The Learnings Of The Glorious Quran

The Learnings Of The Glorious Quran13%

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The Learnings Of The Glorious Quran
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The Learnings Of The Glorious Quran

The Learnings Of The Glorious Quran

Author:
Publisher: www.alhassanain.org/english
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


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The Extent of Divine Potency and Will

The Relation Between Power and Will

Among the theological discussions concerning Divine Power and Will, there is the question whether everything does fall within the circle of the Divine Power, or whether the Divine Power covers only certain things, or whether the things which belong to Divine Power also belong to His Will. That is, is not there any limitation of Divine Power, as we frequently read in the Qur'an: "Surely Allah is capable of (doing) everything."[145] Regarding the Divine Will there are many ayahs to the effect that Allah does whatever He wills. It is not that if Allah willed something it may not be implemented.

The Divine Will is ever-effective, and whenever the implementation of something is willed by Allah it would be carried out. The following are examples of such ayahs: "...Allah does what He Wills"[146] and: "...surely Allah does what He Wills"[147]

Allah Does not Will the Impossible

In this respect many questions are put forth. For example: Can Allah produce impossible things? Can He create another Allah like Himself? Can He grant to one of His creatures all that He has, such that He loses everything? Can He contain a mountain into an atom or, say, in a hen's egg? and so on. That is, are we to imagine that the meaning of saying: He is capable of doing everything, is that He must be able to do all such things, and that if He could not, it would mean that His ability is limited? In order to give a logical answer to these questions, a brief explanation of the concept of ability would be necessary. By saying that somebody is capable of doing something, or creating something, we mean that something is creatable or can be done, but it only needs a power to bring to existence this existable and implementable thing. To put it in a technical term we say that a power-dependent must be a possible being. Ability means doing what is possible to be done.

The conclusion is that ability does not cover the impossible. To ask: "Is it possible to create the impossible?" is a wrong question, because it contradicts itself. If it is impossible to exist, how can it be expected to exist? In other words, ability is dependant on the "thing". The impossible is not a "a thing", it is "nothing". Thus, when we say that Allah is able to do "everything", we must remember that the impossible is not a "thing". A thing is that which is doable possible to do. Here another question may be asked: There are many things, which are thought to be impossible and not power-dependent, yet we see or hear that they had been done by Allah. For example, if it is said that a huge heap of fire had been turned into a cool garden of flowers, we would say: impossible! Fire burns the flower, never turns to flower. How can a heap of kindled fire change into flowers? This is impossible, but we do know that Allah had turned the fire, in which Prophet Abraham (A.S.) was thrown, into a garden of flowers. To answer this, we must explain the kinds of the impossible.

Kinds of the Impossible

Things which are regarded, in the arguments of the gnostics as "the impossible", are divided into three kinds: Self-impossible, occurance-impossible and common-impossible.

The self-impossible is that which is supposed to bear in itself its contradiction, such as to say that the light which is dark, or the light which has no light, the black which is white or the black which is not black. This very supposition is impossible, i.e. the very supposition is self-contradicting. (If we ask: a light which is like darkness in proportion to another light, it is a different subject. But the supposition that a light, though being a light, is not a light, is a contradiction.) So, the supposition which contradicts itself is called self-impossible.

Occurance-impossible means that the supposition in itself is not impossible, but that we have added to it another supposition which made it impossible, such as supposing the appearance of an effect without its exclusive cause. In this case the appearance of this effect is not impossible in itself, because it certainly comes into existence when its exclusive cause is there. But we added the supposition that its cause was not there. So, the occurance of such an effect without its exclusive cause is .impossible.

Furthermore, this is not a power - dependant case, since it is contradictory. By saying that this effect has an exclusive cause we mean that without its exclusive cause it cannot come into existence. So, to suppose that it can be implemented without its exclusive cause is but a contradiction. Therefore, ability covers neither the self-impossible nor the occurence-impossible. It belongs to common-impossible. Miracles are of the common-impossible kind, that is, the appearance of something not from its common outlet. For example, when somebody is dead, he would not commonly come to life again, but the mind does not see it impossible to find one way or another to bring it into life once again, and there will be no contradiction in it. But the people, commonly believe that there is only one cause for that.

So, when an extraordinary event happened they thought that an impossible event had happened! All miracles are imagined to be of the impossibles, since no other cause is thought for them. But, on a second thought, we realize that the mind does not regard them to be impossible. In other words, people think that every event has a single exclusive cause which cannot be replaced by another cause. Consequently, they think that without that very cause it will be impossible for the event to happen.

Where does a flower grow? It grows in a soil with almost a fixed temperature, together with moisture.. Then the flower's seed is sowed. If there is no water; if the temperature is higher or lower then necessary, no flower will grow. If there is no flower - seed no flower will appear. So as far as we know, flowers grow in this way. But is there any other way of growing flowers since we have never heard in our whole life of other than this common way, we say that it is impossible. But when we see another way of growing flowers, we realize that it is not impossible, and that it is possible to grow flowers in a way different from the common one. Even a man with a will overcoming natural forces can, to some extent, perform it, let alone Allah's Will intending to perform something not through its natural causes and common way. Here, of course, is an unknown cause, not that an effect appears without any cause. This effect has another cause which is unknown to us.

To bring the idea nearer, we give an example: There are many phenomena whose causes are still unknown to man who thought them impossible to happen. Then he discovered that they can happen through other ways. The new inventions, which were possible by using the discoveries of the covered secrets of nature, are of this category. If somebody said, years ago, that he could talk to you from several thousand kilometers and you would hear him, you would have certainly told him that it was impossible, while now everybody knows that it is possible.

The supernatural causes are also one way of the implementation of phenomena, though we do not know them or cannot get to them. But it is not that there is no such ways. So, the common-impossibles (i.e. what people think to be impossible, which actually they are not) are power dependant, and Allah is, was and will be, able to carry them out. They are the very extraordinary events, miracles and wonders performed by the prophets and godly men.

The Connection Between Ability and Will

When we say that Allah is able to do everything, we mean that if He willed He would do it, if not He would not do it. So, when we compare the concept of ability with the concept of will, we realize that the scale of will is more limited than the scale of ability.

A simple example: you can talk or keep silent in a given moment, that is, you have the ability to do both. If you want to speak you speak, and if you did not want to speak you keep silent. So, your power covers both. But which one do you will? You will one of them. You either will to speak or to remain silent. So, your power is wider than your will, because ability covers both action and non-action, while the will covers only one of them, either action or non-action. Man has the ability to do something or not to do it in the same moment, but he cannot will the existence and non-existence of a thing in the same time. Thus, if we compare between ability and will, we realize that the range of will is more limited than that of ability.

Similarly, Allah does not will all that He is able to do. So many thing He is able to do, but He does not want to. Here one may ask: what is it that limits Allah's Will such that He does not will everything? Sometimes it happens that the will has nothing to do with doing or not doing an act, for the simple reason that to put these two together would produce a contradiction and an impossible, such as to will the existence of the sun and to will it not to exist at the very same time. It is obvious that such a thing is impossible. Yet, there are other things, which though not impossible, Allah would not will them. Why? What prevents Allah's Will from willing certain things?

Probably you had already heard that some scholars of theology say that "The issuance of ugly acts from Allah is impossible". This is exactly what we have been saying. But the principal question is: "Is Allah unable to produce an ugly act?" We do know that His ability is unlimited, and that He is able to do whatever is possible to do. But not all that is within the ability is willed. Allah's will does not cover particular things. He does not want to do certain acts. He does not want to send the wrongdoers to Paradise. Why? If He did what would happen? Why Allah's Will does not cover this act? There are many other things which are not willed by Allah.

The simple answer given in this respect is that reason says that this act is bad, therefore Allah would not want to do it, nor would He will it. As a matter of course, an obvious objection can be raised here: Does Allah take orders from reason? Reason is one of His creatures; did He create it to issue its orders to Him, and to write down a list of instructions for Him?

Does Reason Rule Allah?

