Hajj The Islamic Pilgrimage According to The Five Schools of Islamic Law

The ‘Ihram

Mawaqit al -'Ihram

The ihram is compulsory for all the various kinds of Hajj as well as' `Umrah, and is regarded as their basic element (rukn) by the Imamiyyah, and as obligatory by other schools. All the five schools agree that the miqat of the people of al-Madinah from where they assume ihram is Masjid al-Shajarah, also known as Dhu al-Hulayfah;1 for the pilgrims of al-Sham (which includes the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Palestinians and the Jordanians, noting further that the routes have changed from what they used to be in the past), Morocco and Egypt the miqat is al-Juhfah;2 for the pilgrims of Iraq, it is al-`Aqiq;3 for those from Yemen and others who take the same route, it is Yalamlam.4

According to the Imamiyyah, Qarn al-Manazil5 is the miqat for the people of al-Ta'if and those who take their route towards Makkah. But according to the four Sunni schools, it is the miqat of the people of Najd. The miqat for those from Najd and Iraq according to the Imamiyyah is al-`Aqiq. All the legal schools agree that these mawaqit also apply to those who in their journey take similar routes, even though they may not be natives of those regions.

For instance, if a Syrian starts on Hajj from al-Madinah, it is permissible for him to assume ihram from Dhu al-Hulayfah; if he starts on Hajj from Yemen, his miqat is Yalamlam; if from Iraq, then al-`Aqiq, and so on. If one does not pass the mentioned mawaqit on his route, the miqat for him is the place parallel to any one of them.

If someone lives at a place nearer to Makkah than any of the prescribed mawaqit, then he assumes ihram from the place of his residence. For, someone who resides in Makkah itself, his miqat is Makkah. For one performing the al-`Umrat al-mufradah, the mawaqit, according to the Imamiyyah, are the same as for the Hajj.

Ihram Before Miqat

The four Sunni legal schools agree on the permissibility of assuming ihram before the point of miqat, but disagree as to which has greater merit. According to Malik and Ibn Hanbal, ihram before miqat is more meritorious (afdal). According to Abu Hanifah, the merit lies in assuming ihram while starting the Hajj journey from one's town: Two opinions are ascribed to al-Shafi'i in this regard.

However, according to the Imamiyyah school, ihram before miqat is not permissible except for one who intends to perform the `Umrah in the month of Rajab and is afraid of missing it if ihram is delayed until miqat is reached, and for one who makes a vow (nadhr) to assume ihram before the miqat. (al-Tadhkirah, Fiqh al-Sunnah)

Ihram after Miqat

There is consensus among all the legal schools that it is not permissible to cross the miqat without ihram, and one who does so must return to the miqat for assuming ihram. If he does not return, according to the four Sunni schools, his Hajj is correct though he should offer a hady in atonement. But

if there be any impediment, such as fear of insecurity on the way or shortage of time, there is no sin. This, regardless of whether there are other mawaqit before him on his path or not.

According to the Imamiyyah, if he has deliberately neglected to assume ihram at the miqat while intending to perform the Hajj or the `Umrah, if he does not turn back to the miqat, there being no other miqat before him from which he can assume ihram, his ihram and Hajj are invalid, whether he had a valid pretext for not returning or not.

But if his failure to assume ihram at miqat was on account of forgetfulness or ignorance, if it is possible to return, he must do so; but if it is not possible, then from the next miqat before him. Otherwise he ought to assume ihram as far as possible outside the haram of Makkah, or within it; though the former is preferable. (al-Tadhkirah, al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba`ah)

Ihram before the Hajj Months

According to the Imamiyyah and Shafi'i schools, the ihram before the months of the Hajj is invalid if assumed with the purpose of Hajj, though it is valid when assumed for the purpose of the `Umrah. They cite in this regard the Qur'anic verse:

الْحَجُّ أَشْهُرٌ مَعْلُومَاتٌ

The pilgrimage is (performed in) the well-known months…(2:197):

But according to the Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools, it is permissible with karahah. (al-Tadhkirah, Fiqh al-Sunnah)

The Mustahabbat of Ihram

There is no disagreement among the legal schools with respect to the ihram being an essential rukn of the `Umrah and all the three forms of the Hajj, namely, tamattu; qiran and ifrad. Also, there is no difference of opinion that ihram is the first act of the pilgrim, irrespective of whether his purpose is `Umrah mufradah, or any of the three forms of Hajj. There are certain wajibat and mustahabbat related to the ihram.

The legal schools agree that it is mustahabb for anyone intending ihram to cleanse his body, clip his fingernails, shorten his moustaches, and to take a bath (even for women undergoing hayd or nifas, for the aim is cleanliness). It is also mustahabb for one intending Hajj to abstain from cutting the hair of his head from the beginning of the month of Dhu al-Qi'dah, to remove the hair from his body and armpits, and to enter ihram after the zuhr (noon) or any other obligatory prayers. It is also mustahabb to pray six, four or at least two raka`at. However, freedom from the state of ritual impurity (hadath) is not a condition for the ihram to be valid.

According to the Hanafi and Maliki schools, if water is not available, one is relieved of the duty to take the bath (ghusl), and tayammum as an alternative is not permissible. According to the Hanbali and Shafi'i schools, tayammum substitutes ghusl. The Imamiyyah jurists differ on this matter, some consider it permissible, others not.

According to the Imamiyyah school, it is mustahabb to leave the hair of the head uncut, but according to the Shafi'i, Hanafi and Hanbali schools, it is mustahabb to shave the head. (al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba`ah)

According to the Hanafi school, it is sunnah for one who wants to assume ihram to scent his body and clothes with a perfume whose trace does not remain after ihram except the smell. According to the Shafi'i school, it is sunnah, except when one is fasting, to apply perfume to the body after the bath. Also, perfuming the clothes does not matter. According to the Hanbali school, one may perfume the body; and the clothes with karahah. (al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba `ah)

According to the Hanafi, Maliki and Shafi'i schools, it is mustahabb for the muhrim to pray two raka'at before assuming ihram after the noon prayer or any other obligatory prayer. If he has no obligatory prayer to make at the time of ihram, he should offer six, or four or at least two raka`at for the ihram. (al-Jawahir)

Al - 'Ishtirat

Al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, the Imamiyyah scholar, in his work Tadhkirat al-fuqaha', says that for one intending ihram it is mustahabb to make a condition with God at the time of assuming ihram, by saying:

اللهم اني أريد ماأمرتني به، فإن منعتني مانعٌ عن تمامه وحبسني عنه حابسٌ فجعلني في حل.

O God, indeed I wish to fulfill Thy command, but if any impediment keeps me from completing it or a barrier obstructs me from it, exonerate me.

Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi'i, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal also consider it mustahabb. However, this ishtirat does not help in relieving one of the obligations of the Hajj if he were to encounter an impediment which keeps him from getting through it.

The Wajibat of Ihram

The wajibat of ihram, with some difference between the legal schools on some points, are three: niyyah (intention); talbiyah; and putting on of the clothes of ihram.

