CHAPTER 4: IMPLICATURES OF SENTENCES (AL-MAFĀHĪM)
The Arabic term mafhūm (pl. mafāhīm) is used for three different expressions the third of which being meant in this discussion. The first is used to denote “meaning,” and the second to denote “concept” as the opposite of instance (mişdāq). The third, however, is used merely in uşūl al-fiqh to convey a specific meaning equivalent to implicature of a sentence. This meaning is used in opposition to manţūq (the uttered) which means what is denoted by the sentence per se in such a way that the uttered sentence is bearing that meaning and is a frame for it. By mafhūm, therefore, is meant what the sentence is not bearing and does not denote comprehensively; rather, it is an “obvious implicature in the most particular sense” of the sentence. (An implicating conceiving of whose implicated would implicate conceiving of itself is called “obvious implicating in the most particular sense,” as in “two being twice as one” in which the very conceiving of two implicates immediate conceiving of its being twice as one.)
Hence, mafhūm is specifically used for the implicative denotation (al-dalāla aliltizāmiyya). Let us take an example in order to give a clear insight of manţūq and mafhūm at the beginning of our discussion. Suppose that the jurist has said, “If the water is pure, one can make ablution with it.” In this sentence, manţūq is the content of the sentence, i.e., lawfulness of making ablution with pure water, and mafhūm, should such a sentence have mafhūm, is unlawfulness of making ablution with impure water.
Hence, manţūq can be defined as “a precept denoted by the word where it is uttered,” and mafhūm as “a precept denoted by the word where it is not uttered.” Here, by the precept is meant precept in the most general meaning and not one of the five-fold burdensome precepts. Sometimes the phrase “nonexistence where non-existence” (al-intifā’ ‘ind al-intifā’) is used for mafhūm, meaning non-existence of the judgment where the condition, qualifier, and the like become non-existent.
As was seen, there is no single word to convey precisely that specific meaning of mafhūm in English; hence, we use the Arabic term in this connection emphasizing that wherever the Arabic term mafhūm is used in this book it is only this specific meaning which is intended. Although this is not exactly the case with manţūq and it can be conveyed by the term “the uttered,” we use the Arabic term in our discussion for the sake of consonance.
Before anything else, two important points should be borne in mind with regard to the discussion of mafhūm:
1. When the matter of dispute is entitled “dispute over authority of mafhūm” it questions whether a specific kind of sentence has mafhūm or not.
It does not question whether or not mafhūm of a specific kind of sentence which has mafhūm is authorized- as is the case with authority of ĥadīths. For instance, where mafhūm of condition is disputed it means that whether such sentence has mafhūm and denotes preclusion of precepts when the condition is precluded or not; it does not mean that such sentence has mafhūm but Uşūlīs dispute whether or not that mafhūm is an authoritative proof.
2. The dispute is over cases where no contextual evidence exits. Should there be any contextual evidence the sentence would doubtlessly be treated the way the evidence designates. Thus, the dispute is over whether the type of conditional sentence, for instance, has mafhūm when it is void of any specific evidence or not.
Varieties of Mafhūm
Mafhūm is generally divided into two types: accordant (al-mafhūm al-muwāfiq or mafhūm al-muwāfaqa), and disaccording (al-mafhūm al-mukhālif or mafhūm al-mukhālafa).
1. Accordant is the one in which the type of precept accords with the precept in the manţūq, i.e., if the precept in the manţūq is obligation it is obligation in the mafhūm, if it is unlawfulness in the former it is unlawfulness in the latter, and so forth - as in the Qur’ānic verse: “Do not say to them (your parents) Fie,” (17: 23) that denotes prohibition of assault and battery which are more insulting and painful than to say “Fie” which is explicitly declared unlawful in the verse.
There is no dispute over authority of accordant mafhūm in the sense that the precept transmits to that which has priority in terms of motive of the precept.
2. Disaccording is the one in which the type of precept disaccords with the precept in the manţūq. There are six instances of this kind with which we should deal separately and in detail.
1. Mafhūm of the Condition (al-Sharţ)
Doubtless manţūq of the conditional sentence conventionally denotes that the consequent is dependent upon the antecedent. However, conditional sentences are of two kinds:
1.1. That which is made to depict the object of judgment. In this kind, the antecedent is the very object of the judgment; the judgment in the consequent is dependent upon the condition in the antecedent in such a way that consideration of the judgment without condition is implausible.
