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Al-Bab Al-Hadi ‘Ashar

(A Treatise On The Principles Of Shi’ite Theology)

Author (s): Hasan Al-Hilli

www.alhassanain.org/english

This text is a summary of al-Shaykh al-Tusi's “Misbah al-Mutahajjid”, a book of supplications and riteluals. 'Allamah al-Hilli completed his summary in ten chapters, but added an eventh chapter to discuss the doctrinal beliefs of Islam. He felt he should add this chapter since the validity of acts of worship is dependent on the correctness of one's belief, and the pleasure of worship comes only after knowing God.

Table of Contents

Foreword 1

Sketch of ‘Allama al-Hilli 2

Introduction 4

The Necessity Of The Knowledge of The Principles of Religion 4

Notes 8

Section 1: The Proof of Self-Existence 9

Section 2: Allah’s Positive Qualities 13

1. Allah Is Powerful and Free 13

2. Allah Is Knowing 15

3. Allah Is Living (Hayy) 17

4. Allah Is A Willer And A Disliker 17

5. Allah Is A Perceiver 19

6. Allah Is Eternal 19

7. Allah Is A Speaker 19

8. Allah Is Veracious 22

Notes 22

Section 3: Allah’s Privative Qualities 24

1. Allah Is Not Compounded 24

2. Allah Is Not A Body 24

3. Allah Is Not A Locus For Originated Things 27

4. Allah Is Not Visible 27

5. Allah Has No Partner 28

6. Allah Has no Idea or State 29

7. Allah Is Self-Sufficient And Has No Need 30

Notes 30

Section 4: Allah’s Justice 32

Reason Is The Judge As To Good And Evil 32

Human Beings Are Free Agents 33

Evil Is Impossible in Allah 34

Allah Acts With An Aim 35

Allah’s Aim Is Man’s advantage 36

Taklif is necessary 36

Kindness (Lutf) Is Incumbent Upon Allah 38

Recompense For The Sufferings Is Incumbent Upon Allah 39

Notes 40

Section 5: Prophecy 43

1. Proof Of The Mission Of Muhammad (S) 44

2. The Prophet Must Be Immune To Sin 45

3. The Prophet Must Be All His Life Immune To Sin 46

4. The Prophet must be the best of the people of his time 47

Notes 48

Section 6: The Imamate 49

1. The Imamate Is Necessary 49

2. The Imam Must Be Immune To Sin 50

3. The Imam Must Be Specified 53

4. The Imam must be the best of the people of his time 53

5. The Imams After Muhammad (S) Are Ali (‘A) And His Eleven Descendants 54

Notes 61

Section 7: The Return 63

1. The Resurrection, The Bridge, The Scale, All Must Be Accepted 63

2. Reward And Punishment 64

3. Repentence 67

4. Command And Prohibition 68

Notes 69

Foreword

In the year 1924 I had the privilege of studying for a few months under Dr. Duncan B. Macdonald of Hartford Theological Seminary, and of reading with him the Arabic creed of An-Nasafi, a concise statement of the tenets of the Sunnite Muslims. Before leaving Hartford, I asked Dr. Macdonald to outline a course of study which I might profitably follow after returning to my work in Persia. He suggested that I should try to find a Shi‘ite creed, similar to that of An-Nasafi, and translate it into English, since no adequate statement of Shi‘ite doctrines was available for English readers.

Accordingly, on reaching Meshed I began to make inquiries in order to discover some such creed which was generally accepted by the Shi‘ite doctors. For some time, I was unsuccessful, but at last, one of my Mulla friends suggested to me “Al-Bab al-Hadi ‘Ashar ,” assuring me it was just the book that I was seeking. He said that it was widely used in the madrasas of Meshed as an introduction to scholastic theology and the usul (the “principles” of the faith), and was generally accepted as a correct exposition of the Shi‘ite doctrines. I secured a copy of the book, a very poor lithograph dated 1320 A.H., and began to read it with the Mulla, without whose assistance I could have made but little headway in it.

