Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Critique of Marxist Philosophy (Part 1)

Author:Ayatullah MuhammadBaqir as-Sadr

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: The Introduction 4

The Social Problem: 4

Chapter 2: The Islamic Solution 6

Chapter 3 Part One: The Theory of Knowledge (Chapter I) 8

Concepts: 8

Judgements: 8

Chapter 4: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge 11

Chapter 5: Empiricism and the Possibility of Metaphysics 12

Chapter 6; Marxism and Metaphysics 14

Chapter 7: The Value of Knowledge (Chapter 2) The Possibility of Knowledge: 15

Descartes bases the whole edifice of existence on the proposition: 16

The Idealists: 16

The Nature of Judgement: 17

Chapter 8: Answers to Objections 19

Chapter 9: Idealism in Physics and Psychology 20

Chapter 10: Skepticism 22

Relativism: 22

Kant's 'Relativism': 22

Chapter 11: Relativism in Philosophy and Sciences 25

Chapter 12: Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy 26

Chapter 13: Knowledge in Dialectical Materialism 27

Marxism and Refutation of Idealism: 27

Chapter 14: Sense Experience and the Thing-in-Itself 28

Chapter 1: The Introduction

The Social Problem:

Here the author spells out his main aim for writing the book. It is not philosophy for philosophy's sake. The purpose is to present Islam as an alternative system superior to capitalism and secular democracy on the one hand and to Marxism and socialism on the other.

Although devoid of an articulate worldview or ideology, capitalistic democracies are materialistic to the core. Dissociating themselves from all transcendental principles, they claim to promote the interests and rights of the individual and safeguard his economic, political liberties and freedom of expression and thought. The interests of the individualare regarded as primary and are emphasized at the cost of the interests of society. The assumption is that since all individuals seek their interests, the provision of individual freedom leads to the automatic fulfillment of the interests of society, whichare regarded as the sum of individual interests.

However, due to the dominant materialistic outlook on life in capitalistic societies, the pursuit of individual self-interest does not transcend the purview of materialism. Nearly all moral values, most of which do not lie within the purview of materialistic self-seeking of individuals, are neglected, causing deep harm to society's welfare. The rights of the minorityare neglected . Unlimited economic freedom permits a handful of capitalists to dominate the majority of people and to usurp their freedoms and rights. With the immense economic resources at their disposal, the wealthy capitalists take control of the mass media, government,legislature and judiciary. Even foreign countries and peoples are not secure from their greed for cheap raw materials, cheaplabour , and markets for finished products. Imperialism, hence, is a direct outcome of capitalistic democracy.

In this dehumanizing hell of materialism and pursuit of individualself-interest there is no place for love, mercy, self-denial or any other higher human value.

Dialectical materialism sees all evils of capitalism to be rooted in the institution of private property. If private propertyis abolished and all property becomes public, passing from the possession and control of the individual into those of the community, individual ambition will die.

All will voluntarily pool the fruits of theirlabour for the common benefit. The higher cultural values will be put within the reach ofall alike through community support and the diffusion of education.

Although communism solved some of the problems of capitalism at the cost of immense human suffering, the remedy was only partial. Dictatorship, repression, deprival of individual freedoms, constant fear of imprisonment, torture and execution for the dissidents, loss of economicvigour due to absence of individual initiative and motivation, the debasement of man's dignity these are some of the outcomes of the socialist solution.

In the view of Martyr al-Sadr , the evil of capitalism lies not in private property but in the neglect of the spiritual dimensions of man's being. Moreover, self-seeking is inherent in human nature; it is not a product of the institution of private property, as alleged by Marx. The failure of secular democracies lies in their emphasis on individualism and their inability to stimulate and promote the higher spiritual aspect of man's self-seeking nature, whose activation is vital for arising man's altruistic potentialities so significant for society's welfare. Marxism makes the mistake of abolishing private property while keeping intact capitalism's destructive materialisticworld view . As a result, it ends up substituting a handful of bureaucrats and party officials for a handful of capitalists who wield all power and control the society's wealth and resources.

