CHAPTER 4: IBN RUSHD AND HIS disagreement with THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
On the basis of their concepts in creation of the world and some other philosophical matters, Ibn Rushd divides the philosophers into five categories.
1. The upholders of creation ex nihilo, they are Muslim and Christian theologians.
2. Those who maintain that everything is in everything and comes into being by differtiation.
These are two extremist schools. And the third one occurs between both of them.
3. Those who believe in a supernatural agent implanting the forms in matter, such as Ibn sina.
4. Those who believe in two different agencies: an immanent one and a transcendent one, such as Themistius and al Farabi
5. The doctrine of Aristotle, the truth. The agent produces neither the form nor the matter bur the compound of the two.Although it is quite clear that Ibn Rushd regards himself as belonging to this last category, there are many evidences that he was not influenced by many of them for instance, his opinion in the process of generation by the sun and the stars whose motions depend upon the divine mind.
Fifty years after the attack of al Ghazali, peripatetic philosophers started to attack against the attack of theologians and it led to ample writings in this context. So, Ibn Rushd starts to define his philosophical perspectives through over his works criticizing the critiques severely concerning the strong reproach of al Ghazali and the accusations of other theologians. In this chapter, the encounter with al Ghazali, criticism over Alexander and Ibn Bajja and the disagreement with ibn sina with a sharp focus into the contradictory phrases from the works along with the response to their arguments.
4.2 ENCOUNTER WITH AL-GHAZALI
When al-Ghazali wrote tahafuthu tahafuth (Incoherence of incoherence) explaining his arguments in favour of creation of ex nihilo
, God’s omniscience and the resurrection of the dead became widely accepted in Islamic world and it welcomed the death of philosophical thoughts belonging Aristotelian mindset. And when it was translated into Latin it was accepted by Christian world as well. It was appealed his great visions in certain issues to the scholastic studies of that time.
But, less than a hundred years after him, Ibn Rushd came forward making the works of Aristotle accessible against both those of philosophers and theologians. He embarked on an incoherence of incoherence; this was accepted by the Islamic world amply. After, it was translated into Hebrew and Latin several times, and it caused ample commentaries by many a number of scholars. Ibn Rushd undertook the role of statement from the position of philosophers after five or six decades.
In Imam Ghazali’s work tahafuthul falasifah, he quotes passage after passage from Ibn Sina’s works and shows the ultimate incoherence of his philosophical arguments. Ibn Rushd quotes passage after passage in his response from Ghazali’s tahafuthul falasifah showing the incoherence of Al Ghazali’ response to that of Ibn Sina.
Despite the fact both of the books have historical importance, Imam Ghazali not only he denies certain arguments but also he appreciates for some of Ibn Sina’s remarks. Ibn Rushd openly argues that Ghazali had denied what Ibn Sina had presented as his philosophical thoughts and what philosophers added over their works. This was by his fear to be shunned like others rather were not out of conviction. Ibn tumlus, Ibn Rushd’s disciple also is of this opinion. He claims that Ibn Sina had altered the ideas of Aristotle after the theologian’s alteration of those ideas.
Ibn Rushd joins al Ghazali in the division of beings into the possible (mumkin), the impossible (muhaal) and the necessary existing (wajibul wujood) presenting these as mental concepts need not have an actual existence. And he argues that Ibn Sina had not showed his proof for the existence of god on his logical difference, the Asharite theologians opine that all is by nature possible, created out of nothing. Ibn Sina counters Aristotle without a special justification to provide the existence to the animals.
Ibn Rushd proceeds to distinguish between essence (zath) and existence (wujood). Ibn Sina had said that ‘in the necessary being essence (zath) and existence (wujood) are one’. These like objections didn’t let Ibn Rushd keeping aside from the field of Islamic philosophy. somewhat, he blames al Ghazali for claiming Ibn Sina and al Farabi that they had committed blasphemy and making accusations over them bitterly. Ibn Rushd says that this was wrong done to the very religion that he pretends to uphold.
