CHAPTER 3: THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF IBN RUSHD WITH REFERENCE TO HIS WORKS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Introducing this core chapter in this paper, attempts have been made to explore the peripatetic philosophical ideas he rendered along his works, to briefly define the principles of Islam concerning the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd and to trace the general theological differences among both the doctrines in general. This chapter will look to the inconsistent ideas found in the philosophical works of Ibn Rushd with a similar focus. It will try to give a general idea about the Islamic principles and consistent entity when it has been compared to the remaining ideologies arrived in the world. The purpose of this chapter is to make the understanding of the incoherent ideologies of Ibn Rushd and the consistency of Islamic principles in focus to the certain issues carry out the philosophical and theological importance.
3.2 THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
In twelfth century, philosophy was confronting so many critical approaches from those ones. When it is examined the onset of the critical approach Ibn Rushd tried too much to perform his duty as a philosopher to defend the philosophers from the severe attacks of critics over them from the side of Islamic jurisprudents and theologians especially after the criticism of al Ghazali by writing Thahafuth ul tahafuth, a sharp rebuttal over the doctrines of philosophers. Ibn Rushd defines the relation between philosophy and religion comparing the basic tenets of religion to that of philosophy especially through his writing of faslul maqal
.
Al Ghazali proclaimed not to believe in their ideas and it is all about irreligious and might be harmful to the Islamic believers. Then, Ibn Rushd aimed by writing faslul maqal fi ma bain al hikmah wal shariah min al ittisal to defend philosophy from the attack of Islamic jurisprudents and theologians, he wished to make philosophy and religion come in terms.
As it is the most important and largely discussed concept in Islamic philosophy it must be mentioned the function of philosophy and religion and how was the accord between them in accordance with the findings of the author.
Three main principles of the religion are the existence of god, the prophecy and the resurrection. Utterly, philosophy can’t cope with that of the ideals of the religion because of the revelation is out of the coverage of the philosophers and that is why philosophy keeps distinct from the religion in this matter. As an effort to harmonize the reason and revelation, Ibn Rushd asserts that the demonstrative truth (aqli) and scriptural truth (naqli) cannot conflict one another. Since religion is true and promotes the study, this leads to the knowledge of the truth where as demonstrative study does not lead to conflict with the scriptures. The law (shar`), as he refers, commands the contemplation of beings and the pursuit of knowledge about them by intellect (aql). Thus, the law (shar`) compels to study philosophy. That is why, as he assumes, there couldn`t be any possibilities of contradiction between philosophy and religion.
‘Anyway philosophy is the twin sister of religion and they are two friends who by their very nature love each other.’
One of the excellences of Islam, according to Ibn Rushd, is its accessibility and practicality to a wide range of followers. In many of his works, and particularly in his Fasl ul-maqal (Decisive Treatise), he argues that the highest form of wise reasoning cannot clash with the principles of religion. He claims here that philosophers are best able to understand properly the figurative passages in the Qur’an on the basis of their logical training, and that there is no religious condition that all such passages have to be interpreted literally. Philosophers should be vigilant when they do this not to offend the religious sensibilities of the less complicated. Language should be seen as a complicated vehicle for communicating information to different categories of audience. Religion is a means for the easy comprehension of the majority of the people, and where a hidden meaning exists it is up to the philosophers to discover it and keep it to themselves, while the rest of the people must accept the literalness of Scripture (shariath). But through a daring attempt to combine philosophy with religion, though he considers specific theme Islam produces he couldn’t bring both together and instead he made countless attempts to show the magnanimity of the certain philosophical teachings.
The function of philosophy is nothing more than the speculations on the beings and considering them in so far as they lead to the knowledge of creator.
It needs to know the creator a rational consideration beyond simple thinking. Demonstration (burhan) is what we call a certain type of reasoning to differentiate between the dialectical and rhetorical deductions. By which one can make a reach out to the knowledge of creator.
‘The objective of religion is defined in philosophical terms to obtain true theory and true practice. In this case we must consider the definition of al kindi to philosophy that is the true knowledge is the knowledge of God. The only way to know god is either apprehension or assent. Men whether they may the philosophers, theologians or the common people they are owed to any one of the three kinds of assent demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical respectively.’
Then the aim of philosophy resembles that of the religion amply.
3.3 IBN RUSHD AS A COMMENTATOR
Most of the works of Ibn Rushd have focused mainly on two aspects of his philosophy: psychology; the theory of the intellect or noetics and his religious philosophy as far as it is seen widely in his faslul maqal and manhijul adilla and in his tahafuthut tahafuth. Even though, his position on any philosophical issues can only understood in tahafuth, which is a better reading than the long repetitive commentaries. Some of the main problems dealt with in tahafuth; creation and emanation versus the eternity of the world, the providence of god and so on, have also made relevant discussions since today.
All of the commentaries written by the author were the mere explanations of Aristotle’s own treatises; rather they do not contain Ibn Rushd’s own philosophy. Since Ibn Rushd’s aim was to follow Aristotle’s philosophy explaining its obscurities and deleting the accretions of later centuries. Though, one could argue that Ibn Rushd followed Aristotle to expound his own ideas, and what he explained in tahafuth and other treatises were derivations upon him to reply for the objections speak up the scope of Aristotelianism and consequently of philosophy. It can be sum marized that Ibn Rushd would have regarded these works as in no way comparable with his scholarly commentaries.
Some of the long commentaries contain many digressions and they are mere extensive, in which he does not explain Aristotle’s meaning literally, sentence by sentence, but elaborates on the main argument and mentions objections of other authors and refuses them. In some of occasions, he even goes beyond Aristotle’s words and expounds what he thinks is implicit in his doctrines.
