The Role of Aishah in the History of Islam Volume 1

The Role of Aishah in the History of Islam33%

The Role of Aishah in the History of Islam Author:
Translator: Dr. Alaedin Pazargadi
Publisher: Naba Publication (www.nabacultural.org)
Category: Islamic Personalities

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The Role of Aishah in the History of Islam

The Role of Aishah in the History of Islam Volume 1

Author:
Publisher: Naba Publication (www.nabacultural.org)
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


1

Part Three: ‘A’ishah in the time of ‘Uthman’s rule

Who was ‘Uthman?

Abu ‘Abd Allah and Abu ‘Amr ‘Uthman was the son of ‘Affan, and grandson of Abu al-‘As ibn Umayyah al-Qurayshi. His mother was Arwa, daughter of Kurayz ibn Rabi‘ah ibn ‘Abd Shams, while Arwa’s mother was al-Bayda’, daughter of ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Prophet’s aunt.(121)

‘Uthman was from the group of men who were the first in embracing Islam. He married Ruqayyah, daughter of the Prophet and emigrated with her to Abyssinia, and after his return from there, went over to Medina.

‘Uthman did not take part in the battle of Badr on the excuse of nursing his sick wife, Ruqayyah, and when she died, he married Umm Kulthum, another daughter of the Prophet. She, too, died while her father was alive. ‘Uthman did not have any children from the Prophet’s daughters.

When ‘Umar was wounded by Abu Lu’lu’ah Firuz, slave of al-Mughayrah, he on his death bed nominated ‘Uthman as one of the six members of the council, but made the final choice of the caliph subject to the agreement of ‘Abd ar-Rahman ibn ‘Awf who was also on the six-member council.

Speaking in such a council, ‘Abd ar-Rahman stated:“I will forego my being chosen as caliph or the condition that you accept my nominee.” When they agreed to this proposal, he too declared that for assuming the position of caliph, one must act upon the Book of God, the Prophet’s tradition and policy of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. He made this offer first to ‘Ali, but ‘Ali refused the last of the conditions.(122) Consequently, ‘Abd ar-Rahman and after him the council members pledged allegiance to ‘Uthman on Saturday, first of Muharram, 24th year after Hijrah, three days after the burial of ‘Umar, since ‘Uthman had accepted all the conditions laid down by ‘Abd ar-Rahman.

‘Uthman became caliph and ruled for twelve years. The period of ‘Uthman’s rule can be divided into two parts: the period of confirmation and support, and the period of wrath and rebellion. It was that same wrath and rebellion as well as people’s uprising against the confusion in the country and the selfishness of ‘Uthman’s companions, most of whom were the Umayyads, which caused ‘Uthman’s overthrow and death, and made the assassination of the caliph something simple and feasible.

As we said in our account of ‘A’ishah, in people’s uprising against ‘Uthman and his assassination by the rebels, ‘A’ishah played a very effective role.

There is a difference of opinion about the date of ‘Uthman’s death, and it is stated to have occurred between 12th and 28th of the month of Dhu al-Hijjah of the year 35 AH. His age, too, at the time of his death is stated to have been between 82 and 92.

His body was buried after three days outside the al-Baqi‘ cemetery in a place called Hash Kawkab, which was the Jews’ cemetery, surrounded by four walls. When Mu‘awiyah became caliph, he ordered the demolition of the walls, and thus ‘Uthman’s grave came to be included among the Muslims’ graves in al-Baqi‘ cemetery.

‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman the period

of confirmation and support

‘A’ishah, like other chiefs of Quraysh, rose up to support ‘Uthman’s caliphate

Text of the book

The initial years of ‘Uthman’s rule were similar to those of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, and ‘A’ishah thought that she would continue; as in the past, to enjoy the respect shown to her by ‘Uthman as the next caliph to receive advantages above other wives of the Prophet, and constantly have a free hand in the settlement of affairs. It was owing to these expectations that ‘A’ishah, like other Quraysh chiefs, decided to support ‘Uthman, and by issuing some traditions about ‘Uthman gave him the benefit of her unsparing support and also to his caliphate for six years.

The traditions which are narrated from ‘A’ishah in praise and eulogy of ‘Uthman with no mention being made of his death, belong, in all probability, to this short period namely the period of her support of ‘Uthman.

Here we give examples of such traditions as quoted by Musnad of Ahmad:

‘A’ishah said:“ The Prophet and I were lying down under the same cloak when Abu Bakr arrived and asked permission to enter. The Prophet, remaining where he was, gave him permission to come in, and after fulfilling his wish, Abu Bakr left the room. After Abu Bakr, ‘Umar asked permission to meet the Prophet, and he too was admitted to his presence in the same way , and then dispatched after meeting his wish. Then ‘Uthman arrived and asked to meet This time the Prophet rose and after arranging his dress admitted him. After attending to his affair the Prophet let him leave. At this time, I said to the Prophet: ‘When Abu Bakr and ‘Umar came in, you received them without changing your position, but on ‘Uthman’s arrival you arranged your garment as if you felt shy of him.’ He answered: ‘You see, ‘Uthman is a shy and modest fellow. I feared that if he saw me in that condition, his shyness would prevent him from stating his wish.’ “

According to another narration(123) ‘A’ishah says:“The Prophet was lying down in bed and had covered himself up with my cloak. When ‘Uthman begged leave to meet him, he told me to cover myself up. I said: ‘O Prophet of God! -You did not get nervous at the arrival of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. How is it, Len, that you prepare yourself so carefully and arrange your clothes in order to receive ‘Uthman?’ He said: ‘O ‘A’ishah!(124) Why should I not show respect to him when, I swear to God, angels too are respectful to him in his presence?’ “

In our opinion, the narration and publication of this tradition date back to the time of ‘Uthman’s caliphate, since as we have already stated in this tradition the names of the three above caliphs are mentioned in the order of their assumption of power and this may assure us that the date of the above tradition was subsequent to the rule of the two elder caliphs and assumption of power by ‘Uthman.

It shows also that the above tradition must have been narrated before the commencement of differences between ‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman, and her disaffection with him, and before his assassination and quite a long time before her decision to kill him; for, otherwise in this tradition, like other similar traditions narrated about ‘Uthman, his assassination would have been mentioned.

In addition to what has already been said, the points that create considerable doubt in this tradition are:

1-As the Prophet himself was a symbol of Etiquette and politeness and greatest teacher, how can he admit Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, while in a restful position under a cloak with his wife without a feeling of shyness and modesty, whereas on the arrival of ‘Uthman, he hastily dresses himself and tells ‘A’ishah to do so too?

2-Moreover, why should the Prophet resort to discrimination between the above three leading companions of his, and how is it that the angels feel shy of ‘Uthman alone?

The period of wrath and rebellion

‘A’ishah was the first to rise against ‘Uthman and take over the leadership of his opponents till he was killed.

Historians

In the first half of ‘Uthman’s rule ‘A’ishah supported him and always showed obedience to him without fail. Even when she and the other wives of the Prophet intended to make a Hajj pilgrimage, first she asked his permission. In this connection, she says:“When ‘Umar passed away and ‘Uthman held the rein of affairs, I, Umm Salamah, Maymunah and Umm Habibah sent someone to ask him leave for Hajj pilgrimage.” ‘Uthman sent this answer:“You remember the way of ‘Umar. Like him, I will take you with me to the pilgrimage. So I am ready to take with me any of you, ladies of the Prophet, wishing to undertake a Hajj pilgrimage.”

‘Uthman fulfilled his promise and took us to this Hajj pilgrimage except Zaynab who had died in ‘Umar’s time and had not accompanied him on pilgrimage, while Sudah, daughter of Zam‘ah and we were veiled from public eyes.(125)

In that year, ‘Uthman accompanied these ladies to Mecca and entrusted their protection to ‘Abd ar-Rahman ibn ‘Awf and Sa‘d ibn Zayd.

But this atmosphere of amity did not last long, and with the passage of time, differences arose between ‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman, with the result that ‘Uthman deducted from her pension the two thousand dinars which ‘Umar had added to it. al-Ya‘qubi says in his history(126) :“An umbrage occurred between ‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman and he deducted from her pension the two thousand dinars which ‘Umar had added as a privilege over the other wives of the Prophet and put her salary on the same scale as theirs.”

We do not know the exact date of the commencement of the dispute, but we know only that it ensued in the second half of ‘Uthman’s rule. We know also that it was not a sudden incident, but was something gradual, which was intensified until the split between them, became very deep.

We know also that ‘A’ishah was the first person to show open opposition to ‘Uthman and gather the dissidents to the caliphate around her and act as their leader until the caliph was killed.(127) It is also certain that when the tension and opposition to ‘Uthman and people’s uprising against him were at their height, the hostility of no tribe and Muslim family of that time was as intense towards ‘Uthman as that of the Taym tribe to which the family of Abu Bakr belonged.

Among the matters which increasingly kindled the(128) flame of dispute between ‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman and made hostility more evident and public, was the subject of al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah, half-brother of ‘Uthman, and Ibn Mas‘ud Sahabi, a chaste and popular man, each of whom we will deal with separately.

al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah

and governorship of Kufah

We see that in the Qur’an, al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah has been introduced as a wicked man who was notorious for winebibbing and obscene acts.

Text of the book

We said that ‘Uthman on his assumption of power, was supported by ‘A’ishah and for six years he benefited from this support of the lady of early Islam, and spared no effort in showing respect and honor to her. But as time went by, difference arose between them and they began forming factions and fronts.

‘A’ishah, in order to show ‘Uthman her power and influence with people, made use of every possible occasion to rouse people’s antagonism towards him. This hostility reached such a point where these two figures were ready to make attempts on one another’s life.

‘Uthman appointed al-Walid, his sinning. Debauchee and winebibbing half-brother, as governor of Kufah, an act which obviously caused this man’s confrontations with the people of Kufah and created pretexts for ‘A’ishah to attack ‘Uthman. We will now look through the history and earlier centuries to give an idea of that period, the deeds of al-Walid, the people’s reactions and ‘A’ishah’s attitude and steps.

al-Walid was the son of ‘Uqbah and grandson of Abu Mu‘ayt ibn Abi ‘Amr, called Dhakwan. Dhakwan was a paid slave of Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Shams who adopted him as son. al-Walid’s mother, Arwa, was the daughter of Kurayz ibn Rabi‘ah, ‘Uthman’s mother. Thus al-Walid became ‘Uthman’s brother on his mother’s side. ‘Uqbah, al-Walid’s father was a neighbor of the Prophet in Mecca and at the beginning of the Prophet’s ordainment, he frequented his sessions.

One day ‘A’ishah had invited a number of guests to his house and had asked the Prophet, too, to attend this feast. The Prophet accepted the invitation, but abstained from eating anything except on the condition that ‘Uqbah express faith in the Unique God.

‘Uqbah agreed to do so and thus embraced Islam. When the Qurayshis learnt of this matter, they said:“ ‘Uqbah has abandoned the faith of his ancestors.”

‘Uqbah had a friend who was not present in Mecca at that time, being on a journey to ash-Sham. On his return one night he asked his wife:“How are Muhammad and his claims?”

She answered:“He is persevering getting on.”

-”What is my friend ‘Uqbah doing?”

-”He, too, has given up his ancestors’ faith and accepted Muhammad’s religion.”

‘Uqbah’s friend(129) became very uneasy on hearing this and spent an uncomfortable night. Next morning when ‘Uqbah came to see him and greeted him, he did not look at him and remained silent.

‘Uqbah asked:“Why do you not return my greeting?”

-”How can I do so when you have abandoned your religion?”

-”Have Quraysh, too, made such a supposition about me?”

-”Yes.”

-”What can I do to change their opinion about me?”

-”It’s very simple. You can enter Muhammad’s session, spit on his face and insult him with the worst of abuses.”

‘Uqbah acted upon his friend’s suggestion and did what he should not have done. The Prophet showed no reaction to ‘Uqbah’s misconduct, and only wiped his face, and turning to ‘Uqbah said:“If I ever get hold of you outside Mecca, I will cut off your head!”

According to another narration, the conversation between ‘Uqbah and his friend was as follows:

-‘‘Uqbah! Have you abandoned your ancestors’ faith?”

-”No! It is not so. One day Muhammad was a guest in my house and swore that if did not embrace Islam, he would not touch my food. I felt embarrassed and to please him I uttered the words testifying the belief in God. But I did not do it in seriousness and sincerity.”

-”I won’t look at you again unless you spit on Muhammad’s face and kick and slap him, thus showing your dislike of him.”

‘Uqbah saw the Prophet prostrating in Dar an-Nudwah and carried out his friend’s suggestion in full. The Prophet said to him:“If I ever see you outside Mecca, I will cut off your head.”

From that time onward, ‘Uqbah became one of the most headstrong enemies of the Prophet and went so far as to get hold of a sheep’s tripe and throw its filthy contents on the Prophet’s head.(130)

When the battle of Badr began, and ‘Uqbah’s friends hastened to join the infidels in the fight with the Prophet, they proposed to him, too, to join them in the combat, but he excused himself, saying:“I fear this man since he warned me that if he ever found me outside Mecca, he would cut off my head.” His friends said:“You have a red-haired camel under you, and if we happen to be defeated and are to retreat, you can easily flee and save yourself.’ They kept on persuading him until he agreed to join them, and he took part in the battle. When the battle started the Muslims with divine aid inflicted a severe defeat on the infidels. At that time in a stampede ‘Uqbah’s camel shied off and carried him to an open desert. The Muslims arrived and took him and seventy others captive. When they brought him to the Prophet, he looked at ‘Uqbah and ordered to kill him. When ‘Uqbah heard this order, he cried out madly: “Why do you want to kill me alone out of so many captives?” The Prophet said:“Your guilt is cardinal. You are to be killed because you showed infidelity to God and His prophet and committed injustice.” Then he ordered ‘Ali to cut his head off.

The following verse has descended about him:

“And the day when the unjust shall bite his hands, saying: O! would that I had taken away with the Apostle; O woe is me! would that I had not taken such a one for a friend! Certainly he led me astray from the reminder after it had come to me; and the Satan foils to aid man.” (131)

The Qur’an introduces al-Walid

al-Walid is the son of the same ‘Uqbah. On the day that Mecca was captured by the Muslims and the Prophet and when there was no escape for the infidels and those who had gone astray, he embraced Islam, and after some time, the Prophet sent him to the tribe of Banu al-Mustalaq to collect religious tithe.

al-Walid returned a little while later to report that the members of that tribe had turned apostate and refused to pay tithe. The reason for making such a report was that a group of people of that tribe, on hearing of al-Walid’s arrival had come out to meet and welcome the Prophet’s envoy. But al-Walid seemed to have taken this gathering as a plot against himself and was so frightened that without facing or talking to them, he hurried back to Medina and gave that false report.

