The Argument of the Sheikh of the Congregation, the Most Venerable al-Tusi
Our discourse with respect to the occultation of the Patron of the Age pursues two pathways:
One is that we say, since (a) it is proved that there must be an Imam in every age, (b) and that it is not possible that the people, being fallible, be at any give time without a chief, (c) and that the chief must be ascertained to be infallible, (d) and it is the case that such a chief is either manifest and known or hidden and unbeknownst, (e) and likewise it is clear that all those for whom a manifest imamate is claimed, their infallibility is not ascertained, but rather the outward appearance of their actions contradict infallibility, it is inferred that the infallible imam who must exist in every age is hidden and invisible.
Likewise, taken into consideration that all those for whom infallibility is claimed, and are said to be invisible and hidden, such as the proclaimed hidden leaders of the Kisa-niyya, Nawu-siyya, Fatihiyya, the Wa-qifiyya, and others, their words are invalid, the Imamate of Ibn al-Hasan and his occultation and his guardianship (Wila-ya) is proved. This argument, relying on these premises, which are very transparent, and the fact that the truth is not outside the bounds of this Ummah, does not need take on the burden of proving his birth and explaining the reason of his occultation and proving his guardianship.
The second pathway of our argument is thus: The inquiry of the occultation of Ibn al-Hasan is secondary to proving his Imamate. Our adversary either submits to us in the question of his Imamate and inquires about the reason of his occultation, obliging us with answering him; or he does not submit to us in the question of his Imamate, in which case, to inquire about the reason of the occultation of someone whose Imamate has not been proven will be meaningless. If disputed about proving his Imamate, we prove it through our assertion as follows:
The necessity of Imamate in every condition and age as long as Divine obligations and duties fall on the shoulders of the fallible human beings is proved through forceful proofs.
ذكر الأدلة التى ذكرها شيخ الطائفة على اثبات الغيبة
قال(رحمة الله): اعلم أن لنا في الكلام في غيبة صاحب الزمان (ع) طريقين: أحدهما أن نقول: إذا ثبت وجوب الإمامة في كل حال وأن الخلق مع كونهم غير معصومين لا يجوز أن يخلو من رئيس في وقت من الاوقات وأن من شرط الرئيس أن يكون مقطوعاً على عصمته فلا يخلو ذلك الرئيس من أن يكون ظاهراً معلوماً أو غائباً مستوراً فإذا علمنا أن كل من يدعى له الإمامة ظاهراً ليس بمقطوع على عصمته بل ظاهر أفعالهم وأحوالهم ينافي العصمة ممن هو غائب من الكيسانية والناووسية والفطحية والواقفة وغيرهم قولهم باطل علمنا بذلك صحة إمامة ابن الحسن وصحة غيبته وولايته ولا نحتاج إلى تكلف الكلام في إثبات ولادته وسبب غيبته مع ثبوت ما ذكرناه ولان الحق لا يجوز خروجه عن الأمة. والطريق الثاني أن نقول: الكلام في غيبة ابن الحسن فرع على ثبوت إمامته والمخالف لنا إما أن يسلم لنا إمامته ويسأل عن سبب غيبته فنكلف جوابه أو (لا) يسلم لنا إمامته فلا معنى لسؤاله عن غيبة من لم يثبت إمامته ومتى نوزعنا في ثبوت إمامته دللنا عليها بأن نقول قد ثبت وجوب الإمامة مع بقاء التكليف على من ليس بمعصوم في جميع الأحوال والأعصار بالأدلة القاهرة
It is likewise proved that one of the conditions of the Imam is to be certain of his infallibility. On the same token, it is clear that the truth is exclusive to this Ummah. With these premises proven and clear, we find the Ummah divided into a number of beliefs. One congregation says that there is no Imam. The premise averring the necessity of Imam in every age and condition invalidates this assertion. Another group claims the Imamate of someone whose infallibility is not certain, an assertion invalidated on the grounds of our proofs with regard to the necessity of certainty about the infallibility of the Imam.
Observation testifies to the contrary of the contention of others who maintain the infallibility of their professed imams. Because the actions of these imams are apparent and their conditions violate infallibility, hence no need to take the burden of disproving a belief the contrary of which is so very evident. Entities for whom infallibility has been claimed and certain congregations have followed them, such as the Kisa-niyya who maintain the imamate of Muhammad Ibn al-Hanafiyya, the Na-wu-siyya who profess the imamate of Ja‘far Ibn Muhammad and that he has not died, and the Wa-qifa who believe that Musa- Ibn Ja‘far has not died - these beliefs are invalid for the reasons we will shortly state.
Thus, both pathways depend on the invalidation of the beliefs of these denominations in order for our purpose to be established. Likewise, the three principles - the necessity of the presence of an Imam, necessity of certainty of his infallibility, and that truth is exclusive to this Ummah - which we mentioned, must be established for this argument to stand. We will elaborate on each one of these premises in a brief manner, since their detail exists in our book on Imamate to an extent that can hardly be expanded further, whereas the purpose of this book is exclusive to the topic of occultation and no more. Allah is the One Who we seek success from for this with purpose.
The proof for the necessity of leadership is that it is a lutf and a principle that rationality testifies to its necessary validity. It is like knowing that God exists, a principle every mukallaf must be availed to. Don’t you see that it is evident that when an fallible group of people are without an awe-inspiring and venerable leader, who would stop the enemy, reprimand the criminal, seize the hand of the counterfeiter, and defend the weakling against the strong, mischief occurs, deceptions spread, debauchery increases and propriety becomes a rarity? And when they have a leader with these qualities the situation becomes the opposite, with integrity expanding and encompassing, mischief becoming uncommon and rare? This is so very obvious and any man of common sense would agree to it - rendering anyone who disputes it unworthy of conversation. We have fully responded to any imaginable query with this regard in Talkhi-s al-Sha-fi and Sharh al-Jumal, and will not lengthen the inquiry by mentioning them here.