I found that the work consisted of a brief statement of the Shi‘ite “principles” and a detailed commentary on the same, all in Arabic. The text(matn) alone was too condensed to be of much value to the student. The commentary was somewhat long, but the argument was in most places so close that it would have been difficult to condense, so I decided to translate it in full. At Dr. Macdonald’s suggestion I have added a few notes, principally in order to explain the differences between the Shi‘ite and Sunnite doctrines. In my translation I have endeavoured to adhere as closely as possible to the original. In quoting the Qur’anic verses I have followed Rodwell’s translation, except that, for the sake of uniformity, I have always used the terms Allah and Messenger(Rasul) instead of God and Apostle.

I wish to express here my deep appreciation to Dr. Macdonald, who inspired me to undertake this task and aided me in performing it. I am also indebted to Dr. R.A. Nicholson of Cambridge University for his great kindness in correcting my manuscript and securing its publication.

William McElwee Miller

The American Presbyterian Mission,

Mashhad, Persia

December 23, 1927

Sketch of ‘Allama al-Hilli

Hassan ibn Yusuf ibn ‘Ali ibn Mutahhar al-Hilli, commonly known as ‘Allama al-Hilli or ‘Allama, was born 19 Ramadan 648/1250, and died 11 Muharram 726/1326. He studied jurisprudence and scholastic theology and the principles(usul) , and Arabic and the other sciences of the law with his uncle, the Doctor of the people of the House (of the Prophet), Najmu’d-Din Abu’l Qasim Ja‘far ibn Sa‘id al-Hilli entitle Muhaqqiq-i-Awwal (d. 726/1325; see Browne’s “Persian Literature in Modern Times,” pp. 378, 405), and with his father Sheikh Sadidu’d-Din Yusuf ibn al-Mutahhar and he studied philosophical subjects with the master of mankind, Khwaja Nasiru’d-Din-i-Tusi (d. 672/1274; see Browne, p. 405), and others of the Shi‘ites and Sunnites.

‘Allama is said to have written 500 books. Among his works mentioned in the Qisasu’l ‘Ulama is “Minhaju’s-Salah,” which consisted of ten chapters. “Al-Bab al-Hadi ‘Ashar” was later added to this book as an eleventh chapter. Thematn (text) only is the work of ‘Allama. The commentary was written by Miqdad-i-Fadil, also of Hilla, who lived and composed commentaries on theological works during the latter part of the eighth century A.H.

‘Allama was born just eight years before the capture of Baghdad by the Mongols. During his youth Persia was ruled by Il-Khans, the descendants of Hulagu. It was a time of bloodshed and confusion, but with the invasion of the Mongols there also came a revival of trade and of letters. The first Il-Khans were heathen, but they showed great favour towards the Christians, and carried on negotiations with the Christian rulers of Europe regarding a united attack upon the Muslims.

Accordingly, there was more freedom for the discussion of religious questions than had previously existed. Several of the Il-Khans were on the point of becoming Christians, but the influence of Islam finally prevailed, and at last in 1295 A.D. (when ‘Allama was forty-five years of age) Ghazan became a Muslim and threw his influence on the side of Islam. He showed great favour toward the Shi’ites, and enriched the shrines of Karbala and Mashhad.

Ghazan was followed by Uljaytu Khuda Banda, who had been baptized in infancy as a Christian, but who, on his accession to the throne in 1305 A.D., confirmed the Islamic laws of his predecessor. At first he was a Hanafite; later he inclined to the Shafi’ite doctrine, and finally, after seeing a vision on the occasion of a visit to the tomb of Ali at Najaf, he became a Shi‘ite. He was fond of religious discussion, and the doctors of the various schools were brought before him to expound their doctrines.

The following stories, which tell something of ‘Allama’s part in the king’s conversion, are taken from the “Qisasu’l-‘Ulama,” which was written in 1290 A.H. by Muhammad ibn Sulayman of Tanukabun (see Browne, pp 354, 355).

In the history of Hafiz Abru (see Browne’s “Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion,” pp 424-426) it is recorded that when the falsity of the faith of the people of tradition and agreement (the Sunnites) had, to some extent become clear to Sultan Uljaytu Mohammad-i-Khuda Banda (1303-1316 A.D., see Browne’s “Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion,” pp 46-51), he commanded the Imamite doctors be summoned. When ‘Allama came with the other doctors it was appointed that Khwaja Nizamu-Din ‘Adbu’l-Malik-i-Maraghi, who was the greatest of the Shafi‘ite doctors, and in fact of all the Sunnite doctors, should dispute with the honoured ‘Allama.