Al -Niyyah

Obviously niyyah or intention is essential to every voluntary act; for every such act is motivated by conscious intent. Therefore, some scholars have pointed out that had we been assigned a duty to be performed without intention it would have been impossible to be carried out. However, when the question of intention is raised in relation to the pilgrim (of the Hajj or the `Umrah), what is meant is whether he becomes muhrim solely on account of the niyyah or if something else is required in addition, acknowledging that ihram is void if assumed frivolously or absent-mindedly.

According to the Hanafi school, ihram is not considered to commence solely with intention unless it is accompanied by the utterance of the talbiyah (Fath al-qadir). According to the Shafi'i, Imamiyyah and Hanbali schools, the ihram is assumed merely by niyyah (al-Jawahir, Fiqh al

Sunnah). The Imamiyyah add that it is obligatory for the niyyah to coincide with the commencement of ihram, and it is not sufficient for the act of niyyah to occur in the course of assuming ihram.

Also while making the niyyah it is essential to specify the purpose of ihram, whether it is Hajj or `Umrah, whether it is Hajj al-tamattu; Hajj al-qiran or Hajj al-'ifrad, whether he is performing the Hajj for himself or as a na'ib of someone else, whether for the obligatory Hajj (Hijjat al-'Islam) or for something else. If one assumes ihram without specifying these particulars, postponing their determination to future, the ihram is invalid. (al-`Urwat al-wuthqa).

According to the Hanafi text al-Mughni, “It is mustahabb to specify the purpose of ihram. Malik is of the same opinion. Two opinions are ascribed to al-Shafi'i. According to one of them, it is adequate if one assumes ihram with a general, non-specific purpose of pilgrimage... without determining the exact purpose, whether Hajj or `Umrah. The ihram thus assumed is valid and makes one a muhrim Afterwards, he may select any of the kinds of pilgrimage." All the five schools agree that if one assumes ihram with the intention to follow another person's intention, his ihram is valid if the other person's purpose is specific. (al-Jawahir; al-Mughni)

The Talbiyah

That the talbiyah is legitimate in ihram is acknowledged by all the five schools, but they disagree as to its being wajib or mustahabb, and also about its timing. According to the Shafi`i and Hanbali schools, it is sunnah, preferably performed concurrently with ihram. However, if the intention to assume ihram is not accompanied by talbiyah, the ihram is correct.

According to the Imamiyyah, Hanafi,6 and Maliki schools, the talbiyah is obligatory, though they differ about its details. According to the Hanafi school, pronouncement of talbiyah or its substitute--such as tasbih, or bringing along of the sacrificial animal (al-hady)--is a provision for ihram to be valid. According to the Maliki school, the ihram neither becomes invalid if talbiyah is recited after a long gap of time, nor if it is not pronounced altogether. However, one who fails to pronounce it must offer a blood sacrifice.

According to the Imamiyyah, neither the ihram for Hajj al-tamattu; nor Hajj al-'ifrad, nor their conjugate `umrahs, nor for al-`Umrat al-mufradah, is valid without talbiyah. However, one who intends to perform Hajj al-qiran may choose between. talbiyah, ish'ar7 or taqlid; ish'ar for this school being exclusively restricted to a camel, though taqlid may apply to a camel or the other forms of hady.

The Formula of Talbiyah

لبيك اللهم لبيك، لا شريك لك لبيك، إن الحمد والنعمة لك والملك لا شريك لك

All the legal schools agree that taharah is not a proviso for pronouncing talbiyah. (al-Tadhkirah).

As to its occasion, the muhrim starts reciting it from the moment of ihram, being mustahabb for him to continue it--all the five schools agree--until the ramy of Jamarat al-`aqabah. To utter it loudly is mustahabb for men (not for women), except in mosques where prayers are offered in

congregation, particularly in the Mosque of `Arafat. According to the Imamiyyah school, it is mustahabb to discontinue reciting the talbiyah on sighting the houses of Makkah. A woman may recite the talbiyah just aloud enough to be heard by herself or someone near her. It is also mustahabb to proclaim blessings on the Prophet and his Family (s). (al-Tadhkirah; Fiqh al-Sunnah).

The Muhrim's Dress

All the five schools agree that it is not permissible for a muhrim man to wear stitched clothing, shirts or trousers, nor may he cover his face. Also, it is not permissible for him to wear shoes (khuffan) except when he cannot find a pair of sandals (na`lan),8 and that after removing the covering on the back of the heels from the base. A woman, however, should cover her head, keep her face exposed, except when she fears that men may ogle at her.

It is not permissible for her to wear gloves, but she may put on silk and wear shoes (khuffan). According to Abu Hanifah, it is permissible for a woman to wear gloves. (al-Tadhkirah; Ibn Rushd's al-Bidayah wa al-nihayah).

The book al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba`ah, under the heading `That which is required of one intending ihram before he starts to assume it', states, "According to the Hanafi school, among other things he wears izar (loin-cloth) and rida' (cloak). The izar covers the lower part of the body from the navel to the knees. The rida' covers the back, the chest and the shoulders, and its wearing is mustahabb.

According to the Maliki school, it is mustahabb to wear izar, rida and na`lan; but there is no restriction on wearing something else that is not stitched and does not encircle any of the parts of the body.

According to the Hanbali school, it is sunnah to put on a new, white and clean rida' and izar together with a pair of na`lan before assuming ihram. According to the Shafi`i school, the rida' and izar should be white, new or washed ones.

According to the Imamiyyah school, the rida' and the izar are obligatory, preferably (istihbaban) of white cotton. The muhrim may put on more than these two pieces of clothing on condition that they are not stitched. Also it is permissible to change the clothes in which one commenced ihram, though it is better to perform the tawaf in the same rida' and izar as worn at the beginning.

All the requirements of the dress for salat apply to the dress of ihram, such as taharah, its being non-silken for men, not made of the skin of an animal eating whose flesh is not permissible. According to some Imamiyyah legists, clothing made of skin is not permissible (in salat and ihram).

In any case, the disagreement between the legal schools about the muhrim's dress is very limited. This is well indicated by the fact that whatever is regarded as permissible by the Imamiyyah is also considered permissible by the remaining schools.

Restrictions of Ihram

There are certain restrictions for the muhrim, most of which are discussed below.

Marriage

According to the Imamiyyah, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali schools, it is not permissible for the muhrim to contract marriage for himself or on behalf of another. Also he may not act as another's agent for concluding a marriage contract, and if he does, the contract is invalid.

Furthermore, according to the Imamiyyah school, he may not act as a witness to such a contract.

According to Abu Hanifah, marriage contract is permissible and the contract concluded is valid.

According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Imamiyyah schools, it is permissible for the muhrim to revoke divorce of his former wife during the period of her `iddah. According to the Hanbali school, it is not permissible. From the viewpoint of the Imamiyyah, if one enters a marriage contract with the knowledge of its prohibition, the woman becomes haram for him for life merely by the act of concluding the contract, even if the marriage is not consummated. But if done in ignorance of the interdiction, she is not prohibited to him, even if consummation has been affected. (al-Jawahir Fiqh al-Sunnah; al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba`ah).

