dualism of Aristotle; matter is created by God. The whole universe was created by an act of the free will of God, and what happens in the universe finds its counterpart in the wisdom of God.

The Soul: When the form in matter is the origin of immanent actions, it is called soul. Hence there is a vegetative soul, a sensitive soul, and an intellective soul. The human soul is directly created by God, and it is the true form of the body; it therefore performs both organic and inorganic activities. The intellect is an inorganic power of the individual soul. The agent intellect is not one and the same for all but is the human soul itself in so far as the soul is intellectual in nature. As such it is able to abstract the intelligibles from material conditions. Since the human soul is able to perform inorganic operations, it is immaterial, spiritual and immortal.

Ethics and Politics

In opposition to the voluntarism of St. Augustine, Aquinas upholds the primacy of the intellect over the will. Aquinas extends this law even to God; the foundation of creation is the Divine Essence, which is rational; the present order of creation has been willed by God because it was rational. All created beings must follow the natural law, and for rational beings, including man, it is the law of reason. Man is free, and he can abuse his freedom; but every abuse of freedom is an irrational act.

Aquinas

departs from Augustinianism also in his doctrine on the state; society is natural to man, and not a consequence of the original fall, as the Augustinians believed. The first step to society is the family and the end of society is the common material good of men. Civil society, therefore, must recognize another superior society, that is, the Church, to which has been entrusted the spiritual good citizens.

John Duns Scotus (1265 - 1308) "The Subtle Doctor"

John Duns Scotus (picture) is the champion of Franciscan Augustinianism. Nevertheless he abandons certain theses of the Augustinian tradition, in favor of the new contributions of Aristotelianism.

Theory of Knowledge

Scotus does not admit Augustinian illumination. He distinguishes between the "proper" object of the intellect, and the object in "state of act." The immediate object of the intellect is the quiddity (essence) abstracted from material conditions; but the "proper" object is "being as being." In regard to abstraction, Scotus holds that the phantasm (sense image) concurs as a concause in the formation of the concept.

General Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, but to these two elements he gives a different interpretation. Prime matter as such can exist; moreover, matter is a constitutive element of every being, even of those of spiritual nature, such as the angels. The principle of individuation, instead of being matter, as Thomas Aquinas taught, is form, in the opinion of Scotus. The determination of the form in the act of individuation is called "haecceitas." Moreover, the concept of being is not analogical, as Aquinas held, but univocal.

Theodicy

Scotus holds, in opposition to traditional Augustianism, that there is no intuition of God. His existence must be proved and Scotus proves the existence of God first a posteriori, by the traditional argument of change. But he admits also the validity of the ontological argument of St. Anselm, to which he gives a new interpretation by introducing into it another principle; that is, that the concept of infinite being is not contradictory, and hence the infinite Being exists. For Scotus the fundamental attribute of God is His infinity.

Cosmology

In this field Scotus accepts the common doctrine of Scholastic tradition. However, according to his principle of the primacy of the will over the intellect, he holds that creation is first an act of will. In consequence of this voluntaristic doctrine, many truths which for Thomas are demonstrable with certainty, are not so for Scotus.

Psychology

In psychology Scotus admits that in every individual there is a multiplicity of forms. The human soul is a complete being in itself. The proper object of the intellect is being in its entire extension. The proof of the immortality of the human soul rests upon faith rather than upon reason. According to Scotus' principle of the primacy of the will, opposites in the field of contingency do not imply contradiction.

Ethics

Scotus reaffirms his voluntarist doctrine in his ethics; this means that God finds within His will the motives for realizing one series of possibles rather than another. The will of God does not act capriciously, however, for God's will is at the same time the most intelligent act. Thus, all that is essentially bound up with the essence of God is also essentially bound up with the divine will, as, for example, the principle of contradiction and the first three commandments of the Decalogue. What is not necessarily bound up with the Divine Essence is dependent upon the free choice of God. Scotus, with St. Augustine, affirms that virtue is an act of love which directs us to God.

Summary

Dogmas, according to Scotus, are beyond dispute; faith is basic to truth; love is the fundamental virtue; faith and love are based on the will; will is superior to the intellect. Universals exist before things, as forms in the mind of God; and after things, as abstract concepts in the human mind. Universal nature (or essence) is supplemented by individual nature and the principle of difference is individuation. General concepts (universals) finally bring us to individuals (nominals, particulars). Duns Scotus agrees with Aquinas in many points; his major difference is in his emphasis on the will, discounting the supreme importance of the intellect in Aquinas' philosophy; Scotus made the will supreme. This difference between the two concepts of the will led to the Thomist-Scotist controversy.

The positive contributions of John Duns Scotus to the Perennial Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge. Scotus distinguishes between the proper object of the intellect and its de facto object. The proper object of this faculty is "being" -- the entire field of being without restriction ("ens in quantum ens") -- through which the intellect can know immaterial essences, even without the aid of sensations. In the field of fact or in actual conditions and as a consequence of original sin, what moves the intellect is only those things that are presented to sensation ("quidditas rei sensibilis").

