Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

96 - الحرام‏

96 THE PROHIBITED (HARAM)

501 - اجتِنابُ المَحارِمِ‏

501 Avoiding the Prohibited

1508. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : إذا رَغِبْتَ في المَكارِمِ فاجْتَنِبِ المَحارِمَ1

1508. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'If you wish for noble traits, then avoid the prohibited things.'2

1509. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مِن أحْسَنِ المَكارِمِ تَجَنُّبُ المَحارِمِ3

1509. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'One of the best noble traits is the avoidance of prohibited things.'4

1510. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : لَو لَم يَنْهَ اللَّهُ سُبحانَهُ عَن مَحارِمِهِ لَوجَبَ أنْ يَجْتَنِبَها العاقِلُ5

1510. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Even if Allah, glory be to Him, had not forbidden that which He has prohibited, it would have been mandatory for the one possessing intellect to avoid them [at least].'6

Notes

1. غرر الحكم : 4069 .

2. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 4069

3. غرر الحكم : 9382 .

4. Ibid. no. 9382

5. غرر الحكم : 7595 .

6. Ibid. no. 7595

502 - أكلُ الحَرامِ‏

502 Consuming the Prohibited

1511. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : العِبادَةُ مَع أكْلِ الحَرامِ كالبِناءِ على‏ الرَّمْلِ - وقيلَ : على‏ الماءِ -1

1511. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Worship alongside consumption of the prohibited is like erecting a building on sand-or on water [according to other narrations].'2

1512. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : تَرْكُ لُقْمَةِ حَرامٍ أحَبُّ إلى‏ اللَّهِ من صلاةِ ألفَي رَكْعَةٍ تَطَوُّعاً3

1512. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Abstaining from eating even one morsel of prohibited food is dearer to Allah than performing two thousand units of voluntary prayers.'4

1513. الإمامُ الباقرٌ عليه السلام: إنَّ الرّجُلَ إذا أصابَ مالاً مِن حَرامٍ لَم يُقْبَلْ مِنهُ حَجُّ ولا عُمْرَةٌ ولا صِلَةُ رَحِمٍ حتّى‏ أنّه يَفْسُدُ فيهِ الفَرْجُ5

1513. Imam al-Baqir (AS) said, 'When a man accumulates wealth from prohibited sources, neither his obligatory pilgrimage (hajj) nor his voluntary pilgrimage (umra) nor his maintaining kinship will be accepted from him, and it even spoils marriage.'6

1514. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام - في قولهِ عزّوجلّ : (وَ قَدِمْنَا إِلى‏ مَا عَمِلُوا مِنْ عَمَلٍ فَجَعَلْناهُ هَبَاءً مَّنثُورًا)7 - : أمَا واللَّهِ إنْ كانت أعمالُهُم أشدَّ بَياضاً مِن القُباطيِّ ، ولكنْ كانوا إذا عَرَضَ لهُمُ الحرامُ لم يَدَعوهُ8

1514. Imam al-Sadiq (AS), with regards to Allah's verse,“Then We shall attend to the works they have done and then turn them into scattered dust” , said, 'By Allah, even though their deeds were whiter than Egyptian cotton, when the prohibited presented itself before them they did not leave it.'9

Notes

1. عدّة الداعي : 141 .

2. Uddat al-Dai, p. 141

3. تنبيه الخواطر : 2 / 120 .

4. Tanbih al-Khawatir, v. 2 , p. 120

5. الأمالي للطوسي : 680 / 1447 .

6. Amali al-Tusi, p. 680 , no. 1447

7. الفرقان : 23 .

8. الكافي : 2 / 81 / 5 .

9. al-Kafi, v. 2 , p. 81 , no. 5

503 - ثَوابُ مَن قَدَرَ عَلى‏ حَرامٍ فَتَرَكَهُ‏

503 The Reward of One Who Has Access to the Prohibited But Abandons It

1515. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : مَن قَدرَ على‏ امرأةٍ أو جاريَةٍ حَراماً فَتَركَها مَخافَةَ اللَّهِ حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عزّوجلّ علَيهِ النّارَ ، وآمَنَهُ اللَّهُ تَعالى‏ مِن الفَزَعِ الأكْبَرِ ، وأدْخَلَهُ اللَّهُ‏الجَنّةَ1

1515. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'He who has unlawful access to enjoy a woman or a maid but leaves her for fear of Allah, He - Mighty and Exalted - will keep him safe from the Fire, preserve him from the Great Terror, and make him enter Paradise.'2

1516. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : لا يَقْدِرُ رَجُلٌ على‏ حَرامٍ ثُمَّ يَدَعُهُ ، لَيس بهِ إلّا مَخافَةُ اللَّهِ ، إلّا أبْدَلَهُ اللَّهُ في عاجِلِ الدُّنيا قَبْلَ الآخِرَةِ ما هُو خَيرٌ لَهُ مِن ذلكَ3

1516. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'No sooner does a man who is able to commit a prohibited act abandon it, only for fear of Allah, than Allah gives him in lieu of it something that is better for him in this present world before the Hereafter.'4

1517. الإمامُ الكاظمُ عليه السلام : إنَّ رسولَ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله كانَ يأتي أهلَ الصُّفَّةِ وكانوا ضِيفانَ رسولِ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله ، كانوا هاجَروا مِن أهاليهِم وأموالِهِم إلى‏ المَدينَةِ فأسْكَنَهُم رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله صُفَّةَ المَسجِدِ، وهُم أربَعُمِائةِ رجُلٍ [ كان‏]، يُسَلِّمُ علَيهِم بالغدوةِ والعَشِيِّ، فأتاهُم ذاتَ يومٍ فمِنهُم مَن يَخصِفُ نَعلَهُ ، ومِنهُم مَن يَرقَعُ ثَوبَهُ ، ومِنهُم مَن يَتَفلّى‏ ، وكانَ رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله يَرزُقُهُم مُدّاً مُدّاً مِن تمرٍ في كُلِّ يَومٍ

فقامَ رجُلٌ مِنهُم فقالَ : يا رسولَ اللَّهِ ، التَّمرُ الّذي تَرْزُقُنا قَد أحْرَقَ بطُونَنا !

فقالَ رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أمَا إنّي لَوِ اسْتَطَعْتُ أنْ اُطْعِمَكُمُ الدُّنيا لَأطعَمْتُكُم ، ولكنْ مَن عاشَ مِنكُم من بَعدي فسَيُغدى‏ علَيهِ بالجِفانِ ويُراحُ علَيهِ بالجِفانِ ، ويَغدو أحَدُكُم في قَميصةٍ ويَروحُ في اُخرى‏ ، وتُنَجِّدونَ بُيوتَكُم كما تُنَجَّدُ الكَعبَةُ

فقامَ رجُلٌ فقالَ : يا رسولَ اللَّهِ ، إنّا على ذلكَ الزَّمانِ بالأشْواقِ ! فمَتى‏ هُو ؟ !