Intercourse

All the five legal schools agree that it is not permissible for the muhrim to have sexual intercourse with his wife, or to derive any kind of sexual pleasure from her. If he performs intercourse before tahlil9 (i.e. relief from the state of ihram) his Hajj becomes void, although he must perform all its acts to the conclusion. Thereafter, he must repeat the Hajj the next year, performing it `separately' from his spouse.10 The seclusion is obligatory according to the Imamiyyah, Maliki and Hanbali schools, and voluntary from the viewpoint of the Shafi'i and Hanafi schools. (al-Hada'iq; Fiqh al-Sunnah).

Moreover, according to the Imamiyyah, Shafi'i, and Maliki schools, besides the fact that his Hajj becomes invalid, he must sacrifice a camel in atonement, and according to the Hanafi school, a sheep.

All the five legal schools agree that if he commits intercourse after the first tahlil (i.e. after the halq or taqsir in Mina, after which everything except intercourse--and also perfume according to the Imamiyyah school--become permissible for the pilgrim), his Hajj is not void, nor is he called upon to repeat it. Nevertheless, he must offer a camel, according to the Imamiyyah and Hanafi schools and according to one of the two opinions ascribed to al-Shafi'i. But according to the Maliki school, he is obliged to offer a sheep only. (al-Hada'iq; Fiqh al-Sunnah).

If the wife yields willingly to intercourse, her Hajj is also void, and she must sacrifice a camel in expiation and repeat the Hajj the year after. But if she was forced, then nothing is required of her, but the husband is obliged to offer two camels: one on his own behalf, and the second on hers. If the wife was not in the state of ihram, but the husband was, nothing is required of her, nor is she did not oblige to offer anything in atonement, nor is anything required of the husband on her account. (al-Tadhkirah).

If the husband kisses his wife, his Hajj is not void if it does not result in ejaculation. On this all schools are in agreement. But according to the four

Sunni schools, he is obliged to make a sacrificial offering in atonement even if it be a sheep. The Imamiyyah author of al-Tadhkirah says, the sacrifice of a camel is obligatory only if the kiss is taken with sexual desire, otherwise he should sacrifice only a sheep. If he ejaculates, the Hajj is void according to the Maliki school, but remains valid according to the other schools, although he should make an offering in atonement, which is a camel according to the Hanbali school and a group of Imamiyyah legists, and a sheep according to the Shafi'i' and Hanafi schools. (al-Hada'iq; al-Mughni).

Use of Perfume

All the legal schools agree that the muhrim, man or woman, may not make use of any perfume, either for smelling, or for applying on himself, or for scenting edibles. Indeed it is not permissible to wash the dead body of a muhrim, or to perform hunut upon it by applying camphor or any other kind of perfumery. If the muhrim uses perfume forgetfully or on account of ignorance, he needs not make any offering in atonement according to the Imamiyyah and Shafi'i schools. But according to the Hanafi and Maliki schools, he must make a sacrificial offering (fidyah). In this relation two different opinions are ascribed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

However, when one is forced to use perfume on account of disease, it is permissible and no fidyah is required. According to the Imamiyyah school, if one uses perfume intentionally, he must offer a sheep, irrespective of the use, whether applied to the body or eaten. However, there is nothing wrong in the Khaluq of Ka'bah even if it contains saffron, and the same applies to fruits and aromatic plants. (al-Jawahir).

Use of Kohl

Al-Tadhkirah states: "There is consensus among the Imamiyyah legists on the point that darkening the eyelids with kohl or applying a kohl containing perfume is not permissible for the muhrim, man or woman. Apart from that (i.e. ihram) it is permissible." According to the author of al-Mughni, "Kohl containing antimony is makruh, and does not require any fidyah. I haven't come across any different opinion on this topic. However, there is no karahah in use of kohl without antimony, as long as it does not contain any perfume."

Shortening of Nails and Hair; Cutting of Trees

All the five legal schools agree about impermissibility of shortening the nails and shaving or shortening of the hair of the head or the body in the state of ihram, fidyah being required of the offender.11 As to cutting of trees and plants within the haram, all the legal schools agree that it is impermissible to cut or uproot anything grown naturally without human mediation.

Al-Shafi'i' states that there is no difference between the two with regard to the prohibition, and fidyah is required for both: cutting of a big tree requires fidyah of a cow, and of other plants of a sheep. According to Malik, cutting of a tree is a sin, though nothing is required of the offender, regardless of whether it has grown with or without human mediation.

According to the Imamiyyah, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools, cutting of something planted by human hands is permissible and does not require a

fidyah; but anything grown by nature requires fidyah, which is a cow according to the Imamiyyah for cutting a big tree and a sheep for cutting smaller plants. According to the Hanafi school, the owner of the tree is entitled to a payment equivalent to the cost of the hady. (Fiqh al-Sunnah, al-Lum`ah)

All the five schools agree that there is no restriction for cutting a dry tree or for pulling out withered grass.

Looking into a Mirror

It is not permissible for a muhrim to look into a mirror, and all the five schools agree that there is no fidyah for doing so. However, there is no restriction on looking into water.

Use of Henna

According to the Hanafi school, it is permissible for the muhrim, man or woman, to dye with henna any part of his body, except the head. According to the Shafi`i school, it is permissible, with. the exception of hands and feet. According to the Hanafi school, dyeing is not permissible for the muhrim, man or woman. (Fiqh al-Sunnah)The predominant view among the Imamiyyah legists is that dyeing is makruh not haram. (al-Lum`ah)

Use of Shade; Covering the Head

All the five schools agree that it is not permissible for the muhrim man to cover his head voluntarily. According to the Maliki and Imamiyyah schools, it is not permissible for him to immerse himself under water until the head is completely submerged, although it is permissible for him, all the five schools except the Shafi'i agree, to wash his head or pour water over it. The Malikis say that with the exception of the hands it is not permissible to remove dirt by washing. If he covers the head forgetfully, nothing is required of him according to the Imamiyyah and Shafi'i schools, but a fidyah is required according to the Hanaf i school.

All the schools, with the exception of the Shafi'i, agree that it is impermissible for the muhrim to shade himself while moving. Neither it is permissible for him to ride an automobile, an aeroplane or the like, which are covered by a roof. But it is permissible while walking to pass under a shadow.12

Stitched Clothing and Ring

All the five schools agree that it is forbidden for the muhrim man to wear stitched clothes and clothes which encircle body members, e.g. turban, hat and the like. These are permissible for women, with the exception of gloves and clothes which have come into contact with perfume. According to the Imamiyyah school, if the muhrim wears stitched clothes forgetfully, or in ignorance of the restriction, nothing is required of him. But if one wears them intentionally to protect himself from heat or cold, he should offer a sheep. Also according to them it is not permissible to wear a ring for adornment, but it is permissible for other purposes. Also, it is not permissible for woman to wear jewellery for the sake of adornment.