I found one of the recent-day writers criticizing the work of al-Seyed al-Murtadha- in the question of occultation, wishfully assuming that he has discovered a line of reasoning and adorning his falsity as righteousness for someone who lacks talent and intellectuality. I would like to discuss his arguments.
وثبت أيضا أن من شرط الامام أن يكون مقطوعاً على عصمته وعلمنا أيضا أن الحق لا يخرج عن الأمة. فإذا ثبت ذلك وجدنا الأمة بين أقوال بين قائل: يقول لا إمام فما ثبت من وجوب الإمامة في كل حال يفسد قوله، وقائل يقول بامامة من ليس بمقطوع على عصمته فقوله يبطل بما دللنا عليه من وجوب القطع على عصمة الامام. ومن ادعى العصمة لبعض من يذهب إلى إمامته فالشاهد يشهد بخلاف قوله لان أفعالهم الظاهرة وأحوالهم تنافي العصمة، فلا وجه لتكلف القول فيما نعلم ضرورة خلافه، ومن ادعيت له العصمة وذهب قوم إلى إمامته كالكيسانية القائلين بإمامة محمد بن الحنفية والناووسية القائلين بإمامة جعفر بن محمد وأنه لم يمت والواقفة الذين قالوا: إن موسى بن جعفر لم يمت فقولهم باطل من وجوه سنذكرها. فصار الطريقان محتاجين إلى فساد قول هذه الفرق ليتم ما قصدناه ويفتقران إلى إثبات الاصول الثلاثة التي ذكرناها من وجوب الرئاسة، ووجوب القطع على العصمة، وأن الحق لا يخرج عن الأمة. ونحن ندل على كل واحد من هذه الاقوال بموجز من القول لان استيفاء ذلك موجود في كتبي في الإمامة على وجه لا مزيد عليه والغرض بهذا الكتاب ما يختص الغيبة دون غيرها والله الموفق لذلك بمنه. والذي يدل على وجوب الرئاسة ما ثبت من كونها لطفا في الواجبات العقلية فصارت واجبة كالمعرفة التي لا يعرى مكلف من وجوبها عليه. ألا ترى أن من المعلوم أن من ليس بمعصوم من الخلق متى خلوا من رئيس مهيب يردع المعاند ويؤدب الجاني ويأخذ على يد المتقلب ويمنع القوي من الضعيف وأمنوا ذلك، وقع الفساد وانتشر الحيل، وكثر الفساد، وقل الصلاح، ومتى كان لهم رئيس هذه صفته كان الامر بالعكس من ذلك، من شمول الصلاح وكثرته، وقلة الفساد ونـزارته والعلم بذلك ضروري لا يخفى على العقلاء فمن دفعه لا يحسن مكالمته وأجبنا عن كل ما يسأل على ذلك مستوفى في تلخيص الشافي وشرح الجمل لانطول بذكره ههنا. ووجدت لبعض المتأخرين كلاما اعترض به كلام المرتضى في الغيبة وظن أنه ظفر بطائل فموه به على من ليس له قريحة ولا بصر بوجوه النظر وأنا أتكلم عليه
He says, The discourse about occultation and criticism thereof consists of three stages:
First: We prove to the Ima-miyya that occultation involves an evil aspect (qubh), or that conferring obligations during occultation involves an evil aspect. They will be required to prove that occultation does not involve any evil aspect, because if evil is involved, occultation becomes evil, through it may carry a good aspect, just as we say in conferring a duty that is beyond one’s capacity, that it involves an evil aspect, though it may involve a good aspect by being a lutf for others.
Second: Occultation violates the argument of the necessity of Imamate in every age. Because, if the fact that the presence of a venerable and awe-inspiring leader in charge of the affairs, who leads the public away from evil, makes his presence a necessary lutf in every age and conferring of obligations without him wrong, this principle cannot stand violated in the time of occultation, since we would be away from evil in the time of occultation if we were with a leader who has these qualities. This is the proof of the necessity of such Divinely ordained leadership. However, the existence of a leader as such is not proved in the time of the occultation, nor has been proven that it is unjust to have religious obligations when he is not present. Thus, the proof stands violated.
Third is to say that according to you, the benefit of Imamate is that it leads the society away from the wrong. However, this cannot be achieved with him being hiding and therefore, his existence and nonexistence have no difference. As his hidden existence does not correspond to his necessary existence you have argued for, your argument does not lead to the necessity of his existence during occultation. Therefore, though your argument indicates your point when he exists in the condition of administering the society, it does not prove an Imam who is not running the affairs of the society, nor is an Imam who is running the affairs of the society is.
The assessment of this argument is as follows: The first segment of his argument, “We prove to the Ima-miyya that occultation involves an evil aspect,” is a mere promise he makes. It was worthy that he had explained “the evil aspect” which he desired to prove to the Ima-miyya, so it would have been possible for us to contemplate it. He has not done that and therefore, his argument is inconclusive.
If he should say in the way of inquiring, “Do you reject that occultation involves a wrong aspect?” our response would be that wrong aspects are conceivable in the context of oppression, vanity, lie, debauchery, and ignorance, and none of these things are involved here. This leads us to reject the presence of any wrong aspect.