قالَ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : زَمانُكُم هذا خَيرٌ مِن ذلكَ الزّمانِ ، إنَّكُم إنْ مَلَأتُم بطُونَكُم مِن الحَلالِ تُوشِكونَ أنْ تَملؤوها مِن الحَرامِ5

1517. Imam al-Kazim (AS) said, 'The Prophet (SAWA) used to visit the people of the ledge [of the mosque], who were his guests and had migrated to Medina without their families and belongings. The Prophet (SAWA) had lodged them on the ledges of the Mosque. They were four hundred men, and he greeted them every morning and every night. One day he came to them while some of them were mending their sandals, some were patching their garments, and some were cleaning their heads from lice. The Prophet (SAWA) used to provide them with half a bushel of dates every day.

One of the men stood up and said, 'O Messenger of Allah! The dates you provide us with have burned our stomachs!' The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'If I could feed you the whole world surely I would have done it, but [know that] those among you who will live after me will be brought bowls [of food] in the morning and bowls in the evening, and each of you will have a shirt in the morning and another in the evening, and each of you will adorn your houses with curtains and carpets as the Kaba is adorned.'

A man then rose and exclaimed, 'O Messenger of Allah! We are waiting eagerly for that time. When will it be?!' He (SAWA) said, 'Your time now is better than that time. When you fill your stomachs with the lawful, you might also fill it with the unlawful.'6

Notes

1. ثواب الأعمال : 334 / 1 .

2. Thawab al-Amal, p. 334 , no. 1

3. كنز العمّال : 43113 .

4. Kanz al-Ummal, no. 43113

5. النوادر للراوندي : 152 / 223 .

6. Nawadir al-Rawandi, p. 152 no 223

97 - الحزب‏

97 THE PARTY

504 - حِزبُ اللَّهِ‏

504 The Party of Allah

(وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا فَإِنَّ حِزْبَ اللَّهِ هُمُ الْغَالِبُونَ)1

“Whoever takes for his guardians Allah, His Apostle and the faithful [should know that] the party of Allah is indeed the victorious.” 2

1518. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : أيَسُرُّكَ أنْ تَكونَ مِن حِزبِ اللَّهِ الغالِبينَ ؟ اتَّقِ اللَّهَ سُبحانَهُ وأحْسِنْ في كُلِّ اُمورِكَ ؛ فإنَّ اللَّهَ مَع الّذينَ اتَّقَوا والّذينَ هُم مُحْسِنونَ3

1518. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Would you like to be of the victorious party of Allah? Then be Godwary and excel in all your affairs, for Allah is with those who are wary of their duty to Him and those who excel in virtue.'4

1519. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : نَحنُ وشيعَتُنا حِزبُ اللَّهِ، وحِزبُ اللَّهِ هُمُ الغالِبونَ5

1519. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'We and our followers (Shia) are the party of Allah, and the party of Allah is the victorious.'6

Notes

1. المائدة : 56 .

2. Qur'an 5 :56

3. غرر الحكم : 2828 .

4. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 2828

5. التوحيد : 166 / 3 .

6. al-Tawhid, p. 166 , no. 3

505 - حِزبُ الشَّيطانِ‏

505 The Party of Satan

(اسْتَحْوَذَ عَلَيْهِمُ الشَّيْطَانُ فَأَنْسَاهُمْ ذِكْرَ اللَّهِ أُولئِكَ حِزْبُ الشَّيْطَانِ أَلَا إِنَّ حِزْبَ الشَّيْطَانِ هُمُ الْخَاسِرُونَ)1

“Satan has prevailed upon them, so he has caused them to forget the remembrance of Allah. They are Satan's party. Look! Indeed it is Satan's parties who are the losers!” 2

1520. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : أيُّها النّاسُ ، إنّما بَدْءُ وُقوعِ الفِتَنِ أهْواءٌ تُتَّبَعُ ولَو أنَّ الحَقَّ خَلَصَ لَم يَكُنِ اخْتِلافٌ ، ولكنْ يُؤخَذُ مِن هذا ضِغْثٌ ومِن هذا ضِغْثٌ فيُمْزَجانِ فيَجيئانِ مَعاً ، فهُنالِكَ اسْتَحْوَذَ الشّيطانُ على‏ أوْليائِه ، ونَجا الّذينَ سَبَقَتْ لَهُم مِن اللَّهِ الحُسْنى‏3

1520. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'O people! Truly the onset of problems is brought about by following the desires... If the truth were pure there would be no disparity. However, a handful is taken from this [the truth] and a handful from that [falsehood] and then the two are mixed and appear altogether. And this is where Satan prevails over his followers, and only those who are favoured by Allah are saved.'4

1521. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام - مِن خُطبةٍ لَهُ يَصِفُ فيها المُنافِقينَ - : فَهُم لُمَةُ الشَّيطانِ ، وحُمَةُ النِّيرانِ ، اُولئكَ حِزبُ الشَّيطانِ ، ألَا إنَّ حِزبَ الشَّيطانِ هُمُ الخاسِرونَ5

1521. Imam Ali (AS) said in one of his sermons where he describes the hypocrites, 'They are the companions of Satan, and the incinerating sting of the Fire. They are the party of Satan; indeed it is Satan's parties who are the losers.'6

(اُنظر) الشيطان : باب 1029

(See also: SATAN: section 1069)

Notes

1. المجادلة : 19 .

2. Qur'an 58 :19

3. الكافي : 1 / 54 / 1 .

4. al-Kafi, v. 1 , p. 54 , no. 1

5. نهج البلاغة : الخطبة 194 .

6. Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 194

98 - الحزم‏

98 PRUDENCE

506 - قِيمَةُ الحَزمِ‏

506 The Value of Prudence

1522. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحَزْم كِياسَةٌ1

1522. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Prudence is sagacity.'2

1523. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن أخَذَ بالحَزمِ اسْتَظْهَرَ ، مَن أضاعَ الحَزمَ تَهوَّرَ3

1523. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who adopts prudence is cautious, and he who lacks prudence is reckless.'4

1524. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : التَّدْبيرُ قَبلَ العَملِ يُؤْمِنُكَ مِن النَّدَمِ5

1524. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Planning before action will preserve you from regret.'6

1525. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : أعْقَلُ النّاسِ أنْظَرُهُم في العَواقِبِ7

1525. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The most intelligent of people is he who looks further into the consequences.'8

1526. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : الحَزمُ مِشْكاةُ الظَّنِّ9

1526. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'Prudence is the lamp-niche of doubt.'10

Notes

1. بحار الأنوار : 71 / 339 / 8 .

2. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 71 , p. 339 , no. 8

3. غرر الحكم : 7913 ، 7914 .

4. Ghurar al-Hikam, nos. 7913 , 7914

5. عيون أخبار الرِّضا : 2 / 54 / 204 .

6. Uyun Akhbar al-Rida (AS), v. 2 , p. 54 , no. 204

7. غرر الحكم : 3367 .

8. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 3367

9. تحف العقول : 356 وفي الكافي : 1 / 27 / 29 : « الحزم مساءة الظنّ » .

10. Tuhaf al-Uqul, no. 356

507 - خَطَرُ تَركِ النَّظَرِ في عَواقِبِ الاُمورِ

507 The Danger of not Forseeing the Consequences of Matters

1527. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن تَورَّطَ في الاُمورِ بغَيرِ نَظَرٍ في العَواقِبِ فَقد تَعرَّضَ للنَّوائبِ1

1527. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who involves himself in matters without considering the consequences exposes himself to troubles.'2

Notes

1. تحف العقول : 90 .

2. Ibid. no. 90

508 - الحَزمُ وَالعَزمُ‏

508 Firm Resolution and Determination

1528. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام: الظَّفَرُ بالحَزْمِ والجَزْمِ.1

1528. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Victory comes through firm resolution and determination.'2

1529. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : لا خَيرَ في عَزمٍ بلا حَزمٍ3

1529. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'There is no good in determination without a firm resolution.'4

Notes

1. عوالي اللآلي : 1 / 292 / 164 .

2. Awali al-La'ali, v. 1 , p. 292 , no. 164

3. غرر الحكم : 10682 .

4. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 10682

509 - تَفسيرُ الحَزمِ‏

509 The Interpretation of Prudence

1530. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحَزمُ النَّظَرُ في العَواقِبِ ، ومُشاوَرَةُ ذَوي العُقولِ1

1530. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Prudence is careful consideration of the consequences and consultation of people of reason.'2

1531. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : أصْلُ الحَزمِ الوُقوفُ عِندَ الشُّبْهَةِ3

1531. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The essence of prudence is stopping in the face of the dubious.'4

1532. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الطُّمَأنينَةُ قَبلَ الخُبْرَةِ خِلافُ الحَزمِ5

1532. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Feeling certainty and quietude before experience is against prudence.'6

Notes

1. غرر الحكم : 1915 .

2. Ibid. no. 1915

3. تحف العقول : 214 .

4. Tuhaf al-Uqul, no. 214

5. غرر الحكم : 1514 .

6. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 1514

510 - الحازِمُ‏

510 The Prudent

1533. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحازِمُ مَن لَم يَشْغَلْهُ غُرورُ دُنْياهُ عنِ العَمَلِ لاُخْراهُ1

1533. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The prudent one is he who is not preoccupied by the delusion of this world from working for his Hereafter.'2

1534. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحازِمُ مَن تَخيَّرَ لخُلَّتِهِ ؛ فإنَّ المَرْءَ يُوزَنُ بخَليلِهِ3

1534. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The prudent one is he who is selective in his friendships, for man is judged according to his friend.'4

1535. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحازِمُ مَن لا يَشْغَلُهُ النِّعْمَةُ عنِ العَملِ للعاقِبَةِ5

1535. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The prudent one is he whose prosperity does not stop him from working towards the end goal.'6

1536. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الحازِمُ مَن يُؤَخِّرُ العُقوبَةَ في سُلطانِ الغَضَبِ ، ويُعَجِّلُ مُكافَأةَ الإحْسانِ اغْتِناماً لفُرْصَةِ الإمْكانِ7

1536. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The prudent one is he who puts off punishment when anger prevails, and hastens to reward the good, taking the first possible opportunity to do so.'8

Notes

1. غرر الحكم : 1984 .

2. Ibid.no. 1984

3. غرر الحكم : 2026 .

4. Ibid. no. 2026

5. غرر الحكم : 1878 .

6. Ibid. no. 1878

7. غرر الحكم : 2179 .

8. Ibid. no. 2179

511 - أحزَمُ النّاسِ‏

511 The Most Prudent of People

1537. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أحْزَمُ النّاسِ أكْظَمُهُمْ للغَيْظِ1

1537. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The most prudent of people is he who is best at controlling his rage.'2

1538. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : إنَّ أكْيَسَكُم أكْثَرُكُم ذِكْراً للمَوتِ ، وإنَّ أحْزَمَكُم أحْسَنُكُمُ اسْتِعْداداً لَهُ3

1538. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'The most sagacious one from among you is he who remembers death the most, and the most prudent one from among you is he who is the most prepared for it.'4

1539. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : أحْزَمُكُم أزْهَدُكُم5

1539. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'The most prudent one from among you is the one who is most abstemious.'6

Notes

1. الأمالي للصدوق : 73 / 41 .

2. Amali al-Saduq, p. 28 , no. 4

3. أعلام الدين : 333 .

4. Alam al-Din, no. 333

5. غرر الحكم : 2832 .

6. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 2832

99 - الحزن‏

99 SORROW

512 - مَضارُّ الحُزنِ‏

512 The Harms Sorrow

1540. عيسى عليه السلام : مَن كَثُرَ هَمّهُ سَقُمَ بَدنُه1

1540. Prophet Jesus (AS) said, 'He who has much anxiety, his body starts to ail.'2

1541. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الهَمُّ نِصفُ الهَرَمِ3

1541. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Worry is half of old age.'4

1542. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : الهمُّ يُذيبُ الجَسَدَ5

1542. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Worry wastes away the body.'6

1543. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : الأحْزانُ أسْقامُ القُلوبِ، كما أنَّ الأمْراضَ أسْقامُ الأبْدانِ7

1543. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'Sorrows are the ailments of the hearts just as illnesses are the ailments of the body.'8

(اُنظر) الدنيا : باب 712

(See also: THE WORLD: section 712)

Notes

1. الأمالي للصدوق : 636 / 853 .

2. Amali al-Saduq, p. 436 , no. 3

3. تحف العقول : 214 .

4. Tuhaf al-Uqul, no. 214

5. غرر الحكم : 1039 .

6. Ghurar al-Hikam, no. 1039

7. الدعوات : 118 / 276 .