As a zealous hunter after truth, he came to see three options open to him those are Ash’arite theology, Aristotelian philosophy and Sufi mysticism. His chief area of concern regarding Aristotelian philosophy was the imperfect principles of causality which it drawn from Aristotle which it implied about God. He adopted a form of “occasionalism, ” which is the idea that God is the real cause of every event, those things which we tend to think of “causes” being merely accidental relations. Here, Aristotle produced a kind of idea that every incident happens in front of us has the occasional relations with the causes. Here he agrees that God is the real cause and everything happens by his causation.
In al-Ghazali’s philosophy and Ibn Rushd’s scornful answer to it, Ibn Rushd, spent his early life studying the religious law of Islam (Shar’iah)... If for Medieval Christian Scholastics Aristotle was often known merely as “The Philosopher, ” Ibn Rushd’s expository and logical output on practically every aspect of Aristotle’s corpus earned him the nickname “The Commentator.” Ibn Rushd paid extremely close attention to Aristotle’s texts, and oftentimes took exception to the philosophical interpretations of them which had been given by Ibn Sina. Unlike other Muslims more concerned with the scholastic fields of the Quran than philosophy, Ibn Rushd assumed that Aristotle was nature’s model for final human perfection. He enthusiastically embraced ideas of Aristotle which other pious Muslims rejected with horror – such as the eternality of the world, the non-immortality of the human soul (ruh), and God’s ability to know finite particular things as well.
Imam Ghazali ascribes to the philosophers over the miracle (mu’jizath) of Ibrahim (A S). The learned among the philosophers do not permit disputation about the principles of religion, and he who does such a thing needs, according to them, a severe lesson. Because, whereas every science has its principles, and every student of this science must concede its principles, and may not interfere with them by denying them, this is still more obligatory in the practical science of religion, to walk on the path of the religious virtues is necessary for human being’s existence (wujood), according to them, not in so far as he is human, but in so far as he has knowledge; and therefore it is necessary for every human to grant the principles of religion and invest with authority the human who lays them down.
Ibn Rushd ascribes the side of the philosophers that none of the philosophers discuss miracles (mu’jizath) despite knowing about them, because, miracles (mu’jizath) are the foundational principles of religion, and even if a religious man eventually becomes a philosopher he may say of the religious principles only that we believe in it, it is all from our God.
It is to be emphasized here that Ibn Rushd got the idea of “double truth.” This is the idea that a thing which is true in philosophy can be false in religion, and vice versa, so that there is no harmony between philosophy and religion. This view was long credited to Ibn Rushd, and gave birth to a school in Western Christendom called “Latin Averroism, ” but there are historic indications that Ibn Rushd himself did not hold to the doctrine of “double truth”. His theory of double truth was criticized severely by Seyyed Hussein Nasr that it is a poor understanding of the hierarchical conception he did produce. It is not agreeable that ‘the Rushdian thought’ in order to the philosophical doctrines he emphasized in kashf, faslul maqal and thahafuth which express the synthesis of the doctrines of Aristotleanism and al Mohad Islam, but, it was of course the outcome of the nature of Latin Averroism as it has been criticized as improper concerning the philosophical doctrines of Ibn Rushd.
Returning to his previous instance mentioned in the discussion of the causality of there being no essential causal relation between fire and the burning of a piece of cotton brought into contact with the fire, al-Ghazali gets to the root of his voluntaristic understanding of God: “If it is established that the Agent creates the burning through His will when the piece of cotton is brought in contact with the fire, He can equally well omit to create it when the contact takes place. His examples range from funny to strange to ridiculous being more effective to make his doctrines on certain philosophical concepts. Because, if someone may be ready to deny the necessary dependence of effects or their causes and relate them to the will of their Creator (swani’), and do not allow even in the will a particular definite model, but regard it as possible that it may vary and change in type, then it may happen to any of us there should be in his presence beasts of prey and flaming fires and immovable mountains and enemies equipped with arms, without his seeing them, because God had not created in him the faculty of seeing them.
