CHAPTER 14: SUNNA
Among Sunnī jurists, Sunna (lit. lifestyle) is “word, act, and acknowledgment (taqrīr) of the Prophet.” That expression is originated by Muslim’s being commanded by the holy prophet to follow his Sunna. Then, wherever the word Sunna is used in an absolute manner without being attributed to anyone, it is interpreted specifically as what contains a precept declared by the holy prophet, whether by his word, act, or acknowledgment.
As for Shiite jurists, since it is proved for them that words of infallibleinnocent Imāms of the Household of the Prophet are, like those of the Prophet, authoritative proofs, they expanded the expression Sunna so that it may include “word, act, and acknowledgment of the infallible-innocent personality.” The secret of that expansion is that holy Imāms are not like transmitters of words of the holy prophet so that their words should be authoritative proofs because they are trustworthy in transmission, but rather because they are appointed by God via the holy prophet in order to deliver factual precepts. That is why they do not make any judgment but in accordance with factual precepts as they are with God, and that happens either through inspiration, as happens for the holy prophet through revelation, or through receiving from the previous infallible-innocent personality, as Imām Ali said, “The holy prophet taught me a thousand windows of knowledge through each one opens for me a thousand windows.” Therefore, their declaration of precepts is not of kind of transmission and narration of Sunna, nor of kind of idjtihād and inference from sources of law-making; but rather, they are themselves a source for law-making.
Thus, their words are Sunna and not transmission of Sunna. However, they sometimes narrate traditions from the holy prophet, for the sake of transferring his precious epigrams, for arguing against others who do not believe in them, or for some other reasons.
As for proving their leadership and that their words are to be considered as those of the holy prophet, it is discussed in ‘ilm al-kalām (Islamic theology).
Now that Sunna in that broad sense is one of the sources of Islamic law-making:
1. If it happened that one could attain it in person by listening to the infallible-innocent personality, one has taken the factual precept from its main source in an absolutely certain manner with regard to transmission; such as taking from the holy Qur’ān and/or holy Imāms.
2. If it could not happen for one who is in search of factual precepts, as in times later than theirs, one has no choice, besides referring to the holy Qur’ān, but to refer to ĥadīths narrating Sunna, whether through massive or single chain of transmission, while taking into consideration the extent of authority of the latter. Hence, ĥadīths are not the very Sunna, but rather its narrator and revealer - though they are sometimes called Sunna figuratively inasmuch as they prove it. Thus, we have to discuss ĥadīths in this chapter, since it deals with Sunna.
Denotation of Act of the Infallible-Innocent Personality
Doubtless act of the infallible-innocent personality (al-Ma‘şūm), inasmuch as he is infallible-innocent, denotes that such an act is, at least, permissible; as his eschewal of an act denotes that it is, again at least, not mandatory. This cannot be a matter of doubt or dispute. However, his act may have a wider scope of denotation where some evidence exists; for instance, where it is certain that he is in the position of depiction of a precept or an act of worship, such as ablution or prayers. In such case, his act will denote the mode of act whether it is mandatory, recommended, etc. too according to what the evidence reveals.
That appearance is doubtlessly an authoritative proof; as appearances of terms are authoritative proofs, without any difference. There are lots of cases in which jurists have argued for precepts of acts of ablution, prayers, pilgrimage to Mecca, and the like as well as their qualities by narrating act of the holy prophet or Imāms in such respects.
There are no doubts and disputes over those things. Matters of dispute in this connection are the two following:
1. Whether act of the infallible-innocent personality, without there being any further evidence, denotes more than permissibility. There are three opinions in this connection: it denotes that such thing is mandatory for us, it is recommended for us, and it denotes no more than permissibility. The justifiable opinion is the third, for there is nothing to prove either of such other two denotations.
It is argued for the first opinion that the verse: “You have had a good example in God’s Prophet for whosoever hopes for God and the Last Day, and remembers God a lot,” (33: 21) denotes that following the holy prophet in his acts is mandatory; and following his acts being mandatory necessitates that whatever he does should be mandatory for us even though it is not mandatory for himself - except what is proved by a certain proof that it is not mandatory for us. Some have said that should the verse not denote obligation of following the holy prophet, it would, at least, denote goodness and preference of following him.