In addition to the difficulties resulting from reading Aristotle in translation, the text of the philosopher contains many puzzles about which scholars and philosophers are still at variance. This is particularly true of the metaphysical and cosmological views of Aristotle. Whereas the modern tendency has been to regard the inconsistencies of Aristotle’s concepts as being due to the evolution in his thoughts or in different viewpoints adopted in different treatises, Ibn Rushd, like most other cmmentators, has tried to interpret them away or to reconcile them. The ideas that there could have been variations in Aristotle’s thought would have appeared preposterous to Ibn Rushd that there cannot be variations in truthe itself.
3.4 ETHICAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
‘The rationalistic aspect of the peripatetic school, reached its terminal point with Ibn Rushd, who became most purely Aristotelian of Muslim peripatetic and rejected those Neo platonic and Muslim elements that had entered into the world view of the eastern peripatetic such as Ibn Sina’.
When it is considered the political facets of his works, it is his work made him a lodestar among the thinking scholars along his earlier period of writing, one of his most controversial works, his prominent work in politics, the interpretation of Plato’s Republic, which aims largely the criticism of the existing social order and studies ways to find solutions for it. The peculiarity can be noticed in these works is Ibn Rushd’s style of philosophy applied Plato’s theories to Ibn Rushd’s own times without hesitation, citing chapter and verses of where the political system had failed. He pointed out, the government of Córdoba should have been considered a autocracy from 1145 onward that is, since the end of Almoravid rule and the accession of the current Almohad dynasty, whose head was his patron and he recommended that it is needed to entire alterations along the administrative system of the state. In total, it was the major content of his political works.
Ibn Rushd’s major commentaries on the works of Plato, mainly on his the republic, and Aristotle, show his ample writings of his western thought. The republic was written its commentary with a deep analysis of the chance for society to be changed, and it was to upset some rulers lived there, a little number of Muslim ulama and some catholic theologians as well. It theorizes a well-defined order of politics and how to systematize the administrative setup of a nation or a state. It was thus largely Ibn Rushd’s texts that encouraged the thinkers of the Renaissance, to produce their theories of utopia,
or the ideal state. His notion can be attained through human effort and wise leadership and it won him further echelons of respect in the west and has indeed inspired reformers to the present day.
And it shows his ethical philosophy that he presents a firm review of the Ash’arite speculation of moral language, which interprets rightness and wrongness entirely in conformity with the commands of God in holy Quran. The function of that theory is to stress the power and authority of the God over everything, even over the meaning of ethical terms. What we have to do then is merely equal to God’s commands, and we have to do it because God has commanded it, so that everything we need to know about moral behaviour is encapsulated in the teachings of Islam. Ibn Rushd argued that on the contrary, a difference should be drawn between ethical notions and divine commands. Here he follows an Aristotelian approach.
The function of a plant is to grow and the aim of a saw is to cut, but what is the function of a human being? One of our ultimate aims is to be happy and to avoid actions which lead to sadness. According to Ibn Rushd, it is not complex here to align Islamic and Aristotelian principles: moral virtue leads to pleasure since, if we do what we should in accordance with our nature, we will be able to achieve pleasure. This pleasure may be interpreted in a number of ways, either as a mixture of social and religious activities or as an entirely intellectual ideal. However, the latter is possible only for a very no few of us, and neither religion or philosophy would approve of it as the ultimate aim for the majority of the community.
It is miserable that he takes mischievous pleasure in comparing the theologians of his own time, the Mutakallimun
, to Plato’s sophists (soofashayiya
). We can’t agree with his idea that he explains the theologians as a real danger to the state and to the purity of Islam. Ibn Rushd suggests to the ruler of that a ban on the publicizing of his administrative set up is too much appropriate for the implementation of the administration of a state. But it is said to be the incoherent political concept because Islam has been configured for an administrative set up accessible for both of the ruler and ruled. Somewhat, his theory of politics could not be practical concerning the administrative systems, which had existed after his time. More over it has been criticized that he did nothing to elucidate these political concepts, other than a mere expansion of the Plato’s concept of politics mentioned in the republic and other works.
In this and many of his other works, Ibn Rushd stresses the importance of a careful understanding of the relationship between religion and philosophy in the state. He insists that revelation (wahy) is superior to philosophy in that it makes its message more widely available than is possible for philosophy.
3.5 THE METHODS OF TA'WIL (INTERPRETATION)
“Ta'wil can be explained that there are certain Qur'anic verses which have an apparent (zahir) meaning and an inner (bathin) meaning.
The Ash'arites could interpret some such verses as that of "sitting on the Throne" (al-istiwa'), while the Hanbalites believed in its apparent meaning. But according to Ibn Rushd, Ta'wil is to be practiced only by the philosophers who are the people of demonstration and it must keep back as esoteric knowledge, far from being declared to the common people.
Ibn Rushd finds out the traditional fiqh mainly the principles of Fiqh, depends on four sources: the Qur'an, Tradition, ijma (consensus) and qiyas (legal syllogism). And he is of the opinion that it can be understood that the Qur'an is the only one source which has to be rationally interpreted. Thus, he conveys his strong disagreement with all other principles as it could not be considered.”
As far as he cannot agree with ijma also, he goes to emphasize that “al-Ghazali has no option to opine that they deserve the charge of heresy (kufr) for three things: their doctrine concerning the eternity of the world, their denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and their denial of bodily resurrection. Because, ijma is unanimous consensus of the scholars of a certain time and there was no consensus at any time about doctrinal matters, simply because it is mentioned in the Qur'an as well, that there are some matters which should be concealed. Only "those who are well grounded in learning" (al-rasikhoon fil-'ilmi) has the right to know. Therefore, al-Ghazili has no right to condemn the philosophers as irreligious on the basis of ijma'.
Ibn Rushd now goes on to explain that “religion is based on three principles in which every Muslim should believe. These are the existence of God, the prophecy, and resurrection. These three principles constitute the subject-matter of religion.”