8. al-Daawat, p. 118 , no. 276

513 - ما يورِثُ الحُزنَ‏

513 The Causes of Sorrow

1544. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : مَن نَظرَ إلى‏ ما في أيْدي النّاسِ طالَ حُزنُهُ ، ودامَ أسَفُهُ1

1544. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Whoever looks at what other people possess, his sorrow endures and his regret is continuous.'2

1545. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : رُبَّ شَهْوةِ ساعةٍ تُورِثُ حُزناً طويلاً3

1545. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Many a desire lasting but an hour brings about enduring sorrow.'4

1546. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن غَضِبَ على‏ مَن لا يقدِرُ أنْ يَضُرَّهُ ، طالَ حُزْنُهُ وعَذّبَ نَفْسَهُ5

1546. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who is angry with somebody whom he cannot hurt, his sorrow endures and he inflicts pain on his own soul.'6

1547. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : ما رأيتُ ظالِماً أشْبَهَ بمظلومٍ من الحاسِدِ ؟ نَفَسٌ دائمٌ ، وقَلبٌ هائمٌ ، وحُزنٌ لازِمٌ7

1547. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'I have not seen a wrong-doer resemble a wronged person more than the jealous one: he has an exhausted spirit, a wandering heart, and an inherent sorrow.'8

1548. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : مَن قَصَّر في العملِ ابْتُلي بالهَمِّ9

1548. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'He who is negligent in his work is afflicted with anxiety.'10

1549. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : إيّاكَ والجَزَعَ ؛ فإنَّهُ يَقْطَعُ الأملَ ، ويُضعِفُ العَملَ ، ويُورِثُ الهَمَّ11

1549. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Beware of apprehension, for it kills hope, weakens action, and brings about worry.'12

Notes

1. أعلام الدين : 294 .

2. Alam al-Din, no. 294

3. الأمالي للطوسي : 533 / 1162 .

4. Amali al-Tusi, p. 533 , no. 1162

5. تحف العقول : 99 .

6. Tuhaf al-Uqul, no. 99

7. بحار الأنوار : 73 / 256 / 29 .

8. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 76 , p. 256 , no. 29

9. نهج البلاغة : الحكمة 127 .

10. Nahj al-Balagha, Saying 127

11. دعائم الإسلام : 1 / 223 .

12. Daa'im al-Islam, v. 1 , p. 223

514 - عِلاجُ الحُزنِ‏

514 Overcoming for Sorrow

(أَلَا إِنَّ أَوْلِيَاءَ اللَّهِ لا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ).1

“Look! The friends of Allah will indeed have no fear nor will they grieve.” 2

1550. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : إنّ اللَّهَ - بحُكْمِهِ وفَضْلِه - جَعلَ الرَّوحَ والفَرحَ في اليقينِ والرِّضا ، وجَعلَ الهَمَّ والحُزنَ في الشَّكِّ والسُّخْطِ3

1550. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Truly Allah, out of His wisdom and grace, placed bliss and happiness in conviction and contentment, and placed worry and sorrow in doubt and discontentment.'4

1551. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : أيُّها النّاسُ ، هذهِ دارُ تَرَحٍ لا دارُ فَرَحٍ ، ودارُ الْتِواءٍ لا دارُ اسْتِواءٍ ، فمَن عَرَفها لَم يَفْرَحْ لِرَجاءٍ ، ولَم يَحْزَنْ لِشَقاءٍ5

1551. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'O people! This is the house of pain and not the house of joy, and the house of writhing [in pain] not the house of repose. So he who knows it will neither rejoice for ease and nor will he grieve for misfortune.'6

1552. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : قَولُ : «لا حَولَ ولا قُوّةَ إلّا باللَّهِ» فيهِ شِفاءٌ مِن تِسعَةٍ وتِسْعينَ داءً ، أدْناها الهَمُّ7

1552. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'There is remedy in the statement“There is no might or power save in Allah” (la hawla wa la quwwata illa billah) for ninety-nine ailments, the least of them being anxiety.'8

1553. مطالب السؤول عن ابنِ عبّاسٍ : ما انْتَفَعْتُ بكلامٍ بَعدَ رسولِ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله كانْتِفاعي بكِتابٍ كَتَبَهُ عليُّ بنُ أبي طالبٍ عليه السلام ، فإنَّهُ كَتبَ إلَيَّ : أمّا بَعدُ فإنَّ المَرءَ يَسوؤهُ فَوتُ ما لَم يَكُن لِيُدْرِكَهُ ، ويَسُرُّهُ دَرْكُ ما لَم يَكُن لِيَفوتَهُ ، فلْيَكُنْ سُرورُكَ بما نِلْتَ مِن آخِرَتِكَ ، ولْيَكُن أسَفُكُ على‏ ما فاتَكَ مِنها ، وما نِلْتَ مِن دُنْياكَ فلا تَكُنْ بهِ فَرِحاً ، وما فاتَكَ مِنها فلا تَأْسَ علَيهِ حُزْناً ، ولْيَكُنْ هَمُّكَ فيما بَعدَ المَوتِ والسَّلامُ9

1553. Ibn Abbas narrated, 'I have not profited by any speech after the Messenger of Allah (SAWA) more than by a letter written by Ali b. Abu Talib (AS). He wrote to me, saying,“But now, indeed man grieves for having missed that which he would not have attained anyway, and is overjoyed at attaining that which he would not have missed anyway. So, let your happiness be for what you attain for your Hereafter, and let your regret be for what you miss of it. Do not be happy for what you attain for this world, nor regret sorrowfully what you miss from it, and let your concern be for what comes after death, and peace be with you.” '10

1554. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : نِعْمَ طارِدُ الهُمومِ اليَقينُ11

1554. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'What an excellent repellent of worries conviction is.'12

1555. الإمامُ عليٌّ عليه السلام : غَسْلُ الثِّيابِ يُذهِبُ الهَمَّ والحُزنَ13

1555. Imam Ali (AS) said, 'Washing clothes takes away worry and sorrow.'14

1556. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : إنْ كانَ كُلُّ شي‏ءٍ بقَضاءٍ وقَدَرٍ ، فالحُزْنُ لِماذا ؟!15

1556. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'If everything is determined by fate and destiny, then wherefore the sorrow?!'16

1557. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : شَكا نَبيٌّ مِن الأنبياءِ إلى‏ اللَّهِ الغَمَّ ، فأمَرهُ بأكْلِ العِنَبِ17

1557. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'One of the prophets complained of his grief to Allah. So He commanded him to eat grapes.'18

1558. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : مَن وَجَدَ هَمّاً ولا يَدري ما هُو فلْيَغْسِلْ رأسَهُ19

1558. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'He who finds himself sorrowful for no reason should wash his head.'20

(اُنظر) السرور : باب 935

(See also: HAPPINESS: section 935)

Notes

1. يونس : 62 .

2. Qur'an 10 :62

3.. تحف العقول : 6 .

4. Tuhaf al-Uqul, no. 6

5. أعلام الدين : 343 .

6. Alam al-Din, no. 294

7. قرب الإسناد : 76 / 244 .

8. Qurb al-Isnad, p. 76 , no. 244

9. مطالب السؤول : 55 .

10. Matalib al-Sa'ul, p. 55

11. بحار الأنوار : 77 / 211 / 1 .

12. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 77 , p. 211 , no. 1

13. الخصال : 612 / 10 .