Metaphysics.There is a difference between Thomas Aquinas and Scotus regarding the principle of individuation. Aquinas had affirmed that the reason for the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon matter signed with quantity. Scotus does not accpet this solution, but observes that quantity is an accident, that therefore in Aquinas' system individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Thus, according to Scotus, individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. This new entitative perfection, which comes to the species (forma) and which indicates the passage from specific difference to individual determination, Scotus calls "thisness."

IV. The Decadence Of Scholastic Philosophy

During the Middle Ages there two celebrated centers of culture: the University of Paris and Oxford University. While at Paris interest in metaphysics prevailed, at Oxford there was an interest in the sciences, with empirical tendencies. This interest was to give origin to the rise of the positive sciences. But at the same time it was to be one of the motives for neglecting metaphysics and returning to the ancient position of nominalism already disproved in the more advanced teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

a. Roger Bacon (1214 - 1294)

Roger Bacon (picture) was a Franciscan monk at Oxford, a student of mathematics and languages; he regarded these subjects as indispensable to theology and philosophy. Bacon wrote an important book entitled "Opus Major" which initiated the modern scientific movement. According to Bacon, there are three ways in which we acquire knowledge: authority, reason, and experience. The last is the most perfect. Bacon distinguishes a twofold experience: external perception, which brings us knowledge of the sensible world; and internal perception, by which is meant "illumination." Bacon combined Augustinian-Platonic philosophy with Arabic speculations and emphasized the need of observation.

b. William of Ockham (1300 - 1349)

For Ockham concepts do not have objective reality; they exist only in our intellect as a "term" or "sign" of the similarity of many experienced objects. The denial of concepts as a reality bears within itself the denial of metaphysics. Moreover, Ockham defends an absolute predomination of the divine will: The Principle of contradiction is under the free will of God, and, if God wished, it would be a meritorious act to hate Him. Furthermore, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are objects of faith and not of reason. Thus, when faith became weaker, these truths were denied, which is exactly what modern philosophy has done.

On the Internet More About William of Ockham

V. Philosophical and Mystical Knowledge

The proper object of philosophy is the essence of material beings, and the philosopher conceives these essences by means of abstraction from data obtained by the senses, from external objects. Any method of knowledge which bypasses sense experience and is based on intuition is not necessarily false, but it is not philosophical: it is true if based on an actual supernatural gift but it is beyond the means of natural knowledge. Therefore, all theories based on illumination are philosophically excluded because they are beyond philosophy, even though they may lead to deeper truths. Such men as St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure were so used to the supernatural method that they accepted it by mistake as a natural means of acquiring knowledge, not noticing that such method was a personal favor of God and could not be followed by the philosopher who was left to reason alone.

Conclusion

Scholastic philosophy grew step by step as a harmonious accord of reason and faith, which met on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such metaphysics does not know decadence. The decadence occurs in men, when their culture indicates a retrogression to past errors, such as Ockham did with his return to nominalism. Thus in later schools these same errors were to appear again; reason was to take the place of faith and man the place of God.

The positive contributions of Scholastic Philosophy to the Perennial Philosophy Scholastic philosophy, in its laborious ascent to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, utilized the best elements of Greek and Patristic philosophy, and succeeded in constructing a weighty metaphysics, in which a rational solution is found to the two problems at the basis of philosophy as well as theology: God and man.

Scholastic metaphysics is a harmonious accord of science and faith, between philosophy and theology, which, although treading different paths, meet on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such a metaphysics does not know decadence, and for this reason Scholasticism has justly been included in the "philosophia perennis," the Perennial Philosophy, the philosophy of all times and of all places.

The Philosophy of Bonaventure

I. Life and Works

Bonaventure (born Giovanni di Fidanza) (picture) was born at Bagnorea in 1221 and entered the Franciscan Order probably about the year 1243. He studied at the University of Paris, where he was a disciple of Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan master of that university; Bonaventure later succeeded his master in the chair of philosophy. He taught at the university from 1248 to 1255 and took part, along with Thomas Aquinas, in the debate against William of Saint Amour, adversary of the Mendicants.

In October of 1257 the degree of Doctor was bestowed on Bonaventure at the university. Nominated General of the Order in the same year, he left his studies to devote himself to the affairs of the Franciscans. At this time he wrote the new Constitutions of the Order and the biography of St. Francis of Assisi which helped to pacify the various Franciscan currents.

In 1273 he was named Cardinal and Bishop of Alvano. He died in Lyons in 1274 while the Council being held in that city was still in session. Bonaventure has been honored with the title "Doctor Seraphicus." His principal works are: Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; Itinerarium mentis in Deum; De reductione artium ad theologiam; and Breviloquium.

II. Doctrine: General Notions

Bonaventure is the theorist of what, in a practical way, was mirrored in the life of St. Francis of Assisi. Francis had been entirely consumed by love of God and of Christ crucified; and the sacred stigmata, visible in his body, were the manifestation of what had already been verified within the very depths of his saintly spirit. In this mystical union with God and with Christ, St. Francis had found the basis of brotherhood not only with men but also with all beings, and the human and physical world was revealed before his eyes as a sanctuary in which all things spoke to him of God.