And ‘Allama disputed with the Khwaja and proved the uninterrupted succession of the Commander of the Faithful (‘Ali) and the fallacy of the claim of the three Sheikhs of the Sunnites with convincing arguments and clear reasons, and he set forth the pre-eminence of the religion of Imamites in such a manner that there was no possibility of doubt left to those who were present. And when the Khwaja heard the reasons of the honoured ‘Allama, he said, “The strength of the arguments is exceedingly plain, but since past generations have walked in a certain way, and men at present have drawn the curtain of silence over their mistakes in order to bridle the ignorant, and remove the differences in the faith(kalima) of Islam, it is therefore fitting that they should not rend the veil and curse them.”

A story is told of Sultan Uljaytu, who had a wife whom he loved very much. Once he spoke the triple divorce formula to her, and the lawyers of Islam said there was no way to take her back except by her first being married to another and having him divorce her. He inquired whether there was not some other sect which provided another way. They replied that the Imamites did, but they were few in number. So, he sent to Hilla for their doctors, and ‘Allama came to him.

On entering the room, he took off his shoes and came in with them in his hand. The courtiers blamed him for not prostrating himself, but he answered that one should bow before God only. Then they asked him why he had not left his shoes at the door. He replied that he had heard that the Prophet had gone to a meeting of Malikites and his shoes had been stolen, and since there were Malikites present he wanted to watch his shoes. They laughed at him for his ignorance, and told him that Malik had lived 100 years after the time of the Prophet.

He said he had forgotten; it was not the Malikites but the Hanbalites. Again, they corrected him, and so for all four of the sects of the Sunnites. “Then,” he said, “if all four of the Imams lived after the Prophet, how did they originate these sects?” And he completely refuted their doctrines.

We are told that ‘Allama was once going to Karbala on pilgrimage riding on a donkey, when a stranger joined him. They began to talk, and the stranger proved to be a very learned man. ‘Allama brought to him all his problems, and he solved them. He answered ‘Allama’s objections by referring him to certain traditions of which he was ignorant, giving book and page and line, and when ‘Allama later consulted these books, he found that all the references were correct. Finally, ‘Allama asked him whether the Hidden Imam could be seen or not. Just then ‘Allama’s whip fell to the ground. The stranger stooped and picked it up and gave it to him, saying, “Why not see him, when his hands are in yours?” and then he disappeared.

As for Miqdad-i-Fadil, the author of the commentary, I have been unable to learn anything of the story of his life from the biographies which I have consulted. He is not so well known as ‘Allama, but for our purpose his commentary is of more value than is the matn of ‘Allama, which is frequently too condensed to be wholly intelligible.

Introduction

1. Allah the Most High did not create the world in vain, in which case He would be only a trifler, but with purpose and wisdom which can be ascertained by those who consider. And He specified that purpose expressly when He said,

“I have not created Djinn and men, but that they should worship me:” (51:56).

Hence, it is incumbent upon everyone who belongs to the company of rational beings to respond to the Lord of the Worlds. And since that is impossible without a certain knowledge(ma‘rifa) of Him, it is incumbent upon every responsible person who knows Allah to arouse the slothful and guide the erring by writing out and explaining the introductory treatises of men of understanding.

And among these introductions is the one calledAl-Bab al-Hadi ‘Ashar (“The Eleventh Chapter”), one of the compositions of our Sheikh and Imam, and the Imam of the world, the most knowing, the most excellent, and the most perfect, the Sultan of the masters of investigation, the preceptor of those who search and examine, the writer on subjects for intellectual investigation, the arranger of legal reasons, the sign of Allah in the worlds, the heir of the wisdom of the prophets and apostles, the perfection of the People and the Religion, Abu Mansur al-Hassan ibn Yusuf ibn Ali ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (‘Allama al-Hilli) – may Allah sanctify his spirit and illumine his tomb.

2. And in spite of the conciseness of its expression this treatise abounds in knowledge, and in spite of the abbreviation of its style it abounds in wealth. And in time past I had had the desire to write something as an aid to the understanding of it by composing the reason and proofs, in response to the request of some of the brethren. The hindering events and the rebuffs of treacherous fortune held me back from finishing it, for these things cut a man off from accomplishing his will and attaining his purpose, and stand between him and his desire.

