A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women

A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women42%

A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women Author:
Translator: Arifa Hudda
Publisher: Islamic Humanitarian Service (IHS)
Category: Jurisprudence Principles Science
ISBN: 1-894701-05-4

A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women
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A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women

A Code of Ethics for Muslim Men and Women

Author:
Publisher: Islamic Humanitarian Service (IHS)
ISBN: 1-894701-05-4
English

Rules relatedTo covering

بسم الله الرّحمن الرّحيم

يَا بَنِي آدَمَ قَدْ أَنزَلْنَا عَلَيْكُمْ لِبَاساً يُوَارِي سَوْئَاتِكُمْ وَرِيشاً وَلِبَاسُ التَّقْوَى ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ ذَلِكَ مِنْ آيَاتِ اللّهِ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَذَّكَّرُونَ .

“O children of Adam! We have indeed sent down to you clothing to cover your shame, and (clothing) for beauty and clothing that guards (against evil), that is the best. This is of the communications of Allah that they may be mindful.

Al-Qur’an · Surah A’raf · Ayah 26

Covering for Men

A) Clothing Forbidden for Men

79 – Rule: It is haram for men to wear clothing that is made of 100% pure silk, even if it is askull-cap or a belt, regardless of whether or not it can be seen by a man or a woman who is a Mahram or non-Mahram.

It is haram for men to wear clothing that is made of 100% pure silk, but as for things such as a skull-cap, belt or socks which in itself can not be used to cover the private parts, if they are made of 100% pure silk then apparently it is allowed to read the Salat (with these things on the person) although it is against Ihtiyat

Attention: This explanation is in the meaning of Ihtiyat Mustahab and therefore according to his ruling, according to Ihtiyat Mustahab, at the time of Salat, men should not have on things like a skull-cap, socks, etc (made of pure silk)…

It is haram for men to wear clothing that is made of 100% pure silk. Also , according to Ihtiyat Wajib, it is not allowed for men to wear things such as a skull-cap, belt, etc… that in itself can not be used to cover the private parts, if they are made from 100% silk.

80 – Rule: If the entire or a part of the lining of clothingis made from 100% pure silk, then it is not allowed for a man to wear it.

If the amount of silk is less than the size of four closed fingers, then it is not aproblem, and any amount more than this is haram for men to wear.

81 – Rule: It is haram for men to wear clothing that is made of 100% pure silk, even if it is the clothing that is not apparent, for example, underclothing.

82 – Rule: It is not a problem to wear clothing that has braids or laces made of silk, or if ithas a patch or emblem made of silk on it.

83 – Rule: It is not a problem to have something made of pure silk with you, such as a handkerchief in the pocket.

84 – Rule: If a type of clothing is made of a mix of silk and something other than silk, then in the event that the term 100% silkcan not be applied to that clothing, it is not a problem to wear it. However, if it is such that itcan be referred to as 100% silk, then it is not permitted to wear it.

85 – Rule: It is not a problem to wear clothing if one is in doubt whether it is 100% silk or something else.

86 – Rule: It is not a problem to wear clothing thathas been stitched with thread made of silk.

Apparently, itis allowed .

87 – Rule: It is haram for men to beautify themselves with gold, or wear clothing that has been stitched with gold, whether it be something apparent or hidden, and the Salat prayed (by a man who has gold on) is void. Therefore, if for example, a man is wearing gold chain around his neck, then even if itis hidden (under his shirt), it is still haram.

88 – Rule: Itis not allowed for men to beautify themselves with anything made of gold, whether it is something apparent or hidden.

Therefore: It is not allowed for a man to wear a gold bracelet or a gold necklace, even if it is under the clothing andcan not be seen.Also , it is not allowed to wear a gold watch or gold cuff links or any other type of beautification that is made of gold.

89 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, men must not wear glasses made of gold either.

It is haram for men to wear glasses made of gold.

90 – Rule: White gold does not have the same ruling as yellow gold, and the wearing of it for men is not a problem, except that which is in reality yellow gold, but only the colour of it has changed.

If white gold is a metal other than yellow gold, then it is not a problem for men to wear it.

If white goldis referred to as gold and is the same thing as yellow gold, then it is not allowed for men to wear it.

91 – Rule: It is not a problem to beautify or decorate one’s self with something that is gold coated, in the event that in reality itcan not be considered as gold.

92 – Rule: If something is a mixture of yellow gold and another metal, and if the yellow goldhas become mixed such that in reality it is no longer considered as yellow gold, then it does not have the ruling as gold.

Itis not allowed for mean to wear anything that is a mixture of gold and other than gold.

93 – Rule: If a man doubts whether an item is made of gold or not, then the usage of it for him is not a problem.

If itis considered as gold, then it is not allowed.

94 – Question: What is the ruling for a man if he purchases a gold ring or a gold watch for his wife, and in order to see if it will fit or to protect it, puts it on his hand? What is the ruling for this if it is during Salat or even otherwise?

Answer: It is haram for the man; and his Salat while wearing it, is void.

95 – Question: A man buys a gold ring for his wife and in order to check the size, he puts it on his finger. Does this amount of wearing it have any relevance or not?

Answer: In this instance, for that amount of time (that he is just trying it), is not a problem.

B) Covering for Men in Front of Maharim, Men, and Others

B) Covering for Men in Front of Maharim, Men, and Others1

96 – Rule: Men must cover their private parts from other men and those women that are hisMahram, however it is not Wajib to cover the rest of their body from them.

97 – Question: Is it sufficient for a man to (only) wear swimming trunks or other types of underclothing which show the shape of the private parts, but do not show the skin, in front of others?

Answer: If there is no fear of falling into sin, then it is not a problem.

Answer: If it leads to corruption or falling into sin, then itis not allowed .

98 – Rule: It is haram for a man not to cover a part of his body with the intention of making others fall into sin.

That amount of the body that must becovered, is the same amount of the body that is haram to be left open, even if others will not fall into sin. As for those parts of the body that are not wajib to be covered, if it (being kept open) will lead one to commit a haram act, then it is wajib to cover that area as well.

99 – Rule: It is haram to take off one’s clothes in the presence of other men or one’s Maharim with the intention of sexually arousing others. One’s spouse is an exception.

That amount of the body that must becovered, is the same amount of the body that is haram to be left open, even if others will not fall into sin. As for those parts of the body that are not wajib to be covered, if it (being kept open) will lead one to commit a haram act, then it is wajib to cover that area as well.

100 – Rule: Doctors are not an exception to the above rules and therefore men must keep their private parts covered in front of them as well, except in the case of necessity.

Summary: That which is an exception to the covering of men is in the case of a necessity. Thus, if a manis compelled , he is permitted to expose his private parts in front of the doctor (for example, some illnesses in which it is necessary to expose the private parts in order to be cured). In cases other than this (such as for birth control, except in the case of necessity), a man must cover his private parts in front of others, even if it may be his father, brother, or son. He must also cover his private parts from other Maharim like such as his sister, mother, aunt, and anyone else.

C) Covering of Men in the Presence of Non-Mahram Women

101 – Rule: A man must cover his private parts when in the presence of non-Mahram women, but it is not wajib to cover the rest of his body.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, a man must cover his body from non-Mahram women even if it (not covering the body) does not lead one to a haram act; but if it does lead one to it, then without a doubt it is wajib to cover the body in the same way that covering the private parts from the view of non-Mahram women is wajib.

102 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Mustahab, men must cover other parts of the body that are normally covered by men, while in the presence of non-Mahram women, especially if the man knows that the non-Mahram women may look at them with the intention of lust.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, men must cover their body from the view of non-Mahram women, even if it does not lead one to a haram act, and if it does, then without doubt it is wajib to cover it.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, a man must cover those parts thatare commonly covered by men, in the event that he knows that a non-family member woman will look at him.

Therefore: Men must cover the area above their wrist, the chest, thefeet and other parts that men usually cover from non-Mahram women who are in their presence. As for covering the other parts such as the head, face, and hands, it is not necessary.

103 – Rule: It is haram to expose any part of the body with the intention of sexually arousing non-Mahrams.

If it helps or leads one to commit a haram act, then without a doubt it is wajib to cover the body.

Therefore: It is haram for a man to expose his arms,chest or any other part of his body with the intention of having non-Mahram women look at him.Also , it is haram for him to wear a see-thru shirt with the intention of having non-Mahram women look at his body, thus he must also refrain from these acts. If clothing such as a short sleeve shirt is worn, however not with the intention of arousing others, but it is known that others may fall into sin,then according to Ihtiyat Mustahab one should not wear such clothing.

104 – Question: Can a non-Mahram woman give an injection to a man, take his blood pressure, or take an x-ray of him?

Answer: If it necessitates touching or a forbidden look at the body of the man, then it is not allowed, except in the case of necessity.

Looking at the body of a non-Mahram man, if it does not lead one to commit a haram act, then according to Ihtiyat Wajib, is not allowed; and if it will lead one to commit a haram act, then without doubt, it is haram to look at his body. In either scenario, itis not allowed to touch the body of a non-Mahram man except in the case of a necessity.

105 – Question: In the event that a man knows that a non-Mahram woman will look at him, can he expose a bit more of his body than that whichis normally covered by men? For example, can he be in the house with his underclothes on, go out to wash carpets, or his car, etc… roll up his pants in the event that he know that non-Mahram women will look at him, or swim in the presence of non-Mahram women?

Answer: If it is with the intention of leading others into something forbidden, then it is haram; and in situations other than this, it is still better to refrain from it, especially if the onlookers are young women.

Answer: If it leads one to a haram act, then itis not permitted ; but even if it does not lead one to a haram act, according to Ihtiyat Wajib the man must cover his body from the view of non-Mahram.

Answer: If it is with the intention of leading others into something forbidden, then it is haram, and if not, then according to Ihtiyat Wajib, one must still cover that which is normally covered.

D) Covering for Men in the presence of Children

Children that are not Mumayyiz

106 – Rule: It is not wajib to cover any part of the body – even the private parts, if the child is not Mumayyiz, whether the child is a boy or a girl.

If the Child is Mumayyiz

107 – Rule: Men must cover their private parts from a child who is Mumayyiz, whether it is a boy or a girl, Mahram or a non-Mahram.

Therefore: Men must cover their private parts in front of their Mumayyiz children in the showers and other places.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, a man must cover his body from girls who have not yet completed 9 years of age, but who understand good and bad, even if there is no intention of sexual pleasure.

Covering of Women

A) Covering for Women in the Presence of Non-Mahram Men

108 – Rule: It is wajib for women to cover their entire body from non-Mahram Men; with the exception of their face and hands, as long as the following conditions are met:

Their face and hands must not have any kind of beautification (zinat) on them.

One will not look at their face or hands with the intention of lust.

Women must cover their body and hair from non-Mahram men, even if there is no harm of falling into sin and even if there is no intention of deriving pleasure.

A woman must cover her entire body except her face and hands from non-Mahram men, with the condition that there is no zinat on these parts and that her intention is not that she wants non-Mahram men to look at these parts. However, if non-Mahram men look at her face and hands with the intention of deriving pleasure, then it is not necessary for the woman to cover her face and hands.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, women must also cover their face and hands from non-Mahram men.

Women must cover the hair (on their head) and their body from non-Mahram men, with the exception of their face and hands; and if they fear that by not covering these parts they will fall into sin, or if their intention of not covering these parts is to make men look at them with a haram look, then in either of these two scenarios, it is not permitted to keep these two parts uncovered.

A Woman must cover her entire body, with the exception of her face and hands from non-Mahram men; and in the event that there is any zinat on her face or hands, such as a ring or if she has shaped her eyebrows, or she has applied Surma to her eyes, even if these things are common among old women, it is not wajib to cover them. In other than these scenarios, a woman must cover her zinat from non-Mahram men. However, according to Ihtiyat Mustahab, a woman should cover her face and hands from a non-Mahram, even if there is no zinat on them.

109 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, women must cover a bit more of their face and hands thanthat which is normally covered. (The faceis said to be that part which is wajib to wash in Wuzhu, and it is stated that the hands are the part from the wrist to the fingertips.)

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, the entire face and handsmust be covered from non-Mahram men.

According to Ihtiyat Mustahab, it is better for a woman to cover her face from non-Mahram men.

110 – Question: According to the laws of Islam,is it allowed to expose the sole, top, malleolus and the heel of the foot, in front of non-Mahram men?

Answer: Itis not allowed .

Therefore: Women are not permitted to go in front of non-Mahram men without socks on their feet, or with their feet showing, go to a nearby store to buy even just one item.Also , if there are non-Mahram men in the house, then it is not permitted to come in their presence without having socks on, even if it may be one’s husband’s brother, a sister’s husband, or any other non-Mahram men.