Some say that, in order to stop this problem, we claim that by reason we do not mean the human intellect, but it is Allah's intellect itself that tells Him not to do this. So, He is not ruled by a created being, but by His own mind. This answer can, to some extent, be acceptable to the layman and convincing. But upon a deeper thought we realize that it cannot be a correct answer, firstly because Allah is a Simple Being in whom there is no entity called mind so that another entity may obey it. Knowledge, power, life and all the Attributes of Essence are His very Essence - a single and simple one and with only a single entity. But to say that Allah's mind issues orders to Him would mean that there are two entities in His Essence: a commanding mind and an obeying one, while such a thing is impossible in respect of Allah.

Furthermore, mind's function is to understand the concepts through acquiring knowledge. The mind which understands the good and bad, and enjoins what to do and not to do, is a mind which understands the concepts, and the concepts are of acquired knowledge, while Allah's is intuitive, not acquired knowledge. In other words, to use the word "mind" in respect to Allah is a mistake. What are we to say, then? What does it mean to say that the act which is disapproved by the mind is impossible to be done by Allah? It neither means that the act in itself is impossible, nor that there is a ruler whose orders Allah is to obey, nor that there is a power which stops the act, as in which case Allah would be affected by a factor which blocks His act, preventing Him from willing. Whatever the factor may be, it would mean that Allah is under the effect of that factor, while Allah is a Being who would not be under any effect. Actually it is He Who has His effect on everything, and will never be effected at all.

By way of answering this question, we must first study the "will". What does it mean to say that somebody "wills" to do something? When we want to carry out an act, how do we will it? Inside us there are factors that attract us. They crystalize through our desires and change into special forms, such as the desire for food, for talking, for self-assertion and many other desires known of man. These desires and inclination take shape under certain material conditions and interactions. When we feel hungry a strong desire for food appears in us. The same is true with our other desires which are connected to our different instincts. When a desire starts inside us, we think it over to see if there is anything preventing us from meeting it and that it brings no harm to us, in this world or in the Hereafter, then that desire can be satisfied. In this way our will is implemented. So, the truth of the will is that it is a crystalized inner desire, under particular conditions, accompanied with the usual ways of reasoning, finding out its pros and cons, its good and bad sides etc. Finding out that it is profitable and harmless, or its loss is less than its interest, it takes shape into a will leading to its being carried out. Thus, there can be no will without there being a desire cherished by the willer.

There are inside every being certain desires which cause the appearance of his will to satisfy them. For example, a hen does not will to have babies and never thinks of it (we, of course, have no knowledge of a hen's thinking, but we only guess), or the sparrow which builds its nest attached to the ceiling or near it, in a corridor, in a certain shape, but never hexagonal, contrary to the bees which build their hives in a hexagonal shape, and they never think of building them in, say, the cubic shape. The sparrow, too, never wills to have its nest in a hexagonal shape.

A special instinct in this creature appears, under particular conditions, in the form of a desire, and ends the performance of an act. Our will also stems from a desire deep inside us, i.e. coincides with our being and psychological disposition. There are creatures which live on certain food which we never desire to have them and we even feel repulsion on seeing such foods being eaten. You may have seen the pigs eating filth and stinking food, with such a good appetite that is quite disgusting to us. Some other animals find it very delicious to feed on rotten and bad smelling food.

Had we known their language, we would have heard them smack their lips, saying: "How delicious this is!" whereas we would be filled with nausea at the sight of it. We would never wish to have such food, though it is palotable to those animals. Why do we never will to eat a rotten, filthy and stinking food, nor to do any disgraceful and disapproved act? Because these are not in harmony with our beings. We are not instinctively attracted to such acts. There is a will when there is drive, though this remains vague until particular conditions obtain and the will appears. If we feel no inclination towards something, we will never will to do it, the same as we will never will to share with a pig its meal.

Matching Factor of the Will

Consequently, no will can take place without a preparation and a cause. The will has an instinctive element, an inner traction, which, under particular conditions, takes shape and turns into a desire, causing us to will to do something.

In short, no will is possible without the act matching the actor. There must be a sort of aptness between the willer and the thing he wills. This aptness appears in the form of an inclination, which, in its turn and under certain conditions, changes into a will. But, in respect to Allah, when we say that He, the Exalted, wills to do something, the act must be suitable to be done by Him. Yet, it is not that there should be first an inclination in Him, and then it gets stronger and stronger until it becomes an eagerness, then He considers it over to deem it advisable or not, as such methods belong to the possible beings - a being that is ill-informed, weak, poor, etc. Allah is above being affected by events and outside factors, or being under any effect, or unknowingness, so that He may want to understand something by way of thinking it over. These notions are inappropriate in respect to Allah.

Allah's Will is connected to an act that is appropriate and agreeable to Him - a fact which is an aspect of His perfection, i.e. any act that is perfect is of Allah's Absolute Perfection, since He is the Unlimited Perfect One. Everything that has an aspect of perfection is proportional to Allah's Essence, and enjoys His consent in proportion to its amount of perfection. But as for the aspects of imperfection, fault, defect, vice and nothingness (all of which actually stem from nothingness), because of their being so, are not willed by Allah. Allah is perfect, likes perfection and His Will belongs to something which has an aspect of perfection. "Allah is beautiful and likes beauty".[148] Allah does not like any ugly act, and thus, His Will never belongs to an ugly act. Why? Because it is not inproportion to Him. This answer makes it clear why Allah does not will to do everything. It is because it has no aspect of perfection. If an act has an aspect of perfection, it may be, because of that aspect, willed by Allah.

The Best System

Here we are to consider another point in order to completely solve this question: Allah may create a being in a particular way that it would not be dependent on anything from outside itself, such as the abstracts. It is not to appear from anything, nor to live on anything. It will be self-sufficient being. Allah creates such beings endowed with perfection, according to a speech of Amirul Mu'minin [Ali ibn Abi Talib] (A.S.) in which he said: "There is no footing in the heavens without being occupied by an angel created by Allah - no shortage of them. They are so many that they are uncountable. Their number is out of my or your reckoning, nor can we, even with an astrologic scales, count the numbers of the beings, their quantity or their quality."

But, on this earth, the appearance of a being cannot happen isolated from other things. It is the nature of this world to be dependent, and that every being should be in need of the others. The human being existing on this earth is created from semen. Without the semen no human being is created. Once he is created he is to live on other things to stay alive: he is to breathe the air, to drink water, etc. and to digest and assimilate them in order to live. So, the existence of a being in this world equals the vanishing of other things from it. This is a characteristic of the world of matter. It is a world of struggle, limitedness, communication and consolidation. In such a world, the survival and perfection of a being means the imperfection and destruction of other beings.

Now, if Allah wills to create this world, a world containing imperfections while principally Allah's Will does not cover imperfection - it means that He actually wants the perfect beings to come to existence, but these perfect beings depend on the imperfections of other beings. Those imperfections are called, in the terms of philosophy, "corollarial objectives". That is, since our principal objectives cannot be fulfilled except through some other unintended requisites, we have but to approve and accept them , though they are not wanted for themselves. For example, man eats meat and vegetables in order to grow. From this point of view, Allah wants these to be eaten, but as corollarial objectives not as direct ones. Therefore, we are to look at the world as a whole. If there are any interactions in the world of matter, they must be in a way leading to the appearance of valuable perfections. It is this world that belongs to Allah's Will.

On counting all the imperfections and perfections, adding and subtracting the pros and cons, and seeing that the perfections are heavier in weight, we say that such a world is willed by Allah. But if these interactions result in the abolishing of even the preliminary perfections, such a world would not be willed by Allah. Thus, Allah's Will originally belongs to perfection. However, when the perfection of a thing encounters the imperfection of another on a competition ground, if the perfection is triumphant, that imperfection will be willed by Allah as a corollary.

Consequently, we conclude that the system of this world is the best. That is, Allah had created it in such a way that its good overcomes its bad, leading to its perfection and procuring His pleasure. As to the world's deficiencies, shortcomings, faults, defects, weaknesses and abnormalities, they are not originally intended for themselves. They are as preliminaries required for the development of another being.

By referring to the Qur'anic ayahs we realize that it declares that the world of nature is entirely intended for the development of man. That is, the original intention is that great perfection to which man can attain, should he press on proceeding along the right path. But what perfection could it be, we leave it now. One thing man can find which is more valuable than the whole world of nature. It is the very secret about which Allah says: "what you do not know!""[149] i.e. there is a secret in the creation of man which you do not comprehend, that is, man can attain to a sort of perfection the knowing of which is above your capacity. It is the perfection which was obtained by the holy Prophet and the[12] pure Imams (A.S.).