Then there occurred gatherings and discussions on several journeys, along with the piling up of business and the disturbance of my thoughts. And some of the great besought me to go back to the consideration and thought of what I had first written and to return to what I had collected. So I agreed to their request, for Allah the Most High made it incumbent upon me to respond to it, in spite of the lack of worldly goods and the excessive number of engagements which hindered me from doing it.

And I began it seeking aid from Allah the Most High for it, and drawing near to Him by means of it, and I called it al-Nafi‘u li-Yaum l-Hashr in explanation of al-Bab al-Hadi ‘Ashar. And there is no success except through Allah, in whom I trust and to whom I shall return.

The Necessity Of The Knowledge of The Principles of Religion

3. Concerning what is incumbent(wajib) upon all mukallafs regarding the knowledge(ma‘rifa) of the foundations of religion(din) .

It is called the Eleventh Chapter because the writer made an abbreviation of the “Misbahu’l-Mutahajjid” which Sheikh Tusi wrote concerning worship and prayer, and arranged it in ten chapters and gave to this abbreviation of the “Misbah” the title of “Minhaju’s-Salah.” And since that book was concerned with the science of conduct(‘amal) and worship and prayer, these things required a knowledge(ma‘rifa) of the Object of worship and of Him to whom prayer is offered. So, he added this eleventh chapter.

4. Being incumbent(wujub) as a word means established and fallen, as in Allah’s word,

“And when they are fallen (wajibat) over on their sides” (22:36).

And in usagewajib is that the neglect of which involves blame under certain circumstances. And it is of two kinds. (1) that which is incumbent in itself, that is, that which no one can perform for another; and (2) that which is incumbent by sufficiency(kifayatan) , and it is the opposite of the first. Knowledge(ma‘rifa) is of the first kind, and for that reason he said, “it is incumbent upon all mukallafs.”

5. And a mukallaf is a human being, alive, adult (males over fifteen and females over nine years of age), and rational. So dead persons, children, and insane persons are not mukallafs.

6. And foundations(usul) is the plural of asl, and is that upon which something else is built.

7. And religion(din) as a word means requital, as said the Prophet, “As thou treatest men(tadinu) so shalt thou be treated.” And in usage it means way(tariqa) and law(shari‘a) , and that is the meaning here. And this science is called “foundations” because the other religious sciences, tradition and jurisprudence and exegesis, are built upon it. And it depends on the veracity of the Messenger.

And the veracity of the Messenger depends on the veracity of the Sender and His qualities and His justice and the impossibility of there being evil in Him. And the science of “foundations” is that in which the unity of Allah the Most High and His qualities and His justice and the prophecy of the prophets and the imamate of the Imams and the return(ma‘ad) are investigated.

8. And the doctors have all agreed in considering incumbent the knowledge(ma‘rifa) of Allah the Most High and of His positive and privative qualities and of what is proper for Him and of what is impossible for Him and of Prophecy and of the Imamate and of the Return.

9. Those of the people of Muhammad who have the power to loose and bind (that is, the mullas, cf. Matt 16:19) have agreed in saying that a knowledge of these things in incumbent, and their agreement is a convincing proof for all – for us Shi‘ites, because of the presence among them of the One Immune to Sin (al-ma‘sum, that is, the Imam whose authority alone is sufficient for the Shi‘ites); and for the rest (the Sunnites) because of the Prophet’s word, “My people will not agree in an error.”

10. And in addition to agreement, the proof that knowledge is incumbent is of two kinds, rational(‘aqli) and traditional(sam‘i) . (1) Now the rational proofs are two. (a) The first is that knowledge guards against the fear which results from differences. And guarding against fear is incumbent, for fear is pain to the soul. Now guarding against pain is possible. Therefore, reason pronounces incumbent the guarding against fear, hence guarding against it is incumbent.1

[From the presence of religious differences among men it is evident that many men do not know God, and therefore they will go to hell. This results in fear, from which only the knowledge of God can save us.]