And a man who had left a book at house might locate it on his comeback changed into a youth, handsome, intelligent, and efficient, or into an animal; or if he left a youth at home, he might find him turned into a dog; or he might leave ashes and find them changed into musk; or a stone changed into gold, and gold changed into stone. And if he were asked about any of these things, he would answer: “I do not know what there is at present in my house; I only know that I left a book in my house, but perhaps by now it is a horse which has soiled the library with its urine and excrement, and I left in my house a piece of bread which has perhaps changed into an apple-tree. Because, God can do any possible thing, and this is possible, and one cannot avoid being perplexed by it; and to this type of picture one may give up ad infinitum
.
This is on the whole what Ibn Rushd had said before the denial of causes is equivalent to a denial of knowledge following Aristotle. To deny the necessity of the cause-effect relationship is to deny that any knowledge may be had of the events in the world. It leads, as al-Ghazali’s own instances show, to a ridiculous world, a world where all manner of nonsensical events could happen at any second, merely because God willed them to happen. But, says al-Ghazali, the strange world does not result from the denial of causation, because, God has created in us the knowledge that He will not do all these possible things, and we only profess that these things are not necessary, but that they are possible and may or may not happen.
Ibn Rushd’s counter-argument is that because the theologians say that the probable reverse of any actual thing is equally possible as the actual thing itself, they affirm of God that there is no fixed standard for His will either constantly or for most cases, according to which things must happen.” God would, on this account of things, be like a tyrant, “for whom nobody in his dominion can act as deputy, of whom no standard or custom is known to which reference might be made.” Like an oppressor, God’s actions would be unpredictable and, because his will would move backward and forward free of rationality, would be in principle incomprehensible.
In responding to Ghazali’s attack on philosophy, Ibn Rushd first insists that there can be no disagreement between philosophy and faith: “Truth does not contradict truth.” Although this is so in principle, Ibn Rushd goes on to make an interesting and subtle concession as he accepts that not everyone is suited to pursue religious questions in the way that philosophy demands.
Following Ghazali, Ibn Rushd distinguishes between “the people of demonstration (burhan)” and “the people of rhetoric”—that is, between the few who are able to follow philosophical reasoning, and the vast majority, who can only follow simple and superficial teachings. The masses, the people of rhetoric, ought merely to accept at face value the words of the Qur’an and the Prophet—such material was, indeed, meant for them. But this does not mean that everyone should follow such crude methods. Those who have the aptitude and the training and those who are well grounded in learning have the obligation to go much deeper. To prohibit such people from studying philosophy would be quite wrong: “those who prevent someone from thinking on the books of philosophy when he is skillful at that doing, on the grounds that some very disreputable people are supposed to have erred due to thinking upon them, are like those who prevent thirsty people from drinking cool, fresh water until they die of thirst, because some people choked on this water and died. This is what Ibn Rushd underlines as far as the philosophical education of a newcomer.”
4.3 CRITICISM ON ALEXANDER [96] AND IBN BAJJA
Ibn Rushd’s writings can best be interpreted Indeed as an investigation for both an original and an authentic interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical system and it is said to have continued both through a constant dialogue with Aristotle's writings and through a parallel critical engagement with major thinkers within the Aristotelian legacy, Alexander and Ibn Bajja.
Ibn Rushd's commentary on De Anima
is the most significant text amid his psychological writings. In order to analyze the evolution of his thought and review the originality of his philosophical contribution, Let us now examine it in detail.
Alexander states that the material intellect (aql) is generating and corrupting, and is at the same time a faculty. This Ibn Rushd discards, just as he discarded Ibn Bajja's position, which, in his view, did not satisfactorily resolve Alexander's inconsistencies.
The analysis of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Tabs exposes the regular processes whereby Ibn Rushd critically rejected the views of Alexander and, subsequently, those of Ibn Bajja, thereby getting rid of the Alexandrian Ibn Bajja influences in his own earlier writings. His earlier writings on logic had been deeply influenced by al -Farabi's views, even as a parallel change had occurred with respect to Abu Nasr al-Farabi, but in a later commentary on the Analytica Posteriora, (Al-Burhan) he severely criticized al -Farabi on account of views which he himself had specifically upheld earlier in Mukhtasar al-Burhan Ibn Rushd's revisionist inclinations aptly demonstrate the degree of rigour and seriousness with which he pursued his philosophical vocation; and there is no better example of this rigour than Al-sharh al-kabir, which formulates a completely different psychological system and a completely different approach to the problem of the intellect, whose force almost annuls much of what he had previously written in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis.
