CHAPTER 11: CONJUNCTION OF THE COMMAND AND THE PROHIBITION (IDJTIMĀ‘ AL-AMR WA’L NAHY)
Uşūlīs have disputed from a long time ago whether or not conjunction of command and prohibition in one act is possible. Since terms “conjunction” and “one” may seem confusing, we have to explain what is meant by them in this discussion.
Conjunction. By conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ ) is meant accidental encounter between the commanded act and the prohibited act in one thing. This may occur only where the command is directed to a designation and the prohibition to another designation which has no relation to the first, but those designations encounter rarely in one thing - here, conjunction of the command and the prohibition occurs, i.e., they encounter one another.
Such conjunction of and encounter between two designations is of two kinds:
1. It is a case conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-mawridī), i.e., there is no one act which corresponds to both designations, but rather there are two acts which have become synchronous and simultaneous one of which corresponding to the designation of the mandatory act and the other to the designation of the prohibited act. For instance, when someone is performing the prayers and in the meantime looking at a woman whom looking at is religiously prohibited, looking does not correspond to designation of the prayers, the prayers do not correspond to designation of looking, and both of them do not conform to one act.
Such case conjunction is neither impossible nor a matter of dispute in this discussion. Hence, should one look at a woman whom looking at is religiously prohibited while performing one’s prayers, one would be both obedient and disobedient simultaneously without one’s prayers being annulled.
2. It is a real conjunction (al-idjtimā‘ al-ĥaqīqī), even though at a glance and in a conventional view, i.e., there is one act which corresponds to both designations, such as the well-known example of performing the prayers in an expropriated space. In that example, which is the matter of dispute in this discussion, designation of the prayers, which is the commanded act, has no relation to that of expropriation, which is the prohibited act, but it accidentally happens that the duty-bound gathers them by performing the prayers in an expropriated space. Here, designation of the commanded, i.e., the prayers, encounters designation of the prohibited, i.e., expropriation, in that prayers performed in an expropriated space; hence, that single act corresponds to both designations of the prayers and expropriation. Thus, that single act is included in the commanded act from one aspect which necessitates treating the duty-bound as obedient while it is included in the prohibition from another aspect which necessitates treating him as disobedient.
One. By one is meant a single act, as it has one existence, which is a gathering of two designations - contrary to the multiple with respect to existence, such as case conjunction. Gathering of two designations in one act as it has one existence occurs either because of its personal nature or because of its universal nature; the latter such as the very “universal” being a gathering of two designations, like the universal “being” which corresponds to the prayers and expropriation.
Thus, by one in this discussion is meant one in the existence; so, the dispute is not restricted to the personal “one.” On the other hand, one in genus is not a matter of dispute. By one in genus is meant the case where the commanded act and the prohibited act are different with respect to the existence but they are included in one nature; such as bowing down to God and to an idol, since both of them are included in the designation of bowing down. As we said, that is not a matter of dispute, for should one bow down to both God and an idol once, one would definitely be considered disobedient.
Now, the matter of dispute in this discussion becomes clear: Is it possible that the command should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and also the prohibition should remain directed to that designation which corresponds to that “one” and the duty-bound should be considered both obedient and disobedient in one act, or is it not possible and the gathering of the two designations is either commanded only or prohibited only, i.e., either only the command remains actual and the duty-bound is obedient alone or only the prohibition remains actual and he is disobedient alone?
One who believes in the possibility, who is called idjtimā‘ī, should hold either of the following:
1. It is the designation (‘inwān) itself that is the object of duty and the precept does not penetrate into the designated (mu‘anwan). Hence, correspondence between two designations and one act does not necessitate that such one should be an object of two precepts. That it why conjunction of designation of the commanded act and that of the prohibited act in “one” is not impossible, since it does not necessitate conjunction of the very command and prohibition in one.
