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THE PERIOD OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

I. INTRODUCTION

The period of Christian thought extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the end of the fifteenth has come to be known as Scholasticism, a name taken from the school of philosophy of the University of Paris.

Background

Patristic philosophy reached its climax in the system of Augustine; it was the last great product of classical-Christian civilization. When the Roman empire fell, the only institution that was capable of standing for law and order was the Church. The Goths sacked Rome but respected the Church and offered it protection. The literature and culture of Greece and Rome became almost extinct; the barbarous tribes initiated the Dark Ages. The only philosophy that survived was that which filtered through the writings of the Church Fathers. From Augustine to the ninth century learning consisted of an ecclesiastical dogmatism which was spiritually lifeless and it did little better than preserve the traditions of past; Plato and Aristotle were only partially known.

Scholastic philosophy means an organized system of truths which are distinct from the dogmas of faith but not opposed to them. This separation and coordination of reason and faith is not found in all Scholastic philosophy, but only during the period of its greatest splendor achieved under Thomas Aquinas. Scholastic philosophy, then, may be divided into: The formative period, extending from the beginning of the ninth century to the middle of the thirteenth; The period of maturity, extending a little more than half a century and covering Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus; The period of decadence, extending from the death of Scotus to the end of the fifteenth century.

The Carolingian Revival of Learning

During the period of decadence, following the fall of the Roman empire, culture was restricted to ecclesiastical schools. There were of three types: Monastic schools, whose purpose was the formation of monks; Episcopal schools, whose purpose was the formation of priests, and occasionally of laymen; Parish schools, which were for the instruction of the faithful in respect to the reception of the sacraments.

It is to Charlemagne's credit to have undertaken the program for the establishment of schools. He summoned the monk Alcuin and entrusted him with the work of organizing the schools. Alcuin reformed the program of studies by establishing the divisions known as the trivium (comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). He established the "scola palatina." Other schools following the program of Alcuin were opened at Tours, Laon, Orleans and Fulda. This cultural movement had no development of any importance after the death of Charlemagne.

On the Internet Texts and Archives of Scholasticism

II. The Formative Period Of Scholastcism

The formative period of Scholasticism (the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth centuries and the first half of the thirteenth century) developed under the influence of St. Augustine's thought. During this period, because of the prejudice of illumination, it was impossible to have a complete separation of reason from faith. Both mystics and dialecticians consider the intellect as unable to reason without being enlightened by God. With the help of illumination the intellect will be able to penetrate the content of the mysteries of faith. This period can be divided as follows: The ninth and the tenth century (John Scotus Erigena and the problem of universals); The eleventh and twelfth century (mystics and dialecticians); The first half of the thirteenth century (the question concerning the works of Aristotle).

a. The Ninth and Tenth Centuries

1. John Scotus Erigena (815? - 877): Scotus Erigena wrote "De Divisione Naturae," a Neo-Platonic work. According to Erigena, Unity (God) descends into multiplicity, and multiplicity returns to Unity. The degrees of reality are the following: (1) creating, non-created Nature -- God, the Father; (2) created and creating Nature -- the Son; (3) created and non-creating Nature -- the sensible world informed by the Holy Spirit; (4) non-created and non-creating Nature -- God Himself as final cause. The first and fourth degrees coincide with God.

2. The Problem of the Universals: What is the value of concepts, which are universal, in relation to real things, which are particular? Four solutions were attempted: Transcendent realism (the Platonic solution); Immanent realism ( the Aristotelian solution); Conceptualism (the concepts are mental signs without basis in reality); Nominalism (the concepts are names, speech).

See also Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty's essay on The World of Universals.

b. The Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

At the beginning of the eleventh century the Churchmen showed a renewed interest in a better understanding of the truths of religion. The thinkers of that time are divided into mystics and dialecticians. Both feel the influence of illumination, and hence consider knowledge a gift of God. Faith is thus presupposed and is considered superior to reason. Nevertheless thinkers disagree in determining what is the contribution that reason can make to faith. The mystics see in philosophy a remnant of paganism and the danger of heresy. St. Peter Damian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines are mystics. The dialecticians, on the contrary, think that once the understanding of religious truths is required reason can be invoked to penetrate the very content of the mysteries of the faith. St. Anselm and Peter Abelard are dialecticians.

St. Anselm (picture) is well known for this ontological argument for the existence of God, as presented in the "Proslogium": The concept which everyone has of God is that of a most perfect being; Greater being cannot be conceived; Consequently, God must also really exist; otherwise He would no longer be that most perfect being, for He would lack real existence.

This argument, however, marks an illicit passage from the concept to reality. But, granted the doctrine of illumination, it would be valid. Abelard is the most complex personality of this time. He attempted to penetrate the mysteries of faith through reason, and found in St. Bernard his strongest opponent. In the question of universals, Abelard is considered a nominalist; but he possibly may not be such, as his vocabulary is not absolutely clear.

On the Internet "Proslogium" by Anselm Anselm: Philosophers' Criticisms of Anselm's Ontological Argument for the Being of God More about Peter Abelard "History of My Calamities" by Peter Abelard.

c. The First Half of the Thirteenth Century

1. The Establishing of Universities: As a consequence of the interest in studies, some ecclesiastical schools were reinvigorated and rose to great fame. This is the origin of many universities; the most celebrated of them is the University of Paris, then Oxford University. While the universities were being organized, two religious Orders -- namely, the Franciscans and Dominicans -- obtained the faculty to teach in them, and made a large contribution to the development of Scholastic philosophy.

2. The Discovery of the Works of Aristotle: The major factor in the development of Scholastic was the discovery of the works of Aristotle, which happened during the first half of the thirteenth century. These works first reached the universities through the commentaries of Jewish and Arabian philosophers.

Among the famous commentators on Aristotle in Spain were two Jewish philosophers, Avicebron (died about 1058), and Maimonides (died 1204) (picture). The Arabian physician Avicenna (picture) enjoyed greater fame. He attempted to reconciled Aristotle with the religion of Islam, and hence affirmed the immortality of the soul.

The most famous commentator was the Spanish-Arabian philosopher Averroes (1126-1198) (picture). He too was a physician and Thomas Aquinas gave him the designation "The Commentator."

Later what was called the "translatio nova" of Aristotle, made directly from the Greek, was attempted. The attitude of thinkers in regard to the works of Aristotle was threefold: Some thinkers advocated the integral acceptance of the system of Aristotle -- the most representative of this group was Siger of Brabant; Others accepted Aristotle's opinions when these were not opposed to St. Augustine -- the most representative of this group is St. Bonaventure; Yet others -- among them, Thomas Aquinas, who accepted the system of Aristotle critically -- discarded the theories of the philosopher in those points which were not in accord with Christianity.

Siger of Brabant (died about 1281) in his work "De Anima Intellectiva" holds the theory that the world is eternal, denies providence, and admits the existence of the acting intellect as something separate and the same for all men. Siger defended himself by having recourse to the principle of the double truth.

III. The Godlden Age Of Scholastic Philosophy

St. Bonaventure (1221 - 1274)

St. Bonaventure (picture) wished to theorize on the life of St. Francis, and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. Bonaventure, therefore, is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle; but his preference is for St. Augustine, in whose doctrine, as in the practical life of St. Francis, the external and the internal world speak to us of God.

Doctrine

1. Theory of Knowledge: Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: Knowledge of the particular, of sensitive objects; Knowledge of ideas, which come from illumination; Contemplation, the understanding of divine things.

2. Metaphysics: Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter has its own form, and contains the seeds of all determinations; there is corporeal matter as well as incorporeal matter. The existence of God is proved a priori (argument of St. Anselm). In every finite being there is a plurality of forms. In cosmology, Bonaventure holds that creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory; God, when He created matter, placed in it the seeds of all determinations. In psychology, Bonaventure's thesis is that the union of the soul with the body is extrinsic, because the soul is a complete substance in itself. In ethics, Bonaventure defends the priority of the will over the intellect.

On the Internet More about Bonaventure

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274)

For a more advanced & comprehensive discussion, see: The Philosophical System of Thomas Aquinas, by Maurice de Wulf.

Philosophy and Theology

Thomas Aquinas (picture) does not accept the Averroist principle of the double truth. Philosophy and theology are distinct but not opposed, and what reason shows to be true is absolutely true in theology also. Moreover, Aquinas does not accept Augustinian illumination, the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. For Aquinas the intellect is able to reach concepts through abstraction. The proper object of the human intellect is this visible world; our intellect cannot penetrate the mysteries of faith. Nevertheless, the most important religious truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are both the object of reason and the object of faith.

Theory of Knowledge

Knowledge is obtained through two stages of operations, sensitive and intellective, which are intimately related to one another. The object of sensitive knowledge is the particular thing, while the object of the intellect is the "intelligible," which is arrived at from the particular by abstraction. The intellect has three operations: abstraction, judgment and reasoning.

General Metaphysics: Aquinas accepts the general principles of Aristotle's metaphysics, in which being is a created composite of potency and act. The general principle of potency and act, applied to those beings in which it is already existent, is specified in a second principle, the principle of matter and form. The principle of individuation is "matter signed by quantity."

Theodicy

Aquinas does not admit supernatural Augustinian illumination, and hence refuses to accept any proof a priori of the existence of God (argument of St. Anselm). The arguments for the existence of God must be a posterior, and they are solidly certain. Aquinas has presented five different ways in which the intellect can prove the existence of God; each of them consists in a fact of experience, which can be justified only by the existence of the transcendent Being (God). Thus: The fact of motion induces the mind to affirm the existence of the immovable Mover; The fact of the production of a new reality demands the existence of the uncaused reality; The fact of a contingent being implies the existence of a necessary Being; The fact of the existence in things, to a greater or lesser degree, of the good, the true, and the noble, implies the existence of "absolute perfection"; The Fact of the order of the whole universe implies the necessity of an Intelligence which is the cause of this order.

Cosmology

In cosmology, Aquinas departs from the dualism of Aristotle; matter is created by God. The whole universe was created by an act of the free will of God, and what happens in the universe finds its counterpart in the wisdom of God.

The Soul: When the form in matter is the origin of immanent actions, it is called soul. Hence there is a vegetative soul, a sensitive soul, and an intellective soul. The human soul is directly created by God, and it is the true form of the body; it therefore performs both organic and inorganic activities. The intellect is an inorganic power of the individual soul. The agent intellect is not one and the same for all but is the human soul itself in so far as the soul is intellectual in nature. As such it is able to abstract the intelligibles from material conditions. Since the human soul is able to perform inorganic operations, it is immaterial, spiritual and immortal.

Ethics and Politics

In opposition to the voluntarism of St. Augustine, Aquinas upholds the primacy of the intellect over the will. Aquinas extends this law even to God; the foundation of creation is the Divine Essence, which is rational; the present order of creation has been willed by God because it was rational. All created beings must follow the natural law, and for rational beings, including man, it is the law of reason. Man is free, and he can abuse his freedom; but every abuse of freedom is an irrational act.

Aquinas

departs from Augustinianism also in his doctrine on the state; society is natural to man, and not a consequence of the original fall, as the Augustinians believed. The first step to society is the family and the end of society is the common material good of men. Civil society, therefore, must recognize another superior society, that is, the Church, to which has been entrusted the spiritual good citizens.

John Duns Scotus (1265 - 1308) "The Subtle Doctor"

John Duns Scotus (picture) is the champion of Franciscan Augustinianism. Nevertheless he abandons certain theses of the Augustinian tradition, in favor of the new contributions of Aristotelianism.

Theory of Knowledge

Scotus does not admit Augustinian illumination. He distinguishes between the "proper" object of the intellect, and the object in "state of act." The immediate object of the intellect is the quiddity (essence) abstracted from material conditions; but the "proper" object is "being as being." In regard to abstraction, Scotus holds that the phantasm (sense image) concurs as a concause in the formation of the concept.

General Metaphysics

Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, but to these two elements he gives a different interpretation. Prime matter as such can exist; moreover, matter is a constitutive element of every being, even of those of spiritual nature, such as the angels. The principle of individuation, instead of being matter, as Thomas Aquinas taught, is form, in the opinion of Scotus. The determination of the form in the act of individuation is called "haecceitas." Moreover, the concept of being is not analogical, as Aquinas held, but univocal.

Theodicy

Scotus holds, in opposition to traditional Augustianism, that there is no intuition of God. His existence must be proved and Scotus proves the existence of God first a posteriori, by the traditional argument of change. But he admits also the validity of the ontological argument of St. Anselm, to which he gives a new interpretation by introducing into it another principle; that is, that the concept of infinite being is not contradictory, and hence the infinite Being exists. For Scotus the fundamental attribute of God is His infinity.

Cosmology

In this field Scotus accepts the common doctrine of Scholastic tradition. However, according to his principle of the primacy of the will over the intellect, he holds that creation is first an act of will. In consequence of this voluntaristic doctrine, many truths which for Thomas are demonstrable with certainty, are not so for Scotus.

Psychology

In psychology Scotus admits that in every individual there is a multiplicity of forms. The human soul is a complete being in itself. The proper object of the intellect is being in its entire extension. The proof of the immortality of the human soul rests upon faith rather than upon reason. According to Scotus' principle of the primacy of the will, opposites in the field of contingency do not imply contradiction.

Ethics

Scotus reaffirms his voluntarist doctrine in his ethics; this means that God finds within His will the motives for realizing one series of possibles rather than another. The will of God does not act capriciously, however, for God's will is at the same time the most intelligent act. Thus, all that is essentially bound up with the essence of God is also essentially bound up with the divine will, as, for example, the principle of contradiction and the first three commandments of the Decalogue. What is not necessarily bound up with the Divine Essence is dependent upon the free choice of God. Scotus, with St. Augustine, affirms that virtue is an act of love which directs us to God.

Summary

Dogmas, according to Scotus, are beyond dispute; faith is basic to truth; love is the fundamental virtue; faith and love are based on the will; will is superior to the intellect. Universals exist before things, as forms in the mind of God; and after things, as abstract concepts in the human mind. Universal nature (or essence) is supplemented by individual nature and the principle of difference is individuation. General concepts (universals) finally bring us to individuals (nominals, particulars). Duns Scotus agrees with Aquinas in many points; his major difference is in his emphasis on the will, discounting the supreme importance of the intellect in Aquinas' philosophy; Scotus made the will supreme. This difference between the two concepts of the will led to the Thomist-Scotist controversy.

The positive contributions of John Duns Scotus to the Perennial Philosophy

Theory of Knowledge. Scotus distinguishes between the proper object of the intellect and its de facto object. The proper object of this faculty is "being" -- the entire field of being without restriction ("ens in quantum ens") -- through which the intellect can know immaterial essences, even without the aid of sensations. In the field of fact or in actual conditions and as a consequence of original sin, what moves the intellect is only those things that are presented to sensation ("quidditas rei sensibilis").

Metaphysics.There is a difference between Thomas Aquinas and Scotus regarding the principle of individuation. Aquinas had affirmed that the reason for the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon matter signed with quantity. Scotus does not accpet this solution, but observes that quantity is an accident, that therefore in Aquinas' system individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Thus, according to Scotus, individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. This new entitative perfection, which comes to the species (forma) and which indicates the passage from specific difference to individual determination, Scotus calls "thisness."

IV. The Decadence Of Scholastic Philosophy

During the Middle Ages there two celebrated centers of culture: the University of Paris and Oxford University. While at Paris interest in metaphysics prevailed, at Oxford there was an interest in the sciences, with empirical tendencies. This interest was to give origin to the rise of the positive sciences. But at the same time it was to be one of the motives for neglecting metaphysics and returning to the ancient position of nominalism already disproved in the more advanced teachings of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

a. Roger Bacon (1214 - 1294)

Roger Bacon (picture) was a Franciscan monk at Oxford, a student of mathematics and languages; he regarded these subjects as indispensable to theology and philosophy. Bacon wrote an important book entitled "Opus Major" which initiated the modern scientific movement. According to Bacon, there are three ways in which we acquire knowledge: authority, reason, and experience. The last is the most perfect. Bacon distinguishes a twofold experience: external perception, which brings us knowledge of the sensible world; and internal perception, by which is meant "illumination." Bacon combined Augustinian-Platonic philosophy with Arabic speculations and emphasized the need of observation.

b. William of Ockham (1300 - 1349)

For Ockham concepts do not have objective reality; they exist only in our intellect as a "term" or "sign" of the similarity of many experienced objects. The denial of concepts as a reality bears within itself the denial of metaphysics. Moreover, Ockham defends an absolute predomination of the divine will: The Principle of contradiction is under the free will of God, and, if God wished, it would be a meritorious act to hate Him. Furthermore, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are objects of faith and not of reason. Thus, when faith became weaker, these truths were denied, which is exactly what modern philosophy has done.

On the Internet More About William of Ockham

V. Philosophical and Mystical Knowledge

The proper object of philosophy is the essence of material beings, and the philosopher conceives these essences by means of abstraction from data obtained by the senses, from external objects. Any method of knowledge which bypasses sense experience and is based on intuition is not necessarily false, but it is not philosophical: it is true if based on an actual supernatural gift but it is beyond the means of natural knowledge. Therefore, all theories based on illumination are philosophically excluded because they are beyond philosophy, even though they may lead to deeper truths. Such men as St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure were so used to the supernatural method that they accepted it by mistake as a natural means of acquiring knowledge, not noticing that such method was a personal favor of God and could not be followed by the philosopher who was left to reason alone.

Conclusion

Scholastic philosophy grew step by step as a harmonious accord of reason and faith, which met on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such metaphysics does not know decadence. The decadence occurs in men, when their culture indicates a retrogression to past errors, such as Ockham did with his return to nominalism. Thus in later schools these same errors were to appear again; reason was to take the place of faith and man the place of God.

The positive contributions of Scholastic Philosophy to the Perennial Philosophy Scholastic philosophy, in its laborious ascent to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, utilized the best elements of Greek and Patristic philosophy, and succeeded in constructing a weighty metaphysics, in which a rational solution is found to the two problems at the basis of philosophy as well as theology: God and man.

Scholastic metaphysics is a harmonious accord of science and faith, between philosophy and theology, which, although treading different paths, meet on the same summit: God, the Creator of man. Such a metaphysics does not know decadence, and for this reason Scholasticism has justly been included in the "philosophia perennis," the Perennial Philosophy, the philosophy of all times and of all places.

The Philosophy of Bonaventure

I. Life and Works

Bonaventure (born Giovanni di Fidanza) (picture) was born at Bagnorea in 1221 and entered the Franciscan Order probably about the year 1243. He studied at the University of Paris, where he was a disciple of Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan master of that university; Bonaventure later succeeded his master in the chair of philosophy. He taught at the university from 1248 to 1255 and took part, along with Thomas Aquinas, in the debate against William of Saint Amour, adversary of the Mendicants.

In October of 1257 the degree of Doctor was bestowed on Bonaventure at the university. Nominated General of the Order in the same year, he left his studies to devote himself to the affairs of the Franciscans. At this time he wrote the new Constitutions of the Order and the biography of St. Francis of Assisi which helped to pacify the various Franciscan currents.

In 1273 he was named Cardinal and Bishop of Alvano. He died in Lyons in 1274 while the Council being held in that city was still in session. Bonaventure has been honored with the title "Doctor Seraphicus." His principal works are: Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; Itinerarium mentis in Deum; De reductione artium ad theologiam; and Breviloquium.

II. Doctrine: General Notions

Bonaventure is the theorist of what, in a practical way, was mirrored in the life of St. Francis of Assisi. Francis had been entirely consumed by love of God and of Christ crucified; and the sacred stigmata, visible in his body, were the manifestation of what had already been verified within the very depths of his saintly spirit. In this mystical union with God and with Christ, St. Francis had found the basis of brotherhood not only with men but also with all beings, and the human and physical world was revealed before his eyes as a sanctuary in which all things spoke to him of God.

Bonaventure wished to theorize on the life of the Poverello and to build it into a perfect system of the Christian life. For this purpose he did not borrow the teachings of the speculative rationalism of Aristotle, but looked to Augustinianism, which already boasted a long tradition in the Church. Its voluntarism, which placed love of God at the center of every activity; its theory of illumination, which made God present to the soul; its analogism, which revealed an image of God and of His attributes in each and every creature -- all of these motives which, outside all speculation, speak to us most vividly of what should be the ideal of the Christian life.

It is understood, then, why Bonaventure is not opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle, why he even accepts it in part. But his preference is for St. Augustine, and he again works out all the motives of Augustinianism, in which all things, the external and the internal world, matter and spirit, speak to us of God; following Augustine he holds that the apex of all human activity is contemplation or mystical union with God.

In brief, Bonaventure shows the Christian what kind of life he should live if he wishes to attain his destiny. This is the historical function of the mysticism of Bonaventure, which is as important in the spiritual order as the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas in the order of rational philosophy.

III. Theory of Knowledge

Bonaventure admits three degrees of knowledge: The first degree is knowledge of the particular, of the individual. For this first degree of knowledge, sensible experience, corresponding to the physical senses, is indispensable; The second degree consists in knowledge of the universal, of ideas, and of all that we acquire by reflecting upon ourselves. This knowledge does not come from abstraction as suggested by Aristotle and Aquinas, but from illumination. This illumination is for Bonaventure the result of an immediate cooperation of God. The intellect needs this cooperation or illumination in order to know the intelligible.

The third degree is the understanding of things superior to ourselves -- God. This kind of knowledge can be obtained through the eye of contemplation. "The eye of contemplation cannot function perfectly except in the state of glory, which man loses through sin and recovers through grace, faith and the understanding of the Scriptures. By these the human mind is purified, illumined, and brought to the contemplation of heavenly things. These are beyond the reach of fallen man unless he first recognizes his own defects and darknesses. But this he can only do by considering the fall of human nature." (Breviloguium, II, 12.)

IV. General Metaphysics

Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but he wanders far afield in the interpretation of both. Matter, created by God, has its proper form, distinct from all other forms or determinations which may come to it. Moreover, it contains the seeds of all these determinations (the doctrine of "rationes seminales" of St. Augustine).

Nevertheless, it is an essential constituent of every creature, even of those which are said to be incorporeal, such as human souls and angels. The matter of incorporeal substances, on account of the form which it receives, is spiritual matter ("materia spiritualis"), which expresses what is contingent and limited in every finite being. Bonaventure admits in every body a plurality of forms. Thus, besides the form which is proper to the matter, in every body there are as many forms as there are essential properties, all placed in hierarchical order; that is, the inferior forms are subordinate to the superior ones.

V. Cosmology

In his cosmology, Bonaventure does not accept the Aristotelian concepts of the eternity of the world and of matter as co-eternal with God. The world has its origin in the creative act in time; creation "ab aeterno" is contradictory. God, who has created matter, has placed in it the seeds or reasons of all the determinations which it can assume ("rationes seminales").

VI. Psychology

In psychology, Bonaventure departs from Aristotelianism not only in the fact of knowledge, as we have already seen, but also in judging the relationship between the soul and the body and between the soul and its faculties. For Bonaventure the soul is of its very nature form and matter (spiritual matter), and as a consequence is a complete substance, independent of the body. The body in turn is composed of matter and form (vegetative and sensitive form), but it aspires to being informed by the rational form. In this aspiration and coordination the unity of the individual consists.

Without doubt, the unity of the person is not as intimately welded as in Aristotelianism; but Bonaventure's teaching avoids the danger into which Aristotelianism entered with its theory of immanent form, of making the soul dependent on the body even in its destiny. Such a danger cannot exist in Bonaventure, for whom the soul is a substance complete in itself and not indissolubly united to the body.

With regard to the faculties of the soul, Bonaventure, in accord with St. Augustine, distinguishes three -- the will, the understanding and the intellective memory. For Bonaventure the faculties are expressions of one and the same soul, which is endowed with three diverse activities; between the soul and its faculties there is merely a logical distinction. In Aristotelianism the faculties are qualities of the soul and really distinct from it. Bonaventure holds that among the faculties of the soul the will has primacy over the other faculties; therefore it is necessary to love in order to understand.

This law is applied also to our knowledge of God: it is necessary to be united to God through faith and grace in order to know Him and His attributes. The process of this knowledge is described in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum. There are three grades or steps through which the soul ascends to God. The first grade is called "vestigium," which is the imprint of Himself that God has stamped on material things outside ourselves. The second grade is "imago," or the reflection of the soul upon itself, by which, seeing the threefold faculties of the soul -- will, intellect, and memory -- man discerns the image of God. The third grade is "similitudo," or the consideration of God Himself. By considering the idea of the most perfect being, we can conceive the unity of God (the ontological argument of Anselm, which Bonaventure admits as valid); and from the concept of infinite goodness we can reach the consideration of the Trinity. In "similitudo" the soul attains to mystical union, the supreme degree of love between the creature and his Creator.

Part III: From Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham

Aquinas

Thomas of Aquin -- more commonly called Thomas Aquinas, or simply Aquinas -- was born during the young manhood of Albert and died before him. Yet it seems natural for us to think of Aquinas appearing on the intellectual scene after Albert had departed. He was a pupil of Albert, and this enlightened teacher recognized his genius in early student days when fellow pupils considered Aquinas only a dreamy lad of no particular talent.

Aquinas was born between 1224 and 1226 in Roccasecca in Italy. He died March 7, 1274, while on his way to attend the Council of Lyons. Thus he lived, at most, but fifty years. Yet the accomplishments of his comparatively short lifetime were enough, one might suppose, for twenty men of twice his span of years.

If we except Aristotle, and perhaps Augustine, the history of philosophy has no name to offer that deserves to stand in the same line with that of Thomas Aquinas. It may be unfair to compare Aquinas with Aristotle, for Aristotle worked in the night of pagan antiquity while Aquinas labored in the daylight of Christianity. Perhaps it is but just to say that, in point of natural gifts, Aristotle stands alone, and that, in point of natural and supernatural gifts combined, Aquinas far surpasses Aristotle.

Aquinas produced a veritable library of valuable writings. These are remarkable for their scope, their completeness, their clarity. No taint of pride, no vain show of erudition for its own sake, soils any page he wrote. No man ever knew more thoroughly, and more sympathetically, the significant writings of all his predecessors in philosophy, theology, Scripture, and physical science. Thoroughly equipped with an easy mastery of the world's worthwhile knowledge, Aquinas brought to bear upon every question the light of his own mighty and original mind. In him the power of analysis and the power of synthesis seem equal.

Following the lead of Albert, Aquinas purified many doctrines attributed to Aristotle of their Mohammedan accretions, and he induced his friend and fellow-Dominican, William of Moerbeke, an able linguist, to make a Latin translation of Aristotle from the original Greek.

Aquinas settled the perplexing question of the distinction between philosophy and theology by justifying the principle: Sciences are distinguished one from another by their respective formal objects, and ultimately by the method or methods they use.

In the matter of universals, Aquinas offers compelling proof for the truth of the Aristotelian doctrine of Moderate Realism. He devotes full and detailed study to the basic concept or idea of being. This concept is the first idea in every order -- the order of time (chronological order), the order of knowledge (logical order), and the order of understandable reality (metaphysical order). For the very first idea or concept acquired in life (since we are born without any equipment of ideas) is the idea of some thing, that is, of some being, and the notion of some being involves, implicitly, the notion or idea of being as such.

Further, the analysis of every concept takes the mind back to the fundamental notion of being. And, finally, every reality that can be thought of as existing is necessarily understood as some thing, that is, as being. The idea of being is truly transcendental. Other transcendental ideas which extend or specially apply the idea of being are distinct from the idea of being by only a distinction of reason (i.e., logical distinction) not a real distinction. These ideas are: thing, something, reality, the one, the good, the true. Together with being, these are called "the transcendentals."

Aquinas holds the sane Aristotelian doctrine that all human knowledge takes its beginning in the action of the senses on the bodily world around us. He rejects the Augustinian theory that a special divine illumination is required for certain kinds of knowledge -- such as knowledge of first principles, or knowledge of spiritual realities. Our natural knowledge, says Aquinas, is due to the fact that the mind is equipped with a power of abstraction which it employs first upon the findings of the senses, and then upon ideas themselves for their further refinement or elaboration.

Thus the mind arises from the physical order, through the mathematical order, to the metaphysical order of concepts or ideas. Thus there are three grades of abstraction. These are truly grades or degrees; they are not merely kinds; they are like steps in one stairway. Aquinas takes the three grades of abstraction as the basis for the general classification of sciences.

In point of physical philosophy, Aquinas holds with Aristotle that all physical being (that is, all being subject to change) is compounded of actuality and potentiality (actus et potentia). Further, all bodily being (all ens mobile) is composed of matter and form, and, fundamentally, of prime matter and substantial form. Aquinas teaches that, at any given moment, only one substantial form can in-form or actualize the same prime matter; in this point, he differs from the view (Scotistic and Franciscan) of those philosophers who defend the "plurality-of-substantial-forms theory." Spiritual substances are pure forms.

The principle of specification, by which one essential kind of substance is distinguished from every other kind, is substantial form. The principle of individuation, by which individual substances of the same species or kind are distinguished from one another, is in-formed prime matter as quantified.

Aquinas holds that the human soul is, in each man, the substantial form of the living body. The soul does not exist before its union with the body. At one and the same instant each soul is created and infused (i.e., substantially united with the body) by God.

Aquinas rejects the Arabian doctrine of a separate and common intellect serving all men, and offers proofs for the existence of intellect as a faculty of each human individual. He shows that man has freewill, that is, that the human will is endowed with the freedom of choice of means to the necessary (and not free) ultimate end, the Supreme Good.

In point of metaphysical philosophy, Aquinas treats of being in itself, of being as it is in the mind (that is, truth and certitude). He asserts a real distinction (not merely a rational or logical distinction) between the essence and the existence of an existing creature. He extends Aristotle's doctrine of causes, and deals most profoundly with the effecting or efficient cause, and with its subsidiary, the instrumental cause.

He shows that God is First Effecting Cause, that the divine "effectingness," as act and as power, is identified with the Divine Substance. In creatures "effectingness" (or efficiency) as act and power is something really distinct from their substance; it is something they have, not something which they are; hence, faculties are things really distinct from the creatural substance which possesses and exercises them.

Aquinas shows that God, the Necessary and Self-Subsistent First Being, is the Effecting, the Final, and the Exemplar Cause of all perfection, that is, of all positive being. He shows how God concurs with creatures in their connatural activities, and he maintains that the divine concurrence is not only simultaneous with the actions of creations, but antecedent to such action; yet such antecedent concurrence (called physical premotion) in no wise destroys the nature of the acting creature; even if the creature be free, its freedom is not destroyed or in any sense hindered, for "God moves every being in a manner consonant with its nature."

In point of moral philosophy or ethics, Aquinas shows that man, in every human act (that is in every thought, word, deed, or omission which is done knowingly and freely), tends towards the Supreme Good, the possession of which will constitute man in the state of perfect beatitude. Even the sinner, perversely choosing evil, chooses it under the guise of good, that is, of something that will satisfy. Man is made for God and endless perfect happiness. This end cannot be achieved perfectly this side of heaven, but it can be approximated here on earth by living for God, by knowing, loving, serving God.

Since God has made man for Himself and happiness, He has a plan, an arrangement, a law which man must follow to attain His end. In other words, the Divine Reason (that is, God as Intellect and Will) has established the law which directs all things to their last goal or end. This law is The Eternal Law. Man, when he comes to the use and practice of his mental powers, inevitably becomes aware of "an order in things" which he must not disturb but must conserve; man's awareness of The Eternal Law is "the natural law." And man, in all his human acts, inevitably sees them in their relation to the natural law, and mentally pronounces upon their agreement or disagreement with the natural law. Such a pronouncement is called a judgment of conscience. And thus we notice that the norm of morality is The Eternal Law as applied by conscience.

Aquinas has been called, and with justice, the prince of philosophers and of theologians. His works merit the earnest study of every thoughtful mind.

Scotus

John Duns Scotus (1266/74-1308), a member of the Franciscan Order, was a philosopher of extraordinary gifts and of wondrous accomplishment. He studied at Oxford, and later taught there and at the University of Paris. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle and on other philosophers, and he produced a notable treatise on theology.

He also wrote Quaestiones Quodlibetales, a discussion of a variety of questions. Many other works are attributed to Scotus. The scholarly researches of the Franciscan Friars in our own day have shown beyond doubt or question that some of these works are spurious, and that some theories long attributed to Scotus are not truly his.

Scotus is known as "the Subtle Doctor." He had a mind of marvelous acuteness, and an untiring zeal for intricacies of discussion in which none but the keenest and most devoted students could keep pace with him. In some points he disagrees with Thomas Aquinas. For instance, he has small reliance on the unaided human reason as the basis of certitude, and requires Faith and Revelation for the solution of some problems of philosophy.

He does not agree with Aquinas in point of "the principle of individuation" which he holds to be, not quantified matter, but a positive reality added to a being fully constituted in its specific nature; he calls this positive individuating reality by the name of haecceitas, which might be clumsily translated as the "thisness" of the being in question.

Again, Scotus teaches that in a created being there is not a real distinction between existence and essence, nor is there merely a rational or logical distinction; the distinction in this instance is an actual formal distinction arising from the nature of the reality in which the distinction is found. This distinction (usually called "the Scotistic formal distinction") is, therefore, something less than real distinction, and something more than logical distinction.

Again, in point of universals, Scotus accepts Moderate Realism, but his expression is involved, and some critics interpret him in such wise as to make him an Ultra-Realist.

Again, Scotus defends the "plurality-of-forms-theory"; he holds that in man, in addition to the spiritual soul which is the substantial form of living man, there is a substantial body-form or "a form of corporeity."

Scotus holds that man is not moved, in his freewill acts, by the ultimate practical judgment of the mind (the ultimum judicium practicum), but that this judgment is only a condition requisite for the will's uninfluenced action.

Scotus holds with unwavering certitude to the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, yet he teaches that is immortality is proved by an appeal to Revelation, and not by unaided reason.

A man of the highest gifts, Scotus has had, and has today, a mighty influence among Scholastic philosophers. He was the great luminary of the Franciscans as Aquinas was the light and oracle of the Dominicans. The Thomist and the Scotist schools are in lively existence at the present time, especially in the realm of speculative theology.

Ockham

William of Ockham was a notable Franciscan philosopher of the 14th century. He was born about 1280 and died in 1348. The name by which this philosopher is most commonly known is that of his home town, Ockham or Ockam, of Surrey in England.

William was of impulsive and even stormy temperament, and his life was not without troubles. He wrote commentaries on the philosophy of Aristotle, on the famous "Sentences" (that is, doctrines) of Peter the Lombard, and on the writings of Porphyry.

His contemporaries hailed William as "the Venerable Inceptor" of a theory of knowledge called Terminism. But this was really no new theory; it was merely Nominalism in a new dress and with a new name.

William of Ockham is memorable for one valuable rule for philosophers, Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, which, translated literally, means, "Things are not to be multiplied without need"; the force of the rule might be given in this fashion, "Explanations are to be made in the simplest and most direct fashion which the facts allow, without needless complications and distinctions." This dictum came to be known as "Ockham's Razor," for it was formulated to cut away wasted verbiage and needless involvement of reasoning.

It is a good rule, but William himself used it without nice discernment of when "multiplication of things" is actually necessary. He sometimes used the "razor," not only to remove extraneous matters, but to level off the features of his subject. Like all impatient men who want to make complicated matters simple, he sometimes turned simplification into falsification.

This note of impatience, this eagerness to make the deepest and most complicated questions as simple as A-B-C, was -- as is always the case when it appears in the works of men of influence -- a sign of decadence in philosophy. For any impatience with multitudinous detail indicates a loss of the philosophic temper which must be tirelessly patient.

Ockham is the symbol and mark of a turning-point in philosophy. He is the last great figure in the age of perfection; some make him the first great figure in the age of transition, even when they try to hide the fact that the transition was also a retrogression. The cord of strong philosophic thought which had begun to fray under the friction of Thomistic-Scotistic argument, snapped asunder under the impatient dicta of William of Ockham. It was literally cut by "Ockham's Razor."

The Period of Evangelization

I. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Christianity is essentially religion; that is the basis of its distinction from philosophy. Philosophy is the work of rational speculation. It is reason which, starting from a few rational principles, tries to solve the supreme metaphysical problems regarding God, the world and man.

Religion does not demonstrate, but affirms. It presents itself as a proposition of wisdom, as a positive assertion expressed in the form of dogma, and does not appeal to the intellect but to the will, whose assent it requests. Religion does not require the affirmation of the will on the basis of the intrinsic rationality which appears to the intellect but because of extrinsic motives -- that is, the authority presenting the assertion.

Religion, therefore, is distinguished from philosophy in that the former works on the will, the latter on the intellect. And the assent of the will, which in philosophy is justified only by reason, in religion is justified by authority.

Although Christianity does not present itself as a philosophy, it presupposes a specific conception of the world and life, so that its dogmas include, on religious grounds, the solution of the greatest metaphysical problems that range from God to matter.

Moreover, while Christianity is distinct from philosophy, it does not follow that the two are opposed; in fact, the indirect solution which religion gives to paramount questions in metaphysics is to be maintained as valid help to reason in its speculations. Christianity has truly integrated philosophy.

Greek philosophy failed to resolve the problem of the origin of matter and that of the presence of evil. Christianity solved the first question by introducing the concept of creation: matter does not exist from eternity, but is created by God as is the whole universe.

Christianity solved also the question of the presence of evil through the mysteries of the first fall of man, of the Incarnation and the Redemption. The doctrine of the first fall teaches that the first begotten man was not only exempt from physical and moral evil, but was elevated to a supernatural order with an abundant equipment of preternatural gifts. But because of the sin of pride committed by the first man, mankind was subjected to physical and moral evil.

The mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption teach that the Word of God became flesh and died upon the cross not only to pay the debt of sin contracted by mankind, but also to give God the complete satisfaction and glory of which He is worthy.

Physical and moral evil still remain after the sacrifice of the cross, because everyone by suffering may take part in this sacrifice and give to God expiation for sin, and the glory of which He is worthy.

Thus, Christianity claims to have solved the problems which human reason is unable to solve by itself. This is the backdrop for an understanding of medieval philosophy.

The Period Of Patristic Philosophy

The Patristic Period extends from the second century through the eighth century. The numerous writers of this age are called Church Fathers because they are sure guides in the interpretation of Christian truths.

The Fathers of the Church were also philosophers, but with the exception of St. Augustine, not one of them was overly preoccupied with philosophy. Hence the Patristic Age may be divided into three periods: Pre-Augustinian Augustinian Post-Augustinian.

I. THE PRE-AUGUSTINIAN PERIOD

This period includes the second and the third century, and the first half of the fourth century.

Second Century

The Church Fathers of the second century are classified as apologists and controversialists. By apologists are meant writers who proposed the truth of Christianity and defended them against the calumnious reports of pagans. Such are Aristides of Athens, Athenagoras, Minucius Felix, and Justin Martyr. Justin Martyr tried to prove that everything that is true and great in Greek philosophy is Christian. Other writers are called controversialists because they tried to refute the various heresies which appeared in the second century. Among these heresies the most important was Gnosticism which, although presented in different forms, is always basically the same in the attempt to empty religion of its supernatural content and to reduce the dogmas of Christianity to physical events.

Third Century

The third century is important because of the Christian School of Alexandria (the Didascalion) and also because of great apologies by writers of Western Africa. The Didascalion was founded by Pantaenus to prepare neophytes to receive baptism. But because of the attacks of the Neo-Platonic philosophers, who taught in the same city, the Didascalion became the seat of a hotly philosophical culture.

The most representative thinkers are: Clement of Alexandria (c.150-220 A.D.), who tried to show how Greek philosophy contributed to making the Christian more convinced of the truths of religion; Origin (c. 185-254 A.D.), a voluminous writer, considered to be the first systematizer of theology, who enjoyed a very wide fame; but because of latent errors about the creation of the world, the human soul, and the nature of evil, his fame gradually declined.

The Latin Apologists

The Fathers of Latin Africa, concentrated in Carthage, had a predilection for practical problems. Their attitude toward philosophy is not only one of negligence, but at times is even hostile, since they see in philosophy the danger of heresy. The most outstanding of them is Tertullian: The Gospel and the Academy have nothing in common; truth is given to us by the former, while the latter loses itself in empty rationalizations.

The First Half of the Fourth Century

During the first half of the fourth century there were many heresies regarding the divinity of Christ. In defense of Catholic truth, there arose a numerous host of Fathers, among them St. Athanasius, St. Cyril, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil and many others. It is the function of Church history to expose the various heresies and to justify their condemnation. According to Church authorities, in the matter of the heresies the authority of the Fathers is very great. In regard to philosophy, we may say that the Fathers were concerned with it only occasionally.

II. The Augustian Period: Reason and Faith

St. Augustine (354 - 430)

The basic characteristic of Augustine's thought is that man needs reason and faith to find truth. Augustine (picture) was led to this conclusion by his personal experience. Another basic characteristic consists in his "interiority." Augustine never ceases to look inside his soul; for in the soul he finds the fundamental principles of knowledge. How do we reach these principles? Illumination is the answer of Augustine. The human soul sees the intelligibles in a certain incorporeal light as the corporeal eye sees material objects in a corporeal light.

Augustine's Doctrines

Augustine even after his conversion to Catholic Christianity remained a Platonist. This adherence does not signify mere acceptance; but, just as Thomas Aquinas presented the doctrine of Aristotle as the rational basis of religion, so Augustine established the teaching of Plato and the Platonists. Philosophy is considered by Augustine as the science for the solution of the problem of life; hence he is more concerned with religious and moral problems than with those of pure speculation.

Theory of Knowledge

For Augustine the question of knowledge involves two problems: one regarding the existence of the subject, the other regarding the origin of concepts. He resolves the first question with the famous argument: "If I doubt, I exist"; he resolves the second by appealing to illumination, i.e., the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. Augustine, as a Platonist, underrates sense knowledge. More about St. Augustine's Illumination.

Metaphysics

God: The existence of God is proved: (1) a priori, by the presence of eternal truths, which take their origin from the Eternal and Necessary Being; (2) a posteriori, by the imperfection and change of beings, a fact which presupposes a perfect and unchangeable being. Regarding the nature of God, Augustine holds that God is being, knowledge and love, the three attributes which are revealed also in every created being.

Cosmology

The world was created by God from nothing. With regard to the manner in which creation was effected, Augustine is inclined ti admit that in the beginning there were created a few species of beings, which, by virtue of the rationes seminales, gave origin to the other species down to the present state of the world. For Augustine "time" is founded in movement, and its reality is in the intellective memory.

Psychology

Augustine, as a Platonist, considers the union of the soul with the body rather extrinsic. Regarding the origin of the soul, he hesitated between creationism and traducianism, but inclined toward the latter for controversial reasons. The faculties of the soul are three: memory, intellect and will; the will is free and superior to the intellect. Along with the question of liberty, there is the problem of the presence of evil. For Augustine, evil is essentially a "privation"; the privation of a due physical perfection makes physical evil, and the privation of moral perfection makes moral evil. The cause of moral evil is neither God nor matter, but the free will, which as such is able to deviate from the right order. Suffering, whether physical or moral, is the consequence of evil.

Liberty and Grace

Augustine sustained a long debate against Pelagianism. Pelagius held that human nature has not been corrupted by original sin and therefore is able of itself to attain the supernatural perfection due to it. Against this heresy, Augustine defended the absolute necessity of grace in order to attain the perfection due to man. How the efficacy of grace is to be reconciled with liberty is a question which disturbed the mind of Augustine, who at times neglected liberty to uphold the necessity and efficacy of grace.

Ethics

Besides what has been said of free will and moral evil, it must be noted that Augustine holds the primacy of the will over the intellect. Every good work is an action of love.

Politics: "The City of God"

"The City of God" is a philosophical classic by which Augustine shows the history of good and evil working among mankind as a consequence of original sin and the Redemption through Jesus Christ. He wrote it while the Roman empire was falling into ruin under the barbarian invasions and the Church was rising from the imperial remains. In The Radical Academy Bookstore Books by and about St. Augustine On the Internet "Confessions" by St. Augustine "City of God" by St. Augustine

The positive contributions of St. Augustine to the Perennial Philosophy

St. Augustine affirms that the world was created by God from nothing, through a free act of His will. Time is a being of reason ("rens rationis") with a foundation in things which through becoming offer to the mind the concept of time as past, present, and future. Augustine affirms the absolute unity and the spirituality of the human soul. In regard to the nature of the soul he affirms that the soul is simple and immortal. Then sensitive soul, besides having the five senses, is endowed also with a sensitive cognition which is common to animals and which judges the proper object of each of the senses. The intellective soul has three functions: being, understanding, and loving, corresponding to three faculties: intellective memory, intelligence, and will. The primary among these three faculties is given to the will, which in man signifies love. The will of man is free.

Three kinds of evil can be distinguished: metaphysical, physical, and moral, and each of them consists in a deficiency in being, a descent toward non-being. Metaphysical evil is the lack of a perfection not due to a given nature and hence is not actually an evil. Under this aspect, all creatures are evil because they fall short of full perfection, which is God alone. Physical evil consists in the privation of a perfection due to nature, e.g., blindness is the privation of sight in a being which ought to have sight according to the exigencies of its nature. The only true evil is moral evil; sin, an action contrary to the will of God.

The cause of moral evil is not God, who is infinite holiness, nor is it matter, as the Platonists would have it, for matter is a creature of God and hence good. Neither is the will as a faculty of the soul evil, for it too has been created by God. The cause of moral evil is the faculty of free will, by which man is able to deviate from the right order, to oppose himself to the will of God. Such opposition gives moral evil reality -- negative, metaphysical reality in the sense of decadence of the order established by God, and hence decadence of being or descent toward non-being. Sin, from the very fact it is decadence of being, carries in itself its own punishment. By sinning man injures himself in his being, for he falls from what he ought to be. As a result of this fall there exist the sufferings which he must bear, such as remorse in the present life.

III. The Post-Augustian Period

The period which runs from the death of Augustine to the beginning of the ninth century is of no special interest in philosophy. The cause of this decadence can be summed up thus: The fall of the Roman empire and the consequent barbarian domination; The engagement of the Church in the works of the apostolate and charity and not in the field of speculation. Nevertheless, several men are worthy of mention: Severinus Boethius, who wrote commentaries on some works of Aristotle, which were widely used as textbooks during the Middle Ages; Cassiodorus, who worked unsuccessfully for the unification of the barbarians and Latins; Above all, St. Benedict of Nursia, the founder of monasticism in Western Europe.

The Order of St. Benedict spread throughout Europe and helped immensely to save Western culture from complete destruction.