If it should be asserted that the wrong aspect is the fact that according to you, he is always the reason for the justification of conferment of religious obligations, whereas the lutf of his administration of the affairs and the fear of his chastisement are not materialized; this a breach in the lutf deferred to the mukallaf, hence the aspect of evil; the answer to this criticism would be that we have explained in the context of the necessity of Imamate, as we referred to it, that his administration of the affairs and fear of his chastisement are not availed to the mukallafs due to their own behavior.
فقال: الكلام في الغيبة والاعتراض عليها من ثلاثة أوجه: أحدها أن نلزم الامامية ثبوت وجه قبح فيها أو في التكليف معها فيلزمهم أن يثبتوا أن الغيبة ليس فيها وجه قبح لان مع ثبوت وجه القبح تقبح الغيبة وإن ثبت فيها وجه حسن كما نقول في قبح تكليف مالا يطاق أن فيه وجه قبح وإن كان فيه وجه حسن بأن يكون لطفا لغيره. والثاني أن الغيبة تنقض طريق وجوب الإمامة في كل زمان لان كون الناس مع رئيس مهيب متصرف أبعد من القبيح لو اقتضى كونه لطفاً واجباً في كل حال وقبح التكليف مع فقده لانتقض بزمان الغيبة لأنا في زمان الغيبة نكون مع رئيس هذه سبيله أبعد من القبيح وهو دليل وجوب هذه الرئاسة، ولم يجب وجود رئيس هذه صفته في زمان الغيبة ولا قبح التكليف مع فقده، فقد وجد الدليل ولا مدلول وهذا نقض الدليل. والثالث أن يقال: إن الفائدة بالإمامة هي كونه مبعدا من القبيح على قولكم وذلك لا يحصل مع وجوده غائبا فلم ينفصل وجوده من عدمه، وإذا لم يختص وجوده غائبا بوجه الوجوب الذي ذكروه لم يقتض دليلهم وجوب وجوده مع الغيبة، فدليلكم مع أنه منتقض حيث وجد مع انبساط اليد ولم يجب انبساط اليد مع الغيبة فهو غير متعلق بوجود إمام غير منبسط اليد، ولا هو حاصل في هذه الحال. الكلام عليه أن نقول: أما الفصل الاول من قوله: "إنا نلزم الامامية أن يكون في الغيبة وجه قبح "وعيد منه محض لا يقترن به حجة فكان ينبغي أن يبين وجه القبح الذي أراد إلزامه إياهم لننظر فيه ولم يفعل فلا يتوجه وعيده وإن قال ذلك سائلا على وجه" ما أنكرتم أن يكون فيها وجه قبح " فانا نقول وجوه القبح معقولة من كون الشئ ظلما وعبئا وكذبا ومفسدة وجهلا وليس شئ من ذلك موجودا ههنا فعلمنا بذلك انتفاء وجود القبح. فان قيل: وجه القبح أنه لم يزح علة المكلف على قولكم لان انبساط يده الذي هو لطف في الحقيقة والخوف من تأديبه لم يحصل فصار ذلك إخلالاً بلطف المكلف فقبح لاجله. قلنا: قد بينا في باب وجوب الإمامة بحيث أشرنا إليه أن انبساط يده والخوف من تأديبه إنما فات المكلفين لما يرجع إليهم
Because they forced him to go into hiding by threatening him and did not empower him to run the society. Therefore, this is an evil that they have caused themselves. This is similar to a case where someone says, “Religious obligations with respect to a person who does not have the knowledge of the existence of Allah, the Exalted, is wrong, since he has not been availed to the knowledge that is lutf for him. Therefore, committing him to religious obligations is wrong.
“The same way our adversary would answer a question as such - that the infidel did that on his own, because Allah assigned ways to His cognition and gave him the capacity to attain belief, and if he did not respect that and did not attain faith, he did that on his own and this does not render his subjection to religious duties wrong - we reply that though administration of affairs by the Imam is not a blessing that the mukallafs enjoy in the time of the occultation, but that is something they caused themselves.
And should they provide the Imam with the power to run the affairs, he will appear and administer the society and his lutf will materialize. Therefore, religious duties are not wrong during his occultation, for the guilt rests in the mukallafs, and not in the Imam. We have explained similar cases in the books we referred to, and we will mention them should the need rise in the future.
As for the second segment of his argument: It is based on his own words. We do not say he did not understand what he stated, for this man is better than that, however, he desired to misguide and disguise lunacy in lucidity, by saying, “The argument for the necessity of the leadership stands violated by the occultation, since if the fact that an awe-inspiring Imam, who is in charge of the affairs makes people away from the wrong, renders his presence a necessary lutf in all ages and religious obligations without him unjust, this would be violated in the time of occultation and conferment of obligation would not be wrong in his absence. Therefore, the argument leads to a conclusion that does not exist. And this is contradiction.”
We said this is disguising lunacy in lucidity because he presupposes that we say the proof for the existence of the Imam stands in the time of occultation while there is no Imam, which is a contradiction. However, we do not say that. Rather, our proof in the time of the presence of the Imam is the very same proof in the time of his occultation, for the Imam is lutf in both conditions. We do not say that the leader does not exist in the age of occultation;
rather, we maintain that the leader exists, however, due to the behavior of the mukallafi-n he does not administer the affairs of the society, not that his administration of the society is not a lutf anymore. Rather, it is lutf as ever. And it has not materialized due to reasons not endorsed by Allah. This is similar to the following argument: “How can the knowledge of the existence of God be lutf, while the infidel does not know about God’s existence? Since the infidel is obliged with duties and he is not blessed with faith, it proves that the knowledge of God’s existence and faith is not always lutf. Because if it were, it would be self-contradictory.”