2. Should the designated be the real object of the precept and not the designation, the designated becomes multiple when the designation is multiple; for, in the precise philosophical view, multiplicity of designation causes multiplicity of designated. Thus, although one act has apparently become correspondent to two designations, there are in fact two designated affairs each of them being correspondent to one of designations. Conjunction of obligation and prohibition, therefore, refers through intellectual precision to the case conjunction, which is of no problem. According to that, there is, in fact, no “one” in terms of the existence which is a gathering of two designations, but rather that which is commanded in its existence is different from that which is prohibited in its existence. In such case, neither penetration of the command into what the prohibition is directed to nor that of prohibition into what the command is directed to will be necessitated; hence, the duty-bound is at once obedient and disobedient in his gathering two designations, like the one who looks at a woman whom looking at is religiously prohibited while one is performing the prayers.
Thus, to hold the possibility of conjunction of the command and the prohibition is not to believe in the conjunction of the command and the prohibition in one act, but rather refers to either the belief in the conjunction of designations of the commanded act and the prohibited act in one act without there being conjunction of the command and the prohibition, or to the case conjunction where there is neither conjunction of the command and the prohibition nor that of the commanded act and the prohibited act.
As for the one who believes in the impossibility, who is called imtinā‘ī, he should hold that the precept penetrates from the designation into the designated, and that multiplicity of the designation does not necessitate that of the designated. In such case, it would be impossible that both the command and the prohibition should remain and should be directed to the one designated in terms of existence, for it would necessitate conjunction of the very command and prohibition in one, which is impossible. Therefore, there either remains a command without a prohibition, or a prohibition without a command.
A very important point to be borne in mind is that the matter of dispute among Uşūlīs over possibility or otherwise of conjunction of the command and the prohibition concerns where the duty-bound has a way out (mandūĥa), i.e., he is able to obey the command in another case other than the gathering; or, in other words, he has encountered the conjunction deliberately because of misuse of his free will. It is such case that is a matter of disagreement among Uşūlīs: some believe in its possibility and others in its impossibility. There is no dispute among Uşūlīs over the impossibility of conjunction where obedience to the command can be actualized exclusively through the gathering and the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction; for it is clear that in case of exclusion, the actuality of two duties becomes impossible, since obedience of both is impossible: if the duty-bound does the commanded act he has disobeyed the prohibition, and if he eschews it he has disobeyed the command. Therefore, all Uşūlīs agree that conjunction of the command and the prohibition in such case is impossible and either the command or the prohibition is actual. However, there is disagreement among them as to which of them is so.
Considering what we said, we have to discuss the problem in two states:
Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition with a Way Out
The Argument for Impossibility
1. Doubtless the five-fold burdensome precepts are opposite to one another in the position of actuality and arousal, for there is a self-evident opposition and contradiction between arousing to something in a specific time and dissuading from it in the same time - even though there may be no opposition between them before that position.
2. Doubtless object of precepts is the act of duty-bound: that which is done by him in the external world and that which he is its doer and maker; it is neither its name nor its abstracted designation.
3. Multiplicity of aspect and designation does not cause multiplicity of designated and does not affect unity of designation, for multiple concepts and designations may correspond to one thing that has no multiplicity, such as the Necessary Being for whom all attributes of perfection hold true without affecting His Oneness.
(d) The existent by one existence has but one quiddity and single reality which is the answer to the question “what is it?” Thus, neither of the two concepts which hold true for that thing is its quiddity and reality; hence, what is one in existence is necessarily one in quiddity and essence. Therefore, although objects of the command and the prohibition hold true for the gathering, as it is one in the existence it is one in the quiddity and essence.
It becomes clear from what we said that since the gathering is one in the existence and essence, directing the command and the prohibition to it is impossible, even though their direction is through two designations, for it was proved that it is the act done by the duty-bound by its reality, and not by its designations, that is the object of precepts.
The Argument for Possibility
1. The object of duty, whether it is command or prohibition, is not the designated, i.e., the external instance of the designation as it has an external existence, for it is impossible; rather, the object of duty is constantly and permanently the designation.