`Fusuq' and Jidal'

God, the most Exalted, says in the Quran:

…فَلَا رَفَثَ وَلَا فُسُوقَ وَلَا جِدَالَ فِي الْحَجِّ …

....There should be no obscenity, neither impiety, nor disputing in Hajj ....' (2:197).

In the above verse, the meaning of `rafath' is taken to be sexual intercourse, to which reference has been made earlier. `Fusuq' is taken to mean lying, cursing, or commission of sins. In any case, all of them are forbidden for the pilgrims of Hajj and the non-pilgrims as well. The stress here is meant to emphasize abstention from them in the state of ihram. The meaning of jidal' is quarrelling. According to an Imamiyyah tradition from al-'Imam al-Sadiq (`a), he is reported to have said, "It (i.e. jidal' in the above-mentioned verse) means using such expressions as `Yes, by God!' or `No, by God!' in conversation. This is the lowest degree of jidal"

According to the Imamiyyah school, if the muhrim tells a lie for once, he must offer a sheep; if twice, a cow; if thrice, a camel. And if he swears once taking a veritable oath, there is nothing upon him; but if he repeats it three times, he is obliged to sacrifice a sheep.

Cupping (Hijamah)

All the five schools agree on permissibility of cupping in case of necessity, and the four Sunni schools permit it even when not necessary as long as it does not require removal of hair. The Imamiyyah legists disagree on this issue; some of them permit it and others not. (al-Tadhkirah; al-Fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-'arba`ah)

Hunting (al -Sayd)

All the five schools are in agreement about the prohibition on hunting of land animals, either through killing or through dhabh, and also on guiding the hunter or pointing opt the game to him in the state of ihram. Also prohibited is meddling with their eggs and their young ones. However, hunting of the animals of water is permitted and requires no fidyah. This, in accordance with the Qur'anic verse:

أُحِلَّ لَكُمْ صَيْدُ الْبَحْرِ وَطَعَامُهُ مَتَاعًا لَكُمْ وَلِلسَّيَّارَةِ وَحُرِّمَ عَلَيْكُمْ صَيْدُ الْبَرِّ مَا دُمْتُمْ حُرُمًا وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ الَّذِي إِلَيْهِ تُحْشَرُونَ

Permitted to you is the game of the sea and the food of it, as a provision for you and for the journeyers; but forbidden to you is the game of the land, so long as you remain in the state of ihram: and fear God, unto whom you shall be mustered. (5:96)

The prohibition on hunting within the precincts of the haram apply to the muhrim and the non-muhrim (muhill) equally. However, outside the haram, the prohibition applies only to the muhrim. If the muhrim slaughters a game, it is considered maytah (a dead animal not slaughtered in accordance with ritual requirements), and its flesh is unlawful for all human beings. The five legal schools agree that the muhrim may kill a predatory bird called hada'ah, crows, mice and scorpions. Others include wild dogs and anything harmful.

According to the Imamiyyah and Shafi'i schools, if the game hunted on land resembles some domestic beast in shape and form (like the Oryx, which resembles the cow), he has the choice between:

(1) giving the meat of one of similar beasts of his livestock in charity after slaughtering it;

(2) estimating its price and buying food of the amount to be given in expiation and charity to the needy, distributing it by giving two mudds (the muddis a dry measure equal to 800 grams) to every individual;

(3) fasting, a day for every two mudds.

The Malikis hold the same viewpoint, except that, they add, the price of the hunted animal itself should be estimated, not that of its domestic equivalent. The Hanafis say that one who hunts in the state of ihram should arrange for the estimated price of the hunted animal, whether there is a domestic animal similar to it or not. When the price has been estimated, he is free to choose between:

(1) purchasing livestock of the money and giving its meat away in charity;

(2) giving it from his own livestock;

(3) purchasing food of the amount to be given away in charity;

(4) fasting, a day for every mudd of food to be given away. (al-Tadhkirah; Fiqh al-Sunnah)In this connection all the legal schools base their position on this Qur'anic verse:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَقْتُلُوا الصَّيْدَ وَأَنْتُمْ حُرُمٌ وَمَنْ قَتَلَهُ مِنْكُمْ مُتَعَمِّدًا فَجَزَاءٌ مِثْلُ مَا قَتَلَ مِنَ النَّعَمِ يَحْكُمُ بِهِ ذَوَا عَدْلٍ مِنْكُمْ هَدْيًا بَالِغَ الْكَعْبَةِ أَوْ كَفَّارَةٌ طَعَامُ مَسَاكِينَ أَوْ عَدْلُ ذَٰلِكَ صِيَامًا لِيَذُوقَ وَبَالَ أَمْرِهِ عَفَا اللَّهُ عَمَّا سَلَفَ وَمَنْ عَادَ فَيَنْتَقِمُ اللَّهُ مِنْهُ وَاللَّهُ عَزِيزٌ ذُو انْتِقَامٍ

O believers, slay not the game while you are in the state of ihram. Whosoever of you slays it wilfully, there shall be reparation--the like of what he has slain, in livestock, as shall be judged by two men of equity among you, as offering on reaching the Ka`bah; or expiation--food for poor persons or the equivalent of that in fasting, so that he may taste the mischief of his action. God has pardoned what is past; but whoever offends again, God will take vengeance on him; God is All-mighty, Vengeful. (5:95)

The meaning of the phrase: يَحْكُمُ بِهِ ذَوَا عَدْلٍ in the above verse is that two equitable (`adil) witnesses should judge whether a certain domestic animal is similar to the hunted wild beast. The meaning of the phrase: هدياً بالغ الكعبة is that he should slaughter the equivalent livestock and give its meat in charity on arrival in Makkah.

According to the Imamiyyah work al-Shara'i`, "Every muhrim who wears or eats anything forbidden for him should slaughter a sheep, regardless of whether his action was intentional, forgetful, or on account of ignorance."

The Imamiyyah and Shafi'i schools agree that no expiation (kafarah) is required of someone who commits a haram act forgetfully or in ignorance, except in the case of hunting, in which case even killing by mistake requires kaffarah.

The Limits of the Harams of Makkah and of Al -Madinah

The prohibition of hunting and cutting of trees applies both to the haram of Makkah and that of al-Madinah. According to Fiqh al-Sunnah, the limits of the haram of Makkah are indicated by signs in five directions, which are one-meter-high stones fixed on both sides of the roads. The limits of the haram of Makkah are as follows: (1) the northern limit is marked by al-Tan'im, which is a place at a distance of 6 kms. from Makkah; (2) the southern limit is marked by Idah,12 kms. from Makkah; (3) the eastern limit is al-Ja'ranah, 16 kms. from Makkah; (4) the western limit is al-Shumaysi, 15 kms. from Makkah.

The limits of the haram of the Prophet's shrine extend from `Ir to Thawr, a distance of 12 kms. `Ir is a hill near the miqat, and Thawr is a hill at Uhud.