But, as far as the Islamic theological principles are concerned, it can be identified as Quran says just before those verses Ibn Rushd cited above that ‘some of the verses of the Quran are ambiguous (muthashabihath) for the public and what they mean is only Allah’s knowledge and those ‘who are well grounded in learning (rasikoona fil ilmi), recognized by the public of certain time and they must be qualified to make ijthihad even as they are one who is deserved to make his personal observations according to the creed of Islam. Thus, doubtlessly it can be understood that al Ghazali is of this crew and no one can deny his charge of heresy against the philosophers as they made their arguments in contrary to the Islamic law (shariath).
Prophet (S.A) has declared that ‘my community must not gather on deviation from the truth’. That is why it can be determined that these like qualified scholars (ulama) can define certain specific ambiguous religious matters according to the necessity of time. Anyway, it is clear that the ambiguous instructions in the holy Quran and hadith must be interpreted by the well-grounded ones to share those things and copy them in to the holy creed of Islam. Thus, philosophers can’t go with their doctrine with the religious interpretation because the fact has been recognized that they don’t deserve the position of well-grounded in Islamic teachings.
3.6 PROPHETHOOD (NUBUWATH)
In case of prophet hood, Ibn Rushd severely criticizes that “theologians assume that the belief in the truth of the prophets lies in the belief in their miraculous acts, which are supernatural. And he ascribes that the Qur'an refuses to follow this way which was common to previous religions. For instance, he adds, ‘When the Arabs told Muhammad that they would not believe in him unless he made a spring flow from the dry earth, he answered through God's revelation: "I am only a human being, a messenger." The only miracle of Islam is its Holy Book, the Qur'an, which comprises the laws necessary for the well-being of man. Thus, there is nothing supernatural, since everything goes on according to natural laws resulting from the close association of causes and effects.”
According to Ibn Rushd, the prophet can perform things which the philosopher cannot such as teaching the masses, understanding the future, establishing religious laws and contributing to the pleasure of the whole of humanity. Through divine revelation (wahy) or inspiration, the prophet establishes laws which make it possible for people to attain an understanding of how they should behave. The qualifications of the prophet are to be established by political skill. Miracles (mu’jizath) are irrelevant here; only legislative abilities count. The philosopher has all the theoretical knowledge which the prophet has, but only the latter can embody this knowledge in a law and persuade the general public that this is a law which must be obeyed.
And Ibn Rushd asserts what the prophet has is practical knowledge as well as the theoretical knowledge of the philosopher, and so the prophetic law (shari’a) is similar to the philosophical law (namus).
But according to Islamic theological principles, in accordance with the words of imam sa’ad udhin thafthazani, ‘the second kind of the causes of knowledge is the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle (mu'jiza). A Messenger (rasool) is a man sent by Allah to creatures in order to convey His judgments; and the bringing of a book may be stipulated of him, in contrast to a prophet (al-nabi) for "prophet" is a more general term. An evidentiary miracle is something that annuls the customary way of things (khariq lil-aada), the purpose of which is to demonstrate the truthfulness of the one making the claim to be the Messenger of Allah.’
3.7 CAUSALITY (SABABIYYAH:)
The famous thinker M.M sheriff
underlines that the creation is an act of God. He created the world providentially, not by chance. The world is well ordered and is in a state of the most perfect regularity, which proves the existence of a wise Creator. Causality is presupposed. All the Rushdian proofs depend on the belief that nothing comes to be without a cause and that there is a definite series of causes emanating from a Prime Cause.
Ibn Rushd says in his Tahafuthul tahafuth in contrary to the strong explanation of Imam al Ghazali in Tahafuthul falasifah: “Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be rendered perfect through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. The man who denies the necessity of any item of knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not necessary knowledge”.
Thus, Ibn Rushd refers as illogical to deny all causal links merely because one does not wish causal links to be reduced merely to those types of efficient causation. Which are perceptible to humans, those things whose causes are not evident are still unknown and must be investigated, precisely because their causes are not evident; and since everything whose causes are not evident is still unknown by nature and must be investigated, it follows necessarily that what is not unknown has causes which are evident. The man who reasons like the theologians do not differentiate between what is self-evident and what is unknown.
It is to be analyzed here that the causality of every things returns unto God. Al-Ghazali asserts against causality along with his sharp criticism on various philosophical facets which come in contrast to the religious norms even in the case of fire burning a piece of cotton, the agent of the burning is not the fire, but God, ‘through His creating the black in the cotton and the disconnection of its parts’. Because, it is God “who made the cotton burn and made it ashes either through the intermediacy of angels or without intermediacy.” Repeated human remarks of fire burning cotton prove that there is no other cause but God.
As Ghazali puts it forward, the difference or relation between the cause and effect is not necessary to present it as a matter. ‘Because, this is not that and that won’t be this. The affirmation one does not imply to that of the other and the denial of the one does not imply to that of the other. That is why the existence of one is not necessitated by the non existence of the other.’
Al Ghazali asserts his position and that of the Asharites that the principles do not act by choice or that God does not act by will.
Likewise, in citing a story from the holy Quran, philosophers say that when Ibrahim (A S) was thrown into fire the fire re majored fire but he was free after all even from a small wound that is why this could only be possible through abstracting the warmth from the fire or through changing the essence of Ibrahim (A S), and making him a stone or something on which fire has no influence, and neither the one nor the other is possible. Unless, he may had to be burned as occurred in case of the pieces of cotton.
Al Ghazali answers clearly that the fire can burn two pieces of cotton as it cannot discriminate between two similar things, whereas we can believe that when certain prophet was thrown into fire, he was not burnt because there must have originated from god, from the angels a new attribute in the fire which confined its heat to itself, so that the heat was not communicated to the prophet. Or there might have originated a new attribute in the prophet’s body which enabled it to resist the influence of fire, although it had not ceased to be composed of flesh and bones.