(b) Second, expression of gratitude to a benefactor is incumbent. But this cannot be done unless one knows him. Now it is incumbent, for all rational beings know that failure to express gratitude deserves blame. But it cannot be done without knowledge. For the expression of gratitude must be of a kind suitable to the condition of the one to be thanked, and that comes only from knowing him – otherwise it is not an expression of gratitude.

Now the Most High Creator is a Benefactor. Therefore, expression of gratitude to Him is incumbent. Therefore, the knowledge of Him is incumbent. And sincetaklif (the imposition of a task) is necessary(wajib) on rational grounds, as shall appear later (see pars. 131-143), it is incumbent that one knows the announcer(muballigh) of it, that is the Prophet, and the guardian of it, that is, the Imam and the Return, because taklif requires the necessity(wujub) of requital.

11. (2) Now for the traditional proof, which is of two kinds: (a) First, the word of the Most High,

“Know then, that there is no god but Allah” (47:19).

And this is a command making it incumbent. (b) Second, when there descended the word of Allah,

“Verily, in the creation of the Heavens and of the Earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding heart;” (3:190).

The Prophet said, “Woe be to him who reads this with his tongue but has not reflected upon it!”

Thus, he attributes blame in case of failure to reflect upon it, that is, the failure to make deduction(istidlal) from what the verse contained in the mention of the heavenly and earthly bodies, because in them are evidences of workmanship and power. And the knowledge(‘ilm) of these things certainly proves the existence of their Creator(Sani‘) and His power and His knowledge. Hence reflection and deduction become incumbent, and that was what we were seeking to demonstrate.

12. And all of this is by proof(dalil) , not by imitation(taqlid) .

13. And proof(dalil) as a word means a director(murshid) and guide(dall) , and in usage it means a thing the knowledge(‘ilm) of which necessitates the knowledge of another thing. And since knowledge(ma‘rifa) is incumbent, it is necessary that it be acquired by means of reflection and deduction. For ma‘rifa is not of necessity(daruri) , for what is known of necessity is that in which rational beings do not differ.

Now ‘ilm is acquired by means of the smallest cause by the direction of the mind upon it, or by the perception of it by the senses, such as the judgment that one is a half of two, and that fire burns, and that the sun is bright, and likewise that we are subject to fear and anger and strength and weakness and so forth.

14. But ma‘rifa is not like that, because there is a difference of opinion about it, and because it cannot be acquired merely by the direction of the mind upon it, and because it cannot be perceived by the senses. Hence, the first statement is demonstrated, because ’ilm includes both necessary knowledge and speculative(nazari) knowledge. Hence speculation and deduction become incumbent.

For that without which a thing absolutely incumbent cannot be performed and by which it is controlled is itself incumbent. (There are two kinds of obligations(wajib) , absolute, like namaz and conditioned, like hajj.) Because whenever anything on which a thing absolutely incumbent depends is not itself incumbent, then the thing absolutely incumbent either remains incumbent or it does not.

If the first be the case, then there becomes necessary a taklif which cannot be performed, and this is impossible, as shall later appear (pars. 134-136). And if the second be the case, then it becomes necessary that a thing absolutely incumbent shall cease to be incumbent, and this also is impossible.

[That is, knowledge is incumbent, therefore investigation is also incumbent. For if it were not, then either a thing (namely,ma’rifa ) would be incumbent which could not be attained – and this is impossible; or else a thing absolutely incumbent becomes non-incumbent – which is also impossible.]

15. And speculation(nazar) is the orderly arrangement of known facts(umur) in order to arrive at another fact. And in explanation of this – first the soul(nafs) conceives the object sought, then it acquires the sound premises necessary for making a deduction, and then it arranges them in order so as to arrive at a knowledge of the object.

16. And it is not possible(ja’iz) that knowledge(ma‘rifa) of the Most High be by imitation(taqlid) . And taqlid is the acceptance of the word of another without proof(dalil) . And this statement of ours has two aspects. (1) First, when mankind is equal in respect of knowledge(’ilm) and differ from one another in belief, then a mukallaf must either accept all that which others believe (in which case the agreement of things irreconcilable becomes necessary), or else he must accept some things and not others.