In order to clarify that better, let us take the example of avidity. It is impossible for the designated to become object of avidity; for it either becomes object while it does not exist or when it exists, and neither of them is possible.
The former is impossible because it necessitates constitution of existent by non-existent and actualization of non-existent as it is non-existent (since the object of avidity has a kind of actualization by realization of avidity for it) and this is a very clear impossibility; and the latter is impossible because avidity for the designated when it exists is acquiring what is already acquired, and that is also a clear impossibility.
Furthermore, avidity is among psychic affairs and it is not plausible that a psychic affair, such as knowledge, imagination, illusion, wish, and the like, could be individuated without an object. On the other hand, it is not plausible that avidity could be individuated by an objective thing which is out of the horizon of the soul. Thus, it should be individuated by the object of avidity as it has an assumed, designative existence which is the object of avidity primarily and essentially; it should be existent by the existence of avidity and by no other existence beyond avidity. However, since designation is taken into consideration as it is an indicator and a mirror of what exists in the external world, i.e., the designated, the latter is the object of avidity secondarily and accidentally. The case is like knowledge; it is not plausible that knowledge could be individuated by an external thing. The essentially, primarily known is constantly and permanently the designation which is existent by the existence of knowledge, but as it is an indicator and mirror of the designated. As for the designated of that designation, it is accidentally and secondarily known by consideration of annihilation of designation in it.
In fact, such thing can become an object of avidity that has an aspect of presence and an aspect of absence; neither a non-existent from all aspects nor an existent from all aspects can become an object of avidity. The aspect of presence in the object of avidity is the designation existent by the existence of avidity in the horizon of the soul as it has an assumed, designative existence; and the aspect of absence in the object of avidity is its real non-existence in the external world the meaning of avidity for it being the desire for bringing it out from the assumption to the actuality.
What we said concerning avidity holds true for wish and arousal too without any difference. Thus, the reality of wishing something is to direct the wish to the designation in order to bring it out from the assumption to the actuality.
2. When we say that the object of duty is the designation and not the designated we do not mean that the designation with its subjective existence is the object of wish. This is self-evidently null and void; for the object of purpose, what causes effects, and that which bears good or evils is the designated and not the designation. Rather, we mean that the object is the designation in its subjective existence not as it has a subjective existence or as it is a concept. The object being the designation in its subjective existence means that wish is directed to the designation itself as it is a mirror of the designated and is annihilated to it; hence, its emptiness of subjective existence is its very embellishment with it.
3. When we say that the object of duty is the designation as it is a mirror of the designated and is annihilated into it we do not mean that the real object of the duty is the designated and the duty penetrates from the designation into the designated because of its annihilation to it - as some have said - for this is also self-evidently null and void; for, as we said earlier, it is impossible for the designated to become the object of duty under any circumstances.
This is impossible even with the mediation of the designation, for mediation of the designation cannot bring it out from such impossibility. What we mean is that the sound idea is that the object of duty is the designation as it is a mirror of the designated and is annihilated to it in such a way that its annihilation to the designated is merely a corrective to the direction of duty to it, since the purpose can only be actualized by the designated in which the designation is annihilated; we do not mean that the annihilation makes the duty being directed to and penetrate into the designated. There is a huge difference between that which is a corrective to the direction of duty to something and that which is itself the object of duty. It is lack of differentiation between those two that made some Uşūlīs believe that the duty penetrates into the designated because of annihilation of the designation in it. It is annihilation and instrumentality in the consideration that causes mistake and confusion so that one gives what belongs to the designation to the designated and vice versa.