‘The real essences (al-haqiqa) of things exist in reality and that the knowledge of them is verifiable. The causes of knowledge for all creation are three: the sound senses, true narrative (khabaru swadiq), and Reason, ’
is a better description for the confusion in the causes of knowledge and different arguments on it. ‘True narrative (khabaru swadiq), is of two kinds: one of them is the mutawatir narrative, and it is the narrative established by the tongues of people of whom it is in conceivable that they would agree together on a falsehood. It brings about necessary knowledge such as the knowledge of former kings in past times and of distant countries. The second kind is the narrative of the Messenger aided by an evidentiary miracle, and it brings about deductive knowledge, and the knowledge established by it resembles the knowledge established by necessity in certainty and in fixity.’
Of course this is a clear picture drawn by Sa’ad Udhin Thafthazani in his Sharhul Aqayid and we can find answer to any kind of confusions arise in the time of the discussion over the matter of the causes of knowledge.
As far as the explanation of Saad dhin thafthazani is concerned, the causal relation to everything is to be divided into three: the sense perception which is hearing, seeing, touching, smell, and taste; the true narrative; either muthawathir or narrative of the messenger, prophet who is sent from Allah into people to convey his message with the support of evidentiary miracle and what is caused to know by the reason (aql).
So, it is deniable of course the argument of causality presented by Ibn Rushd that everything is referred as a result of a prime cause. Rather, it became clear by the explanation of Islamic principles of famous theologian Saad dhin thafthazani that the cause of the knowledge is as it was mentioned earlier. And it can be said that the doctrine of Ibn Rushd in this case which may lead to the deviation a certain sects came after him. Furthermore, it is their attempt to deny the creation of the world is an act of god because, what eternally exists cannot be produced by being a temporal. So, a temporal origin is indispensable for an action. That is why they cannot indeed deny these facts and affirm that the causes and effects result in the actions and the creation was accidental from the God.
The omniscience of God, his creation of the world and his own existence shows the cause is the intellect (aql) and scripture (shar’) too. The burning of a piece of cotton with fire shows the cause is the intellect (aql). It means the cause results the knowledge and these causes are used as tools to know the fact of burning of fire. And, also by the knowledge of divine creation of fire in such a course can only attained by the intellect (aql). So, these are the causes of knowledge result in every case whereas the philosophers assert that either intellect or five senses can only cause the knowledge to the beings. The scriptural knowledge from hadith and the holy Quran as it is the major part of the religious teachings. They ascribed the intellect as another which results assumption, experience and information on the rise of every issues. All of these will cause from the scripture (shar’). These are all the assertions of the theologians configure the problematic strands and refer the causes of every occurrence eventually they reach into the establishment of the fact on the existence of the God and his attributes. And it is the answer for the flimsy arguments of philosophers arise in this issue.
3.8 ALLAH AND HIS ATTRIBUTES (SWIFATH)
Karan Amstrong
underscores ‘the philosophers had to subscribe to the creed of obligatory doctrines which Ibn Rushd listed as follows:
-The existence of God as Creator (swani’) and sustainer of the world.
-The unity of God.
-The attributes (swifath) of knowledge, power, will, hearing, seeing, and speech which are given to God throughout the Quran.
-The uniqueness and incomparability of God clearly asserted in Quran
“there is nothing like unto him”.
-The creation of world by God.
-The validity of prophesy (nubuwath).
-The justice of God.
-The resurrection of the body (jasad) on the last day’.
We cannot agree indeed with this author fully that he goes astray from the religious norms to that of his personal views by which he became satisfied whereas Ibn Rushd’s famous work al kashf an manahijil adillah is almost around this metaphysical issue to find out the road to the god and its methods mentioned in the holy Quran regarding the existence of god and the knowledge about his attributes. The core of al-Ghazali’s attack on philosophical ideas in this issue and entirely it is centered on the relationship between ‘God and the world’.
The Muslim philosophers, following Aristotle’s Neoplatonic commentators, affirm that God’s self-knowledge implies His knowledge of all universals. In man this knowledge forms a plurality, in God it is unified. Ibn Sina subscribes to the Qur’anic words that no particle in Heaven or Earth escapes God’s knowledge, but he holds, as prophets had done before, that God can know the particular things only in a universal way, whatever this means. Ghazali takes it to mean that God, according to Avicenna, must be ignorant of individuals, a most heretical theory. For Ibn Rushd, God’s knowledge is neither universal nor particular, but transcending both, in a way unintelligible to the human mind.
Regarding the knowledge of God, Ibn Rushd seems to subscribe to the view of the philosophers that God apprehends His own being only. With the philosophers this supposition is necessary in order that God may retain His unity, for if He should recognize the multiplicity of things, He would have multiplicity in His own being. This line of thinking forces God to live entirely within Himself and has knowledge of the existence of His own self only and nothing besides that. In this case God’s omniscience becomes doubtful. Obviously, this was only a twisted interpretation of the doctrine of the philosophers forced upon them by the theologians in order to bring them to an embarrassing predicament.
The philosophers agree that the world has a maker that the god is the maker or the agent of the world and that the world is his action or product. Here are three reasons arise in accordance with these doctrines the nature of the action, the nature of the agent and the relationship between the action and the agent. According to first reason, it is essential for an agent to have free will for the action on contrast to that of the philosophers they insist that god has no free will and he has no attribute at all so whatever precedes him is a necessary consequence. And as per the second one, the reason found in the action is that an action must have a beginning in time. And the last and third reason is what is found in the relationship between the action and the agent is according to them god is one and only one proceeds from one. But how can we agree with this idea as the world is composed of different things and how can it proceed from him?
