Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Role of MuhammadBaqir Al-Sadr inShi'a Political Activism in Iraq From 1958 to 1980

By T.M Aziz

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Published on7th January, 2003 (4thZhul Qa'dah , 1423).This work was written by T.M Aziz and was contributed to Victory News Magazine byMr A.GKarim . Editing and design byZaynab El-Fatah. Technical work provided byS.Abidin

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Table of Contents

Dedication: 5

Chapter One: Sadr is Executed 6

Chapter Two: The Rise of Sadr 7

The Communist Party 7

Chapter Three: al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (Religious Academy) 8

Al-Hakim's Fatwa Identifying Communism With Atheism 8

Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959) and Iqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961) 8

Chapter Four: Back to Hawza 10

Mujtama’una (Our Society) 10

Planned Establishment of Western-style Universities 10

Usul al-Din College in Baghdad 11

Chapter Five: Golden Era For Modern Shi’a Politics 12

Chapter Six: Confrontation with the Ba’th Party 13

Ayatullah Khomeini Not Executed by Shah of Iran 15

Chapter Seven: Ashurra Commemorations Banned 16

Chapter Eight: Encounters with the Ba’th Party: The Final Episode 18

Sadr Issues Fatwa Against The Ba'th Party 19

Chapter Nine: Sadr Detained- Bint Al-Huda Gives Fiery Speech 20

Chapter Ten: Sadr Interrogated 21

Security Forces Come For them Both 22

Conclusion 23

Sadr Was Dragged into Public Opposition 23

References 25

Dedication:

This workis dedicated to the memory ofShahid MuhammadBaqir Al-Sadr and his Sister,Shahidah Amina bint al-Huda who were both executed in the name of God's religion.

Chapter One:Sadr isExecuted

On April 8, 1980, MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr was executed . His execution aroused no criticism from the West against the Iraqi regime, however, becauseSadr had openly supported theAyatullah Khomeini’s regime in Iran and because the Westwas distracted by the turbulence in Iran that followed the revolution. Governments both in the West and in the region were concerned that the Iranian revolution would be “exported,” and they set about eliminating that threat. WhenAyatullah Khomeini called upon Muslims in Iraq to follow the example of the Iranian people and rise up against the corrupt secularBa’thist socialist regime, they interpreted it as the first step in the spread of Islamic radicalism that would eventually lead to thedestabilisation of the whole region.

Sadr’s support of the Khomeini crusade against theBa’thists was considered a threat to the Iraqi regime and dealt with swiftly . Thousandswere arrested , and hundreds were executed without trial.Sadr as the head of a movement that had gained popular support from the success of the Iranian revolution, emerged as an anti-governmental leader and a catalyst for anti-Ba’thist activity, and was regarded by his followers as the “future Khomeini” of Iraq.(1) TheBa’thist regime decided that he had to be eliminated if the regime was to survive.Sadr’s execution, hence, was the act of an authoritarian regime fighting for its survival.

What made political Islam such a grave danger to the regimes in the area was not simply its popular appeal, but also the grassroots organizations that embraced its principles and political slogans.In almost all Middle East countries Islamic political groups had, since the turn of the century, been bent on achieving their principal goal of establishing a state based on the principles and teachings of Islam, and these very organizations had paved the way for the victory of the revolution in Iran,(2) Khomeini also found in them both the means and the political muscle to export Islamic revolutionary ideas to the rest of the Middle East.

Some of these organizations, including the IslamicDa’wa Party which Sadr founded, had existed in Iraq before the Islamic revolution in Iran and theBa’thist regime in Iraq.Sadr was also the mastermind behind a program that aimed to establish an Islamic state not only in Iraq,but throughout the Islamic world. The roleSadr played in theShi’a community in Iraq at large and his effort to counter the political acquiescence of the religious establishment and to confront the political oppression there made him theShi’a leader in that country. A detailed account of the events that led to the rise and fall ofSadr is therefore useful for placingSadr in the context of Iraqi politics in general and of the Islamic movement in particular.