In the latter case there is either something to cause a preponderance of opinion(murajjih) , or there is not. If there be something which causes the preponderance, then that is the proof(dalil) . But if there be not, then it becomes necessary for there to be a preponderance without anything to cause it, and this is impossible.2

17. (2) Second, the Most High has blamed imitation(taqlid) by His word,

“But say they, ‘Verily we found our fathers of that persuasion, and verily, by their footsteps do we guide ourselves.’” (43:22).

And he has incited us to speculation and deduction by His word,

“Bring me a Book sent down by them before this Qur’an, or traces of their knowledge – if ye are men of truth.” (46:4).

18. And so it is necessary to mention those things regarding which it is not possible for a single Muslim to be ignorant, and whoever is ignorant as to any of them is outside the bond(ribqa) of believers and deserves everlasting punishment.

19. Since the knowledge(ma‘rifa) of the above-mentioned things has been proved to be incumbent, it necessarily follows that it is incumbent upon every Muslim. That is, he should affirm the two testimonies (that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His Prophet) in order that through knowledge, he should become a believer, according to the word of the Most High,

“The Arabs of the desert say, ‘We believe.’ Say thou: Ye believe not; but rather say, ‘We profess Islam’” (49:14).

He denied faith(al-iman) to them, although they affirmed their belief in divinity and prophecy, because their faith did not derive its existence from speculation and deduction. And since reward(thawab) is conditioned by faith, one who is ignorant of the knowledge of these things deserves everlasting punishment. For everyone who is undeserving of any reward whatever, provided he is in possession of the qualities which constitute the conditions of taklif (see par. 5), is deserving of punishment by agreement (of all Muslims).3

20. Bond(ribqa) is a long rope with space enough to bind animals within it. And the author uses the term metaphorically for the inclusive command which rests upon believers, the desert (for obedience to which) is reward and everlasting honour.

Notes

1. The Mu‘tazilites also “agreed that the principles of ma‘rifa and thankfulness for blessings are wajib before one hears (the Prophet)” (Shahrastani, ed. By Cureton, “al-Milal wa’n-Nihal,” p. 29). But the Ash‘arite position was that ma‘rifa is known to be incumbent not by reason but by tradition only.

We see here that the Shi‘ites hold that the usul are all known by reason, whereas the Ash‘arite position is that they are known only by tradition.

2. “And with regard to taqlid (blind acceptance) – the learned differ. Some say that it does not suffice, and that the muqallid (blind accepter) is an unbeliever (kafir). Ibn al-Arabi (d. 543) held this and as-Sanusi, and the latter gave in his commentary on his Kubra a lengthy refutation of those who hold that taqlid is sufficient” (Creed of al-Fadali, Macdonald, “Development of Muslim Theology,” etc, p. 316). The Mu‘tazilites with their emphasis on reason rejected taqlid, and the Shi‘ites have followed them.

3. In the creed of al-Nasafi, “Belief and Islam are one” (Macdonald, “Development,” p. 312). But the Shi‘ites consider Islam to be wider than faith. See paragraph 234 of this book.

Section 1: The Proof of Self-Existence

21. And he has arranged this chapter in sections. The first section is in proof of the self-existent (wajibu’l wujudu h-dhatihi , the necessarily existent in itself). So we say that every object of thought is either necessarily existent objectively in itself, or is possible of existence in itself(mumkinu’l wujud) or else is impossible of existence in itself(mumtani‘u’l-wujud) .

22. The subject which is supreme and of extreme importance in this science is the Proving of the Creator(Sani‘) so he begin to do this. And as an introduction he gives a division of the objects of thought because the argument to follow depends on this explanation. And in explanation of that every object of thought(kullu ma‘qul) means the form(as-sura) which is acquired in the mind whenever we bring objective existence into relation to it.

Then it is either sound for it (the objective existence) to be qualified by it (the mental image) in itself, or it is not. If it is not sound for it to be qualified by it in itself, that is impossible existence in itself, as (for example) the Creator’s having a partner. But if it is sound for it to be qualified by it, then it is either necessary(wajib) for it to be qualified by it in itself, or it is not. If the former be true, then it is the necessarily existent in itself, namely, Allah the Exalted, and no other. And if the latter be true, then it is possible of existence in itself, namely, all entities(mawjudat) apart from necessary existence.