Ibn Rushd’s system has greater elasticity; it vouchsafes that God in the knowledge of His own essence knows all the things of the world, for finally He is the ultimate sources and ground of them all. God’s knowledge is not like that of man’s; it is a higher kind of knowledge of which we humans can form no idea. This is because God would have sharers in His knowledge if such happens. Furthermore, God’s knowledge like that of human beings is not derived from things; rather things derive their being through God’s knowing them. God’s act of creating and knowing is the same in the since that God’s knowledge is verily the cause through which things come into existence. Ibn Rushd does not circumscribe God’s knowledge merely to the universals. For him it is not legitimate to make the distinction between the particulars and the universals with references to God’s knowledge; this distinction is of human origin and does not apply to God. God’s knowledge can be called neither particular nor universal. Hence the accusation of the theologians that the system of Ibn Rushd leaves no scope for God’s omniscience or knowledge of the world with its multiplicity of particulars is altogether unfounded.
As god is an agent, he is not conceivable that god have been able to avoid his action such as the shadow is unavoidable to a person or the light is to the sun. Here, we see that the light is not the creation of the sun but it is depended on it and the action of the sun is inescapable to the being of its light. Here the agent is on the whole a cause, and the lamp is the cause of the illumination as the sun is the cause of light. So, the agent of the action is the ultimate cause for the creation of the world and all the heavenly bodies and the whole things excluding him.
Ibn Rushd says on the attributes of god that God is qualified by seven main attributes knowledge, life, power, will, audition, sight, and speech. They are human qualifications considered in their absolute. He continues that the common people may believe according to the apparent meaning of the text that He sees, hears, speaks, etc. The people of demonstration should not expound their interpretation before the masses. The doctrines of both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites are unsound. Ibn Rushd criticizes their solutions in his book alManahij and at length in the Tahafut. He holds that in the case of the attributes, without affirming or negating them, one must follow the apparent meaning mentioned in the Qur'an. As to philosophical interpretation, this must be kept esoteric.
“After the discourse of Ibn Rushd on the affirmation of causality, he tries to exemplify his concepts on the attributes of Allah are only the agents to subscribe the causes from him. So, the causes have been transferred through his attributes and these are the agents of those causes. So, he asserts that the god is the real agent of all the actions of all the creatures.
Along with his insistence that the God is a real agent, al-Ghazali was concerned to provide God with real knowledge of the everyday events of the world he created. Ibn Sina argued that God is limited to knowing only very general and abstract features of the world, since any other sort of knowledge would diminish him as an eternal and immaterial being. al-Ghazali objects that any God which is acceptable to Islam must know the everyday events of our world. Ibn Rushd suggests that on the contrary, this would make God into someone very like his creatures and would provide him with knowledge that is beneath his dignity. God’s knowledge is superior and unique because he is not limited to receiving information from the world, as is the case with finite creatures like human beings. He is the Creator (swani’) of the objects in the world, and he knows them in a more perfect and completes way than we can hope to attain. This opinion added by Ibn Rushd suggests that God cannot know individuals as such. The best knowledge is abstract and universal, and this is the sort of knowledge which God can be thought to enjoy.”
Imam Thafthazani concludes in ‘the creed of islam’ as ‘He has attributes from all eternity subsistent in His essence. They are not He nor are they other than Him. And they are Knowledge and Power and Life and Might and Hearing and seeing and willing and Desiring and Doing and Creating and Sustaining. It is known that each of these attributes points to a neither Idea superadded to what is understood by the term "the Necessarily Existent, " nor are these attributes to be taken as synonymous terms. Furthermore, if a derivative term can be properly predicated of a thing, that thing necessarily possesses the source from which that term is derived. And thus, it has been established that Allah possesses the attributes of Knowledge, Power, Life, and so on. This is unlike the view of the Mu'tazilites, who asserts that Fie is to know without possessing Knowledge; He is Powerful without possessing Power, and so on. But this view of theirs is self-evidently impossible, for it is analogous to our saying, "A thing is black but there is no blackness in it." And furthermore, it has already been established in the statutes (al-nusus) that Allah possesses Knowledge, Power, and other attributes. Finally, the procession from Allah of acts of which He has perfect understanding points to the existence of Knowledge and Power in Him, not merely to the fact that He can be described as Knowing and Powerful.’
Imam Thafthazani referred the attributes of Allah as ‘they are not he nor they other than him’. It is a mere explanation carries deft meanings of the criticism of Ibn Rushd’s philosophical doctrines that suggests that god is the real agent and all other causes are giving the results of the actions because, ‘these are neither He nor they other than him’. But these are being possessed from him.
So, every attribute are his essentialities and must be possessed from him. These are not be possessed from him. These are the ideas superadded to the term ‘necessarily existent’ (wajibul wujood), where as these are not to be considered as synonymous terms because, every attribute have been possessed from Allah in its completion according to the significance of every single attributes. Then, it can be assumed that the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd on Allah and his attributes could not be considered as plausible as far as the clarifications of the Islamic principles.
3.9 FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION (QALAA’ AND QADR)
It is a problem which led different Muslim sects to be divided in accordance with different views in theological principles and even to charge heresy and blasphemy each other.it is one of the core attributes of Allah. Allah has free will and he predestines good and bad, vices and virtues for every being in the whole world. So, the man is predestined and he acquires the power to act. That is the acquisition (kasb) in contrary to Ibn Rushd’s view it is self-contradictory and which leads to fatalism.
Ibn Rushd asserts that Allah is just and never does injustice to none. He has created ‘good’ essentially and ‘bad’ accidentally for the ‘good’. Good and bad are similar to fire which has many uses for the well being of things, yet in some cases it may be harmful. This Rushdian theory supports the optimism that prevails in the world and which sponsored fatalism which is irregular to Islamic principles.
According to Ibn Rushd, the term al qadaa (free will) refers to the perfect commanding, decreeing, ruling and accomplishing and perfect precision in execution while al qadr (Predestination) refers to the setting, commanding, executing, and encompassing in due and precise proportions. Holy Quran underlines that ‘then he completed and finished from their creation as seven heavens in two days and he made each heaven its affairs
’.