Both capitalism and communism fail to present a correct world outlook and to formulate an ideology capable of solving the diverse problems of human society. This failure is rooted in their materialistworld view and their inadequate understanding of man's nature.

Chapter 2: The Islamic Solution

There are no more than two alternatives for modern man to solve the basic problem of society. Either, he should somehow abandon his self-seeking character and become altruistic while keeping his materialisticworld view ; or, he should abandon his materialistic outlook and select a different metaphysical criterion and goal.

The communists select the first alternative because they do not believe that man is self-seeking by nature. They erroneously regard private property as infrastructure and man's self-seeking as its superstructure. This is putting the cart before the horse.The second alternative is chosen by Islam . It does not abolish private property but gives a new meaning to human existence. It does not consider human nature a mechanical artifact of social and economic conditions, nor does it put the society at the mercy of the individual.

The Islamic outlookis based in faith in a transcendent source of life and existence. This world is a prelude to another. The highest value and criterion of all human activities and pursuits is the attainment of God's good pleasure and His approval. All human history testifies to the innateness of man's self-seeking character. Had it not been for this self-seeking and self-love there would have been no motive for the satisfaction of human needs. No school of thought or ideology can offer an ultimate solution to man's problems without taking into account his nature and without establishing a harmony between that which is and that which ought to be.

Offering a transcendental interpretation of life, a perspective in which this world is a prelude to the hereafter, Islam seeks to bring about a harmony between man's self-seeking nature and the good of society, by putting forward the criterion of the attainment of God's approval and good pleasure as the ultimate end initself . As a result it eliminates the conflict between the good ofthe individual and that of society, and the individual is promised an everlasting reward in his struggle for the establishment of a prosperous and just society as a means fortheattainment of God's good pleasure:

Upon that day men shall issue in scatterings to see their works, and whose has done an atom's weight of good shall see it, and whose has done an atom's weight of evil shall see it. (99:6-8)

Such a thing is not possible in the framework of a materialisticworld view . The Islamicworld view opens up an infinite vista before man's eye, and compensates his ephemeral losses with lasting benefits.

Apart from transforming human criteria through a transcendentalworld view , Islam offers a specific system of training for nourishing man's various spiritual, moral and emotional potentialities which lie latent in his being. Islam takes into consideration the welfare of both the individual and society, based as it is on a spiritual understanding and moral sense of life. Other systems either sacrifice the individual for society or society for the individual, and as aresult they paralyze man's nature and expose social life to severe complications and perils.

Here, at the end of his introduction, the author spells out his objective, which is a comparative study of the philosophical viewpoints of Islam and otherschools which confront it. Since the capitalist system lacks any philosophical basis, he proposes to examine in detail the philosophical foundations of dialectical materialism.

Chapter 3 Part One: The Theory of Knowledge (Chapter I)

Concepts:

The first chapter in this section is devoted to the epistemological problem of the source of concepts andjudgements . First the author examines the Platonic doctrine of Recollection, then the rationalist theory, and following that the empirical theory. The Platonic theory is false because soul does not exist in anabstract form prior to the existence of the body, being the result of substantial motion in matter. It is by means of this movement that it acquires an immaterial existence not characterized by material qualities and free from the laws of matter.

The rationalist theory that some concepts are innate or a priori is not refutable if interpreted to meanthat innate ideas exist in the soul potentially, becoming actual as the soul develops.

The empirical theory, first propounded by John Locke, holds that there are no innate ideas; all our ideas without exceptionare derived from experience.It was adopted by Marxism . However, the empirical theory as admitted by Hume fails to explain how we form such concepts as that of causality; for that which is derived from the senses is succession, not causality. The rejection of the principle of causality by empiricists does not solve the difficulty, because the fact remains that we do conceive causality, whichis not given in sense perception.

