Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

The Number Of The Army

The number of the army that was in Kufa in the middle years of the first century, A.H. was forty thousand fighters. Every year ten thousand fighters of it made a campaign (against the enemies of Islam). (This is what the reliable books have mentioned).

We have known that the Commander of the faithful (Imam 'Ali), peace be on him, prepared forty thousand or fifty thousand fighters according to two different reports- to attack the Syrians. However, he had died before he made an attack with them. We think that al-Hasan's army was a group of the army which the Commander of the faithful prepared to fight against Mu'awiya.

Then we know nothing about the attitude of these armies towards al-Hasan b. 'Ali, peace be on them, when he summoned them to jihad (armed struggle). Besides we have known, from more than one reference book, that the vanguard which al-Hasan sent to meet Mu'awiya at Maskan was estimated at twelve thousand fighters. The acceptable idea is that this vanguard was from the groups of the army which the Commander of the faithful formed before he died. So some of these groups supported al-Hasan while the rest refused that.

Then, from another reference, we have known that the. Kufans became excited on the day of al-Hasan, so they called up other four thousand fighters.1

Thus these are sixteen thousand fighters whom the unquestionable text have shown.

There also are other figures concerning the number of the army.

The historians have mentioned them, and the important declarations have included them. However, their correctness is liable to test and discussion.

The following are some texts about these different figures. First we will mention these figures as they are. Then we will check them properly.

1. In his book (Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 10, p. 110), he (i.e., Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi) said: "Then he (i.e., al-Hasan) dispatched to him (i.e., Mu'awiya) a leader with four thousand (fighters). He (the leader) was from Kinda. He (al-Hasan) ordered him (the leader) to camp in Anbar2 and not to do anything till his (al-Hasan's) order came to him. When he (the leader) headed for Anbar and stopped there, Mu'awiya knew of that.

Thus he sent messengers to him, and wrote to him: `Indeed, if you came to me, I would appoint you as a ruler over some districts of Sham (Syria) and of the Island (al-jazirah), and the like.' He (Mu'awiya) sent him (the leader) five hundred thousand dirhams. So al-Kindi took the money. He deserted al-Hasan. He went to Mu'awiya with two hundred men from his notables and the member of his family. Al-Hasan heard of that. So he rose and delivered a sermon:

`Al-Kindi went to Mu'awiya. He deserted me and you. I told you a time after a time (that) you have no faithfulness. You are the slaves of this world. I am going to send another man to replace him. I know that he (the man) will do towards you and me as your friend (i.e., al-Kindi) did. He will never fear Allah concerning me and you.' So he (al-Hasan) sent him (Mu'awiya) a man from (the tribe of) Murad with four thousand (fighters).

He (al-Hasan) came toward him (the man) before the very eyes of the people, confirmed him, and told him that he (the man) would desert as al-Kindi did. So he (the man) took a solemn oath before him (al-Hasan) that he (the man) would not do that. So al-Hasan said: `He will desert.' When he (the man) headed for AnbaI, Mu'awiya sent him messengers. He wrote to him as he (Mu'awiya) wrote to his (the man's) companion. He sent him five thousand (maybe he, the reporter, meant five hundred thousand) dirhams. He made him desire for any district he liked from the districts of Sham and of the Island. So he (the man) deserted al-Hasan, went to Mu'awiya, and did not keep his word."

After this text, al-Majlisi mentioned that al-Hasan took al-Nukhayla as a camp for him, and that al-Hasan went there.

2. In his book (Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14), b. Abu al-Hadid said: "The people went out. They became active for going out. Then al-Hasan went out to the camp. He had appointed al-Mughira b. Noufal b. al-Harth b. `Abd al-Muttalib as a successor over Kufa. He ordered him to urge and dispatch the people to him. So he (i.e., al-Mughira) began urging and dispatching them to the extent that the camp was full (of people). Then al-Hasan went with a great army and good equipment till he stopped at Dir `Abd al-Rahman. He stayed there for three (days) till the people gathered. Then he summoned `Ubayd Allah b. al-'Abbas b. `Abd al-Muttalib, and said to him: `Cousin, I am going to send with you twelve thousand (men) from the horsemen of the Arabs and (the Qur'an readers) of the city.'"

3. Al-Tabari (vol. 6, p. 94.) reported on the authority of al-Zuhri, who said: "When Mu'awiya got rid of `Ubayd Allah b. 'Abbas and al Hasan, peace be on him, he came to plot against a man who was the most important of the people in plotting against him (Mu'awiya). There were forty thousand (fighters) with him. Mu'awiya, `Amru, and the Syrians met them."