111 – Rule: It is not permitted for women to reveal or expose the part under the chin, the neck, the ears, thechest or the forearm up to the upper arm; and therefore one must ensure that these parts are also covered from non-Mahram men.

Note: Women must pay close attention to the following: In the house or in other places in which there are non-Mahram men present; if one is wearing something with short sleeves, or if one has long sleeves on and one is trying to reach to something which is high up; or taking something from the hands of a non-Mahram man; or offering fruits or other things to the non-Mahram; or when buying things from the store; or when carrying something big and heavy – in all these and other instances in which there is a chance of the sleeves going up and the arm or any part of the body becoming exposed, women must be extra cautious (to ensure that those parts which must be covered, remain covered) .

112 – Question: What is the extent of the Islamic hijab for women? For this purpose, does the wearing of clothing that is long and loose fitting, with pants and a scarf suffice? Essentially, what are the basics in the clothing and covering that a woman must observe in front of others?

Answer: It is wajib that the entire body of a woman, with the exception of the face and hands up to the wrist,is covered from non-Mahram men. The clothing thathas been mentioned , if it covers that part which is wajib, then it is not a problem; but it is better to wear a chador2 . One must also refrain from that clothing which draws the attention of non-Mahram men.

Answer: It is wajib that the entire body of a womanis covered from non-Mahram men, and according to Ihtiyat Wajib, the face and hands must also be covered. The clothing thathas been mentioned , if it covers that part which is wajib, then it is not a problem; but it is better to wear a chador. One must also refrain from that clothing which draws the attention of non-Mahram men.

113 – Question:Is it allowed to wear a mantou3 and pants in which the shape of the body is visible, in the presence of non-Mahram men?

Answer: From the point of hijab and covering, it is sufficient, but in the event that showing the shape of the body would lead to lust or corruption, then itmust be covered .

Answer: If it does not arouse or excite (others), and there is no corruption (in wearing it), and in the event that it is not considered as a zinat, then it is not a problem.

Answer: In the event that it draws the attention of others (non-Mahram men), then it is not permitted.

114 – Rule: Women are not permitted to raise their sleeves (to show their arms) to non-Mahram men in order to get an injection, have their blood pressure checked, taking of the pulse, or for any other reason, except in the case of necessity.

115 – Question:I am a woman who must have an injection everyday and there is a clinic near my house in which a man gives the injections. However, there is another clinic that is further away in which a woman also gives the injection, but because it is far away,I must travel by car (to get to it). AmI allowed to go to the man to have the injection?

Answer: Itis not allowed , except in the case of necessity.

116 – Question: Are women allowed to go to a male doctor without investigating and inquiring if there is a female doctor available or not?

Answer: Itis not allowed .

Answer: In the event that it is an emergency, it is not a problem

117 – Question: In our city, there is a female doctor and a male one, but the male doctor is more specialized and experienced.Is it allowed for women to go to the male doctor?

Answer: In the event that the female doctorcan not treat the illness, then it is not a problem.

Answer: In the event that the male doctor can treat the patient better, then it is not a problem.

B) Rules Related to Wearing Socks

118 – Question: Is it allowed to wear thick socks in which the shape of the foot is visible in front of non-Mahram men, or not?

Answer: In the event that there is no corruption related to it, and the skin of the feet does not show, then it is not a problem.

Answer: If it leads to corruption and sin, then itis not permitted .

Answer: In addition to this, the socks must not be of the type thatwould be considered as a zinat.

119 – Rule: Wearing of thin, see-thru socks in which the skin of the feet is visibleis not considered as covering, and therefore, women must refrain from wearing these kinds of socks in the presence of non-Mahram men.

120 – Question: There are some women who wear pants, and then pull their socks over top of the pants in such a way that the shape of the bottom of their legs show – what is the ruling for wearing socks in this manner?

Answer: It is not a problem.

Answer: In the event that it leads others to excitement or pleasure, then itis not allowed .

Answer: If it leads to sin or corruption, then itis not allowed .

Answer: In the event that it does not lead to falling into sin and there is no corruption, it is not a problem.

121 – Question: What is the ruling for wearing flashy, repelling-coloured clothing, and clothing that draws the attention of others, in places where non-Mahram men are present, such as universities, stores, etc

Answer: With the assumption that the clothing is arousing, it is haram.

Answer: Although it is not a problem, however, Muslims must maintain their dignity even in their (type of) clothing.

Answer: With the assumption that the clothing is arousing, and leads one to corruption, it is haram.

Answer: If the clothing of the womanis clothing that is considered as zinat, then it is wajib to cover it from the view of non-Mahram men, in the same way that it is wajib to cover the body from their view.

C) Rules Related to the Chador

122 – Question:Is it permitted to wear that type of chador that in the sunlight shows a bit of the body – in the presence of non-Mahram men?

Answer: In the event that the skin of the body does not show, and there is no fear of falling into sin, it is not a problem.

Answer: In all instances, the woman must cover her self in such a way so as not to attract the attention of others (non-Mahram men).

Answer: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, itis not allowed to wear such a chador.

123 – Question: What is the ruling on wearing a chador made of Sherman (a type of fabric)?

Answer: In the event that according to the general population it notbe considered as drawing the attention (of others), it is not a problem.

Note: Attracting of attention (of others) is of two types: sometimes in certain places, no women are known to wear this Sherman Chador, and in this case a woman wearing it, would attract the attention (of others), and thus, it is not allowed for her to wear it. In the second instance, there may be a place where women wear the ShermanChador, however, one wears it in such a way so as to attract the attention of others, in which case this too is not permitted.

124 – Rule: It is not allowed to wear those types of chadors in which the hair or the shape of the hand of the woman shows through or to wear these types of chador in which their hair shows or the shape of their hands shows through, especially if there are non-Mahram men (in the house), and women must refrain from wearing these types of chador.

125 – Question: If a woman wears a type of chador in which the shape of her body can be seen through it, but she is wearing enough clothing under the chador, for example, she is wearing a scarf on her head, socks, and long sleeve clothing, then is it Islamically permissible (to wear such a chador)?

Answer: In the event that the body (skin)can not be seen and by wearing such a chador there is no fear of corruption, then it is not a problem.

Note: Thosewomen who use chador as their hijab, in the following examples, must be extra careful of their covering:

1. At the time of buying and selling something with non-Mahram men; while fixing their chador in the presence of non-Mahram men; taking or giving things to them; working in the presence of non-Mahram men, whether it be in the house or outside of the house; washing clothes, dishes or anything else in the presence of non-Mahram men; setting the table and cleaning up after a meal, etc…

2. In all of the above mentioned examples, and those thatare related to these, it is recommended that women should wear sufficient clothing underneath their chador, and that they make use of a scarf or maqnah. Also, they should wear “add-on sleeves” in the event that the clothing they are wearing under the chador is short sleeved so as to observe the complete hijab and to gain the pleasure of Allah ().

126 – Question: If a closefamily member proposes to a girl but she does not accept his marriage proposal, then later on if these two meet each other, and in the event the man is still single, how should the girl act and behave in front of him?Should she observe more than that which wajib in her hijab or be extra careful while speaking to him or not?

Answer: One must keep away from all those actions that may lead to corruption and sins.

Therefore: For example, according to the fatawa of the late Ayatullah Khomeini, if keeping the face and hands open leads the young man to look at her with the intention of lust, then she must cover her face and hands and if speaking to him leads him to falling into corruption, then she must also keep away from this.

D) Rules Related to Beautification (Zinat)

D) Rules Related to Beautification (Zinat)4

127 – Question: Whatis meant by beautification (zinat)?

Answer: Everything that thegeneral public regards as beautification, and people refer to it as such.

128 – Question: If a woman applies surma – not with the intention of it being for beauty, but instead for the benefits that are in it, then in this case,must it be concealed from the view of non-Mahram men?

Answer: If the general population regard it as being a means of beautification then it must be concealed, whether one’s intention for using it is beautification, or not.

Answer: Itwould be considered as zinat.

Answer: If she applies the surma in such a way that even old women or elderly women use it, then even if it is for beautification, it is not necessary to cover it from non-Mahram men.

129 – Question: Must a woman who has had her eyebrows shaped (hair plucked from the eyebrows) cover them (in the presence of non-Mahram men) in order to observe the true Islamic hijab, or is she permitted to have them exposed?

Answer: She must cover them.

Answer: If it is arousing or stimulating, then she must cover them, and in other than this, according to Ihtiyat (she must cover it).

Answer: In the event that according to thegeneral public it would be considered as a beautification, then it is necessary to cover it.

Answer: If beautifying the face (either by plucking the eyebrows or having them shaped) is done in such a way that even elderly women perform it,then it is not necessary to cover it.

130 – Rule: Womenare allowed to cover only that part of the face or hands that has some beauty on it, and it is not wajib that the rest of the face (or hands) be covered.

Therefore: If a woman only has the bottom part of the eyebrows shaped, then she can just cover that part of her face with her scarf or chador; and in the event that the rest of her face does not have any beautification on it, then it is not a problem if that portion is exposed (without the zinat).

Answer: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, in all instances the face and hands must be covered from non-Mahram men, whether they have any beautification on them or not.

Note: The following are some examples of beautification on the hands and thatmust be covered from non-Mahram men:

Bangle

Bracelet

Ring (even if it is one’s wedding ring)

Longfinger nails

Nail polish

Henna

Certain types ofwatches which are worn as a means of beautification

Certain types ofgloves which are worn as a means of beautification

The followingare considered as beautification for the face:

Applying surma

Shaping of the eyebrows

Applying artificial eyebrows

Using any kind of makeup

Having a nose-ring (as is the custom is some cultures)

Earrings

Other than these, anything else that the general population (of that particular area) considers as beautification is also included and thesemust all be covered while in the presence of non-Mahram men.

131 – Question: Do plucking the eyebrows for women constitute beautification (zinat) or not?Also , if a woman has her eyebrows plucked, must she cover her face from the view of non-Mahram men?

Answer: If thegeneral public considers it as a beautification, then it wajib to cover it from non-Mahram men.

Answer: Yes, itwill be considered as zinat and it must be covered from non-Mahram men.

Answer: If the beautification of the faceis done in such a way that is common even among old women, then it is not wajib to cover it from non-Mahram men.

132 – Rule: In the ruling concerning the covering of the face and hands while in the presence of non-Mahram men, in the event that one has any beautification on – there is no difference between the non-Mahram man being a family member or an outsider.

Therefore: In gatherings, or when guests come to one’s house who are family members or otherwise, women must either refrain from applying any type of beautification on their face and hands, or else cover them in front of the non-Mahram men.

133 – Question:I am a woman who wears a wedding ring (that is very simple) and it is not for zinat, but rather for remembrance and loyalty to my husband. Is it wajib forme to cover this from non-Mahram men?

Answer: To wear any kind of ringis considered as zinat, and therefore it is wajib to cover it from the sight of non-Mahram men.

Answer: If it is arousing or stimulating, then itmust be covered and in other than this, according to Ihtiyat (it must be covered).

Answer: It is not wajib to cover those rings that women usually wear on their hands, from the view of non-Mahram men.

Answer: In the event that thegeneral public consider it is a zinat, it is necessary to cover it.

134 – Question: Is there any difference in the type of beautification? For example, if one applies a type of beautification that according to her own custom is considered as zinat, however, for another group of people, not only is it not considered as a zinat, rather it is taken as something repulsive or ugly, then must this type of zinat be concealed from non-Mahram men as well?

Answer: Beautifying one’s self is not related to beauty or ugliness, and anything that thegeneral public considers as zinat must be covered from non-Mahram men.

Answer: If the beautification on the face or handsis done in such a way that is common even among old women, such as shaping the eyebrows or applying surma, then it is not wajib for the woman to cover it from non-Mahram men. In other than this scenario, it is wajib to cover it (whether itis considered as beautiful or ugly).

135 – Question: Is it allowed for men and women to put perfume on or makethemselves smell nice by other means, in the event that the smell of it reaches non-Mahram?

Answer: There is no problem in applying perfume, but if the usage of it for the woman leads to corruption, arousal or stimulation of (non-Mahram men), then it is not allowed.

Question: If a woman applies perfume on herself for a non-Mahram man, is it necessary for her to perform a Ghusl?

Answer: In the event that putting the perfume on is to attract the attention of non-Mahram men, then it is a problem.

Answer: In the above scenario, it is Mustahab for her to perform a Ghusl.

136 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, women must cover artificial or synthetic hair, whether ithas been joined to one’s own hair or if it is a wig or hairpiece that has been placed on top of the head.Also it does not make a difference if this joined hair is that of a man or a woman.