لأنهم أحوجوه إلى الاستتار بأن أخافوه ولم يمكنوه فاتوا من قبل نفوسهم وجرى ذلك مجرى أن يقول قائل: "من لم يحصل له معرفة الله تعالى، في تكليفه وجه قبح" لأنه لم يحصل ما هو لطف له من المعرفة فينبغي أن يقبح تكليفه فما يقولونه ههنا من أن الكافر أتي من قبل نفسه لان الله قد نصب له الدلالة على معرفته ومكنه من الوصول إليها. فإذا لم ينظر ولم يعرف اتي في ذلك من قبل نفسه ولم يقبح ذلك تكليفه فكذلك نقول: انبساط يد الامام وإن فات المكلف فانما اتي من قبل نفسه ولو مكنه لظهر وانبسطت يده فحصل لطفه فلم يقبح تكليفه لان الحجة عليه لا له. وقد استوفينا نظائر ذلك في الموضع الذي أشرنا إليه وسنذكر فيما بعد إذا عرض ما يحتاج إلى ذكره. وأما الكلام في الفصل الثاني فهو مبني على ألفاظه ولا نقول إنه لم يفهم ما أورده لأن الرجل كان فوق ذلك لكن أراد التلبيس والتمويه وهو قوله إن دليل وجوب الرئاسة ينتقض بحال الغيبة لأن كون الناس مع رئيس مهيب متصرف أبعد من القبيح لو اقتضى كونه لطفاً واجباً على كل حال وقبح التكليف مع فقده ينتقض في زمان الغيبة ولم يقبح التكليف مع فقده فقد وجد الدليل ولا مدلول وهذا نقض. وإنما قلنا إنه تمويه لأن ظن أنا نقول إن في حال الغيبة دليل وجوب الإمامة قائم ولا إمام فكان نقضا ولا نقول ذلك، بل دليلنا في حال وجود الامام بعينه هو دليل حال غيبته في أن في الحالين الامام لطف فذ نقول إن زمان الغيبة خلا من وجود رئيس بل عندنا أن الرئيس حاصل وإنما ارتفع انبساط يده لما يرجع إلى المكلفين على ما بيناه لا لأن انبساط يده خرج من كونه لطفا بل وجه اللطف به قائم وإنما لم يحصل لما يرجع إلى غير الله فجرى مجرى أن يقول قائل كيف يكون معرفة الله تعالى لطفاً مع أن الكافر لا يعرف الله فلما كان التكليف على الكافر قائماً والمعرفة مرتفعة دل على أن المعرفة ليست لطفا على كل حال لانها لو كانت كذلك لكان نقضاً
Our response in the query of Imamate is similar to their response in the query of faith, to wit, belief in God is lutf as ever with regard to the infidel, but he has failed to gain it because of his failure to think, which would have led him to this belief, and therefore, conferring religious duties on him is not wrong. Likewise, we say that Imamate is lutf for the mukallaf in the time of occultation; and all that God must provide in order for this Imamate to materialize, He has provided. However, his administration of the society is not materialized because of the mukallfi-n themselves. Therefore, the responses to both queries are parallel. Discourse with this regard is also detailed, as we mentioned.
And the third segment of his assertion: “The benefit of Imamate is that it takes the society away from the wrong according to you. However, this cannot be achieved with him in hiding and therefore, his existence and nonexistence have not much difference. As his hidden existence does not correspond to his necessary existence you have argued for, your argument - despite being contradicted when he is found administering the society, and administering the society is not necessary during the occultation
- does not lead to the existence of an Imam who is not running the affairs of the society, nor such an Imam exists at this time.”
We respond that the adversary has done little more than complicating his argument, as logicians say, by turning around premises and referring them to one another. Obviously, he has intended to disguise lunacy beneath lucidity, and fallacy beneath logic. Otherwise, the subject is clearer than to be ambiguous. When has the Ima-miyya said that the administration of the affairs by the Imam is not necessary during the time of occultation so it could be said your proof does not prove the necessity of the existence of an Imam who is not administering the society because this is the time of occultation? Rather, what we have enunciated time and again is that his administration of the society is necessary in all conditions, his occultation as well as his appearance.
However, in the time of his appearance he is able to do administer the society and he does that, and in the time of occultation he is unable to perform that and does not do it, because public administration does not remain obligatory anymore. We explained that the mukallafi-n are to be blamed for this, as they prohibited him, did not empower him, and took on the task themselves. We compared this to the subject of faith in the Deity time and again. Furthermore, we know that once religious duties have been conferred, Imamate is necessary because assigning him bears a lutf and he performs duties which no one else can. One has to bear in mind that empowering and assigning the right person is not in the capacity of “the senior and wise” (ahl al-hall wa al-‘aqd), especially so according to the ‘Adliyya, the category this adversary belongs to.