4. In his book (Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 6), b. Abu al Hadid has mentioned the following on the authority of al-Mada'ini3 on the authority of al-Musayyab b. Nujayya, who said to al-Hasan when he blamed him for his Peace Treaty with Mu'awiya `My astonishment at you does not end. You have made peace with Mu'awiya, (while) you have forty thousand (fighters). Or he (al Musayyab) said: `You have pledged allegiance to (Mu'awiya)', due to different reporters."

5. In his book (al-Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh, vol. 3, p. 61), Ibn al-Athir said: "Forty thousand fighters pledged allegiance to the Commander of the faithful ('Ali). They were ready to die for him when he told them about something concerning Sham (Syria) and they appeared. While he was getting ready to advance towards (Syria), he was killed. If Allah wills a thing, no one is able to repulse it (the thing). When he was killed, the people pledged allegiance to his son, al-Hasan. He (al Hasan) heard of the advance of Mu'awiya and the Syrians towards him. So he (al-Hasan) and the army that had pledged allegiance to 'Ali got ready and left Kufa to meet Mu'awiya, who had stopped at Maskan. So al-Hasan arrived in al-Mada'in. There he appointed Qays b. `Abbada al-Ansari over his vanguard with twelve thousand (fighters). It was said that al-Hasan appointed `Abd Allah4 b. `Abbas over his (al-Hasan's) vanguard. So he (al-Hasan) appointed `Abd Allah b. `Abbas over his vanguard in the advance guards of Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada."

I (the author) say: Ibn Kathir followed such a tradition. Apparently he has taken it letter by letter from the book `al-Kamil.'

6. Al-Mada'ini5 has reported the words of al-Hasan, peace be on him, in response to the man who said to him: "Were you right in what you have done?" So al-Hasan said: "Yes, but I am afraid that seventy thousand or eight thousand (fighters) will come on the Day of Resurrection. Their jugular veins will bleed. So they will ask Allah why their blood had been shed."

7. In his book (al-Imama wa al-Siyasa, p. 151), b. Qutayba al-Dinawari has reported: "They mentioned that the people pledged allegiance to Mu'awiya. Then he (Mu'awiya) came back to Sham (Syria). Afterwards Sulayman b. Sirt al-Khaza'i, who was absent from Kufa and was the master and chief of the Iraqis, came to al Hasan and said to him: `You who have humiliated the believers, al salamu `alayka' !

Al-Hasan said: `wa `alayka al-salam, sit down, may Allah have mercy on your father.' He (b. Qutayba) said: Sulayman sat down and said: `Now then, our astonishment at you does not end because of your pledge of allegiance to Mu'awiya. You have one hundred Iraqi fighters who receive salaries. You have a similar number to them from their sons and friends. Moreover, you have followers (Shi'a) in Basrah and Hijaz."

I (the author) say: In his book (Tanzih al-Anbiya') al-Murtada, in his book (al-Manaqib) Ibn Shahrashub, and in his book (al-Bihar) al Majlisi have reported the complete text of what happened between Sulayman b. Sirt and his companions and al-Hasan, peace be on him. No one of them (the authors) have narrated on the authority of Sulayman and his companions that the number of the army was more than forty thousand (fighters).

So only b. Qutayba has reported on the authority of Sulayman that the number of the army was one hundred (fighters). Also only he used the word `pledge of allegiance' (al-bay'a) instead of the word `Peace' (Sulh).

8. Ziyad b. Abih, who was the governor of al-Hasan over Persia, said the following in response to Mu'awiya's threat: "Indeed, the son of she who ate the livers (i.e., Hind), of the shelter of hypocrisy, and of the rest of the allies (ahzab) has written to me to threaten me. Between me and him are the two grandsons of the Apostle of Allah. They have ninety thousand (fighters) {according to a report seventy thousand (fighters)}, who have put the hilts of their swords under their chins. No one of them turns till he dies. Indeed, by Allah, if he (i.e., Mu'awiya) came to me, he would find me stronger (than him) in hitting with the sword."6

Discussion

In this manner, these texts with various forms have suggested different figures about the number of the army. The large figures in these texts are forty thousand, eighty thousand, and one hundred thousand (fighters).

Indeed, all these three figures are liable to doubt and check, even the smallest of them. Now, you read the following explanations:

1. The largest figure is one hundred thousand or ninety thousand (fighters). Ziyad b. Abih referred to this figure. Only al-Dinawari has attributed it to Sulayman b. Sirt al-Khaza'i. This figure is unacceptable for several reasons:

The most important ones of these reasons are:

A. Both leaders (i.e., Sulayman and Ziyad) did not attend the pledge of allegiance to al-Hasan. They did not take part in the jihad of al-Hasan. They were not present during the succession of al-Hasan in Kufa. Generally speaking, they left their homeland in Iraq for two years.7

Thus they did not attend the situation that prevailed Kufa at that time. Namely, they did not witness the strong formation of the parties and the ignoble tardiness that spread all over Kufa, and with which the Kufans faced their Imam to whom they pledged allegiance. Therefore the figures they have mentioned are worthless.