Chapter Two: The Rise ofSadr

In 1958, a military coupd’etat began a period of great turmoil in Iraq that changed its political system and social fabric.The kingdom that had been engineered by British occupation forces in 1921, was replaced by a “republic” under the rule of a military junta ; the royal family and the ruling class were executed. The head of the military junta, GeneralQasim , who had led the revolt gained popular support unprecedented in modern Iraqi history, in part because of his policy of dissociating Iraq from Britain, which included withdrawing from the CENTO alliance known as the “Baghdad Pact” and closing British military bases in the country.(3)

The Communist Party

With the coup in place, a variety of political groups sought a place in the new regime, and in the process created anarchy. Some, of which the Communist Party was the best organized, were given a voice in the new regime. To increase his power base in the country,Qasim used the Communists to eliminate his colleagues in the ruling junta who were loyal to the Arab nationalist movements. In the bloody street fighting that followed, especially in the northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk where the nationalist officers attempted a military coup againstQasim , the Communists emerged as the major political force.(4)

TheShi’ia religious establishment, acquiescent since its last revolt against the British in 1920, found itself challenged by atheist political forces who, if left unchecked, might wipe Islam from the lives of the people,(5) for the nation seemed to be welcoming the secularism and antireligious sentiments of the new regime and to accept Communist propaganda, which denounced the religious establishment as reactionary and religion as an obstacle to modernization and the progress of the people. The Communist forces then began to penetrate the religious establishment itself in the holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, andKadhimiyah , even recruiting members of religious families, but the religious leadership (marja’iyya ) under the GrandMujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim took steps to overcome these challenges.

Chapter Three: al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (Religious Academy)

TheShi’a religious establishment in the al-Hawza al-’ilmiyya (religious academy)was divided between traditional scholars who advocated indifference or aloofness from politics and activists who advocated involvement. The latter organized themselves into theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ in Najaf(6) to counter antireligious trends in society.MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr was at that time a young scholar and was not considered an official member of theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ which was made up mainly of elders and well-knownmujtahids .(7) He was able, however, to exert influence on the group through his father-in-lawShaykh Murtaza AlYasiyn , who was acting president of the group, and through his older brother, Ismail al-Sadr , amujtahid who held a senior position in theJama’at . (8)

According toTalib al-Rifa’i , theJama’at al-‘Ulama ’ had as its immediate objective countering the Communistchallenge to Islam. In theirmanoeuvring , they were realistic enough to appease the popularQasim ; in their public leaflets and announcements, they supported him while attacking the Communists. As a reward, theQasim regime gave them access to the government-controlled radio. The weekly public statements of theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ were written bySadr and delivered byHadi al-Hakim.(9)

Al-Hakim's Fatwa Identifying CommunismWith Atheism

This appeasement did not last long. Conflict between the religious leadership andQasim erupted whenAyatullah Muhsin al-Hakim issued a fatwa that identified Communism with atheism and forbade Muslims from joining the Communist Party or helping its cause. The fatwa embarrassed theQasim government and forced GeneralQasim to abandon the Iraqi Communist Party.Qasim made several requests to visitAyatullah Hakim, but the latter refused to meet with him until he had abrogated the civil-liberties’ law, which violated the Islamic codes of inheritance.( 10)

For two years during the appeasement period theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ had been given permission to publish a monthly journal al-Awa’ (the Lights), whose objective was to counter the intense secular and antireligious propaganda that had followed the 1958 revolution.According toTalib al-Rifa’i ,Muhsin al-Hakim had suggested it, but since it was not acceptable for amarja ’ to sponsor a political publication, theJama’at al-’Ulama ’ was asked to assume the task.(11) Sadr wrote its editorials, which he used to outline the basic political program of the Islamic movement,(12) and in the process discovered that he had a talent for writing persuasively.

Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959) andIqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961)

During the same period,Sadr published his first philosophical study,Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy; 1959),(13) a critique of communism, the materialist school of thought, and dialectic materialism, in whichSadr argued, that communism had too many flaws and shortcomings to be considered the final truth for mankind. It could not be the answer to society’s problems because its basic assumptions were false,Sadr contended. His second work,Iqtisaduna (Our Economics; 1961), criticized the economic theories of communism and capitalism and introduced an Islamic theory of political economy in an effort to counter the argument by secularists and communists that Islam lacked solutions to the problems of man in modern time.Sadr’s major task inIqtisaduna was to show that Islam was concerned with man’s economic welfare. Infact his major intellectual achievement was his formulation of an Islamic economic doctrine based on Islamic law; he was the first to do so.