The Prophet ordered Khalid ibn al-Walid to go to that tribe and after investigating the truth to make a report. He insisted that Khalid should not be hasty and see to the matter quietly and with all possible care.

Khalid said in his report that the said tribe were Muslims and had by no means become apostate. At this time the following verse descended showing al-Walid to be an evil-doer:

“O you who believe! if an evil-doer comes to you with a report, look carefully into it’ lest you harm a people in ignorance then be sorry for what you have done.” (132)

Now ‘Uthman, caliph of the Muslims who considered himself successor to the Prophet, appointed such a notorious evil-doer as governor of Kufah simply on account of his kinship with him, and removed from that position Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas, former commander-in-chief of ‘Umar’s army, whereas Sa‘d had, in ‘Umar’s time and upon his order, built Kufah, turning it into a frontier garrison, and had housed there the soldiers who had accompanied him in the war against Iran. The people of Kufah had a deep respect for Sa‘d.

An evil-doer as a governor

When al-Walid entered Kufah and Sa‘d learnt of his mission, he turned to him and said in surprise:

“We have been away from one another. It seems that despite your stupidity in the past, you have become somewhat intelligent and acquired competence, while in fact it is we who have become stupid and ignorant.”

al-Walid answered:“Sa‘d! Don’t get angry! It is this government and monarchy that passes like a ball into different hands.”

Sa‘d answered with conviction:“Yes, I see that you will soon turn it into a monarchy.” (133)

The people of Kufah were angry at this change of governor and protested, saying:“ ‘Uthman has chosen a bad successor to Sa‘d ibn Waqqas.”

Abu al-Faraj in al-Aghani describes the rule of al-Walid as stated by Khalid ibn Sa‘id as follows: al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al- Muttalib, Abu Sufyan, al-Hakam ibn ‘Abi al-‘As and al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah were the only people who had the privilege of sitting next to him or in his seat.”

One day, as usual, al-Walid was sitting with the caliph, when al-Hakam, ‘Uthman’s uncle, arrived. ‘Uthman rose in respect, offered his seat to him and took another seat himself. ‘Uthman’s gesture towards al-Hakam vexed al-Walid very much, but he said nothing. After al-Hakam’s departure, he turned to ‘Uthman and said:“O commander of the faithful! When you showed preference to your uncle over me, I was reminded of these couplets.” ‘Uthman answered:“al-Hakam is after all a great man of the Quraysh and it is incumbent upon us to show him respect. What are your couplets?” al-Walid recited the following couplets:

“I noticed he held his uncle dearer than his brother, whereas this is an innovation and was not customary before. When I saw this, I longed to see ‘Umar and Khalid (‘Uthman’s sons) grow up and call me uncle on resurrection day.”

‘Uthman felt sorry for him by virtue of these couplets and in order to cause no umbrage with his half-brother, he gave him a share in his government and said:“We offer you the governorship of Iraq!”

Thus, a notorious fellow whom God has called“an evil-doer” in His heavenly Book, was given the power to govern the life, honour and religion of the Muslims and act as an absolute ruler.

al-Hakam, the caliph’s uncle

Let us see who al-Hakam is and what is his position that produces so much respect for him on the part of ‘Uthman, caliph of the Muslims. He was the son of Abu al-‘As, ‘Uthman’s uncle, and a grandson of Umayyah ibn ‘Abd Shams al-Qurayshi. al-Baladhuri says in 5/27: In pagan times, al-Hakam was a neighbor of the Prophet and after the ordainment he did more than all other neighbors to molest the Prophet.

al-Hakam embraced Islam after the capture of Mecca and settled in Medina. But the Muslims regarded him to be weak and lax in religion; for, though he had apparently embraced Islam, he walked behind the Prophet mimicking his footsteps and making faces about him. In prayer, he used his hands and fingers to perform comic gestures.

One day the Prophet happened to notice his mimicry and comic gestures, and was vexed at it, and turning to him said imperiously:“Stay as you are!” As a result of this curse, he remained in that comic state from that moment to the end of his life, and his mouth, head and hands kept on shaking nauseatingly all the time.

The Muslims were right in doubting al-Hakam’s faith, since, despite this strange and comic appearance which was due to the Prophet’s curse, he did not abandon molesting the Prophet, and one day when the Prophet had stayed in the house of one of his ladies, al-Hakam stealthily peered inside through a crack in the door. The Prophet recognized him and came out with a stick and said:“Who will save me from this filthy lizard?” Then he added: ‘He and his offspring’s must not live in the same city as me’ and exiled them to at-Ta’if.

After the Prophet breathed his last, ‘Uthman interceded for his uncle, al-Hakam and asked Abu Bakr to let him and his children return to Medina. Abu Bakr refused permission and said:“I dare not allow those who have been exiled by the Prophet to return to Medina.”

When ‘Umar became caliph, ‘Uthman renewed his request, but he met with a similar refusal. But when ‘Uthman became caliph, he brought back al-Hakam and his offspring’s to Medina, saying:“I had interceded with the Prophet to allow their return to Medina and he had given a favorable promise. However, owing to his death it was not fulfilled.”

The Muslims were not pleased with the return to Medina of those exiled by the Prophet. al-Baladhuri says on p. 5/22:“al-Hakam exposed the Prophet’s secrets. The Prophet laid a curse on him and exiled him and his children to at-Ta’if saying that he should not stay in the same city as himself.” al-Hakam and his children remained in exile there until ‘Uthman became caliph and he brought them back to Medina. al-Baladhuri says on p. 28:“The Muslims were very angry at the act of ‘Uthman in granting to al-Hakam the whole of tithe revenue amounting to 300,000 dinars which the latter bad collected from the Khuza‘ah tribe. He says on p. 27: “al-Hakam died during ‘Uthman’s rule and the caliph performed the burial prayer for him and pitched a tent over his grave as a sign of respect. This was al-Hakam the notorious fellow to whom ‘Uthman offered his seat and sat below him.”

Events which befell Ibn Mas‘ud

I appoint ‘Ammar ibn Yasir as your governor; and ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ud as minister of state for your religious affairs, and remember especially that with the dispatch of ‘Abd Allah Mas‘ud I have given the people of Kufah preference over myself.

‘Umar, in a Lear to the people of Kufah

Abu ‘Abd ar-Rahman ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ud al-Hadhali was the son of Mas‘ud who was allied with the Banu Zuhrah tribe, and was a Muslim of early Islam. At that time no one dared to recite the Qur’an aloud, but he did so and with an audible voice he carried the divine words to the negligent ears of the infidels. The Quraysh did not leave Ibn Mas‘ud’s insolence without retaliation, and beat him so severely that he got badly hurt and was covered with blood. The Prophet took care of him, and Ibn Mas‘ud willingly accepted to serve him. He was so privileged as to be allowed to hear the Prophet’s voice.

Ibn Mas‘ud always served the Prophet and never left him. He placed the Prophet’s shoes before him and helped him put them on. He walked with the Prophet, sometimes in front of him, to shield him against any probable danger. When the Prophet washed himself, he held up a sheet to screen him from others’ eyes. When the Prophet slept, Ibn Mas‘ud kept watch, and also awakened him from sleep when necessary.

Ibn Mas‘ud emigrated to Abyssinia and Medina and took part in the battle of Badr and also in the subsequent combats. The account of his life after the Prophet’s death is as follows:(134)

‘Umar sent him and ‘Ammar ibn Yasir to Kufah and dispatched the following letter to the people of that city:“I have appointed and sent ‘Ammar ibn Yasir to you as your governor and ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas‘ud as your adviser and teacher in religious matters. They are two of the select companions of the Prophet and participants in the battle of Badr. Follow and obey them heartily, and remember especially that in sending Ibn Mas‘ud I have given you preference over myself.”

In Kufah, Ibn Mas‘ud taught the Qur’an to people, acquainted them with religious matters and also acted as treasurer of the public fund.

In ‘Uthman’s rule, al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah, his foster brother, was appointed as governor of Kufah When he arrived and assumed control of affairs, he came finally in direct contact with Ibn Mas‘ud.

In the past, it had been customary for a governor, during his mission to borrow money for a fixed period from the public fund and repay it in due time. al-Walid, too, applied for such a loan, and Ibn Mas‘ud extended it to him. On the due date he asked al-Walid for repayment and insisted upon it. But al-Walid, unable to tolerate this impudence on the part of Ibn Mas‘ud, wrote to ‘Uthman and asked his aid in this involvement with Ibn Mas‘ud. ‘Uthman wrote the following note to Ibn Mas‘ud:“Your job is to act as our treasurer, but you have no authority to interfere and call al-Walid to account for any sum that he draws on the public fund!” When Ibn Mas‘ud received this note and realized that he could no longer accept such an important responsibility, and harmonize himself with ‘Uthman’s methods, he threw down the keys of the treasury before al-Walid and said:“I had supposed till now that I was a keeper of Muslims’ assets. But I have no wish to be your treasurer and I resign from this post.” (135) After his resignation as treasurer, he stayed in Kufah for some time.

Concerning the same story the book“al-‘Iqd al-farid” says that Ibn Mas‘ud addressed the Muslims in the Kufah mosque, in these words:“O people of Kufah! Know that tonight your public fund is reduced by 100,000 and gone, without any instruction being issued by the commander of the Faithful to divest me of the responsibility.” al-Walid reported these words to ‘Uthman and he dismissed Ibn Mas‘ud.(136) al-Baladhuri writes in Ansab al-ashraf(137) : When Ibn Mas‘ud threw down the keys of the treasury before al-Walid, he exclaimed angrily: Whoever changes God’s command at his own wish, will lose his hereafter, and whoever does so at his own whim, will be faced with God’s wrath. I see that ‘Uthman has done so. Is it right to remove such a governor as Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas from Kufah and replace him with al-Walid?’

Ibn Mas‘ud often used to say:“The best words are those of the Qur’an, the best path is the one shown by the Prophet, and the worst deed is heresy since every heresy is deviation that ends in hell.” (138)

al-Walid also reported these stinging words of Ibn Mas‘ud, to ‘Uthman and added that he slandered the caliph and abused him. ‘Uthman summoned Ibn Mas‘ud to Medina. When the people of Kufah learnt of his recall to the capital, they gathered round him asking him not to go but to stay with them to remain immune from any possible injury. Ibn Mas‘ud said: ‘He has the right of being obeyed, and I have no wish to be the first person to open the door to riot and sedition upon him and disobey him.(139)

al-Isti‘ab gives Ibn Mas‘ud’s answer to the people of Kufah as follows:“These conditions are bound to produce riot and sedition, and I have no desire to start a riot.”

The people of Kufah saw him off and he advised them to be chaste and act upon God’s injunctions and then asked them to return home before his departure. The people praised him for his goodness, and on his leaving for Medina, they thanked him for his efforts and services, saying:“May God reward you! You familiarized our ignorant ones with religion, and made our wise ones more steadfast in faith. You taught us the Qur’an, informed us of the Islamic faith and made us clear-sighted about religion. You were indeed a good Muslim, a fine friend and a kind brother.” Then saying farewell, they returned home.(140)

When Ibn Mas‘ud arrived at Medina, he went straight to the Prophet’s mosque where ‘Uthman was at that moment giving a sermon while standing on the Prophet’s pulpit. When he saw Ibn Mas‘ud he changed his words and said:“Just now a mean and worthless quadruped has entered upon you, a fellow who on people’s stretching their hands for bread, will vomit what he has eaten and throw it out of his belly.”

In answer to this abuse, Ibn Mas‘ud said:“No, ‘Uthman, I am not such a man! I am one of the Prophet’s companions with the honor of being present in the battle of Badr and Pledge of ar-Ridwan (Good pleasure).” (141)

‘A’ishah, too, exclaimed:“O ‘Uthman! Are you using such words about Ibn Mas‘ud who has been an intimate companion of the Prophet?”

In answer to her, ‘Uthman shouted:“Be silent” , and then ordered to expel Ibn Mas‘ud from the mosque. They carried out the caliph’s order with Shocking insults to Ibn Mas‘ud. ‘Abd Allah ibn Zam‘ah knocked him down, and it is said that Yahmun, ‘Uthman’s slave, got between Ibn Mas‘ud’s legs, lifted him and threw him down so violently that his ribs were broken. At this time, ‘Ali who was witnessing this scene, turned to ‘Uthman and said:“O ‘Uthman! Do you act in this way only on the words and reports of al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah towards a companion of the Prophet?”

‘Uthman answered:“No! It is not only because of al-Walid’s words! I had also sent Zubayd ibn as-Salt Kindi to Kufah for investigation.” Ibn Mas‘ud, who was twisting with agony, cried out:“ ‘Uthman’s blood is lawful” and ‘Ali said in answer to ‘Uthman:“And you have relied on Zubayd’s words who is not trustworthy!” Then he rose to aid Ibn Mas‘ud and took him home for treatment.

After this incident, Ibn Mas‘ud stayed in Medina and ‘Uthman did not permit him to leave that city. Even when he was cured from his injury, he asked leave to participate in the holy war against the Romans, but ‘Uthman refused permission. It is also narrated that before ‘Uthman could give a positive or negative answer, Marwan anticipated it and said to ‘Uthman:“He has roused Iraq against you and made them suspicious of you. Now it is ash-Sham’s turn and he intends to rouse the people there against you!”

Thus to the end of his life, Ibn Mas‘ud was unable to leave Medina and a watch was kept over him until his death two years before ‘Uthman’s assassination. On this occasion Ibn Mas‘ud’s stay in Medina lasted three years.

The final conversation between ‘Uthman and Ibn Mas‘ud is worthy of attention. When Ibn Mas‘ud was ill in bed and passing through the last moments of his life, ‘Uthman came to visit his sick-bed and said:

-What are you suffering from?

-From my sins.

-What would you like?

-God’s favor and forgiveness.

-Shall I call a doctor for you?

-The doctor himself has made me sick.

-Shall I order to pay your salary and pension?(142)

-You did not pay it when I needed it Do you want to do so today when I have no need for it?