Bonaventure wished to theorize on the life of the Poverello and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. For this purpose he did not borrow the teachings of the speculative rationalism of Aristotle, but looked to Augustinianism, which already boasted a long tradition in the Church. Its voluntarism, which placed love of God at the center of every activity; its theory of illumination, which made God present to the soul; its analogism, which revealed an image of God and of His attributes in each and every creature -- all of these motives which, outside all speculation, speak to us most vividly of what should be the ideal of the Christian life.

It is understood, then, why Bonaventure is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle, why he even accepts it in part. But his preference is for St. Augustine, and he again works out all the motives of Augustinianism, in which all things, the external and the internal world, matter and spirit, speak to us of God; following Augustine he holds that the apex of all human activity is contemplation or mystical union with God.

In brief, Bonaventure shows the Christian what kind of life he should live if he wishes to attain his destiny. This is the historical function of the mysticism of Bonaventure, which is as important in the spiritual order as the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas in the order of rational philosophy.

III. Theory of Knowledge

Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: The first degree is knowledge of the particular, of the individual. For this first degree of knowledge, sensible experience, corresponding to the physical senses, is indispensable; The second degree consists in knowledge of the universal, of ideas, and of all that we acquire by reflecting upon ourselves. This knowledge does not come from abstraction as suggested by Aristotle and Aquinas, but from illumination. This illumination is for Bonaventure the result of an immediate cooperation of God. The intellect needs this cooperation or illumination in order to know the intelligible.

The third degree is the understanding of things superior to ourselves -- God. This kind of knowledge can be obtained through the eye of contemplation. "The eye of contemplation cannot function perfectly except in the state of glory, which man loses through sin and recovers through grace, faith and the understanding of the Scriptures. By these the human mind is purified, illumined, and brought to the contemplation of heavenly things. These are beyond the reach of fallen man unless he first recognizes his own defects and darknesses. But this he can only do by considering the fall of human nature." (Breviloguium, II, 12.)

IV. General Metaphysics

Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but he wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter, created by God, has its proper form, distinct from all other forms or determinations which may come to it. Moreover, it contains the seeds of all these determinations (the doctrine of "rationes seminales" of St. Augustine).

Nevertheless, it is an essential constituent of every creature, even of those which are said to be incorporeal, such as human souls and angels. The matter of incorporeal substances, on account of the form which it receives, is spiritual matter ("materia spiritualis"), which expresses what is contingent and limited in every finite being. Bonaventure admits in every body a plurality of forms. Thus, besides the form which is proper to the matter, in every body there are as many forms as there are essential properties, all placed in hierarchical order; that is, the inferior forms are subordinate to the superior ones.

V. Cosmology

In his cosmology, Bonaventure does not accept the Aristotelian concepts of the eternity of the world and of matter as co-eternal with God. The world has its origin in the creative act in time; creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory. God, who has created matter, has placed in it the seeds or reasons of all the determinations which it can assume ("rationes seminales").

VI. Psychology

In psychology, Bonaventure departs from Aristotelianism not only in the fact of knowledge, as we have already seen, but also in judging the relationship between the soul and the body and between the soul and its faculties. For Bonaventure the soul is of its very nature form and matter (spiritual matter), and as a consequence is a complete substance, independent of the body. The body in turn is composed of matter and form (vegetative and sensitive form), but it aspires to being informed by the rational form. In this aspiration and coordination the unity of the individual consists.

Without doubt, the unity of the person is not as intimately welded as in Aristotelianism; but Bonaventure's teaching avoids the danger into which Aristotelianism entered with its theory of immanent form, of making the soul dependent on the body even in its destiny. Such a danger cannot exist in Bonaventure, for whom the soul is a substance complete in itself and not indissolubly united to the body.

With regard to the faculties of the soul, Bonaventure, in accord with St. Augustine, distinguishes three -- the will, the understanding and the intellective memory. For Bonaventure the faculties are expressions of one and the same soul, which is endowed with three diverse activities; between the soul and its faculties there is merely a logical distinction. In Aristotelianism the faculties are qualities of the soul and really distinct from it. Bonaventure holds that among the faculties of the soul the will has primacy over the other faculties; therefore it is necessary to love in order to understand.

This law is applied also to our knowledge of God: it is necessary to be united to God through faith and grace in order to know Him and His attributes. The process of this knowledge is described in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum. There are three grades or steps through which the soul ascends to God. The first grade is called "vestigium," which is the imprint of Himself that God has stamped on material things outside ourselves. The second grade is "imago," or the reflection of the soul upon itself, by which, seeing the threefold faculties of the soul -- will, intellect, and memory -- man discerns the image of God. The third grade is "similitudo," or the consideration of God Himself. By considering the idea of the most perfect being, we can conceive the unity of God (the ontological argument of Anselm, which Bonaventure admits as valid); and from the concept of infinite goodness we can reach the consideration of the Trinity. In "similitudo" the soul attains to mystical union, the supreme degree of love between the creature and his Creator.