It is so invaluable, so precious, that the whole world of nature is nothing in comparison. It is like a piece of diamond excavated by throwing away tons of rocks and earth. It is a perfection whose greatness and value we cannot estimate. The Qur'an says: "He it is Who created for you all that is in the earth."[150] In another ayah He says: And He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days - and His dominion (extends) on the water - that He might try you which of you is best in action."[151] This means that the creation of all the heavens and the earth was a preliminary step towards the creation of the human being - the being who is free to choose and whose perfection is to be looked for by his own free will. You are placed at a crossroad and asked to choose for yourselves. Then you are watched to see which one of you chooses the best and acts the best.

So, compared with the whole world of nature, the perfection obtained by the ideal and perfect people is more valuable and preferable. The whole world, with all its fruits, is run by the best order. Had it not been for the fact that this world was made of matter, this choosing being and those perfections which he is to get by choosing, would not have come into existence. The sun and the planets on their orbits must all be there, the order must function, so that the conditions for the appearance and the development of such an aware, free, choosing, of free will and evaluating man, can obtain. So, generally speaking, this order is the best, and there can be no better. The insignificant deficiencies are purposely intended for significant aims.

As to other beings, each is so created, in its own particular existing conditions, that it, considering all the conditions of the world of matter, is also the best and perfect. The Qur'an says: "Who made good everything He has created"."[152] That is, every creature, according to its particular existing conditions, and the situation it has in the world of matter, is the best. So, Allah only wills the good and the perfect.

The deficiencies of some creatures are not originally intended by Allah, they are only wanted because of the perfections that depend upon them.

Thus, the correct answer to the question: "Why Allah's Will never pertains to an ugly act?" is that the ugly act is no match for Allah's perfections. The divine will has nothing to do with any act that has no relation with His Holy Essence and unlimited perfections.

The Targets of Divine Acts

One of the questions asked about the divine acts is whether Allah aims at any targets through His acts. In order to give an explicit answer we should give some explanatory preliminaries:

First: What Does "a Target" mean?

The word "target" in the Arabic language means some mark to be aimed at in shooting. The point at which the shooter shoots is called "target" or "objective". These two words are synonyms in the Arabic language.

Idiomatically, the target is the objective which is freely chosen by the concerned person for his act. He takes into his consideration the advantage expected from the intended act, before starting it, deeming that by that act his objective will be fulfilled, the same as the shooter who, by aiming at a target and shooting at it, expects to get a benefit. That advantage or benefit is regarded to be the target or the objective of an act. Besides, sometimes another intention is also foreseen in the concept of "objective". It concerns the advantage which is required to be valuable and reasonable - something worthy of the many troubles and pains taken in the performance of that act, and reason approves carrying out that act to attain to the objective aimed at. According to this latter consideration, if an act is not performed for a worthy and becoming objective, though with an advantage, it will be said that it is an aimless act, a useless and frivolous one, i.e. it is an act which has no valuable objective.

Second: Man's objective - Satisfying the Needs

The second point to be considered is that man, by doing some act, wants to meet a need (whether physical, emotional, mental or else). We eat to satisfy our bodies' need for food. We associate with a friend or a beloved to satisfy our emotional needs. We set on acquiring knowledge to meet our mental needs. Thus, the objectives of our acts are always to satisfy a need. Probably one may imagine that man may do something which meets none of his needs, yet it meets somebody else's. One may help a poor, a needy, a sick or a troubled person. He decides to help him and remove his affliction by giving him money, guiding him, taking him to a hospital. He may even give up his own needs for the sake of meeting the others, such as giving out the money he himself needs. So, this act was not intended to meet one's own need. Such instances are true, but if we study them more carefully we will realize that when the said man sees the touching conditions of the afflicted person he will pity him. This special state of sympathy and emotion is to be responded to. Here there is no question of bodily need. It is an emotional need, a psychological state which needs to be satisfied.

The mother who gets up in the depth of the night to attend to her child, relinquishes her sleep just to comfort her child. She does this in order to respond to her child's need. Yet beyond meeting her child's need, there is her own need, too, which she meets through meeting her child's - it is the call of maternity which requires to be responded to, too. If she does not do it, she will feel uncomfortable. Actually, two objectives are met here, one is apparent and obvious - meeting the others' needs - the other is deeply concealed behind the first one, which is, actually, one's real motive to do the act.

This is true even in respect to the acts performed by pious people for the sake of Allah. If you ask anyone of them: "What was your objective for doing that?" He would reply: "Nothing, it was just for Allah's pleasure. I had no materialistic target, I only wanted to have Allah's pleasure." This pleasure of Allah is not always clear in its meaning. By Allah's pleasure they think of what comes as a result of Allah's pleasure, such as the reward in the Hereafter, or being delivered from torture in the next world, which is usually the motive of the middle pious persons. Weren't they afraid of the Hereafter torture, or hoping for a reward, the pleasure of Allah would have been no concern of theirs. So, by saying that they do it for Allah's pleasure, they mean that since the act is approved by Allah, they do it to get His reward or to be delivered from His punishment. The original aim, therefore, is deliverance from chastisement or getting a reward. If this is the case, then it is clear. The motive is to satisfy one's need, since we do need going to Paradise and avoiding Hell. So, the ultimate objective is also to satisfy the needs of man himself.

Now suppose that somebody had attained to a position of faith in which he regards Allah's pleasure to be his original objective, i.e. as he loves Allah he wants His pleasure. In ordinary affectionate relations, when somebody greatly loves someone else and knows that his beloved likes a certain act, he would certainly do his best to do it in order to please his beloved one, with no other objective, as he finds his ultimate happiness in seeing his beloved pleased with the act which caused so much toiling and difficulties to perform, and receives from him a nice smile of content. He wants nothing else. It is childish that somebody like him should expect any reward from his beloved.

Now, if somebody loves Allah like this, he will have no concern for this world nor the Hereafter. He thinks neither of worldly pleasures, nor of the rewards of the Hereafter. His world here and afterwards is Allah. Allah is his original objective. In one of the supplications of the Imam As-Sajjad [the 4th Imam] (A.S.) he says: "O my blessings and Paradise! O my world here and Hereafter!" That is, instead of thinking about the blessings of this world or the next world, or thinking of how to deserve Paradise, I only think of You. My goal is to reach You, to acquire Your pleasure. When somebody attains to this position, it is observed that, as long as he thinks of himself, his personal needs are hidden behind all those apparently lofty goals and desires, i.e. if you ask him: "Why do you want to reach Allah? Why do you want to acquire His pleasure?" His answer would be: "What can be a higher perfection than getting to Allah?" This is an unconscious confession that behind the goal of reaching Allah there is one's personal goal of getting to the highest position of perfection, unless he may get, in his knowledge, to a position where he becomes no more interested in his own self, as if there is no "self" in between.

Probably we may be able to imagine such a state of mind, but its reality is too sublime and lofty to be attained to by people like us. If there happens to be such persons who could attain to this state of selflessness in life, and be so absorbed in remembering Allah and in His Lordship that they lose and forget themselves, the case is different with them, since we have not attained to that state, and cannot have a correct picture of it. Therefore, we leave it to its people. But as to the ordinary people, when they do something for the sake of Allah out of love, still they have behind that their own objective of attaining to their own perfection. Thus, as long as man thinks of himself, whatever he does he cares, afterall, for his own interest. He satisfies his own needs even indirectly through meeting other people's needs, or, through getting Allah's pleasure, he ensures his own perfection.

Third: Middle and Final Objectives

The Third preliminary note is that we sometimes think of an objective, and our motive for action will be our desire to get to that objective. But when we start we find out that we cannot get to it without getting first to another goal. That is, our principal objective requires a preliminary step to be performed before being able to get to our objective. So, besides the original motive for the final objective there will be another motive and another want as a preliminary act. For example, when somebody wants to ascend to the roof of a house, he uses a step ladder. Here are two objectives. If you ask him when he is on his way to bring the ladder. "Where are you going?" He would say: "I am going to bring a ladder." Or he could say: "My intention is to get to the roof". So, there are two parallel objectives - first a mid-way objective as a means of attaining to a higher and final objective.