-It will remain for your children.

-God will provide for their livelihood.

-Beg God to forgive me for what I have done.

-I beg God to seize my right from you.

Ibn Mas‘ud had willed that ‘Ammar ibn Yasir should perform his burial prayer, and that ‘Uthman should not attend his burial. His will was carried out and he was buried in al-Baqi‘ without ‘Uthman’s knowledge.(143)

When ‘Uthman heard of it, he got very angry and asked why he was buried without his knowledge. ‘Ammar said:“He had willed that you should not perform his burial prayer.” ‘Abd Allah ibn az-Zubayr composed a couplet on this occasion, meaning:“I know that you will lament my death whereas you had cut off my bread and food.”

This was an account of Ibn Mas‘ud.(144) But al-Walid’s rule did not result in the story of Ibn Mas‘ud alone. During his rule he committed many mischievous and seditious acts such as his ill-treatment of Abu Zubayd, a Christian poet, and of a Jewish magician.

Playing with fire

al-Walid arranged for his Christian companion a monthly share of the Muslims’ public fund, including wine and pork.

Ansab al-ashraf of al-Baladhuri

Protecting a winebibbing companion

Abu al-Faraj narrates in the book“al-Aghani” , quoting Ibn al-A‘rabi as follows: When al-Walid was appointed by his brother, ‘Uthman, as governor of Kufah, Abu Zubayd, a Christian poet, joined him. al-Walid provided him with a house belonging to ‘Aqil ibn Abi Talib and granted it to him. This offer of the house to a Christian, addicted to wine, prompted the Muslims of Kufah for the first time ever to speak ill of and criticize al-Walid, since this Christian entered the mosque in order to meet al-Walid and accompany him to his house to engage in nightly revelry and drinking, and while tottering and drunken, he passed through the mosque to return home.

al-Walid’s conduct clearly showed his carelessness towards religious affairs and his indifference towards the people’s feelings and beliefs. At a time when he was expected to abandon wine drinking and check the acts of Abu Zubayd, his companion, which were against religious laws and common usage, he on the contrary granted this Christian the vast lands situated between the red palaces of ash-Sham and Hira and made those lands a pasture for his flock and cattle, forbidding others to use them. In return, for this favour, Abu Zubayd composed a poem in his praise.(145)

al-Baladhuri writes: al-Walid arranged for his Christian companion a monthly allowance from the Muslims’ public fund including wine and pork. His intimate friends reminded him that such an act would antagonize people towards him. Consequently, he stopped the allowance of wine and pork and instead ordered to pay him their price every month in addition to his salary. This governor of Kufah allowed a Christian to enter a Muslims’ mosque.(146)

Another wrong act of al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah resulted in making people cynical about ‘Uthman’s government and his protégé, since he had allowed his Jewish clown to engage in jugglery in the mosque of Kufah in order to amuse the governor and his cavaliers.

One of his shows in a dark night was to exhibit a big elephant sitting on horseback. Another item was that the juggler turned himself into a camel walking on a rope. Next time he showed a donkey through whose mouth he entered and emerged through arsehole. In conclusion, he summoned a spectator and fearlessly cut off his head with a sword, and to the people’s amazement he once more drew the sword across him with the man rising again safe and sound.

Jundab, son of Ka‘b, was present among the spectators in the mosque watching these scenes and acts of the Jewish juggler. He constantly prayed for God’s protection from Satan and perversion and such acts which make a human being forget Allah. He knew that all this amounted to dexterity and sleight of hand which are strongly forbidden in Islam. So he could bear it no longer and drawing his sword cut off the Jew’s head with one blow and shouted:“Right has prevailed over wrong; for, wrong is undoubtedly destructible!” It is also said that all this happened in day time, and Jundab who had no sword with him, went to a shop and got a sword from a sword-maker to return and kill the juggler, saying:“Now, if you are truthful, bring yourself back to life!”

Anyhow it was al-Walid who turned the chaste and holy site of the Kufah mosque, which was a place of worship and benediction, into a scene of juggling by a Jew, and it was Jundab who by killing the same juggler ruined the means amusement of the debauchee governor, the protege’ of ‘Uthman.

al-Walid who was extremely enraged by Jundab’s action, ordered to kill him in revenge for the death of Zurarah, the Jew. But his family, from al-Azd tribe, rose in support of him to prevent his death. But al-Walid in slyness condoned the death order into imprisonment, hoping to kill him secretly. Jundab was sent to prison and Dinar was placed as warden over him. When Dinar learnt of the reason for his imprisonment and noticed his religious devotion and faith, and that he was engaged in prayer all night, he had no wish to shed his blood, so he said to him:

-I will open the door and you can save your skin by escaping.

-If I do so, al-Walid will kill you instead.

-My blood is no worth if it is shed in the way of God and in’ saving one of the devotees.

At last on the insistence of the warden, Jundab left the prison and took to flight.

In the morning when al-Walid found himself free from the meddlesome tribe of al-Azd and others, he prepared himself for killing Jundab and summoned him. His servants came back to report his escape. Dinar, too confirmed this report. al-Walid who was greatly enraged at Jundab’s flight and laxity of the warden, ordered to behead him(147) and hang his body at the sewer of Kufah.(148)

After his escape from prison, Jundab secretly left Kufah and reached Medina where he settled down until ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib mediated for him with ‘Uthman. ‘Uthman accepted his intercession and wrote to al-Walid telling him not to harass Jundab. Thus Jundab was once more able to return to Kufah.(149)

The first sparks of revolution

As al-Walid’s wicked and unlawful deeds as governor of Kufah reached their peak, ‘Uthman’s wrong conduct and reactions, which had caused discontent among the people, were mentioned and reported by everyone. ‘Amr ibn Zurarah, son of Qays an-Nakha‘i and Kumayl ibn Ziyad an-Nakha‘i who were two of the well-known men of Kufah, were among the first of those who brought up the subject of overthrow of ‘Uthman and election of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib as caliph. ‘Amr gathered the people and said to them:“O people! Though ‘Uthman knows well the difference between right and wrong, he has deliberately ignored this matter, and placed low and unworthy individuals as guardian over the life and property of your good people and given them power and authority.”

Khalid ibn ‘Arfatah, who was present among the audience, hurriedly went to al-Walid and reported the gathering of people and ‘Amr’s inciting words. al-Walid was enraged and rode to face the people and disperse them. But this companions stopped him and pointed out that the matter was more serious than he supposed; for, the people were angry and ready to riot and rise, warning him not to fan up the flame of sedition. Meanwhile, Malik, son of al-Harith, suggested that with al-Walid’s approval he would make the people quiet. al-Walid agreed and Malik went to the crowd, warned them of riot and rebellion and dispersed them peacefully. al-Walid immediately wrote a letter to ‘Uthman about Amr ibn Zurarah’s action and words and asked for instructions to get rid of him. ‘Uthman wrote in answer:“This Ibn Zurarah is a mischievous Bedouin and you must exile him to ash-Sham.” al-Walid carried out the order and exiled ‘Amr to ash-Sham.(150) On Amr’s forced departure from Kufah on the charge of seeking justice and truth, he was seen off by Malik al-Ashtar, al-Aswad ibn Yazid, ‘Alqamah ibn Qays and Qays ibn Fahdan, Qays composed this poem to show his sympathy towards ‘Amr:“I swear to God, to the God of Ka‘bah that in all my deeds whether secret or open I seek God’s consent. We will indeed overthrow al-Walid and his master, ‘Uthman, who is a shelter for deviation, from their positions as governor and caliph.”

‘Uthman’s inspector in Kufah

When ‘Uthman received numerous complaints from various sections of Kufans about al-Walid’s conduct, he was forced, at least in appearance, to show some reaction to these protests. So he sent Hamran, his freed slave, as inspector to Kufah to survey the situation there and report on al-Walid’s treatment of people. But al-Walid bought this top official of the government with money, and by offering him bribes sent him back to Medina empty-handed. Hamran returned, and in harmony with the real wish of ‘Uthman, prepared a report in praise of al-Walid’s conduct. So ‘Uthman was relieved and felt no more anxiety.

After some time Marwan(151) met Hamran and asked him the truth about al-Walid. Hamran answered:“The situation is very critical.” Marwan reported the facts to ‘Uthman, who exiled Hamran to Basra for his false report and treason, and gave him a house to live in there.(152)

The winebibber ruler of Muslims

al-Walid spent the whole night drinking wine with his companions, minstrels and musicians.

History of al-Mas‘udi

al-Walid’s rule in Kufah lasted five years during which he fought the pagans in the region of Azerbaijan. But as he was not a true believer, in that critical situation he committed an act, which deserved religious punishment. The leaders came together to see to the execution of punishment in his case, but Hudhayfah opposed this, saying that as a commander of the Islamic army this would not be right, and so they desisted from such an action.(153)

I do not know why al-Walid deserved the punishment, whether it was because of drinking wine or any other offense. But it is certain that he constantly drank wine, and went so far in it that according to all the historians, the related punishment was eventually carried out in his case.

Abu al-Faraj writes in al-Aghani:“al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah was a winebibbing adulterer. One morning he came drunken to the mosque to offer prayer along with the people and instead of offering two units, he performed four. During the prayer he sang out this phrase: “The heart is mortgaged to the ringlets of Rubab, while no trace remains of the youthfulness of either of them.” When the prayer was over, he turned to the congregation and said:“Do you wish me to add some more units to the morning prayer?” And at the same time he vomited what he had eaten.(154)

al-Mas‘udi writes in the same connection: al-Walid spent the whole night drinking wine with his companions, minstrels and musicians.

One day when the muezzin called for prayer, al-Walid, dressed in his underwear and drunken, came to the mosque and stood at the altar to pray with the people. He offered four units of prayer instead of the usual two and prolonged the act of prostration, during which, instead of praising God, he kept on saying:“Drink and give me a drink!” When he supposed the prayer to be over, he returned to the people and said:“Do you wish to offer more than four units of prayer?” ‘Attab ath-Thaqafi, who was sitting in the first row behind al-Walid, shouted at him, saying:“May God favour you! What has happened to you? I swear to God that I am amazed at none but the caliph of the Muslims who has made a person like you governor over us!” The people, too, threw pebbles at him. When this brother of caliph ‘Uthman saw himself in such an awkward position, he staggeringly betook himself to the palace while murmur¬ing a song meaning:“I never turn away from wine and a pretty slave-girl, and do not deprive myself of their blessing and pleasure. I keep on drinking so much wine as to quench my brain, and then pass staggering through the crowd!”

The event about witnesses

At last the people of Kufah got wearied of the unlawful and obscene acts of al-Walid, and when they saw that their protests and complaints to ‘Uthman were of no avail, they decided to secure decisive evidence about al-Walid’s laxity and addiction, go to the caliph and inform him of the problem and confusion faced by their worldly and religious affairs, so as to convince him of these matters and compel him to turn his attention to their complaints and meet their requests.

To carry out this plan, the leaders of the people thought of removing, from al-Walid’s finger in his state of drunkenness, the signet ring with which he sealed official documents and which ‘Uthman knew well, and show it to the caliph as a definite evidence.

al-Baladhuri writes in this connection(155) : On the day al-Walid performed in drunkenness the prayer along with the people, Abu Zaynab; Zuhayr ibn ‘Awf al-Azdi asked for the help of al-Muwarra‘ of the Banu Asad tribe in this plan. The latter agreed and declared his readiness.

On that day they were watching to find al-Walid drunk, but as it happened, he did not leave his residence even for the afternoon prayer. So they went to the door of his house, but the porter did not allow them to enter. Abu Zaynab placed a dinar in the porter’s hand, which on seeing the gold coin stood aside and opened the way for them. Both Abu Zaynab and al-Muwarra‘ entered and came across a strange and despicable scene. They saw al-Walid fallen in a corner in total drunkenness. They laid him on his bed, but at that moment al-Walid vomited. Abu Zaynab without hesitation removed the signet ring from al-Walid’s finger, and both of them left the house.

In ‘Uthman’s presence

Abu Zaynab, accompanied by three other dignitaries of Kufah departed via Basra for Medina, in order to meet the caliph and present to him their complaint about al-Walid. On coming to his presence they began by saying to the caliph:“Though we have no hope of winning your attention to our suffering, we consider it our duty to inform you of certain matters.” ‘Uthman asked what it was. They explained their complaints about al-Walid and described the details of the incidents and events from which the complaint arose, as well as the confusion and disorders which existed in Kufah.

‘Abd ar-Rahman ibn ‘Awf who was present in this meeting, enquired about complainants:“What does this mean? What do you think has happened to al-Walid? Has he gone mad?” They said:“No He gets drunk and loses all control due to excessive drinking.” ‘Uthman turned to Jundab and asked:“Have you yourself observed my brother’s drinking spree?” Jundab said:“No. Never!” , But Abu Zaynab said:“I testify that I have seen him drunk, vomiting wine and polluting Himself. I myself removed ring from his finger while he was wholly intoxicated.” ‘Uthman asked:“How did you know he had taken wine?” They answered:“How could we not know? He drank the kind of wine we used in pagan times ourselves.” Then they showed al-Walid’s ring to the caliph and offered it as evidence. ‘Uthman who had become very angry by this time threatened the complainants and witnesses, and promised punishment, and then placing his hand on their chests, dismissed them.

The caliph’s reward to the witnesses

Abu Zaynab and his companions had with great hopes reached Medina, went to the caliph, informed him of the true situation and presented their evidence. But ‘Uthman not only ignored their report and testimony about al-Walid’s addiction to wine and his obscene acts during prayer, but also abused them and ordered to beat some of them. Those of the witnesses who had been maltreated went to ‘Ali and begged for a solution. ‘Ali went to ‘Uthman, spoke in their favour and protested saying:“You are neglecting divine limits and insulting and maltreating the witnesses who have testified against your brother, and you are thus altering God’s law!” (156)

‘A’ishah, too, whose help had been sought by the witnesses, shouted at ‘Uthman, saying:“You have failed to carry out religious laws and insulted the witnesses.” (157) The complainants had stated before ‘Uthman that al-Walid drank wine of the kind used in pagan times.(158)

Their testimony was that al-Walid in his intoxication, had performed four units of morning prayers instead of the usual two, and then he had turned to the people offering to perform more units, and had then vomited. They said also that during the prayer, instead of reciting Quranic verse, he had sung a song about wine and women. They also exhibited the signet ring which they had removed from his finger while he was drunk, and handed it over to ‘Uthman as final evidence.