14. al-Khisal, p. 612 , no. 10

15. الأمالي للصدوق : 56 / 12 .

16. Amali al-Saduq, p. 16 , no. 5

17. المحاسن : 2 / 362 / 2262 .

18. al-Mahasin, v. 2 , p. 362 , no. 2262

19. الدعوات : 120 / 284 .

20. al-Daawat, p. 120 , no. 284

515 - عِلَّةُ الحُزنِ وَالفَرَحِ مِن غَيرِ سَبَبٍ عرَفُ‏

515 The Reason for Sorrow and Joy for an Unknown Cause

1559. علل الشرائع عن أبي بصيرٍ : دَخَلتُ على‏ أبي عبدِ اللَّهِ عليه السلام ومَعي رجُلٌ مِن أصْحابِنا ، فقُلتُ لَهُ : جُعِلتُ فِداكَ يابنَ رسولِ اللَّهِ ، إنّي لَأغْتَمُّ وأحْزَنُ مِن غَيرِ أنْ أعْرِفَ لِذلكَ سَبباً ، فقالَ أبو عبدِ اللَّهِ عليه السلام : إنَّ ذلكَ الحُزنَ والفَرحَ يَصِلُ إلَيكُم مِنّا؛ لأ نّا إذا دَخلَ علَينا حُزنٌ أو سُرورٌ كانَ ذلكَ داخِلاً علَيكُم ، لأ نّا وإيّاكُم مِن نُورِ اللَّهِ عزّوجلّ1

1559. Abu Basir narrated, 'I once went to visit Abu Abdillah [al-Sadiq] (AS) along with one of our companions. I said to him, 'O son of the Prophet! Could I but sacrifice myself for you. I grieve and become sorrowful without knowing the cause of that.' So Abu Abdillah (AS) replied, 'Truly that sorrow and joy reaches you from us, for when sorrow or joy comes to us it comes to you too, for indeed we and you are all from the Light of Allah, Mighty and Exalted.'2

1560. بحار الأنوار : رُوي أنَّه سئلَ العالِمُ عليه السلام عنِ الرّجُلِ يُصْبِحُ مَغْموماً لا يَدْري سَببَ غَمِّهِ ، فقالَ : إذا أصابَهُ ذلكَ فلْيَعْلَمْ أنَّ أخاهُ مَغْمومٌ ، وكذلكَ إذا أصْبَحَ فَرْحانَ لغَيرِ سَببٍ يُوجِبُ الفَرَحَ ، فباللَّهِ نَسْتَعينُ على‏ حُقوقِ الإخْوانِ3

1560. It is narrated in Bihar al-Anwar that the scholar [al-Sadiq] (AS) was once asked about why a man may wake up in the morning feeling sad without knowing the reason for his sorrow. He said, 'If that happens to him then he should know that his brother is in sorrow, and similarly if he wakes up happy without a specific reason for that joy. And Allah's help do we seek with regard to the rights of the brothers.'4

Notes

1. علل الشرائع : 93 / 2 .

2. Ilal al-Shara'i, p. 93 , no. 2

3. بحار الأنوار : 74 / 227 / 20 .

4. Bihar al-Anwar, v. 74 , p. 227 , no. 20

516 - الحُزنُ المَمدوحُ‏

516 Praiseworthy Sorrow

1561. رسولُ اللَّهِ صلى اللَّه عليه وآله : ما عُبِدَ اللَّهُ عزّوجلّ على‏ مِثْلِ طُولِ الحُزْنِ1

1561. The Prophet (SAWA) said, 'Allah, Mighty and Exalted, is worshipped through nothing like continuous sorrow.'2

1562. الإمامُ زينُ العابدينَ عليه السلام : إنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ كُلَّ قَلبٍ حَزينٍ3

1562. Imam Zayn al-Abidin (AS) said, 'Truly Allah loves every sorrowful heart.'4

1563. الإمامُ الباقرُ عليه السلام: قَرَأتُ في كِتابِ عليٍّ عليه السلام: إنَّ المؤمنَ يُمْسي حَزيناً ويُصبِحُ حَزيناً ، ولا يَصْلُحُ لَهُ إلّا ذلكَ5

1563. Imam al-Baqir (AS) said, 'I have read in Ali's book that the believer spends nights and days in sorrow and only this can benefit him.'6

1564. الإمامُ الصّادقُ عليه السلام : نَفَسُ المَهْمومِ لَنا المُغْتَمِّ لظُلْمِنا تَسْبيحٌ ، وهَمُّهُ لأمْرِنا عِبادَةٌ7

1564. Imam al-Sadiq (AS) said, 'The breath of one who is saddened on our account and is grieved for the oppression done unto us is glorification, and his grief for our cause is worship.'8

(اُنظر) عنوان 47 « البكاء» ؛ القلب : باب 1554

(See also: WEEPING; THE HEART: section 1554 )

Notes

1. مكارم الأخلاق : 2 / 367 / 2661 .

2. Makarim al-Akhlaq, v. 2 , p. 367

3. الكافي : 2 / 99 / 30 .

4. al-Kafi, v. 2 , p. 99 , no. 30

5. التمحيص : 44 / 55 .

6. al-Tamhis, p. 44 , no. 55

7. الكافي : 2 / 226 / 16 .

8. al-Kafi, v. 2 , p. 226 , no. 16

Domains of Logic

The Subject Matter of Logic

Al-Farabi, in his Ihsa' al-'ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), defines logic as an instrumental, rule-based science aimed at directing the intellect towards the truth and safeguarding it from error in its acts of reasoning. He states:

The subject matters (mawdû‘ât ) of logic are the things for which [logic] provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles.

He defends the need for such a science of reasoning on the grounds that it is possible for the mind to err in at least some of its acts, for example, in those in which the intelligibles sought are not innate, but are rather attained discursively and empirically 'through reflection and contemplation'. Al-Farabi compares logic to tools such as rulers and compasses, which are used to ensure exactness when we measure physical objects subject to the errors of sensation. Like these tools, logical measures can be employed by their users to verify both their own acts of reasoning and the arguments of others. Indeed, logic is especially useful and important to guide the intellect when it is faced with the need to adjudicate between opposed and conflicting opinions and authorities.

Al-Farabi's view of logic as a rule-based science which governs the mind's operations over intelligibles forms the foundation for Ibn Sina's later refinements. In the opening chapters of hisal-Madkhal (Introduction), the first logical book of his encyclopedic workal-Shifa' (Healing), Ibn Sina describes the purpose of logic as one of enabling the intellect to acquire 'knowledge of the unknown from the known'. He defends the need for logic by arguing that the innate capacities of reasoning are insufficient to ensure the attainment of this purpose, and thus they require the aid of an art. While there may be some cases in which innate intelligence is sufficient to ensure the attainment of true knowledge, such cases are haphazard at best; he compares them to someone who manages to hit a target on occasion without being a true marksman. The most important and influential innovation that Ibn Sina introduces into the characterization of logic is his identification of its subject matter as 'second intentions' or 'secondary concepts', in contrast to 'first intentions'. This distinction is closely linked in Ibn Sina's philosophy to his important metaphysical claim that essence or quiddity can be distinguished from existence, and that existence in turn can be considered in either of its two modes: existence in concrete, singular things in the external world; or conceptual existence in one of the soul's sensible or intellectual faculties.

