CHAPTER 5: GENERAL (AL-‘ĀMM) AND PARTICULAR (AL-KHĀŞŞ)
General and particular are among clear, self evident concepts which need no definition but lexical explanation for the sake of bringing the meaning closer to the mind. By general is meant a term whose concept covers whatsoever capable of being conformable to its designation in realization of the judgment.
A judgment, too, is sometimes called general due to its covering all instances of the object, the object of burden, or duty-bound. On the contrary, by particular is meant a term, or a judgment, which covers only some instances of its object, object of burden, or duty-bound.
In the discussion of general and particular, there are two frequently used expressions whose definition seems necessary: al-takhşīş (restriction), and altakhaşşuş (non-inclusion). The former means to expel some instances from being covered by the judgment, and the latter means not being included from the very beginning in the object. In order to clarify that, let us take an example. Suppose that John is a teacher in the school while Joshua is not. Now, the principal orders his deputy to pay salaries of all teachers except John’s. Should there not be such exclusion in the principal’s order, John should be paid too, since he was a teacher; but the case is not the same with Joshua, since he is not a teacher at all. In the first case it is exclusion, while in the second it is non-inclusion; and that is the difference between takhşīş and takhaşşuş.
Varieties of Generality
With regard to direction of a judgment to a general, generality is divided into three kinds:
1. The encompassing generality (al-‘umūm al-istighrāqī), such as “respect every scholar.” In this kind, the judgment covers every single instance in such a way that every instance is singly an object of the judgment and every judgment of every instance has its own specific obedience or disobedience.
2. The total generality (al-‘umūm al-madjmū‘ī), such as “believe in the holy Imāms.” In this kind, the judgment is for the total as such and the total is treated as one object. Hence, the obedience in the example will not be actualized unless one believes in the all twelve Imāms and not even in the eleven. Thus, in this kind there would only be a single obedience, i.e., obedience of the total, and disobedience even in one instance will be considered an absolute disobedience.
3. The substitutional generality (al-‘umūm al-badalī), such as “respect any scholar you wish.” In this kind, the judgment is directed to one instance in a substitutional way. Hence, only one instance, in a substitutional way, is the object of the judgment and should one instance be obeyed the burden would absolutely be treated as being obeyed.
Should it strike you that this third kind cannot be treated as generality, since to be substitutional, in which the object is not but one, contradicts generality, we would remind you that the meaning of generality in this kind is generality in the substitution, i.e., capability of every instance to be an object. Of course, should the generality in this kind be understood because of absoluteness, it would be included in the absolute and not the general.
Generally speaking, generality of the object of the judgment with regard to its states and instances, if it is an object of a mandatory or a recommended command, is mostly of the kind of substitutional generality.
Terms of Generality
Doubtless there are some terms specifically used for generality either by convention, or by absoluteness through Premises of Wisdom (Muqaddimāt alĤikma,) something to be explained in detail in the sixth chapter). Such terms are either single words like “every,” “all,” “any,” “ever,” and so forth, or lexical dispositions like occurrence of an indefinite noun in a negative or prohibitive context. There are some discussions in this connection with regard to some terms in the Arabic language, as the language of Kitāb (the holy Qur’ān) and Sunna, but as they make no sense in the English language we refer readers to Arabic texts on uşūl al-fiqh for further, detailed studies.
The Joint Restrictor (al-Mukhaşşiş al-Muttaşil) and the Separate Restrictor (al-Mukhaşşiş al-Munfaşil)
Qualification of a general can be made in two ways:
1. The restrictor is depicted in the same single utterance delivered by the speaker, such as “perform your prayers completely except when travelling.”
This restrictor is called joint and denotes that by general is meant other than the particular. The case is the same with the circumstantial evidence denoting peculiarity in such a way that the speaker can count on it in depicting his will.
2. The restrictor is not uttered in the same speech, but rather in an independent utterance before or after that. This restrictor is called separate and like the first denotes that by general is meant other than the particular.
These two types have no differences with regard to being evidence for the real intent of the speaker. The difference appears with regard to formation of the appearance in generality; as in the joint restrictor the appearance is not formed but in peculiarity while in the separate restrictor the appearance is initially formed in generality but since the appearance of the particular is stronger it is given precedence over the general - and this is due to the principle of giving the more apparent (al-ażhar) or the explicit-definite (al-naşş) precedence over the apparent.
The reason is that no appearance for any kind of speech, general or otherwise, would be formed unless when that speech is customarily ended and terminated in such a way that there would customarily remain no room for addition of any supplement as an evidence of changing the speech's primary, initial appearance.