Nevertheless, they saw no sign of attention to their complaint and testimony, but were insulted beaten and whipped instead, and also threatened with death.

‘A’ishah opposing ‘Uthman

Abu al-Faraj writes in al-Aghani: ‘Uthman said in answer to their objections:“Is it not so that in taking umbrage to one’s emir and ruler, one should level accusation against him? Now that this is the case I will order to punish you in the morning!” (159)

This group, fearing punishment by ‘Uthman, took refuge in ‘A’ishah’s house, and when in the morning ‘Uthman was sharply rebuked by ‘A’ishah, he shouted:“Do Iraqi rebels and debauchees find no asylum but ‘A’ishah’s house?!”

When ‘A’ishah heard these insulting and unforgivable words of ‘Uthman, she picked up a shoe of the Prophet and raising it high cried out loudly:“How soon you have abandoned the way and tradition of God’s prophet, the owner of this shoe!”

These words of ‘A’ishah were soon reported to all the people of Medina, and they rushed to the mosque. The crowd became so dense that no room was left for newcomers. The words of ‘Uthman and ‘A’ishah were commented upon so excitedly that these produced a difference and division among the crowd. A number began to praise ‘A’ishah for her reaction, and others frowned and said in reproach:“Why should women meddle with such matters?”

The demonstrations of the two opposite groups reached a point where they fell upon one another, using stones and shoes in these attacks within the mosque.

al-Baladhuri adds and says: ‘Uthman did not remain silent against ‘A’ishah’s protest, and shouted angrily:“What right have you to interfere in the affairs? You have been ordered to keep quiet in your house!”

The people were divided in their opinion about this protest and reproach. Some supported ‘Uthman’s attitude while others backed ‘A’ishah and exclaimed:“Who deserves more than ‘A’ishah to interfere in the affairs?”

Arguments soared high to the point where the two groups fell upon one another with shoes. This was the first quarrel to occur among the Muslims after the departure of the Prophet.

This story is mentioned by al-Ya‘qubi in his history, and by ‘Abd al-Barr in al-Isti‘ab in a similar way, showing clearly the effect of ‘A’ishah’s action and interference. After this incident, Talhah and az-Zubayr went to ‘Uthman and said in reproach:“We told you at the beginning not to let al-Walid take charge of any Muslims’ affairs. But you paid no attention to our words, and rejected them. It is not late yet. Now that a group has testified to his addiction to wine and his intoxication, it would be advisable to remove him.”

‘Ali, too, said:“Remove al-Walid from his post, and if the witnesses give testimony in front of him, then you could sentence him to the religious punishment.”

al-Walid’s dismissal and purification

of the pulpit at the Kufah Mosque

‘Uthman was compelled to dismiss al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah from the governorship of Kufah recall him to Medina, and appoint a new governor for Kufah. So he chose Sa‘id ibn al-‘As(160) as a governor of Kufah, ordering him to send al-Walid back to Medina.(161) When Sa‘id arrived in Kufah, he sent a message to al-Walid that he had been summoned to Medina by the caliph. But al-Walid postponed the order for a few days and ignored it. So Sa‘id said to him:“Hasten to your brother, for, he has instructed me to send you to him.” Then he ordered him to vacate and surrender the governor’s house.

al-Walid was forced to obey, surrendered the governor’s house and moved to the house of ‘Amrah ibn ‘Uqbah. Then Sa‘id ordered to purify the pulpit of the Kufah mosque, and he did not ascend it until it was done.

Some of the Umayyad chiefs who had accompanied Sa‘id to Kufah, requested him to desist from such a purification, and reminded him that if anyone else resorted to this act, it was his duty to check him, since such an act would disgrace al-Walid for ever (for, both of them belonged to the Umayyads and the same tribe). But Sa‘id refused and the pulpit and the governor’s house were eventually washed and purified.(162)

al-Aghani says: ‘Uthman ordered al-Walid to go back to Medina. When he was about to leave Kufah for Medina, a group of people including ‘Adi ibn Hatam accompanied him in order to offer excuses for al-Walid’s actions to the caliph. During the journey one day al-Walid, according to the Arab custom, sang a song for the camels(163) and(164) . ‘Adi exclaimed:“Let me see, where are you taking us like this?”

When al-Walid came to ‘Uthman’s presence in Medina and the witnesses testified to his face about his addiction to wine, ‘Uthman was compelled to administer on him the legal punishment with the lash. But he let him wear a thick cloak so that he would not feel the strokes of the lash and sent him into the room where the punishment was to be carried out.

Justice dispensed by ‘Ali

Whenever any members of the Quraysh came to carry out the religious punishment, al-Walid said:“Look at your kin and yourself. Do not break the ties of relationship with me, and abstain from carrying out the punishment thereby enraging the commander of the faithful.” Thus an individual, hearing these words, desisted from doing his duty and no one dared administer the lash on al-Walid’s back.

When ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib observed this, he picked up the lash and entered the room accompanied by his son, al-Hasan. al-Walid repeated his words in order to dissuade ‘Ali from his task. Al-Hasan confirmed his words and reminded his father of the purport. ‘Ali said in answer to his son:“If I, too, act in the same way, it would mean having no faith in God!”

It is also said that al-Walid asked ‘Ali, in the name of God, reminding him of their kinship (the Umayyads and Banu Hashim were cousins) to desist from enforcing punishment. But ‘Ali said:“Be quiet; for, the reason for the annihilation of the Israelites was their oblivion of God’s limits. Let the Quraysh call me an executioner.”

al-Walid wrapped his cloak round himself, but ‘Ali pulled it away forcefully and dealt him forty strokes with a double-edged whip.

al-Mas‘udi writes: when ‘Ali began to punish al-Walid, he abused ‘Ali and called him a blackmailer. ‘Aqil ibn Abi Talib who was present, shouted at him saying: “O son of Abu al-Mu‘ayt! It is strange how you have lost yourself! You forget that you are the same slave offspring of Safuriyah!” (165)

al-Walid kept on creeping here and there; trying to flee from the strokes, but ‘Ali seized him, knocked him down and whipped him.

When ‘Uthman observed his brother’s disgrace to such an extent, he protested to ‘Ali and said:“You had no right to treat him in that way.” But ‘Ali said:“I have the right! A worse treatment is deserved by one who engaged in debauchery and flees from justice and from the execution of divine punishment.”

When the whipping was over, al-Walid sang out a poem which meant:“O Umayyads! May God bring separation between you and me in kinship; for, whoever of you gets rich, is treated well by you, and if he becomes poor, he despairs of you!”

It is said that after al-Walid received his punishment, ‘Uthman was asked to get al-Walid’s head shaved according to the custom for punished persons. But he refused and said: ‘‘Umar acted in that way, but he had abandoned it by the end of his rule.”

After al-Walid’s dismissal from his position as governor of Kufah on account of his addiction to wine, and due to his receiving punishment, ‘Uthman did not deprive him of involvement in governmental affairs. Now he was commis¬sioned to collect the tithe from the two tribes of Kalb and Bulaqayn, and thus the former debauchee governor became a trustee of state fund and collector of taxes.

We probed into various events of al-Walid’s history and found him a strange man and his friends even stranger than him. We found him to be a man notorious for adultery and addiction, who was regarded as an evil-doer by the Qur’an. This alone would be enough to show his personality and position in society to a considerable extent. He was so dominant over the weakness and carelessness of his brother, ‘Uthman, who governed the Islamic land, that he could turn him to any direction he wished, and as we saw, he so influenced him that he secured from him a free access to the life and property of the Muslims and rule over the people. He made use of his close relationship with the caliph to promote his own whims and fancies and, sheltered by this immunity, he carried out daringly and inconceivably his lustful designs. He granted his drunkard companions, the Christian poet, extensive land, arranged for him an allowance of money, pork and wine and allowed him entry into the Muslims’ place of worship in a gay and drunken state. He brought the Jewish magician into the mosque to perform his tricks and amuse the debauchee governor. He himself stood up to prayer in the altar of the mosque, gay and drunk and feasting garments, acting as Imam of the congregation, and performing four units of morning prayer instead of two, while prostrating instead of reciting lines in praise of God, drunkenly singing poems about women and wine, and polluting the altar with vomiting.

Even when this reckless debauchee was summoned to Medina to investigate his deeds, and when the nobles of Kufah accompanied him to offer excuses to the caliph for his misdeeds, on the way to Medina, he nonchalantly spoke of wine, song and carnal desires, even though he fully knew that it was because of his conduct that he had been summoned to trial, resulting in his punishment.

All the Muslims were dissatisfied with that government and constantly expressed protest. Such matters had excited public opinion so much that all day and night the undesirable acts of the government of the time and its debauchee and godless agents had become the topics of discussion. All these talks and protests everywhere showed that a revolution was imminent and a general uprising against the government was about to begin, and that time it took the form of occasional protests of Ibn Mas‘ud, complaints of ‘Ammar, Abu Dharr, Jundab and other chief companions of the Prophet. At that time two outstanding personalities drew greater attention of the Muslims. The first was ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib who was well-known to the people, and from among all the great companions of the Prophet, it was only he who administered punishment in the presence of the caliph, despite the latter’s unwillingness, without taking notice of his rage and uneasiness, and without fearing the vengeance of the Umayyads or its consequence.

It was a rare and amazing coincidence that this same unique and famous personality of all times had upon the order of the Prophet, beheaded the father of this same evil-doer who was whipped for his inattention to religious criteria and for his addiction to wine. Therefore, ‘Ali had the right to say:“Let the Quraysh call me their executioner.”

With such acts, ‘Ali produced deep rancor in the hearts of the Quraysh which, later on, in ‘Ali’s caliphate, erupted into a violent hostility to spread everywhere. This flame eventually swallowed him and his family.

‘A’ishah’s instigation’s against ‘Uthman

The second distinguished personality was ‘A’ishah who at that time had turned away from ‘Uthman, to join his opponents and accept their leadership. In order to rouse public feelings against ‘Uthman she had taken certain steps, which were unprecedented, as these had not been taken by anyone before her. While the people were wholeheartedly attached to the memories of the Prophet, and still spoke of association with him, of his vision and gestures and even of his clothes, she raised his shoe as a decisive evidence of disregard of his ways and traditions by ‘Uthman, thus rousing the people violently against him, and instigating them to her heart’s content.

With this single gesture which was made with a careful calculation and was appropriate in terms of time and place, she made a great number of people cynical about the caliphate’s administration and scattered them away from the caliph in the manner she desired. This step was so calculated that the supporters and opposers confronted each other, and arguments led to a quarrel and conflicts. The first clash among the Muslims took place after the Prophet’s death. At last, she succeeded in vanquishing the powerful and despotic caliph with her power, and compelling him to agree to the people’s demand, dismiss his debauchee brother as governor of Kufah and summon him to the capital for trial.

Had it not been for her talent and genius in inciting people’s feelings, and for her leadership of ‘Uthman’s opponents, such a thing would not have occurred.

We know that she was not the only wife of the Prophet still living; Hafsah, Umm Habibah and Umm Salamah still lived, and each of them had some share in meddling with governmental affairs, but none of them showed such a leadership as ‘A’ishah especially in inciting the people against ‘Uthman.

It seems that unlike the tradition of the two preceding caliphs, ‘Uthman had prepared a special seat or throne for himself, which he sometimes shared with Abu Sufyan, leader of the Prophet’s opponents and commander of infidel forces, as well as his wicked and winebibbing brother and al-Hakam who was made an outcast by the Prophet. al-Hakam, son of Abu al-‘As and his uncle, who had been exiled by the Prophet, and also cursed and driven away from himself, was admitted as a favorite to ‘Uthman’s court, contrary to people’s expectations, and was shown such favors that he rose to greet him, allowing him to take his own seat, while himself taking an inferior place below him.

We saw also that he had handed over control of the finance of a half of the eastern part of the country to his mad and wicked brother in order to console him, and had given this shameless fellow a free hand in taking possession; of the Muslims’ public fund. On the contrary, he punished such a noble companion of the Prophet as Ibn Mas‘ud, despite his brilliant record, on the charge of protesting against his wicked brother’s misdeeds and abused him obscenely, driving him in disgrace Out of the mosque and breaking his ribs. He ordered to cut off his salary, and forbade his participation in the holy war with pagans, and to the end of his life this unfortunate old man was refused permission to leave Medina, and he committed all these mean acts only in support of his evil brother, al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah. We also noted that he rejected the testimony of the witnesses against his brother and awarded them lashes and threatened and drove them away. And when he was compelled to agree to the legal punishment of this brother, we saw that he made him wear a cloak so as not to feel the pain produced by the strokes of the lash, and also refused to allow the culprit’s head to be shaved as an evidence of his punishment. And after all those wrong deeds, he commissioned him to collect tithe in a vast part of the Islamic country.

The subject of al-Walid ibn ‘Uqbah, half brother of ‘Uthman on the mother’s side, and his five-year rule in Kufah, constituted one of the cases in which ‘A’ishah interfered directly, and she openly rose in opposition to ‘Uthman, using it as a pretext to start a combat with the caliphate. We also observed as to how she emerged victorious out of this combat and forced the center of power to submit to her.

‘Ammar ibn Yasir

‘Ammar is like the skin between my eyes.

The Prophet

Another matter with which ‘A’ishah interfered personally and roused the people against the caliph, was related to ‘Ammar ibn Yasir.

Let us first introduce ‘Ammar and then relate the story. Abu al-Yaqzan ‘Ammar was the son of Yasir. His father belonged to the Arab tribe of Qahtani Mudhhaj, who came from Yemen to Mecca, befriended Abu Hudhayfah al-Makhzumi and married his slave-girl, Sumayyah from whom ‘Ammar was born. Abu Hudhayfah released ‘Ammar and thenceforth he was allied to the Banu Makhzum.

‘Ammar, his brother, and parents were among the early Muslims who fearlessly proclaimed their faith in Islam, as a result of which they received nothing but pain and torture at the hands of infidels who made them wear iron chain mail, lay them down on the stones of Meccan desert in burning sun, and placed heavy stones in their chests and bellies to compel them to abandon their religion. But these tortures did not have the slightest effect in weakening their steadfast faith as they refused to submit to the infidels’ pressure.