Answer: It is wajib for a woman to cover (it) from non-Mahram men.

Answer: If this actionis considered as a beautification, then it is wajib for her to cover it from non-Mahram men.

137 – Question: What is the ruling for a woman beautifying herself for other than her husband, in gatherings where there are only women present such as in weddings, or dinner invitations only for women?

Answer: In the event that non-Mahram men do not see her, it is not a problem.

138 – Question: Is there a problem for women to wear shoes that make noise, such that when one walks, non-Mahram men canher the sound of them?

Answer: In the event that corruption can be associated with it, one must refrain from it.

139 – Rule: If a woman knows that a non-Mahram man will look at her face or hands with the intention of lust, then even if she does not have any zinat on them, she must cover these parts from him.

Answer: In the event thatis leads or helps to commit a sin, then it is wajib to cover (these two parts).

140 – Rule: Itis not allowed to keep the face and hands open with the intention of making others fall into sin.

In the event that it helps to commit a sin, itis not allowed .

141 – Rule: Old women who do not have the hope of marrying - in addition to their face and hands, can also keep a bit of their hair, hands up to the elbows, and the legs up to the knees open, in the front of non-Mahram men.

142 – Rule: Itis not allowed for a woman to go to a place where she knows that non-Mahram men will look at her with the intention of lust.

In itself, going (to such a place) is not a problem, but she must observe the proper clothingso as to not make others fall into sin.

E) Covering of a Woman in the Presence of Other Women

143 – Rule: A woman must cover her private parts from other womenhowever it is not wajib to cover the rest of the body in front of them.

144 – Rule: If a woman knows that other women will look at her body,face or hands with the intention of lust, then it is wajib for her to cover these parts from them.

Therefore: In bathrooms, swimming pools,fitness or sports clubs, and beauty parlors, if a woman sees that other women are looking at her with the intention of lust, the she must immediately cover her body from them.

145 – Rule: It is haram for a woman to reveal her body with the intention of wanting other women to fall into sin.

That amount of the body that is wajib to cover is that (same) amount that is haram to keep uncovered, even if others will not fall into a haram act; butd those places that are not wajib to cover, if it leads or helps to commit a sin, then it becomes wajib to cover them.

146 – Rule: It is wajib for a woman to cover her private parts from other women, even if they will not look at them with the intention of lust, except in the case of necessity.

Therefore: Just as has been mentioned in the previous section on ‘looking’, women are not permitted to show their private parts to a doctor, unless it reaches to the stage of necessity. Even in the matter of birth control, itis not allowed to expose one’s private parts in front of a doctor, and one must refrain from this, except in the case of a necessity. Also in this ruling, it does not make a difference if the doctor is a woman either.

Note: Women must be cautious in places such as public showers that their private parts are covered, and itis also not allowed to wear thin, see-thru clothing in which one’s private parts are not covered properly. In addition, to have x-rays taken (of certain areas), or a sonograph of the womb, or have certain devices inserted into the womb or other related things, if it necessitates the exposing of one’s private parts in front of others, then it is not allowed and one must refrain from it (unless it is in the case of necessity).

F) Covering of a Woman in the Presence of Children

(Those who have reached the age of Mumayyiz or not) (Those who have reached the age of Mumayyiz or not)

147 – Rule: It is not wajib to cover any part of the body, even so far as the private parts, from a child (a girl or a Mahram or non-Mahram boy) who has not yet reached the age of Mumayyiz.

148 – Rule: A woman must cover her private parts from a girl child who is Mumayyiz.

149 – Rule: It is wajib for a woman to cover her private parts from a boy who is a Mumayyiz child and her Mahram.

150 – Rule: In the event that the Mumayyiz child is a boy and a non-Mahram, then not only is it wajib for the women to cover their private parts from him, but according to Ihtiyat Wajib, she must also cover her entire body from him, with the exception of the face and hands.

According to Ihtiyat Mustahab, a woman should cover her body and hair from non-Baligh children who understands good and bad – meaning that he has reached to such a stage that his look would be with lust (meaning that he is Mumayyiz). However, it is not necessary for her to cover the face and hands.

Clothing that is haram for Men and Women

1. Notorious Clothing

1. Notorious Clothing5

151 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, itis not allowed for men or women to wear notorious clothing. This means whether it be the type of clothing, type of stitching, its style, or its color or a combination of any of these. The same rule applies to the way of wearing the clothing as well.

Rather, it is haram to wear notorious clothing.

In the event that it leads to disgrace or degradation (of a person), then it is haram to wear it.

152 – Question: What is meant by notorious clothing ?

Answer 1: That clothing whose material, color, the way itis sewn , or the way it is worn, is not common for that person to wear.

Answer 2: That clothing that has certain qualities or characteristics that attract the attention of thegeneral public , causing one to stand out in a crowd.

Note: First of al, anything that is considered as clothing or a covering can be considered under this ruling, therefore it includes clothing such as shoes, a hat, a shirt, a skirt, a head scarf (for women), a Maqne, socks, pants, a Mantou, etc… If any of these are such that theycould be classified as notorious clothing, then they are included in this ruling.

Secondly, it does not make a difference if the clothing is considered as notorious clothing due to the kind or type (of clothing) or the color of it, for example, those types of clothing whose color is loud or repulsive, or the style of clothing which is common among the Punks, or the manner in which it is worn.

Notorious clothing is that clothing which does not suit one’s appearance nor fits his status.

Note: These explanations of notorious clothing are the same as those given by Ayatullah Khomeini in answer one above. The meaning of notorious clothing, is clothingthat is not the usual type that a certain person wears . Thus, if an older person puts on clothing that is the style for children, or a person puts on clothing that is not fitting for his position or status, then that type of clothingwould be referred to as notorious clothing. Therefore, even if wearing a chador in foreign countries, or wearing clothing (specific) to one area in another area draws the attention of others, but if these types of clothing signify the status of that person, then it is not a problem.

That clothing which is made of a certain kind of fabric or its color or ithas been stitched in such a way that it is not common for that person to wear it and could lead to degradation or make him stand out, is referred to as notorious clothing.

The meaning of notorious clothing is that clothing which may lead one to being proud or by wearing it, that person wants tobe known as an ascetic or one who has renounced all worldly pleasures. Whether it is by means of the type of fabric, color, or the way itwas stitched . However, if in actuality a person’s intention is to wear simple clothing and he does not have the intent of showing off, then not only is it permitted, but rather it is a worthy action.

Notorious clothing is that clothing which is made of a type of fabric or color or the way in which it has been stitched is not common for that person to wear and it is degrading or a disgrace (to the one who wants to wear it).

2. Clothing which is Specific to One Gender

153 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, itis not allowed for women to wear clothing that is specific to men, and similarly, it is not allowed for men to wear clothing that is specific to women.

For a woman to wear clothing that is specific for a man and vice-versa is problematic.

If a man wears clothing that is specific for a woman or a woman wears clothing that is specific for a man, then in the event that that clothing would be classified as ‘Notorious’, then it is haram (to wear such clothing); and in other than this scenario, according to Ihtiyat Wajib, one must refrain from wearing such clothing.

It is haram for women to wear clothing that is specifically for men, and similarly, it is haram for men to wear clothing that is specifically for women.

(Makarim): It is not a problem for a man to wear the clothing of a woman or for a woman to wear the clothing of a man, except in the event that it necessitates a haram action, in which it becomes not permissible. However, according to IhtiyatMustahab it is better that men and women do not wear clothing that is specific to the other gender.

If a man wears women’s clothing, or a woman wears men’s clothing, then in the event that that clothing becomes customary for them (they become known as one who wears that type of clothing), then according to Ihtiyat Wajib, it is haram to wear such clothing.

154 – Rule: The meaning of clothing that is specific only to men is that clothing which is normally only worn by men; and specific clothing for women means that which is normally only worn by women.

155 – Rule: The meaning of specific clothing includes all those things which are classified as clothing – whether it be something that it is visible when worn, for example a chador, skirt, scarf, or long socks – (where are not allowed) for men; or a coat and pants (suit-type), men’s shoes, etc… - (which are not common) for women. This also includesclothing which may not be visible – such as men wearing women’s under clothing or women wearing men’s under clothing.

156 – Question: Further to whathas been stated that according to Ihtiyat Wajib, men must not wear women’s clothing, and women must not wear men’s clothing, relating to this rule are some questions below:

Is this covering (of specific clothing) limited to being in public or even in (one’s) privacy is it problematic?

In the event that it is problematic, then would it also be a problem for men to wear women’s slippers if it is just inside the house?

Answer:

There is no difference between being in public or private.

According to Ihtiyat Wajib, if the clothing is considered as specific (for one sex), then it is not permitted.

In privacy,it’s being haram is an area of question.

1. In privacy, the condition of it being haramis not known .

There is no problem.

157 – Rule: According to Ihtiyat Wajib, it is haram to wear specific clothing, whether it is in privacy and there is no one else to see the person, or it is in public.Also , it does not make a difference in it being haram if the one who sees the person wearing the clothing is a man or woman, a Mahram or a non-Mahram.

In privacy,it’s being haram is an area of question.

In the event that there is no one to see the person (in privacy), the condition of it being haram is not known.

158 – Rule: It is not a problem to wear non-specific clothing, for example that clothing which the common people would regard as not being specific to men or women (such as pants, certain types of shirts, etc…).

Note: Just by a clothing being labeled “for women” or “for men”, does not make that clothing specific, rather, the usage of the clothing being only for men or women makes clothing that is specific (to that sex). As an example, the wearing of slippers in the house that the common people acknowledge tobe worn by both men and women is not a problem, and thus either one of them can wear those slippers, even if they are referred to as women’s slippers or men’s slippers. However, if there is a pair of slippers that the common people acknowledge as only for women (such as slippers that were asked about in the previous question), then it is not allowed for men to wear them, even if it is only for a moment (such as to get something from the kitchen).

159 – Rule: Itis not allowed , according to Ihtiyat Wajib, to wear specific clothing no matter what the reason is – whether it is for simply trying it on, playing or acting in the theatre, cinema, showing off or anything else.

It is a problematic area for a woman to wear clothing that is specific to men.

It is haram for a man to wear clothing that is specifically for women and similarly for a woman to wear clothing that is specifically for men, however until the point that this is not regarded as notorious clothing, this being haram is an area to ponder upon.

Question:Is it permitted for a woman who is acting in the theatre or in a play and is playing the role of a man, to wear the clothing of a man if she is performing in front of women?

Answer: As long as non-Mahram Men will not see her, it is not a problem.

160 – Question: Are men allowed to use things of zinat that women usually wear – such as a ring, watch, bangle, belt, necklace, etc… keeping in mind that the wearing of clothing specific to women is not allowed for men?

Answer: One must refrain from wearing anything that goes against one’s character.

Answer: It is haram for men and women to beautify themselves with that whichis used as a beautifier for the opposite sex.

Answer: Itis not allowed for men to use any kind of beautification or clothing that is specific to women.

Answer: If the manis considered to resemble a woman or the woman is considered to resemble a man, then it is not permitted.

161 – Question: What is the ruling for a woman who cuts her hair short such that she resembles a man,and also what is the ruling for a man to grow his hair long such that he resembles a woman?

Answer: If it consideredthat the man resembles the woman or the woman resembles the man then it is not allowed.

3. Arousing or Stimulating Clothing

162 – Rule: It is haram for a woman or a man to wear any type of clothing that the common people would consider as arousing or stimulating, or one that attracts the attention of non-Mahrams.

It is problematic to wear clothing that can lead to degradation, loss of one’s self-respect or corruption.

163 – Rule: Arousing or stimulating clothing can be due to its color, style, type of cloth, or any other thing. Thus, it is possible that a woman’s headscarf, mantou,maqnah or shoes are such that they attract the attention of non-Mahram Men and are stimulating. In these instances, it is not permissible to wear them.

Note: The meaning of arousing or stimulating is related to the type of clothing and not the person wearing it. Thus if according to the common people a certain type of clothing is considered as arousing, then it is not allowed to wear it, even if one or a few people would not be aroused or stimulated by it.

Therefore: Clothing such as certain types of gloves with lace, chador, a thin scarf with lace, things that hand (around a person’s neck) such as flowers, and other things of beautification such as gold stitching or lace stitching on the headscarf, chador or mantou, etc… or placing buttons on a specific part of the clothing, keeping the buttons of the clothing open even if underneath there may be clothing, etc… - all of these kinds of clothing, if they are considered as stimulating or arousing, or they attract the attention of others, then it is haram and one must refrain from wearing these (types of clothing).

164 – Question:Are men allowed to beautify their faces with make-up that women use?Also , are men allowed to pluck the hair under their eyebrows?