This problem has led Muslims to be divided into two groups. The one believed that man’s wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement and that according to these he will be either punished or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites say that man can do action, but the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God. This is the ultimate idea given by Asharites and this is the most accepted one according to us.
Al Ashari founder of school, Abul Hasanil Ashari
, which was named after him, took an almost completely opposing stand on all major issues advocated by the mu’thazilah. Al ashari, in his al ibnah as usul al diyanah, uses al qadr in an active sense to affirm God’s power of determination and that, both good and bad, are attributed to God. While in kitab al luma, he defines al qadaa as the decree of god which is a creation and includes what is right, such as acts of obedience and what god has not prohibited, and it also includes what is wrong, such as unbelief and acts of disobedience.
Al Ghazali discusses al qadaa and al qadr in the same manner, namely, that god, who created man, his powers and his movements, also created all his actions and that all his actions are dependent upon god’s power. He argues firstly, since the power of god is perfect and unlimited, it cannot but the actions of man be created by god. And secondly, since all man’s actions are dependent upon the power of god, there is no reason to differentiate some movements of man from all man’s actions, as their very essence is equally dependent upon god. It is obvious the basis of Al Ghazali’s argument is aimed to quash the view that differentiates certain actions by man over which god has power and certain actions of man over which has no power.
So that, with no doubt, to believe in al qada and al qadar is not to deny man freedom of choice.
Surah Al Insan refers to this truth ‘has there not been a man over period of time, when he was a thing worth mentioning? Verily we had created man from nuthfa, in order to try him so we made him hearer and seer. Verily we showed him the way whether he be grateful or ungrateful’
. this is the concept of free will clearly mentioned in holy Quran and what Sunni scholars generally advocate.
Imam Thafthazani speaks about this issue in contrast to that of the philosophers with ultimate evidences show the fact. ‘The question on the justice of Allah, which was a rallying point for the Mu'tazilites
as well, went back to very early debates about the punishment of sins and man's responsibility for his actions. Christian teaching regarding predestination influenced these controversies even though discussion was inevitable from what appeared in the Qur'an and Traditions. Allah is described as having created the world and established His decrees in eternity. Some creatures are destined to do ‘good’, others to do ‘evil’; some are Believers, others are Unbelievers. Men are also urged to repent and turn to Allah. Had it been possible to identify absolutely the body of Believers with those who do ‘good’ and obtain entrance into jannah, and the Unbelievers with those who do ‘evil’ and deserve the hell, there would have been little place for dispute. The Qadarites
, who appear to have been forerunners of the Mu'tazilites, said that man possessed free will to choose good deeds. The Kharijites
taught that one who committed a great sin must be an Unbeliever; the orthodox Muslims, influenced by the Murji'ite
teaching which delayed judgment on sinners, since it is Allah who passes judgment, said that the professing Muslim who is an evil-doer should not be considered an Unbeliever. The Mu'tazilite position also hinted at delay or at least uncertainty by saying that the evil-doer is in a middle position and not to be identified with the Believers or the Unbelievers. In general, they held that his final destiny rests on his actions and on the absolute justice of Allah. Faith is not granted freely to some and withheld from others. Allah acts for the good and the guidance of man. If man accepts, he enters jannah; if he refuses, he receives the punishment he deserves.
As to the statement of the Asharites, philosophers answer that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity.
God is just and never does injustice to man, as declared in the Qur'an. The nature of man is not absolutely good, although good is dominant. The majority of mankind is good. God has created ‘good’ essentially, and ‘bad’ accidentally for the good. Good and bad are similar to fire which has many uses for the well-being of things, yet in some cases it may be harmful. This Rushdian theory supports the optimism that prevails in the world.
The Asharites
have expressed a very clear opinion to elucidate the religious facets on divine justice and injustice; both with regard to reason and religion. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They confirm that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions. So when a man’s action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust, He is unjust say that whatever has not been imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just nor unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in it be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good and injustice as bad.
3.10 CREATION OF THE WORLD
As far as the doctrine of the eternity of the world is concerned, he does not deny the principle of creation but only offers an explanation of it which is different from that given by the theologians. Ibn Rushd apparently seems to submit that the world is eternal but at the same time makes the important distinction, as empathetically as he can, between the eternity of God and the eternity of the world. There are two kinds of eternities: eternity with cause and eternity without cause. The world is eternal because of a creative and moving agent eternally working upon it; God, on the other hand, is eternal without a cause. The priority of God to the world does not consist with reference to time; God’s existence does not imply time, since He exists solely in timeless eternity. God’s priority to the world consists solely in His being its cause and that from all eternity. For Ibn Rushd there is no creation ex nihilo once for all, but rather a creation renewed from moment to moment. According to his views, a creative power is perpetually at work in the world, moving it and maintaining it. it is easy to reconcile this notion with that of evolution and even with the Bergsonian
type of evolution, through with Ibn Rushd it is not so much the creatures as the creative power which evolved, the final result being the same.
Likewise what happened before in those arguments, the same we can see that philosophers here also fail to reach into the truth and they are not ready to go with that of the Asharites’ theological ideas.
The world along with the totality of its parts, the heavens and what is in them and the earth and what is on it, is a thing originated, that is, everything except Allah of the existent things (al-maujudat) by which the Maker is known, is called the world of bodies (al-ajsam), the world of accidents (al-a'ral), the plant world (al nabat), the animal world (al-hayavan), and so on. The attributes of Allah are excluded [from the things making up the world] because they are not other than His essence, just as they are not the essence itself.
This means the world is something brought from non-existence into existence, meaning that it was once non-existent (ma'dum) and then it existed. This is in opposition to the Philosophers, insofar as they held to the position of the eternity (qidam) of the heavens, including their respective matters (mawadd), forms (suwar), and shapes (ashkal), and the eternity of the sub-lunar elements (al-anasir) including their respective matters and forms, but these forms are only specific forms, inasmuch as the elements were never without form. Definitely, the Philosophers used the term "being originated" with reference to that which is not Allah, but they used it in the sense of being dependent on something else, not in the sense of being preceded by non-existence.