While they were being tortured by the infidels, the Prophet, happening to pass by, noticed their sorry condition, suffering so much under the scorching sun and being so maltreated by the inhuman pagans. So he turned to them and consolingly said:“O Yasir’s household! Be patient! Heaven is waiting for you!”

Sumayyah, ‘Ammar’s mother, passed away as a result of a blow received from Abu Jahl with his weapon, and thus she became the first martyr for the cause of Islam. After Sumayyah, her husband Yasir who was ‘Ammar’s father died under the tortures inflicted by the pagans. But ‘Ammar, contrary to his inherent desire, in order to be saved from their cruelty, was compelled to utter the words forced upon him, abuse the Prophet thereby being released by the infidels.

It was reported to the Prophet that ‘Ammar had turned unbeliever and gone astray. The Prophet said:“Never! Faith is so deep in ‘Ammar that it has taken root in the whole of his soul!”

Meanwhile, ‘Ammar who was writhing with pain and sorrow, and shedding tears, came to the Prophet who received him affectionately and wiped his tears, saying:“If they molest you again, repeat your words of abuse and deliver yourself from their mischief’s!” It was on this occasion that the following verse descended about ‘Ammar (Chapter an-Nahl, Verse 106).

“He who disbelieves in Allah after his having believed, not he who is compelled while his heart is at rest on account of his faith.”

‘Ammar contributes to building

the first mosque of Islam

‘Ammar emigrated to Medina and took part in the battle of Badr and other battles. When the Prophet emigrated to Medina, ‘Ammar took part in the construction of the Quba’ Mosque and thus he became the first builder of an Islamic mosque.(166)

He took part also in the construction of the Prophet’s mosque, and showed much more activity than some other companions in carrying stones and bricks. In the meantime, ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan who was an aristocratic Quraysh companion and wore expensive garments, did not show much activity and kept on removing from himself and his clothes the dust raised by the other companions. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib who observed this, began to recite a poem while engaged in work, meaning:(167)

“Those who labor in building a mosque and are constantly on the move, are not the equal of those who avoid dust and stay away.”

‘Ammar who was a simple-minded person and did not know what the poem hinted, began to recite the same poem. ‘Uthman who knew what ‘Ali meant, thought that ‘Ammar was deliberately cutting jokes at him. So he said:“O son of Sumayyah! I know your meaning! By God I will knock you on the head with this stick!” The Prophet, who noticed the scene, was vexed at ‘Uthman’s threat and said:“What do they expect from ‘Ammar? He is inviting them to heaven while they call him to the fire! ‘Ammar is like skin between my eyes. Abstain from molesting a man who has attained such a rank!”

According to another narration, the story goes on as follows: When the companions saw the Prophet’s uneasiness, they asked ‘Ammar himself to find a way to alleviate that uneasiness. So ‘Ammar who was carrying a heavy load of unbaked bricks, turned to the Prophet and said laughingly:“O Prophet of God! Your companions have killed me, for, they load me with what they are unable to carry themselves.”

As the Prophet was removing dust from ‘Ammar’s curly hair, he said:“O Sumayyah’s son! These are not your killers; your killers are the unruly group.”

The Prophet has, on many occasions, praised ‘Ammar, such as the time when Khalid ibn al-Walid spoke angrily to ‘Ammar. So he said:“Whoever shows hostility to ‘Ammar, will be faced with God’s hostility, and whoever earns ‘Ammar’s rancor will receive God’s wrath.”

‘Ammar took part in the battles of al-Jamal and Siffin under ‘Ali. In the latter battle whenever he proceeded towards the battlefield, he was followed by the Prophet’s friends, as if the Prophet’s words sounded in their ears, saying:“You will surely be killed by an unruly group!” As he was advancing followed by the companions, he sang Out the following words in the battle of Siffin:“Today is the day when together with my friends I meet Muhammad and his party.”

Eventually in the same battle ‘Ammar was killed by the soldiers of Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, and two of them fell upon one another in order to receive the honor of having killed him. ‘Amr ibn al-‘As said:“By God! These two are fighting each other for the purpose of going to hell. I swear to God that I wish to have died twenty years ago!” (168)

‘Uthman and ‘Ammar

Now that we are acquainted with ‘Ammar, it would be fitting to know as to what extent ‘Uthman has carried out the Prophet’s recommendation about ‘Ammar, and what reaction was shown by ‘A’ishah, and how she has used him for pounding ‘Uthman.

al-Baladhuri writes: On the day that they reported to ‘Uthman the death of Abu Dharr in ar-Rabadhah(169) he said:“May he be blessed by God!” ‘Ammar who was present said sadly:“Yes we say from the bottom of our heart, may God bless him.” ‘Uthman who did not expect such a reproach shouted at ‘Ammar:“You villain! Are you reminding me of his exile? Go and take his place!” Then he ordered his beating.

‘Ammar prepared to leave since the caliph had ordered him to do so. A number of the people of Banu Makhzum’s tribe who were allied to ‘Ammar, went to ‘Ali, asking him to intercede with ‘Uthman to cancel his order. ‘Ali did so and said to ‘Uthman:“ ‘Uthman, fear God! You have exiled a chaste man as a result of which he died there. Now you intend to treat a similar man in the same way?”

They argued for some time, and at last ‘Uthman said roughly to ‘Ali:“You deserve exile more than he.” ‘Ali answered:“You can order it if you wish!” The emigrants gathered and said to the caliph:“These wont’s do that you exile anyone who has a word with you!” So ‘Uthman was obliged to let ‘Ammar alone.(170)

One day some of the Prophet’s companions including al-Miqdad ibn ‘Amr, ‘Ammar ibn Yasir, Talhah and az-Zubayr, after some consultations wrote a letter to ‘Uthman enumerating his improper acts spoke about the fear of God into his heart, adding that if he did not abandon his practice, they would rise and rebel against him.(171) ‘Ammar took the letter to him, and read a part of it. ‘Uthman who had become very angry at ‘Ammar’s impudence and at the contents of the letter, shouted at him:“From among this group is it you alone who have resorted to this act and brought the letter?”

-Yes, because I wish you well more than others do.

‘Uthman said:“You are lying, O son of Sumayyah!”

‘Ammar answered:“You call me the son of Sumayyah? By God I am the son of Sumayyah and Yasir!”

‘Uthman, who was greatly enraged ordered his servants to get hold of ‘Ammar’s legs and arms, forced him to assume the position of a crucified person, and then with the shoe on his foot gave him such a kick between the legs that he made him suffer from hernia, and fall down unconscious.

Public funds kept on private asset

Another occasion when ‘Uthman quarreled with ‘Ammar was when the former had taken jewels Out of the public fund. al-Baladhuri writes: In the Medinan treasury, there was a basket full of jewelry and valuable ornaments. ‘Uthman had taken out some pieces to adorn one of his ladies.

The people heard of this and they began to criticize and reproach ‘Uthman, speaking disparagingly to him. Their protests angered him so intensely that he climbed the pulpit and said: Despite all the protests we will take whatever we wish out of this fund!

‘Ali protested to him and said:“You will be stopped and not allowed to act so obstinately and seize public property.” ‘Ammar too shouted:“I take God as witness that I will be the first person not to tolerate such an action.” ‘Uthman cried Out in rage:“You scoundrel! Do you dare to be insolent towards me?” Then issued order for arresting him. They seized ‘Ammar and took him to the caliph’s house. When ‘Uthman arrived, he ordered to bring ‘Ammar to his presence. Then he beat him so hard that ‘Ammar fell down unconscious and he was later thrown out of the house in the same condition. Then other people carried him to the house of Umm Salamah, wife of the Prophet.

Many hours and even the time for prayer passed and he was still unconscious. Later on, he regained consciousness and performed ablution and prayer and then said: God be praised! This is not the first time that we are tortured in the way of God!

As we have already said, ‘Ammar was allied to the Banu Makhzum tribe. When Hisham ibn al-Walid al-Makhzumi learnt of such maltreatment, he protested to ‘Uthman and said:“You take heed of ‘Ali and Banu Hashim and do not molest them, but act unjustly towards us and beat our brother to death. By God! If ‘Ammar dies I will kill a pot-bellied fellow! (Meaning ‘Uthman)”

‘Uthman became very angry and abused him, saying:“O son of Qasriyah!(172) Do not show so much impudence.” Hisham answered:“Then remember that I reach Qasriyah by two mothers!”

‘Uthman ordered to expel Hisham from his house and he went straight to Umm Salamah and found her to be very uneasy about ‘Ammar’s affair and at the injustice done to him.

‘A’ishah aiding ‘Ammar

When ‘A’ishah heard of ‘Ammar’s affair, she was greatly enraged and in protest to ‘Uthman’s conduct, she held up a lock of the Prophet’s hair, his shirt and shoe and cried out.“How soon you have forgotten the tradition of the owner of this hair, shirt and shoe, whereas they have remained from him and have not yet gone old or worn out?”

The crowd in the mosque was greatly roused and cried out the name of God. ‘Amr ibn al-‘As who had been dismissed by ‘Uthman as governor of Egypt and was replaced by ‘Abd Allah ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Sarh, was deeply vexed with ‘Uthman. He kept on exclaiming:“I take refuge unto God!” more loudly than others, and expressed much astonishment. Meanwhile, ‘Uthman was in such a rage that he could not utter a word.(173)

Burial of Ibn Mas‘ud and al-Miqdad

The burial of Ibn Mas‘ud was another occasion when ‘Ammar was subjected to ‘Uthman’s anger. Ibn Mas‘ud had willed at the time of his death that ‘Ammar should perform his burial prayer without informing ‘Uthman. ‘Ammar carried out the will, but when ‘Uthman learnt of the matter, he became very angry with ‘Ammar. al-Miqdad too died not long after and he too willed that ‘Ammar rather than ‘Uthman should perform his burial prayer. This will too was duly fulfilled by ‘Ammar without informing ‘Uthman. He became angrier with ‘Ammar this time and exclaimed:“Woe to me at this son of a slave-girl! I knew him well!” (174)

What mostly draws our attention to these incidents is the confrontation of ‘Uthman with ‘Ammar and utterance of obscene language. In view of what is quoted from ‘A’ishah in well-known commentaries to the effect that ‘Uthman was a very shy, modest and polite person and that even the angels feel shy at his modesty and virtue, how could such obscene words be indicative of that modesty and politeness?

Meanwhile, we observe ‘A’ishah as a wise leader, organizing the people and those harmed by ‘Uthman against him. He was so clear-sighted that she knew exactly what roused public feelings and excitement.

On the first occasion she incited the people only by showing a shoe of the Prophet, and achieved the required result with such an act. She knew well that the same simple object would not for the second time be so effective in rousing public feelings. But at the same time, she was aware that she should not disregard the first experiment altogether. So she added the Prophet’s hair and shirt to the shoe, and these simple relics of him did the trick in instigating people thereby shaking the very foundation of the caliph’s rule.

By these two simple but significant methods, she was able, in a clever manner, to destroy the immunity which ‘Uthman had secured as an outstanding Islamic personality and the lofty position that he had gained among the Muslims as successor to the Prophet.

She was able to use appropriate means which required no proof and argument in order to exhibit the caliph’s true personality, one side, and the Prophet’s way and tradition, and his relics and ladies on the other, thereby destroying the respect shown to ‘Uthman and considerably lowering his posi-tion and prestige in the society to such a level where an uprising against the caliph was not only considered important, but rather as something easy and practicable.

This lowering of the dignity was confined to the person of the caliph, but extended also to the position of the caliphate, since from that time onward, it no longer possessed the former respect and dignity in the Muslim society and was regarded with little credit. Consequently the people began to show insolence and disobedience openly to the caliphs who succeeded ‘Uthman.

Moreover, the sequence of events showed that the relation between ‘A’ishah and ‘Uthman continued to be drained further. Once she had been a staunch supporter of ‘Uthman, but now she became one of this strongest opponent, and as time went by her rancor and hostility towards him became sharper.

It may be said that the verbal duels between them began with the reduction of her pension by him, and the passage of time, succession of events and her sharp protests which were met with even sharper responses, changed ‘A’ishah from a personality who defended the interests of others into a vengeful and determined person who wished to maintain her own position, and so she came to be regarded as a strong and stubborn enemy of the caliph and caliphate.

Now her opposition to ‘Uthman was not merely for the sake of preservation of the interests of others but for upholding her owns personality and position in an increasing manner.

IV

At first sight, there may certainly appear to be a good deal of justice in Peirce’s specific claims regarding Hegel’s unwillingness to give Secondness its due, and Peirce’s complaints here undoubtedly fit a certain traditional way of reading Hegel as a speculative metaphysician with an extravagantly idealist and a prioristic project. However, in many respects that traditional reading has been challenged in recent years, in ways that show a side to Hegel’s thought in which a greater role for Peircean Secondness can perhaps be found.

The first issue, then, concerns how far Hegel leaves room for what Burbidge called “the brute facts of Secondness”, such as the poke in the back “that Pure Reason fails to account for”. On a traditional view, which Peirce seems to endorse, Hegel’s position is seen as being Spinozistic, ruling out possibility or contingency, and rendering everything necessary. However, as several commentators have argued recently (including Burbidge), this is a mistaken picture of Hegel’s position, for (as Hegel puts it) “Although it follows from discussion so far that contingency is only a one-sided moment of actuality, and must therefore not be confused with it, still as a form of the Idea as a whole it does deserve its due on the world of ob-jects”.[65] Here it is important to remember Hegel distinction between what is actual and what exists or what is “immediately there” (das unmittelbar Daseiende ),[66] where the actual is necessary but the existent is not, and where Hegel is quite happy to accept that (for example) the natural world is not fully “actual” in this sense, though it does of course exist. Thus, while Peirce might have been right to say that Hegel took a greater philosophical interest in actuality than in possibility and contingency, he was far from denying its reality: “It is quite correct to say that the task of science and, more precisely, of philosophy, consists generally in coming to know the necessity hidden under the semblance of contingency; but this must not be understood to mean that contingency pertains only to our subjective views and that it must therefore be set aside totally if we wish to attain the truth. Scientific endeavours which one-sidedly push in this direction will not escape the justified reproach of being an empty game and a strained pedantry”.[67]

Turning now to the second issue, of whether Hegel’s neglect of Secondness can be seen in his corresponding neglect for the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge, it is again a complex matter to decide whether Peirce is right in what he claims. Central to Peirce’s position is the way in which he sees Hegel as a typical proponent of what in “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce identified as the “a priori method”, and thus as someone who holds that our reason will lead us to a convergence on the truth; according to Peirce, Hegel therefore fails to recognize that unless there is a sufficient role for experience, this method cannot result in any stable consensus, as what is “agreeable to reason”[68] (like what is agreeable to taste) is “always more or less a matter of fashion”,[69] which depends too much on the subjective dispositions of inquirers and not enough on how things are in the world. Peirce thus sees Hegel’s dialectical approach as an attempt to reach truth in this rationalistic fashion, in the hope of showing that each limited category or standpoint can lead to the next until we attain a category or standpoint for which no limitation can be found; but he doubts the feasibility of this enterprise, claiming that not everyone will find the moves Hegel makes or the criticisms he offers “rationally compelling”, so that in the end Hegel cannot claim to reach “absolute knowledge”, as a picture of the world to which we must all consent; rather, he can only appeal to those who already think like him and share his preconceptions:

[Hegel] simply launches his boat into the current of thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the current leads. He himself calls his methoddialectic , meaning that a frank discussion of the difficulties to which any opinion spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after modification until a tenable position is attained. This is a distinct profession of faith in the method of inclinations.[70]

Thus, rather than guiding his inquiries by the “outward clash” of experience, Peirce claims that Hegel fails to see the significance of Secondness in this respect, because he hopes that by following “that which we find ourselves inclined to believe”[71] (and thus “the method of inclinations”), we can be led to convergence, and so to truth.