Or suppose you want to visit the holy shrine of the Imam ar-Rida (A.S.), with the objective of receiving Allah's reward for that visit. But carrying out this intention necessitates preliminary arrangements, such as getting an air-ticket or a train-ticket, going to the airport or the railway station, providing for some food for the journey and some money. When you leave your house in the morning, if you are asked: "Where are you going?" You may tell him you were going to buy the ticket, or get some food. But these are middle objectives which are not so important in themselves. You do them because you want to travel to Mash'had.

Here also you have two objectives which go longitudinally. One of them is preliminary to the other. It is both an objective and a means an objective for the first movement, and a means for attaining to the final objective. Such objectives, which are both goals and means at the same time, can be recognized by certain signs. As you may ask yourself about the act: "Why are you doing this?" You may also ask yourself about the objective: "Why do you aim at this very objective?" and repeat this question at each objective until you reach to an objective about which you cannot ask "Why?", since no rational person may ask why. In the same above example, when you ask: "Where are you going?" he says: "I am going to buy a ticket?", you ask: "Why?" he says: "I want to go to Mashhad". You ask: "Why do you want to go to Mashhad?" "I want to visit the holy shrine of Imam Rida (A.S.)," he replies. "Why do you want to visit his shrine?" you continue asking him. He may reply: "For its reward."

Still you can ask: "What for do you want the reward?" He says: "Because it brings happiness, and as I seek happiness, I do what brings it". Now, is it reasonable to ask: "Why do you want to be happy?" No, here we cannot ask such a question. It is in man's nature to seek his happiness. No normal person rejects happiness, since it is an inborn desire. It is without cause. It is the final objective. The final objective is that about which one cannot ask "Why?". We reach a state which is philosophically termed as intrinsic, and "the intrinsic is inexplicable". The one who loves Allah, if asked: "Why do you leave your bed in the heart of the night?" he says: "I want to have supplication with my Lord." We ask: "What for do you want to supplicate Him?" "I want to be intimate with my beloved," he replies. "Why do you want to be intimate with Him?" you ask. Probably he would answer: "Because I feel pleased with that", or, if he had reached the stage of self-forgetfulness, there would be no mention of his own pleasure.

The final objective of a lover is his intimation with his beloved. There is no "why" in this case. He cannot but do it. The one who loves Allah cannot but proceed to Him, be intimate with Him; unless something keeps him back. This will be his final objective. Therefore, an objective can pass through many stages, even in a single act. As long as one has not yet attained to one's final objective, one can be asked about the objectives of one's acts.

Conclusion

Taking the afore-mentioned points into our consideration, we conclude that what we regard as the objectives of our acts, especially the final ones, are actually a number of movements and activities through which we can ensure our interests. Ensuring our interest and attaining to our perfection are innately demanded as final objectives.

The Objectives of Allah and of Man - The Differences

Now we present our principal question: Does Allah aim at any objectives by His acts? If we try to speak of such objectives, with the certain characteristics as we find in ourselves, and ascribe them to Allah, we will have first to say that Allah lacks particular perfections which He wants to obtain through His acts, just as we do to acquire the perfections which we do not have, the interests which we try to ensure by doing certain acts.

If Allah aims through His acts at objectives like ours, then He must lack something which He, by certain acts, tries to obtain. But Allah is not so. Allah is absolutely in need of nothing. He is the Absolute Perfection. Therefore, He lacks nothing at all, as otherwise He must be subject to limitations. We cannot even think that Allah, before creating the world, was displeased with His loneliness and that He wished to come out of His solitude. So, He created the world so that He may no more be alone, and do away with His loneliness by keeping company with His creatures. No. Allah remains Alone in His Essence even after creating the world. This state of being alone is perfection and wanted. We cannot comprehend that Allah's loneliness is not a deficiency in Him, and He Himself is not displeased with His solitude, actually He is very pleased with it.

At any rate, let us start from this point which says that Allah is in need of nothing. So, if He disliked His loneliness, He must be regarded as a needy being, and there should be an outside factor to do away with that need. But Allah is far above being in need of anyone of His creatures, even the prophets, the godly men or the favourite angels. It is they who are nothing but needs.

Therefore, as far as the objectives, which we recognize in ourselves, are concerned, it is impossible that similar ones should be Allah's, too. He is in need of nothing. Otherwise it sometimes leads to speak of Allah's incapability. In our example about our intention to ascend to the roof, we knew that we could not ascend without a ladder, so we had to find one. Why had we to carry out some preliminary acts with middle objectives? Because without them we could not implement our final and principal objective. If we could jump with one leap to the roof we would not have needed the ladder. If Allah has to do some middle acts before attaining to His final objective, He will be an important Allah, while Allah is powerful and capable of doing everything.

Consequently, Allah has no objective like ours in his acts. But if we look carefully at the matter, we will see that we are stating the characteristics of our own objectives. The meaning of "objective" does not indicate these things. It does not mean that I must be needy. Being needy is coincident with our acts. It is a characteristic of man's objectives. The absence of such characteristic of man's objectives does not mean that there is no objective at all. There can even be middle and final objectives, but without such characteristics as are in man. How can this be explained? An object is a matter resulting from a voluntary act, and receives the doer's attention, acceptance and pleasure, no matter whether he needs it or not. The doer does the act in order to fulfill the objective. But to be in need of that objective or not to be, is not part of its meaning. It is of the characteristics proving a human objective. If it is said that the need is a part of the meaning of the objective, we say that it should be omitted in respect to Allah. Haven't we already said that the things which we see in ourselves accompanied with fault and deficiencies, must be omitted when we ascribe them to Allah? We even said that the concept of acting is accompanied with time when ascribed to human beings, but when ascribed to Allah, time is to omitted from it, since He has no time. Here it is the same.

Even if we suppose that the meaning of the objective includes an indication of need, it must be omitted, as it does not befit Allah's sacred position. Yet, originally the meaning of need is not implied in an objective, though it can be applicable to our understanding of an objective. When we had to do different acts with longitudinal goals, this was because we could not attain to our final objective without carrying out acts with middle objectives. But is it inevitable that the middle objectives should always mean that the doer can never attain to his final objective without them, or can the middle and final objectives be imposed without implying the doer's impotency and inability?

In a previous discussion it was stated that there can be certain conditions for the implementation of the divine and holy people's acts, but these are, in fact, conditions for the suseptibility of the suseptible, not the effectiveness of the agent. Here it is the same. It is possible that the act cannot be done without preliminaries which are the conditions of the suseptibiltiy of the agent. If an actual tree is to exist, it cannot exist without soil and water. The prerequisite of a materialistic being is to come to existence through another phenomenon, and to be in need of other simultaneous phenomena.

If we supposes that there is a being which is not like that, then, it must not be a material being. Owing to the fact that this world is materialistic, the acts that take place therein require some preliminaries. Nevertheless, these preliminaries belong to the condition of the suseptibility of the suseptible, not the effectiveness of the agent. That is it does not mean that Allah cannot do the act except through this way. It actually means that to suppose an act is to suppose its preliminaries and conditions, too.

Suppose that someone does not need food and air, that he is not begotten by a father and mother, that he has no children, no growth, no development and no change at all. Such a person cannot be material. You may suppose that the person is of the Barzakh. [The intervening state between death and the Day of Judgement]. He would be a more human being affected by no change. But if you suppose that Allah has created a corporeal man, this man must be material, must be affected by changes and developments - these are inseparable requisites of the material.

These requisites do not mean that if Allah created a non-material man in a different way it would mean that His power had decreased. No, it is not that. It is your own supposition that implies these conditions.

If we say: "Couldn't Allah create man without using earth? Why did He create him from earth? The answer is that man means an earthy being. If man was not made of earth, he would not have been man. If, for example, he were made of light, he would have been, according to our belief, an angel. Or if he were made of fire, he would have been a jinn, and no more a man. So, to say that Allah does this act in this particular way; or supposing some middle objectives in His acts, does not mean that He is in need of these objectives. It, in fact, means that the nature of the job is such that it cannot be done in a different way.

Therefore, we may say that Allah does aim at certain objectives, but not in the meaning that they satisfy His needs, nor that He has to resort to middle objectives, without which He cannot do. Actually, the disposition of the act demands that it should be performed through a certain channel, and passing through each of its stages represents an objective for the doer, but not an objective which He needed, though needed by the job itself.