Hence, the appearance of the speech is suspended while the speech is customarily not terminated. Should the speech be ended without addition of any contrary evidence, its primary appearance would become established and the appearance of the speech would be formed upon that. However, should contrary evidence be added the primary appearance of the speech would change into another, on the basis of denotation of the evidence, and the appearance of speech would be formed upon that evidence. That is why if the evidence is ambiguous or there exists something that can probably be evidence the primary appearance is not formed; and since there is no other appearance the speech as a whole becomes ambiguous.
Now, since the restrictor is contrary evidence: if it is separate, it will not harm the primary appearance of the speech, as the appearance had been formed before it intervened; and if it is joint, it will change the primary appearance of the general and will form its appearance in accordance with the joint restrictor.
However, where a separate restrictor occurs, it intervenes in the appearance of the general, and as it is evidence revealing the real intent of the speaker it should be given precedence over the general.
Usage of the General in the Restricted (al-Mukhaşşaş)
As was said, both kinds of restrictors reveal that by the general is meant other than the particular; hence, what is meant by the general is some of the objects covered by its appearance. However, there is a dispute among Uşūlīs whether such usage is literal or figurative. Opinions in this connection are various the most notable of which being as follows: (1) it is absolutely figurative, (2) it is absolutely literal, and (3) the case differs with regard to the joint and separate restrictors.
Investigate of the reason presented by those who believe in the first reveals the truth and proves that the justifiable opinion is the second, i.e., such usage is absolutely literal. Holders of the first opinion argue that since the particle of generality is conventionally made to denote extensiveness of its posterior term as well as its inclusiveness with regard to all of its instances, it would have been used in other than what it is specified for had by that be meant some and not all instances - and this is a figurative usage.
This is an illusion, however, and would be removed by simple deliberation.
Since the explanation will be somehow different with regard to the joint and the separate restrictors, we will deal with them separately:
1. In the restriction by a joint restrictor, such as “perform all your prayers completely except when travelling,” the particle of generality, i.e., all, is not used but in its meaning, i.e., inclusion of all instances of its posterior term.
However, the meaning of restriction is that the term next to does not cover whatsoever the term prayers holds true for, but rather the home-performed prayers in particular. As for the term “all,” it still has its signification of generality and inclusion; for it denotes inclusion of every home-performed prayers. That is why changing it with “some” and saying “Perform some of your prayers completely except when travelling” is not correct and makes no sense. It also makes no sense if one says, “Perform completely some of the home-performed prayers,” since it does not denote limitation of the object as in the case where both “all” and “exception” exist.
2. The case would be the same with the restriction by a separate restrictor, for the meaning of restriction by a separate restrictor is to make the particular a separate evidence for allocation of the term next to “all” to other than the particular. Thus, neither in the particle of the generality nor in its posterior term has a change been made; in the process of restriction, the particular reveals what the speaker has really meant by the general.
Authority or Otherwise of the Restricted General in the Remaining (al-Bāqī)
In case where it is doubted whether some remaining instances of a restricted general are included in that general or not, it is disputed whether or not the general is an authoritative proof in that portion so that one can or cannot appeal to the appearance of the generality in order to include it in the judgment of the general. For instance, if the Lord says, “Every water is pure,” and then excepts from that general, whether by a joint or a separate proof, the water polluted by a juristically impure object, and at the same time it is probable that the scant water (al-mā’ al-qalīl) touched by a juristically impure object without being polluted is excepted. Now, should we hold that the restricted general is an authoritative proof in the remaining, we would reject that probability by the appearance of the generality of the general in the whole remaining, judging thereby that the touched, unpolluted water is juristically pure. However, if we believe in the contrary view, that probability remains suspended without there being any proof from the very general as to it. Hence, we should look for another proof to prove its juristic purity or impurity.
Opinions in this connection are multiple some of which differentiating between the joint and the separate restrictors. To find the justifiable opinion, however, is not that difficult; for this problem is secondary to the previous one, and since we held there that the restricted general is literally, and not figuratively, applied to the remaining, we should hold here that it is absolutely an authoritative proof, no matter of what kind the restrictor is. The reason is that, as we said, the particle of the generality still holds its meaning of encompassing all instances of its posterior term. Now, when some of its instances are excepted by restriction, no matter of which kind the restrictor is, its indication of the generality still remains established and it is only the scope of its posterior term that has become limited by the restriction. Thus, there is no difference between the restricted and the unrestricted general in being apparent in encompassing whatsoever may possibly be included in them.