Al-Sadr then goes on to the Abstraction theory (nazariyyat al-'intiza ')favoured by the Islamic philosophers in general. According to this theory, concepts are of two kinds: primary and secondary. The primary ones are products ofsense-perception . The secondary onesare produced from the primary concepts by the mind through the means of 'abstraction.' The secondary concepts although derived from the primary ones transcend them and are the inventions of the mind.

Judgements :

Moving from concepts tojudgements , al-Sadr selects here the rational and empirical theses about the source ofjudgements for discussion.

1. According to the rationalists, knowledge (in the form ofjudgements or propositions) consists of two kinds. The first kind is primary, self-evident, and intuitive. It includes such propositions as the principle of contradiction, and such statements as 'The whole is greater than the part', 'One is half of two', 'A thing cannot have contradictory attributes at the same time', and so on. The other kind is what the author calls 'theoretical' knowledge, whose truth cannot be established except in the light of the first kind. Among the examples given are: 'The earth is spherical', 'Heat is caused by motion', 'Infinite regress isimpossible', 'The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'.

The author does not seem to be right here in putting two different kinds of statements in one class called 'theoretical knowledge'. 'The earth is spherical' is not the same kind ofjudgement as 'The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'. The former requires observation and inference for its proof, while the lattercan be established by pure reasoning. The same distinction applies to the two statements 'Heat is caused by motion' and 'Infinite regress is impossible'.

All knowledgeis based on previous knowledge, which in turn depends on knowledge preceding it. The a priori or primary knowledge is that irreducible remainder which does not arise from any previous knowledge. A part of primary knowledge, consisting of such general principles as the law of contradiction, constitutes the basic condition of all knowledge. Withoutit no general proposition can be affirmed.

It is this knowledge independent of experience that makes metaphysics possible.

The progression of thought is from universal tomore particular propositions . This is true even in the experimental sciences, which cannot dispense with the universal principles of causality and uniformity of nature. Experimentation also, without the application of necessary rational laws, does not lead to general scientific truths. The Islamic philosophers, including al-Sadr , espouse this theory.

2. According to the empiricists sense experience is the primary source of all knowledge. They do not admit the existence of any necessary rational knowledge prior to experience. There can be no knowledge of universal truths prior to experience.Theirpositionmakes metaphysics and deduction impossible.

The empirical doctrine has tobe rejected for the following four reasons.

First, either the empirical doctrine is prior to experience or it is not. If it is, it refutes itself. If itis derived from experience, the validity of experience as a criterion of knowledge has not yet been established. Second, empiricism fails to affirm the existence of matter and the external world, whichcannot be affirmed except by primary rational knowledge.Thus the metaphysical realities are not the only ones which depend for their affirmation on the rational method.

Third, experience by itself is not sufficient to assert the impossibility of anything. All that experience can affirm isnon presence or at the most non-existence. The notion of impossibility can be accepted only on rational grounds, noton the basis of experience. If the notion of impossibilityis denied , anything, including contradiction, becomes possible. The possibility of contradiction leads to the collapse of all knowledge and science.

Fourth, the principle of causalitycannot be demonstrated by the means of the empirical doctrine. All that experience can affirm is succession and contiguity, not causal necessity.

The author then turns to the effort of Hume to show how the 'feeling' of necessary connection implicit in the concept of causality arises from experience: the theory of association of ideas. According to Hume, the habit of leaping forward to and expecting the sequent associated with the antecedentbecomes so ingrained by continual repetition of their conjunction as to make the mind feel that when the one event occurs the other simply must follow it. Events so habitually conjoined and associated as tobe accompanied by this feeling of must are called cause and effect, and the relation of simple sequence is turned into one of causation. Al-Sadr offers five reasons for rejecting this explanation. First, if it were true, no scientist would be able to confirm a causal relation between two things in a single experiment, where there is no repetition of the conjoined events to produce the feeling of necessity. Similarly, many times, belief in a causal relationshipis not strengthened by further repetition of events involving a cause and its effect.