وجوابنا في الإمامة كجوابهم في المعرفة من أن الكافر لطفه قائم بالمعرفة وإنما فوت (على) نفسه بالتفريط في النظر المؤدي إليها فلم يقبح تكليفه فكذلك نقول: الرئاسة لطف للمكلف في حال الغيبة وما يتعلق بالله من إيجاده حاصل وإنما ارتفع تصرفه وانبساط يده لأمر يرجع إلى المكلفين فاستوى الامران والكلام في هذا المعنى مستوفى أيضا بحيث ذكرناه. وأما الكلام في الفصل الثالث من قوله إن الفائدة بالإمامة هي كونه مبعداً من القبيح على قولكم وذلك لم يحصل مع غيبته فلم ينفصل وجوده من عدمه فإذا لم يختص وجوده غائبا بوجه الوجوب الذي ذكروه لم يقتض دليلهم وجوب وجوده مع الغيبة، فدليلكم مع أنه منتقض حيث وجد مع انبساط اليد ولم يجب انبساط اليد مع الغيبة فهو غير متعلق بوجود إمام غير منبسط اليد ولا هو حاصل في هذه الحال. فانا نقول: إنه لم يفعل في هذا الفصل أكثر من تعقيد القول على طريقة المنطقيين من قلب المقدمات ورد بعضها على بعض ولا شك أنه قصد بذلك التمويه والمغالطة وإلا فالامر أوضح من أن يخفى متى قالت الامامية إن انبساط يد الامام لا يجب في حال الغيبة حتى يقول: دليلكم لا يدل على وجوب إمام غير منبسط اليد لان هذه حال الغيبة، بل الذي صرحنا دفعة بعد اخرى أن انبساط يده واجب في الحالين في حال ظهوره وحال غيبته غير أن حال ظهوره مكن منه فانبسطت يده وحال الغيبة لم يمكن فانقبضت يده لا أن انبساط يده خرج من باب الوجوب وبينا أن الحجة بذلك قائمة على المكلفين من حيث منعوه ولم يمكنوه فاتوا من قبل نفوسهم، وشبهنا ذلك بالمعرفة دفعة بعد اخرى. وأيضا فانا نعلم أن نصب الرئيس واجب بعد الشرع لما في نصبه من اللطف لتحمله القيام بما لا يقوم به غيره، ومع هذا فليس التمكين واقعا لاهل الحل والعقد من نصب من يصلح لها خاصة على مذهب أهل العدل الذين كلامنا معهم
Therefore, no one says that the necessity of appointing the leader is diminished now as his empowerment is not possible. Our answer with respect to the occultation of the Imam is the same as their answer in the incapacity of “the senior and the wise” with respect to choosing a suitable candidate for Imamate. The only difference is that we say we know this through rationality and they say it is known through the Shar‘, which is a difference that does not divide us on the issue.
Critique: When “the senior and the wise” lack the power to choose who is best for Imamate, Allah bestows other alta-f which take the place of an Imam who is in power. Therefore, religious commands remain intact and are not relinquished. Some of the Sheikhs have said that the appointment of an Imam is necessary in the Shar‘ for worldly expediencies, and it is not necessary that Allah bestows a lutf when a worldly benefit is missing.
Answer: The idea that the appointment of the Imam is for worldly expediencies is false, for if it were as such, his appointment would not have been obligatory, whereas they have no disagreement that establishing Imamate is obligatory when possible. Additionally, the many affairs which the Imam leads - such as jiha-d, overseeing the governors and judges, distributing the spoils, executing the penalties and punishments - they are religious matters that cannot be abandoned. If they were for worldly expediencies, they would not be obligatory. Therefore, his argument is not binding.
As for the theory that Allah will do something to take the place of the presence of an Imam, it is a void idea, since if it were such, it would not be required to appoint an Imam in all conditions, even when it were possible, and it would be only a matter of choice, like the kifa-yee obligations. The fact that we know that the appointment of the Imam is necessary in all conditions indicates the falsity of their assertion. Besides, either way
the logic of this reasoning encourages that when the infidel does not attain belief in Allah, He will do him a lutf that takes the place of belief in Him, which leads to the conclusion that belief in Allah is not always necessary.
Or a parallel argument would follow that because the restraint from oppression that is attained when one has faith is a worldly expediency, belief in Allah should not be necessary for it. If it should be argued that there is no alternative to belief in Allah, on the same grounds we will assert that there is no alternative to the Imam. We have explained this fully in Talkhi-s al-Sha-fi. Likewise, if they should expound that abstinence from the wrong when one has belief is a religious matter, we would assert that its analogy in the being of the Imam is the same.
Critique: Given the existence of a leader who is obeyed and runs the affairs of the society is necessary, either it is all the work of Allah to offer, or it is for Allah to create him and for us to empower him with the administration of the society, or it is required of us both to create and empower him.
ومع هذا لا يقول أحد إن وجوب نصب الرئيس سقط الآن من حيث لم يقع التمكين منه، فجوابنا في غيبة الامام جوابهم في منع أهل الحل والعقد من اختيار من يصلح لإمامة ولا فرق بينهما فإنما الخلاف بيننا أنا قلنا علمنا ذلك عقلاً وقالوا ذلك معلوم شرعاً وذلك فرق من غير موضع الجمع. فان قيل: أهل الحل والعقد إذا لم يتمكنوا من اختيار من يصلح للامامة فإن الله يفعل ما يقوم مقام ذلك من الالطاف فلا يجب إسقاط التكليف وفي الشيوخ من قال إن الامام يجب نصبه في الشرع لمصالح دنياوية وذلك غير واجب أن يفعل لها اللطف. قلنا: أما من قال نصب الامام لمصالح دنياوية قوله يفسد لانه لو كان كذلك لما وجب إمامته ولا خلاف بينهم في أنه يجب إقامة الإمامة مع الاختيار على أن ما يقوم به الامام من الجهاد وتولية الامراء والقضاء، وقسمة الفئ، واستيفاء الحدود والقصاصات امور دينية لا يجوز تركها، ولو كان لمصلحة دنياوية لما وجب ذلك فقوله ساقط بذلك. وأما من قال: يفعل الله ما يقوم مقامه باطل لأنه لو كان كذلك لما وجب عليه إقامة الإمام مطلقاً على كل حال ولكان يكون ذلك من باب التخيير كما نقول في فروض الكفايات وفي علمنا بتعيين ذلك ووجوبه على كل حال دليل على فساد ما قالوه. على أنه يلزم على الوجهين جميعاً المعرفة بأن يقال: الكافر إذا لم يحصل له المعرفة يفعل الله له ما يقوم مقامها فلا يجب عليه المعرفة على كل حال أو يقال إنما يحصل من الانـزجار عن فعل الظلم عند المعرفة أمر دنياوي لا يجب لها المعرفة فيجب من ذلك إسقاط وجوب المعرفة، ومتى قيل إنه لا بدل للمعرفة، قلنا وكذلك لا بدل للإمام، على ما مضى وذكرناه في تلخيص الشافي، وكذلك إن بينوا أن الانـزجار من القبيح عند المعرفة أمر ديني قلنا مثل ذلك في وجود الامام سواء. فان قيل: لا يخلو وجود رئيس مطاع منبسط اليد من أن يجب على الله جميع ذلك أو يجب علينا جميعه أو يجب على الله إيجاده وعلينا بسط يده
If you say all of that is necessary for Allah, your assertion will be contradicted by the time of occultation, as He has not created an Imam who is running the society. If it is required of us to do it all, it is a task that we do not have the capacity to perform, for we do not have the ability to create him. If it is required of Him to create him and for us to invest him with the power and authority of administration, then first, what is your proof? Second, it proceeds that we should be required to do something which is actually a lutf for someone else. How would it be possible that Zaid be required to empower the Imam so ‘Amr’s lutf can be materialized? Is this but a violation of principles?”