The style of illustration of Al-Sharh can be said somewhat in a different way from those made of Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis, the cause being that the original Arabic text of the work is lost; the initial trustworthy version is in fact conserved in a Latin translation. Let us start in brief reviewing the central strands of this text, which largely point to the complete alteration in Ibn Rushd's idea.
The transformation exhibits not only in the new views advanced but in the very method in which Al-Sharh is written. There is an earnest effort, on Ibn Rushd's part, to clear processes of thought which had led him to face hitherto new questions and unexamined obscurities. The conclusions reached in this work are advanced in a way which absolutely suggests a new set of perspectives.
Ibn Rushd makes it clear that the material intellect (aql) constitutes the central idea of this text, but he also indicates, subsequently, that the examination of the material intellect (aql) in isolation from the other faculties won’t be practical and mistaken. As such, the scope of changes in Al-Sarh affects not only the outset of the material intellect, as previously articulated in Al-Mukhtasar and Al-Talkhis, but his entire psychological structure, concerning all the major rudiments from the intellect, theoretical intelligible (mafhoom) and the active intellect (aqli faaili) to imaginary representations. The implications of these structural changes are examined from the perspective both of epistemological states and of the different ontological states in question; his analysis of the material intellect (aql) is thus constantly linked up with all the other aspects of the intellect (aql).
Regarding the link between the material intellect (aql) and the senses (havass), Ibn Rusted states that, while the material intellect (aql) is not affected by passivity akin to that of the senses, and does not experience change analogous to what the senses experience, within it a concept of passivity exists whose meaning is subsumed within its function of acceptance. The material intellect (aql) is regarded as belonging among the type of passive faculties, and is thus rightfully distinguished from the active intellect, yet it is neither a body (jasad) nor a faculty within a body (jasad); it is, in result, a substance which accepts all forms without itself being one of the forms it accepts. This is because the material forms are not separate, whereas the material intellect (aql) is simple and separate. The material intellect (aql) is free of a specific nature, except in so far as it exists in potentia. It contains all universal material intelligible, but in actuality it is not a thing prior to its being endowed with the faculty of reason. Hence it differs from the irrational prime matter which accepts particular forms, and, similarly, differs from the form, the matter and the compound of both. It is a part of a particular mode of existence (wujood). To assert that the material intellect (aql) exists in potentia does not mean that it is not a definite thing or a substance; what is implied is that, whatever the substrate bears, it cannot exist in actuality and thus cannot be taken in an absolute sense, but should rather be approached in a qualified manner. However, the substrate need not be a definite thing in actuality; rather, what the substrate bears should not be found in it in actuality.
The first problem to comprehend the nature of this intellect is the question of how it can be from the genus of the passive faculties, while at the same time being simple, separate and not mixed in with the body (jasad). If we say that it is separate and simple, does this mean that the intellect and the intelligibles (mafhoom) within it are one, as is the case with the active and separate intellects? This is a second problem.
The solution to the first problem lies in defining the concept of passivity in the context of the material intellect; for passivity, here, has a particular sense, implying a form of changeless potentiality, analogous to the disposition in the tablet to receive writing without being affected by passivity or change. Just as the tablet does not bear any writing either in actuality or in potentia approach to actuality, so the material intellect (aql) does not embrace any of the intelligible forms which it accepts, either in actuality or in potentia approaching actuality. It would be wrong to say, with Alexander, that the material intellect (aql) is akin to the disposition that exists in the tablet, rather than to the tablet itself inasmuch as it is disposed 41 This is because we must first know the nature of the thing that is disposed before we can completely know the nature of the disposition-this because the material intellect (aql) is not only a disposition. Here, clearly, Ibn Rushd is not only criticizing the views of Alexander, but also laying aside his own positions in Al-Talkis and Al-Mukasar. He emphasizes for the first tune that the capacity within the intellect is different from all other capacities, since it does not bear any intelligible (mafhoom), either in actuality or in potentia, and is neither a body (jasad) nor a faculty within a body (jasad). Nor is it a capacity existing within imaginative forms; for, among the many other absurdities enumerated, this would make it a faculty within a body (jasad) and therefore accepting the intellect itself.