Second, when we take the associated ideas of two events regarded as being in cause-effect relationship, is the relation between these two ideas that of mere conjunction or necessity? If it is mere conjunction, the element of necessity implied in their associationis not explained .

Third, the necessity of the principle of causality is not a psychological necessity but an objective one.

Fourthly, the mind distinguishes between cause and effect even when theyare completely conjoined (e.g. the movements of the pen and the hand while writing).

Fifthly, it often happens that two events are frequently associated without producing the belief that one of them is the cause of the other (e.g. day and night). Empiricism cannot provide the basis for the sciences, which are based on some rational principles that are not subject to experimentation, viz., the principle of causality, the principle of harmony between cause and effect, and the principle ofnon contradiction . The scientist, in framing his theories, passes from these general principles to particular hypothesis through a process of syllogistic reasoning.

Of course, experience has a high value, but it itself stands in need of a rational criterion. This criterion is primary rational knowledge.

The rational theory of knowledge also explains the quality of necessity and certainty that distinguishes the propositions of mathematics from the propositions of the natural sciences. This is because mathematicsis entirely based on primary rational principles. Some empiricists have tried to explain this difference by stating that mathematical propositions are analytic (tautological). Yet even mathematical statements would not be certain had it not been for their reliance on certain rational principles, such as the law of contradiction. Moreover,allmathematical statements are not analytic, such as, ,The diameter is shorter than the circumference'.

How does primary knowledge emerge when it is not present at birth and in all men at all times? The answer is that the primaryjudgements proceed from the innermost being of the soul after it has formed the necessary conceptions, directly or indirectly,as a result of experience. As the soul develops through substantial movement, the primary knowledge, which exists in it potentially, becomesactual .

Chapter 4: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge

Here, the statement of the Marxist position by the author is, unfortunately, not basedeither on the original works of Marx or Engels or their authoritative interpreters. Perhaps due to the non-availability of translations, he bases his criticism on the writings of second-rate interpreters, such as MaoTse-tung . The result is that the Marxist position stated is weak, weakening in turn somewhat the author's criticism of Marxist epistemology.

According to Marxism, all knowledge begins in experience. The next step is that of ordering of information,inference and application.

It does not accept that some knowledge is independent of sense experience. Denying that there exists some primaryknowledge which enables the mind to move from the first to the second stage, it fails to explain how the mind can move from the stage of sense perception to that of theory and inference.

The conclusion is- drawn that only the rationalist theory provides an adequate explanation of how the mind is able to move from the first to the second stage of knowledge. It is only the knowledge of the general rational laws that affords the scientist to develop theories and to draw inferences in hisendeavour to discover the reality that lies beyond empirical phenomena. The rejection of primary rational knowledge, which is independent of experience, makes it impossible to go beyond the stage ofsense-perception .

Chapter 5: Empiricism and the Possibility of Metaphysics

Before the birth of empiricism, philosophywas considered responsible for discovering the general laws of being. Its tool was syllogistic reasoning and philosophic thought moved from general tomore particular propositions . Not only metaphysics and ethics but also such sciences as physics and psychology lay within the sphere of philosophy. However, the experimental method and induction took the sciences, each of them devoted to a specific class of phenomena, out of the purview of philosophy, which was left to deal withissues which fell within the purview of pure reason. The empiricists claimed that there is no field of knowledge beyond the field of experimentation that the sciences have divided among themselves, leaving nothing for philosophy. The only scope thatwas admitted for philosophy by some schools was that of discovering the relations and links among the sciences and to postulate general scientific theories based on the outcome of experiments in various scientific fields. Foremost amongst them were the schools of Marxism and positivism.