When Sulayman and Ziyad mentioned these figures of the fighters, they compared the present period of Kufa with its past.. They thought that the Kufans mobilized fighters during the time of al-Hasan as they did during the time of his father, the Commander of the faithful, in the years 37 and 38 A.H.

B. The attitude of both men (i.e., Sulayman and Ziyad) at the emotional moment when they mentioned these figures indicate that they inclined to exaggeration. This exaggeration about the number of the army resulted from Sulayman's strong anger. Thus he censured Imam al-Hasan, peace be on him, for making peace with Mu'awiya. Also it resulted from the threat Ziyad made in response to Mu'awiya's threat.

Therefore there is nothing correct in these two figures. Thus we must not rely on them to determine the number of the army.

Besides we have known that Sulayman was the friend of al-Musayyab b. Nujayya. In other words Sulayman had ties with al-Musayyab other than the personal friendship. In text no. 4, you have read that al-Musayyab admonished al-Hasan for making peace with Mu'awiya:" You have forty thousand (fighters)." It is undeniable that these two friends did not differ over the affairs of the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) peace be on them, as they differed over these figures.

Accordingly, the reason for these unusual figures of Sulayman b. Sirt is that al-Dinawari, only, who reported such reports about the matter of al-Hasan, did not check them out.

Fate had decided to punish these two leaders (Sulayman and Ziyad) before they left the life in this world. For they recklessly blamed Imam Abu Muhammad (i.e., al-Hasan), peace be on him, for making peace with Mu'awiya.

So in the year 65 A.H., eighteen thousand people pledged allegiance to Sulayman and Ziyad to avenge the blood of al-Husayn, peace be on him. When the Battle of `Ayn al-Warda took place, most people deserted them. Thus suffered from the desertion of the people.

Such kind of desertion reminded them of the attitude of the people towards the matters of the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt), peace be on them.

Then Sulayman and al-Musayyab, who were the leaders of the Movement of the Repentant, were killed at the Battle of `Ayn al-Warda. Also most of their followers were killed on that day.

2. As for the number eighty thousand or seventy thousand fighters, it was mentioned by al-Hasan when he answered the man who asked him: "Were you right in what you have done."

The words of al-Hasan, in fact, indicate that he had not more than twenty thousand fighters according to the greatest assessment. That is because when al-Hasan mentioned those "whose jugular veins will bleed on the Day of Judgment," he ranged their number from seventy thousand to eighty thousand persons. By this number, he did not mean his soldiers in particular. Rather he meant the total number of the two fighting armies. Moreover, we have known that the number of the Syrians during their advance against al-Hasan was sixty thousand fighters. So the rest was the number of al-Hasan's private army.

Al-Hasan's hesitation in determining the number is clear in what we have mentioned. That is because if he had meant his army with the exception of the army of the others, he would have mentioned its number without hesitation. For he was the most knowledgeable of the people in the number of his army.

3. As for the number forty thousand fighters, it has been mentioned more than one historian. Also al-Musayyab b. Nujayya has mentioned it. We have nothing concerning this number but two ideas:

A. This number disagrees with al-Hasan's words with which he referred to the number of the army. You have known that his words do not mean more than twenty thousand fighters according to the greatest estimation. Also this number disagrees with his other words with which he described the attitude of the people towards him. Namely, he described their attitude as: "Sluggishness in fighting."8 Thus if al-Hasan had forty thousand fighters, the people would not have been sluggish in fighting alongside him. So the number is still liable to doubt.

B. The doubt imposed the number on those who believed in it. So they thought that the Commander of the faithful, peace be on him, prepared forty thousand fighters for his final campaign against Sham (Syria). Then his holy life had ended before he advanced against Sham with this army. So they thought that the soldiers of the father (i.e., Imam 'Ali) were added to the soldiers of the son (i.e., al-Hasan). However, they forgot to mention the number of the people who deserted the new Successor in Kufa.

Therefore, the figure based on these errors is worthless.

Al-Zuhri's report is very unusual. For it denotes that there were forty thousand fighters with Qays b. Sa'd b. `Abbada al-Ansari. They belonged to the army of al-Hasan. Namely, they were with Qays who became the commander of the vanguard in Maskan when `Ubayd Allah and his followers had escaped. This means that only the vanguard of al-Hasan had forty- eight thousand fighters before the events of escaping.