Inal-Madkhal , Ibn Sina argues that logic differs from the other sciences because it considers not conceptual existence as such (this would be psychology), but rather the accidents or properties that belong to any quiddity by virtue of its being conceptualized by the mind. These properties, according to Ibn Sina, include such things as essential and accidental predication, being a subject or being a predicate, and being a premise or a syllogism. It is these properties that allow the mind to connect concepts

together in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown; they provide the foundation for the rules of reasoning and inference that logic studies. They are moreover formal properties in the sense that, as properties belonging to all concepts in virtue of their mental mode of existence, they are entirely independent of the content of the thought itself; they are indifferent to the intrinsic natures of the quiddities which they serve to link together.

In theIlahiyyat (Metaphysics) of al-Shifa', Ibn Sina introduces the terminology of first and second 'intentions' or concepts in order to express the relation between the concepts of these quiddities themselves - which are studied in the theoretical sciences - and the concepts of the states and accidents of their mental existence which logic studies: 'As you know, the subject matter of logical science is second intelligible intentions (al-ma'ani al-ma'qula al-thaniyya) which are dependent upon the primary intelligible intentions with respect to some property by which they lead from the known to the unknown' (Ilahiyyat Book 1, ch. 2,). For example, the second intentions of 'being a subject' and 'being a predicate' are studied in logic independently of whatever first intentions function as the subject and predicate terms in a given proposition, for example, 'human being' and 'rational animal' in the proposition 'a human being is a rational animal'. The logical second intentions depend upon the first intentions because the first intentions are the conceptual building blocks of the new knowledge which second intentions link together: but logic studies the second intentions in abstraction from whatever particular first intentions the logical relations depend upon in any given case.

Secondary Intelligibles

A more careful statement is provided by Avicenna. Concepts like “horse”, “animal”, “body”, correspond to entities in the real world, entities which can have various properties. In the realm of the mental, concepts too can acquire various properties, properties they acquire simply by virtue of existing and being manipulated by the mind, properties like being a subject, or a predicate, or a genus. These are the subject matter of logic, and it seems it is only mental manipulation that gives rise to these properties:

If we wish to investigate things and gain knowledge of them we must bring them into Conception (fî t-tasawwur ); thus they necessarily acquire certain states (ahwâl ) that come to be in Conception: we must therefore consider those states which belong to them in Conception, especially as we seek by thought to arrive at things unknown from those that are known. Now things can be unknown or known only in relation to a mind; and it is in Conception that they acquire what they do acquire in order that we move from what is known to what is unknown regarding them, without however losing what belongs to them in themselves; we ought, therefore, to have knowledge of these states and of their quantity and quality and of how they may be examined in this new circumstance.

These properties that concepts acquire are secondary intelligibles; here is an exposition of this part of Avicennan doctrine by Râzî:

The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as it is possible to pass by means of them from the known (al-ma‘lûmât) to the unknown (al-majhûlât) not in so far as they are intelligible and possess

intellectual existence (an existence) which does not depend on matter at all, or depends on an incorporeal matter).. The explanation of “secondary intelligibles” is that man Conceives the realities of things (haqâ'iq al-ashyâ’ ) in the first place, then qualifies some with others either restrictively or predicatively (hukman taqyîdiyyan aw khabariyyan ). The quiddity's being qualified in this way is something that only attaches to the quiddity after it has become known in the first place, so it is a second-order [consideration] (fî d-darajati th-thâniya ). If these considerations are investigated, not absolutely, but rather with respect to how it is possible to pass correctly by means of them from the known to the unknown, that is logic. So its subject matter is certainly the secondary intelligibles under the consideration mentioned above (Râzî (1381 A. H.) Mulakhkhas 10.1-10.8).

In identifying the secondary intelligibles, Avicenna is able to place logic within the hierarchy of the sciences, because it has its own distinct stretch of being which is its proper subject matter.

So much for the first problem in Alfarabi's formulation of what the subject matter of logic is; finding it to be secondary intelligibles preserves the topic-neutrality of logic. Avicenna also has a view on the second problem, the question of whether or not expression is essential to a definition of logic and its subject matter.

There is no merit in what some say, that the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning the expressions insofar as they signify meanings… And since the subject matter of logic is not in fact distinguished by these things, and there is no way in which they are its subject matter, (such people) are only babbling and showing themselves to be stupid.

Conceptions and Assents

Khûnajî argued in the second quarter of the thirteenth century that the subject matter of logic was Conceptions and Assents:

A thing is knowable in two ways: one of them is for the thing to be merely Conceived (yutasawwara) so that when the name of the thing is uttered, its meaning becomes present in the mind without there being truth or falsity, as when someone says “man” or “do this!” For when you understand the meaning of what has been said to you, you will have conceived it. The second is for the Conception to be [accompanied] with Assent, so that if someone says to you, for example, “every whiteness is an accident,” you do not only have a Conception of the meaning of this statement, but [also] Assent to it being so. If, however, you doubt whether it is so or not, then you have Conceived what is said, for you cannot doubt what you do not Conceive or understand… but what you have gained through Conception in this [latter] case is that the form of this composition and what it is composed of, such as “whiteness” and “accident,” have been produced in the mind. Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them; denial is the opposite of that.

Note that an Assent is not merely the production of a proposition by tying a subject and predicate together; “Assent, however, occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them.” All knowledge, according to Avicenna, is

either Conception or Assent. Conception is produced by definition, Assent by proof. All Avicennan treatises on logic are structured in accordance with this doctrine: a first section deals with definition, which conduces to Conception, a second with proof, which conduces to Assent.