Now, one difficulty in assessing Peirce’s criticism here is that he does not tell us precisely what he has in mind: Hegel’sPhenomenology , hisLogic , or theEncyclopaedia system as a whole. As regards thePhenomenology , we have already seen that commentators such as Burbidge would choose to emphasise the role of Secondness in that work, as what moves consciousness on from one standpoint to the next is an awareness of how things around us do not fit how we conceive them to be.[72] In the case of theLogic , Peirce may be correct to say that there is no role for experience as such here, as one category is seen to lead on to another, in accordance with “Hegel’s plan of evolving everything out of the abtractest conception by a dialectical procedure”;[73] but in fact Peirce allows that Hegel might be right to adopt this method here, commenting as we have seen that it is “far from being so absurd as the experientialists think”,[74] his only reservation being its ambitiousness: “[it] overlooks the weakness of individual man, who wants the strength to wield such a weapon as that”.[75] Peirce thus chooses to argue for the necessity of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness not in this dialectical manner, but by showing (in “A Guess at the Riddle”) how this triad plays a fundamental role in all the “fields of thought”, such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, physiology, biological development, and physics, as well as showing (in the later Harvard lectures) that they have a fundamental role in our phenomenology. It could be argued that by appealing to the sciences in support of his categorial theorizing in this way, Peirce is again showing a greater recognition of Secondness than Hegel, in acknowledging that the empirical nature of these sciences must play a role in warranting our speculations about the categories. But again this implied contrast between Peirce and Hegel is potentially misleading: for Hegel himself uses the second and third books of theEncyclopaedia (thePhilosophy of Nature andPhilosophy of Mind ) in just this way, trying to show how the categories he has developed in theLogic can be used to inform our inquiries into the natural and human worlds, to which they must themselves be compatible: “It is not only that philosophy must accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics”.[76] Hegel’sPhilosophy of Nature andPhilosophy of Mind can thus be read not as spurious attempts to use a priori methods to try to establish truths about the natural and human worlds that are in fact really established through the empirical sciences (as Peirce suggests at one point),[77] but rather as attempts to reflect on the categories that our inquiries into these areas employ, in order to “clarify” them[78] and make them more explicit, so that those inquiries can be made more fruitful, in a way that their empirical results will then attest to. Of course, none of this makes Hegel a straightforward empiricist, in confining knowledge to the evidence of the senses or treating that evidence as if it was somehow independent of or prior to our capacity for thought: but Peirce himself was no such empiricist either. Thus, while Peirce’s picture of Hegel as an a priori metaphysician and thus as an opponent of Secondness fits with a certain traditional interpretation,[79] we have seen how it can be argued that this does not do justice to the full story.[80]

In fact, it is perhaps symptomatic of Peirce’s tendency to read Hegel in a rather one-sided way on this issue, that in the Royce review, where he accuses Hegel of making the “capital error” of ignoring “the Outward Clash”, the text from Hegel that he cites in support of this claim does not seem to substantiate it sufficiently. The text Peirce refers to is from the Remark to §7 of theEncyclopeadia Logic , which Peirce renders as follows: “ “We must be in contact with our subject-matter,” says he [i.e. Hegel] in one place, “whether it be by means of our external senses,or, what is better , by our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness”“.[81] This is in fact a paraphrase of part of the following:

The principle ofexperience contains the infinitely important determination that, for a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himselfbe actively involvedwith it , more precisely that he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with thecertainty of his own self . He must himself be involved with it, whether only with his external senses, or with his deeper spirit, with his essential consciousness of self as well. – This is the same principle that is today called faith, immediate knowing, revelation in the [outer] world, and above all in one’sown inner [world].[82]

Aside from the fact that Peirce’s paraphrase is somewhat inaccurate (for example, there is nothing in the original corresponding to the phrase “orwhat is better ”), Peirce’s way of using this remark by Hegel also fails to appreciate its context. For, Hegel’s aim here is not to contrast experience on the one hand with some form of knowledge acquired solely by “our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness” on the other, and certainly not to claim that the latter would be “better” than the former. Rather, he is simply registering the fact that some of his contemporaries (and the language he uses strongly suggests he has F. H. Jacobi in mind) have extended “experience” to include not just the evidence of our outer senses concerning the spatio-temporal world around us, but also the evidence of our experience of ourselves as subjects as well as of God. Hegel is thus not saying that knowledge is better had without experience or “the Outward Clash”, but rather noting that his contemporaries have extended this notion of “the Outward Clash” beyond our awareness of the empirical world to our awareness of ourselves and of God, because otherwise we would feel alienated from the latter as much as without experience we would feel alienated from the former. But if this is all that Hegel is saying here, it would seem Peirce is wrong to take the passage in the way he does, as attempting to give priority to our “essential consciousness of self” as a form of non-experiential knowledge, when Hegel’s aim is to show how the concept of experience has come to beextended to knowledge of this kind, rather than being excluded from it (as many more traditional empiricists may have thought). Of course, it may be that Peirce would be critical of this extension;[83] but nonetheless the fact that Hegel here remarks upon it in the way he does in no way suggests that he was opposed to the “infinitely important determination” that “the principle ofexperience contains”, which is what Peirce wants to claim.

The Peircean might argue, however, that Peirce’s characterisation of Hegel’s method as a priori in Peirce’s sense can be shown to be justified, because Hegel’s lacks the commitment torealism that Peirce identifies with the “method of science” and which lies behind its recognition of the importance of experience in our inquiries. In a well-known passage from “The Fixation of Belief”, Peirce makes this connection clear, between the method of science, realism, and what he would later call Secondness:

To satisfy our doubts…it is necessary that a method [of inquiry] should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect… Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of reality.[84]

This then brings us to the third issue of dispute between Peirce and Hegel over Secondness: namely, the claim that Hegel is an idealist, who fails to see that experience is needed because our beliefs must be related to “something upon which our thinking has no effect”, whereas the coherentism of the dialectical method neglects to incorporate any such relation, leaving us to move from one standpoint to the next within the circle of thought.

In categorising Hegel as an idealist in this manner, it is plausible to think that Peirce was following the lead of F. E. Abbot, whose work had a major influence in taking Peirce’s thought in a realist direction.[85] In his bookScientific Theism , Abbot portrays all modern philosophy as nominalistic, and thus as idealistic in a mentalistic or subjectivist sense, so that for modern philosophy, nominalism is “its root” and idealism “its flower”;[86] and he sees Hegel as exemplifying this trend:

Hegel, the greatest of the post-Kantian Idealists, says: “Thought, by its own free act, seizes a standpoint where it exists for itself, and generates its own object;” and again: “This ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every true philosophy is Idealism.” This is the absolute sacrifice of the objective factor in human experience. Hegel sublimely disregards the distinction between Finite Thought and Infinite Thought: the latter, indeed,creates , while the formerfinds , its object. And, since human philosophy is only finite, it follows thatno true philosophy is Idealism, except the Infinite Philosophy or Self-thinking of God.[87]

It is likely that comments such as these encouraged Peirce to adopt this reading of Hegel.[88]

However, while plausibly read as statements of mentalistic idealism when taken out of context in this way, it is not clear on closer inspection that the remarks Abbot cites here can bear the interpretative weight he places upon them. The first statement might be translated more accurately as follows: “Only what we have here is the free act of thought, that puts itself at the standpoint where it is for itself and where hereby it produces and gives to itself its object”.[89] This comes in the Introduction to theEncyclopaedia Logic , where Hegel is discussing the difference between philosophy and other forms of inquiry. Other inquiries, Hegel suggests, must presuppose their objects (such as space, or numbers), but philosophy need not do so, because philosophy investigates thought and the adequacy of our categories and so produces its own object simply through the process of inquiry itself, as this already employs thought and the categories. Thus, in saying here that (in Abbot’s translation) “Thought…generates its own object”, Hegel is not making the subjective idealist claim, that the world is created by the mind, but rather saying that in theLogic , thinking is not simply taken for granted as an object for philosophy to investigate, as thinking is inherent in the process of investigation itself.

Likewise, Abbot’s second quoted statement is not best read as a declaration of subjective idealism. For, although Hegel does indeed say in theEncyclopaedia Logic that “This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every genuine philosophy isIdealism ”,[90] the context is again important here, as the corresponding passage from theScience of Logic makes clear:

The proposition that the finite is ideal [ideell ] constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being [wahrhaft Seiendes ]. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being [ein wahrhaftes Sein ], as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms arethoughts , universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality – not even the water of Thales. For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also thein-itself oressence of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves, but areposited by, arederived from, another , from water, that is they are ideal entities.[91]

When looked at in detail, it is clear that Hegel is not conceiving of idealism here in mentalistic terms: for if he was, he could hardly claim that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism”, as mentalistic idealism is a position held by few philosophers, and not by those classical philosophers directly and indirectly referred to here, such as Thales, Leucippus, Democritus and Empedocles, not to mention Plato and Aristotle – as Hegel clearly recognized.[92] A better reading of the passage is to see Hegel as offering a picture of idealism not as mentalistic, but asholistic .[93] On this account, Hegel claims that finite entities do not have “veritable, ultimate, absolute being” because they are dependent on other entities for their existence in the way that parts are dependent on other parts within a whole; and idealism consists in recognizing this relatedness between things, in a way that ordinary consciousness fails to do.[94] The idealist thus sees the world differently from the realist, not as a plurality of separate entities that are “self-subsistent or grounded in themselves”, but as parts of an interconnected totality in which these entities are dependent on their place within the whole. It turns out, then, that idealism for Hegel is primarily an ontological position, which holds that the things of ordinary experience are ideal in the sense that they have no being in their own right, and so lack the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence required to be fully real. Once again, therefore, Abbot would seem to lack adequate textual support for his account of Hegel’s idealism.

As a result of misreading Hegel in this way, Abbot failed to recognize how much Hegel’s trajectory away from Kantian idealism resembled his own; and in following Abbot here, Peirce did the same. Much like Abbot (and later Peirce), Hegel complains that for Kant “the categories are to be regarded as belonging only tous (or as ‘subjective’)”,[95] giving rise to the spectre of “things-in-themselves” lying beyond the categorial framework we impose on the world; to dispel this spectre, Hegel argues (again like Abbot and Peirce) that we must see the world as conceptually structured in itself: “Now, although the categories (e.g. unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to our thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of ob-jects themselves”.[96] Like Abbot (and Peirce), Hegel sees himself as reviving here a vital insight of classical philosophy, which the subjective idealism of modern thought has submerged: “It has most notably been only in modern times…that doubts have been raised and the distinction between the products of our thinking and what things are in themselves has been insisted on. It has been said that the In-itself of things is quite different from what we make of them. This separateness is the standpoint that has been maintained especially by the Critical Philosophy, against the conviction of the whole world previously in which the agreement between the matter [itself] and thought was taken for granted. The central concern of modern philosophy turns on this antithesis. But it is the natural belief of mankind that this antithesis has no truth”.[97] No less than Abbot and Peirce, therefore, Hegel was a realist concerning the relation between mind and world, where that relation is mediated by the conceptual structures inherent in reality, in a way that the nominalist and subjective idealist denies.

If this is so, then once again it can be argued that Peirce’s case is undermined, that Hegel naturally adopted a dialectical method that had no role for Secondness: for, this involves the assumption that Hegel was a coherentist idealist, who rejected the hypothesis that “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them”; in seeing Hegel as a realist, we do not have this reason to hold that Hegel to have neglected Secondness in this respect.

V

Thus far, therefore, we have given grounds for supposing that Peirce’s critique of Hegel on Secondness is wide of the mark, in so far as Hegel can be shown not to have held many of the views that Peirce attributes to him, and which Peirce suggests led him to neglect that category in favour of Thirdness. However, I now want to turn to two remaining issues that Peirce identifies as differentiating his view from Hegel’s – the issue of haecceity, and of indexicality – and to show that here there is a genuine difference between these two thinkers; but I want to suggest that on these issues Hegel can perhaps stand his ground in the face of Peirce’s critique, and argue that Peirce’s emphasis on Secondness in these respects is misplaced.

The doctrine of haecceity comes from Duns Scotus, and while its details are notoriously complex, it is evident in a general way why Peirce should associate it with Secondness.[98] For, as we have seen, Peirce distinguishes Secondness from Thirdness in so far as it relates to particularity, whereby the individual is differentiated from other things: “Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore, different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common”.[99] Secondness thus leads inevitably to the classical problem of individuation: how is it that individualscan be unique in this way, where any properties we attribute to them are universal and so can be shared by other individuals?:

A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine an other, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of theprinciple of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.[100]

Scotus’s solution to this problem, which Peirce favours above the others, is to introduce the idea ofhaecceity , as the unique “Thisness” of the thing that makes it an individual, and which cannot be characterised in any way, for to characterise it would make it general again: “An index does not describe the qualities of an object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, havingthisness , and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called ahecceity ”.[101]

Now, in so far as Peirce associates the doctrine of haecceity with Secondness in this way, I think it is right to see a real difference here with Hegel. This is not because, as some critics have suggested, Hegel does not recognize the status of individualsat all , and so failed to take the problem of individuation seriously;[102] it is just that he was suspicious of answers to that problem which left the solution opaque, in so far as the “Thisness” that supposedly constitutes the individuality of the particular has no determination of any kind, where for Hegel this indeterminacy means that in fact it cannot serve an individuating role, and is rather utterly general. Hegel famously makes this point when he writes as follows concerning sense-certainty, and its claim to grasp the particular thing in its sheer individuality as “This”:

It is as a universal…that weutter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: “This”, i.e. theuniversal This; or, “it is”, i.e.Being in general . Of course, we do notenvisage the universal This or Being in general, but weutter the universal, in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty wemean to say.[103]

I take this and related passages to suggest that Hegel would reject the Peircean solution to the problem of individuation that he adopts from Scotus, and this his claim that Secondness involves haecceity.