Now, the meaning of possibility of conjunction becomes clear: should the duty bound gather in one act an obligation directed to a designation and a prohibition directed to another designation accidentally through misuse of his free will, that one act, which is the designated of both designations, would not be the object of obligation and prohibition except accidentally; and this is not impossible - what is impossible is that one thing becomes essentially the object of obligation and prohibition. Thus, it would be justifiable that one act should become obedience to the command from one aspect since the designation of the commanded act holds true for it and become disobedience to the prohibition from another aspect since the designation of the prohibited act corresponds to it; for that one act is not essentially and by itself the object of the command and the prohibition, rather, annihilated designations are objects of the command and the prohibition.
Finally, it becomes clear from what we said that to believe in the possibility is not dependent upon the belief that multiplicity of designation causes multiplicity of designated; for, according to what was proved, the designated never becomes the object of duty. Add to this that there is no general rule necessitating that multiplicity of designation causes multiplicity of designated - it may or may not cause that.
The Outcome of This Discussion
The outcome of this discussion manifests itself where an act of worship is involved. As was said earlier, according to those who believe in the impossibility, either the command remains actual or the prohibition. However, there is disagreement among them which of those two should be preferred:
1. Should the prohibition be preferred, as it is well-known, the act of worship would be annulled where the duty-bound is aware of prohibition and he has committed the conjunction deliberately; for there is no command where prohibition is preferred, and there is also nothing in the essence of what has been done that can be capable of taking the duty-bound closer to God, as it is impossible for something causing distance to cause proximity. The case is so even though the essence of what has been done contains an essential good and we hold that intending the essential good is enough for acceptance of the act of worship.
But how is the case where the duty-bound has committed the conjunction while he has been ignorant of the prohibition incapably and not negligently, or he has forgotten it, while he has done the act with the intention of getting closer to God? The prevailing opinion is that the act of worship is acceptable, for its essential preference and its containing essential good is enough to take the duty-bound closer to God - if this is intended - even though the command should not be actual. However, some hold that the act of worship is annulled, for proofs of obligation and prohibition become contradictory according to impossibility, though they are not essentially contradictory. Now that the prohibition is preferred, as there remains no command, existence of cause for command, i.e., the essential good, in the gathering becomes also uncertain; for restriction of the command to other than the gathering may be either because of an impediment in the gathering to be included in the command or because of non-existence of the cause for command; hence, existence of the cause for command is not for certain.
2. Should the command be preferred, the act of worship would doubtlessly be acceptable; for there is no prohibition to prevent its acceptability, especially if we hold that the two proofs contradict one another according to the impossibility, since in such case the essential evils in the gathering is not for certain.
Acceptability of the act of worship is clear according to the possibility, for as it is possible to direct the command and the prohibition to two different designations gathered in the gathering - and that is why we believed in the possibility of conjunction in the position of law-making - there is no problem with the conjunction in the position of obedience too, as was explained earlier that the designated itself cannot become the object of duty neither before nor after its existence.
Conjunction of the Command and the Prohibition without a Way Out
As said earlier, conjunction of the command and the prohibition without a way out occurs where the duty-bound has become compelled to encounter the conjunction. Compulsion to encounter the conjunction occurs in two forms:
Not Preceded by Free Will
An example of this is one who intends to save a drowning person but the only way to reach him passes through an expropriated space. Here, to take that way is mandatory because of saving the drowning person and is prohibited because of expropriation. In such case, interference of the mandatory act and the prohibited act in the position of obedience occurs. For it is assumed that the duty-bound has no way out; hence, there would remain no way to obey the command to saving a drowning person but the gathering, since the obedience can exclusively be actualized in that prohibited instance and the duty-bound has no choice but to either disobey the command or disobey the prohibition.
Generally speaking, in case of interference, one is principally supposed to take into consideration the more important criterion; if the criterion for the command is stronger, as in the example mentioned, the command is given the priority and actuality of the prohibition is removed, and if the criterion for the prohibition is stronger, as where saving an animal can exclusively be actualized by death of a human being, the prohibition is given the priority and actuality of the command is removed.