To that argument, al-‘Allāma al-Ĥilli replied that: “To follow someone is to do what he has done because it is his act and in the mode he has acted.
Thus, if the act is mandatory, we will treat it as being done mandatorily; if it is recommended, we will treat it as being done as recommended; and if it is permissible, we will treat is as being permissible.”
2. Whether the act of the infallible-innocent personality is an authoritative proof of us, i.e., whether the precept is common between him and us - in a case where the mode of what he has done is clear. The dispute is originated by the fact that some precepts are peculiar to the holy prophet in which Muslims are not common, such as obligation of night prayers and the like. Now, if it is known that what the infallible-innocent personality has done is peculiar to him it is doubtlessly peculiar to him and no Muslim shares him in that, and if it is known that it is not peculiar to him in any way it is doubtlessly common for all Muslims and his act is authoritative proof of us. The matter of dispute is a case where it is not known whether the act is peculiar to him or common for all Muslims without there being any evidence to determine any of them. There are three opinions in this connection: it is peculiar to him, it is common for all Muslims, and it has no appearance in either of them remaining thereby ambiguous.
The justifiable opinion is the second one, for the holy prophet is primarily a human being burdened by all duties. Thus, he is principally common with all people in all divine duties, except what he is treated by the Almighty as different.
Denotation of Acknowledgment (Taqrīr) of the Infallible-Innocent Personality
By acknowledgment is meant a case where someone performs an act in the presence of the infallible-innocent personality and the latter remains silent while he is aware of what the former is doing and is in the state of capability of informing the former if he is wrong in what he is doing. The state of capability occurs when the time is enough for depiction and when there is no obstacle for that, such as fear, dissimulation, despairing of influence of advising, and the like.
Such silence of the infallible-innocent personality and taking no action with regard to what someone has done is called taqrīr.
Doubtless such an acknowledgment, accompanied by those conditions, is apparent in that such an act is permissible where its prohibition is probable and is lawful and acceptable where it is an act of worship or transaction. For should it be unlawful in the actuality or suffer from deficiency it was upon the infallible-innocent personality to prohibit the doer if he is knowledgeable of what he is doing, because of obligation of commanding to good and prohibiting from bad, and to expound the precept as well as mode of the act if the doer is ignorant of the precept, because of obligation of teaching the ignorant.
The case is the same where someone explains a precept or quality of an act of worship or transaction in the presence of the infallible-innocent personality while he is capable of depiction but he remains silent, since this is acknowledgement of what he has said.
The Massive Report (al-Khabar al-Mutawātir)
The report is of two principal kinds: massive (mutawātir), and single (wāĥid).
Massive is a report which causes confidence in one’s soul in such a way that all doubts are removed and definite certainty occurs because of report of massive transmitters whose collusion in lying is impossible. On the contrary, single report, in its uşūlī sense, means that which is not massive even though reporters may be more than one.
What should be emphasized with regard to the massive report is that in a report which has several mediators, like reports of old events, all conditions of massive report must be actualized in each generation; otherwise the report is not to be treated as massive, for the conclusion is pursuant to the inferior preliminary. The reason is clear: a report with several mediators is in fact made of several reports, for each generation reports the report of its previous one. Therefore, report of the last generation must be a massive report of a massive report of a massive report, and so forth, up to a massive report of the very incident or words; and it is clear that should conditions of massive report not be actualized in any generation the report would not be massive, but rather single.
The Single Report (Khabar al-Wāĥid)
The single report, which, as said earlier, is the one not attaining the level of massive report, may sometimes provoke knowledge even though the reporter may be one - and that is where the report is overwhelmed by evidence provoking knowledge of truthfulness of the report. Such a report is doubtlessly an authoritative proof, for acquisition of knowledge is the utmost end, as there is no authority beyond knowledge and authority of every authoritative proof affair rests upon it.