23. But we have confined the “Necessary”(al-wajib) to that which is necessary in itself, to guard against the necessary because of something else, such as the necessity of the existence of an effect when a sufficient cause is present. (That is, there are two kinds of necessary, self-existent and existent in something else – but the term the Necessary should be used only of the former.) So, the effect is necessary, not in itself, but rather because of the existence of a sufficient cause.

24. And we have also confined the “impossible” to that which is impossible in itself, to guard against the impossible because of something else, such as the impossibility of the existence of an effect without its cause. And these two sorts (namely, the necessary because of something else and the impossible because of something else) belong to possible existence.

25. And as for the “possible,” its existence does not come about because of something else, so it is of no use to confine it to that which is possible in itself, except to explain that it does not come into being except in that way. There is no need of guarding against anything besides.

26. We will end this discussion by mentioning two matters of importance on which the discussion that is to follow depends. (1) The first is the characteristics of the necessarily existent in itself, which are five:

(a) First, its existence is not necessary both because of itself and because of something else at the same time, otherwise its existence would certainly be discontinued on the discontinuance of the existence of the other thing, in which case it would not be the necessary in itself, and that is contrary to the premises.

(b) Second, its existence(wujud) and its necessity are not additions(za’id) to it, otherwise it would have been in need of those two, and would then have been the possible.

(c) Third, composition(tarkib) is not true of it, because a thing composed is in need of parts distinct from it, and this is possible existence, and possible existence is not the self-existent.

(d) Fourth, it cannot be a part of another thing, for then it would have been parted from that other thing, and that is possible existence. (That is, God has no father or source.)

(e) Fifth, it cannot be true of two things, as shall appear in the proofs of the Unity (that is, there are not two necessarily self-existents).

27. (2) The second matter is the characteristics of the possible, which are three: (a) First, one of the two sides (I mean existence and non-existence) is not better for it than the other, but both are equal in relation to it, like the two sides of a balance. And making one of the two sides to preponderate certainly comes about by a cause outside of itself. For if one of them were better for it than the other, then the occurrence of the other (that is, the worse) either comes about or it does not.

If the worse occurs, then being better is not a sufficient cause; and if the worse does not occur, then the first supposition regarding it is necessary for it (that is, that one alternative is better for it than the other). In this case the possible becomes either the necessary or the impossible, and that cannot be.

28. (b) Second, the possible needs a mover(mu’aththir) . For when the two sides (I mean, its existence and non-existence) are equal in relation to it, the preponderance of one of the two over the other is not possible unless there be something to cause a preponderance. And the knowledge of this is evident.

29. (c) Third, the possible-which-abides needs a mover, not only to bring it into existence (see b) but also to continue it in existence. But we have said this because possibility(al-imkan) is required for the quiddity of the possible, and possibility cannot be removed from it, otherwise its change from possibility to necessity or impossibility would be required. Now it has already been proved that need(ihtiyaj) is required for possibility, and possibility is required for the quiddity of the possible. Now the requirement of something required is itself required. Hence, the need of the quiddity of the possible is required – which is what we sought.

30. And there is no doubt that here (in the universe) there is that which exists of necessity. If this be the necessary in itself, then that was what we were seeking. And if it be the possible, then it would need a bringer-into-existence(mujid) which would bring it into existence of necessity.

Now if the bringer-into-existence be the necessary in itself, then that was what we were seeking. And if it be the possible, then it would need another bringer-into-existence. If it be the first, then it is a circle, and that is a fallacy of necessity. And if it be another possible, then it is an endless chain, and that also is a fallacy. For all the links in this chain which includes all possible existences(al-mumkinat) are possible of necessity.

Hence, they share in the impossibility of existence in themselves. Hence, they need some bringer-into-existence necessarily outside of themselves. Then that is the necessary(al-wajib) of necessity – which was what we were seeking.

31. Among all the doctors there are two ways of proving the Creator. (1) First, seeking for proof in effects(athar) which need a cause for their existence, such as is indicated in His Mighty Book in the word of the Most High,

“We will show them our signs in different countries and among themselves, until it become plain to them that it is the truth.” (41:53).

And this is the way of Ibrahim the Friend, for he sought for proof in the setting of stars, which is disappearance, and that requires motion, and that requires becoming(huduth) , and that requires the Most High Creator.