Al-`Allamah al-Hilli, an Imamiyyah legist, states in his work al-Tadhkirah that "the haram of Makkah extends over an area of one band by one band (1 band =12miles), and the haram of al-Madinah extends from `Ayir to `Ir.13

Endnotes

1. Dhu al-Hulayfah, nowadays known as Bi'r `Ali or Abyar `Ali, is at a distance of about 486 kms. from Makkah to the north and 12 kms. from al-Madinah. (Tr.)

2. Al-Juhfah, lies a distance of about 156 kms. from Makkah to the north-west. (Tr.)

3. There are three points in the valley of al-`Aqiq, 94 kms. From Makkah in the north-east, from where ihram is assumed: al-Maslakh, al-Ghamrah, and Dhat al-`Irq. According to the Imamiyyah fuqaha', it is permissible to assume ihram from any of these points, though al-Maslakh is considered best, then al-Ghamrah, and then Dhat al-Irq. (Tr.)

4. Yalamlam is a mountain of the Tahamah range, lying at a distance of 84 kms. from Makkah (Tr.)

5. Qarn al-Manazil, the miqat for those coming from al-Ta'if, lies at a distance of 94 kms. east of Makkah.

6. 8 According to the Hanafi school, bringing along of hady substitutes the talbiyah, as mentioned by Ibn `Abidin and the author of Fath al-Qadir.

7. "Ish'ar" here means slitting the right side of the camel's hump. By "taqlid" is meant the hanging of an old horseshoe in the neck of the hady, which is meant to identify the sacrificial animal as such.

8. The nal has a sole, but is devoid of the covering on the sides and the back of the foot at the heels. The khuff is the common shoe, which covers the foot on the sides and the heels.

9. After performing ramy al jamarat and halq, everything except intercourse and perfume becomes permissible to the pilgrim--such as wearing of stitched clothes and other things. This is called al-hill al-'awwal (or "the first relief" from the restrictions of ihram). After the last tawaf all things including intercourse become permissible to him. This "second relief”--to be explained later--is called al-hill

al-thani.

10. According to al-Tadhkirah, It is necessary during the next Hajj that the `separation' should take place from the point where the misdemeanour was committed during the first Hajj. The meaning of `separation' (tafriq) is that the two should not be alone together without there being present a third muhrim, whose presence acts as a deterrent.

11. According to the Imamiyyah, the kaffarah for cutting a single nail is giving one mudd (800 grams) of food in charity. If all the nails of fingers and toes are cut in one sitting, the kaffarah is one sheep, but if done in several sittings, it is sacrifice of two sheep.

12. The author of al-Tadhkirah ascribes impermissibility of shadowing oneself while moving to Abu Hanifah, and the author of Rahmat al-'ummah ascribes to him permissibility.

13. Al-Mughni states, "Those knowledgeable about al-Madinah do not know of any Thawr or `Ir," but it is possible that names have changed with time.

III

Before addressing the “distinctly human desire” and sociality claims, let me pause here and return to the objections McDowell has made to this sort of reading and to his alternative interpretation. He says that in the crucialBegierde passage of ¶167, “There is no suggestion here of anything as specific as a mode of consciousness that has its objects in view only in so far as they can be seen as conducive or obstructive to its purposes,”[18] and he says that I take the notion of desire “too literally.” My response is of course that there is no question of a more or less literal understanding; that by using the word desire, Hegel simply means to introduce the topic of desire as a continuation of his discussion of consciousness, and goes on in that register, discussing life as the object of desire, the conflict between desiring beings, and ultimately the impossibility of understanding a subject’s relation to itself and the world apart from that subject’s relation to other subjects.[19] McDowell’s argument against this reading is for the most part comprised of an alternate reading that he suggests is more plausible.

It is true, as McDowellsays, that thereis a “structural” issue at stake. Hegel is continuing to try to show why the “negation” of the object’s otherness cannot be simple annihilation (or “subjective imposition”), whether the object is external or internal. Suchan other must beaufgehoben , preserved as well as negated.but McDowell interprets all of this as a mind-world or intra-psychic issue, where the latter issue remains self-consciousness’s relation to itself, and especially to the deliverances of its own sensible faculties. This all correctly isolates what McDowell calls the structure at issue in the discussion but it unnecessarily formalizes and so thins out what Hegel is talking about, such that desire, life and negation get no purchase in McDowell’s account except as exemplifications of structure. As far as I can see, on McDowell’s reading Hegel is simply repeating with several figures, exemplifications and illustrations, and even “allegories,” the desiderata we now know we need at the conclusion of the first three chapters. I don’t see how his account shows us Hegel advancing his argument; it all seems the repetition of the same point, and the point remains a desideratum.

Even in his account of the intra-psychic issue McDowell is considering, Hegel has already set things so up so that self-consciousness cannot, let us say, find itself (or its “unity” with the deliverances of its sensibility) “inside itself.” The self-relation in relation to an object that has emerged as a topic from the first three chapters is not a relation to an object of any kind, and so involves no grasp of anything. When Hegel had declared that in the understanding’s relation of objects, the understanding discovers only itself, it would distort Hegel’s understanding of what has been achieved to import the model of consciousness in any sense, whatever equipoise is suggested between subject and object in consciousness. According to Hegel, such a self-regard is always transparent and a projection “outward,” and therein lies the essential negative or going-beyond itself moment in Hegel’s account. In reporting what I think (even to myself), I am not reporting anything about me, but what I take to be true, and in being aware of what I desire, of a desirous me, I am not reporting an affective state but thereby avowing a possible project of action in the world[20] , and it is in the world that the natural cycle of desire or need and satisfaction will be, later in the account, interrupted in a way of decisive importance for the rest of thePhG .

I want to talk about such sociality in a moment, but to anticipate, McDowell complains that when Hegel makes his well-known claim in ¶175 that “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness,” he cannot mean to begin describing an encounter with another person because that would leave the original puzzlement still a puzzle. That problem was, inHegelese ,the otherness of the sensible world and how to overcome it (in the simple sense know it, but without turning it into an idea). All that seems bypassed, he thinks, if we treat“another self -consciousness” as a second person. “…hat has happened to ‘the whole expanse of the sensible world’?”[21] McDowell asks. He therefore concludes that“another self -consciousness” in “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness,” must still be referring to a singular self-consciousness, now aware of itself as self-conscious.[22]

But Hegel has always been clear that he is interested throughout in a self-relationin relation to objects . That problem has not disappeared. It has been reformulated in terms of the objects of desire for a living, desiring self-conscious consciousness. And Hegel specifically alerts us that we should not think of the whole expanse of the sensible world, although still “there,” in the same way as before.

What self-consciousness distinguishes from itselfas existing also has in it, insofar as it is posited as existing,not merely the modes of sense-certainty and perception. It is being which is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is somethingliving …( ¶168,m.e .)

And there is no reason to think that his early formulation will remain Hegel’s last word. The problem of the status of the sensible world in consciousness’s self-relation in relation to an object will recur again, formulated at a higher level, in the discussion of Observing Reason. In this chapter, having shownphenomenologically the necessity of an account of such a self-relation, Hegel is concentrating mainly on that. He has not forgotten the sensory world.