So, we can simply understand what the word ‘originated’ means as it was referred by imam thafthazani above that is something brought from non-existence into existence not it is dependent on something else. It shows their tenacity to agree with the idea of Asharites and they are standing firmly on their rubbish discourse.
Imam thafthazani continues in his work about the creation of universe that ‘In the matter of the origin of the universe the Qur'an everywhere teaches that Allah is Creator and Maker. Repeatedly man's nothingness is contrasted with the power and wisdom of Allah who brings all things into existence. Most Muslim philosophers, through the use of an amalgam of the Neoplatonic
Chain and the Aristotelian Cosmos, came to look at the world not so much as a creation but an emanation from the Deity. The language of the Qur'an, because of its implicit pantheism, lent itself to this interpretation. Both al-Ash'arl and al-Maturldi
believed that Allah had created the universe out of nothing. This created world consists of substances and accidents; the former subsist in themselves, the latter only in something else. But the unique contribution of Islam in the realm of philosophy was an elaborate atomic theory which is a combination of material atoms and time atoms into a complete system to explain the origin and working process of the universe. Maimonides
, who gives in The Guide for the Perplexed a most systematic summary of the theory, says that Muslims borrowed it from the Greek philosophers but notes that there are fundamental differences between the Muslim position and that of Epicurus
and other atomists
. al-Baqillanl
has been called the original atomist among the Muslims.
This is a matter for consideration, inasmuch as this is the meaning of "eternal" and of "originated" according to what the Philosophers say. But "the originated" is defined by the Mutakallims as that thing the existence of which had a beginning, meaning that its existence was preceded by nonexistence; and "the eternal" is the contrary of this. The mere connection of the originated thing with something else does not require, according to this meaning, that it be originated, but mere connection permits it to be in need of something else, proceeding from it and lasting as long as it lasts, which is just what the Philosophers held in claiming that its eternity is one of the possible, just like primary matter (al-hayulah), for example. Certainly whenever we establish, by means of a proof that does not rest on the origination of the world, which the world preceded from the Maker by His choice rather than of necessity, then the proposition that its existence is connected with the Creating of Allah is a proposition that it is originated. And from this one may go on to say that it applies to every part of the world, thereby answering the one who asserts that some parts, like primary matter, are eternal. Or the Philosophers maintain that some parts are eternal, meaning that they were not preceded by non-existence, which, however, does not mean that the world was not created by something outside itself.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we do not admit that Creating is inconceivable without the existence of the created thing, and that Creating has the same relation to the thing created as the act of striking has to the one struck. Striking is an attribute showing relationship which is inconceivable without the two things related, namely, the striker and the one struck, but Creating is a real attribute that is the basis for the relationship, which is the bringing of the non-existent out from non-existence into existence, but not the relationship itself. Yet even where it the relationship itself, according to the terminology used by the Early Theologians, then the proposition, which verifies this relationship as true without there being a thing which was actually created, would be a contention and a denial of that which is necessary. And this proposition that Creating bears the relation to the thing created that striking does to the thing struck] is not to be rejected by saying that striking is an accident the continuance of which is impossible; for [even if it is an accident] it must be connected with the thing acted upon, and pain must pass on to the thing acted upon, inasmuch as it exists at the same time as the action, since where it delayed it would become non-existent. This is unlike the action of the Creator. His action is from eternity and of necessity endures, continuing until the time of the existence of the thing acted upon.’
Al Ghazali elucidates the discourse of them in the incoherence of the philosophers that ‘The philosophers assert that the world is an action of god and is to be found in a condition for an action. Here, an action must have a beginning in time. But according to their discourse, the world is eternal (khadeem) not temporal. An action means something to come out of non existence into existence with a temporal origin. In this case it is inconceivable because what eternally exists cannot be produced by being given a temporal origin. So a temporal origin is an indispensable for an action. Then, how can they consider that the world is eternal despite these clinching evidences?’
The demonstration of these arguments between the theologians and philosophers is the judgment that the world, what is other than him and his attributes, is temporal (haadith) and all is created by Allah. So, all of these creatures were brought from non existence to existence by the omnipotent Allah.
3.11 THE SOUL (ROOH)
Ibn Rushd left behind nearly ten treatises on the soul (nafs), the intellect ('aqi) and conjunction (ittisal), all of which are lost in the original Arabic, with the exception of an addendum to the doctrine of the rational faculty within an Epitome (Mint tasar) of the De Anima in the Cairo manuscript; this addendum being, apparently, a commentary or part of a commentary on the Risalat al-ittisal of Ibn Bajja Most of it is in Hebrew and Latin translations.
Sir Muhammed Iqbal says that ‘In history of Muslim thought, Ibn Rushd approached the question of immortality from a purely metaphysical point of view and ventures to think, achieved no results. He drew a distinction between sense and intelligence probably because of the expressions nafs and ruh used in the Quran. These expressions, apparently suggesting a conflict between two opposing principles in man, have misled many a thinker in Islam. However, if Ibn Rushd`s dualism was mistaken, for the word ‘nafs’ does not seem to have been used in the Quran in any technical sense the kind imagined by Muslim theologians intelligence, according to Ibn Rushd, is not a form of the body it belongs to a different order of being, and transcends individuality. It is there for universal and eternal. Which means since unitary intellect transcends individuality, its appearance as so many unities in multiplicity of human persons is a mere illusion. The eternal unity of intellect means the everlastingness of humanity and civilization, not the personal immortality.’