Answer: It is haram for a man and woman to beautify themselves with those things thatare used by the opposite sex.

Answer: It is problematic.

Answer: If the manis considered to resemble a woman or a woman is considered to resemble a man, then it is not allowed.

4. Usurped Clothing

165 – Rule: It is not allowed to wear clothing that has been usurped, and according to Islamic law, it is haram; and the Salat recited with this clothingwill also be void.

It is haram to wear usurped clothing, and according to Ihtiyat Wajib, Salat recited with this clothingwill also be void.

166 – Rule: If a type of clothing is made or purchased from money thatwas usurped , then it has the same ruling as usurped clothing and thus, the wearing of them is not allowed.

167 – Rule: Even if a part of the clothingis usurped , then the wearing of it is not allowed either, even if it is just a single stitch, a button, a zipper or the lining of the material.

168 – Rule: It is not allowed for a person who has Khums pending on him/her to buy any clothing from that money on which Khums has not yet been paid, since it will be considered as usurped, and the wearing of it is not allowed;also the Salat recited in it is void. (Except those who have received the permission of the Islamic Ruler, or his representative.)

5. Clothing Specific to the Non-Muslims

169 – Rule: It is haram to wear that clothing which only the non-Muslims make useof .

In the event that it endorses the non-Muslims or makes them powerful, then itis not allowed .

According to Ihtiyat, one must refrain from imitating the non-Muslims.

Therefore: It is not permitted for a Muslim man or woman to wear clothing that is commonly worn by Punks, clergymen of the Church, Rabbis, the Hindus, or other groups of non-Muslims.

170 – Rule: There is no problem in wearing that clothing which is common to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

171 – Question: What is the view of Islam on the necktie?

Answer 1: The necktie is the practice of the Christian religion, which has unfortunately become widespread amongst the Muslims.

Answer 2: The necktie is one of the symbols of the Christians, and it is incumbent on the Muslims to refrain from using it.

Answer: The necktie is related to and is one of the symbols of the Christians, thus, it is better that the Muslims refrain from wearing it, even though it is no longer prevalent among the Muslims as being a symbol for the Christians.

Notes

1. In the following rulings, the spouse is an exception.

2. The Chador is the type of ‘hijab’that is commonly worn by Iranian women and consists of a large, usually black cloth wrapped around the body .

3. A long overcoat type covering for women thatis commonly worn in Iran.

4. Itshould be noted that the meaning of Zinat refers to those decorations and beautification that a woman applies to herself, and not that which is natural. (Translator)

5. Please note that the term Libas al-Shuhrah has been translated here as Notorious Clothing for lack of a better term in English. Please refer to the list of definitions at the end of this book for a detailed explanation.

1.1. THE SELF-EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE

The concept of ‘existence’ is a self-evident one and needs no mediating terms. Hence it has no explanatory terms (mu’arrif ) in the form of a definition (hadd ) or description (rasm ), because its meaning is more obvious than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as “Existence is what subsists in reality,” or “Existence is that which allows of predication” are explications of the word, not true definitions.

Moreover, as will be explained later, existence has neither any genus (jins ), nor differentia (fasl ), nor any proprium (khassah ) in the sense of one of the five universals (al-kulliyyat al-khams ). As all explanatory terms are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.

الفصل الثاني في أن مفهوم الوجود مشترك معنوي

يحمل الوجود على موضوعاته بمعنى واحد اشتراكا معنويا.

و من الدليل عليه أنا نقسم الوجود إلى أقسامه المختلفة كتقسيمه إلى وجود الواجب و وجود الممكن و تقسيم وجود الممكن إلى وجود الجوهر و وجود العرض ثم وجود الجوهر إلى أقسامه و وجود العرض إلى أقسامه و من المعلوم أن التقسيم يتوقف في صحته على وحدة المقسم و وجوده في الأقسام.

و من الدليل عليه أنا ربما أثبتنا وجود شي‏ء ثم ترددنا في خصوصية ذاته كما لو أثبتنا للعالم صانعا ثم ترددنا في كونه واجبا أو ممكنا و في كونه ذا ماهية أو غير ذي ماهية و كما لو أثبتنا للإنسان نفسا ثم شككنا في كونها مجردة أو مادية و جوهرا أو عرضا مع بقاء العلم بوجوده على ما كان فلو لم يكن للوجود معنى واحد بل كان مشتركا لفظيا متعددا معناه بتعدد موضوعاته لتغير معناه بتغير موضوعاته بحسب الاعتقاد بالضرورة.

و من الدليل عليه أن العدم يناقض الوجود و له معنى واحد إذ لا تمايز في العدم فللوجود الذي هو نقيضه معنى واحد و إلا ارتفع النقيضان و هو محال.

و القائلون باشتراكه اللفظي بين الأشياء أو بين الواجب و الممكن إنما ذهبوا إليه حذرا من لزوم السنخية بين العلة و المعلول مطلقا أو بين الواجب و الممكن و رد بأنه يستلزم تعطيل العقول عن المعرفة فإنا إذا قلنا الواجب موجود فإن كان المفهوم منه المعنى الذي يفهم من وجود الممكن لزم الاشتراك المعنوي و إن كان المفهوم منه ما يقابله و هو مصداق نقيضه كان نفيا لوجوده تعالى عن ذلك و إن لم يفهم منه شي‏ء كان تعطيلا للعقل عن المعرفة و هو خلاف ما نجده من أنفسنا بالضرورة

1.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS UNIVOCAL

Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense, i.e., univocally (ishtirak ma’nawi ).

A proof of it is that we divide existence into its different categories, such as the existence of the Necessary Being (wujud al-wajib ) and the existence of the contingent being (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of the contingent is divided into that of substance (wujud al-jawhar) and that of accident (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of substance and the existence of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is being divided and on its presence in all its divisions.

Another proof of it is that after positing the existence of something, at times we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may have doubts as to whether the creator is a necessary (wajib ) or a contingent (mumkin ) being, or as to whether or not he is characterized with quiddity (mahiyyah). Or, for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (nafs ), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (maddi ) or immaterial (mujarrad ), a substance (jawhar) or an accident (‘arad). Hence, if ‘existence’ were not univocal in the different instances and were it an equivocal or homonymous term with disparate meanings (mushtarak lafzi ), its meaning would necessarily vary from one subject of which it is predicated to another.

Another proof is that non-existence (‘adam ) is the contradictory of existence (wujud ): non-existence is univocal, because there, are no distinctions (tamayuz ) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, is also univocal, for otherwise it would imply a violation of the law of contradiction, which is impossible.

Those who have held that ‘existence’ is equivocal in relation to different existents, i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity (sinkhiyyah ) between cause and effect, or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents. However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect’s cognitive faculties. To elaborate, if in the statement, ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ we understand ‘existence’ to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that ‘existence’ is univocal (mushtarak ma’nawi ). If what is understood in the former statement [by ‘existence’] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ would amount to the negation of Its existence.

Finally, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect’s cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.

الفصل الثالث في أن الوجود زائد على الماهية عارض لها

بمعنى أن المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر فللعقل أن يجرد الماهية و هي ما يقال في جواب ما هو عن الوجود فيعتبرها وحدها فيعقلها ثم يصفها بالوجود و هو معنى العروض فليس الوجود عينا للماهية و لا جزءا لها.

و الدليل عليه أن الوجود يصح سلبه عن الماهية و لو كان عينا أو جزءا لها لم يصح ذلك لاستحالة سلب عين الشي‏ء و جزئه عنه.

و أيضا حمل الوجود على الماهية يحتاج إلى دليل فليس عينا و لا جزءا لها لأن ذات الشي‏ء و ذاتياته بينة الثبوت له لا تحتاج فيه إلى دليل

و أيضا الماهية متساوية النسبة في نفسها إلى الوجود و العدم و لو كان الوجود عينا أو جزءا لها استحالت نسبتها إلى العدم الذي هو نقيضه

1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY

A thing’s existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense, that each of them [i.e. ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’] signifies something not understandable from the other. From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [‘urud , i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it.

A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity. Had it been identical with quiddity, or a part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with it or a part of it.

Also, a proof is required if existence is to be predicated of a quiddity; therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it, because a thing’s essence (dhat ) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and differentia] are self-evident and do not stand in need of a proof.

Moreover, quiddity is in itself indifferent (mutasawiyat al-nisbah , lit. ‘equally related’) to existence and non-existence. Were existence identical with quiddity or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute to it non-existence, which is its contradictory.

الفصل الرابع في أصالة الوجود و اعتبارية الماهية

إنا لا نرتاب في أن هناك أمورا واقعية ذات آثار واقعية ليست بوهم الواهم ثم ننتزع من كل من هذه الأمور المشهودة لنا في عين أنه واحد في الخارج مفهومين اثنين كل منهما غير الآخر مفهوما و إن اتحدا مصداقا و هما الوجود و الماهية كالإنسان الذي في الخارج المنتزع عنه أنه إنسان و أنه موجود.

و قد اختلف الحكماء في الأصيل منهما فذهب المشاءون إلى أصالة الوجود و نسب إلى الإشراقيين القول بأصالة الماهية و أما القول بأصالتهما معا فلم يذهب إليه أحد منهم لاستلزام ذلك كون كل شي‏ء شيئين اثنين و هو خلاف الضرورة.

و الحق ما ذهب إليه المشاءون من أصالة الوجود.

و البرهان عليه أن الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي متساوية النسبة إلى الوجود و العدم فلو لم يكن خروجها من حد الاستواء إلى مستوى الوجود بحيث تترتب عليها الآثار بواسطة الوجود كان ذلك منها انقلابا و هو محال بالضرورة فالوجود هو المخرج لها عن حد الاستواء فهو الأصيل.

و ما قيل إن الماهية بنسبة مكتسبة من الجاعل تخرج من حد الاستواء إلى مرحلة الأصالة فتترتب عليها الآثار مندفع بأنها إن تفاوتت حالها بعد الانتساب فما به التفاوت هو الوجود الأصيل و إن سمي نسبة إلى الجاعل و إن لم تتفاوت و مع ذلك حمل عليها أنها موجودة و ترتبت عليها الآثار كان من الانقلاب كما تقدم

برهان آخر الماهيات مثار الكثرة و الاختلاف بالذات فلو لم يكن الوجود أصيلا لم تتحقق وحدة حقيقية و لا اتحاد بين ماهيتين فلم يتحقق الحمل الذي هو الاتحاد في الوجود و الضرورة تقضي بخلافه فالوجود هو الأصيل الموجود بالذات و الماهية موجودة به.

برهان آخر الماهية توجد بوجود خارجي فتترتب عليها آثارها و توجد بعينها بوجود ذهني كما سيأتي فلا يترتب عليها شي‏ء من تلك الآثار فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل و كانت الأصالة للماهية و هي محفوظة في الوجودين لم يكن فرق بينهما و التالي باطل فالمقدم مثله.

برهان آخر الماهية من حيث هي تستوي نسبتها إلى التقدم و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف و القوة و الفعل لكن الأمور الموجودة في الخارج مختلفة في هذه الأوصاف فبعضها متقدم أو قوي كالعلة و بعضها بخلاف ذلك كالمعلول و بعضها بالقوة و بعضها بالفعل فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل كان اختلاف هذه الصفات مستندة إليها و هي متساوية النسبة إلى الجميع هذا خلف و هناك حجج أخرى مذكورة في المطولات.

و للقائلين بأصالة الماهية و اعتبارية الوجود حجج مدخولة كقولهم لو كان الوجود أصيلا كان موجودا في الخارج فله وجود و لوجوده وجود فيتسلسل و هو محال.

و أجيب عنه بأن الوجود موجود لكن بنفس ذاته لا بوجود آخر فلا يذهب الأمر إلى غير النهاية

و يظهر مما تقدم ضعف قول آخر في المسألة منسوب إلى المحقق الدواني و هو أصالة الوجود في الواجب تعالى و أصالة الماهية في الممكنات و عليه فإطلاق الموجود على الواجب بمعنى أنه نفس الوجود و على الماهيات بمعنى أنها منتسبة إلى الوجود كاللابن و التامر بمعنى المنتسب إلى اللبن و التمر هذا و أما على المذهب المختار فالوجود موجود بذاته و الماهية موجودة بالعرض.

1.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF EXISTENCE

We have no doubt that there are real things out there in external reality possessing certain real properties (athar), and that they are not illusory. In regard to each of the things that we observe -  which is a single reality in the external world - we form two concepts different from one another, though they pertain to a single thing. These two concepts are ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity.’ For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his/her quiddity as a ‘human being’ and that he/she exists.