Finally and briefly, McDowell takes on the toughest passage for his reading ¶177, where Hegel says that in this chapter the “Begriff of spirit is already present for us,” that a “self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness” (I note that Hegel saysein Selbstbewusstsein exists forein Selbstbewusstsein ) and he signals the arrival on the phenomenological scene of an “I that isa we anda we that is an I.” McDowell says two things here. One is that in this remark about spirit being present for us, Hegel makes clear that by “spirit” he merely means (at this point) an object that ‘is just as much I as object,” that we have left behind an objectifying notion of a self or subject. Another is that Hegel could be read as just previewing coming attractions, noting the full phenomenology ofGeist’s experience of itself will come later.[23]

It is true that Hegel stresses here that the self of self-consciousness is not an object, but first, Hegel in the full quotation says, “Because a self-consciousness is the object [of a self-consciousness], “the object is just as muchan I as it is an object.”

In the context of the passage it does not seem possible to me to read this (¶177) as saying that self-consciousness has itself as an object of reflection, that no reference toanother self -consciousness need be meant. (Note again the use of “ein Selbstbewusstsin ,” not justSelbstbewusstsein or “dasSelbstbewusstsein .”) That might be a possible reading if one frames the issue exclusively in terms of the preceding paragraph, ¶176. But a transition has already occurred in the text by this point. In ¶175 Hegel has already argued that the model of “mind and world,” let us say, or “subject and object” in his terminology, obscures rather than helps reveal the nature of the self-consciousness essential to consciousness. On this model, desire is a manifestation of a natural process, and no trueorectic intentionality has been achieved.

Self-consciousness is thus unable by way of its negative relation to the object tosublate it, and for that reason it once again to an even greater degree re-engenders the object as well as the desire. (¶175)

This claim serves as the premise of his inference to a radically new “object.”

On account of the self-sufficiency of the object, it thus can only achieve satisfaction ifthis object itself effects the negation in it [the object]; and the object must in itself effect this negation of itself, for it isin itself the negative, and it must be for the other what it is. Since the object is the negation in itself and at the same time is therein self-sufficient, it is consciousness.(m.e .)

This seems clearly to saythat this negation must be “reflected” back to self-consciousness in order to be successful or satisfying; that one’s claim for example should not just produce submissive assent, but be acknowledged as authoritative. Anobject, or self-consciousness itself cannot accomplish this. Hence the famous conclusion: “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only inanother self -consciousness .

Further, McDowell offers no explanation of why Hegel would glossthat claim (“the object is just as much an I as it is an object “) by saying that spirit,Geist , which certainlydoes mean some sort of communal conception of subjectivity, should be a gloss onthat passage.[24] Such a communalGeist , moreover, is notjust said to be something to be discussed later. Itis “vorhanden ,” herenow . How could he say that on McDowell’s interpretation?

Actually, ¶177 is not the most difficult passage for McDowell’s interpretation. That honor goes to ¶182.

In this way, this movement of self-consciousness in its relation to another self-consciousness has been represented asthe activity of one self-consciousness , but this activity on the part of one self-consciousness has itself the twofold significance of being equallyits own activity as well asthe other’s activity , for the other is likewise self-sufficient… Each seesthe other do the same as what he himself does; eachhimself does what he demands of the other and for that reason also does what he doesonly insofar as the other does the same. A one-sided activity would be useless because what is supposed to happen can only be brought about by way of both of them bringing it about. (¶182)

I suppose it is possible to continue to claim that Hegel is still here talking about two aspects of a single self-consciousness, whetherapperceptive and empirical I, or a subject discovering itself as not object but subject, and that language like “each seesthe other do the same as what he himself does” remains “allegorical,” but I think there is more textual and systematic evidence to support a non-allegorical reading than the evidence McDowell cites.

IV

So the idea is that all determinate consciousness is positional,[25] is something likehaving a position on what is its intentional object, or is to be understood as a judging, and it can onlybe positional, have a position, if this involvestaking a position actively, isapperceptive . But this latter self-knowledge as an activity isnot positional. It is not because itsapperceptive self-awareness is not of an object but rather is something like the avowing of a practical commitment of a sort, something like a projecting (if we stay with the project language) of oneself outward into the world and the future; all in the same sense that knowing what I am doing is not observational or introspective. If I have such knowledge, it is to be carrying on in the appropriate way. (So whatits for me to be aware of my giving a lecture as I am giving it is for me to be continuously, now and into the future, following the rules of appropriateness for such an activity, something that certainly doesn’t happen automatically, and can be disputed.This stretching along or projecting or commitment-sustaining from the present into all appropriate contexts and futures in what Hegel calls “desire” and its satisfaction.) [26] As we saw, Hegel’s language for this is that the unity of self-consciousness “must become essential” for the subject, and he tells us thatthis means that “self-consciousness is desire itself.” To some degree this means that no self-conscious consciousness can take up one “position” and no other. What it is to have one position is to be committed to the various inferences and exclusions and further commitments in the future in other situations that position or commitment would entail, many obviously not evident at the time of assertion, but which introduce the problem of self-unity and so theorectic dimension of carrying on in a way that realizes the commitments I have undertaken. So the line of thought in Hegel has gone from consciousness to activity to necessarilyapperceptive to the problem of negation or consciousness being beyond itself (never conscious just by being absorbed in a state) to the gloss on the problem of the unity or such striving for unity as “self-consciousness is desire itself” to this activity as a living self-sustaining as well as anorectic striving to “get it right” to the issue we confront next: the distinctiveness of human self-conscious desire.

If this language of commitment, inference and practical projects sounds familiar in a contemporary context, I hasten to admit the relevance ofBrandom’s terminology and I hereby “project into the future” my desire and my commitment to take up his interpretation of this chapter. The Hegelian point thatBrandom captures extremely well in his own terminology is that self-consciousness, how I take myself to be, is self-constituting; I am who I take myself to be and accordingly functionally vary as such self-constituted takings vary. I can turn out not to be whom I took myself to be but that erroneous self-conception is still an essential dimension of who I am. (I mightbe a fraud, for example, or self-deceived.)[27] So self-conscious beings do not have natures, they have histories. And that is indeed Hegel’s deepest point here and stressed throughout many formulations. “Geist ,” he says, “is a product of itself.”

What I want to say is thatBrandom , because he favors his own account (not Hegel’s) of the relation between a causal perceptual interchange with the world and the role of sociality in the constitution of veridical claims (his RDRD - score-keeping account)[28] , reintroduces the two-step story Kant and Hegel were trying to avoid and so isolates the social nature of self-consciousness in a way that is the mirror opposite of McDowell’s account. Where McDowell’s interpretation made Chapter Four look like a repetition,Brandom’s comes close to a “new topic” interpretation of Chapter Four. While McDowell is certainly not trying to deny that sociality and social dependence will play crucial roles in Hegel’s account later, he denies that such themes are relevant here, and so tries to preserve a common sense picture in whichsuccessful perception does not involve such socialdependence, Brandom too distinctly isolates the sociality of self-consciousness.[29] I think this is because McDowell is generally suspicious of attributing any role to sociality in the conditions of perceptual knowledge. His position is more Kantian and concentrates only on the Hegelian account of the way conceptual activity shapes perceptual knowledge and intentional action.Brandom concentrates on the issue of self-consciousness and sociality because he has his own quasiSellarsean theory of perceptual content. What I am trying to argue is that neither gets right the relation between Chapter Four and the first three chapters.)