Answer: Our assertion is that since the existence of an Imam with the authority to administer the society is proved to be a lutf, due to the arguments we have established for this purpose, and as his creation is not in our power, it would not be right that we should be required to create him, for it would be assigning a duty that is beyond our capacity.
As for empowering him with administrative affairs and strengthening his scepter, many a time it is within our capacity and the capacity of Allah. However, when He does not do that, we infer that it is not necessary for Him to do so and that it is necessary for us, because he must be in charge of the affairs so the purpose of the Divinely ordained duties be materialized. We explained that should investing administrative powers be the work of Allah, the Exalted, He would compel the creation to that purpose. However, getting between him and his enemies, strengthening his command through angels, would lose the purpose of the Divinely ordained duties and would lead to compulsion. Therefore, it is our duty to empower him in every condition and should we not do that, it is something that we have done it ourselves.
As for their assertion that this amounts to procuring lutf for someone else, it is incorrect, because we say, each person who helps the Imam and strengthens his scepter, enjoys a benefit specific for himself, may it carry expediency for others as well. It is like what you say about the apostles that their carriage of the burden of Prophethood and delivery of the message to the public bears expediency for others. This requires the adversary to answer a query about “the senior and the wise” that how is it that it is obligatory upon them to choose an Imam for expediencies that encompasses the entire Ummah and is that but a requiring one to do something that benefits someone else? Whatever may be your justification with regard to the situation of the apostles is our very answer here.
If it should be inquired, “Why do you believe that he must exist in the time of occultation, and why is it not possible that he does not exist?” We will respond that we consider his existence necessary for the following: His administration of the affairs and leadership of the society, which is lutf with respect to us, is not possible without his existence. And as his creation is not in our capacity, we said it is obligatory upon Allah, or else it would mean that we are not the missing part of the cause of materialization of lutf, meaning that, missing the lutf is His work and not ours. However, if He creates him but we do not vest the power of running the society in him, it is our work, and therefore, ordainment of duties is correct. Whereas, in the previous supposition it would be incorrect.
فان قلتم يجب جميع ذلك على الله، فانه ينتقض بحال الغيبة لانه لم يوجد إمام منبسط اليد وإن وجب علينا جميعه فذلك تكليف ما لا يطاق لانا لا نقدر على إيجاده وإن وجب عليه إيجاده وعلينا بسط يده وتمكينه فما دليلكم عليه مع أن فيه أنه يجب علينا أن نفعل ما هو لطف للغير وكيف يجب على زيد بسط يد الامام ليحصل لطف عمرو، وهل ذلك إلا نقض الاصول. قلنا: الذي نقوله أن وجود الامام المنبسط اليد إذا ثبت أنه لطف لنا على ما دللنا عليه ولم يكن إيجاده في مقدورنا لم يحسن أن نكلف إيجاده لانه تكليف مالا يطاق وبسط يده وتقوية سلطانه قد يكون في مقدورنا وفي مقدور الله فإذا لم يفعل الله علمنا أنه غير واجب عليه وأنه واجب علينا لانه لابد من أن يكون منبسط اليد ليتم الغرض بالتكليف وبينا بذلك أن بسط يده لو كان من فعله تعالى لقهر الخلق عليه بالحيلولة بينه وبين أعدائه وتقوية أمره بالملائكة وبما أدى إلى سقوط الغرض بالتكليف، وحصول الالجاء، فإذا يجب علينا بسط يده على كل حال وإذا لم نفعله اتينا من قبل نفوسنا. فأما قولهم: في ذلك إيجاد اللطف علينا للغير، غير صحيح لانا نقول إن كل من يجب عليه نصرة الامام وتقوية سلطانه له في ذلك مصلحة تخصه وإن كانت فيه مصلحة ترجع إلى غيره كما تقوله في أن الانبياء يجب عليهم تحمل أعباء النبوة والاداء إلى الخلق ما هو مصلحة لهم لان لهم في القيام بذلك مصلحة تخصهم وإن كانت فيها مصلحة لغيرهم. ويلزم المخالف في أهل الحل والعقد بأن يقال: كيف يجب عليهم اختيار الامام لمصلحة ترجع إلى جميع الأمة وهل ذلك إلا إيجاب الفعل عليهم لما يرجع إلى مصلحة غيرهم فأي شئ أجابوا به فهو جوابنا بعينه سواء. فان قيل: لم زعمتم أنه يجب إيجاده في حال الغيبة وهلا جاز أن يكون معدوما. قلنا: إنما أوجبناه من حيث إن تصرفه الذي هو لطفنا إذا لم يتم إلا بعد وجوده وإيجاده لم يكن في مقدورنا قلنا عند ذلك أنه يجب على الله ذلك وإلا أدى إلى أن لا نكون مزاحي العلة بفعل اللطف فنكون اتينا من قبله تعالى لا من قبلنا وإذا أوجده ولم نمكنه من انبساط يده اتينا من قبل نفوسنا فحسن التكليف وفي الاول لم يحسن
Inquiry: What do you mean by saying that we should empower him? Do you mean that we find him and converse with him? That is not possible without him being existent. You will be told that none of that is possible without him being manifest and without us knowing, or someone of us knowing, his place. If you say, “We mean by empowering him that we should submit to his obedience, fight under his command, refrain from helping the tyrants, and rise to his support when he calls us to his Imamate and proves it to us through his miracles,” we will say to you it is possible for us to do that during the occultation, even if it is a time without an Imam. How do you say then what we have been ordained to do cannot be performed without an Imam?”