Another example is one who is compelled to commit a prohibited act without misuse of his free will and then he is compelled to perform an act of worship in such a way that the said prohibited act becomes an instance of that act of worship. In other words, the duty-bound is compelled to perform the act of worship as it is gathered with that prohibited act to which he is compelled.
For instance, one who is imprisoned in an expropriated space and he is compelled to perform his prayers there. The question is that is performing that act of worship mandatory in such case, and is it acceptable if performed so? The answer to both questions is positive; for in case of compulsion to committing the prohibited act no actuality will remain for the prohibition - since power is a condition in all duties. Thus, nothing interferes with the actuality of the command and this makes performing the prayers mandatory, and in such case the prayers must doubtlessly be acceptable.
Preceded by Misuse of Free Will
The example of this is one who has entered an expropriated space through misuse of his free will but one has become repentant wishing to get out of the place while the very getting out from the place is itself expropriation - since there is still no permission from the owner. Two problems are discussed here:
(1) whether such exit is prohibited or mandatory, and (2) whether the prayers performed while exiting is acceptable.
1. There are different opinions in this connection: that the exit is prohibited, that it is mandatory but the duty-bound will be punished, that it is mandatory and the duty-bound will not be punished, that it is both prohibited and mandatory, and that it is neither prohibited nor mandatory but the dutybound will be punished. In order to find out the justifiable opinion, we have to discuss the reason for the prohibition and that for the obligation.
The reason for the prohibition is that expropriation, of any kind, whether entry, stay, or exit, has been prohibited from the very beginning before the compulsion. Hence, the duty-bound has been prohibited from every kind of occupation even that exit, for he has been able to eschew it by not entering.
One who holds that it is not prohibited argues that this much occupation is necessary whether the expropriator exits or stays; hence, its eschewal is impossible for him, and when its eschewal is impossible it cannot remain prohibited. This is not correct, however, for it is he who had made himself compelled through misuse of his free will while he has been capable of eschewal by eschewing the entry, and impossibility through free will does not contradict free will. Thus, he is commanded from the very beginning to eschew the occupation until he exits; hence, the exit per se as it is occupation was from the very beginning included in the instances of the prohibited designation. In other words, the prohibited designation, i.e., occupying someone else’s property without one’s permission, encompasses in its generality all occupations whose eschewal is possible - even the exit - and impossibility of such occupation because of misuse of one’s free will does not exclude it from generality of the designation.
As for the reason for obligation, some hold that the exit is mandatory for itself since it is designated by the designation of “release from the prohibited act” and release from the prohibited act is both good intellectually and mandatory religiously, while others hold that it is mandatory for something else since it is a preliminary for the release from the prohibited act, i.e., the additional expropriation which will be actualized if he does not exit.
However, the truth is that neither of those opinions is correct; the exit is (1.1) neither mandatory for itself (1.2) nor mandatory for something else.
1.1 It is not mandatory for itself because:
First, it is clear that the release from something, whatever its meaning may be, is a designation contrary to that of involvement in that thing; it is a substitute for that and their contrariety is that of possession and privation. Now, the question is that what they mean by the release which they say it is good.
If by that is meant release from the very expropriation per se, it is not correct, for by exit he is involved in expropriation and not being released from it, as it is occupation and passing through an expropriated space without permission.
And if by that is meant release from the additional expropriation which will be actualized if he does not exit, that does not correspond to the motions in the exit. For, since release is contrary to involvement and is a substitute for it, the time which can be a time for involvement must be the same with the time which holds true for designation of release, while the time of motions in the exit precedes the time of additional expropriation if he does not exit. Thus, in the motions of the exit he is neither involved in nor released from the additional expropriation; rather, the expropriator is involved in expropriation from his entry until his exit and he is only released from expropriation when he is out of the expropriated space.
Secondly, should release be a designation which holds true for the exit, by the exit should not be meant the very motions in the exit, but rather that for which motions in the exit are preliminaries or like preliminaries; and in such case designation of release does not correspond to the prohibited occupation of the expropriated space - that which the holder of this opinion wishes to prove.