Now, we reach at the point where we have to ask: "What can Allah's objective of creating the world be?" Since we know that He is in no need of the world, we can say that Allah's objective of creating the world is to bestow His favour upon the people, to bless them with His mercy. This is expressed in poetry by Mawlana Rumi, who says:

I did not create the people to get a profit, But to show my generosity to the servants.

If we say that Allah's objective is not for his own interest, but for His servants', we are not wrong, though not precise, because by admitting that we would mean that we have ascribed to Allah an objective outside His Essence. One may still ask: "Why does Allah want to bestow His favours on His servants?" We had already said that as long as we could ask "why?" the final objective would have not been reached yet. We say that Allah had created the world as well as the favours in order to bestow upon me and you a benefit, a mercy. Still one can ask: "Why does Allah want to do us these favours?" Unless the question is returned to a matter inside His Essence, the asking will never stop. Is there any need in His Divine Self? Never! He is never in need of any thing. So, how can the objectives of His acts be returned to His Divine Self?

Prompt and Gradual Acts of Allah

One of the discussions about Allah's acts is whether He does His acts gradually along the time, or promptly and on the spot. The reason behind this question may be the declarations of some ayahs in the Qur'an. It can be understood from certain ayahs that Allah's acts, or some of them at least, are done gradually, such as the ayahs concerning the creation of the heaven and the earth, as well as man who is created first from a semen and then he gradually grows up to perfection.

There are, on the other hand, a group of ayahs which give us to understand that when Allah wants something He tells it to be, and there it will be on the spot. The outer meanings of such ayahs denote that Allah's acts, in certain instances, are immediately fulfilled, and they need no time. The Qur'an says: "His command, when He wills anything, is only to say to it: 'Be!' so it is."[132] This concept is repeated many times in the Qur'an. so, how is it possible to join these two groups of ayahs? A question arises in this respect: are Allah's acts gradual or prompt, or are some done gradually and some done on the spot? Many of the commentators have chosen the third version. They say that if a phenomenon appears gradually and takes time to become grown up and complete, Allah's relevant act will similarly be gradual, such as the creation of man who starts from a semen and takes some nine months to become a complete embryo. In this respect, Allah's act takes nine months, too, to be fulfilled. But if it was an immediate affair unconditioned by time, that is, if the creature was to wear the apparel of existence in no time, it would not, of course, be a gradually created. In this respect, it seems that to say: "prompt" or "all at once", is not quite correct. Nevertheless, anything which has nothing to do with time cannot be described as "gradual".

Now let us forsake whether this division of Allah's acts as gradual and immediate conforms with the ayahs revealed in relation to either of them, and what the opinions of the critics in this respect are. We intend now to present the third suggested opinion, which, besides solving this problem, also solves a number of complicated questions related to theology. To do so, we must first explain that when we say that an act is gradual or immediate, do we mean that the relevant result of the act happens immediately or gradually? Or is there a different meaning? For example, when we say that the creation of the world was immediate or gradual, do we mean that the world itself is immediate or gradual? This is very clear. Creation can be of two kinds: what is materialistic takes time and thus its creation is gradual, and what is not materialistic is abstract and its existence is not connected to time, and thus it is immediate, or, better to say: not gradual. So, there can be no question whether Allah's acts are immediate or gradual. Yet, the problem does not end by this.

The Infinitive and the Gerund

A verbal noun can have two moods:

1. As an infinitive

2. As a gerund

In the Persian language the verb is sometimes interpreted as an act and sometimes as the performance of the act. But in the Arabic language it seems that the word denoting the infinitive and the gerund is the same in many instances. It should be noted, however, that such words have two aspects, they are either infinitive or gerund. The basic difference between them is that as regards the infinitive it has a sort of connection with the subject, i.e. it has an additional meaning, which is a kind of verbal meaning: to do, besides denoting the act which is to be done, it always attracts our attention to the subject, the doer of the act.

So, to eat, to sleep, to go, to talk, denote some connection between the subject and the action. As regards the gerund, such a connection is not noticeable. Actually, an obstruction and non-connection are noted, such as: trying and to try. In the first the subject is not obvious, while it is in the second, as it denotes the one who tries, the subject. Similar are: creating and to create. When we say that creation is gradual or immediate, we must make it clear whether we mean "to create" or "creating", whether we mean the creation of this world, disregarding who created it, or the creation including our concern about the creator. More precisely, we realize that this verbal noun does not speak of a concrete fact, but of an abstract matter.

By way of explanation, we may say that an action depends on two elements:

1. The doer himself, who is real, i.e. he is an entity in the outside.

2. The act which is to be fulfilled and implemented. It can also be an entity.

For instance, Allah, Who creates the world, is a real entity that gives entity to all things. There is no entity higher than Allah.[133] The world, being created, is also a real entity, because, having been created by Allah and got its entity in the outside, it could no longer be regarded as a mental image.

But what about creating? Is it an entity, too? Is it, like the subject and the object of a verb, an entity? Can we find in the outside something named "creating"? Or is "creating" an abstract mental concept, a proportion which we consider to exist between two things (from a certain view, of course)? Undoubtedly, there is nothing in the outside named "creating". What is outside is the subject and the verb meaning the object. But the verbal noun related to the subject cannot be an entity. It can only be a relation which we admit to be between the subject and its dependent. When I write something, a letter, I myself am an entity, the letter is an entity, too. Similarly are the movements of my hand, the paper and the pen. But the "writing" as something related to the writer, is not an entity. So, "writing' is an abstract concept taken from these entities. The hand which moves on the paper at the command of the writer's will result in the appearance of writings on the paper, from which we extract a concept and name it "writing", but it is not a separate entity beside these. All such concepts are abstract ones extracted from the relation between the subject and the object.

So, as regards the creation of the world, instead of having three things: Allah, to create and creating, we only have the creator and the created. When it is recognized by the mind that the world did not come into existence by itself, but was created by Allah, we, then, say that Allah is the creator and the world is the created.

Of the other clear "annexed concepts" is the concept of "brotherhood". You may be given a son by Allah. As long as this is your only son, we cannot describe him to be a "brother" - whose brother? When Allah grants you your second son, only then you can say that it is the first's brother - Hasan is Husayn's brother. This "brotherhood" is nothing but Hasan and Husayn. We have nothing in the outside except Hasan and Husayn. There is no third entity named "brotherhood". Brotherhood is an annexed concept, a correlation between two things. It is not a real thing and has no entity. What has entity, in this respect, is Hasan and Husayn. As long as Hasan was the only son he was not a brother. The concept of brotherhood appeared only when Husayn was born. Did the birth of Husayn add something to Hasan? Did Hasan find a thing called "brotherhood" which he did not have in his existence? Hasan did not change at all. But when another son was born to Hasan's parents, you extracted from this incident a concept which you called "brotherhood".

Such are the annexed concepts - they are concepts that come true between two things, without adding anything to either of them. "To create" and "being created" can similarly be explained. When Allah created the world nothing was added to Him as a creative. Likewise when the world was brought into existence, we got nothing in the name of "creating" along with the world itself, so as to say we have got four things: "Allah", "creating", "the world" and "being created". In the outside we have Allah and the world, to create and being created, while the correlation between these two, the creating, is an extracted abstract concept.

Temporal and Non-Temporal Beings

When the two sides of a correlative matter are controlled by time, the extracted abstract concept related to the said two sides will also be a temporal one. That is, when you say: "I wrote a letter", your being will be controlled by time, because it happened in a materialistic condition related to a material. The letter, being written in a period of time, is also temporal. The writing (that relation between you and the letter, whose accepted infinitive is "to write") is also temporal. The writing is temporal because the writer is temporal, as well as what is written. This annexed abstract matter happens in time, too. But when the two sides of this correlation are non-temporal, the correlation will, of course, be non-temporal too, since the correlation itself has no independence of its own. So, if its two sides were non-temporal, the very concept would not be temporal. So far no problem. Whoever can correctly recognize the concepts of this proposition and predicate, will admit that the case is as has been explained.

