Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

TheologyAnd Metaphysics InNahj AlBalaghah

Ayatullah Murtadha Mutahhari

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

Preface 3

A Bitter Fact 5

Shi'i Rationalism 6

Philosophical Notions Concerning Metaphysics 9

The Value of Study of the Natural Phenomena 13

Purely Rationalistic Problems 14

The Divine Essence and Attributes 17

The Divine Essence 18

Divine Unity an Ontological, not a Numerical Concept 19

God, The First and the Last; the Manifest and the Hidden 21

An Appraisal 23

The Nahj al-balaghah and the Notions of Kalam 24

The Nahj al-balaghah and Philosophical Concepts 26

The Nahj al-balaghah and Western Philosophic Thought 29

Notes 30

Preface

One of the fundamental issues dealt with in theNahj al-balaghah relates to theological and metaphysical problems. In all, there are about forty places in the sermons, letters, and aphorisms where these matters are discussed. Some of these pertain to the aphorisms, but more often the discussion is longer, covering sometimes several pages.

The passages ontawhid (Divine Unity) in theNahj al-balaghah can perhaps be considered to be the most wonderful discussions of the book. Without any exaggeration, when we take into account the conditions in which they were delivered, they can almost be said to be miraculous.

The discussions on this theme in theNahj al-balaghah are of a varied nature. Some of them constitute studies of the scheme of creation bearing witness to Divine creativity and wisdom. Here, 'Ali speaks about the whole system of the heaven and the earth, or occasionally discusses the wonderful features of some specific creature like the bat, the peacock or the ant, and the role of Divine design and purpose in their creation. To give an example of this kind of discussion, we may quote a passage regarding the ant:

Have you observed the tiny creatures that He has created? How He has made them strong and perfected their constitution and shaped their organs of hearing and sight, and how He has styled their bones and skin?

Observe the ant with its tiny body and delicate form. It is so small that its features can hardly be discerned by the eye and so insignificant that it does not enter our thoughts. See how it roams about upon the ground and arduously collects its livelihood. It carries the grain to its hole and deposits it in its store.

It collects during the summer for the winter and, when winter arrives, it foresees the time to reemerge. Its livelihood is guaranteed and designed according to its built. The Benefactor and the Provider does not forget or forsake it. He does not deprive it, even though it should be in hard and dry stones and rocks.

You will be amazed at the delicate intricacy of its wonderful constitution if you investigate the structure of its alimentary canals, its belly, and its eyes and ears which are in its head ...1

However, most of the discussions abouttawhid in theNahj al-balaghah are rational and philosophical. The rare sublimity of theNahj al-balaghah becomes manifest in these discourses. In these philosophical and rational discourses of theNahj al-balaghah ontawhid what constitutes the focus of all arguments is the infinite, absolute and self-sufficing nature of the Divine Essence. In these passages, 'Ali ('a) attains to the heights of eloquence, and none, neither before him nor after him, has approached him in this aspect.

Another issue dealt with is that of the absolute simplicity (al-basatatal -mutlaqah ) of the Divine Essence and negation of every kind of multiplicity, divisibility in the Godhead and refutation ofseparability of the Divine Attributes from the Divine Essence. This theme occurs repeatedly in theNahj al-balaghah .

Also discussed is a series of other profound problems which had never been touched before him. They are: God being the First while also being the Last; His being simultaneously the Manifest and the Hidden; His priority over time and number, i.e.

His pre-eternity is not temporal and His Unity is not numerical; His Supremacy, Authority, and Self-sufficiency; His Creativeness; that attendance to one affair does not prevent Him from attending to other affairs; the identity of Divine Word and Act; the limited capacity of human reason to comprehend His reality; that gnosis (ma'rifah ) is a kind of manifestation (tajalli ) of Him upon the intellects, which is different from conception or cognition by the mind; the negation of such categories and qualities as corporeality, motion, rest, change, place, time, similarity, opposition, partnership, possession of organs or instruments, limitation and number; and a series of other issues which we shall, God willing, mention later and give examples of every one of these.

Even a thinker well-versed in the beliefs and views of ancient and modern philosophers would be struck with wonder to see the wide range and scope of the problems propounded in that wonderful book.

An elaborate discussion of the issues raised and dealt with in theNahj al-balaghah would itself require a voluminous book and cannot be covered in one or two articles. Unavoidably, we shall be brief; but before we commence our brief survey, we are compelled to mention certain points as an introduction to our discussion.

A Bitter Fact

We, theShi'ah Muslims, must confess that we have been unjust in regard to our duty with respect to the man whom we, more than others, take pride in following; or, at the very least, we must admit falling short in our duty towards him. In substance, any kind of failure in fulfilling our responsibility is an act of injustice on our part.

We did not want to realize the significance of 'Ali ('a), or we had been unable to. All our energy andlabour were devoted to proclaiming the Prophet's statements about 'Ali and to denouncing those who ignored them, but we failed to pay attention to the intellectual side of Imam 'Ali's personality.

Sadi says:

The reality of musk lies in its scent,Not in the perfumer's advice.

ApplyingSa'di's words to our attitude regarding Imam 'Ali's personality, we did not realize that this musk, recommended by the Divine Perfumer, itself carried its pleasant aroma, and before everything else we should have tried to know its scent and become familiar with it. That is, we should have familiarized ourselves and others with its inner fragrance.

The counsel of the Divine Perfumer was meant to acquaint the people with its pleasant redolence, not for the purpose that they may believe that it is musk and then devote all their energies trying to convince others by arguing with them, without bothering to acquaint themselves with its real fragrance.