Here we can check it out the arguments of the philosophers in the issue of the soul. ‘They argue mainly the soul can be perished following three:
1. Along with the death of the body.
2. By the occurrence of the contrary of the soul which comes to replace it.
3. By the power of a powerful agent.’
Here, it is false to say that ruin of the soul is the ruin of the body too because the body is not the bedrock of the soul. It is only a tool used by the soul with the intermediation of certain powers which subsist in the body. So, the ruin of the tool must not need the ruin of one who uses this tool.
So, he remembers that Aristotle's thesis on the immortality of the soul is that all Made entities generable and corruptible composed of matter and form. Major Issue, the same that eventually become infrastructure, does not exist unless it is 'Science' and as such, is really synonymous with pure possibility.
In this case, this argument is based upon the theory that the death of the body does not cause death of the soul because of the soul does not subsist in the body which has died, not because of the body is a tool used by the soul.
Secondly, though they don’t consider the soul as subsisting in body, yet it is evident that there is a connection between the soul and the body because a soul does not come into existence unless a body exists. In total, Ibn Rushd is firm on this opinion that the human soul is related to its body, as Form is to Matter. He is completely in earnest on this point. The theory of numerous immortal souls he most decidedly rejects, combating Ibn Sina. He insists that the soul has an existence only as a completion of the body with which it is associated.
Ibn Rushd appears to argue that as we become more involved with immortal and eternal knowledge, and with universal and abstract principles, our mind becomes identical to a degree with those objects of knowledge. So, once we have perfected ourselves intellectually and know everything that there is to know about the formal structure of reality, there is no longer really any `us’ around to do the knowing. Ibn Rushd regards our progress in knowledge as equivalent to a lessening of our ties with our material and individual human characteristics, with the radical result that if anything survives death, it must be the species and not the individual. Temporal and finite creatures are destructible, but as members of a species we are permanent, although only the species itself is entirely free from destruction.
And its response has been clearly expressed the entire proof for the non divisibility of the human soul through the works of al ghazali that there is a reason to reject the division of the soul as incompatible with the need for rational. Let's imagine whether the soul of Zaid is identical with that of Amr? If identical, it would be ridiculous, for each one of the two knowing that it is not the same as any other state. If souls are the same, they are equal with respect to cognition. But if you say that the soul of Zaid is not the soul of Amr and that this duplication is required as a result of the division of the two souls’ relationship to the bodies, and it can be concluded that the division that is one which does not have the size or the amount is obviously impossible. How it can become and that is one of the two and then restores the oneness? Something like this can be visualized in the case, which has the size or quantity. The presence of both knowledge and ignorance in an individual's personality is an absolute impossibility, while they can be found separately in two different people. Both green and black cannot be on eye, while the eyes of two different people can be green and black. This indicates that the soul is indivisible object. All agreed learned of all ages to lead the human mind to believe that the human soul is a part of the universe, which is an integral part because part belongs to all, and here there is no whole. It can be called part only in the sense in which we can assume to be one part of the ten. It is absurd to think that it occupies space, because this implies division session. It is a mistake to think of something that occupies space, and so far does not allow division. This is against the rules of logic and engineering sciences. If an individual atom is between two other atoms, not one of the two sides to come into contact with the same thing the other, or are two different things?
3.12THE DAY OF RESURRECTION
According to the philosophers, the fact that it is a substance independent of a body and is immaterial shows that a corruption of the body cannot affect it. This, as a matter of fact, is a truism, since the meaning of substantiality and immateriality for the philosophers implies already the idea of eternity. On the other hand, if the soul is the form of the body, as is also affirmed by them, it can only exist with its matter and the mortality of its body would imply its own mortality, as Ghazali rightly points out. The Arabic philosophers through their combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism hold, indeed, at the same time three theories inconsistent with each other, about the relation of body and soul: that the soul is the form of the body, that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself and immortal, and that the soul after death takes a pneumatic body (a theory already found in Porphyry). Besides, their denial of the Platonic idea of pre-existence of the soul vitiates their statement that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself, that is, eternal, ingenerated, and incorruptible.
Although Ibn Rushd in his whole book tries to come as near to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as possible, in this chapter he seems to adopt the eschatology of the Late Greek authors. He allows to the souls of the dead a pneumatic body and believes that they exist somewhere in the sphere of the moon. He also accepts the theory of the Djinn, the equivalent of the Greek Daimones. What he rejects, and what the philosophers generally reject, is the resurrection of the flesh.
Some Islamic theologians express that when you pass the death of the body and the reactions of the physical and chemical come to an end, everything to the point of termination. However, when the resurrection occurs, and reassembled on the human form clouds of particles that have been buried in the ground, scattered in the air, or drowned in the ocean. When the body and thus begins a new life, it is very important for the soul, which is one of the characteristics of the mechanism of the body also to return to life.
Al Ghazali counters the argument that Scripture (shar’) has affirmed in no uncertain terms that the soul survives the destruction of the body at death, as the philosophers actually admit, but is reunited to the same body or one similar to it on the Day of Resurrection - a thesis which the philosophers deny.
Al-Ghazali brought against philosophy that it fails to allow the physical resurrection of human beings and the provision of physical rewards and punishments appropriate to their behaviour during their lives. He has in mind here the Aristotelian notion of the soul, which makes the idea of an afterlife complex to grasp. This is because the soul is the form of the living being, an aspect of the being itself, and there is no point in talking about the matter existing without the form when we are considering living creatures. Persons are combinations of soul and body (jasad), and in the absence of the latter there are no persons left.
On the Day of Judgment and the resurrection of the bodies, philosophers believe that the body will be different from our present body, which what we have today. This is only temporary, that will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. Ibn Rushd is based upon the kinds of principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look as impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another, i.e., one and the same matter is found in many people and in many different times. The same example of bodies cannot be found one more time, because their matter is the same. For instance, a man dies and his body becomes dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then our aforesaid view cannot be true.
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Author: ABDUL HAFEES PK