However, where the single report is not overwhelmed by such evidence, even though it may be overwhelmed by some evidence provoking confidence but not knowledge, there is a major disagreement among Uşūlīs as to its authority as well as conditions of its authority. The disagreement, especially among Shiite scholars, refers, in fact, to the existence or otherwise of definite proof supporting authority of the single report; for it is a matter of consensus among them that the single report as it provokes personal or typical conjecture is not considerable - as conjecture per se is definitely not authoritative proof in their opinion. Thus, those who deny authority of single report merely deny existence of such a definite proof, while others believe that it does exist.
As for opinions in this connection, some have denied authority of single report in an absolute way, such as al-Sayyid al-Murtađā, Ibn Barrādj, Ibn Zuhra, and Ibn Idrīs who claimed that there is a consensus among Shī‘a scholars that the single report is absolutely not an authoritative proof. However, that opinion has found no support from others who came after Ibn Idrīs. Some Akhbārīs have said that all ĥadīths collected in Shiite well-known books, especially al-Kutub al-Arba‘a (the Four-fold Books, i. e., al-Kāfī by al-Kulainī, Man LāYaĥđuruh al-Faqīh by al-Shaikh al-Şadūq, and Tahdhīb al-Aĥkām and al-Istibşār fī-mā Ikhtalaf min al-Akhbār both by al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī) are definitely truthful.
Others, who believe in the authority of single report but not in an absolute way hold different views as to the criterion for its authority maintaining that it is its being considered by Shī‘a jurists, righteousness of the transmitter or only his being trustworthy, the sheer conjecture of being uttered by authorities without taking into consideration qualities of the transmitter, and so forth.
What we have to do is to find out whether it is basically an authoritative proof or not, and then the extent of denotation of proofs in this connection.
Proofs of Authority of Single Report from the Book
It should be noted that one who argues Qur’ānic verses for authority of single report does not claim that they are explicit-definite in their denotation -
they are at most apparent. If so, how can one argue something conjectural for proving authority of something else whereas the proof of authority, as proved earlier, must be definite-certain? The answer is simple: as will be seen, authority of appearances of the holy Qur’ān is proved by definite proofs; therefore, arguing them ends finally in knowledge and would not be argumentation for conjecture by conjecture. Thus, we merely mention some verses for the authority of single report making ourselves content with proving their appearance in the desired.
1. Verse 6, sūra 49: “O believers, if an evil-doer comes to you with a report, make clear, lest you afflict a people unwittingly and then repent of what you have done.”
Implicatures of “condition” and “qualifier” of this verse are argued for proving authority of single report. However, it seems that arguing the former is enough. Apart from detailed discussions on this verse, we can argue that the verse declares that the report as it is report is supposed to be confirmed by people and be taken into consideration as that is their practical conduct, otherwise the Almighty would have not prohibited from consideration of report of an evil-doer as he is evil-doer. Hence, God whishes to draw attention of the believers not to rely on every report by everyone. Rather, they must deal with a report by an evil-doer with caution and investigate to find out whether it is true, lest they afflict a people in an unwise way which may harm them. The secret is that the evil-doer is not supposed to be confirmed in his reporting, that is why his report must not be accepted. Thus, implicature of condition of the verse denotes that report of a pious person is supposed to be true, that is why one is not supposed to avoid afflicting a people in an unwise way through investigation his report - its implication being authority of such a report. In short, the verse reveals authority of report of a pious person since his report is supposed to be true, contrary to report of an evil-doer.
2. Verse 122, sūra 9: “It is not for the believers to go forth totally; therefore, why should not a party of every section of them go forth to become learned in religion and to warn their people when they return to them, that haply they may beware?”
Arguing this verse for the authority of single report is dependent upon two preliminaries:
2.1. The first part of the verse, i.e., “It is not for the believers to go forth totally,” as something preparing the ground for the reasoning; for it is apparent in the negation of obligation of going forth of all believers to the holy prophet for learning the religion. This part is either predicative by which being meant configuration of obligation and thereby is really configurative, or predicative by which being meant emphatic announcement of non-actualization of such a thing from all believers since it is almost impossible - its necessity being non-obligation of going forth of all. No matter which one is considered, the verse denotes non-obligation of going forth of all, whether predicatively or configurationally.