32. (2) Second, that one should speculate(nazar) about that which exists itself, and divide it into the necessary and the possible, that division may bear witness to the existence of the necessary from which proceed all of the possible existences which are separate from it. And there is reference to this in that which descended, in the word of the Most High,

“Is it not enough for thee that thy Lord is witness of all things?” (41:53).

33. And in this chapter the writer has referred to both ways at once. He refers to the first in connection with His being powerful, the explanation of which is to follow (see par. 38). And the second is what is mentioned here. And as for his statement that thou shouldest say, “If the Necessary, the Most High, does not exist, then either a circle or an endless chain must follow,” (it is clear that) both of the things necessitated are false, hence, that which necessitated them, that is, the non-existence of the Necessary, is in like manner false. And there is need here of an explanation of both matters, first of the necessity for a circle and an endless chain, and second of the fallacy of both of them.

34. (1) Now in explanation of the first matter, (we would say that) there are here quiddities(mahiyyat) which are qualified by objective existence of necessity. If the Necessary exists along with them, then that was what we were seeking. And if it does not exist, then it becomes necessary that all these quiddities share in possibility, for there is no middle ground between them (that is, between the possible and the necessary). Then in this case they (the quiddities) must of necessity have a mover(mu’aththur) .

And if their mover is the Necessary, that is what we sought to prove. And if it is the possible, then it needs another to produce it. Now if that mover be what we first supposed (if it be caused by the other possible), it results in a circle. And if it be another possible, we will transfer the discussion to that and say what we said regarding the first – and the result is an endless chain. So, the necessity(luzum) of both of them has been proved (that is, either a circle or an endless chain must result in case there is no Necessary).

35. (2) And in explanation of the second matter, namely, the fallacy of the circle and the chain, we say (a) that a circle means the dependence of a thing upon something which in turn depends on it, as for example that A should depend on B, and B on A – and that is a fallacy of necessity. For it would then be necessary that the first thing should be both existent and non-existent at the same time, and that cannot be.

For when A depends on B, then A is dependent on B and on all on which B depends. And among the things on which B depends is A itself. Then A must depend on itself. And that on which something depends precedes that which depends on it. Then it is necessary for A to precede itself. And that which precedes, by the fact that it precedes, comes into existence before that which follows. So in this case, A comes into existence before itself. Hence, it is both existent and non-existent at the same time, and this is impossible.

36. (b) And an endless chain is the arrangement of causes and effects in such a way that each one which precedes is the cause of the one which follows, and so on – and this also is fallacious. For all the individual links of this chain, which includes all possible existence, are possible because they possess the quality of need. Hence, they all share in possibility. Hence, they need a mover (a cause). And their mover is either themselves or a part of themselves or something external to them. And all of these alternatives are absolutely fallacious.

37. First, it is impossible for a thing to be moved(ta’thir) by itself, for otherwise it would be necessary for it to precede itself, and this is a fallacy, as was proved above. And the second is impossible, because if the mover of them (the units of the chain) be a part of them, then it becomes necessary for a thing to be the mover of itself, because it (the mover) is one of their number and also one of their causes(‘ilal) . Then it would have to precede itself and its causes – and this also is a fallacy.

And the (proof of the fallacy of the) third alternative is of two kinds. (a) First, the thing external to them must be necessary(wajib) , since it is presupposed that all possible existences are united in this chain, and there remains no external entity(mawjud) except the Necessary(al-wajib) . For there is no middle ground between the Necessary and the possible. Hence, our conclusion has to be true. (b) Second, if the mover of each single individual of the links of the chain be something external to them, then two independent causes(‘illa) would have to unite in producing one single effect, and this is a fallacy.

For the supposition was that each of the links of this chain be the mover of the one that follows. (But according to this third alternative) it has been supposed that for each of the links there be also an external moving(ta’thir) . Then two causes would have to unite in producing one single effect, and that cannot be, otherwise, it would have to be independent of the two causes, in spite of its being in need of them both. Then two contradictories would have to agree, and that is impossible. Hence, the endless chain is absolutely false. So the fallacy both of the circle and of the chain has been demonstrated, and that was what we sought, namely, the existence of Allah the Most High.