As for those who believe that the restricted general is figuratively applied to the remaining, they encounter a problem concerning the appearance of the general and its authority in the whole remaining. For it is assumed that usage of the general in the whole remaining is one figurative application and its usage in some of the remaining is another; hence, it is disputed whether the first figurative application is closer to the literalness making the general become apparent in it or both of applications are equal in this connection and the general has no appearance in neither of them. If the first, the general is an authoritative proof in the whole remaining, and if the second, it is not an authoritative proof. Thus, it is not true that those who believe in the figurative application believe absolutely in non-authority of the restricted general.
Penetration or Otherwise of Ambiguity of the Restrictor to the General
The previous discussion was based on the presumption that the particular was clear without having any ambiguity. The matter doubted there was whether something, other than the particular, which was clearly known that it was not included in the particular, is restricted or not. The present discussion, however, deals with the authority of the general in the case of ambiguity of the particular.
First of all, we should bear in mind that the ambiguity in question is of two types:
1. The dubiety concerning the concept (al-shubha al-mafhūmiyya). Here, the doubt is about the concept of the particular per se, i.e., the particular is ambiguous; such as this ĥadīth: “Every water is juristically pure except what its taste, color, or smell is polluted [by a juristically impure object],”
in which it is doubted whether by pollution is meant the sheer sensory pollution or it includes the assumed pollution as well. Or this order, for instance, by the commander: “Trust soldiers of the squadron except John,”
in which it is doubted whether John refers to John Smith or John Cooper.
2. The dubiety concerning the instance (al-shubha al-mişdāqiyya). Here, the doubt is about the inclusion of an instance of the general in the particular while the concept of the particular is clear without any ambiguity. For instance, we doubt whether specific water has been polluted by something juristically impure and has been included in the precept of the particular or not and still holds its purity.
Another thing to be mentioned before dealing with the problem in detail is the meaning of penetration of ambiguity of the restrictor into the general.
Whenever it is said that the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general it means that one cannot refer to the principality of generality in order to include the doubtful instance in the precept of the general.
1. The Dubiety concerning the Concept
The dubiety in this type is sometimes over the least (al-aqall) and the most (alakthar), like the first example in which it was doubted whether the sheer sensory pollution is excepted or the restriction includes the assumed change as well (the least being the sensory pollution, and the most being what incorporates the assumed as well), and sometimes over two divergent things (al-mutabāyinayn), such as the second example in which the restriction is doubted whether it addresses John Smith or John Cooper. On the other hand, the restrictor can be joint or separate - something influential in the case in question. For the sake of comprehensiveness, therefore, we will discuss the problem in the following separate states:
1 & 2. Where the restrictor is joint, whether the dubiety is over the least and the most or over two divergent things. Here, the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general. For, as was said earlier, the joint restrictor is of kind of joint evidence of the speech; hence, no appearance takes form for the general except in other than the particular. Therefore, should the particular be ambiguous, its ambiguity would penetrate into the general; since other than the particular is unknown, and it is clear that no appearance will take form for the general in something whose exclusion of the designation of the particular is not known.
3. Where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over two divergent things. In this state, too, the ambiguity of the restrictor penetrates into the general. For it is known in summary fashion that the restriction has actually occurred, though between two things in a doubtful manner, and this will cause non-authority of the general in either of them.
The difference between this and the previous state is that in the latter the very appearance of the speech in the generality is eliminated while in the former the authority of appearance is eliminated - though the primary appearance is still remaining - and one cannot refer to the principality of generality in either of the two doubtful things.
4. Where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over the least and the most. Contrary to all previous states, the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general in this state. For in a general restricted by a separate restrictor, the appearance takes form in the generality, as was said earlier in the second chapter, and the particular is given precedence over the general only because it is stronger. Thus, should the restrictor be ambiguous with regard to the additional to the definite amount, it would not be an authoritative proof in that additional; for it is assumed that the restrictor is ambiguous having no appearance in that additional and is an authoritative proof exclusively in the definite amount, which is the least. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the general whose appearance in encompassing all of its instances, among which being the definite amount of the particular as well as the additional to the definite amount whose inclusion in the particular is doubtful, has been established. Now, should the definite amount be excluded by an authoritative proof stronger than the general, the additional to the definite amount would remain included without interference of anything with the appearance as well as authority of the general in it.
2. The Dubiety concerning the Instance
Although it is sometimes said that the prominent opinion among the earliest jurists has been that the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general in the dubiety concerning the instance and one can refer to the principality of generality in order to include the doubtful instance in the precept of the general, the justifiable opinion is contrary to that with regard to both joint and separate restrictors. The reason is that since the particular is a stronger authoritative proof than the general, it causes allocation of the precept of the general to its remaining instances and removes the authority of the general from some of its objects of denotation. In the case in question, it is doubted whether the doubtful instance is included in or excluded from what the general is an authoritative proof in, while the general does not denote its inclusion in what it is an authoritative proof in. Therefore, the general is not an authoritative proof in the doubtful instance without encountering any interference - as argued by those who believe in the contrary opinion.
In other words, there are two known, authoritative affairs here: the general which is an authoritative proof in other than the particular, and the restrictor which is an authoritative proof in its object of denotation; the doubtful instance is doubted whether it is included in this authoritative affair or that one.
What we said clarifies the difference between “the dubiety concerning the instance,” and “the dubiety concerning the concept where the restrictor is separate while the dubiety is over the least and the most” in which the ambiguity of the restrictor does not penetrate into the general. For in the latter the particular is not an authoritative proof except in the least, and it is not the doubtful additional which is doubted to be included in what the particular is clearly an authoritative proof in; rather, it is the particular which is doubted whether it is made an authoritative proof as to the doubtful additional or not - and, as will be proved in the third part, something whose authority in something else is doubtful is definitely not an authoritative proof in that thing.
The general, however, is authoritative proof except in what the particular is authoritative proof in. Thus, the most is not doubted whether to be included in this or that authoritative proof, as was the case with the doubtful instance; on the contrary, it is known that the particular is not an authoritative proof in the most - because of the doubt - and therefore the particular does not interfere with the authority of the general in it.
Unlawfulness of Implication of the General before the Quest for the Restrictor
Doubtless a good number of general precepts in the Qur’ān and Sunna are restricted by separate restrictors which describe what is meant by them, and this is so clearly known from the conduct of the holy Prophet and holy Imāms that a sentence has constantly been prevalent: “there is no general except it is restricted.” This fact necessitates that the jurist should not hasten to implicate the general before a thorough quest for the restrictor, since that general may be among those which are restricted by a separate restrictor existing in the Book or Sunna not known by the one who received the general. The reason is simple: when we know that the Divine Lawgiver’s conduct is to count on separate evidence in expounding His objectives, there will remain no confidence in the appearance of the general in its generality - as it is a primary appearance. That is why the Divine Lawgiver (al-Shāri‘) has the right to punish the duty-bound if he shirks his duty of questing for the restrictor. However, should the dutybound do his level best and make a thorough quest for the restrictor where it is supposed to exist in such a way that he becomes confident that there exists no restrictor, he would have the right to take the appearance of the general and implement it. Thus, should there actually exist a restrictor but in such a way that the duty-bound could not attain it through his quest, he would be excused for implementation of the general.
What we said concerning divine laws applies to all other kinds of appearances too, for one is not allowed to take them except after one has made a quest for the separate evidence. This is summed up in a rule: “the principality of appearance will not be an authoritative proof except after one has made a thorough quest for the evidence and one has despaired of finding it.”
A General Preceding a Pronoun Which Refers to Some Instances of the General
In the verse 228 of sūra 2: “Divorced women will wait by themselves for three periods…in such time their mates have better right to restore them…”“divorced women” is general covering both revocable and irrevocable divorcées while by pronoun in “their mates” is merely meant revocable divorcées. In such cases, one has to oppose either the appearance of the general in generality restricting it to those to which the pronoun refers, or that of reference of the pronoun to what has preceded it referring it to some of them (something called istikhdām in Arabic rhetoric) which leaves no room for the generality.
There are different views in this connection the justifiable one being that there is no problem with reference to the principality of generality. The reason is that the reference of pronoun to some instances of the general makes no changes in the appearance of the general, for determination of some instances because of reference of the pronoun due to some evidence does not necessitate that some instances are determined by the general’s precept per se; as the precept in the sentence containing pronoun is different from the precept in the sentence containing general and there is no connection between the two sentences. Thus, reference of the pronoun to some instances of the general is not such evidence capable of necessitating change in general’s appearance in the generality.
An Exception Preceded by Multiple Sentences
In verses 4-5 of sūra 24: “And those who cast it up on women in wedlock and then do not bring four witnesses, scourge them with eighty stripes, do not accept any testimony of theirs ever, and they are the ungodly; save such as repent thereafter and make amends…,” there are three general precepts followed by an exception in the end. In such cases, one doubts whether the exception is made to the last sentence or to all sentences.
There are four opinions in this connection:
1. The speech is apparent in reference of the exception to the last sentence.
Although its reference to other than the last is possible, it needs evidence.
2. The speech is apparent in its reference to all sentences, and it is its reference to the last sentence that needs proof.