The philosophers (hukama) have differed as to which of the two concepts is fundamental (asil). The Peripatetics (al-Mashsha’un) hold existence to be fundamentally real (asalat al-wujud). The belief in the fundamentality of quiddity (asalat al-mahiyyah) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (al-Ishraqiyyun). The view that both of them may be regarded as fundamentally real is one which no one has held, for that would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible.

The Peripatetics are right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. A proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or stands in equal relation to] existence and non-existence, and were it capable by itself of emerging from this state of indifference [or neutrality] and assuming existence along with its properties (athar), that would amount to a violation of the law of identity (inqilab; lit. ‘mutation’), which is impossible. Hence it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real.

As to that which some have said, that quiddity emerges from its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in the state of quiddity after its relation with the Maker amounts to existence, though it should be called ‘a relation with the Maker.’ And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a violation of the law of identity, as mentioned.

Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and diversity. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity, nor any union between two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence, there would be no predication, which signifies unity in existence [as in a proposition of the type, ‘A is B’], and logical necessity requires the contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it.

Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the properties (athar) expected of it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (wujud dhihni) (which will be dealt with later on), it does not possess any of these properties. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity  -  which is there in both modes of being - real, there would be no difference between these two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent must also be such.

Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta’khkhur), strength (shiddah) and weakness (da’f), actuality (fi’l) and potentiality (quwwah). However, things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of

them are prior and strong, such as the cause (‘illah), and some are the opposite of that, such as the effect (ma’lul). Some of them have actuality and some of them possess potentiality. Were existence not fundamentally real, the difference in respect to these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent in relation to all of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here and they are mentioned in detailed works.

Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity arid consider existence to be derivative (i’tibari), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, ‘If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from which it follows that it has an existence, and that existence again has another existence, and so on ad infinitum. This involves an infinite regress, which is inadmissible.’

The answer to such an argument is that existence does indeed exist; but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress.

In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to Dawwani, also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence with respect to the Necessary Being, and to quiddity with respect to contingent beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Necessary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have only a relation with being, such as the relation between the ‘milkman’ (labin) and ‘milk’ (laban) and the ‘date seller’ (tamir) and ‘dates’ (tamr). However, in accordance with the doctrine endorsed by us, existence exists by itself (bi dhatih) and quiddity exists accidentally (bi al-‘arad).

الفصل الخامس في أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة

اختلف القائلون بأصالة الوجود فذهب بعضهم إلى أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة و هو المنسوب إلى الفهلويين من حكماء الفرس فالوجود عندهم لكونه ظاهرا بذاته مظهرا لغيره من الماهيات كالنور الحسي الذي هو ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره من الأجسام الكثيفة للأبصار.

فكما أن النور الحسي نوع واحد حقيقته أنه ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره و هذا المعنى متحقق في جميع مراتب الأشعة و الأظلة على كثرتها و اختلافها فالنور الشديد شديد في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الضعيف و النور الضعيف ضعيف في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الشديد فليست شدة الشديد منه جزءا مقوما للنورية حتى يخرج الضعيف منه و لا عرضا خارجا عن الحقيقة و ليس ضعف الضعيف قادحا في نوريته و لا أنه مركب من النور و الظلمة لكونها أمرا عدميا بل شدة الشديد في أصل النورية و كذا ضعف الضعيف فللنور عرض عريض باعتبار مراتبه المختلفة بالشدة و الضعف و لكل مرتبة عرض عريض باعتبار القوابل المختلفة من الأجسام الكثيفة.

كذلك الوجود حقيقة واحدة ذات مراتب مختلفة متمايزة بالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و غير ذلك فيرجع ما به الامتياز فيها إلى ما به الاشتراك و ما به الاختلاف إلى ما به الاتحاد فليست خصوصية شي‏ء من المراتب جزءا مقوما للوجود لبساطته كما سيجي‏ء و لا أمرا خارجا عنه لأن أصالة الوجود تبطل ما هو غيره الخارج عنه بل الخصوصية في كل مرتبة مقومة لنفس المرتبة بمعنى ما ليس بخارج منها.

و لها كثرة طولية باعتبار المراتب المختلفة الآخذة من أضعف المراتب و هي التي لا فعلية لها إلا عدم الفعلية و هي المادة الأولى الواقعة في أفق العدم ثم تتصاعد المراتب إلى أن تنتهي إلى المرتبة الواجبة لذاتها و هي التي لا حد لها إلا عدم الحد و لها كثرة عرضية باعتبار تخصصها بالماهيات المختلفة التي هي مثار الكثرة.

و ذهب قوم من المشاءين إلى كون الوجود حقائق متباينة بتمام ذواتها أما كونه حقائق متباينة فلاختلاف آثارها و أما كونها متباينة بتمام الذوات فلبساطتها و على هذا يكون مفهوم الوجود المحمول عليها عرضيا خارجا عنها لازما لها.

و الحق أنه حقيقة واحدة مشككة أما كونها حقيقة واحدة فلأنه لو لم تكن كذلك لكانت حقائق مختلفة متباينة بتمام الذوات و لازمه كون مفهوم الوجود و هو مفهوم واحد كما تقدم منتزعا من مصاديق متباينة بما هي متباينة و هو محال بيان الاستحالة أن المفهوم و المصداق واحد ذاتا و إنما الفارق كون الوجود ذهنيا أو خارجيا فلو انتزع الواحد بما هو واحد من الكثير بما هو كثير كان الواحد بما هو واحد كثيرا بما هو كثير و هو محال

و أيضا لو انتزع المفهوم الواحد بما هو واحد من المصاديق الكثيرة بما هي كثيرة فإما أن تعتبر في صدقه خصوصية هذا المصداق لم يصدق على ذلك المصداق و إن اعتبر فيه خصوصية ذاك لم يصدق على هذا و إن اعتبر فيه الخصوصيتان معا لم يصدق على شي‏ء منهما و إن لم يعتبر شي‏ء من الخصوصيتين بل انتزع من القدر المشترك بينهما لم يكن منتزعا من الكثير بما هو كثير بل بما هو واحد كالكلي المنتزع من الجهة المشتركة بين الأفراد الصادق على الجميع هذا خلف.

و أما أن حقيقته مشككة فلما يظهر من الكمالات الحقيقية المختلفة التي هي صفات متفاضلة غير خارجة عن الحقيقة الواحدة كالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و القوة و الفعل و غير ذلك فهي حقيقة واحدة متكثرة في ذاتها يرجع فيها كل ما به الامتياز إلى ما به الاشتراك و بالعكس و هذا هو التشكيك.

1.5. EXISTENCE IS ONE GRADATIONAL REALITY

The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single gradational reality (haqiqah mushakkakah wahidah). This view is ascribed to the Fahlaviyyun, philosophers of [ancient] Iran. Existence, according to them, is self-manifesting and makes other things - i.e. quiddities - manifest. It may be likened to sensible light, which is self-manifesting and makes other things, such as opaque bodies, manifest to vision.

Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and manifests things other than itself. This feature applies to all the different grades of light and shade with their multiplicity and diversity. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light, and a weak light shares its luminous nature with a strong one. The strength of a strong light is neither the constituting differentia (juz muqawwim) of its luminous nature, so as to negate the luminous character of weak light, nor is it an accident extraneous to its reality. The weakness of a weak light neither negates its luminous nature, nor is it a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so does the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivity of opaque bodies [as in reflection and refraction].

Similarly, existence is one reality with various degrees differentiated by intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is exactly that which is common to them, and that which makes them different is exactly that which makes them one. Hence the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence, by virtue of the simplicity (basatah) of existence  - as will be explained later on - nor is it anything extraneous to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes that there should be anything other than it or external to it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not something other than it.

The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (tuli) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees  - represented by prime matter, which exists on the verge of non-existence -  where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality. From there it rises in degrees to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (‘aradi) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity.

A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence consists of entities essentially disparate  - disparate in their entirety -  from each other (haqa’iq mutabayinah bi tamami dhawatiha). They are disparate because their properties are disparate. The disparity is essential and complete, by virtue of the simplicity of their essences. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes, of necessity, something accidental and extrinsic to them (for, were it intrinsic to them, it would be a constituent, and this contradicts simplicity).

The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Were it not one reality, entities would have been disparate from one another with the totality of their essences (dhawat). That would entail that the concept of existence, which is a single concept, as said, has been abstracted from disparate things qua disparate things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of disparity lies in existence being mental or external. Were something which is one, qua one, capable of being abstracted from that which is many, qua many, one qua one would be the same as many qua many, which is impossible.

Also, suppose that a single concept were abstracted from a multiplicity of referents qua disparate things. If the concept represented a certain characteristic of one referent, it would not be predicable of a second referent. If the concept represented some characteristic of the second referent, it would not correspond to the first referent. If the characteristics of both the referents were represented in it, it would not correspond to either of the referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept were to represent that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been possible from different things qua different things, but from their unifying aspect, such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption.

As to existence being a gradational reality, since it manifests various real perfections that make up the distinctive attributes that are not extraneous” to the single reality of existence, such as intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc., existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, wherein all that makes existents differ refers to what is common to them, and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (tashkik).

الفصل السادس في ما يتخصص به الوجود

تخصص الوجود بوجوه ثلاثة :

أحدها تخصص حقيقته الواحدة الأصلية بنفس ذاتها القائمة بذاتها

و ثانيها تخصصها بخصوصيات مراتبها غير الخارجة عن المراتب

و ثالثها تخصص الوجود بإضافته إلى الماهيات المختلفة الذوات و عروضه لها فيختلف باختلافها بالعرض.

و عروض الوجود للماهية و ثبوته لها ليس من قبيل العروض المقولي الذي يتوقف فيه ثبوت العارض على ثبوت المعروض قبله فإن حقيقة ثبوت الوجود للماهية هي ثبوت الماهية به لأن ذلك هو مقتضى أصالته و اعتباريتها و إنما العقل لمكان أنسه بالماهيات يفترض الماهية موضوعه و يحمل الوجود عليها و هو في الحقيقة من عكس الحمل.

و بذلك يندفع الإشكال المعروف في حمل الوجود على الماهية من أن قاعدة الفرعية أعني أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء فرع ثبوت المثبت له توجب ثبوتا للمثبت له قبل ثبوت الثابت فثبوت الوجود للماهية يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية قبله فإن كان ثبوتها عين ثبوته لها لزم تقدم الشي‏ء على نفسه و إن كان غيره توقف ثبوته لها على ثبوت آخر لها و هلم جرا فيتسلسل.

و قد اضطر هذا الإشكال بعضهم إلى القول بأن القاعدة مخصصة بثبوت الوجود للماهية و بعضهم إلى تبديل الفرعية بالاستلزام فقال الحق أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء مستلزم لثبوت المثبت له و لو بهذا الثابت و ثبوت الوجود للماهية مستلزم لثبوت الماهية بنفس هذا الوجود فلا إشكال.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود لا تحقق له و لا ثبوت في ذهن و لا في خارج و للموجود معنى بسيط يعبر عنه بالفارسية ب هست و الاشتقاق صوري فلا ثبوت له حتى يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود ليس له إلا المعنى المطلق و هو معنى الوجود العام و الحصص و هو المعنى العام مضافا إلى ماهية ماهية بحيث يكون التقييد داخلا و القيد خارجا و أما الفرد و هو مجموع المقيد و التقييد و القيد فليس له ثبوت.

و شي‏ء من هذه الأجوبة على فسادها لا يغني طائلا و الحق في الجواب ما تقدم من أن القاعدة إنما تجري في ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء لا في ثبوت الشي‏ء و بعبارة أخرى مجرى القاعدة هو الهلية المركبة دون الهلية البسيطة كما في ما نحن فيه

1.6. THAT WHICH PARTICULARIZES EXISTENCE

Existence is particularized in three aspects:

(1) as a single fundamental reality in itself, which is self-subsistent [unlike quiddity]; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not extraneous to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence pertains and which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference.

The manner in which existence pertains to quiddity and gives it subsistence (thubut) is not the kind peculiar to categories [like accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subsistence of a quality depends on the prior subsistence of its subject. That is because the meaning of existence of quiddity is its subsistence through existence. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the derivative (i’tibari) character of quiddity. It is the intellect which, by virtue of its familiarity with quiddities, supposes quiddity to be the subject to which predicates existence. However, the matter is the inverse of this predication in concrete reality.

This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in relation to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (qaidat al-far’iyyah), the subsistence (thubut) of some quality (q) of a thing (A) is subordinate to that thing’s subsistence, which makes it necessary that the thing of which the property is posited subsist prior to the quality posited of it. Hence the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior subsistence of quiddity. For should the subsistence of quiddity be the same as the subsistence of existence, that would imply something being prior to itself; and should it be different, the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on another subsistence of quiddity, and so on. This results in an infinite regress.