Later logicians in the line of Fakhraddîn ar-Râzî made Conceptions and Assents the subject matter of logic. We know that Khûnajî was the first to do this thanks to a report in the Qistâs al-Afkâr of Shamsaddîn as-Samarqandî (d. c. 1310). Samarqandî says:

This is the view adopted by the verifying scholars (al-muhaqqiqûn), but Khûnajî (sâhib al-kashf ) and the people who follow him differed from them and said: Logic may investigate the universal and the particular and the essential and the accidental and the subject and the predicate; they are among the questions [of the science]. You [Avicennan logicians] are taking the subject matter of logic as more general than the secondary intelligibles so that the secondary intelligibles and (especially) the secondary intelligibles you have mentioned and what follows after them may come under it as logic. It would be correct for you to say that the subject matter of logic is known Conceptions and Assents (al-ma‘lûmât at-tasawwuriyya wa-t-tasdîqiyya ) not in so far as they are [what they are] but in so far as they conduce to what is sought (al-matlûb ) …

Two logicians who followed Khûnajî on this were Abharî and Kâtibî. Here is Abharî's statement:

The subject matter of logic, I mean, the thing which the logician investigates in respect of its concomitants in so far as it is what it is, are precisely Conceptions and Assents. [This is] because [the logician] investigates what conduces to Conception and what the means [to Conception] depends upon (for something to be universal and particular, essential and accidental, and such like); and he investigates what conduces to Assent and what the means to Assent depends upon, whether proximately (like something being a proposition or the converse of a proposition or the contradictory of a proposition and such like) or remotely (like something being a predicate or a subject). These are states which inhere in Conceptions and Assents in so far as they are what they are. So certainly its subject matter is Conceptions and Assents (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.14-20).

Here is part of Tûsî's rejection:

If what he means by Conceptions and Assents is everything on which these two nouns fall, it is the sciences in their entirety, because knowledge is divided into these two; whereupon what is understood from [his claim] is that the subject matter of logic is all the sciences. Yet there is no doubt that they are not the subject matter of logic…

The truth is that the subject matter for logic is the secondary intelligibles in so far as reflection on them leads from the known to the unknown (or to something similar, as do reductive arguments or persuasive arguments [146] or imaginative arguments and the like). And if they are characterised by the rider mentioned by the masters of this craft, Conceptions and Assents are among the set of secondary intelligibles in just the same way as definition and syllogism and their parts, like universal and particular and subject and

predicate and proposition and premise and conclusion (Tûsî (1974b) Ta‘dîl 144.21-u, 145.pu-146.3).

It is hard to know precisely what is being disputed. What we can note at this stage is that one point at issue has to do with the claim that Avicenna's identification of secondary intelligibles as logic's subject matter is inaccurate, and too narrow to achieve what he hopes it can.

Arguments aim to bring about Assent; more precisely, when Conceptions have been gained that produce in the mind both the meaning of the terms in a given proposition, and the form of composition of these terms, Assent “occurs when there takes place in the mind a relating of this form to the things themselves as being in accordance with them…” In fact, different kinds of discourse can bring about one or other kind of Assent, or something enough like Assent to be included in a general theory of discourse..

Since Avicenna had finished explaining the formal andquasi -formal aspects of syllogistic, he turned to its material aspects. With respect to these, syllogistic divides into five kinds, because it either conveys an Assent, or an Influence (ta‘aththur) of another kind (I mean an Imagining or Wonder). What leads to Assent leads either to an Assent which is Truth-apt (jâzim) or to one which is not. And what is Truth-apt is either taken [in the argument] as True (haqq), or is not so taken. And what is taken as True either is true, or isn't.

That which leads to true truth-apt Assent is Demonstration; untrue truth-apt Assent is  Sophistry. That which leads to truth-apt Assent not taken as true or false but rather as (a matter of) Common Consent(‘umûm al-i‘tirâf ) is - if it's like this - Dialectic (jada l), otherwise it's Eristic (shaghab ) which is, along with Sophistry (safsata ), under one kind of Fallacy Production (mughâlata ). And what leads to Overwhelming though not Truth-apt Assent is Rhetoric; and to Imagining rather than Assent, Poetry (Tûsî (1971) Sharh al-Ishârât 460.1-461.12).

Tûsî immediately goes on to lay out grounds for Assent to propositions, for example, because they are primary, or because they are agreed for the purposes of discussion. Propositions to be used as premises for Demonstration make the most irresistible demands for our Assent; premises for lower kinds of discourse make weaker demands.

Logic and Language

Al-farabi explains how logic, grammar and language relate to each other:

And this art (of logic) is analogous to the art of grammar, in that the relation of the art of logic to the intellect and the intelligibles is like the relation of the art of grammar to language and expressions. That is, to every rule for expressions which the science of grammar provides us, there is a corresponding [rule] for intelligibles which the science of logic provides us (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 68).

al-Farabi argues that logic and grammar both have some legitimate interest in language, but whereas grammatical rules primarily govern the use of language, logical rules primarily govern the use of intelligibles.

More precisely, al-Farabi explains that although grammar and logic share a mutual concern with expressions, grammar provides rules that govern the correct use of expressions in a given language, but logic provides rules that govern the use of any language whatsoever in so far as it signifies intelligibles. Thus, logic will have some of the characteristics of a universal grammar, attending to the common features of all languages that reflect their underlying intelligible content. Some linguistic features will be studied in both logic and grammar, but logic will study them as they are common, and grammar in so far as they are idiomatic. On the basis of this comparison with grammar, then, al-Farabi is able to complete his characterization of the subject matter of logic as follows: 'The subject-matters of logic are the things for which logic provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles' (Ihsa' al-'ulum, in Amin 1968: 74).

Alfarabi adds:

Logic shares something with grammar in that it provides rules for expressions, yet it differs in that grammar only provides rules specific to the expressions of a given community, whereas the science of logic provides common rules that are general for the expressions of every community. This is to say - logic is something of a universal grammar or, more strictly, providing a universal grammar is one of the tasks of logic.

Avicenna recognizes and attempts to deal with the close nexus between language and thought:

Were it possible for logic to be learned through pure cogitation, so that meanings alone would be observed in it, then this would suffice. And if it were possible for the disputant to disclose what is in his soul through some other device, then he would dispense entirely with its expression. But since it is necessary to employ expressions, and especially as it is not possible for the reasoning faculty to arrange meanings without imagining the expressions corresponding to them (reasoning being rather a dialogue with oneself by means of imagined expressions), it follows that expressions have various modes (ahwâl) on account of which the modes of the meanings corresponding to them in the soul vary so as to acquire qualifications (ahkâm ) which would not have existed without the expressions. It is for this reason that the art of logic must be concerned in part with investigating the modes of expressions… But there is no value in the doctrine of those who say that the subject matter of logic is to investigate expressions in so far as

they indicate meanings…but rather the matter should be understood in the way we described.

Ibn Sina criticized attempts to introduce linguistic concerns into the subject matter of logic. In al-Madkhal, Ibn Sina labels as 'stupid' those who say that 'the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning expressions in so far as they signify meanings (ma'ani)'. However, Ibn Sina does not deny that the logician is sometimes or even often required to consider linguistic matters; his objection is to the inclusion of language as an essential constituent of the subject matter of logic. The logician is only incidentally concerned with language because of the constraints of human thought and the practical exigencies of learning and communication. 'if logic could be learned through pure thought so that meanings alone could be attended to in it, then it would dispense entirely with expressions'; but since this is not in fact possible, 'the art of logic is compelled to have some of its parts come to consider the states of expressions' (al-Madhkal, in Anawati et al. 1952: 22-3). For Ibn Sina, then, logic is a purely rational art whose purpose is entirely captured by its goal of leading the mind from the known to the unknown; only accidentally and secondarily can it be considered a linguistic art.