Sadr and his colleagues also confronted the secular forces on a third front through the establishment of theDa’wa Party. According toTalib al-Rifa’i , itwas founded byMahdi al-Hakim, al-Rifa’i and another, unknown, person. Al-Rifa’i later introducedSadr to the party leadership, andSadr eventually became its head,( 14) playing an important role in setting party structure and doctrine,(15) and later its supremejurisconsult (faqih al-hizb ). Even the name of the party,Da’wa (“Call”), was said to beSadr’s idea.( 16) The aim of theDa’wa was to organize dedicated Muslim believers with the goal of seizing power and establishing an Islamic state. To achieve that goal it would indoctrinate revolutionaries, fight the corrupt regime, and establish an Islamic state; then it would go on to implement Islamic laws and export the Islamic revolution to the rest of the world.( 17) This grand plan was said to beSadr’s idea. The first stage had to be clandestine to secure the party against a crackdown, so the partywas organized in a hierarchical multi-branch cell structure. Its activities were not to be limited to Iraq only, but were to go on in otherShi’a communities around the world. To that end, branches were secretly formed in the Gulfstates and in Lebanon; attempts to form them in Iran were unsuccessful.

Chapter Four: Back toHawza

By 1960,Sadr was one of the leadingmujtahids in the religious school of Najaf with a distinguished reputation in jurisprudence (fiqh andusul al-fiqh ).His seniors in theHawza therefore advised him to give up his political role in theDa’wa party and on the Awa’, which were detrimental to his leadership in theHawza and prepare himself for becoming the future grandmarja ’ of theShi’i (thehawza would not accept an activemujtahid for the position of grandmarja ’ , at least not a member of a political party).(18) Themarja ’ is usually selected from among the leadingmujtahid in thefiqh andusul al-fiqh , and the candidate has to prove his capacity in these areas by using the Socratic method in his teaching and by publishing his legal opinions. Since being appointed depended on the approval of the teachers andmujtahids in theHawza , the prospect ofSadr’s becoming the grandmarja ’ of allShi’as was in jeopardy so long as he continued to be politically active. Although pressure onSadr to give up his political activities seemed to come mainly from the formermarja ’Muhsin al-Hakim, many factions in theHawza were critical ofSadr’s activism. Led by Hussein al-Safi,( 19) a public campaign was launched againstSadr depicting his activities as harmful to the survival of theHawza .(20) A group in theJama’at , influenced by the propaganda againstSadr , began to show their dissatisfaction with him as well.(21) Sadr’s editorials in al-Awa’ also raised a disturbing question: they were subtitledRisalatuna (Our Message), but the enemies ofSadr questioned whether they represented the views of theJama’at at all. Finally, in 1961Muhsin al-Hakim, through his sonMahdi , persuadedSadr to give up his post asfaqih of theDa’wa party and as editor of Awa’.(22)

Mujtama’una (Our Society)

After his resignationSadr confined himself to the traditional way of life of theHawza , avoiding activities that might jeopardize hismarja ’ status . He even delayed the publication of his long awaited book,Mujtama’una (Our Society) because, according to some sources, the time was not ripe for it.(23) According to members of theDa’wa party, however,Sadr kept in touch with the party through one of his pupils.(24) As for the Awa’,Fadlullah notes thatSadr encouraged him to write its editorials.(25)

Planned Establishment of Western-style Universities

Sadr’s passion for reformwas now directed toward thehawza itself.First it was necessary to modernize its curriculum: for the past century and a half, Najaf’shawza had emphasized onlyfiqh andusul al-fiqh because that was what Najaf was noted for; other Islamic studies were considered minor or unimportant, and thehawza’s teachers paid little attention to them.Sadr was also uneasy over the irregular attendance of the students and their neglect of their studies. He felt that students must complete their courses with distinction before they could claim to be religious scholars (‘alim )(26) and proposed a new textbookon the grounds that the old ones were not written for students. A textbook, according toSadr , must take into consideration the student’s ability to comprehend the subject only gradually from its basic concepts to its most recent development.Sadr’s plan embraced not only the use of textbooks of the sort used in modern academic institutions, but the establishment of Western-style universities that would hold the student responsible for completing certain courses and passing regular examinations.