This objection has forced some philosophers to admit an exception to the rule in the case of subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity. Some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance. They state: ‘The truth is that the subsistence of one thing [quality] in relation to another [subject] is concomitant with the subsistence of the subject, though it be through the subsistence of the former. The subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity is concomitant with the subsistence of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.”

Some of them have been compelled by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. ‘Being’ has a simple meaning represented in Farsi by the word hast (‘is’). This derivation [of a substantive from a verb] is merely verbal, and existence has no subsistence at all so as to depend on the subsistence of quiddity.

Some others have been led to hold that ‘existence’ has nothing but a general meaning, signifying existence in general and its parts, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the conditioning is internal while the condition is external. The individual, which is the totality of the conditioned, the conditioning, and the condition, has no subsistence.

These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid, like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested by the foregoing discussion, that the Rule of Subordination applies to the subsistence of a thing in relation to another thing (thubutu shay’in li shay), not to a thing’s subsistence (thubutu al-shay’). In other words, the rule applies to composite propositions [e.g., ‘A has the quality q’], not to simple propositions [e.g., ‘A exists’], as is the matter in the present case.

الفصل السابع في أحكام الوجود السلبية

منها أن الوجود لا غير له و ذلك لأن انحصار الأصالة في حقيقته يستلزم بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له أجنبيا عنه بطلانا ذاتيا.

و منها أنه لا ثاني له لأن أصالة حقيقته الواحدة و بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له ينفى عنه كل خليط داخل فيه أو منضم إليه فهو صرف في نفسه و صرف الشي‏ء لا يتثنى و لا يتكرر فكل ما فرض له ثانيا عاد أولا و إلا امتاز عنه بشي‏ء غيره داخل فيه أو خارج عنه و المفروض انتفاؤه هذا خلف.

و منها أنه ليس جوهرا و لا عرضا أما أنه ليس جوهرا فلأن الجوهر ماهية إذا وجدت في الخارج وجدت لا في الموضوع و الوجود ليس من سنخ الماهية و أما أنه ليس بعرض فلأن العرض متقوم الوجود بالموضوع و الوجود متقوم بنفس ذاته و كل شي‏ء متقوم به.

و منها أنه ليس جزءا لشي‏ء لأن الجزء الآخر المفروض غيره و الوجود لا غير له.

و ما قيل إن كل ممكن زوج تركيبي من ماهية و وجود فاعتبار عقلي ناظر إلى الملازمة بين الوجود الإمكاني و الماهية لا أنه تركيب من جزءين أصيلين.

و منها أنه لا جزء له لأن الجزء إما جزء عقلي كالجنس و الفصل و إما جزء خارجي كالمادة و الصورة و إما جزء مقداري كأجزاء الخط و السطح و الجسم التعليمي و ليس للوجود شي‏ء من هذه الأجزاء.

أما الجزء العقلي فلأنه لو كان للوجود جنس و فصل فجنسه إما الوجود فيكون فصله المقسم مقوما لأن الفصل بالنسبة إلى الجنس يفيد تحصل ذاته لا أصل ذاته و تحصل الوجود هو ذاته هذا خلف و إما غير الوجود و لا غير للوجود.

و أما الجزء الخارجي و هو المادة و الصورة فلأن المادة و الصورة هما الجنس و الفصل مأخوذين بشرط لا فانتفاء الجنس و الفصل يوجب انتفاءهما.

و أما الجزء المقداري فلأن المقدار من عوارض الجسم و الجسم مركب من المادة و الصورة و إذ لا مادة و لا صورة للوجود فلا جسم له و إذ لا جسم له فلا مقدار له

و مما تقدم يظهر أنه ليس نوعا لأن تحصل النوع بالتشخص الفردي و الوجود متحصل بنفس ذاته‏

1.7. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE

One of the properties of existence is that it has no ‘other.’ Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, this necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alienated from it or besides it.

Another of these properties is that it has no second, for the oneness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything else that may be supposed, precludes its possessing any ingredient within it or appended to it. It is absolute (sirf), and a thing in its absoluteness does not yield to duplication or repetition. Any second that may be assumed for it would be either identical with the first, or differ from it due to something intrinsic or extrinsic that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other.

Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is a quiddity that does not require a subject to subsist in external reality, while existence is not of the order of quiddity. As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it.

Another of these properties is that existence is not a part of anything, because the other supposed part will be something other than existence, while existence has no other.

As to the statement that ‘every contingent existent (mumkin) is a duality composed of quiddity and existence’ [which apparently implies that existence is a part of something], that is merely one of the intellect’s constructs (i’tibar ‘aqli) representing the necessary relation between contingent existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a compound made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality.

Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (i) conceptual, such as genus and differentia; (ii) external, such as matter and form; or (iii) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these parts.

As to the absence of conceptual constituents in existence, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something else. If the genus were existence, its differentia, which divides the genus, would constitute it, for the differentia in relation to the genus actualizes the genus [through species]; it does not constitute the essence of the genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other.

As to external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia in regard to existence necessarily implies the negation of these also.

As to quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither bodiness, nor, as consequence, magnitude.

From what has been said, it become evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by individuation, and existence is actualized by itself.

الفصل الثامن في معنى نفس الأمر

قد ظهر مما تقدم أن لحقيقة الوجود ثبوتا و تحققا بنفسه بل الوجود عين الثبوت و التحقق و أن للماهيات و هي التي تقال في جواب ما هو و توجد تارة بوجود خارجي فتظهر آثارها و تارة بوجود ذهني فلا تترتب عليها الآثار ثبوتا و تحققا بالوجود لا بنفس ذاتها و إن كانا متحدين في الخارج و أن المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية و هي التي لم تنتزع من الخارج و إنما اعتبرها العقل بنوع من التعمل لضرورة تضطره إلى ذلك كمفاهيم الوجود و الوحدة و العلية و نحو ذلك أيضا لها نحو ثبوت بثبوت مصاديقها المحكية بها و إن لم تكن هذه المفاهيم مأخوذة في مصاديقها أخذ الماهية في أفرادها و في حدود مصاديقها.

و هذا الثبوت العام الشامل لثبوت الوجود و الماهية و المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية هو المسمى بنفس الأمر التي يعتبر صدق القضايا بمطابقتها فيقال إن كذا كذا في نفس الأمر.

توضيح ذلك أن من القضايا ما موضوعها خارجي بحكم خارجي كقولنا الواجب تعالى موجود و قولنا خرج من في البلد و قولنا” الإنسان ضاحك بالقوة “ صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للوجود العيني.

و منها ما موضوعها ذهني بحكم ذهني أو خارجي مأخوذ بحكم ذهني كقولنا الكلي إما ذاتي أو عرضي و الإنسان نوع و صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للذهن لكون موطن ثبوتها هو الذهن و كلا القسمين صادقان بمطابقتهما لنفس الأمر فالثبوت النفس الأمري أعم مطلقا من كل من الثبوت الذهني و الخارجي.

و قيل إن نفس الأمر عقل مجرد فيه صور المعقولات عامة و التصديقات الصادقة في القضايا الذهنية و الخارجية تطابق ما عنده من الصور المعقولة.

و فيه أنا ننقل الكلام إلى ما عنده من الصور العلمية فهي تصديقات تحتاج في صدقها إلى ثبوت لمضامينها خارج عنها تطابقه.

1.1. THE SELF-EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE

The concept of ‘existence’ is a self-evident one and needs no mediating terms. Hence it has no explanatory terms (mu’arrif ) in the form of a definition (hadd ) or description (rasm ), because its meaning is more obvious than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as “Existence is what subsists in reality,” or “Existence is that which allows of predication” are explications of the word, not true definitions.

Moreover, as will be explained later, existence has neither any genus (jins ), nor differentia (fasl ), nor any proprium (khassah ) in the sense of one of the five universals (al-kulliyyat al-khams ). As all explanatory terms are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.

الفصل الثاني في أن مفهوم الوجود مشترك معنوي

يحمل الوجود على موضوعاته بمعنى واحد اشتراكا معنويا.

و من الدليل عليه أنا نقسم الوجود إلى أقسامه المختلفة كتقسيمه إلى وجود الواجب و وجود الممكن و تقسيم وجود الممكن إلى وجود الجوهر و وجود العرض ثم وجود الجوهر إلى أقسامه و وجود العرض إلى أقسامه و من المعلوم أن التقسيم يتوقف في صحته على وحدة المقسم و وجوده في الأقسام.

و من الدليل عليه أنا ربما أثبتنا وجود شي‏ء ثم ترددنا في خصوصية ذاته كما لو أثبتنا للعالم صانعا ثم ترددنا في كونه واجبا أو ممكنا و في كونه ذا ماهية أو غير ذي ماهية و كما لو أثبتنا للإنسان نفسا ثم شككنا في كونها مجردة أو مادية و جوهرا أو عرضا مع بقاء العلم بوجوده على ما كان فلو لم يكن للوجود معنى واحد بل كان مشتركا لفظيا متعددا معناه بتعدد موضوعاته لتغير معناه بتغير موضوعاته بحسب الاعتقاد بالضرورة.

و من الدليل عليه أن العدم يناقض الوجود و له معنى واحد إذ لا تمايز في العدم فللوجود الذي هو نقيضه معنى واحد و إلا ارتفع النقيضان و هو محال.

و القائلون باشتراكه اللفظي بين الأشياء أو بين الواجب و الممكن إنما ذهبوا إليه حذرا من لزوم السنخية بين العلة و المعلول مطلقا أو بين الواجب و الممكن و رد بأنه يستلزم تعطيل العقول عن المعرفة فإنا إذا قلنا الواجب موجود فإن كان المفهوم منه المعنى الذي يفهم من وجود الممكن لزم الاشتراك المعنوي و إن كان المفهوم منه ما يقابله و هو مصداق نقيضه كان نفيا لوجوده تعالى عن ذلك و إن لم يفهم منه شي‏ء كان تعطيلا للعقل عن المعرفة و هو خلاف ما نجده من أنفسنا بالضرورة

1.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS UNIVOCAL

Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense, i.e., univocally (ishtirak ma’nawi ).

A proof of it is that we divide existence into its different categories, such as the existence of the Necessary Being (wujud al-wajib ) and the existence of the contingent being (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of the contingent is divided into that of substance (wujud al-jawhar) and that of accident (wujud al-mumkin ). The existence of substance and the existence of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is being divided and on its presence in all its divisions.

Another proof of it is that after positing the existence of something, at times we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may have doubts as to whether the creator is a necessary (wajib ) or a contingent (mumkin ) being, or as to whether or not he is characterized with quiddity (mahiyyah). Or, for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (nafs ), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (maddi ) or immaterial (mujarrad ), a substance (jawhar) or an accident (‘arad). Hence, if ‘existence’ were not univocal in the different instances and were it an equivocal or homonymous term with disparate meanings (mushtarak lafzi ), its meaning would necessarily vary from one subject of which it is predicated to another.

Another proof is that non-existence (‘adam ) is the contradictory of existence (wujud ): non-existence is univocal, because there, are no distinctions (tamayuz ) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, is also univocal, for otherwise it would imply a violation of the law of contradiction, which is impossible.

Those who have held that ‘existence’ is equivocal in relation to different existents, i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity (sinkhiyyah ) between cause and effect, or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents. However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect’s cognitive faculties. To elaborate, if in the statement, ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ we understand ‘existence’ to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that ‘existence’ is univocal (mushtarak ma’nawi ). If what is understood in the former statement [by ‘existence’] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ would amount to the negation of Its existence.

Finally, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect’s cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.

الفصل الثالث في أن الوجود زائد على الماهية عارض لها

بمعنى أن المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر فللعقل أن يجرد الماهية و هي ما يقال في جواب ما هو عن الوجود فيعتبرها وحدها فيعقلها ثم يصفها بالوجود و هو معنى العروض فليس الوجود عينا للماهية و لا جزءا لها.

و الدليل عليه أن الوجود يصح سلبه عن الماهية و لو كان عينا أو جزءا لها لم يصح ذلك لاستحالة سلب عين الشي‏ء و جزئه عنه.

و أيضا حمل الوجود على الماهية يحتاج إلى دليل فليس عينا و لا جزءا لها لأن ذات الشي‏ء و ذاتياته بينة الثبوت له لا تحتاج فيه إلى دليل

و أيضا الماهية متساوية النسبة في نفسها إلى الوجود و العدم و لو كان الوجود عينا أو جزءا لها استحالت نسبتها إلى العدم الذي هو نقيضه

1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY

A thing’s existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense, that each of them [i.e. ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’] signifies something not understandable from the other. From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [‘urud , i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it.