But if there was a correlation between a non-temporal and a temporal being, such as is between Allah, who is non-temporal and the world, or man, who is temporal, there would be a correlation of creating and createdness. This abstract concept, which consists of correlation and annexation, is connected from one side to a non-temporal being, Allah, and from the other side to a temporal being, the world or man. What kind of correlation can this be? Does it follow the temporal or the non-temporal being. Naturally, there can be two standpoints, depending on your own point of view. If you consider its connection to the non-temporal being, then it is non-temporal, and if you consider its connection to the temporal being, then it is temporal. But since we are not well-informed about the non-temporal and cannot quite explicitly imagine a being that is not conditioned by time, we press our intellect hard to imagine a mental picture of a being that is outside the limits of time.

It is the intellectual proof that takes us so far, as otherwise we cannot by ourselves imagine a being that is outside time, the same as we cannot imagine a being that is outside place. In which case we shall continually ask ourselves: if it is in neither time nor place, where is it then? Perhaps you have, within your argument with yourself about abstract things, felt that a question keeps pressing upon your mind: How can an abstract and non-material being be in no need of place? To ask "where" actually belongs to a being that is in a place, but if it has no place, we cannot ask "where"?, or "when"? it was, since this is used in respect to something that is conditioned by time. If a verb can have no time, no tense, there will be no meaning in asking about the time of its being carried out.

But this is how our minds are. According to Avicenna, the nature of imagination is such that we understand what is within time and place, while we are unable to comprehend what is outside time and place. At any rate, having understood, through mental reasoning, that Allah is outside time, and that it is He who creates the time. He is not in a place, but it is He who creates the place, while all the things of this world are in time and place. The relation which takes place between Allah and the things of time and place, is it temporal or non-temporal?

We said that in respect to the creator it is non-temporal, and in respect to the created it is temporal. But as our mind cannot perceive the being that does not belong to time and place, it commonly is inclined to think of its relation with the created, the temporal, and talk about it as temporal, too.

The Verb and Its Three Tenses

A notable point is that in our language, as in many other languages, in respect to the verb, we observe its main tenses, the past, the present and the future. Now, if we wanted to speak of something which is not connected to time, what verb should we use? Suppose we want to say that Allah, who is non-temporal, had created a being which is also non-temporal, what verb could we use to denote creation. If we said "created" we would be using the past tense, that is, a time in the past. But our supposition was that neither the creator nor the created belongs to time. So, how can we express such an idea. We know of no vocabulary in our language to express it, because all the tenses denote a certain time. Every act must be related to time. So, how are we to tell that a non-temporal being had been brought to existence by the non-temporal Allah? We lack such a word. We have but to use the ordinary words used for temporary acts.

The Timeless Verb

Men of literature use a noteworthy expression in this respect. They say that verbs ascribed to Allah are timeless. For example: ...and Allah is ever Knowing, Wise".[134] They say that this "is" is timeless [the English commentator had added "ever" to denote this meaning, although it is not in the original Arabic text. trans.]. Probably those who are acquainted with the Arabic syntax and grammar know this expression to mean so. That is, the verb, as it is, and according to its position, requires to denote time. But in this very instance it is timeless.

No time is observed in respect to Allah's acts. The indication of time is to be omitted from them. When we say that this verb is timeless we mean that time has been omitted from it, i.e. past tense minus its past time. What is observed here is its relation with the subject, disregarding time, since it has no place, too, for the simple reason that neither its creator nor the created is temporal.

Consequently, the relation is also not temporal. But when Allah creates a temporal thing, it is created with the limits of time, while Allah, who is non-temporal and who encompasses all times, His relations to the past, the present and the future are equal. He is not subject to any time - dimension to be bound by a certain limit of time. He encircles all times.

When we want to ascribe a temporal verb to the non-temporal, what kind of a verb must we use? Will it denote time or not? Being ascribed to the non-temporal Allah, it should be non-temporal, too, and being ascribed to a created thing, it should be related to time. To throw more light on this, imagine a piece of a string or a rope, of which one end is connected to the supernatural which has no time, and its other end is connected to the temporal nature. It seems that this example cannot incarnate the truth, yet it will do as an example. Or you may imagine a cone whose base is in the infinitive and whose head is placed on a concrete thing. It is possible for man to imagine such a thing.

The base which is in the infinitive has no limit, no distinct point and no time, but the cone's head connected to the world of limits must inevitably rest on a particular spot, where the limits, time and place are distinct. Similar are the acts of Allah. They are of two ends, one is connected to the limitless Allah, while the other end is connected to the created which is captured by the bounds of time and place. At one end it is connected to the world of constancy, eternity, infinity and divinity, and at the other end it is connected to the world of the limits, bounds, time and place.

Allah's Timed Acts

Consequently, it can be said that Allah's acts which are connected to temporal and material things, have two aspects, one is that which is connected to Allah, it is non-temporal. The act that is issued by Him does not happen in a frame of time. The other aspect connection to this world would be temporal. As a matter of course, this connection is an abstract one. We imagine the existence of such a connection between Allah and the creation, and say that the end with Allah is timeless, and the end with the creation is timed. Such an act, therefore, is, on the one side, untimed and not gradual, while, on the other side, it is timed. Why? Because it is issued by Allah who is beyond gradualness, since gradualness is twin to time. Because of this we say that all things, even the materialistic ones, are created by Allah without time.

On His part, He just says: Bet It is a will of Him. When Allah's Will decides that there should be a world and human beings, this Will happen in no time. He, of course, does not need to move, as it were, any hand or limb to "make" something. So, when Allah wants to create something, He has but to will, and there the thing is. But the created thing is governed by time.

Time as a Dimension of a Corporeal Being

It had already been proved that length, width and size are dimensions of the material being, likewise is time. It is another of its dimensions. Everything has its particular time, as it has its particular length, width and size. This had been proved by Sadrul Muta'allihin of Shiraz (may Allah be pleased with him). This is other than that problem which Albert Einstein said to have solved concerning time being the fourth dimension. The former idea is much wider than the latter. However, we are not to discuss it at this instance. If it is solved to us that time is originally the dimension of the very world, not a vessel in which the world is placed, and that it appeared simultaneously with the appearance of the world itself, we will very well understand that Allah's act does not happen in time, since there was no time yet.

. It was with the creation of the world that time appeared, just as the world's length, width and depth, which also appeared together with its creation. If we could understand that time is another dimension of this being, we would come to the conclusion that to create a thing means creating its time, since time is not something separate from the things. Therefore, Allah's acts, so far as connected to Him, are not characterised by time. When He creates a temporal thing, its time is also created with it, because time is one of that thing's dimensions, just as when a table is made its size is simultaniously made, too. The size is not made separately. Wherever there is a table there is its size, too. Similar is time.

Therefore, as the world is temporal, its creation is temporal, too, but as it had been issued by the non-temporal Allah its creation is non-temporal, too. But how? Like this: It is Allah alone who, when willing to create the world, says: Be! and there it is. But what kind of a world it would be? A world of a billion years old, and of, say, a billion km. long.

When Allah wanted to create the length' of the world, had He to go along the length while creating it? Had He to be present in the place? When He wants to create a being with length or size, has He, like an architect, who wants to draw a line on the ground, to walk along the line? Is He to be with the length? Certainly not! Allah is non-spatial. Likewise, He need not go along the time when He creates a temporal creation, since He is never simultanious with time. Neither Allah nor His act, as far as it is ascribed to Him, has time, but if the act is ascribed to a temporal creation, it will be temporal, too. Therefore, if we consider an act as relevant to Allah, none of His acts are temporal: "His command, when He wills anything, is only to say to it: Be! so it is[135] What command? No matter what it is. Material or non-material "when He intends anything".

The opinion of some commentators that this ayah belongs to non-material thing is not in conformity with the ayah's generalization. The Qur'an does not say that when Allah wants to create any non-material thing, He says to it "Be!". It says "When He intends anything He says to it 'Be!' so it is.". This is because Allah is non-temporal, and similar is His act. But what about the created? All the material creations have temporal and spatial dimensions. We say that the creation of the earth and the heavens was completed in six periods: "And he it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days"[136] or the creation of man which takes nine months. But it does not mean that Allah accompanies these events along the time of their fulfillment and development, such as to be present at the time of ejaculating the semen, then at the time of its becoming a clot, then a lump of flesh, and so on. No, Allah does not move along time. All the times are in Him.