THE PERIOD OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

I. INTRODUCTION

The period of Christian thought extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the end of the fifteenth has come to be known as Scholasticism, a name taken from the school of philosophy of the University of Paris.

Background

Patristic philosophy reached its climax in the system of Augustine; it was the last great product of classical-Christian civilization. When the Roman empire fell, the only institution that was capable of standing for law and order was the Church. The Goths sacked Rome but respected the Church and offered it protection. The literature and culture of Greece and Rome became almost extinct; the barbarous tribes initiated the Dark Ages. The only philosophy that survived was that which filtered through the writings of the Church Fathers. From Augustine to the ninth century learning consisted of an ecclesiastical dogmatism which was spiritually lifeless and it did little better than preserve the traditions of past; Plato and Aristotle were only partially known.

Scholastic philosophy means an organized system of truths which are distinct from the dogmas of faith but not opposed to them. This separation and coordination of reason and faith is not found in all Scholastic philosophy, but only during the period of its greatest splendor achieved under Thomas Aquinas. Scholastic philosophy, then, may be divided into: The formative period, extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth; The period of maturity, extending a little more than half a century and covering Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus; The period of decadence, extending from the death of Scotus to the end of the fifteenth century.

The Carolingian Revival of Learning

During the period of decadence, following the fall of the Roman empire, culture was restricted to ecclesiastical schools. There were of three types: Monastic schools, whose purpose was the formation of monks; Episcopal schools, whose purpose was the formation of priests, and occasionally of laymen; Parish schools, which were for the instruction of the faithful in respect to the reception of the sacraments.

It is to Charlemagne's credit to have undertaken the program for the establishment of schools. He summoned the monk Alcuin and entrusted him with the work of organizing the schools. Alcuin reformed the program of studies by establishing the divisions known as the trivium (comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). He established the "scola palatina." Other schools following the program of Alcuin were opened at Tours, Laon, Orleans and Fulda. This cultural movement had no development of any importance after the death of Charlemagne.

On the Internet Texts and Archives of Scholasticism

II. The Formative Period Of Scholastcism

The formative period of Scholasticism (the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth centuries and the first half of the thirteenth century) developed under the influence of St. Augustine's thought. During this period, because of the prejudice of illumination, it was impossible to have a complete separation of reason from faith. Both mystics and dialecticians consider the intellect as unable to reason without being enlightened by God. With the help of illumination the intellect will be able to penetrate the content of the mysteries of faith. This period can be divided as follows: The ninth and the tenth century (John Scotus Erigena and the problem of universals); The eleventh and twelfth century (mystics and dialecticians); The first half of the thirteenth century (the question concerning the works of Aristotle).

a. The Ninth and Tenth Centuries

1. John Scotus Erigena (815? - 877): Scotus Erigena wrote "De Divisione Naturae," a Neo-Platonic work. According to Erigena, Unity (God) descends into multiplicity, and multiplicity returns to Unity. The degrees of reality are the following: (1) creating, non-created Nature -- God, the Father; (2) created and creating Nature -- the Son; (3) created and non-creating Nature -- the sensible world informed by the Holy Spirit; (4) non-created and non-creating Nature -- God Himself as final cause. The first and fourth degrees coincide with God.

2. The Problem of the Universals: What is the value of concepts, which are universal, in relation to real things, which are particular? Four solutions were attempted: Transcendent realism (the Platonic solution); Immanent realism ( the Aristotelian solution); Conceptualism (the concepts are mental signs without basis in reality); Nominalism (the concepts are names, speech).

See also Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty's essay on The World of Universals.

b. The Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

At the beginning of the eleventh century the Churchmen showed a renewed interest in a better understanding of the truths of religion. The thinkers of that time are divided into mystics and dialecticians. Both feel the influence of illumination, and hence consider knowledge a gift of God. Faith is thus presupposed and is considered superior to reason. Nevertheless thinkers disagree in determining what is the contribution that reason can make to faith. The mystics see in philosophy a remnant of paganism and the danger of heresy. St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines are mystics. The dialecticians, on the contrary, think that once the understanding of religious truths is required reason can be invoked to penetrate the very content of the mysteries of the faith. St. Anselm and Peter Abelard are dialecticians.

St. Anselm (picture) is well known for this ontological argument for the existence of God, as presented in the "Proslogium": The concept which everyone has of God is that of a most perfect being; Greater being cannot be conceived; Consequently, God must also really exist; otherwise He would no longer be that most perfect being, for He would lack real existence.

This argument, however, marks an illicit passage from the concept to reality. But, granted the doctrine of illumination, it would be valid. Abelard is the most complex personality of this time. He attempted to penetrate the mysteries of faith through reason, and found in St. Bernard his strongest opponent. In the question of universals, Abelard is considered a nominalist; but he possibly may not be such, as his vocabulary is not absolutely clear.