A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity. Had it been identical with quiddity, or a part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with it or a part of it.

Also, a proof is required if existence is to be predicated of a quiddity; therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it, because a thing’s essence (dhat ) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and differentia] are self-evident and do not stand in need of a proof.

Moreover, quiddity is in itself indifferent (mutasawiyat al-nisbah , lit. ‘equally related’) to existence and non-existence. Were existence identical with quiddity or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute to it non-existence, which is its contradictory.

الفصل الرابع في أصالة الوجود و اعتبارية الماهية

إنا لا نرتاب في أن هناك أمورا واقعية ذات آثار واقعية ليست بوهم الواهم ثم ننتزع من كل من هذه الأمور المشهودة لنا في عين أنه واحد في الخارج مفهومين اثنين كل منهما غير الآخر مفهوما و إن اتحدا مصداقا و هما الوجود و الماهية كالإنسان الذي في الخارج المنتزع عنه أنه إنسان و أنه موجود.

و قد اختلف الحكماء في الأصيل منهما فذهب المشاءون إلى أصالة الوجود و نسب إلى الإشراقيين القول بأصالة الماهية و أما القول بأصالتهما معا فلم يذهب إليه أحد منهم لاستلزام ذلك كون كل شي‏ء شيئين اثنين و هو خلاف الضرورة.

و الحق ما ذهب إليه المشاءون من أصالة الوجود.

و البرهان عليه أن الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي متساوية النسبة إلى الوجود و العدم فلو لم يكن خروجها من حد الاستواء إلى مستوى الوجود بحيث تترتب عليها الآثار بواسطة الوجود كان ذلك منها انقلابا و هو محال بالضرورة فالوجود هو المخرج لها عن حد الاستواء فهو الأصيل.

و ما قيل إن الماهية بنسبة مكتسبة من الجاعل تخرج من حد الاستواء إلى مرحلة الأصالة فتترتب عليها الآثار مندفع بأنها إن تفاوتت حالها بعد الانتساب فما به التفاوت هو الوجود الأصيل و إن سمي نسبة إلى الجاعل و إن لم تتفاوت و مع ذلك حمل عليها أنها موجودة و ترتبت عليها الآثار كان من الانقلاب كما تقدم

برهان آخر الماهيات مثار الكثرة و الاختلاف بالذات فلو لم يكن الوجود أصيلا لم تتحقق وحدة حقيقية و لا اتحاد بين ماهيتين فلم يتحقق الحمل الذي هو الاتحاد في الوجود و الضرورة تقضي بخلافه فالوجود هو الأصيل الموجود بالذات و الماهية موجودة به.

برهان آخر الماهية توجد بوجود خارجي فتترتب عليها آثارها و توجد بعينها بوجود ذهني كما سيأتي فلا يترتب عليها شي‏ء من تلك الآثار فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل و كانت الأصالة للماهية و هي محفوظة في الوجودين لم يكن فرق بينهما و التالي باطل فالمقدم مثله.

برهان آخر الماهية من حيث هي تستوي نسبتها إلى التقدم و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف و القوة و الفعل لكن الأمور الموجودة في الخارج مختلفة في هذه الأوصاف فبعضها متقدم أو قوي كالعلة و بعضها بخلاف ذلك كالمعلول و بعضها بالقوة و بعضها بالفعل فلو لم يكن الوجود هو الأصيل كان اختلاف هذه الصفات مستندة إليها و هي متساوية النسبة إلى الجميع هذا خلف و هناك حجج أخرى مذكورة في المطولات.

و للقائلين بأصالة الماهية و اعتبارية الوجود حجج مدخولة كقولهم لو كان الوجود أصيلا كان موجودا في الخارج فله وجود و لوجوده وجود فيتسلسل و هو محال.

و أجيب عنه بأن الوجود موجود لكن بنفس ذاته لا بوجود آخر فلا يذهب الأمر إلى غير النهاية

و يظهر مما تقدم ضعف قول آخر في المسألة منسوب إلى المحقق الدواني و هو أصالة الوجود في الواجب تعالى و أصالة الماهية في الممكنات و عليه فإطلاق الموجود على الواجب بمعنى أنه نفس الوجود و على الماهيات بمعنى أنها منتسبة إلى الوجود كاللابن و التامر بمعنى المنتسب إلى اللبن و التمر هذا و أما على المذهب المختار فالوجود موجود بذاته و الماهية موجودة بالعرض.

1.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF EXISTENCE

We have no doubt that there are real things out there in external reality possessing certain real properties (athar), and that they are not illusory. In regard to each of the things that we observe -  which is a single reality in the external world - we form two concepts different from one another, though they pertain to a single thing. These two concepts are ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity.’ For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his/her quiddity as a ‘human being’ and that he/she exists.

The philosophers (hukama) have differed as to which of the two concepts is fundamental (asil). The Peripatetics (al-Mashsha’un) hold existence to be fundamentally real (asalat al-wujud). The belief in the fundamentality of quiddity (asalat al-mahiyyah) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (al-Ishraqiyyun). The view that both of them may be regarded as fundamentally real is one which no one has held, for that would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible.

The Peripatetics are right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. A proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or stands in equal relation to] existence and non-existence, and were it capable by itself of emerging from this state of indifference [or neutrality] and assuming existence along with its properties (athar), that would amount to a violation of the law of identity (inqilab; lit. ‘mutation’), which is impossible. Hence it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real.

As to that which some have said, that quiddity emerges from its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in the state of quiddity after its relation with the Maker amounts to existence, though it should be called ‘a relation with the Maker.’ And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a violation of the law of identity, as mentioned.

Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and diversity. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity, nor any union between two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence, there would be no predication, which signifies unity in existence [as in a proposition of the type, ‘A is B’], and logical necessity requires the contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it.

Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the properties (athar) expected of it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (wujud dhihni) (which will be dealt with later on), it does not possess any of these properties. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity  -  which is there in both modes of being - real, there would be no difference between these two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent must also be such.

Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta’khkhur), strength (shiddah) and weakness (da’f), actuality (fi’l) and potentiality (quwwah). However, things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of

them are prior and strong, such as the cause (‘illah), and some are the opposite of that, such as the effect (ma’lul). Some of them have actuality and some of them possess potentiality. Were existence not fundamentally real, the difference in respect to these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent in relation to all of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here and they are mentioned in detailed works.

Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity arid consider existence to be derivative (i’tibari), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, ‘If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from which it follows that it has an existence, and that existence again has another existence, and so on ad infinitum. This involves an infinite regress, which is inadmissible.’

The answer to such an argument is that existence does indeed exist; but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress.

In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to Dawwani, also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence with respect to the Necessary Being, and to quiddity with respect to contingent beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Necessary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have only a relation with being, such as the relation between the ‘milkman’ (labin) and ‘milk’ (laban) and the ‘date seller’ (tamir) and ‘dates’ (tamr). However, in accordance with the doctrine endorsed by us, existence exists by itself (bi dhatih) and quiddity exists accidentally (bi al-‘arad).

الفصل الخامس في أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة

اختلف القائلون بأصالة الوجود فذهب بعضهم إلى أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة مشككة و هو المنسوب إلى الفهلويين من حكماء الفرس فالوجود عندهم لكونه ظاهرا بذاته مظهرا لغيره من الماهيات كالنور الحسي الذي هو ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره من الأجسام الكثيفة للأبصار.

فكما أن النور الحسي نوع واحد حقيقته أنه ظاهر بذاته مظهر لغيره و هذا المعنى متحقق في جميع مراتب الأشعة و الأظلة على كثرتها و اختلافها فالنور الشديد شديد في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الضعيف و النور الضعيف ضعيف في نوريته التي يشارك فيها النور الشديد فليست شدة الشديد منه جزءا مقوما للنورية حتى يخرج الضعيف منه و لا عرضا خارجا عن الحقيقة و ليس ضعف الضعيف قادحا في نوريته و لا أنه مركب من النور و الظلمة لكونها أمرا عدميا بل شدة الشديد في أصل النورية و كذا ضعف الضعيف فللنور عرض عريض باعتبار مراتبه المختلفة بالشدة و الضعف و لكل مرتبة عرض عريض باعتبار القوابل المختلفة من الأجسام الكثيفة.

كذلك الوجود حقيقة واحدة ذات مراتب مختلفة متمايزة بالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و غير ذلك فيرجع ما به الامتياز فيها إلى ما به الاشتراك و ما به الاختلاف إلى ما به الاتحاد فليست خصوصية شي‏ء من المراتب جزءا مقوما للوجود لبساطته كما سيجي‏ء و لا أمرا خارجا عنه لأن أصالة الوجود تبطل ما هو غيره الخارج عنه بل الخصوصية في كل مرتبة مقومة لنفس المرتبة بمعنى ما ليس بخارج منها.

و لها كثرة طولية باعتبار المراتب المختلفة الآخذة من أضعف المراتب و هي التي لا فعلية لها إلا عدم الفعلية و هي المادة الأولى الواقعة في أفق العدم ثم تتصاعد المراتب إلى أن تنتهي إلى المرتبة الواجبة لذاتها و هي التي لا حد لها إلا عدم الحد و لها كثرة عرضية باعتبار تخصصها بالماهيات المختلفة التي هي مثار الكثرة.

و ذهب قوم من المشاءين إلى كون الوجود حقائق متباينة بتمام ذواتها أما كونه حقائق متباينة فلاختلاف آثارها و أما كونها متباينة بتمام الذوات فلبساطتها و على هذا يكون مفهوم الوجود المحمول عليها عرضيا خارجا عنها لازما لها.

و الحق أنه حقيقة واحدة مشككة أما كونها حقيقة واحدة فلأنه لو لم تكن كذلك لكانت حقائق مختلفة متباينة بتمام الذوات و لازمه كون مفهوم الوجود و هو مفهوم واحد كما تقدم منتزعا من مصاديق متباينة بما هي متباينة و هو محال بيان الاستحالة أن المفهوم و المصداق واحد ذاتا و إنما الفارق كون الوجود ذهنيا أو خارجيا فلو انتزع الواحد بما هو واحد من الكثير بما هو كثير كان الواحد بما هو واحد كثيرا بما هو كثير و هو محال

و أيضا لو انتزع المفهوم الواحد بما هو واحد من المصاديق الكثيرة بما هي كثيرة فإما أن تعتبر في صدقه خصوصية هذا المصداق لم يصدق على ذلك المصداق و إن اعتبر فيه خصوصية ذاك لم يصدق على هذا و إن اعتبر فيه الخصوصيتان معا لم يصدق على شي‏ء منهما و إن لم يعتبر شي‏ء من الخصوصيتين بل انتزع من القدر المشترك بينهما لم يكن منتزعا من الكثير بما هو كثير بل بما هو واحد كالكلي المنتزع من الجهة المشتركة بين الأفراد الصادق على الجميع هذا خلف.

و أما أن حقيقته مشككة فلما يظهر من الكمالات الحقيقية المختلفة التي هي صفات متفاضلة غير خارجة عن الحقيقة الواحدة كالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر و القوة و الفعل و غير ذلك فهي حقيقة واحدة متكثرة في ذاتها يرجع فيها كل ما به الامتياز إلى ما به الاشتراك و بالعكس و هذا هو التشكيك.

1.5. EXISTENCE IS ONE GRADATIONAL REALITY

The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single gradational reality (haqiqah mushakkakah wahidah). This view is ascribed to the Fahlaviyyun, philosophers of [ancient] Iran. Existence, according to them, is self-manifesting and makes other things - i.e. quiddities - manifest. It may be likened to sensible light, which is self-manifesting and makes other things, such as opaque bodies, manifest to vision.

Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and manifests things other than itself. This feature applies to all the different grades of light and shade with their multiplicity and diversity. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light, and a weak light shares its luminous nature with a strong one. The strength of a strong light is neither the constituting differentia (juz muqawwim) of its luminous nature, so as to negate the luminous character of weak light, nor is it an accident extraneous to its reality. The weakness of a weak light neither negates its luminous nature, nor is it a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so does the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivity of opaque bodies [as in reflection and refraction].

Similarly, existence is one reality with various degrees differentiated by intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is exactly that which is common to them, and that which makes them different is exactly that which makes them one. Hence the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence, by virtue of the simplicity (basatah) of existence  - as will be explained later on - nor is it anything extraneous to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes that there should be anything other than it or external to it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not something other than it.