Thus this idea is incorrect in history.

The reports of al-Zuhri concerning the matters of the members of the house (Ahl al-Bayt) are the weakest of all reports, and the most confused of them all in subjects. The author of the book (Dirasat fi al-Islam) regarded al-Zuhri as a mercenary for the Umayyads. This is enough evidence for the weakness of his reports.

Al-Zuhri said: "Mu'awiya, `Amru, and the Syrians stopped at them." Now, we want to act freely with this narration of his. We want to correct this intentional confusion as follows: the above-mentioned words contain a pronoun that is `them.' If we attribute the pronoun to Mu'awiya's army and exclude Qays' army, then the number will concern Mu'awiya's soldiers with whom he met Qays. The concerned ones of them were those who received salaries. The concerned ones of the Syrians were the volunteers other than those who received salaries. In this way there will be coherence between this narration of his and the other narration that has added the soldiers of Mu'awiya to the vanguard of al-Hasan.

4. Ibn Abu al-Hadid has used the phrase `the great army' to describe the movement of al-Hasan from al-Nukhayla to Dir `Abd al-Rahman on his way to his camps. These words, as you see, are brief. They agree with the number that we have already mentioned. Indeed, sixteen thousand fighters were a great army. If you refuse that; then they were twenty thousand fighters.

5. The narration in the book `Bihar al-Anwar' is the best of all reports which we have mentioned to understand what has been reported about this matter. There is an order in the frequent events of this narration so that such an order imposes doubt on it.

When this narration shows the same events, it ignores the names of the two leaders (i.e., al-Kindi and al-Muradi). For this narration indicates that they met Mu'awiya before `Ubayd Allah. Also they deserted al-Hasan before him. In the history of such an event, the people do not know that ignoring the names of two leaders during two events is among the ugliest events of man in history.

Apart from ignoring the names of the two leaders, this narration which is in Bihar al-Anwar underlines that the Imam (al-Hasan) insisted on accusing the two leaders (of desertion) before he dispatched them. Moreover, this narration underlines that the Imam sent them to meet Mu'awiya though he was aware of their desertion.

Some of this (explanation) is enough so that we will not go on discussing this narration, for it is very easy to understand.

I (the author) say In spite of this discussion, we have not gotten any result about the matter which we have mentioned under the topic: The Number of the Army. These texts, though many, are some examples about the fabrications from which the matter of al-Hasan suffered. No wonder when we mention this fact (matter), repeat it, regard its danger as great, condemn it, and draw the attention of people to its results. These are eight texts. Not one of them is able to resist the discussion, so we cannot use them as historical proofs.

Then we have nothing except the number of the army of the vanguard, that was twelve thousand fighters, and the number of the volunteers in Kufa that was four thousand fighters. Then we have to mention the groups of the people who came to al-Hasan at Dir `Abd al-Rahman when he stayed there for three days. They were about twenty thousand fighters. All these groups of people were the army of al-Hasan when he headed for his two camps at Maskan and al-Mada'in.

As for the fighters from al-Mada'in itself, they did not tarry from the battlefields headed by 'Ali, peace be on him. We have already mentioned that, so it was impossible for them to desert his son (al-Hasan) when he camped among them.

This is what makes us believe that the number of the army at both camps was twenty thousand fighters or little over.

This number was `the great army' which b. Abu al-Hadid meant. Also it is the number that agrees with the foregoing words of al Hasan, peace be on him. There is no proof better than al-Hasan's words concerning his matters.

Then we do not know whether al-Hasan, peace be on him, received any help from any party when he was in al-Mada'in.

Notes

1. Al-Rawandi, al-Kharaij wa al-Jaraih, p. 228.

2. A city was on the bank of the Euphrates (west of Baghdad). Anbar was ten leagues far from Baghdad. It was called so, for the stores (`anabir) of wheat and barley were gathered together in it during the days of the Persians. Abu al-`Abbas al-Saffih al-`Abbasi resided in it till he died. He rebuilt palaces and house in it, but they have become extinct.

3. He was Abu al-Hasan b. Muhammad b. Abu Sayf al-Basri. He lived in al-Mada'in, then moved to Baghdad, and died there in the year 215 A.H. Ibn Abu al-Hadid reported many traditions on his authority. He, may Allah have mercy on him, has about two hundred books on various matters.

4. He was `Ubayd Allah, neither `Abd Allah nor Qays. We have already mentioned the reasons for the error in mentioning each of them.

5. Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 7. Ibn Kathir, al Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh vol. 8, p. 42.