Brandom presents in his own terminology an account of the movement of Hegel’s argument in the text that illuminates a lot of what is going on in these tenebrous pages. The question is something like: what would we have toadd to the picture of an object’s differential responsiveness to its environment (something that iron can do in responding to humid environments by rusting and to others by not rusting), from differential responses that are intentional, that are not simply caused responses to the world, but which can be said to involve taking the world to be a certain way. This is the proto-intentionality typical of animals who, when hungry (and so desirous), can practically classify, take, the objects in their environment as food (desire-satisfying). But differentially responding to food and distinguishing it from non-food, does not satisfy hunger just ipso facto. (As would be the caseif we were still at the level of the iron.) The animal mustdo something to satisfy its hunger and must do what is appropriate, sometimes involving several steps and even cooperation with other animals. It must get and eat such food. Another way of saying that the animal does not just respond to food items in its environment but takes things to be food is that there is now possible for the animal an appearance-reality distinction. It can take things to be food that are not and can learn from its mistakes. Or it only responds and acts to eat such food when it is hungry, when in a proto-intentional way, it takes the food as to-be-eatennow .[30]

And thus far, I think this tracks very well what Hegel is up to. Having conceded (as any sane person would)[31] a basic tenet of empiricism – no sensory interchange with the world, no possible knowledge about the world - he goes on to argue that such a perceptual interchange alone cannot amount to a world we could experience. We must understand how things are taken to be what they are by subjects, and that means understanding the kind of beings for whom things can appear, and so be taken (apperceptively ) to be such and such, or not. And I thinkBrandom is quite right that this at least means understanding the difference between mere differential responsiveness, and anorectic , discriminatory consciousness, a practical classification (or “taking”), which is the most basic, minimal way of understanding how things can be for a subject, and not just response-triggers,

The next step is the crucial one.Now what do we have to add to this picture to get not proto-intentionality but real intentionality, not just something like a sentiment of one’s life in play as one seeks to satisfy desire, but genuine self-consciousness? What is it for aself to be for itself? One way to look at this is: in line with what has been said, both in thisBrandom section and before, we need to know what is necessary to introduce a distinction between what I take myself to be and what I am, and we must do this without suggesting that one misapprehends an object. Rather, what is involved in so taking oneself is to attribute a certain determinate authoritative status tooneself , and that has to be provisional.[32] It could be in some psychological sense “sincere” but inconsistent with what someone attributing to himself such an authority would have to say and do, and this latter must eventually mean, by the lights of the relevant others. InBrandom’s summation of the point, he says,

…what is required to be able to take something to be a self is to be able to attribute attitudes that have distinctivelynormative significances: to move from a world ofdesires to a world ofcommitments ,authority andresponsibility .[33]

But, asBrandom argues, to move from that world is necessarily to introduce both a social dimension into Hegel’s account and the appropriateorectic attitude “after” such amove . Attributing a normative significance tomyself or acknowledging someone’s entitlement to claim authority cannot be expressions of sentiment or preference; these are claims that are supposed to hold for everyone.[34] (The radical Hegelian claim, which need not be an issue here, is that all having such authority amounts to is being acknowledged –under the right conditions and in the right way – to have such authority.)[35] And the relevantorectic attitude for such a self-taking must be adesire for recognition by others.

How this all works is then spelled out byBrandom in ways quite close to his own account of the role of score-keeping as that constituent of this requirednormativity essential to possible intentionality as well as self-consciousness.

So specific recognition involves acknowledging another as having some authority concerning how things are (what things are Ks). When I do that, I treat you as one of us, in a primitive normative sense of ‘us’ – those of us subject tohe same norms, the same authority – that is instituted by just such attitudes.” (p. 142)

There are various aspects ofBrandom’s account that do not match Hegel’s in Chapter Four, and they are related. His account is of course a reconstruction[36] , but for one thing, he leaves out an element that on the surface seems quite important to Hegel’s sense of the case he is making. I mean his appeal to the experience ofopposed self-consciousnesses . This concerns whatBrandom has elsewhere called disparagingly the “martial” rhetoric of Chapter Four, especially the talk of a struggle to the death, which, as we have seen,Brandom wants to treat as a metonymy for genuine commitment, but which Hegel seems to treat as a key elementin the story itself, not an exemplification of a larger story (about the nature of commitment). The second concerns the way Hegel treats the relation between natural desire, its expression and the accompanying self-sentiment and, on the other hand, genuine self-consciousness, taking oneself as a taker, a being for whom things can be. Hegel does not just articulate the conceptual difference between these, asBrandom does, andargue that the added element to the picture,normativity , has to be there in order to distinguish animal desire from self-conscious takings. Consistent with Hegel’s narrative and developmental approach throughout there is an experiential claim about the experience of a natural desirer when confronted with a kind of object which is not simply to be negated, as Hegel understands the term, but which, remarkably, negates back. Hegel seems to want to explain the difference between proto-intentional animal desire and the sort of “desire” that is self-consciousness - that is, one who takes the world to be such and such, and takes himself to be a taker, thereby aware of the defeasibility of the normative claim - all in experiential and developmental terms, not just by making explicit the conceptual conditions for such a differentiation but by appeal to this experiential and developmental argument. (I don’t mean actual historical experience, but an argument form like Hobbes’s, where a picture of everyone trying to maximize their own safety and well-being is shown unavoidably to result in everyone being maximally insecure and worse off.This suggestion about the state of nature experience functions as an argument for the rationality of exiting the state of nature, which of course no one was ever in and no one everexited . The same argument form is in play in Hegel)

So the key question is how does Hegelget from his picture of animaldesire ( one who can take the world to be a certain way) to anorectic self-consciousness, one who also takes himself to be a taker and so understands that his “takings” are normative phenomena, and what justifies Hegel’s contention that a necessary condition of the possibility of this latter phenomenon is striving to recognize and be recognized by other subjects? WhatBrandom essentially does is pose this question as a structural one, by applying what he had called the tri-partite structure of erotic awareness (TSEA) not just to ordinary objects which one takes for-oneself to be a certain way (e.g. food), but to ask about how it applies with regard to another being for whom things also are. What is the TSEA for another TSEA as the object of awareness? When the object one takes to be in some such a way for oneself is another awareness taking things to be for-it self – especially includingthat first taker , when one is aware of being taken in a way by another taker – what are the relevant elements necessary to account for such anincipient social situation?