So, how is it that a human being is created in nine months, i.e. He creates something whose temporal dimension is nine months, and it has, at the same time, its particular length, width and depth. Taking these facts into consideration, the ayah, in its generality, comes true in respect to all things. Even in respect to a thing whose creation requires billions of years, we can say that Allah tells it to be, and there it is. What does it mean to say to something: "Be!"? It means: "O you whose age is six million year, come to existence!" What is it? It is a being which had been continuous for six million years, but not that Allah had been moving along those six million years, from one point to another (temporal point). A million light year or a single minute makes no difference to Him. Similarly being spatial is the characteristic of the created, not the Creator.

In short, Allah's acts, taken as issued from Him, are non-temporal because Allah Himself is non-temporal, but taken as belonging to material and temporal beings. They have their temporal dimension, as well as the acts issued from them.

Allah's Will and Talk

In the previous discussion concerning whether Allah's acts are prompt or gradual, we referred to some ayahs which denoted that when Allah willed to create something He just said to it "Be!" and there it was. Such ayahs spoke of Allah's Will and talk. Here also arises the following question: Does Allah's Will, or speech, take time to be fulfilled? Taking into consideration what has already been said, the answer will be easy. Considering Allah's Will and speech as being ascribed to Him, they are neither gradual nor temporal. But considering them belonging to a gradual and temporal matter, they can be regarded so. However, to expound this subject, which is extensively handled in the theological and philosophical writings, we shall touch upon it a little.

Attributes of Essence and of Acts Firstly, we must say that Allah's attributes are divided into two groups: the Attributes of Essence, and the Attributes of Acts. The Attributes of Essence are those which the mind independently comprehends, without having to consider any of His creations. For example, life is of Allah's Attributes of Essence: Allah, there is no god save Him, the everliving."[137] The divine life is a divine attribute, and it has nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of any other living being. Allah is a living Being. He is not a dead thing like stone.

Life is an attribute which we ascribe to Allah's Essence as far as the very Essence is concerned, not that something comes forth from the Essence. Similarly Allah's Knowledge of Himself is an attribute of Essence. Allah is Knowing. Allah's Knowledge of Himself is nothing but His Essence. Similarly the attribute of power, which means He is a powerful being. Even if we take the concept of power to include the concept of free will and explain power as to be something that can be used whenever wanted. He is not compelled, and no one can force Him to do anything. However, power is an abstract concept extracted from His sacred and divine state.

On the other hand, there are attributes which are ascribed to Allah only with connection to a creature. Such attributes are called "Attributes of Acts", or the attributes abstracted from the divine acts, such as: The Creator, the Provider, the Manager, and the like, which denote Allah's acts. Without thinking of a created thing we cannot say: Allah is the Creator, or He is the Provider without there being someone needing to be provided for. This is unlike the Attributes of Essence, such as life. When we say: Allah is alive, no object is needed here. Yet, if we consider the concept of "the Creator" to include "Power", i.e. the one who has "Power" to create, then it would be referring to an Attribute of Essence. Allah is the potential Creator of the world before its appearance. That is, in Him is the "Power" to create it. But when there is no creating, there can be no attribute as Creator. The existence of the two is simultaneous. Whenever there is a created there is a creator, too. When there is no creator there can be no creating and created, and the concept of Creator cannot be abstracted, too, unless our intention is directed to His "Power" of creating, in which case it means an Attribute of Essence. That is why the divine and theological books divide the attributes into Attributes of Essence and Attributes of Acts. After this dividing there were discussions about some other attributes, whether they were among the attributes of Essence or of Acts, such as: to want, to will, to talk, etc.

One of the earliest subjects discussed by the theologians is Allah's words. It is said the 'Ilmul Kalam [theology] began with discussing whether Allah's 'Kalam [talk] is eternal or new. Is Allah's talk to be abstract from His Essence, or from His creation? A group, Ash'aris, believed that the Qur'an, Allah's words, was eternal and one of Allah's Attributes.

On the other end, the Mu'tazilahs insisted on saying that the Qur'an was new and created, and it was not eternal. The situation was so grave between the two groups that they began to accuse one another of infidelity.

However, the dispute about whether Allah's words and His Will are of the Attributes of Essence or of Acts, continued till the blooming of the Islamic philosophy. Even the philosophers who used to consider the philosophic questions through the Islamic standpoint had their disputes and differences, until the matters ripened and became more acceptable. The philosophers used to say that Allah's Will is His Knowledge of what is good. When we say that Allah has willed to do an act, we mean that He knew that that act was the best and the most advisable, and since they believed that Allah's knowledge was an Attribute of Essence, it was natural to regard His Will also to be of the Attributes of Essence. They would sometimes take Allah's Words to be an Attribute of Essence, too.

The Attribute of Will as an Act

If one wanted to disregard the purely philosophic way of handling such a question, and study it from the Qur'anic standpoint, what should one say? If "will" is taken to mean "knowledge", then it is an Attribute of Essence because "knowledge" is an Attribute of Essence. If the reality of "speech" is Allah's knowledge, it will also be an Attribute of Essence. But as regards the will and the words stated in the Qur'an, are they to be taken as such, or are they differently regarded by the Qur'an? Disregarding the mental arguments of the philosophers, and resorting, instead, to the method of the exegeses of the Qur'an and the study of its concepts, we realize that the "will" is undoubtedly regarded by the Qur'an as an act, and thus it should be of the Attributes of Acts: His command, when He wills anything, is only to say to it: Be!" so it is!"[138]

Is it possible to speak of the Attributes of Essence in the conditional or temporal moods? Can we say: during Allah's life, or when He was living, He did a certain act? No, of course not, because life is the very Essence of Allah, and cannot be expressed in conditional or temporal speech forms. It is true that we do not regard as temporal what is ascribed to Allah, though temporal, i.e. we do omit the time from it, but the style of speaking of Attributes of Essence is different from the style of speaking of Attributes of Acts. There should be a justification for using a conditional or temporal sentence.

Therefore, according to the Qur'an, willing and talking are two attributes of acts. Allah says: "And Allah spoke to Moses direct".[140] Allah's speaking to Moses, to the prophets or to the angels, is abstracted from the state of act, i.e. there must be angels or else so as to may receive Allah's words and understand them. In this case we can say: "He said to them, spoke to them". As long as there is no listener, there will be no talking. So, talking is an attribute of acts.

But here is a point worthy of noting. All these attributes stem from the single Attributes of Essence. For example, creating stems from Power. If there was no Power of creation there could be no creating. Will is also Allah's acts, and its source, as a matter of fact, is an Attribute of Essence. Which one? Is it, as the philosophers say, the will of knowing what is best? To extensively handle this subject is out of our concern here. But those who have some studies of this subject are to pay attention to the fact that the origin of will is "to love", which is of Allah's Attributes of Essence. Actually, the very word "will" or "want" is used in the Qur'an to mean "love": "you want the vanities of this world, while Allah wants (for you) the Hereafter".[141]

"To will" and "to want" are the same in meaning, though "will" has another meaning that denotes taking decision, in which case it refers to a "work" that is willed by the doer. If the will mentioned in the ayah denotes decision on doing a work, then it must belong to work. But it says that you want this world, which is not your "work". So, "will" here means something else, i.e. you like and want it. "Want" in the Persian language has, like its Arabic equivalent, two meanings, too: one denoting decision to do something, such as when you say: "I wanted to get up but I could not." So, "I wanted" means here "I willed". But sometimes we say: "I want" to mean "I like" or "I desire". Willing, in the Arabic language, also has two meanings: to like, to accept, to approve, to be pleased with, and another meaning is to decide, which, after all, also denotes liking doing something, to assent. Consequently, there is a kind of connection between "to decide" and "to like".

The origin of willing to act is not only knowledge. Knowledge is, of course, necessary. Without knowledge one would not voluntarily carry out an act. But the concept of wanting and willing is proportionate to loving and desiring, not to knowing, because desire results in deciding to perform the act. However, I think that to will is an attribute of the act, though its origin is self-willing, meaning love. In other words, the will can, from one aspect, be regarded as an Attribute of Act, while, from another aspect, it can be regarded as an Attribute of Essence. If it denotes deciding on doing something, it is of the Attributes of Act, but if it refers to its origin, the Divine Essence, denoting love, then it is of the Attributes of Essence.

This idea is inferred from the writings of Sadrul Muta'llihin and the late 'Allama at-Tabataba'i (may Allah be pleased with him). They explicitly said that the will can sometimes be of the Attributes of Act, and sometimes of the Attributes of Essence-from a certain point it is of the Attributes of Act, and from another point it is of the Attributes of Essence. Now, let us see what Allah's Will, as an Attribute of Act, means. Our decision to do something is usually preceded by some preliminary steps. When we want to decide upon doing something we first think it over, count its prons and cons, and accordingly we make one decision to do or not to do it. This would be our will to do or not to do something. But in respect to Allah, the Exalted, Who says: "His command, when He Wills anything, is only to say to it: 'Be!' so it is", words like "when" have no meaning, since Allah's acts are detached from time, and, as long as they are ascribed to His sacred Being, they are non-temporal. So, how is it that we say: "When He wills"? We had already said that if the attributes of act are looked at as being abstracted from a temporal act, they can be regarded as temporal. Allah's Will, when abstracted from a temporal act referring to a connection between Him and His act, will be temporal, too.

Seeing that the act was not implemented contrary to Allah's Will, and that during its implementation it received His contention and pleasure, we regard the will to act as an additional attribute, as, actually, the time limitation belongs to the act, not to its doer.

But if it is looked at through its connection to Allah, the act is to be detached from time limits, as we had formerly explained. So, what is the truth about Allah's Will? His Will means that His Acts are not carried out under the pressure and force of any subduer, and He likes doing them.

Later on we shall have discussions about the things Allah loves to do, and that the events that happen in the world belong to His Will. Now we turn to the Divine Talking When one talks the air quivers, that is, by passing the air through the respiratory tract to the vocal cords, sound-waves will be produced. When these sound waves enter the ear, they vibrate the tympanic membrance, and they will be translated, according to a certain process, into intelligible signs to be understood by the brain. So, if Allah produced a sound exactly like human voices, producing sound-waves transforming intelligible concepts to the hearer, there would be grounds to say that He talked.

Moses (A.S.), when on Mount Tur, heard a voice coming from the tree - the tree from which a light was glowing - telling him: "O Moses! Surely, I am Allah, the Lord of the worlds".[142] Supposing that Allah had produced the voice from it, and it was heard by Moses (A.S.), then it would be right to say that Allah talked to Moses (A.S.). But if there were other beings whose means of hearing are not the ear and the sound-waves - such as if the angels way of hearing is not through corporeal ears and air - talking with them would be in a different way, of which we have no idea.

We just know that Allah expresses Himself to everybody through "an act" understood by him, and this "act" is called "talking". In such cases, however, there must be a hearer with the ability to understand the subject under certain conditions, before being allowed to say that Allah talked and the hearer heard: "And when your Lord said to the angels: 'I am going to place in the earth a vicegerent'"[143] He talked to the angels and they heard Him. But we know nothing about the mode of that conversation. We only know that Allah made them understand His intention. As to a non-existent being which Allah wants to bring into existence, how does He tell it: "Be!"? His command, when He wants something, is only to say to it: 'Be!' so it is."[144]

Undoubtedly, Allah's talk here is different from other talks.

As far as Allah's talk with the angels, Moses (A.S.) or other prophets is considered disregarding the mode of the conversation, there was an addressee who understood the meaning intended by the speaker. But when there is no being yet, in what mode will Allah's talk to it be? Should there actually be any talk, there must also be a hearer. But as it is supposed that there is no hearer yet, talking in common meaning will not fit in. In such cases the talking, in fact, is a kind of metaphor, i.e. there is no interim of time between Allah's willing and the implementation of the thing. No sooner had the command been issued than the thing was implemented. This is a metaphor denoting that when Allah intends to do something, there will be no delaying and no hindering condition. Allah's act, being His own, is never conditional, since, as a Creator, He is in need of nothing. It is the created who is in need all the time.

The Effectiveness of the Factor and the Receptivity of the Recipient

Here a question arises: Does Allah create the things of the world with or without an agent? There is no doubt that the creation of the things of this world are governed by a system of causation, cause and effect. The sun is the cause of heat, the rain comes from the clouds. When there is no cloud there can be no rain. The cloud is moved by the wind, and so on. All the phenomena of the world appear only through causes and means. So, are they not conditional on these causes? Without father and mother no human being can be brought into existence, except a single instance in which Allah had caused Jesus (A.S.) to be born without having a father, and another exception in which Adam (A.S.) was created without any father and mother. Except in those two instances, all human beings exist by means of mothers and fathers. Do fathers and mothers have no effect on the existence of their children? Of course, they have.

Through the mother and father Allah brings their children into existence. So, this act of Allah is conditional on the existence of a father and a mother. Heat is conditional on the existence of the sun and light. If it is so, then Allah's acts cannot be implemented without means. So, Allah's acts are conditional, too. What answer can be given to this? Here is the answer: The conditions needed for the appearance of an effect are divided into two groups: One covers the conditions of the effectiveness of the factor, that it, without carrying out the given condition. The factor will not have the power to be effective. The other group covers the conditions of the receptivity of the recipient.

The first condition for a teacher to be efficient is to have good knowledge of the subject he is to teach. He is to know it well. In this case the teacher is the "factor", the one who "gives" his knowledge. The teaching is the "act", which is implemented only when the teacher knows his subject. So, the condition for a teacher to be a qualified one is that he must have prepared himself to be a good teacher. This is called the effectiveness of the factor.

But sometimes it happens that there can be too many students in a class, in which case a loudspeaker should be used by the teacher, as otherwise some of the back benchers may not hear the teacher's voice. But this loudspeaker does not increase his ability. His ability is to know the lesson and explain it. That is what is related to the teacher. But there must be a means for the student to be benefitted by the lesson. This means increases the receptivity of the recipient, the student, but not the effectiveness of the factor, as it adds no perfection to it. The means offers a condition for the perfection of the listener, not the speaker. There is no deficit in the teacher. It is the recipient who is in need of a means to receive the lesson.

As a matter of fact, this example does not, all in all, fit in our argument. An example, we may say, brings nearer on one side and keeps at a distance on other sides.

The Conditions of the Recipient's Receptivity

If earth is to be changed into man, it must undergo certain stages under certain conditions. If food (vegetables, meat, etc.) is to turn into blood, it must undergo some stages of certain changes until at last it changes into blood, and later into a muscle. This condition belongs to matter. The condition for a matter to reach this last stage, is to go through the middle stages, similarly, when you want to reach a certain town, you will have to cover the distance to that town, whether on foot, by car or by any other means of transport.

This condition is connected to matter. The changes in matter are subject to these conditions, and this is not a deficiency in Allah's Power. If He wills to turn earth into man, the earth must undergo some stages before turning into man. If Allah wanted to take you from Tehran to Qum He must pass you through stages of transport to take you there. If somebody objectingly says that Allah is capable of taking us there without having to pass through any stages, he is mistaken. If there is moving, journeying or taking someone to somewhere, the common steps are to be taken, as without passing through the middle stages no goal can be reached. Therefore, supposing that Allah turns a being into another, or moving from one place to another, requires that certain stages should be passed through, and this is not a deficiency in Allah's Power. In other words, Allah may, in an instance, want to create a being, which is not preceded by past nor present conditions, since it is free from matter and not subject temporal and special conditions, He has the power to create it. But such a being would not be made of matter, because a materialistic being cannot come into existence without passing through all the stages prescribed for it, in which case such a being would be an abstract, of which uncountable ones had been created by Allah.

In "Nahjul Balaghah" you read that the heavens are crowded with angels created by Allah, such that there is no room even for a foot, unless an angel is engaged in genuflection or kneeling in worship. They are unlike the beings of this world which we know to be made of matter that under go many stages of changing. They exist all at once and their perfections are in their inner potentiality. But if Allah wants to create a world of matter, it must be created accompanied with movement, time and place. The conditions of this world's phenomena are of the kind of the receptivity of the recipient, not of the kind of effectiveness of the factor. Thus, Allah's act, when ascribed to the Divine Potency and His limitless Power, is unconditional.


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