The logical positivists were not satisfied with the empiricist attacks against metaphysics. They did not limit themselves, for instance, to the assertion that metaphysics was useless since its propositionscould not be demonstrated by the scientific method. The positivists went on to assert that the propositions of metaphysics were meaningless. The criticism of the positivists against metaphysicscan be summarized as follows:

1. Metaphysical propositions deal with matters that lie beyond the sphere of experience and experiment.Hence they cannot be verified.

2. Their being true or false makes no differenceso far as the world of experience is concerned.

3. Metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they do not give any information about the world.

4. It is inappropriate to ascribe truth or falsity to them.

The author suggests the following lines for answering this criticism:

1. If we refute the empirical theory of knowledge and affirm the existence of a primary knowledge prior to experience in the core of the human mind, we can demonstrate that the mind has the capacity to confirm the veracity or falsity of metaphysical propositions.

2. Although metaphysical propositions have no direct bearing on the data of experience, these data arenot altogether irrelevant to metaphysical statements. Further clarification tobe given later.

3. The logical positivists describe a proposition as 'meaningful' if its truth or falsitycan be affirmed within the limits of sense experience.

This is equal to saying, "The content of metaphysical propositions lies beyond sense experience". With this, the positivists assert an indisputable truth, that the subjects of metaphysics are not empirical something which the rationalists have stressed all along.

What would the positivist say about such propositions as relate to nature butcannot be verified by sense experience, such as a statement about the existence of mountains and valleys on the other side of the moon? Positivism revises its original position to assert that that which is important here is logical possibility, not actual possibility. However, the notion of logical possibility is a metaphysical notion, and thus positivism, in the last analysis, has to adopt a metaphysical criterion of 'meaning'. Metaphysical propositions are as meaningful as anyother , in that they relate to realities independent of the mind and the logical possibility of being true or false holds in their case.

Chapter 6; Marxism and Metaphysics

The Marxist position regarding metaphysics is essentially similar to that of positivism. Marxism rejects a higher philosophy above and over the sciences and independent of them. Marxist philosophy calls itself 'scientific', yet soon trespasses into other fields to judge metaphysical issues affirmatively or negatively. In violating its self-set limits it contradicts itself a result of the Marxist mistake of basing its theory of knowledge on sense experience alone.

It is in the light of the rational theory of knowledge that philosophy and metaphysics rest on firm fundamental principles. The acceptance of primary rational knowledge relieves philosophy of bondage to the constantly changing theories of experimental science.

The link between philosophy and science is strong, for science furnishes philosophy with new facts that enable philosophy to obtain new philosophical conclusions. Yet in spite of this philosophy may at times not need any sense experience, nor is it necessary for philosophy to accompany the procession of science in its gradual march.

Chapter 7: The Value of Knowledge (Chapter 2) The Possibility of Knowledge:

In this chapterMartyr al-Sadr is concerned not with the 'value' of knowledge but rather with the possibility of knowledge as such. To what extent does 'knowledge' (i.e. that which is consideredto be knowledge ) capture the essence of reality and the secrets of the external world?

Marxism believes in the possibility of knowledge of objective realities and rejects skepticism and sophistry. The world does not contain anything thatcannot be known .But is it appropriate for Marxism to claim that definite knowledge is possible? Can it escape skepticism in the ultimate analysis?

In order to understand the Marxist and Islamic positions on this issue, the author considers it essential to review important doctrines formulated by philosophers, beginning with the Sophists.

Greek Philosophy: In the fifth centuryB.C. a class of teachers emerged in Greece that devoted itself to teaching of rhetoric and giving professional advice to their clients in matters of law, court procedure and politics. Protagoras (b.c . 500 B.C.) andGorgias (fl.c . 427 B.C.), two major skeptics, were the products of this class.Gorgias , for instance, taught that the Real, about which the pre-Socratic philosophers had argued, does not exist. If a world-stuffexisted we could never know what it was like; it is not what it appears, since the senses lie. Even if Realitycould be known , knowledge is incommunicable; for, language, being mere noise, cannot convey the knowledge of reality to other minds.