Usul al-Din College in Baghdad

To implement his reforms,Sadr helped establish theUsul al-Din College in Baghdad in 1964 and set up its curriculum.(27) He later wrote three textbooks on the Qur’an, theusul al-fiqh , and Islamic economics for first and second year college students.(28) However, his efforts to carry out his reforms in theHawza itself faced stubborn resistance from both students and its antiquated establishment.

Chapter Five: Golden EraFor ModernShi’a Politics

The years 1964-1968 were a “golden era” for modernShi’i politics, first because theBa’thist-Arif regime felt indebted to theShi’a religious establishment for its help in discrediting and oustingQasim’s regime and second because the new regime gained legitimacy from theShi’a leaders who supported their crackdown on Communist forces in the country (ironically, most of those prosecuted were alsoShi’as ). The relative freedom theShi’a enjoyed during that period resulted from the continuous struggle between theBa’thists andArif , between the Arab nationalists and the Communists, and among theBa’thists themselves. The regime was so preoccupied withthis internal fighting that it turned a blind eye toShi’a political activities, though later, it oustedShi’as from the few governmental posts they had gained underQasim .

Free from government interference, theDa’wa party increased its membership in the universities and among the intelligentsia. According toDa’wa sources, more than 1,500 copies of theDa’wa official, but underground, journal, theawt al-Da’wa ,were distributed to members and supporters in the University of Baghdad alone. Students showed their commitment in a march known as themawakb al-talaba (students’ procession) in Karbala at the annual commemoration of the martyrdom of the ImamHusayn . Al-Hakim expanded his influence by increasing enrolment in theHawza in Najaf and by developing plans to establish a Western-styleShica academy inKufa , where a college education would become available toShi’a youths who would someday be influential in political affairs.He also established new religiouscentres and libraries in several Iraqi cities directed by missionaries known aswukala ’ (representatives). The religious scholars of Baghdad andKadhimiyah organized an association, similar to theJama’at al-Ulama ’ in Najaf, known as theHay’at Jama’at al-Ulama ’fi Baghdadwa al-Kadhimiyah .(29)

Chapter Six: Confrontation with theBa’th Party

TheBa’th Party’s rise to power on July 17, 1968, started a new phase in the conflict betweenShi’a leaders,Muhsin al-Hakim and MuhammadBaqir al-Sadr , and the central government in Baghdad. The regime faced two leaders, whoboth had charisma and political clout, al-Hakim through his symbolic leadership of theShi’a worldwide, andSadr through his influence over theDa’wa . The stability of the new regime depended on withstanding them.Its first step toward limiting theShi’a’s power was to curtail their religious activities, which included the closing of theJawadayn elementary and high schools and theUsul al-Din college in Baghdad, confiscating the land and funds set aside for buildingKufa University, shutting down theRisalat al-Islam, the only religious journal the government allowed to be published at that time, prohibiting themawakb al-talaba in Karbala, expelling hundreds of non-Iraqi students from thehawza in Najaf, and issuing a law requiring Iraqis attending thehawza to join the armed forces.

TheShi’a leaders appeared tobe disorganized and theBa’th regime to catch them by surprise. Unaware of theBa’thist’s plan to eliminate the political structure of theShi’a community, its leaders met to figure out some peaceful means for dealing with the government and decided on a public protest. TheHay’at al-Ulama ’ suggested thatMuhsin al-Hakim visit Baghdad to mobilizeShi’a support against the government.(30) Al-Hakim took up residence inKadhimiyah to receive supporters;Sadr went to Lebanon to organize protest from abroad and use the office of theShi’a supreme council headed by his cousin Musa al-Sadr to campaign against the Iraqi government. Telegramswere sent by Musa al-Sadr to the heads of the Islamic states and Islamic groups calling attention to theBa’thist’s government harassment of the religious leadership in Najaf. The result of these efforts was disappointing. Only Nasser of Egypt, Faisal of Saudi Arabia,Iriyani of North Yemen, and theJama’at-i Islami of Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in Pakistan gave any moralsupport, and no one acted.