The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (tuli) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees  - represented by prime matter, which exists on the verge of non-existence -  where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality. From there it rises in degrees to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (‘aradi) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity.

A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence consists of entities essentially disparate  - disparate in their entirety -  from each other (haqa’iq mutabayinah bi tamami dhawatiha). They are disparate because their properties are disparate. The disparity is essential and complete, by virtue of the simplicity of their essences. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes, of necessity, something accidental and extrinsic to them (for, were it intrinsic to them, it would be a constituent, and this contradicts simplicity).

The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Were it not one reality, entities would have been disparate from one another with the totality of their essences (dhawat). That would entail that the concept of existence, which is a single concept, as said, has been abstracted from disparate things qua disparate things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of disparity lies in existence being mental or external. Were something which is one, qua one, capable of being abstracted from that which is many, qua many, one qua one would be the same as many qua many, which is impossible.

Also, suppose that a single concept were abstracted from a multiplicity of referents qua disparate things. If the concept represented a certain characteristic of one referent, it would not be predicable of a second referent. If the concept represented some characteristic of the second referent, it would not correspond to the first referent. If the characteristics of both the referents were represented in it, it would not correspond to either of the referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept were to represent that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been possible from different things qua different things, but from their unifying aspect, such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption.

As to existence being a gradational reality, since it manifests various real perfections that make up the distinctive attributes that are not extraneous” to the single reality of existence, such as intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc., existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, wherein all that makes existents differ refers to what is common to them, and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (tashkik).

الفصل السادس في ما يتخصص به الوجود

تخصص الوجود بوجوه ثلاثة :

أحدها تخصص حقيقته الواحدة الأصلية بنفس ذاتها القائمة بذاتها

و ثانيها تخصصها بخصوصيات مراتبها غير الخارجة عن المراتب

و ثالثها تخصص الوجود بإضافته إلى الماهيات المختلفة الذوات و عروضه لها فيختلف باختلافها بالعرض.

و عروض الوجود للماهية و ثبوته لها ليس من قبيل العروض المقولي الذي يتوقف فيه ثبوت العارض على ثبوت المعروض قبله فإن حقيقة ثبوت الوجود للماهية هي ثبوت الماهية به لأن ذلك هو مقتضى أصالته و اعتباريتها و إنما العقل لمكان أنسه بالماهيات يفترض الماهية موضوعه و يحمل الوجود عليها و هو في الحقيقة من عكس الحمل.

و بذلك يندفع الإشكال المعروف في حمل الوجود على الماهية من أن قاعدة الفرعية أعني أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء فرع ثبوت المثبت له توجب ثبوتا للمثبت له قبل ثبوت الثابت فثبوت الوجود للماهية يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية قبله فإن كان ثبوتها عين ثبوته لها لزم تقدم الشي‏ء على نفسه و إن كان غيره توقف ثبوته لها على ثبوت آخر لها و هلم جرا فيتسلسل.

و قد اضطر هذا الإشكال بعضهم إلى القول بأن القاعدة مخصصة بثبوت الوجود للماهية و بعضهم إلى تبديل الفرعية بالاستلزام فقال الحق أن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء مستلزم لثبوت المثبت له و لو بهذا الثابت و ثبوت الوجود للماهية مستلزم لثبوت الماهية بنفس هذا الوجود فلا إشكال.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود لا تحقق له و لا ثبوت في ذهن و لا في خارج و للموجود معنى بسيط يعبر عنه بالفارسية ب هست و الاشتقاق صوري فلا ثبوت له حتى يتوقف على ثبوت الماهية.

و بعضهم إلى القول بأن الوجود ليس له إلا المعنى المطلق و هو معنى الوجود العام و الحصص و هو المعنى العام مضافا إلى ماهية ماهية بحيث يكون التقييد داخلا و القيد خارجا و أما الفرد و هو مجموع المقيد و التقييد و القيد فليس له ثبوت.

و شي‏ء من هذه الأجوبة على فسادها لا يغني طائلا و الحق في الجواب ما تقدم من أن القاعدة إنما تجري في ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء لا في ثبوت الشي‏ء و بعبارة أخرى مجرى القاعدة هو الهلية المركبة دون الهلية البسيطة كما في ما نحن فيه

1.6. THAT WHICH PARTICULARIZES EXISTENCE

Existence is particularized in three aspects:

(1) as a single fundamental reality in itself, which is self-subsistent [unlike quiddity]; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not extraneous to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence pertains and which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference.

The manner in which existence pertains to quiddity and gives it subsistence (thubut) is not the kind peculiar to categories [like accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subsistence of a quality depends on the prior subsistence of its subject. That is because the meaning of existence of quiddity is its subsistence through existence. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the derivative (i’tibari) character of quiddity. It is the intellect which, by virtue of its familiarity with quiddities, supposes quiddity to be the subject to which predicates existence. However, the matter is the inverse of this predication in concrete reality.

This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in relation to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (qaidat al-far’iyyah), the subsistence (thubut) of some quality (q) of a thing (A) is subordinate to that thing’s subsistence, which makes it necessary that the thing of which the property is posited subsist prior to the quality posited of it. Hence the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior subsistence of quiddity. For should the subsistence of quiddity be the same as the subsistence of existence, that would imply something being prior to itself; and should it be different, the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on another subsistence of quiddity, and so on. This results in an infinite regress.

This objection has forced some philosophers to admit an exception to the rule in the case of subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity. Some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance. They state: ‘The truth is that the subsistence of one thing [quality] in relation to another [subject] is concomitant with the subsistence of the subject, though it be through the subsistence of the former. The subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity is concomitant with the subsistence of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.”

Some of them have been compelled by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. ‘Being’ has a simple meaning represented in Farsi by the word hast (‘is’). This derivation [of a substantive from a verb] is merely verbal, and existence has no subsistence at all so as to depend on the subsistence of quiddity.

Some others have been led to hold that ‘existence’ has nothing but a general meaning, signifying existence in general and its parts, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the conditioning is internal while the condition is external. The individual, which is the totality of the conditioned, the conditioning, and the condition, has no subsistence.

These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid, like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested by the foregoing discussion, that the Rule of Subordination applies to the subsistence of a thing in relation to another thing (thubutu shay’in li shay), not to a thing’s subsistence (thubutu al-shay’). In other words, the rule applies to composite propositions [e.g., ‘A has the quality q’], not to simple propositions [e.g., ‘A exists’], as is the matter in the present case.

الفصل السابع في أحكام الوجود السلبية

منها أن الوجود لا غير له و ذلك لأن انحصار الأصالة في حقيقته يستلزم بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له أجنبيا عنه بطلانا ذاتيا.

و منها أنه لا ثاني له لأن أصالة حقيقته الواحدة و بطلان كل ما يفرض غيرا له ينفى عنه كل خليط داخل فيه أو منضم إليه فهو صرف في نفسه و صرف الشي‏ء لا يتثنى و لا يتكرر فكل ما فرض له ثانيا عاد أولا و إلا امتاز عنه بشي‏ء غيره داخل فيه أو خارج عنه و المفروض انتفاؤه هذا خلف.

و منها أنه ليس جوهرا و لا عرضا أما أنه ليس جوهرا فلأن الجوهر ماهية إذا وجدت في الخارج وجدت لا في الموضوع و الوجود ليس من سنخ الماهية و أما أنه ليس بعرض فلأن العرض متقوم الوجود بالموضوع و الوجود متقوم بنفس ذاته و كل شي‏ء متقوم به.

و منها أنه ليس جزءا لشي‏ء لأن الجزء الآخر المفروض غيره و الوجود لا غير له.

و ما قيل إن كل ممكن زوج تركيبي من ماهية و وجود فاعتبار عقلي ناظر إلى الملازمة بين الوجود الإمكاني و الماهية لا أنه تركيب من جزءين أصيلين.

و منها أنه لا جزء له لأن الجزء إما جزء عقلي كالجنس و الفصل و إما جزء خارجي كالمادة و الصورة و إما جزء مقداري كأجزاء الخط و السطح و الجسم التعليمي و ليس للوجود شي‏ء من هذه الأجزاء.

أما الجزء العقلي فلأنه لو كان للوجود جنس و فصل فجنسه إما الوجود فيكون فصله المقسم مقوما لأن الفصل بالنسبة إلى الجنس يفيد تحصل ذاته لا أصل ذاته و تحصل الوجود هو ذاته هذا خلف و إما غير الوجود و لا غير للوجود.

و أما الجزء الخارجي و هو المادة و الصورة فلأن المادة و الصورة هما الجنس و الفصل مأخوذين بشرط لا فانتفاء الجنس و الفصل يوجب انتفاءهما.

و أما الجزء المقداري فلأن المقدار من عوارض الجسم و الجسم مركب من المادة و الصورة و إذ لا مادة و لا صورة للوجود فلا جسم له و إذ لا جسم له فلا مقدار له

و مما تقدم يظهر أنه ليس نوعا لأن تحصل النوع بالتشخص الفردي و الوجود متحصل بنفس ذاته‏

1.7. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE

One of the properties of existence is that it has no ‘other.’ Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, this necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alienated from it or besides it.

Another of these properties is that it has no second, for the oneness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything else that may be supposed, precludes its possessing any ingredient within it or appended to it. It is absolute (sirf), and a thing in its absoluteness does not yield to duplication or repetition. Any second that may be assumed for it would be either identical with the first, or differ from it due to something intrinsic or extrinsic that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other.

Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is a quiddity that does not require a subject to subsist in external reality, while existence is not of the order of quiddity. As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it.

Another of these properties is that existence is not a part of anything, because the other supposed part will be something other than existence, while existence has no other.

As to the statement that ‘every contingent existent (mumkin) is a duality composed of quiddity and existence’ [which apparently implies that existence is a part of something], that is merely one of the intellect’s constructs (i’tibar ‘aqli) representing the necessary relation between contingent existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a compound made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality.

Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (i) conceptual, such as genus and differentia; (ii) external, such as matter and form; or (iii) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these parts.

As to the absence of conceptual constituents in existence, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something else. If the genus were existence, its differentia, which divides the genus, would constitute it, for the differentia in relation to the genus actualizes the genus [through species]; it does not constitute the essence of the genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other.

As to external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia in regard to existence necessarily implies the negation of these also.

As to quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither bodiness, nor, as consequence, magnitude.

From what has been said, it become evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by individuation, and existence is actualized by itself.

الفصل الثامن في معنى نفس الأمر

قد ظهر مما تقدم أن لحقيقة الوجود ثبوتا و تحققا بنفسه بل الوجود عين الثبوت و التحقق و أن للماهيات و هي التي تقال في جواب ما هو و توجد تارة بوجود خارجي فتظهر آثارها و تارة بوجود ذهني فلا تترتب عليها الآثار ثبوتا و تحققا بالوجود لا بنفس ذاتها و إن كانا متحدين في الخارج و أن المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية و هي التي لم تنتزع من الخارج و إنما اعتبرها العقل بنوع من التعمل لضرورة تضطره إلى ذلك كمفاهيم الوجود و الوحدة و العلية و نحو ذلك أيضا لها نحو ثبوت بثبوت مصاديقها المحكية بها و إن لم تكن هذه المفاهيم مأخوذة في مصاديقها أخذ الماهية في أفرادها و في حدود مصاديقها.

و هذا الثبوت العام الشامل لثبوت الوجود و الماهية و المفاهيم الاعتبارية العقلية هو المسمى بنفس الأمر التي يعتبر صدق القضايا بمطابقتها فيقال إن كذا كذا في نفس الأمر.

توضيح ذلك أن من القضايا ما موضوعها خارجي بحكم خارجي كقولنا الواجب تعالى موجود و قولنا خرج من في البلد و قولنا” الإنسان ضاحك بالقوة “ صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للوجود العيني.

و منها ما موضوعها ذهني بحكم ذهني أو خارجي مأخوذ بحكم ذهني كقولنا الكلي إما ذاتي أو عرضي و الإنسان نوع و صدق الحكم فيها بمطابقته للذهن لكون موطن ثبوتها هو الذهن و كلا القسمين صادقان بمطابقتهما لنفس الأمر فالثبوت النفس الأمري أعم مطلقا من كل من الثبوت الذهني و الخارجي.

و قيل إن نفس الأمر عقل مجرد فيه صور المعقولات عامة و التصديقات الصادقة في القضايا الذهنية و الخارجية تطابق ما عنده من الصور المعقولة.

و فيه أنا ننقل الكلام إلى ما عنده من الصور العلمية فهي تصديقات تحتاج في صدقها إلى ثبوت لمضامينها خارج عنها تطابقه.


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