However, the divine lawgiver as He is divine lawgiver is not supposed to negate obligation of something, whether predicatively or configurationally, unless when He is in the position of removal of supposition of or belief in the obligation of that thing. On the one hand, the wise are supposed to believe in the obligation of going forth; for learning the religion is intellectually obligatory for everyone, and acquisition of certainty of that, which is usually restricted to hearing from the holy prophet, is also an intellectual obligation. Hence, believers are truly right in believing in the obligation of going forth to the holy prophet in order to acquire knowledge of precepts. On the other hand, going forth of all believers from all parts of Islamic land to the holy prophet for the acquisition of knowledge of precepts whenever they encounter a problem is no doubt practically impossible - in addition to causing severe difficulties.
Thus, this part of the verse indicates that God, the All-Merciful, wished to remove that duty and difficulty from believers by removing obligation of going forth of all of them. However, that removal does not necessitate removal of obligation of going forth for learning the religion in principle; for necessities should be dealt with within the limits of necessity, and difficulty will clearly be removed by removal of obligation of going forth of every one. That is why God has made another legitimate way for learning the religion other than that of learning it in a definite way by hearing from the holy prophet himself, and that way is explained in the second part of the verse: “therefore, why should not a party of every section of them go forth to….” The letter (ف
to be translated as “therefore”) clearly indicates that this way is dependent upon negation of obligation of going forth of all believers.
2.2. The second part of the verse, which is mainly argued by Uşūlīs for proving authority of single report: “Therefore, why should not a party of every section of them go forth to become learned in religion and to warn their people when they return to them, that haply they may beware?” It is argued that when God, the Al-Merciful, announced non-obligation of going forth for everyone, He stimulated believers to follow another way, i.e., to send a party of every section of them so that they convey to others the precepts they have learned when they return. In fact, that way is the best, and indeed the only, one for acquisition of knowledge.
Thus, the verse as a whole expounds an intellectual affair, which is obligation of knowledge and learning. Now that the definite knowledge, through going forth of everyone to the holy prophet in order to learn the religion, is not possible, God has allowed believers to send a party of every section of them in order to learn - and it is this party which is entrusted with teaching others. Furthermore, not only God has allowed them to do so, but He has made that thing obligatory for them. That obligation is inferred from (لولا
tobe translated as “why should not”), which is for stimulation; and from end of going forth, which is learning for the sake of teaching others so that they may beware - in addition to the intellectual obligation of learning, as said above. All those are clear evidence for obligation of learning the religion for a party of every section in order to teach others religious precepts. That obligation is, naturally, collective and not individual.
Now that obligation, or at least lawfulness, of learning of a party of every section for the sake of teaching others when they return to them is inferred from the verse, it must be inferred that the Almighty has made their reporting precepts an authoritative proof for others; otherwise, making such a going forth lawful in the way of obligation or permission would be absurd and in vain when the obligation of going forth of all is negated. Furthermore, should reporting precepts not be an authoritative proof, there would remain no way for learning them - a way which can be an excuser for the duty-bound or can be used as an argument for and against him.
In short, removal of obligation of going forth from all and deeming that of a party of believers to learn the religion and to teach others is a clear proof for authority of reporting precepts, even though that reporting may not provoke definite knowledge. Since the verse is absolute with regard to making the warning conditional upon provoking knowledge, it should be absolute with regard to accepting the warning and teaching; otherwise, that solution legitimized by God would be absurd and in vain not being capable of actualizing the purpose for which going forth was legitimized.
It should be noted that arguing that verse for the authority of single report is not dependent upon going forth of a party of every section being mandatory. Rather, that way being legitimized by the Almighty even though in the way of permissibility would be enough, for its very legitimizing necessitates legitimizing authority of reporting precepts on the part of the one who has learned. Therefore, there is no need of prolixity for inferring obligation from the verse.