I think that what Hegel wants to say at this point, when he wants to explain why it is that we cannot treat as satisfactory amonadically conceived self-consciousorectic consciousness, a desiring being who can practically classify but who is a aware of being a practical classifier and so has a normative sense of properly and improperly classifying, but imagined in no relation to another such self-conscious classifier or imagined to be indifferent to another’s takings, is simply that on the simple empirical premise that there are other such subjects around in a finite world, those other subjectswill not and from their point of view cannot allow such pure self-relatedness. The sketch we have so far of a self-conscious theoretical and practical intentionality simply insures not only that there will be contention, but that on the premises we have to work with so far, it has to be a profound contention that can, initially or minimally conceived, only be resolved by the death of one, or the complete subjection of one to the other. That this is so will play a large role in Hegel’s account of the sociality on which we are said by him to depend.

Here are some examples of passages where Hegel makes such claims. The important remarks occur after ¶175. There Hegel contrasts the satisfaction of animal desire, whose subject, followingBrandom , takes things a certain way, but then simply negates these objects, or satisfies its desire. Such a subject may be resisted in a sense by one’s desired object fighting back, if we are talking about predator and prey, but such resistance is just not a challenge, more like an obstacle. (No challenge to the correctness of the classifications or the entitlement to make it has been made.) With this sort of negation of one’s object, another desire arises. That is,

Desire and the certainty of itself achieved in its satisfaction are conditioned by the object, for the certainty exists by way of the act ofsublating of this other.For this act ofsublating even to be, there must be this other. (¶175)

In this situation one cannot be said to be the subject of one’s desires but subject to one’s desires. One’s putative independence as the subject of one’s thoughts and deeds is actually a form of dependence and so one’s takings cannot yet be counted as normative takings.

That is,

Self-consciousness is thus unable by way of its negative relation to the object tosublate it, and for that reason it once again to an even greater degree re-engenders the object as well as the desire.

This all changes however, when, among the objects of self-consciousness’sorectic attitudes there is an object which is not an object, another subject, which, as such a subject, cannot simply be “negated” (only destroyed as an object), but if it is to satisfy the desire of the first subject, “must in itself effect this negation of itself.” (He puts it less abstractly in ¶182, “For that reason, it can do nothing on its own about that object if that object does not do in itself what the first self-consciousness does in it.”)

At this point we must remember back all the way to ¶80, and the fact that a self-conscious consciousness is always “beyond itself” and that the problem this engenders, the unity of self-consciousness with itself, “must become essential” to self-consciousness. One form of such satisfaction is simple desire satisfaction; unity with self is produced by eliminating the gap or need within the self, the desire. But another sort of satisfaction altogether is at issue when one’s claims or takings, as such are confronted by another who denies them, who has his own claims, or when one’s deeds, inevitably affecting what others would otherwise be able to do, are rejected, not merely obstructed, by a being whose deeds conflict with one own.[37] The achievement of such a unity is not then possible alone. As Hegel will go on to show, one will not have responded to such challenges as the challenges they are (a resolution of unity of such disparity will not have become “essential to it”) by simply annihilating the other, and so one will not have satisfied oneself, achieved the unity (self-satisfaction) spoken of so frequently. (One would still be in the position of an animal desirer, subject to one’s desires.) The presence of another “taker who takes himself to be a taker” and so who is a potential challenge, not an obstacle, establishes that the normative problem, whether one’s takes on the world are as they ought to be, is essential to this self-reconciliation, and that means that this confrontation of affirmation and negation cannot be resolved on, let us say, the animal level. That is, “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only inanother self -consciousness .” Or, “Only thereby does self-consciousness in factexist, for it is only therein that the unity of itself in its otherness comes to be for it.” (¶177)

But in Hegel’s account, there is no non-question-begging criterion, or method, or procedure or standard by which such a contention can be resolved. One whatever might count as the giving and asking for reasons might be counted by the other as the arbitrary expression of the other’s desire for success, as a mere ploy or strategy.[38] So, Hegel reasons, the primitive expression of normative commitment, the only available realization (Verwirklichung ) of the claimas a claim , is a risk of life itself.

…theexhibition of itself as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself to be the pure negation of its objective mode, that is, in showing that it is fettered to no determinateexistence , that it is not at all bound to the universal individuality of existence,that it is not shackled to life. ¶187)

Hegel makes such a claim not because of any anthropological claim about the centrality of honor in human life but because, in assembling the central, minimal elements of sociality, the genuinely human sociality among self-conscious beings that can provide the satisfaction he has claimed arises as a problem with the realization that consciousness is always “beyond itself,” we must begin without begging any questions. So he proposes we think of the problem as a struggle within such narrow parameters and we get this famous picture.

The relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that it is through a life and death struggle that eachproves his worth tohimself, and that bothprove their worth to each other. (…daß sie sich selbst und einander durch den Kampf auf Leben und Todbewähren .) (¶187)[39]

Throughout the rest of the chapter, Hegel shows the practical incoherence of any attempted resolution of such conflict by the establishment of mere power, or coerced recognition. It is clear that what is necessary for such a conciliation, for beings conceived as Hegel now has, is some resort to practical reason and so ultimately some shared view of a universal norm.[40] And it is true that Hegel has a “pragmatic” or a “historicized” or “dialogical”[41] view of what counts as the appeal to reasons. He understands practical reason as a kind of interchange of attempts at justification among persons each of whose actions affects what others would otherwise be able to do, and all this for a community at a time. But his account of what this consists inrequires , in effect, the rest of the book, the developmental and experiential procedure characteristic of a “phenomenology.”

V

“Self-Consciousness is desire itself.” I have argued that Hegel means by this that theapperceptive element in all thought and action is not self-regarding but “self-positing,” or something like, in both McDowell’s andBrandom’s terms, taking responsibility, claiming authority for, what one thinks and does. In Hegel’s account there is a transition between a primitive, still naturally explicable version of such a taking and it is shown to become the full-fledged version only in the presence and especially challenge of another such self-conscious being. This is the beginning of a socially mediated conception of intentionality as such, but at this early stage in his account, we are not entitled to assume any prior agreement about the rules of reason in resolving the struggle forrecognition , for acknowledgement of the authority of one’s claims, that must inevitably arise under the premises of Hegel’s account thus far. The emergence of suchcommon commitments must also be shown, as everything in thePhenomenology , developmentally and experientially, and this will eventually involve nothing less than a philosophically inflected narrative of Western modernity. That is, the question for Hegel is not so much the logical structure of commitment and eventually the mutual recognition of commitments, but to understand what is involved in themaking of commitments; under what conditions would it plausible to see such common commitments arising, and so forth. He does not just want to explain what it is to have a commitment by a metonymical image (being willing to sacrifice natural attachments), but to askhow anyone could come to see themselves as bound to such a commitment, bound especially to such a degree. This approach might seem to some like a blurring of the lines between philosophy and approaches like sociology, history, social psychology and anthropology. I don’t think it does, but that is a separate question. I have tried here mainly to offer an interpretation of Hegel’s unusual claim about desire, and to defend that against two philosophically rich and challenging contrary interpretations.

Notes