The Sophists rejected the possibility of knowledge and made truth a purely subjective and relative affair.Hence metaphysics is idle speculation and its results are worthless.There is no reality that reason can know except the ever-changing flux of sensible experience.

Sophistry wished to destroy what philosophy had built hitherto. They were opposed by Socrates (d.399 B.C.), Plato (428-347B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who tried to maintain reason on its throne. Aristotelian epistemology validated reason and recognized the value of experience, and posited the possibility of certain knowledge.

The skepticism that reemerged after Aristotle was a compromise in that it did not deny reality but denied the possibility of certain knowledge. However, skepticism could not prevail in philosophy, and reason mounted the throne offered to it by Aristotle, until skepticism emerged again in the 16th century in an atmosphere of doubt and rebellion against the authority of reason. Descartes emerged in this atmosphere and he tried to bring back certitude to philosophy.

Descartes: Descartes (1596-1650) began his philosophy with sweeping doubt. Ideas, he reasoned are susceptible to error and sense perception is often deceptive. The point of departure for philosophical certitude was the existence of his thoughts, which leads him to infer his own existence: 'I think, therefore, I am'. This statement is true because it is clear and distinct. He therefore adoptsas a general rule the principle that all things that we conceive very clearly and distinctly are true.

Ideas seem to be of three sorts: (1) those that are innate, (2) those that are foreign and come from without, (3) those thatarethe mind's constructs. Descartes disposes of skepticism by first proving the existence of God, whose idea belongs to the first class. Since we as imperfect beings are not sufficient reason for the idea of perfection we entertain the idea of God being the idea of an absolutely perfect being the idea of God must have been caused by Him. God is thus the first objective reality posited by Descartes. Now since God is good, the innate ideas (which include the ideas of external bodies) which we have such strong inclination to believe must be true. This is how Descartes posits external reality and the possibility of science.

Al-Sadr points out that 'I think, therefore, I am', contains a concealed syllogism: 'I think, every thinker exists, therefore I exist'.

Moreover as pointed out byIbn Sina , this argument from thought to existence is invalid; for the thinking subject admits his existence in the first phrase 'I think'.

Secondly, Descartes confuses between the idea of a perfect being and the objective reality it represents. It is God, not the idea of God, which is more sublime than humanbeings .

Descartes bases the whole edifice of existence on the proposition:

"It is impossible for God to deceive". He confuses between 'deception is impossible', and 'deception is abominable', which is not a metaphysical (judgement of fact) but an ethical (judgement of value) proposition.

In any case, the author's purpose is not an elaborate criticismof Descartes' philosophy but to present his view regarding the possibility of knowledge . Descartes accepts the validity of innate rational knowledge.

Locke (1632-1704) is the founder of modern empiricism. While he claims that all knowledgeis derived from experience there being no innate ideas or principles he divides knowledge into three types:

(1)by intuition, (2) by rational demonstration, (3) by sensation. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive, our knowledge of God's existence is demonstrative, and our knowledge ofthingspresent to sense is sensitive. This division of knowledge into three groups is inconsistent with his empirical doctrine.

Locke makes a distinction between what he calls primary and secondary qualities. The primary ones are in separable from bodies, such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. The secondary qualities are only in the percipient, such ascolour , sound, smell, etc.

Since there is no way, according to Locke, of knowing the primary qualities except through the senses, this division is also inconsistent with his empirical doctrine.

The Idealists:

The Platonic theory of Ideas, generally called 'realism',is referred to as 'idealism' by the author. Whatever we may call it, it did not involve any denial or doubt about reality. In metaphysics, idealism is the theory that reality is of the nature of mind or idea. To al-Sadr , it is an attempt to shake the foundations of objective reality and to exterminate certainty. In order to study the role of idealism in the theory of knowledge, he proposes to examine three tendencies in idealism. These he calls 'philosophical', 'physical' and 'physiological'.

Philosophical Idealism: Its founder was Berkeley, who declared, 'To exist is to know or to be known'. He denies existence to objective realities existing independent of minds. Mind and its ideas exist. All we know of 'matter' are the qualities of our sense (the secondary qualities of Locke). Berkeley's idealism has been interpreted differently and al-Sadr has selected an interpretation that he considersbest-known . He cites Berkeley's proofs in support of his doctrines.

The first oneis intended to prove that all knowledge is based on and comes from the senses. The main criticism against Berkeley is that he takes for granted the law of contradiction in his proofs while denying that there is any knowledge not rooted in sense experience. The author interprets Berkeley as denying the independent existence of things and offers reasons for rejecting this alleged denial of Berkeley.

The fact is thatBerkeley's position is not understood clearly by the author . Berkeley does not deny the reality of external objects. What he denies is that such objects could exist by themselves and independent of the Divine mind. That is, existence for him is synonymous with being the object of consciousness. Things cannot exist except as ideas inside minds. Why does Berkeley deny what Locke calls primary qualities? That is because he is reluctant to recognize such qualities as extension, number, motion,solidity and figure as being attributes of the Divine mind, perhaps in accordance with the theological notions of the scholastics.

If external objects are tobe conceived as ideas in the Divine mind, there is no place for matter and materiality in the external world, matter being the main obstacle in the way of conceiving external objects as Divine ideas.Hence he denies the primary qualities as representing attributes of material bodies, and thus he annihilates matter. In some ways Berkeley's thesis that existence is mental is similar to the theory of God's 'knowledge by presence' ('ilm huduri ) propounded by some Muslim philosophers. In both thecases; things are conceived as objects of knowledge, not as things in themselves independent of a perceiving mind.On the whole, one may say that the reasonsbehindBerkeley's denial of matter and corporeality are mainly theological, because he regards the idea of material substratum as the base on which the concept of thing-in-itself rests. Since corporeality cannot be a quality of Divine ideas, Berkeley will not have any things-in-themselves.According to him everything that there is thing- in-consciousness.

The Nature ofJudgement :

However, to return to al-Sadr's criticism of Berkeley, it is obvious that Berkeley's denial of the objectivity of thought leads to solipsism. Berkeley's proofs involve a misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge has two main divisions according to al-Sadr : conception andjudgement . The forms of objects exist on three levels in our intellect:

(1)as percepts, on the level of sense perception, (2) as images, on the level of imagination (and perhaps memory), and (3) as concepts, on the abstract level of intellection. Mere concepts, in isolation from one another, do not ensure the mind's movement from the subjective to the objective realm. The presence of the form of an essence in our intellect is onething, while the objective presence of that essence in the outside is something else (it is not clear whether this is true of sense perception or only of imagination and conception).

Judgement , however, is different from conception. It is the point of departure for the movement from conception to objectivity. 1.Judgement does not arise in the mind by way of senses. It is rather an act of the knowing mind.

2. Most importantly, it is an inherent property ofjudgement to reveal a reality beyond the mind. Although the mind has no direct conjunction with anything except its knowledge, it is inherent injudgement to be essentiallydisclosive (kashfan dhatiyyan ) of something outside knowledge.

Berkeley's argument is based ona confusion between conception andjudgement . The empirical doctrine that all knowledge arises from perception relates to the stage of conception. By failing to recognize the difference between concepts andjudgements , it makes it impossible to move in the direction of objectivity.