But, the Peircean might ask: what then is Hegel’s solution to the problem of individuation, if it does not involve haecceity in this way? Very briefly, as I understand it, Hegel’s solution is to argue that what constitutes the individuality of a thing is its properties, each of which it may share with other things, but where the particularcombination of these properties makes something an individual: so, while many other individuals also have properties that I possess (being of a certain height, colour, weight etc.), only I have the specificset of properties that determine me as an individual, and so make me who I am. Peirce’s conception of individuality means he would be dissatisfied with this, because he wants individuation to be something more than can be derived from the properties of the individual in this way, and so thinks that things could be different even if they were exactly alike inall qualitative respects:[104] but it is open to the Hegelian to deny this, and to argue that to say that it is the “Thisness” of each that would differentiate them is to make this differentiation wholly mysterious, for if “This” is indeterminate,how can it distinguish one thing from another?

Peirce might go on to claim, however, that where Hegel goes wrong is in failing to see that Peirce’s conception of Secondness here is vital to his view ofindexicality , which picks out the individual as a “bare this”, and not as anything general:

An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener. By a hecceity, I mean, some element of existence which, not merely by the likeness between its different apparitions, but by an inward force of identity, manifesting itself in the continuity of its apparition throughout time and space, is distinct from everything else, and is thus fit (as it can in no other way be) to receive a proper name or be indicated asthis orthat .[105]

Peirce argues therefore that in so far as “the index…designates [the subject of a proposition] without implying any characters at all”,[106] we can refer to the individual as a “this” which appears to us as an individual in the “ouward clash” of experience.

I take it that Hegel’s response to this final issue concerning Secondness reflects the previous one, and is also to be found in his discussion of sense-certainty: namely, that for indexicality to work, a description must be involved in the way the thing is picked out, otherwise what “this” refers to is indeterminate: is it (for example) the door in front of me that I am pushing, the door in the wall, the wall in the building, the building in the city, and so on – what exactly is the “this” to which my indexical refers, outside some further specification of theclass of things to which the “this” belongs?[107] Peirce writes: “We now find that, besides general terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all reasoning. One of these kinds is theindex , which like a pointing finger, exercises a real physiologicalforce over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense”,[108] and gives the example of experiencing as a “Now!” a flash of lightening. But unless the flash is conceptualised in some wayas a particular in distinction from other things (the sky against which it is set, the trees below it, and so on), how can we determine the “particular object of sense” to which the indexical is meant to refer?[109] Of course, in normal contexts, that specification is taken for granted, and so may not be articulated, making it possible to refer to something determinate by just saying “This”: but this background is important and should not be forgotten, as Peirce appears to do when he takes it that two speakers will know that “this” or “now” refers to a flash of lightening “without implying any characters at all”.[110]

However, if the Hegelian is arguing that we are incapable of referring to anything by pointing and just saying “This”, but must also categorise the individual in some general way (“This house”, “This tree” etc.), so that we must use descriptions in picking out individuals, does the Hegelian position have the implications which Peirce fears, and which he thinks Royce accepts: namely, “If the subject of discourse had to be distinguished from other things, if at all, by a general term, that is, by its peculiar characters, it would be quite true that its complete segregation [as an individual from other individuals] would require a full knowledge of its characters and would preclude ignorance”?[111] Peirce’s concern here is that the Hegelian neglects the role of indexicals altogether, and so can only use general descriptions to refer to individuals; but because any such description can never be specific enough to capture the individual (or at least would require a complete knowledge of all other individuals with which to contrast it), this would seem to put the individual out of reach.

Some interpreters of Hegel have indeed taken this to be his view;[112] but others have argued that this is one-sided,[113] in so far as Hegel is not assuming that indexicals haveno reference, but only that they cannot perform this role on their own, independent of a use within a context that helps determine what general kind the indexicals are referring to when we say “This”: so, the proper Hegelian view is that neither the indexical “This”, nor the universal description can pick out the individual on their own, but that both must operate together, where the universal serves to mark out the kind of individual to which we are referring using the indexical.

Now, it might be said that to criticise Peirce as having failed to see this is unfair, as it treats Peirce as if he thought Secondness (and hence individuality and indexicality) could be entirely independent of Thirdness (and hence generality), when (as Peirce emphasises in his Harvard lectures) he agrees with Hegel that each of these categories must involve the others: “Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by Thirdness”.[114] Peirce might therefore be expected to agree with this Hegelian view of indexicality, and only to object to the way in which Hegel takes it too far, and moves to claim from this that “Firstness andSecondness must somehow beaufgehoben ”.[115]

But, of course, we have precisely tried to show that this concern of Peirce’s is an exaggeration, and that it is possible to read Hegel in a way that shows him to have accorded just the same status to these categories as Peirce himself demanded: namely, as each requiring the others, and none as “refuted” or “refutable”. On this account, then, Hegel’s conception of the Peircean category of Secondness is close to Peirce’s own, so that on many of the issues raised by this category, Peirce and Hegel can find common cause in a way that Peirce failed to recognize, and which therefore may have surprised him.[116]

Notes

IV

At first sight, there may certainly appear to be a good deal of justice in Peirce’s specific claims regarding Hegel’s unwillingness to give Secondness its due, and Peirce’s complaints here undoubtedly fit a certain traditional way of reading Hegel as a speculative metaphysician with an extravagantly idealist and a prioristic project. However, in many respects that traditional reading has been challenged in recent years, in ways that show a side to Hegel’s thought in which a greater role for Peircean Secondness can perhaps be found.

The first issue, then, concerns how far Hegel leaves room for what Burbidge called “the brute facts of Secondness”, such as the poke in the back “that Pure Reason fails to account for”. On a traditional view, which Peirce seems to endorse, Hegel’s position is seen as being Spinozistic, ruling out possibility or contingency, and rendering everything necessary. However, as several commentators have argued recently (including Burbidge), this is a mistaken picture of Hegel’s position, for (as Hegel puts it) “Although it follows from discussion so far that contingency is only a one-sided moment of actuality, and must therefore not be confused with it, still as a form of the Idea as a whole it does deserve its due on the world of ob-jects”.[65] Here it is important to remember Hegel distinction between what is actual and what exists or what is “immediately there” (das unmittelbar Daseiende ),[66] where the actual is necessary but the existent is not, and where Hegel is quite happy to accept that (for example) the natural world is not fully “actual” in this sense, though it does of course exist. Thus, while Peirce might have been right to say that Hegel took a greater philosophical interest in actuality than in possibility and contingency, he was far from denying its reality: “It is quite correct to say that the task of science and, more precisely, of philosophy, consists generally in coming to know the necessity hidden under the semblance of contingency; but this must not be understood to mean that contingency pertains only to our subjective views and that it must therefore be set aside totally if we wish to attain the truth. Scientific endeavours which one-sidedly push in this direction will not escape the justified reproach of being an empty game and a strained pedantry”.[67]

Turning now to the second issue, of whether Hegel’s neglect of Secondness can be seen in his corresponding neglect for the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge, it is again a complex matter to decide whether Peirce is right in what he claims. Central to Peirce’s position is the way in which he sees Hegel as a typical proponent of what in “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce identified as the “a priori method”, and thus as someone who holds that our reason will lead us to a convergence on the truth; according to Peirce, Hegel therefore fails to recognize that unless there is a sufficient role for experience, this method cannot result in any stable consensus, as what is “agreeable to reason”[68] (like what is agreeable to taste) is “always more or less a matter of fashion”,[69] which depends too much on the subjective dispositions of inquirers and not enough on how things are in the world. Peirce thus sees Hegel’s dialectical approach as an attempt to reach truth in this rationalistic fashion, in the hope of showing that each limited category or standpoint can lead to the next until we attain a category or standpoint for which no limitation can be found; but he doubts the feasibility of this enterprise, claiming that not everyone will find the moves Hegel makes or the criticisms he offers “rationally compelling”, so that in the end Hegel cannot claim to reach “absolute knowledge”, as a picture of the world to which we must all consent; rather, he can only appeal to those who already think like him and share his preconceptions:

[Hegel] simply launches his boat into the current of thought and allows himself to be carried wherever the current leads. He himself calls his methoddialectic , meaning that a frank discussion of the difficulties to which any opinion spontaneously gives rise will lead to modification after modification until a tenable position is attained. This is a distinct profession of faith in the method of inclinations.[70]

Thus, rather than guiding his inquiries by the “outward clash” of experience, Peirce claims that Hegel fails to see the significance of Secondness in this respect, because he hopes that by following “that which we find ourselves inclined to believe”[71] (and thus “the method of inclinations”), we can be led to convergence, and so to truth.

Now, one difficulty in assessing Peirce’s criticism here is that he does not tell us precisely what he has in mind: Hegel’sPhenomenology , hisLogic , or theEncyclopaedia system as a whole. As regards thePhenomenology , we have already seen that commentators such as Burbidge would choose to emphasise the role of Secondness in that work, as what moves consciousness on from one standpoint to the next is an awareness of how things around us do not fit how we conceive them to be.[72] In the case of theLogic , Peirce may be correct to say that there is no role for experience as such here, as one category is seen to lead on to another, in accordance with “Hegel’s plan of evolving everything out of the abtractest conception by a dialectical procedure”;[73] but in fact Peirce allows that Hegel might be right to adopt this method here, commenting as we have seen that it is “far from being so absurd as the experientialists think”,[74] his only reservation being its ambitiousness: “[it] overlooks the weakness of individual man, who wants the strength to wield such a weapon as that”.[75] Peirce thus chooses to argue for the necessity of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness not in this dialectical manner, but by showing (in “A Guess at the Riddle”) how this triad plays a fundamental role in all the “fields of thought”, such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, physiology, biological development, and physics, as well as showing (in the later Harvard lectures) that they have a fundamental role in our phenomenology. It could be argued that by appealing to the sciences in support of his categorial theorizing in this way, Peirce is again showing a greater recognition of Secondness than Hegel, in acknowledging that the empirical nature of these sciences must play a role in warranting our speculations about the categories. But again this implied contrast between Peirce and Hegel is potentially misleading: for Hegel himself uses the second and third books of theEncyclopaedia (thePhilosophy of Nature andPhilosophy of Mind ) in just this way, trying to show how the categories he has developed in theLogic can be used to inform our inquiries into the natural and human worlds, to which they must themselves be compatible: “It is not only that philosophy must accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics”.[76] Hegel’sPhilosophy of Nature andPhilosophy of Mind can thus be read not as spurious attempts to use a priori methods to try to establish truths about the natural and human worlds that are in fact really established through the empirical sciences (as Peirce suggests at one point),[77] but rather as attempts to reflect on the categories that our inquiries into these areas employ, in order to “clarify” them[78] and make them more explicit, so that those inquiries can be made more fruitful, in a way that their empirical results will then attest to. Of course, none of this makes Hegel a straightforward empiricist, in confining knowledge to the evidence of the senses or treating that evidence as if it was somehow independent of or prior to our capacity for thought: but Peirce himself was no such empiricist either. Thus, while Peirce’s picture of Hegel as an a priori metaphysician and thus as an opponent of Secondness fits with a certain traditional interpretation,[79] we have seen how it can be argued that this does not do justice to the full story.[80]

In fact, it is perhaps symptomatic of Peirce’s tendency to read Hegel in a rather one-sided way on this issue, that in the Royce review, where he accuses Hegel of making the “capital error” of ignoring “the Outward Clash”, the text from Hegel that he cites in support of this claim does not seem to substantiate it sufficiently. The text Peirce refers to is from the Remark to §7 of theEncyclopeadia Logic , which Peirce renders as follows: “ “We must be in contact with our subject-matter,” says he [i.e. Hegel] in one place, “whether it be by means of our external senses,or, what is better , by our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness”“.[81] This is in fact a paraphrase of part of the following:

The principle ofexperience contains the infinitely important determination that, for a content to be accepted and held to be true, man must himselfbe actively involvedwith it , more precisely that he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with thecertainty of his own self . He must himself be involved with it, whether only with his external senses, or with his deeper spirit, with his essential consciousness of self as well. – This is the same principle that is today called faith, immediate knowing, revelation in the [outer] world, and above all in one’sown inner [world].[82]

Aside from the fact that Peirce’s paraphrase is somewhat inaccurate (for example, there is nothing in the original corresponding to the phrase “orwhat is better ”), Peirce’s way of using this remark by Hegel also fails to appreciate its context. For, Hegel’s aim here is not to contrast experience on the one hand with some form of knowledge acquired solely by “our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness” on the other, and certainly not to claim that the latter would be “better” than the former. Rather, he is simply registering the fact that some of his contemporaries (and the language he uses strongly suggests he has F. H. Jacobi in mind) have extended “experience” to include not just the evidence of our outer senses concerning the spatio-temporal world around us, but also the evidence of our experience of ourselves as subjects as well as of God. Hegel is thus not saying that knowledge is better had without experience or “the Outward Clash”, but rather noting that his contemporaries have extended this notion of “the Outward Clash” beyond our awareness of the empirical world to our awareness of ourselves and of God, because otherwise we would feel alienated from the latter as much as without experience we would feel alienated from the former. But if this is all that Hegel is saying here, it would seem Peirce is wrong to take the passage in the way he does, as attempting to give priority to our “essential consciousness of self” as a form of non-experiential knowledge, when Hegel’s aim is to show how the concept of experience has come to beextended to knowledge of this kind, rather than being excluded from it (as many more traditional empiricists may have thought). Of course, it may be that Peirce would be critical of this extension;[83] but nonetheless the fact that Hegel here remarks upon it in the way he does in no way suggests that he was opposed to the “infinitely important determination” that “the principle ofexperience contains”, which is what Peirce wants to claim.