6. Al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh, vol. 2, p. 194. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Ta'rikh, vol. 3, p. 166. The former has narrated that the number of the army was ninety' thousand fighters, while the latter has mentioned that it was seventy thousand fighters.

7. Ibn Qutayba (in al-Imama wa al-Siyasa), and al-Murtada (in Tanzih al Anbiya') have mentioned that Sulayman was not in Kufa for two years. As for Ziyad, he was the governor of Basrah. Then `Abd Allah b. `Abbas dispatched him to Persia, to be a governor over it in the year 39 A.H. In the events of the year 39 A.H, al-Tabari mentioned that Ziyad was in Basrah before the year 39.

8. Al-Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 10, p. 113.

The Members Of The Army

In his book `al-Irshad p. 169, al-Mufid said: "Al-Hasan sent Hujr b. `Adi to order the leaders (Ummal) to set out and to call the people together for war (jihad). They were slow to (answer) him and then they came forward. (Al-Hasan) had a mixed band of men: some of them belonged to his Shi'a and to his father's; some of them were members of the Muhakkima (i.e., Kharijites) who were influenced by (the desires of) fighting Mu`awiya with every means (possible); some of them were men who loved discords and were anxious for booty; some of them were doubters; others were tribal supporters who followed the leaders of their tribes without reference to religion."1

I (the author) say: From what we have just said, we have known that the number of al-Hasan's army was about twenty thousand fighters or little more. However, we do not know in detail the way used to form this army. However, I think it was the primitive way which was not based on the succeeding, acquired improvements. It was the way which the Muslim communities followed during the first centuries A.H. It was the way that did not stipulate any qualities necessary for accepting the soldier or the fighter (mujahid).

It did not stipulate personal abilities and age, nor did it stipulate compulsory military service as it is in the present time. For the Muslim person who was able to carry the weapon had a religious motive. Thus he took part in jihad willingly when he heard the summons to it in the way of Allah. This motive made him feel his religious obligation. So he was ready to sacrifice his life in the way of Allah. Otherwise, he was unable to carry out his religious duty. For the worldly desires would suppress this feeling in him. Moreover, they would have deprived him of his share of the reward and booty if Allah had predetermined victory and booty for that war.

Modern military laws force people to carry out military service, summon them in certain years, and examine their limited abilities. These laws were not known at that time. Besides they disagree with the Islamic law that is general and tolerant.

Islam is certain correct facts so that the people obey it. In other words the laws of this religion do not force anyone to carry out any obligation. For Islam has showed people two ways (i.e., the way of good and the way of evil). Moreover, it has helped them to choose the way of good through guidance:

وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا

"And (as for) those who strive hard for us, We will most certainly guide them to Our ways." (Qur'an 29:69).

In this way Islam enjoins people to do good and forbids them from doing evil. Also Muslim leaders have used the same way to enjoin people to do well and to prevent them from doing evil. When they decide to wage war (against their enemies), they follow an excellent way to urge people to take part in jihad (holy war) through convincing them to carry the weapon.

Among these ways are: They increase the salaries of fighters, order their governors to encourage people to take part in jihad, and spread their orators and prominent figures to urge people to volunteer to strive in the way of Allah, the Great and Almighty.

Al-Hasan, peace be on him, followed all these ways from the day when he assumed the succession in Kufa. Also he used them when he declared jihad. Among his measures, as we have said earlier, were: He increased the salaries of the fighters to 100%. He sent Hujr b. `Adi to his rulers to summon them to jihad.

His notable companions, who were orators, helped him with his task. Among them were `Adi b. Hatam, Ma'qal b. Qays al-Riyahi, Ziyad b. Sa'sa'a al-Tamimi, and Qays b. Sa'd al-Ansari. They criticized the people2 for their slowness and urged them to take part in jihad for Allah. Then they themselves competed with each other for their places in the general camp, and they competed with the people for that.

They spread the standards of jihad all over Kufa. They summoned the people (to obey) Allah, the Great and Almighty, and the family of Muhammad, peace be on them.

Thus new awareness arose in the slow city. Namely, the Kufans felt their obligations, and became ready to carry them out.

The slowness in the war happened because either the people inclined to worldly pleasures or the Syrians changed their religious beliefs. This slowness included some of the people in Kufa and the regions around it.

As for this new awareness which the eloquent orators made, it soon created motivation in many of the slow people. The wish stirred up an activity. So enthusiasm resulted from the activity. To some extent, the summons of the Shi'a to jihad was successful in making the majority eager for war in spite of the ignoble attitudes of the oppressors in Kufa at that time. "The people became active for going out to their camp."3

Moreover, the summons of the Shi'a to jihad was successful, to a great extent, in winning the public opinion in Kufa, its sevenths (asba ), its tribes, and the neighboring outskirts whose dwellers used to come to markets and official offices.