On the Internet "Proslogium" by Anselm Anselm: Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God More about Peter Abelard "History of My Calamities" by Peter Abelard.

c. The First Half of the Thirteenth Century

1. The Establishing of Universities: As a consequence of the interest in studies, some ecclesiastical schools were reinvigorated and rose to great fame. This is the origin of many universities; the most celebrated of them is the University of Paris, then Oxford University. While the universities were being organized, two religious Orders -- namely, the Franciscans and Dominicans -- obtained the faculty to teach in them, and made a large contribution to the development of Scholastic philosophy.

2. The Discovery of the Works of Aristotle: The major factor in the development of Scholastic was the discovery of the works of Aristotle, which happened during the first half of the thirteenth century. These works first reached the universities through the commentaries of Jewish and Arabian philosophers.

Among the famous commentators on Aristotle in Spain were two Jewish philosophers, Avicebron (died about 1058), and Maimonides (died 1204) (picture). The Arabian physician Avicenna (picture) enjoyed greater fame. He attempted to reconciled Aristotle with the religion of Islam, and hence affirmed the immortality of the soul.

The most famous commentator was the Spanish-Arabian philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) (picture). He too was a physician and Thomas Aquinas gave him the designation "The Commentator."

Later what was called the "translatio nova" of Aristotle, made directly from the Greek, was attempted. The attitude of thinkers in regard to the works of Aristotle was threefold: Some thinkers advocated the integral acceptance of the system of Aristotle -- the most representative of this group was Siger of Brabant; Others accepted Aristotle's opinions when these were not opposed to St. Augustine -- the most representative of this group is St. Bonaventure; Yet others -- among them, Thomas Aquinas, who accepted the system of Aristotle critically -- discarded the theories of the philosopher in those points which were not in accord with Christianity.

Siger of Brabant (died about 1281) in his work "De Anima Intellectiva" holds the theory that the world is eternal, denies providence, and admits the existence of the acting intellect as something separate and the same for all men. Siger defended himself by having recourse to the principle of the double truth.

III. The Godlden Age Of Scholastic Philosophy

St. Bonaventure (1221 - 1274)

St. Bonaventure (picture) wished to theorize on the life of St. Francis, and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. Bonaventure, therefore, is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle; but his preference is for St. Augustine, in whose doctrine, as in the practical life of St. Francis, the external and the internal world speak to us of God.

Doctrine

1. Theory of Knowledge: Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: Knowledge of the particular, of sensitive objects; Knowledge of ideas, which come from illumination; Contemplation, the understanding of divine things.

2. Metaphysics: Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter has its own form, and contains the seeds of all determinations; there is corporeal matter as well as incorporeal matter. The existence of God is proved a priori (argument of St. Anselm). In every finite being there is a plurality of forms. In cosmology, Bonaventure holds that creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory; God, when He created matter, placed in it the seeds of all determinations. In psychology, Bonaventure's thesis is that the union of the soul with the body is extrinsic, because the soul is a complete substance in itself. In ethics, Bonaventure defends the priority of the will over the intellect.

On the Internet More about Bonaventure

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274)

For a more advanced & comprehensive discussion, see: The Philosophical System of Thomas Aquinas, by Maurice de Wulf.

Philosophy and Theology

Thomas Aquinas (picture) does not accept the Averroist principle of the double truth. Philosophy and theology are distinct but not opposed, and what reason shows to be true is absolutely true in theology also. Moreover, Aquinas does not accept Augustinian illumination, the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. For Aquinas the intellect is able to reach concepts through abstraction. The proper object of the human intellect is this visible world; our intellect cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith. Nevertheless, the most important religious truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are both the object of reason and the object of faith.

Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge is obtained through two stages of operations, sensitive and intellective, which are intimately related to one another. The object of sensitive knowledge is the particular thing, while the object of the intellect is the "intelligible," which is arrived at from the particular by abstraction. The intellect has three operations: abstraction, judgment and reasoning.

General Metaphysics: Aquinas accepts the general principles of Aristotle's metaphysics, in which being is a created composite of potency and act. The general principle of potency and act, applied to those beings in which it is already existent, is specified in a second principle, the principle of matter and form. The principle of individuation is "matter signed by quantity."

Theodicy

Aquinas does not admit supernatural Augustinian illumination, and hence refuses to accept any proof a priori of the existence of God (argument of St. Anselm). The arguments for the existence of God must be a posterior, and they are solidly certain. Aquinas has presented five different ways in which the intellect can prove the existence of God; each of them consists in a fact of experience, which can be justified only by the existence of the transcendent Being (God). Thus: The fact of motion induces the mind to affirm the existence of the immovable Mover; The fact of the production of a new reality demands the existence of the uncaused reality; The fact of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary Being; The fact of the existence in things, to a greater or lesser degree, of the good, the true, and the noble, implies the existence of "absolute perfection"; The Fact of the order of the whole universe implies the necessity of an Intelligence which is the cause of this order.

Cosmology

In cosmology, Aquinas departs from the dualism of Aristotle; matter is created by God. The whole universe was created by an act of the free will of God, and what happens in the universe finds its counterpart in the wisdom of God.