Answer: Our response here is what al-Murtadha- has mentioned in al-Dhakhi-ra and what we have mentioned in Talkhi-s al-Sha-fi. The lutf that reaches us from the Imam’s running the affairs and administering the society cannot materialize without three elements: One pertains to Allah, and that is that He creates the Imam. The second element pertains to the Imam, which is that he carries the burdens of Imamate and performs its duties. The third element pertains to us, and is to wit, to help him and support him and submit to him. The obligation of undertaking the tasks of Imamate is secondary to his existence, for a task cannot be undertaken by a nonexistent entity. Therefore, Allah’s creation of him is prior to his obligation of accepting leadership and our obligation of supporting him is secondary to these two elements because it is obligatory upon us to obey him when he exists and has undertaken to carry the burdens of Imamate and perform its tasks. With this prologue in mind, how can it be questioned that why does not he remain nonexistent? Should it be inquired, what is the difference between him being existent and hidden, and being nonexistent until Allah knows our determination to empower him and that is when He creates him; our answer will be that it is not worthy of Allah, the Exalted, to oblige us to empower someone who is nonexistent, for it is an impossible task.
Therefore, he must exist. Should it be inquired that why does not Allah create him when He knows we are determined to help him altogether in one time since He will manifest him in time as such; we will answer that the imperativeness of supporting him and determination of his obedience is required in all conditions, which requires that to support and obey and to follow his path should be possible in all conditions, or else, obliging with this duty would be wrong. The suggestion would be relevant if we were not obliged in all conditions to his obedience and submission to his command and rather it were required of us at the time of his appearance. However, the reality is contrary to this.
We address our adversary who desires to convince us of the Hujja’s nonexistence on the grounds of his occultation and ask him why is it not possible that Allah, the Exalted, enacts the obligation of believing in him as a duty without creating signs and reasons for the validation of such belief, since He knows that we will not consider such signs and reasons, and when He discovers from our condition that we intend to consider them and are determined to think, He creates the reasons and proofs of believing in Him.
فان قيل: ما الذي تريدون بتمكيننا إياه؟ أتريدون أن نقصده ونشافهه وذلك لايتم إلا مع وجوده وقيل لكم لا يصح جميع ذلك إلا مع ظهوره وعلمنا أو علم بعضنا بمكانه وإن قلتم نريد بتمكيننا أن نبخع بطاعته والشد على يده ونكف عن نصرة الظالمين ونقوم على نصرته متى دعانا إلى إمامته ودلنا عليها بمعجزته قلنا لكم: فنحن يمكننا ذلك في زمان الغيبة وإن لم يكن الامام موجودا فيه. فكيف قلتم لايتم ما كلفناه من ذلك إلا مع وجود الامام. قلنا الذي نقوله في هذا الباب ما ذكره المرتضى في الذخيرة وذكرناه في تلخيص الشافي أن الذي هو لطفنا من تصرف الامام وانبساط يده لايتم إلا بامور ثلاثة أحدها يتعلق بالله وهو إيجاده والثاني يتعلق به من تحمل أعباء الإمامة والقيام بها والثالث يتعلق بنا من العزم على نصرته، ومعاضدته، والانقياد له، فوجوب تحمله عليه فرع على وجوده لأنه لا يجوز أن يتناول التكليف المعدوم فصار إيجاد الله إياه أصلا لوجوب قيامه، وصار وجوب نصرته علينا فرعا لهذين الاصلين لانه إنما يجب علينا طاعته إذا وجد، وتحمل أعباء الإمامة وقام بها، فحينئذ يجب علينا طاعته، فمع هذا التحقيق كيف يقال: لم لا يكن معدوماً. فان قيل: فما الفرق بين أن يكون موجودا مستتراً أو معدوماً حتى إذا علم منا العزم على تمكينه أوجده قلنا: لا يحسن من الله تعالى أن يوجب علينا تمكين من ليس بموجود لانه تكليف مالا يطاق فإذا لابد من وجوده. فان قيل: يوجده الله إذا علم أنا ننطوي على تمكينه بزمان واحد كما أنه يظهر عند مثل ذلك، قلنا: وجوب تمكينه والانطواء على طاعته لازم في جميع أحوالنا فيجب أن يكون التمكين من طاعته والمصير إلى أمره ممكنا في جميع الاحوال وإلا لم يحسن التكليف وإنما كان يتم ذلك لو لم نكن مكلفين في كل حال لوجوب طاعته والانقياد لامره، بل كان يجب علينا ذلك عند ظهوره والامر بخلافه. ثم يقال لمن خالفنا في ذلك وألزمنا عدمه على استتاره: لم لا يجوز أن يكلف الله تعالى المعرفة ولا ينصب عليها دلالة إذا علم أنا لا ننظر فيها حتى إذا علم من حالنا أنا نقصد إلى النظر ونعزم على ذلك، أوجد الادلة ونصبها فحينئذ ننظر
We ask what is the difference between existent proofs and reasons, which are not considered and are not used to deduce faith from them, and nonexistent ones, which Allah will create when we decide to mull over them. And when the adversary says that creating proofs and reasons is a form of granting the capability to perform, like providing the necessary physical power and instrument for an act of obedience, without which to Allah’s requiring of a duty would be wrong;
we will respond that likewise, the existence of the Imam is a necessary component of the required capability to obey the Lord and if the Imam does not exist, we will be unable to obey Him, just as if the reasons were nonexistent, it would have been impossible for us to infer the validity of religious belief from them. So the two cases are parallel. This line of reasoning refutes all criticisms applied here, which contain answers that do not satisfy us as answers and questions of the adversary in regard to them. This argument has been fully explicated in my books, specially so in Talkhi-s al-Sha-fi; therefore, we will not prolong the discourse by going into detail here.