The orators of al-Hasan were so skillful that they exploited the appropriate mind of the people. So they spared no effort to summon them to support the members of the House (Ahl al-Bayt) under the pretext of the summons to jihad.

The throats of the companions became hoarse because they mentioned many laudable qualities of the family of Muhammad. In the meantime they showed the defects of their enemies. They resisted the different clubs of Kufa, its districts, and its public places. They drew the attention of the people to the excellent position which no one of the Muslims occupied but the two lords of the youth of Paradise (i.e., al-Hasan and al-Husayn), peace be on them. They indicated the religious firmness inherited by the members of the House of Inspiration. They spread the distinguished qualities of this tribe such as knowledge, purity, religious devotion, sacrifice for Allah, and reforming acts. They indicated their obligatory love on the believers.

Then they (the orators of al-Hasan) mentioned the pledge of allegiance to al-Hasan. They reminded the people that Allah would ask them about obedience of these rulers and the obligatory pledge of allegiance to them.

They (the orators) mentioned the lineage in their enthusiastic sermons. Suddenly, this lineage was very nice, very truthful, and very effective. They bewildered the people and filled them with admiration.

The orators mentioned al-Hasan and Mu'awiya. They said: "What a great difference is between b. 'Ali and b. Sakhr! What a great difference is between b. Fatima and b. Hind! What a great difference is between his (i.e., al-Hasan's) grandfather the Apostle of Allah, may Allah bless him and his family, and his (i.e., Mu'awiya's) grandfather! What a great difference is between his (al-Hasan's) grandmother Khadija and his (i.e., Mu'awiya's) grandmother!"

They cursed the more unknown one of the two persons (i.e., al-Hasan and Mu'awiya). Also they cursed the more ignoble one of them in lineage, the more evil one of them in the past and the present time, and the older one of them in unbelief and hypocrisy. So the people shouted and said: `Amen!' Then the generations came after them (the people). When a Muslim person reads this nice comparison, he will record a new amen against Mu'awiya.

These wise ways and enthusiastic eloquent orations played an important role in moving the people. So they were ready to desert Sham (Syria) and to support Kufa.

In Kufa, the new powerful city, there were mixed bands of people. They belonged to Arab and non- Arab communities. They adopted Islam, but they were displeased with it. In other words they embraced Islam and used it as means to achieve their immediate interests. So they understood the summons to jihad as means for interests and booty. When these mixed bands became satisfied with the success of that war, they joined the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him, to achieve their interests and to take their shares of booty. So why did they not join those who were the first to take part in jihad?

You may agree with me on discovering the motives that drove these rabble mixed groups to join the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him. Suddenly, the men of discords, the men of booty, the men of tribalism, the doubters, and the like became volunteers in the army of al-Hasan.

As we have previously said, the regulations of the Islamic mobilization at that time did not prevent the above mentioned groups from joining the army as fighters or mujhahidin. That is because these regulations stipulated only one condition that was the ability to carry the weapon.

Concerning the reason that urged the Kharijites to join the army of al-Hasan, Shaykh al-Mufid, my Allah have mercy on him, said: "They chose to fight Mu`awiya with every means (possible)."

However, we (i.e., the author) do not believe in this reason though brief, and we do not deny it because it has some meanings What al Mufid said might be part of their aim, and their aim might be a thing other than this.

The relations between al-Hasan, peace be on him, and the Kharijites do not encourage us to have a good opinion about them. Besides, if we study the events (of the Battle) of al-Nahrwan, our doubt in them will double. Suppose that they were right when they summoned al-Hasan to fight against Mu'awiya, and that they had no ill-intention towards him, then where were they during the lifetime of Mu'awiya? Why didn't they band together against him as they did against 'Ali, peace be on him? Moreover, hasn't history kept their revolt against the latter?

The enmity and malice of the Kharijites, and the way of their abominable summons move us to mistrust their purpose when they wanted to go out with: al-Hasan, peace be on him.

We have known the conditions of the Kharijites before their going out for that war. Namely, they cajoled the people. Meanwhile they complimented al-Hasan after their unbelieving fighting against the late Imam (i.e., 'Ali), peace be on him. Through that, they tried to avoid the general abhorrence that prevailed them after that great tragedy.

Do you not think that the Kharijites followed cunning ways? Didn't their timely pressing conditions make them pretend to be loyal soldiers, volunteers in the army of al-Hasan? Without doubt they had hidden their purposes under this pretense. So they became soldiers to achieve their hidden principles which no one has known since then.