Chapter 8: Answers to Objections

(1) Itmay be said that if it is inherent injudgement to essentially disclose reality lying beyond knowledge, then alljudgements must be true, which is not the case. To solve this difficulty al-Sadr explains the meaning of 'essential disclosure'. It is inherent injudgement to point towards a reality independent of itself. Whether true or false, it disclosesjudgement is not detached other than itself. Thus essential disclosure of fromjudgement itself, even when there is error and ambiguity (the author uses the word 'knowledge' instead ofjudgement inthis statement , which does not agree with the conception that knowledge is something always true).

(2) The second objection is that ifjudgement may be erroneous, its property of essential disclosure being unable to protect it from error, how can we rely upon it? The answer is that if human thought did not possess a number ofjudgements of indubitable certainty, nojudgement would be free of doubt and it would be impossible for us to know any reality. It is here that the doctrine of necessary primary knowledge comes to our rescue. This doctrine asserts that there is a knowledge whose truth is secure and which is completely free from error. Error occurs in inferring secondaryjudgements on the basis of primary knowledge. Even Berkeley unconsciously believes in a store of certain knowledge, for no one can demonstrate anything unless he bases his demonstration on the fundamentals contained in primary knowledge such as the law of contradiction and the principle of causality and necessity.

This discussion of philosophical idealism enables us to draw two conclusions: (1) the acceptance of the essentially disclosing nature ofjudgements , (2) the acceptance of basic principle of human knowledge whose truth is necessarily secure. Even Berkeley's belief in the existence of other minds and his proofs infavour of idealism assume the acceptance of these two notions.

Realism (which in metaphysics means that reality is not reducible to mind andthought, and in epistemology means the doctrine that objects of knowledge and experience exist independently of their being known or experienced) bases its arguments on these two principles.

Chapter 9: Idealism in Physics and Psychology

The nineteenth-century physicist explained nature in terms of mechanical laws involving material bodies,particles and waves. The developments in atomic physics abolished the classical conception of matter. Matter wasno more indestructible ; mass and matter became convertible to energy.As a result of this, the materialistic conception of the world became inconsistent with the findings of empirical science.

The discoveries in subatomic particle physics lead to an idealistic tendency among some physicists. The concepts and theories of science, they said, were only convenient ways of discussing reality, whose true nature escaped the categories of thought and knowledge. Thisidealism, or absence of faith in the objective value of knowledge was, according to Martyr al-Sadr , the result of a philosophical error. They perceived the debate between realists and idealists as revolving about the choice of one of these two alternatives: Either the world is attributable to mind and consciousness, or to a material reality existing outside them.

This is a fallacious formulation of the primary issueinvolved, that is whether the world has an objective reality independent of mind and consciousness (which in the last analysis may not be material).

As a result, when they failed to posit the fundamental reality of matter, they came to doubt the possibility of knowledge. However, realism and materialism are not synonymous. If science is led to discard the materialistic view of the world, or if any of its scientific axioms collapseas a result of experiments, it should not lead us to reject realism and deny the objective value of knowledge.

The evaporation of matter as a fundamental reality existing independently of mind was a deadly blow to materialist philosophies, including Marxism. However, the Marxist ideologues, such as Lenin, tried to save face by insisting that the philosophical conception of matter is different from the matter of science. The only necessary quality of 'matter', they pleaded, was its existence independent of mind, not the corporeal qualities traditionally ascribed to matter.

This is a futile play with words, for it does not conceal the fact that Marxism has to abandon its philosophical position. If to exist independently of mind is the only necessary quality of matter, then theological metaphysics, according to this new definition of matter, is a materialistic philosophy!

The tendency towards idealism and agnosticism among the physicists was the result of a psychological crisis that came due to the collapse of certain scientific axioms. Materialism was such an axiom, but realism is not. Realism is not the result of empirical proof or experiments; its acceptance is inherent in human nature.

A similar skeptical tendency arose among the physiologists studying the physiology of perception and the causal processes related to it.

They suggested that the objects given in sense perception are symbolic, not representative of the external objects. This tendency was a complication of the materialistic notion that knowledge was purely a physiological act conditioned by the nature of the nervous system.