On his return to Iraq,Sadr , with the cooperation of theJama’at of Najaf and theHay’at of Baghdad andKadhimiyah , held a public meeting at the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf to support al-Hakim and condemn theBa’thist government action.The statement, which was delivered to the audience byMahdi al-Hakim, had been drafted bySadr .(31) The next step tobe taken against the government, according toMurtada al-Askari , was to organize a mass demonstration in Baghdad in support of al-Hakim.(32) However, before the plan was carried out theBa’thist government announced thatMahdi al-Hakim was plotting to overthrow the government in a military coup with the help of some generals andShi’a businessmen who had links to Iran and the West (by which they meant the United States and Israel).(33) This accusation put theShi’a leaders on the defensive and diluted their support. Mahdi al-Hakim was smuggled out of the country; al-Askari went to Lebanon; andMuhsin al-Hakim retreated to Najaf where he died a few months later. His successorAyatullah Khoei , the mentor ofSadr , refrained from taking any action against theBa’thist government.( 34)

AfterMuhsin al-Hakim died, theBa’th government intensified its efforts to reduce the influence of theHawza in Najaf by expelling its non-Iraqi students (the majority of students were foreigners) and monitoring the Iraqi students there. That threw the wholeHawza into chaos. To keep non-Iraqi students in the country so they could help resist the government,Sadr convincedAyatullah Khoei to issue an order (hukm ) to students to stay in Najaf and continue their studies.(35) Unwilling to antagonize the newShi’a marja ’ ,Ayatullah Khoei , who was considered to be above politics, theBa’th government postponed implementing its deportation policy. TheBa’thist regime then started to crack down on theDa’wa party. Many suspected members of the partywere rounded up in 1972 and sentenced to one to five years in prison .(36) SahibDakhiyl , known as Abu ‘Isam , died under torture in 1973.He was the organizer of the student procession held in Karbala(37) and was also believed to have been the head of theDa’wa party’s Baghdad branch.(38) A year later, about seventy-fiveDa’wa party members, some of them religious scholars, were detained by the security forces, and five, all of whom were believed to be leaders of theDa’wa party, were sentenced to death by the revolutionary court.(39) Sentencing these people, three of themulama ’, brought a public outcry and condemnation from the religious establishment, includingKhoei , Khomeini, andSadr .(40) In order to avoid a precedent for executing religious scholars of theHawza ,Sadr issued a fatwa forbidding students or scholars of theHawza to join any political party. Later that year,Sadr himself was detained by security forces and taken from Najaf to Baghdad for interrogation, but was soon released.(41)

In the post-Hakim era,Sadr was recognized in theHawza as amarja ’ and the heir-apparent of Grandmarja ’Ayatullah Khoei .(42) However, he was aware that themarja’iyya , theShi’as ’ only true source of political leadership, lacked adequate institutional underpinning, even though it was a thousand years old. In particular, it lacked the means of enforcing decisions on therank and file of ‘ulama ’. Additionally, themarja ’ traditionally made policies and arrived at decisions using an inner circle of close associates and family members to gather information, issue statements, and distribute religious funds. There was no formal procedure for making decisions or planning long-term strategy, and that often resulted in confusion that weakened the relationship between themarja’iyya and the people.

To enhance the power of themarja’iyya ,Sadr sought, as he put it, to transform what he called the “subjectivemarja’iyya ” into an “objectivemarja’iyya .” Themarja ’ , according toSadr , must conduct his affairs and guide his people using an organized structure. To conduct the affairs of theummah , themarja ’ should set up committees to manage educational affairs in thehawza , to support Islamic studies, research, and writing on essential subjects, to look after the affairs of the ‘ulama ’ who represent themarja ’ in other cities, to support the Islamic movement, and, finally, to administer financial affairs.