The adversary has analogized that if Allah had made it obligatory upon us to make ritual ablution from the water of a specific well that does not have a rope for pulling water, but He declared, “Should you approach the well, I would create a rope for you for pulling water,” this would take away any excuse we may have. And should we not approach the well, the misgiving would be our own doing, not Allah’s. Likewise, a master says to his servant who is far from him, “Buy some meat for me from the market,” and the servant replies, “I cannot do that because I do not have the money for it.” The master replies,
“If you come to me, I will give you the money.” This will eliminate the slave’s excuse and if he does not come near to take the money, it will be a misgiving caused by himself, not by his master. Same is the condition of the appearance of the Imam with regard to our duty of providing him help and power. Therefore, it is our lack of providing help and power that is the reason that he has not appeared in these conditions, not his lack of existence. Since if we had provided him help and power, he would have been created and he would have appeared.
This argument presupposes that it is our obligation to provide him help and power when he appears and it is not mandatory upon us in every condition. Even if we yield to the example he has mentioned, his argument does not stand, because if Allah, the Exalted, has ordained us to pull water right now, it is necessary that the rope be existent right now, because that is what eliminates the legitimate excuse. However, if He says, If you approach the well, I will create a rope for you, obligation is to approach, not to pull water. Therefore, the ability to approach is what is sufficient at that time, because he is not required to pull water from the well yet. It is when he approaches the well that he becomes ordained to pull water, and then it is necessary that He creates the rope for him. An analogous instance to this would be that if it were not obligatory on us in every condition to obey the Imam and empower him, in such times, his existence would not have been necessary.
ونقول ما الفرق بين دلالة منصوبة لا ينظر فيها وبين عدمها حتى إذا عزمنا على النظر فيها أوجدها الله. ومتى قالوا: نصب الادلة من جملة التمكين الذي لا يحسن التكليف من دونه كالقدرة والآلة قلنا: وكذلك وجود الامام (ع) من جملة التمكين من وجوب طاعته ومتى لم يكن موجوداً لم يمكنا طاعته كما أن الادلة إذا لم تكن موجودة لم يمكنا النظر فيها فاستوى الأمران. وبهذا التحقيق يسقط جميع ما يورد في هذا الباب من عبارات لا ترتضيها في الجواب وأسولة المخالف عليها وهذا المعنى مستوفى في كتبي وخاصة في تلخيص الشافي فلا نطول بذكره. والمثال الذي ذكره من أنه لو أوجب الله علينا أن نتوضأ من ماء بئر معينة لم يكن لها حبل يستقى به وقال لنا إن دنوتم من البئر خلقت لكم حبلا تستقون به من الماء فانه يكون مزيحا لعلتنا. ومتى لم ندن من البئر كنا قد اتينا من قبل نفوسنا لا من قبله تعالى، وكذلك لو قال السيد لعبده وهو بعيد منه: اشتر لي لحما من السوق فقال: لا أتمكن من ذلك لأنه ليس معي ثمنه، فقال: إن دنوت أعطيتك ثمنه فانه يكون مزيحا لعلته، ومتى لم يدن لاخذ الثمن يكون قد اتي من قبل نفسه لا من قبل سيده وهذه حال ظهور الامام مع تمكيننا فيجب أن يكون عدم تمكيننا هو السبب في أن لم يظهر في هذه الاحوال لا عدمه إذ كنا لو مكناه لوجد وظهر. قلنا: هذا كلام من يظن أنه يجب علينا تمكينه إذا ظهر ولا يجب علينا ذلك في كل حال، ورضينا بالمثال الذي ذكره لأنه تعالى لو أوجب علينا الاستقاء في الحال لوجب أن يكون الحبل حاصلاً في الحال لأن به تنـزاح العلة لكن إذا قال: متى دنوتم من البئر خلقت لكم الحبل إنما هو مكلف للدنو لا للاستقاء فيكفي القدرة على الدنو في هذه الحال لانه ليس بمكلف للاستقاء منها فإذا دنا من البئر صار حينئذ مكلفا للاستقاء فيجب عند ذلك أن يخلف له الحبل فنظير ذلك أن لا يجب علينا في كل حال طاعة الامام وتمكينه فلا يجب عند ذلك وجوده
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![The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]](books/0263_the_book_of_occultation/images/cover.jpg "The Book of Occultation: Kitab al-Ghaibah [Majlisi] (Bilingual Edition) [English = Arabic]")
Author: Allamah Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi
