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The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas

For a more advanced & comprehensive discussion, see: The Philosophical System of Thomas Aquinas, by Maurice de Wulf

I. The Life of Thomas Aquinas --1225-1274

The "Angelic Doctor" Thomas Aquinas (picture), born of a noble family in Rocca Secca, near Aquino in 1225, was to complete the magnificent synthesis of Scholasticism. As a very young boy, he went to Monte Cassino, the celebrated Benedictine monastery which at the time was headed by one of his uncles. He displayed such brilliance that the monks advised his father to send him to the University of Naples, where he could receive a more advanced education. While in Naples, he entered the Dominican Order. His mother, far from favorable to this move, hastened to Naples; but the Dominicans, fearing her opposition, had already send Thomas to Rome in the hope that he would eventually be able to reach Paris or Cologne.

His brothers captured him on the road and held him prisoner in the fortress of San Giovanni at Rocca Secca, where he remained almost two years while his family tried to dissuade him from following his vocation.

Finally released, he was sent to Rome, then to Paris and Cologne where he studied in the school of Albertus Magnus. There he was introduced to the study of Aristotelianism and completed his theological studies. In 1252, Thomas Aquinas was sent to Paris to further his studies and then to teach, which he continued to do until 1260. In that year he returned to the Roman province of his Order, where he was given various offices of administration and education in the province.

In 1269 he was again in Paris, where he carried on the controversy against the Averroism of Siger of Brabant. In 1272 he went to Naples to assume the chair of theology at the university there. At the beginning of 1274 he set out with a companion for the Council of Lyons, but died en route, at the Cistercian monastery of Fossa Nuova near Terracina, on March 7, at the early age of forty-nine. He was proclaimed a saint by the Church, and by posterity has been acclaimed as the Angelic Doctor.

II. The Works of Thomas Aquinas

The works of Thomas Aquinas may be conveniently divided into four groups:

1. COMMENTARIES on the Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics of Aristotle; on the Scriptures; on Dionysius the Areopagite; on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard.

2. SUMMAE The Summa contra Gentiles (A Summary Against the Gentiles), founded substantially on rational demonstration; The Summa Theologica (A Summary of Theology), begun in 1265, and remaining incomplete because of Thomas' early death.

3. QUESTIONS Quaestiones Disputatae (Disputed Questions): De Veritate (On Truth), De Anima (On the Soul), De Potentia (On Power), De Malo (On Evil), etc.; Quaestiones Quodlibetales (Questions About Any Subject).

4. OPUSCULA (selected examples) De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence); De Unitate Intellectus (On the Unity of the Intellect), written against the Averroists; De Regimine Principum (On the Rule of Princes).

III. An Introduction to His Doctrine

Thomas Aquinas was the first to recognize the fact that Aristotelian intellectualism would be of great help for the study of philosophy as well as theology. But the introduction of Aristotle's works involved the solution of the disputed question of the relationship between philosophy and theology.

At the time of Aquinas, besides the Averroist theory of the double truth, by virtue of which philosophy and theology were not only separate but opposed, there was also Augustinianism, which was largely accepted in the School and held that no real distinction between philosophy and theology was possible.

This confusion between philosophy and theology was a necessary consequence of the theory of illumination, according to which the human intellect was considered incapable of abstracting intelligibles from the data of experience, but rather received them from the Divine Teacher. This Teacher communicated to the intellect the intelligibles regarding the material things of the surrounding world as well as those concerning the invisible and supernatural world. Thus the human intellect was capable of understanding not only material things but also the mysteries of religion. Hence no distinction between philosophy and theology was possible.

Thomas Aquinas sharply opposed both Averroism and Augustinianism. He did not accept the theory of the double truth, not only because of its irreligious consequences regarding the mortality of the human soul, but because he was convinced of the falsity of such a theory.

For Aquinas, what reason shows to be true is absolutely true, so that the opposite is absolutely false and impossible.1 If religion, therefore, teaches something that is opposed to reason, as the Averroists maintained it does, it would teach what is absolutely false and impossible.

Two contradictory truths cannot be admitted; truth is one, either in the field of reason or of religion. The two fields are separate but not opposed. There are religious truths -- such as the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation -- which the human intellect cannot penetrate; and these truths must accepted on the authority of revelation.

Parallel to them, there are natural truths concerning this visible world which are intelligible to the human mind and are the object of philosophy and science.

To the question whether there also some truths which at the same time are revealed and open to rational demonstration, Aquinas answers yes. Such truths are the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul, which are demonstrable by reason. God revealed them, however, in order to make these truths accessible to the minds of those who cannot attain philosophical investigation.2

But Aquinas also opposed Augustinian illumination. Granting that the human soul is intellectual by nature, he maintains that the human intellect by its natural power is able to draw the intelligibles from material objects. Besides its own natural power, the human intellect does not need any special divine assistance in abstracting the intelligibles from the data of experience.

Indeed, if Aristotle, a pagan philosopher, could establish a systematic and rational interpretation of the visible world, we must admit that the human intellect has the power of knowing some fundamental principles and is capable of drawing therefrom a perfect science without divine assistance.

Moreover, since with Aristotle we know what rational demonstration means, we can see how vain is the assumption of the Augustinians that the mysteries of faith can be demonstrated "by means of necessity." The truths of faith are above human understanding. They are the object of faith and not of science. Hence philosophy and theology are distinct and this distinction must be retained.

Although distinct, they are related. Philosophy shows the necessity of faith by demonstrating the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Theology on the other hand helps philosophy to reflect more deeply and to correct itself if some philosophical conclusion is contrary to the mysteries of faith.3

IV. Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology)

To explain the process of knowledge, Thomas Aquinas has recourse neither to the innate ideas of Platonism nor to the illumination of Augustine. Instead, he postulates a cognitive faculty naturally capable of acquiring knowledge of the object, in proportion to that faculty. Agreeing with Aristotle, he admits that knowledge is obtained through two stages of operation, sensitive and intellective, which are intimately related to one another. The proper object of the sensitive faculty is the particular thing, the individual; the proper object of the intellect is the universal, the idea, the intelligible.

But the intellect does not attain any idea unless the material for that idea is presented to it by the senses: "Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu." The two cognitive faculties, sense and intellect, are naturally capable of acquiring knowledge of their proper object, since both are in potency -- the sense, toward the individual form; and the intellect, toward the form of the universal.

The obtaining of the universal presupposes that the sensible knowledge of the object which lies outside us comes through the impression of the form of the object upon the sensitive faculty. This is likened to the impression of the seal upon wax. Upon this material impression the soul reacts according to its nature, that is, psychically, producing knowledge of that particular object whose form had been impressed upon the senses. Thus the faculty which was in potency is actuated with relation to that object, and knows and expresses within itself knowledge of that particular object.

But how is the passage made from sensitive cognition to that which is intellective? Or, rather, how is the individual form which is now offered by sensible cognition condensed into an idea and thus made the proportionate object of the intellect?

To understand the solution to the problem, it is necessary to recall the theory of Aristotle which Aquinas makes his own; that is, that the individual form is universal in potentia. It is the matter which makes the form individual. Hence if the form can be liberated from the individualizing matter, or dematerialized, it assumes the character of universality.

According to Thomas Aquinas, this is just what happens through the action of a special power of the intellect, i.e., the power by which the phantasm (sense image) is illuminated. Under the influence of this illumination, the form loses its materiality; that is, it becomes the essence or intelligible species (species intelligibilis). Thomas call this faculty the intellectus agens (agent intellect), and it is to be noted that for Thomas the "intellectus agens" is not, as the Averroists held, a separate intellect which is common to all men.

For Aquinas, the agent intellect is a special activity of the cognitive soul, and it is individual and immanent in every intellective soul. The "species intelligibilis" is then received by the intellect, which is called passive since it receives its proper object, and become intelligible in act. Note that according to Aquinas the form, both intelligible and individual, is not that which the mind grasps or understands (this would reduce knowledge to mere phenomenalism), but is the means through which the mind understands the object (individual form) and the essence of the object ("forma intelligibilis").

Knowledge thus has its foundation in reality, in the metaphysical.

Furthermore, since the cognitive faculty is in potency, when it becomes actuated, it becomes one with the form which actuates. Thus it may be said, in a certain sense, that the intellect is identified with the determined form which it knows.

For Aquinas all the data of sense knowledge and all intelligible things are essentially true. Truth consists in the equality of the intellect with its object, and such concordance is always found, both in sensitive cognition and in the idea. Error may exist in the judgment, since it can happen that a predicate may be attributed to a subject to which it does not really belong.

Besides the faculty of judgment, Aquinas also admits the faculty of discursive reasoning, which consists in the derivation of the knowledge of particulars from the universal. Deductive, syllogistic demonstration must be carried out according to the logical relationships which exist between two judgments. In this process consists the science which the human intellect can construct by itself, without recourse either to innate ideas or to any particular illumination.

V. General Metaphysics

Aquinas accepts the general principles of the metaphysics of Aristotle, for whom there are two principles of being, potency and act. Act signifies being, reality, perfection; potency is non-being, non-reality, imperfection. Potency does not, however, mean absolute non-being, but rather the capacity to receive some perfection, the capacity to exist, as Aristotle taught.

The transition from potential to actual existence is becoming, that is, the passage from potency to act. Outside of becoming there exists Pure Act, the absolute reality and perfection upon which all becoming depends. The general principle of metaphysics, potency and act, applied to that part of becoming in which matter is already existent, is specified in a second principle, the principle of matter and form.

Matter which in potency is not be understood as pure nothingness, but is as a being having in itself no determination. Thus matter is to be conceived of as the substratum of form. The form which is in act gives to the matter specific determination, reality, perfection -- that which we mean when we ask what is such and such a thing.

The union of matter and form constitutes or gives place to the substance, to the "totum," the individual. Relative to the question of the principle of individuation, or the question of how it happens that a determined specific form can give place to a multiplicity of individuals of the same species, Aquinas affirms that the principle of individuation is matter -- not matter considered abstractly, pure matter, but matter signed by quantity, or that concrete matter in which the new form is produced.

If prime matter and substantial form are sufficient to constitute the "totum" (the substance), then this latter, to be perfect, can and must receive other or secondary forms, i.e., accidental forms which give new determination to the substance (quantity, quality, etc.). The accidents, since they are determinations of the substance, are ordained to the substance and depend on it.

The concept of matter and form gives us an explanation of how a thing becomes, but does not tell why it becomes. To present us with the why of becoming, it is necessary to have recourse to a third concept -- that of efficient cause -- which produces such a determination of form in matter and is the reason why this particular form arises in the matter.

Finally, to give us the reason why the efficient or acting cause or agent is made to bring about the union of this form in this matter, we need a fourth element, the concept of end. End (finis) indicates the purpose the agent has in mind when he acts, or gives actuation to this form in this matter.

Final cause hence indicates the end, and also the order according to which the agent is determined to act: First in intention, the purpose or end is last in execution -- the purpose of the agent is achieved only when the entity is completed in its material element and its substantial and accidental forms. Thus for Aquinas, as for Aristotle, the concepts explaining reality are reduced to the concepts of the four causes -- material, formal, efficient, and final.

VI. The Existence of God (Theodicy)

The Five Ways

The search for God and His relationship with the world was as fundamental in the Middle Ages as it was at any time during the history of Christian thought. At the time of Aquinas, Augustinianism was the most appreciated doctrine in the school of philosophy at the University of Paris. In virtue of illumination, which is the central point of Augustinianism, the human soul could have an intuitive knowledge of God. Indeed the intellect had only to reflect upon itself to find the presence of the Divine Teacher.

Thus the existence of God was proved a priori by means of necessary reason. Obviously, if the presence of the ideas of absolute truth and good in our mind must be explained by the direct suggestion of God, we do not need any other proof of God's existence.

But, according to Aquinas, any natural intuitive knowledge of God is precluded to man. For us, only the visible world, which is capable of impressing our senses, is the object of natural intuitive knowledge. Thus any argument a priori for the existence of God is devoid of validity. For Aquinas, the existence of God needs to be demonstrated, and demonstration must start from the sensible world without any prejudice. 4 Such demonstrations are possible and are accommodated to anyone who is simply capable of reflecting. There are five ways in which the human intellect can prove the existence of God. All have a common point of resemblance. The starting point is a consideration of the sensible world known by immediate experience. Such a consideration of the sensible world would remain incomprehensible unless it was related to God as author of the world.

So each argument might be reduced to a syllogism whose major premise is a fact of experience, and whose minor premise is a principle of reason, which brings to light the intelligibility of the major premise.

It is interesting to note that Aquinas uses the Aristotelian principle of the priority of act over potency for the first three arguments. Where there is a being in change, i.e., passing from potency to actuality, there must be another being actually existent, outside the series in change, whether this series is considered to be finite or infinite.

Aquinas formulates this principle in three different ways according to the three aspects of reality taken into consideration. For the first way the formulation is: What is moved, is moved by another; for the second way: It is impossible for something to be the efficient cause of itself; for the third way: What is not, cannot begin to be, unless by force of something which is. The fourth way takes into consideration many aspects of reality, which, when compared with one another, show that they are more or less perfect. The principle of intelligibility is the following: What is said to be the greatest in any order of perfection is also the cause of all that exists in that order.

The fifth way takes into consideration the order of nature: Where there is a tendency of many to the same end, there must be an intellectual being causing such an order. Let us set forth the schematic structure of the five ways: Our senses attest to the existence of movement or motion. But every motion presupposes a mover which produces that movement. To have recourse to an infinite series of motions is not possible, for such an infinite series does not and cannot solve the question of the origin of the movement. Hence there exists a first mover that moves and is not itself moved. This is God.

Some new thing is produced. But every new production includes the concept of cause. Thus there exists a first cause which is itself not caused. This is God. Everything in the world is contingent; that is, it may or may not exist. We know from experience that all things change in one way or another. But that which is contingent does not have the reason of its existence in itself, but in another, that is, in something which is not contingent.

Hence there exists the necessary being, God. The fourth way takes into consideration the transcendental qualities of reality, "the good, the true, the noble," and so forth, which we find in things to a greater or lesser degree. But transcendental qualities are nothing other than being, expressed through one of its attributes; hence things under our experience are beings to a greater or lesser degree. But the greater and lesser are not intelligible unless they are related to that which is the highest in that order; and what is the highest is also the cause of all that exists in that order. Therefore there exists the highest degree of being and it is the cause of all limited being. This is God. Order exists in the world about us. Hence there must exist an intelligence responsible for the order of the universe. This is God.

Thus, in brief, we have Aquinas' five proofs for the existence of God; proofs from the notion of motion, cause, contingency, perfection, and order. The proofs for the existence of God are also means of knowing something of God's essence. This knowledge, however, remains always essentially inadequate and incomplete.

One way of knowing God is the way of negative theology, that is, by removing from the concept of God all that implies imperfection, potentiality, materiality. In other words, by this method we arrive at a knowledge of God through considering what He is not.

A second method is that of analogy. God is the cause of the world. Now every object reflects some perfection of the cause from which it proceeds. Hence it is possible for the human mind to rise to the perfections of God from the consideration of the perfection it finds in creatures. This it does, naturally, by removing all imperfection and potentiality from the creatures considered. The resultant idea of the nature of God is thus had through analogy with the perfections of the created universe.

________________________

1. Contra Gent., I, 7.

2. Summa. Theol., Part I, q. I, a.1.

3. Summa Theol., Part I, q 1, a. 1; q. 12, a. 4; q. 32, a. 1; In Primum Librum Sent., q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

4. Summa Theol., Part I, q. 2, a.1; Contra Gent., I, 11.

VII. The World (Cosmology)

In determining or defining the relationship of God with the world, Aquinas departs not only from the doctrine of the Averroist Aristotelians, but also from the teaching of Aristotle himself. For Aristotle matter was uncreated and co-eternal with God, limiting the divinity itself (Greek dualism). Aquinas denies this dualism. The world was produced by God through His creative act, i.e., the world was produced from nothing.

Besides, all becoming in matter is connected with God, since He is the uncaused Cause and the immovable Mover of all that takes place in created nature. God has created the world from nothingness through a free act of His will; hence any necessity in the nature of God is excluded. Again, we know that Aristotle did not admit providence: the world was in motion toward God, as toward a point of attraction; but God did not know of this process of change, nor was He its ordinator.

For Aquinas, on the contrary, God is providence: creation was a knowing act of His will; God, the cause and mover of all the perfections of beings, is also the intelligent ordinator of them" all that happens in the world finds its counterpart in the wisdom of God. Now, how the providence and the wisdom of God are to be reconciled with the liberty of man is a problem which surpasses our understanding. It is not an absurdity, however, if we keep in mind that the action of Divine Providence is absolutely distinct and can be reconciled with the liberty of man without diminishing or minimizing this latter.

VIII. The Human Soul (Rational Psychology)

Besides God, the spiritual substances are the angels and human souls. Angels are not destined to inform any matter; the human soul, on the contrary, is ordered to be the form of the body. Hence the question arises as to the nature of the soul and its relations with the body. In regard to the first question, at the time of Aquinas, the Averroists held that "the agent intellect" was a form existent per se and that it was separated from human souls, in which, however, it made its appearance occasionally in order to impress the intelligibles on the passive intellect. The logical conclusion in this theory is that the human soul will perish when the conditions of the body make impossible the presence of the Unique Intellect.

Aquinas was always a strong opponent of Averroism. He rejected the unity and transcendence of the agent intellect not only for theological but for philosophical reasons.

As Aquinas observes 1, he who receives an intelligible form does not thereby become an "intelligent being." For instance, a house which receives the intelligible form of the idea of the artist, is intelligible but not intelligent.

Man not only is intelligible but also intelligent; he is intelligent, because he make intelligent operations. The principle of these intelligent operations, therefore, must be the soul itself and not a separate intellect. 2 The second question deals with the relationship of the human soul to the body. In man there are many operations -- vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. Now, unquestionably the intellective operations are performed by the rational soul. But who performs the others? Platonic-Augustinian philosophy solved the question by admitting a multiplicity of inferior forms which are subordinated to the rational soul. Thus there was a sensitive form as well as a vegetative form.

Aquinas, following Aristotle in this matter, denies any multiplicity of substantial forms in the same individual. The form for man is one as is the form for any individual thing; in man this form is the rational soul. It is the principle of all operations, whether material or spiritual. We know that the one soul understands and performs all the operations. We express this identity of the subject when we say: "I understand and I feel, and I see."

Proper to the human soul is the understanding, which does not need the cooperation of any organ in its operations. But the human soul is also the "form of the body"; and just as every form is the principle of all the operations of the informed matter, so also the human soul is the principle of all operations performed by the body through its various organs. 3 The doctrine that "the soul is the form of the body" gives rise to another difficulty, which seems to spring from the same principle of matter and form taken from Aristotelian metaphysics.

According to Aristotle, the forms of natural bodies depend on the conditions of matter, so that when these conditions become unfit the permanence of the form is no longer possible; then it will be corrupted and another form will take its place. Hence the doctrine of the soul as the unique form of the body seems to lead logically to the mortality of the human soul. Aquinas overcomes the difficulty with the same Aristotelian principles. The operations of any being follow from its nature; thus any form leading only to organic operations is bound to matter and follows the conditions of matter, as, for instance, the animal soul, which is corrupted with the organism. But the human soul has superorganic operations.

The intellect does not need any organ in its understanding; hence the human soul is a superorganic substance, not dependent for its being upon any matter. And despite the fact that the human soul is the form of the body, it will last as a separate substance of intellectual nature, even when the conditions of the body render impossible the functioning of the soul as the form of the body.4

Thus the doctrine of Aquinas concerning the soul in general and the human soul in particular, may be summed us as follows:

When the form in matter is the origin of immanent actions, it gives origin to life and as such is more particularly called the "soul." There is a vegetative soul, such as the principle of plants, whose activity is fulfilled in nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Superior to the vegetative is the sensitive soul, which is present in animals; besides the processes of nutrition, growth and reproduction the sensitive soul is capable of sensitive knowledge and appetition. Superior still to the sensitive soul is the rational soul.

The rational soul is created directly by God; it is distinct for each man; it is the true form of the body. The human soul performs the functions of the vegetative and sensitive life, but besides these functions it has activities which do not depend upon the body, i.e., understanding and volition.

The intellect and the will are the faculties of the soul, the means through which it operates. The intellect has for its object the knowledge of the universal, and operates by judging and reasoning. The will is free; that is, it is not determined by any particular good, but it determines itself.

From an analysis of the intellect and the will, Aquinas proves the spirituality, the simplicity, and the immortality of the soul. The intellect has, in fact, for its proportionate object the universal, the understanding of which is a simple and spiritual act. Hence the soul from which the act of understanding proceeds is itself simple and spiritual. Since it is simple and spiritual, it is by nature also immortal.

The same conclusion is reached through an analysis of the will, which, as we have said, is free, i.e., not determined by any cause outside itself. In the physical world everything is determined by causal necessity, and hence there is no liberty. The faculty which is not determined by causal motives declares its independence of these causes and hence is an immaterial faculty. The soul upon which such a faculty depends must be of the same nature as the faculty; that is, the soul must be immaterial.

The human soul, since it is immaterial and performs acts which are not absolutely dependent upon the bodily organs, does not perish with the body -- although, as Aquinas says, the soul separated from the body is not entirely complete but has an inclination to the body as the necessary instrument for its complete and full activity.

IX. Ethics and Politics

In opposition to the voluntarism of Augustinian thought, Aquinas holds the primacy of the intellect over the will. Reason precedes volition. Aquinas extends this law even to God. Creation is founded upon the essence of God in so far as this essence is known by God's intellect and can be produced through the creative act. The divine will freely selects from among the possibilities in the divine essence. Thus even in God this present order of creation has been willed because it was reasonable, and not vice versa, reasonable because willed. Analogously, in man the act of understanding precedes the movement of the will. Nevertheless the will is free and hence is not constrained to select necessarily what the intellect presents to it as reasonable.

In order to demonstrate the freedom of our will, Aquinas goes to the very root of the will. The will is determined by good as is the intellect by truth. Thus if the will were presented with an object which is essentially good -- good under every aspect (God) -- the will in this case would not be free, because it would find itself confronted with the adequate object of its nature.

But our will is dependent on the intellect, and the intellect, as we know, is dependent upon sensations, i.e., upon particular goods, which may be good from one standpoint and evil from another. In this case the will is free to select from among the various objects presented to it by the intellect.

But all of this is not yet sufficient to form the moral act in its entirety. Freedom of the will and the free volitional act are the subjective part of morality. To complete the moral act, it is necessary to have also the objective part, or the conformity of volition to the supreme norm of morality. This supreme norm is called by Aquinas the eternal law; it resides in God and is the norm of the order established by God in the creature. The eternal law, in so far as it is manifested and recognized by the intelligence, constitutes the natural law. This latter, then, is none other than the eternal law in so far as it is manifested to our conscience.

The morality of an act depends upon its conformity to the law of conscience and hence to the eternal law; nonconformity brings about moral evil, sin. The more regularly moral law is observed, the easier such observance becomes; hence, virtue consists in the habitual and conscious conformity of action to the moral law. The natural virtues, for Aquinas as for Aristotle, are four: prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. In opposition to Augustinian teaching, which affirmed that society is not natural but is the consequence of original sin, and in conformity with Aristotle, Aquinas discovers the necessity of society by analyzing human nature.

Society is necessary for the perfection to which man by his nature has been destined. Man is hence a political animal. The first form of society is the family, an imperfect society because it is destined by nature solely for the propagation of the species.

Society has for its end the common good, and man does not exist for society, but society exists for man. The duties of society are of a positive and a negative nature; i.e., the state not only must provide for the defense of its citizens and for their free exercise (negative duties), but must also provide educative and formative measures for the elevation of the members of society.

Since the end of the state is the common good of material nature, the state must recognize another society, the Church, to which has been entrusted the spiritual good of the same citizens; and since the material must be coordinated with the spiritual, the state, although complete in itself, must recognize the rights of the Church in matters of morality and religion.

Part III: From Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham

Aquinas

Thomas of Aquin -- more commonly called Thomas Aquinas, or simply Aquinas -- was born during the young manhood of Albert and died before him. Yet it seems natural for us to think of Aquinas appearing on the intellectual scene after Albert had departed. He was a pupil of Albert, and this enlightened teacher recognized his genius in early student days when fellow pupils considered Aquinas only a dreamy lad of no particular talent.

Aquinas was born between 1224 and 1226 in Roccasecca in Italy. He died March 7, 1274, while on his way to attend the Council of Lyons. Thus he lived, at most, but fifty years. Yet the accomplishments of his comparatively short lifetime were enough, one might suppose, for twenty men of twice his span of years.

If we except Aristotle, and perhaps Augustine, the history of philosophy has no name to offer that deserves to stand in the same line with that of Thomas Aquinas. It may be unfair to compare Aquinas with Aristotle, for Aristotle worked in the night of pagan antiquity while Aquinas labored in the daylight of Christianity. Perhaps it is but just to say that, in point of natural gifts, Aristotle stands alone, and that, in point of natural and supernatural gifts combined, Aquinas far surpasses Aristotle.

Aquinas produced a veritable library of valuable writings. These are remarkable for their scope, their completeness, their clarity. No taint of pride, no vain show of erudition for its own sake, soils any page he wrote. No man ever knew more thoroughly, and more sympathetically, the significant writings of all his predecessors in philosophy, theology, Scripture, and physical science. Thoroughly equipped with an easy mastery of the world's worthwhile knowledge, Aquinas brought to bear upon every question the light of his own mighty and original mind. In him the power of analysis and the power of synthesis seem equal.

Following the lead of Albert, Aquinas purified many doctrines attributed to Aristotle of their Mohammedan accretions, and he induced his friend and fellow-Dominican, William of Moerbeke, an able linguist, to make a Latin translation of Aristotle from the original Greek.

Aquinas settled the perplexing question of the distinction between philosophy and theology by justifying the principle: Sciences are distinguished one from another by their respective formal objects, and ultimately by the method or methods they use.

In the matter of universals, Aquinas offers compelling proof for the truth of the Aristotelian doctrine of Moderate Realism. He devotes full and detailed study to the basic concept or idea of being. This concept is the first idea in every order -- the order of time (chronological order), the order of knowledge (logical order), and the order of understandable reality (metaphysical order). For the very first idea or concept acquired in life (since we are born without any equipment of ideas) is the idea of some thing, that is, of some being, and the notion of some being involves, implicitly, the notion or idea of being as such.

Further, the analysis of every concept takes the mind back to the fundamental notion of being. And, finally, every reality that can be thought of as existing is necessarily understood as some thing, that is, as being. The idea of being is truly transcendental. Other transcendental ideas which extend or specially apply the idea of being are distinct from the idea of being by only a distinction of reason (i.e., logical distinction) not a real distinction. These ideas are: thing, something, reality, the one, the good, the true. Together with being, these are called "the transcendentals."

Aquinas holds the sane Aristotelian doctrine that all human knowledge takes its beginning in the action of the senses on the bodily world around us. He rejects the Augustinian theory that a special divine illumination is required for certain kinds of knowledge -- such as knowledge of first principles, or knowledge of spiritual realities. Our natural knowledge, says Aquinas, is due to the fact that the mind is equipped with a power of abstraction which it employs first upon the findings of the senses, and then upon ideas themselves for their further refinement or elaboration.

Thus the mind arises from the physical order, through the mathematical order, to the metaphysical order of concepts or ideas. Thus there are three grades of abstraction. These are truly grades or degrees; they are not merely kinds; they are like steps in one stairway. Aquinas takes the three grades of abstraction as the basis for the general classification of sciences.

In point of physical philosophy, Aquinas holds with Aristotle that all physical being (that is, all being subject to change) is compounded of actuality and potentiality (actus et potentia). Further, all bodily being (all ens mobile) is composed of matter and form, and, fundamentally, of prime matter and substantial form. Aquinas teaches that, at any given moment, only one substantial form can in-form or actualize the same prime matter; in this point, he differs from the view (Scotistic and Franciscan) of those philosophers who defend the "plurality-of-substantial-forms theory." Spiritual substances are pure forms.

The principle of specification, by which one essential kind of substance is distinguished from every other kind, is substantial form. The principle of individuation, by which individual substances of the same species or kind are distinguished from one another, is in-formed prime matter as quantified.

Aquinas holds that the human soul is, in each man, the substantial form of the living body. The soul does not exist before its union with the body. At one and the same instant each soul is created and infused (i.e., substantially united with the body) by God.

Aquinas rejects the Arabian doctrine of a separate and common intellect serving all men, and offers proofs for the existence of intellect as a faculty of each human individual. He shows that man has freewill, that is, that the human will is endowed with the freedom of choice of means to the necessary (and not free) ultimate end, the Supreme Good.

In point of metaphysical philosophy, Aquinas treats of being in itself, of being as it is in the mind (that is, truth and certitude). He asserts a real distinction (not merely a rational or logical distinction) between the essence and the existence of an existing creature. He extends Aristotle's doctrine of causes, and deals most profoundly with the effecting or efficient cause, and with its subsidiary, the instrumental cause.

He shows that God is First Effecting Cause, that the divine "effectingness," as act and as power, is identified with the Divine Substance. In creatures "effectingness" (or efficiency) as act and power is something really distinct from their substance; it is something they have, not something which they are; hence, faculties are things really distinct from the creatural substance which possesses and exercises them.

Aquinas shows that God, the Necessary and Self-Subsistent First Being, is the Effecting, the Final, and the Exemplar Cause of all perfection, that is, of all positive being. He shows how God concurs with creatures in their connatural activities, and he maintains that the divine concurrence is not only simultaneous with the actions of creations, but antecedent to such action; yet such antecedent concurrence (called physical premotion) in no wise destroys the nature of the acting creature; even if the creature be free, its freedom is not destroyed or in any sense hindered, for "God moves every being in a manner consonant with its nature."

In point of moral philosophy or ethics, Aquinas shows that man, in every human act (that is in every thought, word, deed, or omission which is done knowingly and freely), tends towards the Supreme Good, the possession of which will constitute man in the state of perfect beatitude. Even the sinner, perversely choosing evil, chooses it under the guise of good, that is, of something that will satisfy. Man is made for God and endless perfect happiness. This end cannot be achieved perfectly this side of heaven, but it can be approximated here on earth by living for God, by knowing, loving, serving God.

Since God has made man for Himself and happiness, He has a plan, an arrangement, a law which man must follow to attain His end. In other words, the Divine Reason (that is, God as Intellect and Will) has established the law which directs all things to their last goal or end. This law is The Eternal Law. Man, when he comes to the use and practice of his mental powers, inevitably becomes aware of "an order in things" which he must not disturb but must conserve; man's awareness of The Eternal Law is "the natural law." And man, in all his human acts, inevitably sees them in their relation to the natural law, and mentally pronounces upon their agreement or disagreement with the natural law. Such a pronouncement is called a judgment of conscience. And thus we notice that the norm of morality is The Eternal Law as applied by conscience.

Aquinas has been called, and with justice, the prince of philosophers and of theologians. His works merit the earnest study of every thoughtful mind.

Scotus

John Duns Scotus (1266/74-1308), a member of the Franciscan Order, was a philosopher of extraordinary gifts and of wondrous accomplishment. He studied at Oxford, and later taught there and at the University of Paris. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle and on other philosophers, and he produced a notable treatise on theology.

He also wrote Quaestiones Quodlibetales, a discussion of a variety of questions. Many other works are attributed to Scotus. The scholarly researches of the Franciscan Friars in our own day have shown beyond doubt or question that some of these works are spurious, and that some theories long attributed to Scotus are not truly his.

Scotus is known as "the Subtle Doctor." He had a mind of marvelous acuteness, and an untiring zeal for intricacies of discussion in which none but the keenest and most devoted students could keep pace with him. In some points he disagrees with Thomas Aquinas. For instance, he has small reliance on the unaided human reason as the basis of certitude, and requires Faith and Revelation for the solution of some problems of philosophy.

He does not agree with Aquinas in point of "the principle of individuation" which he holds to be, not quantified matter, but a positive reality added to a being fully constituted in its specific nature; he calls this positive individuating reality by the name of haecceitas, which might be clumsily translated as the "thisness" of the being in question.

Again, Scotus teaches that in a created being there is not a real distinction between existence and essence, nor is there merely a rational or logical distinction; the distinction in this instance is an actual formal distinction arising from the nature of the reality in which the distinction is found. This distinction (usually called "the Scotistic formal distinction") is, therefore, something less than real distinction, and something more than logical distinction.

Again, in point of universals, Scotus accepts Moderate Realism, but his expression is involved, and some critics interpret him in such wise as to make him an Ultra-Realist.

Again, Scotus defends the "plurality-of-forms-theory"; he holds that in man, in addition to the spiritual soul which is the substantial form of living man, there is a substantial body-form or "a form of corporeity."

Scotus holds that man is not moved, in his freewill acts, by the ultimate practical judgment of the mind (the ultimum judicium practicum), but that this judgment is only a condition requisite for the will's uninfluenced action.

Scotus holds with unwavering certitude to the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, yet he teaches that is immortality is proved by an appeal to Revelation, and not by unaided reason.

A man of the highest gifts, Scotus has had, and has today, a mighty influence among Scholastic philosophers. He was the great luminary of the Franciscans as Aquinas was the light and oracle of the Dominicans. The Thomist and the Scotist schools are in lively existence at the present time, especially in the realm of speculative theology.

Ockham

William of Ockham was a notable Franciscan philosopher of the 14th century. He was born about 1280 and died in 1348. The name by which this philosopher is most commonly known is that of his home town, Ockham or Ockam, of Surrey in England.

William was of impulsive and even stormy temperament, and his life was not without troubles. He wrote commentaries on the philosophy of Aristotle, on the famous "Sentences" (that is, doctrines) of Peter the Lombard, and on the writings of Porphyry.

His contemporaries hailed William as "the Venerable Inceptor" of a theory of knowledge called Terminism. But this was really no new theory; it was merely Nominalism in a new dress and with a new name.

William of Ockham is memorable for one valuable rule for philosophers, Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate, which, translated literally, means, "Things are not to be multiplied without need"; the force of the rule might be given in this fashion, "Explanations are to be made in the simplest and most direct fashion which the facts allow, without needless complications and distinctions." This dictum came to be known as "Ockham's Razor," for it was formulated to cut away wasted verbiage and needless involvement of reasoning.

It is a good rule, but William himself used it without nice discernment of when "multiplication of things" is actually necessary. He sometimes used the "razor," not only to remove extraneous matters, but to level off the features of his subject. Like all impatient men who want to make complicated matters simple, he sometimes turned simplification into falsification.

This note of impatience, this eagerness to make the deepest and most complicated questions as simple as A-B-C, was -- as is always the case when it appears in the works of men of influence -- a sign of decadence in philosophy. For any impatience with multitudinous detail indicates a loss of the philosophic temper which must be tirelessly patient.

Ockham is the symbol and mark of a turning-point in philosophy. He is the last great figure in the age of perfection; some make him the first great figure in the age of transition, even when they try to hide the fact that the transition was also a retrogression. The cord of strong philosophic thought which had begun to fray under the friction of Thomistic-Scotistic argument, snapped asunder under the impatient dicta of William of Ockham. It was literally cut by "Ockham's Razor."

The Period of Evangelization

I. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Christianity is essentially religion; that is the basis of its distinction from philosophy. Philosophy is the work of rational speculation. It is reason which, starting from a few rational principles, tries to solve the supreme metaphysical problems regarding God, the world and man.

Religion does not demonstrate, but affirms. It presents itself as a proposition of wisdom, as a positive assertion expressed in the form of dogma, and does not appeal to the intellect but to the will, whose assent it requests. Religion does not require the affirmation of the will on the basis of the intrinsic rationality which appears to the intellect but because of extrinsic motives -- that is, the authority presenting the assertion.

Religion, therefore, is distinguished from philosophy in that the former works on the will, the latter on the intellect. And the assent of the will, which in philosophy is justified only by reason, in religion is justified by authority.

Although Christianity does not present itself as a philosophy, it presupposes a specific conception of the world and life, so that its dogmas include, on religious grounds, the solution of the greatest metaphysical problems that range from God to matter.

Moreover, while Christianity is distinct from philosophy, it does not follow that the two are opposed; in fact, the indirect solution which religion gives to paramount questions in metaphysics is to be maintained as valid help to reason in its speculations. Christianity has truly integrated philosophy.

Greek philosophy failed to resolve the problem of the origin of matter and that of the presence of evil. Christianity solved the first question by introducing the concept of creation: matter does not exist from eternity, but is created by God as is the whole universe.

Christianity solved also the question of the presence of evil through the mysteries of the first fall of man, of the Incarnation and the Redemption. The doctrine of the first fall teaches that the first begotten man was not only exempt from physical and moral evil, but was elevated to a supernatural order with an abundant equipment of preternatural gifts. But because of the sin of pride committed by the first man, mankind was subjected to physical and moral evil.

The mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption teach that the Word of God became flesh and died upon the cross not only to pay the debt of sin contracted by mankind, but also to give God the complete satisfaction and glory of which He is worthy.

Physical and moral evil still remain after the sacrifice of the cross, because everyone by suffering may take part in this sacrifice and give to God expiation for sin, and the glory of which He is worthy.

Thus, Christianity claims to have solved the problems which human reason is unable to solve by itself. This is the backdrop for an understanding of medieval philosophy.

The Period Of Patristic Philosophy

The Patristic Period extends from the second century through the eighth century. The numerous writers of this age are called Church Fathers because they are sure guides in the interpretation of Christian truths.

The Fathers of the Church were also philosophers, but with the exception of St. Augustine, not one of them was overly preoccupied with philosophy. Hence the Patristic Age may be divided into three periods: Pre-Augustinian Augustinian Post-Augustinian.

I. THE PRE-AUGUSTINIAN PERIOD

This period includes the second and the third century, and the first half of the fourth century.

Second Century

The Church Fathers of the second century are classified as apologists and controversialists. By apologists are meant writers who proposed the truth of Christianity and defended them against the calumnious reports of pagans. Such are Aristides of Athens, Athenagoras, Minucius Felix, and Justin Martyr. Justin Martyr tried to prove that everything that is true and great in Greek philosophy is Christian. Other writers are called controversialists because they tried to refute the various heresies which appeared in the second century. Among these heresies the most important was Gnosticism which, although presented in different forms, is always basically the same in the attempt to empty religion of its supernatural content and to reduce the dogmas of Christianity to physical events.

Third Century

The third century is important because of the Christian School of Alexandria (the Didascalion) and also because of great apologies by writers of Western Africa. The Didascalion was founded by Pantaenus to prepare neophytes to receive baptism. But because of the attacks of the Neo-Platonic philosophers, who taught in the same city, the Didascalion became the seat of a hotly philosophical culture.

The most representative thinkers are: Clement of Alexandria (c.150-220 A.D.), who tried to show how Greek philosophy contributed to making the Christian more convinced of the truths of religion; Origin (c. 185-254 A.D.), a voluminous writer, considered to be the first systematizer of theology, who enjoyed a very wide fame; but because of latent errors about the creation of the world, the human soul, and the nature of evil, his fame gradually declined.

The Latin Apologists

The Fathers of Latin Africa, concentrated in Carthage, had a predilection for practical problems. Their attitude toward philosophy is not only one of negligence, but at times is even hostile, since they see in philosophy the danger of heresy. The most outstanding of them is Tertullian: The Gospel and the Academy have nothing in common; truth is given to us by the former, while the latter loses itself in empty rationalizations.

The First Half of the Fourth Century

During the first half of the fourth century there were many heresies regarding the divinity of Christ. In defense of Catholic truth, there arose a numerous host of Fathers, among them St. Athanasius, St. Cyril, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Basil and many others. It is the function of Church history to expose the various heresies and to justify their condemnation. According to Church authorities, in the matter of the heresies the authority of the Fathers is very great. In regard to philosophy, we may say that the Fathers were concerned with it only occasionally.

II. The Augustian Period: Reason and Faith

St. Augustine (354 - 430)

The basic characteristic of Augustine's thought is that man needs reason and faith to find truth. Augustine (picture) was led to this conclusion by his personal experience. Another basic characteristic consists in his "interiority." Augustine never ceases to look inside his soul; for in the soul he finds the fundamental principles of knowledge. How do we reach these principles? Illumination is the answer of Augustine. The human soul sees the intelligibles in a certain incorporeal light as the corporeal eye sees material objects in a corporeal light.

Augustine's Doctrines

Augustine even after his conversion to Catholic Christianity remained a Platonist. This adherence does not signify mere acceptance; but, just as Thomas Aquinas presented the doctrine of Aristotle as the rational basis of religion, so Augustine established the teaching of Plato and the Platonists. Philosophy is considered by Augustine as the science for the solution of the problem of life; hence he is more concerned with religious and moral problems than with those of pure speculation.

Theory of Knowledge

For Augustine the question of knowledge involves two problems: one regarding the existence of the subject, the other regarding the origin of concepts. He resolves the first question with the famous argument: "If I doubt, I exist"; he resolves the second by appealing to illumination, i.e., the belief that the eternal truths are imparted to our soul by the Word of God. Augustine, as a Platonist, underrates sense knowledge. More about St. Augustine's Illumination.

Metaphysics

God: The existence of God is proved: (1) a priori, by the presence of eternal truths, which take their origin from the Eternal and Necessary Being; (2) a posteriori, by the imperfection and change of beings, a fact which presupposes a perfect and unchangeable being. Regarding the nature of God, Augustine holds that God is being, knowledge and love, the three attributes which are revealed also in every created being.

Cosmology

The world was created by God from nothing. With regard to the manner in which creation was effected, Augustine is inclined ti admit that in the beginning there were created a few species of beings, which, by virtue of the rationes seminales, gave origin to the other species down to the present state of the world. For Augustine "time" is founded in movement, and its reality is in the intellective memory.

Psychology

Augustine, as a Platonist, considers the union of the soul with the body rather extrinsic. Regarding the origin of the soul, he hesitated between creationism and traducianism, but inclined toward the latter for controversial reasons. The faculties of the soul are three: memory, intellect and will; the will is free and superior to the intellect. Along with the question of liberty, there is the problem of the presence of evil. For Augustine, evil is essentially a "privation"; the privation of a due physical perfection makes physical evil, and the privation of moral perfection makes moral evil. The cause of moral evil is neither God nor matter, but the free will, which as such is able to deviate from the right order. Suffering, whether physical or moral, is the consequence of evil.

Liberty and Grace

Augustine sustained a long debate against Pelagianism. Pelagius held that human nature has not been corrupted by original sin and therefore is able of itself to attain the supernatural perfection due to it. Against this heresy, Augustine defended the absolute necessity of grace in order to attain the perfection due to man. How the efficacy of grace is to be reconciled with liberty is a question which disturbed the mind of Augustine, who at times neglected liberty to uphold the necessity and efficacy of grace.

Ethics

Besides what has been said of free will and moral evil, it must be noted that Augustine holds the primacy of the will over the intellect. Every good work is an action of love.

Politics: "The City of God"

"The City of God" is a philosophical classic by which Augustine shows the history of good and evil working among mankind as a consequence of original sin and the Redemption through Jesus Christ. He wrote it while the Roman empire was falling into ruin under the barbarian invasions and the Church was rising from the imperial remains. In The Radical Academy Bookstore Books by and about St. Augustine On the Internet "Confessions" by St. Augustine "City of God" by St. Augustine

The positive contributions of St. Augustine to the Perennial Philosophy

St. Augustine affirms that the world was created by God from nothing, through a free act of His will. Time is a being of reason ("rens rationis") with a foundation in things which through becoming offer to the mind the concept of time as past, present, and future. Augustine affirms the absolute unity and the spirituality of the human soul. In regard to the nature of the soul he affirms that the soul is simple and immortal. Then sensitive soul, besides having the five senses, is endowed also with a sensitive cognition which is common to animals and which judges the proper object of each of the senses. The intellective soul has three functions: being, understanding, and loving, corresponding to three faculties: intellective memory, intelligence, and will. The primary among these three faculties is given to the will, which in man signifies love. The will of man is free.

Three kinds of evil can be distinguished: metaphysical, physical, and moral, and each of them consists in a deficiency in being, a descent toward non-being. Metaphysical evil is the lack of a perfection not due to a given nature and hence is not actually an evil. Under this aspect, all creatures are evil because they fall short of full perfection, which is God alone. Physical evil consists in the privation of a perfection due to nature, e.g., blindness is the privation of sight in a being which ought to have sight according to the exigencies of its nature. The only true evil is moral evil; sin, an action contrary to the will of God.

The cause of moral evil is not God, who is infinite holiness, nor is it matter, as the Platonists would have it, for matter is a creature of God and hence good. Neither is the will as a faculty of the soul evil, for it too has been created by God. The cause of moral evil is the faculty of free will, by which man is able to deviate from the right order, to oppose himself to the will of God. Such opposition gives moral evil reality -- negative, metaphysical reality in the sense of decadence of the order established by God, and hence decadence of being or descent toward non-being. Sin, from the very fact it is decadence of being, carries in itself its own punishment. By sinning man injures himself in his being, for he falls from what he ought to be. As a result of this fall there exist the sufferings which he must bear, such as remorse in the present life.

III. The Post-Augustian Period

The period which runs from the death of Augustine to the beginning of the ninth century is of no special interest in philosophy. The cause of this decadence can be summed up thus: The fall of the Roman empire and the consequent barbarian domination; The engagement of the Church in the works of the apostolate and charity and not in the field of speculation. Nevertheless, several men are worthy of mention: Severinus Boethius, who wrote commentaries on some works of Aristotle, which were widely used as textbooks during the Middle Ages; Cassiodorus, who worked unsuccessfully for the unification of the barbarians and Latins; Above all, St. Benedict of Nursia, the founder of monasticism in Western Europe.

The Order of St. Benedict spread throughout Europe and helped immensely to save Western culture from complete destruction.