For instance, in this Qur’ānic verse: “And do not constrain your slavegirls to prostitution if they desire to live in chastity,” (23: 33) supposition of constraining to prostitution is implausible unless when the desire of slavegirls to live in chastity is assumed.
All Uşūlīs are in agreement that such conditional sentences have no mafhūm, since non-existence of the condition means non-existence of the judgment; hence, to judge that the consequent does not exist is nonsensical except in the way of “negative by non-existence of the object”: it is not to judge that consequent does not exist, it is non-existence of the judgment. Thus, there is no mafhūm for the verse in question and it cannot be said that if your slave-girls did not desire to live in chastity you should constrain them to prostitution.
1.2. That which is not made to depict the object of the judgment. In this kind, the antecedent is not the very object of the judgment and the judgment in the consequent is dependent upon the condition in the antecedent in such a way that its consideration without condition is plausible. For instance, when one says, “If your friend did you a favor, do him a favor,” to do one’s friend a favor is not logically dependent upon one’s friend’s doing one a favor, since one can do one’s friend a favor whether the latter does the former a favor or not.
It is this kind of conditional sentence that is a matter of dispute in this discussion. It refers to the dispute whether or not the conditional sentence denotes non-existence of the judgment where the condition becomes non33
existent, in the sense that whether or not it is understood from the nature of making the judgment conditional upon the condition that the type of precept, obligation for instance, would become non-existent should the condition become non-existent.
Concerning mafhūm of the condition, there are two opinions: having mafhūm and not having mafhūm, and the justifiable one is the former. Before dealing with arguments, we have to discover the criterion for mafhūm of the condition.
The Criterion for Mafhūm of the Condition
In order to have mafhūm, conditional sentence needs to denote three subsequent affairs, whether conventionally or by absoluteness, as follows:
1. To denote that there is a relation and implication between the antecedent (al-muqaddam) and the consequent (al-tālī).
2. To denote that, in addition to relation and implication, the consequent is dependent upon, subsequent to, and subject to the antecedent; hence, the antecedent is a cause for the consequent.
3. To denote that, in addition to those two, the antecedent is the exclusive cause, in the sense that there is no parallel cause upon which the consequent can be dependent.
That the mafhūm of the conditional sentence is dependent upon those three affairs is obviously clear; for should the sentence be occasional, or the consequent not be dependent upon the antecedent, or be dependent but not in an exclusive way, the consequent would not become non-existent where the antecedent does not exist. The only thing to be proved is that the sentence is apparent in those three-fold affairs, whether conventionally or by absoluteness, so that it can have mafhūm.
The truth is that the conditional sentence is apparent in those affairs, conventionally in some and by absoluteness in others:
1. As for the relation and existence of necessary connection between the two, it appears that it is conventional - because of tabādur. It should be noted, however, that it is not because of articles of condition being specified to that so that one may deny it; it is necessitated by the compound disposition of the conditional sentence as a whole.
2. As for the consequent being dependent upon the antecedent, no matter what kind of dependence it might be, it is also conventional; but not in the sense that the sentence is specified twice - one for the implication and another for the dependence - but rather in the sense that it is specified once for the specific relation which is dependence of the consequent upon the antecedent. Again, the reason is tabādur of dependence of the consequent upon its antecedent, as the conditional sentence denotes that the antecedent is situated in the position of supposition and in case of its actualization the consequent will be actualized secondarily, i.e., consequent follows the antecedent in the actualization. In other words, what immediately comes to the mind from the conditional sentence is that its consequent would necessarily be actualized should its condition be actualized. This is obviously clear and cannot be denied, except by someone who is obstinate or negligent, for it is the meaning of dependent-making of something - which is the content of conditional sentence. The conditional sentence has no content other than that; that is why its first clause is called subordinate clause and antecedent and its second clause principle clause and consequence.
3. As for exclusiveness of the condition, it is by absoluteness; for had there been another condition to substitute that one or to be added to it so that they may both make one compound condition, there would have necessarily been an additional depiction either by “or” in the first state or “and” in the second. Now, where dependent-making of the consequent upon the condition is left absolute, it reveals that the condition is independent and inclusive; it has neither a partner nor a substitute or parallel. Otherwise, the wise speaker was mandatorily supposed to depict that where he was in the position of depiction.
In short, there is no doubt that the conditional sentence is apparent in having mafhūm, except in cases where it is made to depict the object of the judgment or there is contradictory contextual evidence. This can clearly been proved by the following ĥadīth of the sixth Imām:
Abū Başīr asked, “A lamb is slaughtered and blood came out, but no part of its body moved.”
Imām replied, “Do not eat. Ali said, ‘If the leg jerked or the eye blinked, eat.’”
It is clear that Imām’s appeal to Imām Ali’s words cannot be justified except when the conditional sentence has mafhūm, i.e., “If the leg did not jerk or the eye did not blink, do not eat.”
Conditions Being Multiple While Consequents Being One
What should one do where there are two or more conditional sentences in which conditions are multiple but consequents are one? The case in question may be of two kinds:
1.The consequent is religiously unrepeatable, as in two ĥadīths concerning the prayers when one is travelling: “If the call to prayers (adhān) is not heard, perform your prayers shortened,” and “If ramparts are not seen, perform your prayers shortened.”
2.The consequent is religiously repeatable, as in: “If you had sexual intercourse, make major ablution,” and “If you touched a dead body, make major ablution.”
Since the discussion in either of these two kinds differs from the other, we will discuss them separately:
1. In this kind, contradiction between proofs would appear should the conditional sentence have mafhūm - though between mafhūm of each and manţūq of the other. For instance, if one is in a place where one does not hear the call to prayers but sees the ramparts, according to manţūq of the first one should perform one’s prayers shortened while according to mafhūm of the second one should not do so. To solve this problem, one may take one of the two following ways:
1.1. To qualify both conditions with respect to their appearance in “independence in the causality” - an appearance caused by that absoluteness which is contrary to qualification with “and.” Hence, the condition would, in fact, become a compound of two conditions each of them being part of the cause. Thus, the two sentences will be like one whose antecedent is the compound of two conditions: “If the call to prayers is not heard and ramparts are not seen, perform your prayers shortened.” In that case, the two sentences may have one mafhūm which is non-existence of both conditions or one of them - as if they were one sentence.
1.2. To qualify both conditions with respect to their appearance in “exclusiveness” - an appearance caused by that absoluteness which is contrary to qualification with “or.” Hence, the condition would be either of them, or, if possible, an inclusive affair covering both of them either of them being its instance.
Now, the question is that which of those two ways is more justifiable. There are two opinions in this connection. The more justifiable one is to take the second way; for the contradiction is originated by appearance of two conditional sentences in exclusiveness which necessitates their appearance in mafhūm -
something, in turn, causing contradiction of manţūq of each to mafhūm of the other, as explained earlier. Therefore, one should abandon appearance of each of them in the exclusiveness - of course, to the extent denoted by manţūq of the other, since appearance of manţūq is stronger. As for the appearance of each sentence in the independence, it has no contradictory side so that one should abandon it.
Now that the second opinion is preferred, each condition will be independent in the efficacy. Thus, should one condition be actualized singly the judgment will be proved by it; and should both conditions be actualized, if they are actualized subsequently the judgment will be proved by the first, and if they are actualized simultaneously the judgment will be proved by both of them and they are treated as one condition - since it is assumed that the consequent cannot be repeated.
2. This kind is, in turn, of two kinds:
2.1. It is proved that each condition is part of the cause. Doubtless, the consequent is one and will be actualized when both conditions are realized.
2.2. It is proved, either by another proof or by the appearance of the same proof, that each condition is an independent cause. Here, whether or not the conditional sentence has mafhūm, it is disputed whether the rule to which one is supposed to refer to in such cases necessitates intervention of causes so that they may have one consequence, or necessitates nonintervention of causes so that the consequence should be repeated by repetition of conditions. Doubtless, as we have frequently stressed, the specific proof should be followed in this respect should there be one, as in the case with intervention of causes of ablution such as urine, sleep, and the like and non-intervention of causes of obligation of prayers such as coming of the time of daily prayers, eclipse of the sun or moon, and so forth. The dispute is over the problem where no specific proof exists and one wonders what one is principally supposed to do - a problem known as the problem of “intervention of causes.”
2.2.1. The problem of intervention of causes (tadākhul al-asbāb). The justifiable opinion concerning this problem is non-intervention of causes.
The reason is that every conditional sentence has two appearances: appearance of the condition in independence in the causality, and appearance of the consequence in that the object of the judgment is the sheer being. As for the former, the appearance necessitates that the consequence should be multiple in the conditional sentences; hence, causes do not intervene. As for the latter, since the sheer being of something cannot be object of two judgments, it is necessitated that all causes should have one consequence and judgment when their conjunction is assumed; hence, the causes intervene.
Thus, those two appearances contradict one another. If the first appearance is preferred, we should believe in non-intervention, and if the second, in intervention. Now, which one is more justifiable to be preferred?
The justifiable idea is to give the appearance of condition priority over that of consequence. Since the consequence is dependent upon the condition it is subject to the latter both in realization and demonstration: if the latter is one it is one, and if the latter is multiple it is multiple. Now that the antecedent is multiple, because of appearance of two conditional sentences, the consequent, which is subject to it, is not apparent in the unity of the desired. Thus, there would be no contradiction between the two appearances; rather, the appearance in the multiplicity removes the appearance in the unity, since the latter cannot exist unless when it is assumed that the appearance in the multiplicity is removed or that there is no such appearance, while there is such appearance here. The principle in such case, therefore, is non-intervention.
2.2.2. The problem of intervention of the caused (tadākhul al-musabbabāt). Should one believe that causes intervene, one would not be in need of discussing whether or not the caused intervene. That discussion, however, is necessary for those who hold the contrary opinion, for they should find out whether or not is it acceptable to content oneself with one obedience where the caused are common in the designation and reality, such as major ablutions. In other words, they should find out whether or not the caused intervene.
The principle here is also non-intervention. The reason is that obedience of multiple mandatory acts by one act, even though where all of them are intended, needs a specific proof; otherwise, every obligation necessitates a specific obedience incapable of substitution by any other obedience - even in cases where mandatory acts share the same designation and reality.
2. Mafhūm of the Qualifier (al-Waşf)
By waşf (the qualifier) in this discussion is meant whatsoever can be a condition, in its broadest sense, for the object of burden.
The qualifier here should have an object of qualification, for a case where the qualifier itself is the object of judgment - like this verse: “And the thief, male and female, cut off the hands of both” (5: 38) - is called designation (al-laqab) and should be discussed in the mafhūm of designation. The reason is that there must be a constant object of the judgment which can be both qualified and not qualified by the qualifier so that the negation of judgment can be assumed.
The qualifier here should also be more particular than the qualified either absolutely or in some aspect, since should it be equal or absolute general, it would make no constriction in the qualified so that one can assume negation of the judgment from the qualified where the qualifier is negated. However, the more particular in some respect is considered only with respect to the separation of the qualified from the qualifier and not to that of the qualifier from the qualified, for the object, i.e., the qualifier, should be preserved in the mafhūm; a given object neither proves nor negates any other object. Thus, mafhūm of “there is zakāt in the pastured sheep” - should there be mafhūm for such sentence - would be “there is not zakāt in the fed sheep,” and not “there is not zakāt in other than the pastured sheep” nor “there is not zakāt in other than the pastured, such as camel.”
The Justifiable Opinion on Mafhūm of the Qualifier
Should there be contextual evidence that a qualifier has or does not have mafhūm, the denotation would doubtlessly be in accordance with the evidence.
An instance of the qualifier having no mafhūm is this verse: “Forbidden to you are… and your stepdaughters who are in your care” (4: 23) in which the quality of stepdaughters being in one’s care is declared because it has been the prevalent situation - the qualifier alludes implicitly to the cause of the judgment, since those girls who are in one’s care are like one’s own daughters.
Such sentences have absolutely no mafhūm, since it is clearly understood that neither in existence nor in non-existence is the judgment made dependent upon the qualifier.
The dispute is, then, whether the sheer qualification by the qualifier, without there being any contextual evidence, denotes mafhūm, i.e., denotes nonexistence of the judgment of the qualified where the qualifier does not exist.
There are two opinions in this connection, the prominent one being that such sentence has no mafhūm. The problem in this discussion is that whether the qualification understood from the qualifier is the qualification of the judgment which means that the judgment is made dependent upon the qualifier, or it is the qualification of the object of the judgment - or the object of the object (muta‘allaq al-mawđu‘), due to difference of cases -the object or the object of the object being the combination of the qualified and the qualifier altogether.
If the first, the qualification by the qualifier is apparent in non-existence of the judgment where the qualifier does not exist; because of absoluteness, for absoluteness necessitates that when dependence of the judgment upon the qualifier is assumed the qualifier should be exclusive - as explained in the qualification by the condition.
If the second, however, the qualification by the qualifier is not apparent in non-existence of the judgment when the qualifier does not exist, for this case is included in mafhūm of designation. Here, the qualifier and the qualified are merely uttered to limit the object of judgment; the case is not that the object is the essence of the qualified and the qualifier being a condition for judging it. For instance, if the teacher says, “Draw a quadrilateral, perpendicular, equilateral shape,” it is clearly understood that what he desires is a square and he has expressed his wish by using those terms to allude to that. In this case, the object is the total meaning denoted by the statement, which is a compound of the qualified and the qualifier, i.e., “a quadrilateral, perpendicular, equilateral shape” in the example which is in place of square. Thus, as the sentence “draw a square” does not denote non-existence where non-existence, what is in its place does not denote either, for it is in fact like a qualifier which is not dependent upon a qualified.
Now, it is time to determine the justifiable opinion. The appearance of the qualifier per se and without any contextual evidence is the second, i.e., it is a condition for the object and not the judgment. Thus, the judgment is absolute with regard to it; hence, there is no mafhūm for the qualifier. This presentation, however, is not enough to convince the opponents and we have to deal with doubts raised by them in this connection - and they are as follows:
1. Should the qualifier not denote non-existence where non-existence, there would be no benefit in using it.
The answer is that the benefit is not exclusively its reference to the judgment. Suffice it to say that it limits and qualifies the object of the judgment.
2. Conditions are principally supposed to be constrictive (iĥtirāzī).
The answer is that although this is undeniable, it means to constrict the realm of the object and to expel other than the condition from being covered by the person of the judgment; and this is something we believe in too. However, it has no relation to mafhūm, since to prove a judgment for an object does not negate affirmation of the type of the judgment for others - as is the case with mafhūm of designation. In short, the condition being constrictive does not necessitate its playing the role of condition for the judgment.
3. The qualifier adumbrates causality, i.e., it adumbrates that the qualifier is the cause for the judgment; hence, it necessitates that the judgment should be dependent upon it.
The answer is that although that adumbration is undeniable, it does not denote mafhūm so long as it has not reached the state of explicit-definite denotation. The explanation is that there are three states of denotation where a sentence is uttered by someone. If the term one utters leaves no probability for any other meaning but what is uttered, it is called naşş (explicit, definite).
If it leaves some probability for other meanings but that probability is so scanty that the wise do not take it into consideration and ignore it, it is called żāhir (apparent). Finally, if it leaves a notable room for other meanings in such a way that the wise take other probabilities into consideration as well, this transmission of meaning is called ish‘ār (adumbration). Naşş is essentially an authoritative proof, and żāhir is made an authoritative proof by the conduct of the wise - something to be discussed in the third part in detail - but there is no proof of authority of ish‘ār; hence, it cannot be useful for proving mafhūm of the qualifier.
4. There are some sentences whose having mafhūm is absolutely clear, such as the prophetic ĥadīth: “Procrastination of the wealthy man [in paying his debt] is injustice.”
The answer is that there is contextual evidence in that sentence, since the conformity between judgment and object declares that procrastination of a rich debtor in payment of his debt is injustice, contrary to the poor one who has no money to pay his debt and if he procrastinates he will not be considered an unjust person. As was frequently repeated, should there be any contextual evidence in any kind of sentences it is the evidence that should be followed, even though it is against primary principles. The problem in the discussion of mafhūm is that whether a specific kind of sentence per se has or does not have mafhūm without there being any contextual evidence.
3. Mafhūm of the Termination (al-Ghāya)
In the sentences where a termination occurs, such as the Qur’ānic verse: “Then complete the Fast unto the night,” (2, 187) and the ĥadīth: “Everything is lawful until you know that it, itself, is unlawful,” there is a dispute among Uşūlīs over two problems: one over manţūq and the other over mafhūm.
1. As for manţūq, it is disputed whether or not the termination is included in manţūq, i.e., in the judgment of the terminated first; and secondly, whether the termination, i.e., what comes after the article of termination such as to, unto, until, and the like, is included in the terminated with regard to judgment or not and its role is only terminating the terminated in terms of object and judgment.
Ignoring details of opinions in this connection, we merely state that the justifiable opinion is that the very qualification by the termination neither makes the termination included in nor excluded from the terminated; it is the contextual evidence that determines the situation. However, there is no doubt that the termination is not included where it is a termination for the precept, as in the ĥadīth: “Everything is lawful…,” since inclusion of knowledge of unlawful in the precept of lawful is nonsensical.
2. As for mafhūm, it is disputed whether or not qualification by termination denotes negation of type of the judgment from other than termination as well as from termination itself should it not be included in the terminated.
The criterion for mafhūm of the termination is the very criterion for that of condition and qualifier. Should the termination be condition for the judgment it would have mafhūm and would denote negation of the judgment from other things, and should it be condition for the object or the predicate only it would not denote mafhūm. Now, the question is that which of those two probabilities can be justified.
What seems to be more justifiable is to hold that the termination is apparent in referring to the judgment and to be a termination for its preceding relation; it is its reference to the object itself or the predicate itself is the one which is in need of depiction and evidence. Hence, the termination has mafhūm.
4. Mafhūm of the Exclusivity (al-Ĥaşr)
There are some different words in Arabic alluding to exclusivity; that is why they are all supposed to be discussed separately in order to determine whether they denote mafhūm or not. However, as the case is not the same in English, we simply assert that whatsoever denotes exclusivity will definitely denote mafhūm, since such structure is merely made to convey non-existence where non-existence, otherwise there would be no need to use such structure with such terms and one could simply convey one’s desire by using simple words in simple sentences. What we said in this connection is enough and leaves no room for any further discussion.
5. Mafhūm of the Number (al-‘Adad)
Limitation of an object to a specific number will doubtlessly not denote negation of the judgment from others. Thus, this command: “Fast three days of every lunar month” does not mean that fasting other than the three days is not recommended; hence, it does not contradict another proof which commands fasting some other days of every month.
Of course, should the precept be obligation, for instance, and limitation by the maximum number be for determination of the highest level- such as the proof that makes fasting thirty days of Ramađān obligatory - it would doubtlessly denote that the more is not mandatory. However, this is not due to the limitation by number having mafhūm, but rather because of peculiarities of the case. Thus, limitation by number has no mafhūm.
6. Mafhūm of the Designation (al-Laqab)
By al-laqab is meant any noun used as an object of the judgment, such as the thief in this Qur’ānic verse: “And the thief, male and female, cut off the hands of both.” (5: 38) Mafhūm of the designation means that the judgment does not cover what is not covered by the noun in general.
Since we did not accept that the qualifier denotes mafhūm, it is more plausible to hold that the designation does not have such denotation, for the very object of the judgment does not even allude to the judgment being dependent upon the designation, let alone any appearance in the exclusiveness.
The ultimate thing understood from the designation is that the person of the judgment does not cover what is not generally covered by the noun, but this is far from negation of the type of the judgment from another object. It is even said that should the designation have mafhūm, it would be the weakest one.
Three Important Denotations Not of Kind of Mafhūm or Manţūq: Necessitation (al-Iqtiđā’), Hint (al-Tanbīh), and Implicit Conveyance (al-Ishāra)
It was said that manţūq is what is denoted by the essence of a sentence and mafhūm is what is denoted by a sentence through an obvious implicature of manţūq in the most particular sense.
However, there are some denotations that are included neither in mafhūm nor in manţūq, such as the case where the speech denotes implicatively a single word or a single meaning not mentioned in the manţūq, or it denotes contents of a sentence which is an implicature of manţūq but not obviously in the most particular sense. Those are all called neither mafhūm nor manţūq.