The Soul: When the form in matter is the origin of immanent actions, it is called soul. Hence there is a vegetative soul, a sensitive soul, and an intellective soul. The human soul is directly created by God, and it is the true form of the body; it therefore performs both organic and inorganic activities. The intellect is an inorganic power of the individual soul. The agent intellect is not one and the same for all but is the human soul itself in so far as the soul is intellectual in nature. As such it is able to abstract the intelligibles from material conditions. Since the human soul is able to perform inorganic operations, it is immaterial, spiritual and immortal.

Ethics and Politics

In opposition to the voluntarism of St. Augustine, Aquinas upholds the primacy of the intellect over the will. Aquinas extends this law even to God; the foundation of creation is the Divine Essence, which is rational; the present order of creation has been willed by God because it was rational. All created beings must follow the natural law, and for rational beings, including man, it is the law of reason. Man is free, and he can abuse his freedom; but every abuse of freedom is an irrational act.

Aquinas

departs from Augustinianism also in his doctrine on the state; society is natural to man, and not a consequence of the original fall, as the Augustinians believed. The first step to society is the family and the end of society is the common material good of men. Civil society, therefore, must recognize another superior society, that is, the Church, to which has been entrusted the spiritual good citizens.

John Duns Scotus (1265 - 1308) "The Subtle Doctor"

John Duns Scotus (picture) is the champion of Franciscan Augustinianism. Nevertheless he abandons certain theses of the Augustinian tradition, in favor of the new contributions of Aristotelianism.

Theory of Knowledge

Scotus does not admit Augustinian illumination. He distinguishes between the "proper" object of the intellect, and the object in "state of act." The immediate object of the intellect is the quiddity (essence) abstracted from material conditions; but the "proper" object is "being as being." In regard to abstraction, Scotus holds that the phantasm (sense image) concurs as a concause in the formation of the concept.

General Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, but to these two elements he gives a different interpretation. Prime matter as such can exist; moreover, matter is a constitutive element of every being, even of those of spiritual nature, such as the angels. The principle of individuation, instead of being matter, as Thomas Aquinas taught, is form, in the opinion of Scotus. The determination of the form in the act of individuation is called "haecceitas." Moreover, the concept of being is not analogical, as Aquinas held, but univocal.

Theodicy

Scotus holds, in opposition to traditional Augustianism, that there is no intuition of God. His existence must be proved and Scotus proves the existence of God first a posteriori, by the traditional argument of change. But he admits also the validity of the ontological argument of St. Anselm, to which he gives a new interpretation by introducing into it another principle; that is, that the concept of infinite being is not contradictory, and hence the infinite Being exists. For Scotus the fundamental attribute of God is His infinity.

Cosmology

In this field Scotus accepts the common doctrine of Scholastic tradition. However, according to his principle of the primacy of the will over the intellect, he holds that creation is first an act of will. In consequence of this voluntaristic doctrine, many truths which for Thomas are demonstrable with certainty, are not so for Scotus.

Psychology

In psychology Scotus admits that in every individual there is a multiplicity of forms. The human soul is a complete being in itself. The proper object of the intellect is being in its entire extension. The proof of the immortality of the human soul rests upon faith rather than upon reason. According to Scotus' principle of the primacy of the will, opposites in the field of contingency do not imply contradiction.

Ethics

Scotus reaffirms his voluntarist doctrine in his ethics; this means that God finds within His will the motives for realizing one series of possibles rather than another. The will of God does not act capriciously, however, for God's will is at the same time the most intelligent act. Thus, all that is essentially bound up with the essence of God is also essentially bound up with the divine will, as, for example, the principle of contradiction and the first three commandments of the Decalogue. What is not necessarily bound up with the Divine Essence is dependent upon the free choice of God. Scotus, with St. Augustine, affirms that virtue is an act of love which directs us to God.

Summary

Dogmas, according to Scotus, are beyond dispute; faith is basic to truth; love is the fundamental virtue; faith and love are based on the will; will is superior to the intellect. Universals exist before things, as forms in the mind of God; and after things, as abstract concepts in the human mind. Universal nature (or essence) is supplemented by individual nature and the principle of difference is individuation. General concepts (universals) finally bring us to individuals (nominals, particulars). Duns Scotus agrees with Aquinas in many points; his major difference is in his emphasis on the will, discounting the supreme importance of the intellect in Aquinas' philosophy; Scotus made the will supreme. This difference between the two concepts of the will led to the Thomist-Scotist controversy.

The positive contributions of John Duns Scotus to the Perennial Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge. Scotus distinguishes between the proper object of the intellect and its de facto object. The proper object of this faculty is "being" -- the entire field of being without restriction ("ens in quantum ens") -- through which the intellect can know immaterial essences, even without the aid of sensations. In the field of fact or in actual conditions and as a consequence of original sin, what moves the intellect is only those things that are presented to sensation ("quidditas rei sensibilis").