The Peircean might argue, however, that Peirce’s characterisation of Hegel’s method as a priori in Peirce’s sense can be shown to be justified, because Hegel’s lacks the commitment torealism that Peirce identifies with the “method of science” and which lies behind its recognition of the importance of experience in our inquiries. In a well-known passage from “The Fixation of Belief”, Peirce makes this connection clear, between the method of science, realism, and what he would later call Secondness:

To satisfy our doubts…it is necessary that a method [of inquiry] should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect… Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of reality.[84]

This then brings us to the third issue of dispute between Peirce and Hegel over Secondness: namely, the claim that Hegel is an idealist, who fails to see that experience is needed because our beliefs must be related to “something upon which our thinking has no effect”, whereas the coherentism of the dialectical method neglects to incorporate any such relation, leaving us to move from one standpoint to the next within the circle of thought.

In categorising Hegel as an idealist in this manner, it is plausible to think that Peirce was following the lead of F. E. Abbot, whose work had a major influence in taking Peirce’s thought in a realist direction.[85] In his bookScientific Theism , Abbot portrays all modern philosophy as nominalistic, and thus as idealistic in a mentalistic or subjectivist sense, so that for modern philosophy, nominalism is “its root” and idealism “its flower”;[86] and he sees Hegel as exemplifying this trend:

Hegel, the greatest of the post-Kantian Idealists, says: “Thought, by its own free act, seizes a standpoint where it exists for itself, and generates its own object;” and again: “This ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of philosophy; and for that reason every true philosophy is Idealism.” This is the absolute sacrifice of the objective factor in human experience. Hegel sublimely disregards the distinction between Finite Thought and Infinite Thought: the latter, indeed,creates , while the formerfinds , its object. And, since human philosophy is only finite, it follows thatno true philosophy is Idealism, except the Infinite Philosophy or Self-thinking of God.[87]

It is likely that comments such as these encouraged Peirce to adopt this reading of Hegel.[88]

However, while plausibly read as statements of mentalistic idealism when taken out of context in this way, it is not clear on closer inspection that the remarks Abbot cites here can bear the interpretative weight he places upon them. The first statement might be translated more accurately as follows: “Only what we have here is the free act of thought, that puts itself at the standpoint where it is for itself and where hereby it produces and gives to itself its object”.[89] This comes in the Introduction to theEncyclopaedia Logic , where Hegel is discussing the difference between philosophy and other forms of inquiry. Other inquiries, Hegel suggests, must presuppose their objects (such as space, or numbers), but philosophy need not do so, because philosophy investigates thought and the adequacy of our categories and so produces its own object simply through the process of inquiry itself, as this already employs thought and the categories. Thus, in saying here that (in Abbot’s translation) “Thought…generates its own object”, Hegel is not making the subjective idealist claim, that the world is created by the mind, but rather saying that in theLogic , thinking is not simply taken for granted as an object for philosophy to investigate, as thinking is inherent in the process of investigation itself.

Likewise, Abbot’s second quoted statement is not best read as a declaration of subjective idealism. For, although Hegel does indeed say in theEncyclopaedia Logic that “This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that reason every genuine philosophy isIdealism ”,[90] the context is again important here, as the corresponding passage from theScience of Logic makes clear:

The proposition that the finite is ideal [ideell ] constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable being [wahrhaft Seiendes ]. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this principle is actually carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not recognize finitude as a veritable being [ein wahrhaftes Sein ], as something ultimate and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, or atoms arethoughts , universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality – not even the water of Thales. For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also thein-itself oressence of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in themselves, but areposited by, arederived from, another , from water, that is they are ideal entities.[91]

When looked at in detail, it is clear that Hegel is not conceiving of idealism here in mentalistic terms: for if he was, he could hardly claim that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism”, as mentalistic idealism is a position held by few philosophers, and not by those classical philosophers directly and indirectly referred to here, such as Thales, Leucippus, Democritus and Empedocles, not to mention Plato and Aristotle – as Hegel clearly recognized.[92] A better reading of the passage is to see Hegel as offering a picture of idealism not as mentalistic, but asholistic .[93] On this account, Hegel claims that finite entities do not have “veritable, ultimate, absolute being” because they are dependent on other entities for their existence in the way that parts are dependent on other parts within a whole; and idealism consists in recognizing this relatedness between things, in a way that ordinary consciousness fails to do.[94] The idealist thus sees the world differently from the realist, not as a plurality of separate entities that are “self-subsistent or grounded in themselves”, but as parts of an interconnected totality in which these entities are dependent on their place within the whole. It turns out, then, that idealism for Hegel is primarily an ontological position, which holds that the things of ordinary experience are ideal in the sense that they have no being in their own right, and so lack the self-sufficiency and self-subsistence required to be fully real. Once again, therefore, Abbot would seem to lack adequate textual support for his account of Hegel’s idealism.

As a result of misreading Hegel in this way, Abbot failed to recognize how much Hegel’s trajectory away from Kantian idealism resembled his own; and in following Abbot here, Peirce did the same. Much like Abbot (and later Peirce), Hegel complains that for Kant “the categories are to be regarded as belonging only tous (or as ‘subjective’)”,[95] giving rise to the spectre of “things-in-themselves” lying beyond the categorial framework we impose on the world; to dispel this spectre, Hegel argues (again like Abbot and Peirce) that we must see the world as conceptually structured in itself: “Now, although the categories (e.g. unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to our thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of ob-jects themselves”.[96] Like Abbot (and Peirce), Hegel sees himself as reviving here a vital insight of classical philosophy, which the subjective idealism of modern thought has submerged: “It has most notably been only in modern times…that doubts have been raised and the distinction between the products of our thinking and what things are in themselves has been insisted on. It has been said that the In-itself of things is quite different from what we make of them. This separateness is the standpoint that has been maintained especially by the Critical Philosophy, against the conviction of the whole world previously in which the agreement between the matter [itself] and thought was taken for granted. The central concern of modern philosophy turns on this antithesis. But it is the natural belief of mankind that this antithesis has no truth”.[97] No less than Abbot and Peirce, therefore, Hegel was a realist concerning the relation between mind and world, where that relation is mediated by the conceptual structures inherent in reality, in a way that the nominalist and subjective idealist denies.

If this is so, then once again it can be argued that Peirce’s case is undermined, that Hegel naturally adopted a dialectical method that had no role for Secondness: for, this involves the assumption that Hegel was a coherentist idealist, who rejected the hypothesis that “There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them”; in seeing Hegel as a realist, we do not have this reason to hold that Hegel to have neglected Secondness in this respect.

V

Thus far, therefore, we have given grounds for supposing that Peirce’s critique of Hegel on Secondness is wide of the mark, in so far as Hegel can be shown not to have held many of the views that Peirce attributes to him, and which Peirce suggests led him to neglect that category in favour of Thirdness. However, I now want to turn to two remaining issues that Peirce identifies as differentiating his view from Hegel’s – the issue of haecceity, and of indexicality – and to show that here there is a genuine difference between these two thinkers; but I want to suggest that on these issues Hegel can perhaps stand his ground in the face of Peirce’s critique, and argue that Peirce’s emphasis on Secondness in these respects is misplaced.

The doctrine of haecceity comes from Duns Scotus, and while its details are notoriously complex, it is evident in a general way why Peirce should associate it with Secondness.[98] For, as we have seen, Peirce distinguishes Secondness from Thirdness in so far as it relates to particularity, whereby the individual is differentiated from other things: “Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore, different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common”.[99] Secondness thus leads inevitably to the classical problem of individuation: how is it that individualscan be unique in this way, where any properties we attribute to them are universal and so can be shared by other individuals?:

A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine an other, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of theprinciple of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.[100]

Scotus’s solution to this problem, which Peirce favours above the others, is to introduce the idea ofhaecceity , as the unique “Thisness” of the thing that makes it an individual, and which cannot be characterised in any way, for to characterise it would make it general again: “An index does not describe the qualities of an object. An object, in so far as it is denoted by an index, havingthisness , and distinguishing itself from other things by its continuous identity and forcefulness, but not by any distinguishing characters, may be called ahecceity ”.[101]

Now, in so far as Peirce associates the doctrine of haecceity with Secondness in this way, I think it is right to see a real difference here with Hegel. This is not because, as some critics have suggested, Hegel does not recognize the status of individualsat all , and so failed to take the problem of individuation seriously;[102] it is just that he was suspicious of answers to that problem which left the solution opaque, in so far as the “Thisness” that supposedly constitutes the individuality of the particular has no determination of any kind, where for Hegel this indeterminacy means that in fact it cannot serve an individuating role, and is rather utterly general. Hegel famously makes this point when he writes as follows concerning sense-certainty, and its claim to grasp the particular thing in its sheer individuality as “This”:

It is as a universal…that weutter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: “This”, i.e. theuniversal This; or, “it is”, i.e.Being in general . Of course, we do notenvisage the universal This or Being in general, but weutter the universal, in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty wemean to say.[103]

I take this and related passages to suggest that Hegel would reject the Peircean solution to the problem of individuation that he adopts from Scotus, and this his claim that Secondness involves haecceity.

But, the Peircean might ask: what then is Hegel’s solution to the problem of individuation, if it does not involve haecceity in this way? Very briefly, as I understand it, Hegel’s solution is to argue that what constitutes the individuality of a thing is its properties, each of which it may share with other things, but where the particularcombination of these properties makes something an individual: so, while many other individuals also have properties that I possess (being of a certain height, colour, weight etc.), only I have the specificset of properties that determine me as an individual, and so make me who I am. Peirce’s conception of individuality means he would be dissatisfied with this, because he wants individuation to be something more than can be derived from the properties of the individual in this way, and so thinks that things could be different even if they were exactly alike inall qualitative respects:[104] but it is open to the Hegelian to deny this, and to argue that to say that it is the “Thisness” of each that would differentiate them is to make this differentiation wholly mysterious, for if “This” is indeterminate,how can it distinguish one thing from another?

Peirce might go on to claim, however, that where Hegel goes wrong is in failing to see that Peirce’s conception of Secondness here is vital to his view ofindexicality , which picks out the individual as a “bare this”, and not as anything general:

An indexical word, such as a proper noun or demonstrative or selective pronoun, has force to draw the attention of the listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener. By a hecceity, I mean, some element of existence which, not merely by the likeness between its different apparitions, but by an inward force of identity, manifesting itself in the continuity of its apparition throughout time and space, is distinct from everything else, and is thus fit (as it can in no other way be) to receive a proper name or be indicated asthis orthat .[105]

Peirce argues therefore that in so far as “the index…designates [the subject of a proposition] without implying any characters at all”,[106] we can refer to the individual as a “this” which appears to us as an individual in the “ouward clash” of experience.

I take it that Hegel’s response to this final issue concerning Secondness reflects the previous one, and is also to be found in his discussion of sense-certainty: namely, that for indexicality to work, a description must be involved in the way the thing is picked out, otherwise what “this” refers to is indeterminate: is it (for example) the door in front of me that I am pushing, the door in the wall, the wall in the building, the building in the city, and so on – what exactly is the “this” to which my indexical refers, outside some further specification of theclass of things to which the “this” belongs?[107] Peirce writes: “We now find that, besides general terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all reasoning. One of these kinds is theindex , which like a pointing finger, exercises a real physiologicalforce over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense”,[108] and gives the example of experiencing as a “Now!” a flash of lightening. But unless the flash is conceptualised in some wayas a particular in distinction from other things (the sky against which it is set, the trees below it, and so on), how can we determine the “particular object of sense” to which the indexical is meant to refer?[109] Of course, in normal contexts, that specification is taken for granted, and so may not be articulated, making it possible to refer to something determinate by just saying “This”: but this background is important and should not be forgotten, as Peirce appears to do when he takes it that two speakers will know that “this” or “now” refers to a flash of lightening “without implying any characters at all”.[110]

However, if the Hegelian is arguing that we are incapable of referring to anything by pointing and just saying “This”, but must also categorise the individual in some general way (“This house”, “This tree” etc.), so that we must use descriptions in picking out individuals, does the Hegelian position have the implications which Peirce fears, and which he thinks Royce accepts: namely, “If the subject of discourse had to be distinguished from other things, if at all, by a general term, that is, by its peculiar characters, it would be quite true that its complete segregation [as an individual from other individuals] would require a full knowledge of its characters and would preclude ignorance”?[111] Peirce’s concern here is that the Hegelian neglects the role of indexicals altogether, and so can only use general descriptions to refer to individuals; but because any such description can never be specific enough to capture the individual (or at least would require a complete knowledge of all other individuals with which to contrast it), this would seem to put the individual out of reach.

Some interpreters of Hegel have indeed taken this to be his view;[112] but others have argued that this is one-sided,[113] in so far as Hegel is not assuming that indexicals haveno reference, but only that they cannot perform this role on their own, independent of a use within a context that helps determine what general kind the indexicals are referring to when we say “This”: so, the proper Hegelian view is that neither the indexical “This”, nor the universal description can pick out the individual on their own, but that both must operate together, where the universal serves to mark out the kind of individual to which we are referring using the indexical.

Now, it might be said that to criticise Peirce as having failed to see this is unfair, as it treats Peirce as if he thought Secondness (and hence individuality and indexicality) could be entirely independent of Thirdness (and hence generality), when (as Peirce emphasises in his Harvard lectures) he agrees with Hegel that each of these categories must involve the others: “Not only does Thirdness suppose and involve the ideas of Secondness and Firstness, but never will it be possible to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that is not accompanied by Thirdness”.[114] Peirce might therefore be expected to agree with this Hegelian view of indexicality, and only to object to the way in which Hegel takes it too far, and moves to claim from this that “Firstness andSecondness must somehow beaufgehoben ”.[115]

But, of course, we have precisely tried to show that this concern of Peirce’s is an exaggeration, and that it is possible to read Hegel in a way that shows him to have accorded just the same status to these categories as Peirce himself demanded: namely, as each requiring the others, and none as “refuted” or “refutable”. On this account, then, Hegel’s conception of the Peircean category of Secondness is close to Peirce’s own, so that on many of the issues raised by this category, Peirce and Hegel can find common cause in a way that Peirce failed to recognize, and which therefore may have surprised him.[116]

Notes


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