As for the second problem, he asserts that the material intellect (aql) is closer to the other faculties of intellection than to separate intellects. There is, however, an important difference, namely that it is, in its essence (zath), an intellect existing in actuality, while the other intellects exist in potentia. He further states, however, that the material intellect (aql) ranks lowest among the separate intellects, in that the action of the material intellect (aql) is less commanding than that of the separate intellects. Furthermore, the material intellect (aql) is marked more by passivity than by activity, and in this respect it differs from the active intellect.
“In Al-Sharh the material intellect (aql) is not merely analyzed for the elementary purposes of formulating a new definition, but is also analyzed for its philosophical importance. Ibn Rushd daringly asserts that the material intellect (aql) is eternal and unitary with respect to mankind, and it is this which underlines the radical transformation in his thought and the revolt against his own earlier positions and those of his predecessors.”
4.4 CRITICISM ON THE SCHOOL OF THEMISTIUS
Ibn Rushd after attacking severely the writings of Alexander and Ibn bajja, he criticizes the school of Themistius and others for their views on the theoretical intellect and the active intellect. It was mainly for Themistius’s view that the theoretical intellect springs from the combination of the active and material intellect (aql) within us, and is therefore external. Since the first two intellects are external, Ibn Rushd asserts that Themistius' standpoint has departed from that of Aristotle and is in opposition to truth itself.
It is this concept, in Ibn Rushd's vision, that will finally lead to confusions related with the process of intellection and the intellect. Ibn Rushd criticized Themistius’s position in Al-Mukhtasar, but there his criticism reflects his adoption of the Ibn Bajja or Alexandrian school. The criticism is equally determined by the ontological position of the material and active intellect. All this is in contrast to the standpoint of earlier schools, which had concluded the theoretical intellect to be eternal.
In his words, “if the material intellect (aql) is the first perfection of Man and the theoretical intellect is the second perfection, then both these categories should be functioning under the same conditions.
For example, if Man is generating and corrupting, this would apply equally to the first and second perfection within Man-a viewpoint which contradicts earlier conclusions and leads to absurdities and ambiguities concerning the material intellect. The claim, for instance that the material intellect (aql) is a body (jasad) or a faculty within a body (jasad) could not possibly be upheld, since it has already been postulated that the intellect is not generating or corrupting.”
There are two separate aspects to intelligible (mafhoom): with respect to the subject which makes them dependent they are generating and corrupting, while with respect to the material intellect (aql) which makes them one of the existents of the world they are eternal; from this perspective they can be viewed as simultaneously generating, corrupting and eternal. The theoretical intellect is, in other words, eternal with respect to its activity. This solution bypasses the problems and absurdities found in the previous schools of commentators, and Ibn Rushd takes evident pride in his significant discovery, which enables him to uphold and further strengthen his central thesis about the intellect and its eternity.
4.5 DISAGREEMENT WITH IBN SINA
It was one of the most discussed topics in the philosophical world, the wide-ranging Ibn Rushd’s critique of Ibn Sina. Ibn sina, who was a renowned figure in philosophy in the west and by whose name Islamic Neo-Platonism was identified in the Middle Ages in both East and West. As it has been discussed, it was Ibn Sina who was the direct object of al-Ghazali’s critique. While al-Ghazali tried to distance Ibn sina from the sort of Neo plationic approach to theoretical issues, Ibn Rushd was in a Gordian knot trying to counter to al-Ghazali’s attacks upon philosophy.
One of the most major methodological disputes between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina lies in their opposing analyses of the relationship between essence (zath) and existence (wujood), and this has an important influence upon Ibn Rushd’s approach to meaning in Islamic philosophy.