The reason is clear, for exit is contrary to entry, and since entry is a designation for being in the space preceded by non-existence, exit must be a designation for being out of the space preceded by non-existence due to contrariety. As for the very occupation of the expropriated space by motions in the exit one of which being the exit, it is a preliminary or pseudo preliminary for the exit and not the exit itself.
Thirdly, if we accept that release is a designation which corresponds to the motions in the exit, we will not accept that it is mandatory for itself; for to be released from the prohibited act is nothing but eschewal of the prohibited act, and eschewal of the prohibited act is not mandatory for itself in such a way that it has an essential good contrary to the essential evils of the act. Of course, it is desired secondarily to the prohibition from the act, as was said earlier in discussions of commands and prohibitions in the first and the problem of the opposite in the second part. Therefore, as commanding something does not necessitate prohibiting its general opposite, i.e., its contradictory which is eschewal, prohibiting something does not necessitate commanding its general opposite, i.e., its contradictory which is eschewal. There is but evils of the act in the prohibition and the good of the act in the command.
1.2 It is not mandatory for something else because:
First, even if we accept that the release is mandatory for itself, we have already proved that the preliminary of the mandatory act is not mandatory.
Secondly, exit, which is motions while exiting as meant by one who holds that opinion, is not a preliminary for the very being released from the prohibited act, but rather is a preliminary for being out of the expropriated space. Being out of the expropriated space implicates designation of being released from the prohibited act and is not the very being released from it, and assumption of obligation of release does not implicate obligation of its implicative; for, as explained earlier in the problem of the opposite, two implicative affairs are not necessarily common in the precept. Now that being out of the expropriated space is not mandatory, how can its preliminary be so?
Thirdly, even if we accept that the release is mandatory for itself, that it is the very being out of the expropriated space and motions in the exit are preliminaries for it and that the preliminary of the mandatory act is mandatory, we cannot accept this opinion; for preliminary of the mandatory act is mandatory only when there is no impediment, while such impediment exists here. For example, since to ride an expropriated vehicle in one’s way to the pilgrimage to Mecca is prohibited per se, it is not qualified as mandatory even though one has performed a mandatory act by it. Here, motions in the exit are prohibited, since they are among instances of a prohibited act, i.e., occupying the expropriated space; hence, they are not qualified as mandatory because of their being preliminaries.
2. The answer to the question whether the prayers performed while exiting is acceptable or not is dependent upon what one chooses in the previous section:
2.1. One who holds that the exit is only mandatory, he should hold that performing the prayers in that case is of no problem, whether the time designated for it is enough or not - conditional upon performing of the prayers not necessitating any occupation additional to the motions in the exit, since that additional occupation is forbidden and prohibited. Should performing the prayers necessitate additional occupation: (2.1.1.) if the time is not enough for performing the prayers after the exit, the duty-bound should perform it in his exit contenting himself with the least mandatory acts of the prayers and gesticulate instead of bowing and bowing down, and (2.1.2.) if the time is enough for performing the prayers after the exit, he should wait and perform it out of the expropriated space.
2.2. One who holds that the exit is prohibited, he should hold that: (2.2.1.) if the time is enough for performing the prayers after the exit, the dutybound should perform the prayers after the exit whether such performing necessitates additional occupation or not; and (2.2.2.) if the time is not enough for performing the prayers after the exit, there occurs interference and the duty-bound becomes uncertain whether to avoid the prohibited expropriation or to perform the mandatory prayers. Since the prayers should not be abandoned in any case, the duty-bound should perform the prayers while he abandons what necessitates additional occupation; he should gesticulate instead of bowing and bowing down and recite sūra al-ĥamd while walking and so on.
2.3. One who holds that the exit is neither mandatory nor prohibited, he should hold that performing the prayers while exiting is of no problem if it does not necessitate any additional occupation, even when the time is enough for performing the prayers after the exit.
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Author: Alireza Hodaee