As Sabra says, Avicenna seems to hold that “the properties constituting the subject matter of logic would be inconceivable without the exercise of a particular function of language” (Sabra (1980) 764).

However, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi were concerned to distinguish logic from grammar as many Arabic grammarians - whose linguistic theories were developed to a high degree of complexity and sophistication - were contemptuous of the philosophers for importing Greek logic, which they saw as a foreign linguistic tradition, into the Arabic milieu. This attitude toward Greek logic is epitomized in a famous debate reported to have taken place in Baghdad in 932 between the grammarian Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi and Abu Bishr Matta, a Syriac Christian who translated some of Aristotle's works into Arabic and is purported to have been one of al-Farabi's teachers. Abû Bishr argued that speakers of Arabic need to learn Greek logic. For him Logic comes ahead of Grammar:

"The logician has no need of grammar, whereas the grammarian does need logic. For logic enquires into the meaning, whereas grammar enquires into the expression. If, therefore, the logician deals with the expression, it is accidental, and it is likewise accidental if the grammarian deals with the meaning. Now, the meaning is more exalted than the expression, and the expression humbler than the meaning".

The extant account of the debate is heavily biased towards al-Sirafi, who attacks logical formalism and denies the ability of logic to act as a measure of reasoning over and above the innate capacities of the intellect itself. His principal claims are that philosophical logic is nothing but Greek grammar warmed over, that it is inextricably tied to the idiom of the Greek language and that it has nothing to offer speakers of another language such as Arabic.

Yahya ibn 'Adi, makes his case for the independence of logic from grammar based upon the differences between the grammar of a particular nation and the universal science of logic. He argues that the subject matter of grammar is mere expressions (al-alfaz ), which it studies from the limited

perspective of their correct articulation and vocalization according to Arabic conventions. The grammarian is especially concerned with language as an oral phenomenon; the logician alone is properly concerned with 'expressions in so far as they signify meanings' (al-alfaz al-dalla 'ala al-ma'ani ) (Maqala fi tabyin, in Endress 1978: 188). To support this claim, Yahya points out that changing grammatical inflections do not affect the basic signification of a word: if in one sentence a word occurs in the nominative case, with the appropriate vocalization, its signification remains unchanged when it is used in another sentence in the accusative case and with a different vocal ending.

Concluding Remarks

We have seen that the Greek syllogism underwent a variety of modifications in the Medieval Islamic environment. The involvement of analogical reasoning with syllogistics was an attempt to aid the process of legal reasoning, but it was the a priori metaphysical assumptions which de marcate thinkers most forcefully. AI-Fiiriibi's successfully raised the strength of analogy to that of a first order syllogism thereby insisting that the 'il/a must exist along with a judgment in all inferences. Inevitably, al-Farabi's departure from the a priori interpretation of the Qur'an attracted much adversity from literalists. It is to al-Farabi that thinkers such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya owe their whole point of departure.

In his article, "GhazaI'i's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic", Michael Marmura has stated:

The matter of the syllogism involves the epistemological status of its premises; the form, the rules for valid inference. To take the formal aspect first, the philosopher's logic is the more comprehensive as it includes, for example, the Aristotelian figures which, prior to Ghazali, were not included in nazar. It also included a more precise formulation of analogical reasoning which, for example, Alfarabi reduced to the first Aristotelian figure and which, probably following him, Ghazali urged his fellow theologians to adopt.

AI-Ghazal'i could not deny, at least at the level of social and legal disputation, the auspicious utility of the syllogism, replete with its probable analogies. It is only at the metaphysical level (causality) where al-GhazaI'i becomes uncomfortable with the encroachment of the Greek tools (logic) upon the Muslim texts. If scriptures conflict with the "findings" of the syllogism, then (unlike with Hume and his aversion to religion) the Scriptures are to be assigned metaphorical readings. The dissonance produced by religion and logic is diffused, and the syllogism can remain a welcome addendum to the legal ambiguities pondered by the jurists.

With Ibn Taymiyya we saw that all legitimate definitions proceed from the Qur'an when legal and/or existential conceptions are being formed. His attack on causality and modal logic, employed mainly by philosophers (but also by theologians) places him in a-causal agnostic position where the explication of metaphysics is concerned. One could almost assume that, in relation to logic, analogy and syllogistic proofs, the words of David Hume could be supplanted into the pen of Ibn Taymiyya who resisted all such logical attempts at a definitive metaphysical reconstruction:

But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all comparison and inference from observing the growth of a hair? Can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree?

And elsewhere:

If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to is.

Ibn Taymiyya would undoubtedly agree with much of this, but would reject Hume's skeptical ethos by maintaining revealed Qur'anic foundations. Indeed, he would take literally Hume's ambiguous statement, "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe". However, it would not be adverse to state that Ibn Taymiyya was also a skeptic, "a sceptic who was saved by religion", but nevertheless a skeptic. Thus his bid to question identity goes only so far. In the face of outright skepticism, then, comes outright faith.

 There remained the task of determining the proper limits and applications of syllogism so as to define and categorize the termqiyiis (a method of inference).

These discussions were the result of the theologically motivated defense of the concept of divine omnipotence that solely actuated existence, events, miracles and their causal links. It follows, then, that Theologians did not accept the doctrine of natural causation where phenomenal acts proceeded from a thing's quiddity. In their view Causal efficacy resided solely with God's divine will and contingent atoms and accidents were created ex nihilo. Thus, no causal uniformity in nature was inherently possible

For Muslims Greek logic was initially a means to defend metaphysical doctrines but the scope of logic was expanded to jurisprudence and language. All of this was attempted under the questionable notion that logic could remain doctrinally neutral and, at the same time, could be used to the advantage and defense of religion.  Eventually, the supposed neutrality of logic was vehemently called into question.

The use of analogy formed part of the Qur'anically derived juridical system. Complications arose once the syllogism was introduced. Suddenly, metaphysical assumptions were questioned; this gave rise to the ambiguous relationship between analogy and the syllogism especially when attempting to define qiyas. A variety of arguments surrounds this term and its translation into "analogy": "Qiyiis thus cannot be given the fixed definition of analogy. Instead, it should be regarded as a relative term whose definition and structure vary from one jurist to another." Qiyiis, denotes a way of inferring something from another, and is derived from the logical sciences which embrace both the syllogism and analogy. The concern here is to determine the central method by which juridical qiyas was endowed with "a wider definition as to include formal arguments".