To address those denotations in a general way, a good number of Uşūlīs have called them contextual denotation (al-dalāla al-siyāqiyya) meaning that the context of a speech denotes a single or compound meaning, or an omitted word. Such denotations are divided into the three following varieties:
1. Denotation of necessitation. In this denotation, two criteria are taken into consideration: the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, and the truth or correctness of the speech being logically, juristically, lexically, or conventionally dependent upon the denotation. Numerous examples can be found for such denotation two of which being as follows:
In the verse 82 of sūra 12 of the holy Qur’ān, parts of words of Joseph’s brothers to their father when they returned from their journey to Egypt are narrated in this way: “Question the city wherein we were,” and it is clear that the city cannot be questioned. Thus, the sentence can rationally be correct only if the word “people” is considered omitted in it, so that the sentence should be “Question people of the city… .”
There is a ĥadīth saying, “There are no prayers for the mosque’s neighbor except in the mosque,” while we know that should such a person say his prayers in his home it will be juristically acceptable. Thus, the truth and correctness of the sentence is dependent upon the word “perfect” being omitted so that what is negated should be perfection of the prayers and not the prayers itself.
Generally speaking, all implicative denotations to single meanings and all figurative meanings refer to the denotation of necessitation.
2. Denotation of hint. In this denotation, only the first criterion, i.e., the denotation being conventionally meant by the speaker, is taken into consideration. Here, the truth or correctness of the speech is not dependent upon the denotation; it is the context of the speech that causes certainty that such requisite is meant or makes its non-consideration unlikely. This denotation has also numerous instances the most important of which being classified as follows:
a) The speaker whishes to depict something but expresses its logical or conventional requisite. For example, one addresses his friend saying, “It is ten o’clock” in order to remind him that the time they had agreed upon to go somewhere has come.
b) The speech is associated with some word which conveys that something is a cause, condition, impediment, or part of the judgment. To mention the judgment is thereby a hint that the thing mentioned is a cause, condition, impediment, part of the judgment or it is not so. For instance, if the jurist says, “Repeat your prayers,” where he is asked about the doubt concerning numbers of rak‘as of a two-rak‘a prayers, it is understood that the said doubt is a cause for annulment of the prayers and the obligation of repetition.
c) The speech is associated with some word which determines some objects of the act. For instance, when someone says, “I reached the river and drank,” it is understood that what was drunk was water and it was from the river.
3. Denotation of implicit conveyance. In this denotation, neither of the two criteria is taken into consideration and what is denoted is only an unclear implicature of the speech or an obvious implicature of the speech in the most general sense - no matter the object of denotation is understood from a single sentence or from a couple of sentences.
An instance of this is denotation of two Qur’ānic verses as to the minimum time of pregnancy: the verse 15 of the sūra 46 “And painfully she gave birth to him his bearing and his weaning being thirty months,” and the verse 233 of the sūra 2 “Mothers will suckle their children two complete years completely for such as desire to complete the suckling,” since to subtract two years, i.e., twenty four months, from thirty months is six and thereby it becomes clear that the minimum time for pregnancy is six months. It is also of this kind the question of obligation of something necessitating obligation of its preliminary, since it is an obvious implicature of the obligation of the thing in the most general sense. That is why they consider obligation of the preliminary of a mandatory act a secondary and not a primary one; for it is not a denotation of the speech by intention and is only understood secondarily, i.e., by the denotation of implicit conveyance.
Authority of Such Denotations As for denotations of necessitation and hint, they would undoubtedly be an authoritative proof should there be a denotation and appearance, because of authority of appearances.
Denotation of implicit conveyance, however, cannot be treated as an authoritative proof because of authority of appearances, for there is no appearance where it is assumed that such thing is not intended - it is obviously clear that denotation is subject to the intention. Therefore, implicit conveyance should only be called adumbration and implicit conveyance without using the term denotation; hence, it is clear that such conveyance is not included in the appearances so that it can be an authoritative proof from that aspect. Of course, it would definitely be an authoritative proof should there be an intellectual implication through which its requisites, whether judgment or otherwise, could be discovered, such as taking requisites of one’s confession into consideration even though he claims that he has not intended them or he denies existence of any implication there.
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Author: Alireza Hodaee