“Ibn Sina held that a state of affairs is possible only if something else acts to bring it into existence (wujood), with the sole exception of the deity. Ibn Rushd characterizes this view, quite correctly, as one in which possible states of affairs are nonexistent in themselves, until their existence (wujood) is brought about by some cause. The possible is that whose essence (zath) does not include its existence (wujood) and so must depend upon a cause which makes its actuality necessary, but only necessary relative to that cause. In this modal system there are really only two kinds of being, that necessary through another and that necessary in itself (that is, God), so that the realm of the possible becomes identical with both the actual and the necessary.”
Ibn Rushd accuses Ibn sina of conflating the order of thought with the order of things, the logical order with the ontological order while both of them maintain that there is a logical difference between essence (zath) and existence (wujood). Ibn sina goes on via emanation theory to show how existence (wujood) comes to essence (zath) from the necessarily acting Necessary Being. In fact, it can be considered that the theory of occasionalism of al-ghazali is like the theory of emanation of Ibn Sina. Both the doctrines interpret the dependent world as radically dependent upon something else. The account of essence (zath) and existence (wujood) provided by Ibn Sina is perfectly acceptable to al-Ghazali, with a condition that direct divine intervention is required to bring existence (wujood) to the essence (zath)s. Ibn Sina divides up the world into existing things and essence (zath)s, and into things which are necessary through another and are possible in themselves. These differences throw emphasis upon substance that is so important for Ibn Rushd and his form of Aristotelianism. This is based upon a model of the world as one entity, as a single order of nature with no impenetrable barriers to human understanding and investigation. This leads Ibn Rushd to argue that although a logical difference can be drawn between the existence (wujood) and essence (zath) of a thing, there is nonetheless a necessary relationship between existence (wujood) and essence (zath). Ibn Rushd now concludes this discussion and agrees that it is a radical error in the philosphy of language to separate essence (zath) and existence (wujood).
To understand Ibn Rushd’s account of a variety of paths to the truth, we have to grasp his theory of meaning. He emphasizes the importance of notions such as equivocation and ambiguity in language because he thinks it is important to be able to explain how names can be used in the same ways in different contexts. Ibn Rushd agrees with Aristotle that there can be no priority or posterity within the same genus, and so he develops an account of meaning which is based upon the pros hen rather than the genus-species relation. If the latter were used, meaning would come out as univocal and al-Ghazali would be entirely justified in expecting the philosophers to account for God and his activity in the same sort of language as we use to describe ourselves If meaning is expressed in terms of pros hen equivocal (bi nisba ila shay’ wahid), then we can look for some similarity in the objects which form the basis to the sharing of the name, but we do not have to insist that exactly the same name be used in its different contexts with precisely the same meaning. We can also insist that the different contexts in which a name is used have to be taken into account when we come to ask for the meaning of the name. For al-Ghazali, abstract terms have a meaning which is independent of their reference in the external world. The meaning of such terms is equivalent to the series of pictures or images in which the events they describe are characterized in particular ways. All that we have to do to conceive of God miraculously creating something out of nothing is to imagine it happening, and so it is possible.
Ibn Rushd argues that, on the contrary, it is not enough to have a chain of images in one’s mind to establish the meaningfulness of that combination of images. A meaningful use of language is possible only through the relation of linguistic terms and ideas with a framework in which they make sense, and such a framework is connected to the varying uses of the terms and to the way in which the world is.
The concept which Ibn Rushd wants his account of language to characterize is that of a point of view. In Ibn Rushd’s thought there is a continual contrast between different points of view, not just a difference between God’s point of view and the human point of view, but also a differentiation of the standpoints of the whole of humanity based upon their forms of reasoning. For example, in the Fasl al-maqal he talks about demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical and sophistical people, all of whom are using similar language to discuss what is important to them, namely their faith, morality, the next life and so on. This language is not identical regardless of the way in which it is used, nor is it completely equivocal. There are relations between different applications of the same name, and these relations are strong enough for it to make sense to say that these uses are of the same name; so there being a variety of routes to the same destination, a variety of views based upon the same ideas and beliefs, and a variety of ways of living which together add up to a morally and religiously desirable form of life.
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Author: ABDUL HAFEES PK