3. The speech is apparent in neither of them - though its reference to the last sentence is something for sure. As for other sentences, they remain ambiguous, because of existence of some potential evidence; hence, no appearance in generality takes form for them and one cannot refer to the principle of generality in this connection.
4. Differentiation should be made between the case where the object of sentences is repeated in every sentence, like the verse mentioned, and the case where the object of sentences is one and is just mentioned in the first sentence, like: “do people good, respect them, and satisfy their needs, except evildoers.” In the latter, the object, i.e., people, is mentioned only in the first sentence and is not repeated in others - what is repeated is a pronoun referring to it - while in the verse in question the object of all precepts is a pronoun which refers to a word mentioned in the beginning without being accompanied by a judgment.
According to this opinion, in cases where the object of sentences is not repeated, the exception is apparent in referring to all sentences. For the exception is to be made from the object with the consideration of the judgment, and the object is only mentioned in the beginning; hence, it refers to all. However, in cases where the object of sentences is repeated, the exception is apparent in referring to the last sentence. For the object is mentioned in the last sentence independently and the exception has found its reference. Restriction of previous sentences is in need of another proof which, as was assumed, is missing; that is why one may refer to their principality of generality with regard to them.
The fourth opinion can bring all opinions together, since one may make any of them conformable to a case mentioned in this view.
Restriction of the General by Mafhūm
As explained earlier in chapter 4, implicatures of sentences (mafāhīm) are divided into accordant and disaccording. There is no dispute among Uşūlīs that a general can be restricted by an accordant mafhūm. For instance, according to the general ruling of the verse 40 of sūra 42 “the recompense of evil is evil the like of it,” if one is beaten by another one is allowed to beat him. On the other hand, the verse 23 of the sūra 17 declares that: “Your Lord has decreed you … to be good to parents … and do not say to them Fie,” according to whose accordant mafhūm one is not allowed to beat one’s parents. The general ruling of that verse is restricted by accordant mafhūm of this verse, then.
As for disaccording mafhūm, it is a matter of dispute among Uşūlīs. For instance, according to the general ruling of the verse 36 of sūra 10 “indeed conjecture is no substitute for the truth,” no conjecture may be treated as an authoritative proof even though it is caused by report of a righteous-trustworthy transmitter, while according to the disaccording mafhūm of the verse 6 of sūra 49 “O believers, if an evildoer bring you some news you should verify it,” it is allowed to treat a report by a righteous-trustworthy person as valid without verifying it. Since the appearance of the disaccording mafhūm is not as strong as the appearance of Manţūq or that of the accordant mafhūm, it is disputed whether it is stronger than the appearance of the general and should be given precedence over it, the general is stronger and it is the general that should be given precedence, they are equal in the appearance and none of them should be given precedence, or the case differs in various states.
Since it is assumed that mafhūm is more particular than the general, the former is conventionally treated as evidence for what is intended by the latter; and it is the rule that evidence should principally be given precedence over that which has evidence, no matter its appearance is stronger or not. Of course, if the general is explicit-definite, it is the general that should be considered as evidence for what is intended by the sentence containing mafhūm, and in this case the sentence will not have mafhūm.
Restriction of the Book by Single Tradition
Since issuance of the holy Qur’ān is for certain while that of single tradition (khabar al-wāĥid) is doubtful, to restrict the Qur’ān by single tradition seems problematic. However, there has always been consensus that the latter should be given precedence over the former. The reason is that definite proofs have proved that single tradition, where it is valid because of certain evidence, is an authoritative proof though its issuance is not for certain. Now, should theme of a single tradition be more particular than a general Qur’ānic verse, one should either reject the tradition and treat its transmitter as a liar, or make some change in the appearance of the Qur’ān; for one can neither change the theme of a tradition, as it is explicit-definite (naşş) or more apparent (ażhar), nor reject the transmission of the Qur’ān since it is for certain. In other words, one should oppose either the conjecture for the truth of tradition or the conjecture for the generality of the Qur’ānic verse.
Doubtless the tradition can be evidence for changing the appearance of the Book, for it is assumed that it has an eye for the appearance of the Book and comments on it. On the contrary, the appearance of the Book is not capable of rejecting the proof of authority of the tradition, for it is assumed that it has no relation with the latter in this respect so that it can have an eye for it or comment on it. The language of the tradition is that of commenting on the Book; hence, it should be given precedence over the latter. The appearance of the Book, however, does not intend to comment on the proof of authority of the tradition so that it may be given precedence over it. In other words, it is assumed that the tradition is evidence for the Book and the principle as to the evidence, i.e., the principle of truthfulness of the transmitter, should be given precedence over the principle as to that which has evidence, which is the principle of generality.
0%
Author: Alireza Hodaee