One problem remains: What is mandatory is going forth of a party of every section, and a party consists of at least three persons; hence, the verse does not cover the report of one or two persons. What can solve the problem is that there is no denotation in the verse that the party should collectively warn their people when they return to them. Therefore, the verse is absolute in this connection, and its absoluteness necessitates that report of a single person should also be an authoritative proof when he reports singly.
We do not discuss other verses presented to prove authority of single report, as they have no such denotation.
Proofs of Authority of Single Report from Sunna
It is obviously clear that one cannot argue the very single report for the authority of single report, since it is obviously a vicious circle. Rather, reports argued must be definite; either by being massive, or by being overwhelmed by definite evidence. As for ĥadīths available in this connection, they are doubtlessly not massive in their terms, i.e., there are no massive reports containing such words as “authority of single report;” they are at most massive in their concepts, i.e., one can say that the concept of authority of a single report where the reporter is reliable in his reporting is confirmed in some massive reports - as asserted by alShaikh al-Ĥurr al-‘Āmilī in his Tafşīl Wasā’il al-Shī‘a.
Al-Shaikh al-Anşārī has narrated some groups of ĥadīths by consideration of which altogether one becomes certain that report of a single reporter who is reliable and trustworthy in his reporting is definitely treated as an authoritative proof on the part of holy Imāms. Here, we mention those groups briefly:
1. What is said by holy Imāms with regard to referring people to such preferences as the reporter being more righteous-trustworthy, truthful, and the like in case of contradiction of ĥadīths. (Some of those ĥadīths will be mentioned later in the discussion of “equilibrium and preferences.”) Had report of a single reporter who is reliable and trustworthy in his reporting not been an authoritative proof, assumption of contradiction of ĥadīths and preference giving would have been absurd - as it is clear.
2. What is said by holy Imāms with regard to referring single reporters to their single companions, as Imām’s referring to Zurāra by saying, “If you wish to hear a ĥadīths, you should refer to the man sitting here,” and Imām’s positive answer when someone said, “Sometimes I need to ask you, but I cannot see you whenever I wish. Is Yūnus b. ‘Abd al-Raĥmān reliable so that I may learn my religious teaching from him?” The second ĥadīth indicates that it has been taken for granted that one should accept words of a reliable reporter; that is why he asks Imām whether Yūnus is reliable in order to conclude that he can refer to him for learning religious teachings.
3. Ĥadīths encouraging narration, writing, and conveying traditions, such as the famous prophetic ĥadīth: “Whosoever saves forty ĥadīths for my followers will be raised as a knowledgeable scholar in the hereafter,” and the like.
4. Ĥadīths blaming those who forge falsehood against the holy prophet and Imāms and warning people against them. Had acceptance of single reports not been prevailing among Muslims, there would have remained no room for forging falsehood against them, fear of that, or warning against those who forge; for such forging would be fruitless if Muslims were not to accept single reports.
As such words as truthful, trustworthy, and the like used in those ĥadīths indicate, the single report in question is the one reported by such a person whose lying is nearly improbable in such a way that the wise do not take probability of his lying into consideration.
Proofs of Authority of Single Report from Consensus
A good number of scholars have claimed that there is a consensus among Shī‘a on the authority of report of a single transmitter if he is truthful and trustworthy in his reporting, even though his report does not provoke knowledge. The chief figure among those is al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī; but he conditioned that upon the single report being narrated by Shī‘a transmitters from the holy prophet or Imāms, the transmitter being precise and not being accused of lying in his reporting. On the other hand, another group of Shī‘a scholars, pioneered by al-Sayyid al-Murtađā, have claimed such a consensus among Shī‘a on nonauthority of single report and treated it as analogy (qiyās) whose non-authority is quite well-known among Shī‘a. He asserts every now and then that “the single report neither provokes knowledge nor causes an act.”