Metaphysics.There is a difference between Thomas Aquinas and Scotus regarding the principle of individuation. Aquinas had affirmed that the reason for the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon matter signed with quantity. Scotus does not accpet this solution, but observes that quantity is an accident, that therefore in Aquinas' system individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Thus, according to Scotus, individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. This new entitative perfection, which comes to the species (forma) and which indicates the passage from specific difference to individual determination, Scotus calls "thisness."

IV. The Decadence Of Scholastic Philosophy

During the Middle Ages there two celebrated centers of culture: the University of Paris and Oxford University. While at Paris interest in metaphysics prevailed, at Oxford there was an interest in the sciences, with empirical tendencies. This interest was to give origin to the rise of the positive sciences. But at the same time it was to be one of the motives for neglecting metaphysics and returning to the ancient position of nominalism already disproved in the more advanced teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

a. Roger Bacon (1214 - 1294)

Roger Bacon (picture) was a Franciscan monk at Oxford, a student of mathematics and languages; he regarded these subjects as indispensable to theology and philosophy. Bacon wrote an important book entitled "Opus Major" which initiated the modern scientific movement. According to Bacon, there are three ways in which we acquire knowledge: authority, reason, and experience. The last is the most perfect. Bacon distinguishes a twofold experience: external perception, which brings us knowledge of the sensible world; and internal perception, by which is meant "illumination." Bacon combined Augustinian-Platonic philosophy with Arabic speculations and emphasized the need of observation.

b. William of Ockham (1300 - 1349)

For Ockham concepts do not have objective reality; they exist only in our intellect as a "term" or "sign" of the similarity of many experienced objects. The denial of concepts as a reality bears within itself the denial of metaphysics. Moreover, Ockham defends an absolute predomination of the divine will: The Principle of contradiction is under the free will of God, and, if God wished, it would be a meritorious act to hate Him. Furthermore, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are objects of faith and not of reason. Thus, when faith became weaker, these truths were denied, which is exactly what modern philosophy has done.

On the Internet More About William of Ockham

V. Philosophical and Mystical Knowledge

The proper object of philosophy is the essence of material beings, and the philosopher conceives these essences by means of abstraction from data obtained by the senses, from external objects. Any method of knowledge which bypasses sense experience and is based on intuition is not necessarily false, but it is not philosophical: it is true if based on an actual supernatural gift but it is beyond the means of natural knowledge. Therefore, all theories based on illumination are philosophically excluded because they are beyond philosophy, even though they may lead to deeper truths. Such men as St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure were so used to the supernatural method that they accepted it by mistake as a natural means of acquiring knowledge, not noticing that such method was a personal favor of God and could not be followed by the philosopher who was left to reason alone.

Conclusion

Scholastic philosophy grew step by step as a harmonious accord of reason and faith, which met on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such metaphysics does not know decadence. The decadence occurs in men, when their culture indicates a retrogression to past errors, such as Ockham did with his return to nominalism. Thus in later schools these same errors were to appear again; reason was to take the place of faith and man the place of God.

The positive contributions of Scholastic Philosophy to the Perennial Philosophy Scholastic philosophy, in its laborious ascent to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, utilized the best elements of Greek and Patristic philosophy, and succeeded in constructing a weighty metaphysics, in which a rational solution is found to the two problems at the basis of philosophy as well as theology: God and man.

Scholastic metaphysics is a harmonious accord of science and faith, between philosophy and theology, which, although treading different paths, meet on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such a metaphysics does not know decadence, and for this reason Scholasticism has justly been included in the "philosophia perennis," the Perennial Philosophy, the philosophy of all times and of all places.

The Philosophy of Bonaventure

I. Life and Works

Bonaventure (born Giovanni di Fidanza) (picture) was born at Bagnorea in 1221 and entered the Franciscan Order probably about the year 1243. He studied at the University of Paris, where he was a disciple of Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan master of that university; Bonaventure later succeeded his master in the chair of philosophy. He taught at the university from 1248 to 1255 and took part, along with Thomas Aquinas, in the debate against William of Saint Amour, adversary of the Mendicants.

In October of 1257 the degree of Doctor was bestowed on Bonaventure at the university. Nominated General of the Order in the same year, he left his studies to devote himself to the affairs of the Franciscans. At this time he wrote the new Constitutions of the Order and the biography of St. Francis of Assisi which helped to pacify the various Franciscan currents.

In 1273 he was named Cardinal and Bishop of Alvano. He died in Lyons in 1274 while the Council being held in that city was still in session. Bonaventure has been honored with the title "Doctor Seraphicus." His principal works are: Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; Itinerarium mentis in Deum; De reductione artium ad theologiam; and Breviloquium.

II. Doctrine: General Notions

Bonaventure is the theorist of what, in a practical way, was mirrored in the life of St. Francis of Assisi. Francis had been entirely consumed by love of God and of Christ crucified; and the sacred stigmata, visible in his body, were the manifestation of what had already been verified within the very depths of his saintly spirit. In this mystical union with God and with Christ, St. Francis had found the basis of brotherhood not only with men but also with all beings, and the human and physical world was revealed before his eyes as a sanctuary in which all things spoke to him of God.