However, at that timeSadr was not ready to form the institutional structure of the “objectivemarja’iyya ” because he was not the suprememarja ’ , the symbolic authority for allShi’as , a position that would give him the financial and the religious power to carry out changes. The publication of his al-Fatawa al-Wadiha , a book on religious laws, was intended in a way to announce hismarja’iyya , and prepare himself and contenders in Najaf and Qum in the traditional manner to succeedAyatullah Khoei , the grandmarja ’Sadr also had a political motive behind his early indirect announcement of interest in themarja’iyya . He thought it would protect him from government prosecution.

Ayatullah Khomeini Not Executed by Shah of Iran

Once he was amarja ’,Sadr believed, the government would spare his life regardless of his political stand, because regimes in Iraq and Iran did not execute leading jurists. A case in point was the Shah’s decision not to executeAyatullah Khomeini after themaraji ’ in Qum issued a statement proclaiming that Khomeini as one of them.Instead the Shah expelled Khomeini from Iran.

In announcing hismarja’iyya ,Sadr somehow thought he was gaining political immunity. At the publication ofSadr’s al-Fatawa al-Wadiha , members ofDa’wa party andSadr’s admirers, mostly students and intellectuals, started referring to him as theirmarja ’ and leader.

Chapter Seven:Ashurra Commemorations Banned

In early 1977, theBa’th regime took the boldest step yet to curb theShi’a when it banned the annual ceremonies commemorating ImamHusayn’s martyrdom. The regime had tried but failed to prohibit them since 1970, especially in Najaf and in Karbala. That year, theBa’th leadership was determined to use any means necessary to stop the traditional procession from Najaf to Karbala, an event that generates considerable religiousfervour . Tens of thousands ofShi’a from all over Iraq participate in the pilgrimage, which usually takes four days to cover about fifty miles. The processionwas seen by the regime as hindering their policy of secularism and as providing the religious authorities with popular support.

Banning the procession in 1977 provoked riots in Najaf. Organizers distributed leaflets that called on people to participate in defiance of the authorities to protect their religious rights.(43) The public hearings organized by theBa’th Party and the governor of Najaf did not ease the tension but rather precipitated chaos.(44) An estimated thirty thousand people began their procession holding banners printed with verses from the Qur’an, such as “The power of God is above theirs” and “Victory shall come from God.”(45)

Faced with this defiance, the regime first met with the leaders of theprocession( 46) and sought the help of MuhammadBaqir al-Hakim, who informed theShi’a that the regime was willing to lift the ban on the procession if the rioters would stop chanting anti-government slogans. However, anti-Ba’thist sentiments ran so high by then that compromise was impossible. The government on its part mobilized a military brigade with tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets to block the way to the city of Karbala.(47) Hundreds of demonstrators were able to get into the city, however, because many officers and soldiers were sympathetic to the cause and were unwilling to obey the government orders to fire on people chanting religious slogans.(48) The government then mobilized theBa’th Party security and police to suppress the procession in the streets of Karbala and to detain as many people as they could. Hundredswere imprisoned , and many were injured.

The government then formed a special revolutionary court (makamat al-thawra ) headed by three high-rankingBa’th Party leaders to try the defendants.(49) Seven peoplewere sentenced to death and fifteen, including MuhammadBaqir al-Hakim, to life imprisonment. The incident also caused a split within theBa’th leadership itself. Some high-ranking members of the party judged the action unduly harsh and seemed hesitant to take strong action. An extremist group led by theBakr -Saddam factions won by expelling the moderate group, including the members of the Special Revolutionary Court, from their government and party positions.

The regime suspectedSadr of having had a part in the demonstration. Ithad been well organized , which suggested that theDa’wa Party was behind it. Al-Hakim, the head of the group who negotiated on behalf of the regime with the rioters, was a disciple and personal representative ofSadr . His failure to gain concessions from the rioters whose links were with theDa’wa , the mainSadr organization, was one of the signs that made the regime suspect thatSadr led a behind-the-scenes conspiracy. The regime’s security forces detainedSadr and sent him to Baghdad for questioning, but released him when the people demanded it in order not to instigate another riot by theHawza .