The idea of the Kharijites represented an evil beginning that resulted from the matter of the arbitration (al-tahkim) at the Battle of Siffin. For this reason, they were call al-muhakkim. The roots of this idea were fixed in themselves as a firm thought. In the course of time, their idea spread here and there. Thus many people followed it. Therefore it created various kinds of disasters and hardships.

Although the Kharijites were intense in the matter of the religion, they did cunning very well.

So the Kharijites seized the opportunities of the war that took place between the two great enemies. They joined this army that moved from Kufa to Maskan and al-Mada'in.

Through these explanations, I do not want to deny the enmity of the Kharijites towards Mu'awiya. Moreover, I do not deny their choice to fight against him with every means (possible), as Shaykh al-Mufid, May Allah have mercy on him, has said. However, I think that the Kharijites intended to achieve two purposes through their plan.

They had no purpose through their revolts and plots but to destroy the great Islamic figures in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. The purposes of these people were secret assassinations. These purposes prevailed their other plans. For this reason, they went with al-Hasan to make discords. They followed the way of jihad to make corruption. For example, they achieved a traitorous act at Mazlam Sabat.4 The act harmed al-Hasan very much. It was the second dangerous part of the series of the crimes which this evil band committed against the great, Prophetic family.

Both those two crimes resulted from the active, secret plots which the foolish Kharijites mastered on various occasions.

Ibn. Sinan al-Asadi5 stabbed al-Hasan. Also Ibn. Muljim al-Muradi, Sinan's friend, stabbed the Commander of the faithful, al-Hasan's father, peace be on him. Through His favor, Allah wanted these two stabs to be different from each other.

This mean plot represented the ugliest estrangement towards the Apostle of Allah, may Allah bless him and his family. For, through this stab, b. Sinan tried to kill his eldest grandson, and to render a rare service to Mu'awiya. This stab belonged to the people (i.e., the Kharijites) about whom it was said: "They went out with al-Hasan because they chose to fight against Mu'awiya with every means (possible)."

In this way, al-Hasan became certain of the intentions of the muhakkima (i.e., the Kharijites) in spite of their false flatter for him. From the beginning, al-Hasan was very cautious of them. Still he treated them kindly in spite of their hidden spites.

There is no one more dangerous than the enemy who pretends friendship. Such an enemy shows you friendship openly, but he fights against you secretly. So the most dangerous enemy is he who fights against you with hatred, malice, and tribalism, as the Kharijites did against al-Hasan.

In this way, the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him, was full of those mixed bands who discouraged it from winning the battles. It was also afflicted by the plots of both internal and external enemies, namely in Iraq and Syria (Sham).

It was natural for such an army to be liable to internal discords and mutiny against its commanders.

The holy war (jihad) was not some means for material greed, nor was it a field for dangerous plots, nor was it an aspect for trivial, ignorant tribalism, nor was it an arena for the experiences of the doubters.

So "the insight of al-Hasan increased when the people (i.e., the mixed bands) deserted him.6

Many words have been reported on the authority of al-Hasan. They indicate that he had low confidence in his army.

Al-Hasan said very eloquent words when he addressed his army in al-Mada'in. These words are appropriate for the subject of this chapter. Thus we will mention them here: "During your movement towards Siffin, your religion was before your life in this world. Anyhow today, your life in this world is before your religion. So you are between two killed persons: one was killed at (the Battle of) Siffin and you weep over him. The other was killed at (the Battle of) Nahrawan7 and you avenge his blood. As for the rest, they are betrayers. As for the weepers, they are revolutionaries."

This is the only oration of al-Hasan, in which he refers to the inclinations and desires of the mixed bands in his army during the battles.

As for the revolutionary weepers, al-Hasan refers to the large number from his companions and his bosom ones. As for those who wanted to avenge the blood, he refers to the Kharijites who were in his army. Namely, they wanted to avenge the blood of their companions on al-Hasan. As for the betrayers, he refers to the other groups from the men of the discords, the followers of the ambitions, and the worshippers of desires.

Go over the pages of history. You will find gloomy bloody lines in them. That was because of what the captivated prominent figures from those mixed bands followed. Also it was because of their terrible deeds with which they corrupted the field of the holy war (jihad). Some of their deeds were treason, discords, breaking pledges, plots, forgetting the religion, and the like. So the rest of the family of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and his family, were liable to their attacks. We will mention some of these tragic pictures in their appropriate places in this book.

Conclusion

Here, we have to listen to what sounds in the mind of people when they study this sorrowful presentation about the bands of the army of al-Hasan, peace be on him. They ask: "Why did al-Hasan permit these mixed bands to join his army? After their joining his army, why was he slow in purifying his army from them? Why did he not use the methods that commanders of armies use to purify their armies such as dismissing corrupt members, censuring them, and banishing them?