Bonaventure wished to theorize on the life of the Poverello and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. For this purpose he did not borrow the teachings of the speculative rationalism of Aristotle, but looked to Augustinianism, which already boasted a long tradition in the Church. Its voluntarism, which placed love of God at the center of every activity; its theory of illumination, which made God present to the soul; its analogism, which revealed an image of God and of His attributes in each and every creature -- all of these motives which, outside all speculation, speak to us most vividly of what should be the ideal of the Christian life.

It is understood, then, why Bonaventure is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle, why he even accepts it in part. But his preference is for St. Augustine, and he again works out all the motives of Augustinianism, in which all things, the external and the internal world, matter and spirit, speak to us of God; following Augustine he holds that the apex of all human activity is contemplation or mystical union with God.

In brief, Bonaventure shows the Christian what kind of life he should live if he wishes to attain his destiny. This is the historical function of the mysticism of Bonaventure, which is as important in the spiritual order as the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas in the order of rational philosophy.

III. Theory of Knowledge

Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: The first degree is knowledge of the particular, of the individual. For this first degree of knowledge, sensible experience, corresponding to the physical senses, is indispensable; The second degree consists in knowledge of the universal, of ideas, and of all that we acquire by reflecting upon ourselves. This knowledge does not come from abstraction as suggested by Aristotle and Aquinas, but from illumination. This illumination is for Bonaventure the result of an immediate cooperation of God. The intellect needs this cooperation or illumination in order to know the intelligible.

The third degree is the understanding of things superior to ourselves -- God. This kind of knowledge can be obtained through the eye of contemplation. "The eye of contemplation cannot function perfectly except in the state of glory, which man loses through sin and recovers through grace, faith and the understanding of the Scriptures. By these the human mind is purified, illumined, and brought to the contemplation of heavenly things. These are beyond the reach of fallen man unless he first recognizes his own defects and darknesses. But this he can only do by considering the fall of human nature." (Breviloguium, II, 12.)

IV. General Metaphysics

Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but he wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter, created by God, has its proper form, distinct from all other forms or determinations which may come to it. Moreover, it contains the seeds of all these determinations (the doctrine of "rationes seminales" of St. Augustine).

Nevertheless, it is an essential constituent of every creature, even of those which are said to be incorporeal, such as human souls and angels. The matter of incorporeal substances, on account of the form which it receives, is spiritual matter ("materia spiritualis"), which expresses what is contingent and limited in every finite being. Bonaventure admits in every body a plurality of forms. Thus, besides the form which is proper to the matter, in every body there are as many forms as there are essential properties, all placed in hierarchical order; that is, the inferior forms are subordinate to the superior ones.

V. Cosmology

In his cosmology, Bonaventure does not accept the Aristotelian concepts of the eternity of the world and of matter as co-eternal with God. The world has its origin in the creative act in time; creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory. God, who has created matter, has placed in it the seeds or reasons of all the determinations which it can assume ("rationes seminales").

VI. Psychology

In psychology, Bonaventure departs from Aristotelianism not only in the fact of knowledge, as we have already seen, but also in judging the relationship between the soul and the body and between the soul and its faculties. For Bonaventure the soul is of its very nature form and matter (spiritual matter), and as a consequence is a complete substance, independent of the body. The body in turn is composed of matter and form (vegetative and sensitive form), but it aspires to being informed by the rational form. In this aspiration and coordination the unity of the individual consists.

Without doubt, the unity of the person is not as intimately welded as in Aristotelianism; but Bonaventure's teaching avoids the danger into which Aristotelianism entered with its theory of immanent form, of making the soul dependent on the body even in its destiny. Such a danger cannot exist in Bonaventure, for whom the soul is a substance complete in itself and not indissolubly united to the body.

With regard to the faculties of the soul, Bonaventure, in accord with St. Augustine, distinguishes three -- the will, the understanding and the intellective memory. For Bonaventure the faculties are expressions of one and the same soul, which is endowed with three diverse activities; between the soul and its faculties there is merely a logical distinction. In Aristotelianism the faculties are qualities of the soul and really distinct from it. Bonaventure holds that among the faculties of the soul the will has primacy over the other faculties; therefore it is necessary to love in order to understand.

This law is applied also to our knowledge of God: it is necessary to be united to God through faith and grace in order to know Him and His attributes. The process of this knowledge is described in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum. There are three grades or steps through which the soul ascends to God. The first grade is called "vestigium," which is the imprint of Himself that God has stamped on material things outside ourselves. The second grade is "imago," or the reflection of the soul upon itself, by which, seeing the threefold faculties of the soul -- will, intellect, and memory -- man discerns the image of God. The third grade is "similitudo," or the consideration of God Himself. By considering the idea of the most perfect being, we can conceive the unity of God (the ontological argument of Anselm, which Bonaventure admits as valid); and from the concept of infinite goodness we can reach the consideration of the Trinity. In "similitudo" the soul attains to mystical union, the supreme degree of love between the creature and his Creator.