Occurrence of such a contradiction between claims of two contemporary scholars, the first of whom being studied at the second, who were both expert on Shī‘a teachings and were not that heedless to claim something without an exhaustive research is astonishing. That is why later scholars have attempted to find some compromise solution, one being that the single report claimed by al-Sayyid al-Murtađā as being a matter of consensus of non-authority is the one which is narrated by Sunnīs, and al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī agrees with him on that. A second one is that by single report al-Sayyid al-Murtađā has meant the one opposite to that which is taken from trustworthy transmitters, recorded in authentic books, and accepted by all Shī‘a scholars - something al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī agrees with. A third one is that the single report claimed by al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī as being a matter of consensus of authority is the one which is overwhelmed by some evidence provoking knowledge of its truthfulness -
something al-Sayyid al-Murtađā agrees with. A fourth one is that by knowledge al-Sayyid al-Murtađā has meant the sheer confidence and not a certainty into which no probability can penetrate, and this interpretation brings those two claims close to one another. The more reliable compromise solution is the fourth, the first, and the second respectively.
However, no matter one can find a compromise solution, it is al-Shaikh al-Ţūsī’s claim that is acceptable, for all Shī‘a scholars, including the very alSayyid al-Murtađā and Ibn Idrīs, have always referred to trustworthy single reports narrated in Shiite reliable books. In short, one who doubts existence of consensus in this connection can find no consensus in Shī‘a jurisprudence.
Proofs of Authority of Single Report from the Conduct of the Wise
It is doubtlessly and definitely clear that the wise (i.e., human beings as they are intellectual creatures), though having various tastes and approaches to affairs, have only one practical conduct with regard to the single report: On the one hand they take report of one whom they trust and are confident that he is truthful and not a liar into consideration, and on the other hand they rely on trustworthy single persons in order to convey their words. The secret of that conduct is that the wise do not take the weak counter-probabilities into consideration; they ignore the probability of falsehood of report of the trustworthy person as well as that of his mistake, heedlessness, or error.
People’s lives are based upon that practical conduct. Should that conduct not exist, their social order would become chaotic and anxiety would dominate their lives, because of scantiness of reports provoking knowledge in terms of transmission and context.
Muslims, in particular, are like other people in this connection and have had the same practical conduct from early Islam with regard to receiving religious precepts. Have Muslims ever hesitated to learn their religious duties from the holy prophet’s and holy Imāms’ companions?
When, on the one hand, the practical conduct of the wise is to take the report of a trustworthy single into consideration, and, on the other hand, the divine lawgiver has not prohibited from following that way, we can infer, as will be explained in detail in chapter 19, that the divine lawgiver has confirmed that way; for He is among the wise, and even their chief. Otherwise, if He had adapted another way in conveying religious precepts, He would have announced and depicted that way having ordered believers to follow it.
As confirmed by a good number of celebrated scholars, this proof is the main proof in this connection. If one can supposedly find some way to refute other proofs, he will not be able to do so with regard to this one.
The only doubt cast upon this argument is that the second premise of the proof is not actualized here, since the divine lawgiver has prohibited from following that way in such Qur’ānic verses that forbid believers from following conjecture, as explained earlier, among which being the single report which does not provoke knowledge. However, that doubt can be removed by realizing that such verses do not include single report of the trustworthy person, for consideration of that report in the conduct of the wise is not an instance of observing conjecture. Rather, it is an instance of knowledge, since the wise, due to their nature and practical conduct, ignore the probability of that report being in opposition to the factuality. Thus, single report of the trustworthy person is basically not included in the conjecture, and that is why those verses cannot prohibit from consideration of single report of the trustworthy person.
If one wishes to prove that one is in need of a particular proof, and such proof is missing.
Anyhow, could those verses be capable of prohibiting from consideration of single report of the trustworthy person, appearances, and the like for which a conduct of the wise exists, it would be revealed and known among Muslims and they would have no practical consensus on taking them into consideration.
This is a definite proof of such verses not being capable of prohibiting from consideration of single report of the trustworthy person; hence, we are in need of no more proof in this connection.
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Author: Alireza Hodaee