These questions are the secret of the matter of al-Hasan. In response to these questions, we say:

1. Islam has abolished classes in jihad as it has abolished them in society through its laws and regulations. So it is unfair for the rulers to differentiate among the classes of Muslims who want to be soldiers. That is because such soldiers believe in Islam and are able to carry weapons. As for those mixed bands who followed al-Hasan, they believed in Islam and were able to carry weapons. Thus it was incumbent on the Imam to accept them according to the Islamic law.

2. The Prophet himself, may Allah bless him and his family, and such groups afflicted the Commander of the faithful during their battles. It is reported on their authority that they permitted such soldiers to enter their armies though they suffered from their disturbances at battlefields.

Concerning the Battle of Hunayn, the historians said: "Some Muslims saw the large number of their army, so they admired it. Then they said that the small army of their enemy would not overcome. However, the army of the Muslims was mixed. Among them (the Muslims) were many of those who came for booty."

The events of the returning of the Muslims from the campaign against the Banu al-Mustalaq indicates the existence of such mixed bands in the army of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and his family.

Also concerning the army of 'Ali, peace be on him, the historians said: "The army of 'Ali at (the Battle of) Siffin had mixed bands. They belonged to various tribes and communities. They were disobedient and opposing. They did not yield to any command, nor did they take any advice."

In his book (al-Mahasin wa al-Masawi'), al-Bayhaqi has narrated the following on the authority of Mu'awiya, who said: "He (i.e., 'Ali), peace be on him, was among the most wicked army and the most one of them in disagreement. I (i.e., Mu'awiya) was among the most obedient army and the least of them in disagreement."

I (the author) say: So al-Hasan had to follow the Sunna (practice) of his grandfather and that of his father. For it was enough for him to follow their example.

Al-Hasan conformed to Islam and fear of Allah in every movement and silence. Still the opponents of al-Hasan did not conform to these Islamic manners. Were it not for that (i.e., al-Hasan's fear of Allah and his conforming to Islam), you would find that the history of that period would be written in a way different from what you read today.

3. Nevertheless, al-Hasan refused to treat the situation through these ways. The commanders of armies use ways to purify their armies from corrupt persons. For example, they kill them, remove them from office, scold them, and the like. For he did not want to hasten the disaster before its time, as we have mentioned in chapter four. Besides he did want to be the direct reason for stirring up discords, declaring disagreement, and raising the banner of disobedience, at least, in half of his army. This means that al-Hasan intentionally wanted to light the fire of the revolt in the core of his army. Also this means that the holy war (Jihad) would turn into violent internal war. If al-Hasan had taken such steps, he would have achieved Mu'awiya's hopes. For the latter did his best to sow division between al-Hasan and his companions. Thus al-Hasan was very careful of Mu'awiya's tricks.

Moreover, al-Hasan, peace be on him, had no opportunity to reform those mixed bands of people and to unify their ideas, for his time was short and was full of various disasters. In other words, no one, except Allah (the Great and Almighty), was able to reform that situation at that time. That is because the manners, the religion, and the inherited backgrounds of the community were in need of reform during that short time. Moreover, the opposing trends that brought about various kinds of temptation to that generation prevented al Hasan from reforming the members of his army and unifying their ideas. Thus al-Hasan had to treat the situation through the ambitions themselves. This means that he had to cure the illness through the illness. However, he was not ready to follow such a way, for he took the fear of Allah into consideration.

Notes

1. Also see: Al-Arbali, Kashif al-Ghumma, p. 161. Al-Majlisi, Bihar al Anwar, vol. 10, p. 110.

2. Ibn Abu al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, vol. 4, p. 14.

3. Ibid.

4. In Arabic, Sabat means a shelter between two houses through which there is an open way. Sabat was a village in al-Mada'in. Near Sabat there was an arch over the river of the King (nahr al-malik). Maybe it was called so because there was a rare shelter among the shelters (Sawabit) in it. We think that this rare shelter was Mazlam Sabat.

5. In his book (al-Dawla al-Amawiya fi al-Sham wa al-Andalus, p. 50, chapter 4.), Hasan Murad made a mistake when he attributed the stab of al Hasan, peace be on him, with the dagger to the followers of the Umayyads, excluding the Kharijites. In chapter, the Secret of the Attitude, you will read the texts of the event which the old historians reported, and which the modern historians should understand.

6. Al-Mufid, al-Irshad, p. 170.

7. In his book [al-Malahim wa al-Fitan, p. 142, (Najaf, 1368)], Ibn Tawus has narrated: "And the other was killed at (the Battle of) Nahrwan and you avenge his blood on us."