Had theNahj al-balaghah belonged to some other people, would they have treated it in the way we treated this great book? The country of Iran is the centre ofShi'ism and the language of its people is Persian. You have only to examine the translations and commentaries on theNahj al-balaghah to make ajudgement about what our accomplishment amounts to.

To take a more general case, theShi'i sources ofhadith (tradition) and texts ofdu'a ' (prayers) are incomparable to the texts of the non-Shi'i works in the same field. This is also true of Divine teachings and other subjects. The problems and issues discussed in works like al-Kulayni's al-Kafi , or al-Shaykh al-Saduq's al-Tawhid , or al-'Ihtijaj of al-Tabarsi are nowhere to be found among the works of the non-Shi'is .

It can be said that if occasionally similar issues are dealt with in the non-Shi'i books, the material is unmistakably spurious, for it is not only opposed to the prophetic teachings but is also contradictory to theQur’anic fundamentals.

There is a strong smell of anthropomorphism which hangs around them. Recently,Hashim Ma'ruf al-Hasani , in his bookDirasat fi al-Kafi li al-Kulayni wa al-Sahih li al-Bukhari , which is an original but a brief comparative study of al-Sahih of al-Bukhari and al-Kulayni's al-Kafi , has dealt with the traditions related to the problems of theology.

Shi'i Rationalism

The discussion of theological problems and their analysis by theShi'i Imams, of which theNahj al-balaghah is the earliest example, was the main cause of the emergence of rationalistic approach and philosophic outlook in theShi'i intellectual world from the earliest days of Islam.

This cannot belabelled as an innovation in Islam; rather, its basis was laid down by the Qur’an itself. It was in accordance with the approach of the Qur’an and for the purpose of its interpretation that the Imams of theAhl al-Bayt ('a) expounded such issues. If anybody can be reproached in this matter, it is those who did not adopt this method and abandoned the means to follow it.

History shows that from the earliest Islamic era, theShiah , more than any other sect, were interested in these problems. Amongst theAhl al-Sunnah , theMu'tazilites , whowere nearer to theShi'ah , did possess similar inclinations. But, as we know, the general view predominant among theAhl al-Sunnah did not welcome it, and as a result theMu'tazilite sect became extinct about the end of the 3rd/9thcentury .

AhmadAmin , the Egyptian writer, confirms this view in the first volume of hisZuhr al-'Islam. After discussing the philosophic movement in Egypt during the reign of theFatimids , who were aShi'ah sect, he writes:

Philosophy is more akin toShi'ism than it is to the Sunni Islam, and we witness the truth of this in the era of the Fatimid rule [in Egypt] and in that of theBuyids [in Iran]. Even during the later ages Iran, which is aShi'ite country, has paid more attention to philosophy than any other Islamic country. In our own times,Sayyid Jamal al-Din alAsadabadi , who hadShi'ite inclinations and had studied philosophy in Iran, created a philosophic movement in Egypt when he arrived here.

Curiously, AhmadAmin in his explanation of why theShi'ah showed more inclination towardsphilosophy, commits an error, willfully or otherwise. According to him, “the reason for greater inclination on the part of theShi'ah towards rational and philosophical discussions is to be found in their esotericism and their flair forta'wil .2

They were compelled to seek the assistance of philosophy fordefence of their esotericism. That is why the Fatimid Egypt andBuyid Persia, and Iran during theSafawid andQajar periods, were more disposed towards philosophy than the rest of the Islamic world.”

This is sheer nonsense on the part of AhmadAmin . It was the Imams ('a) of theShi'ah who for the first time introduced philosophical approach, and it was they who introduced the most profound and intricate concepts with regard to theological problems in their arguments, polemics, sermons,ahadith , and prayers, of which theNahj al-balaghah is one example.

Even with regard to the prophetic traditions, theShi'ah sources are far more sublime and profound than the traditions contained in the non-Shi'i sources. This characteristic is not confined to philosophy only, but is also true ofkalam ,fiqh , andusul al-fiqh , in which theShi'ah enjoy a position of distinction. All this owes its origin to one and same source: stress on rationalism.

Some others have tried to trace the origin of this difference [between theShi'i and the Sunni intellects] in the concept of “theShi'ite nation”. According to them, since the Persians areShi'ite and theShi'ah are Persian, and as the Persians are a people with a philosophical temperament, fond of the intricacies of speculation and pure thought, with the help of their rich and strong philosophical tradition, they succeeded in raising the level ofShi'a thought and gave it an Islamiccolour .

Bertrand Russell, in A History of Western Philosophy, expresses a similar view based on the above-mentioned argument. With his habitual or inherent impoliteness he puts forth this opinion. However, Russell lacks the capacity of vindicating his claim, since he was totally unfamiliar with Islamic philosophy and basically knew nothing about it.

He was not qualified to express any informed opinion about the origins ofShi'ah thought and its sources.

Our rejoinder to the upholders of this view is: first of all, not allShi'ah were Iranian, nor all Iranians wereShi'ah . Were Muhammadibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni , Muhammadibn 'Aliibn al-Husayn ibn Babawayh al-Qummi and Muhammadibn Abi Talib al-Mazandarani Persian, but not Muhammadibn Isma'il al-Bukhari , AbuDawud al-Sijistani and Muslimibn Hajjaj al-Nishaburi ?

Was al-Sayyid al-Radi , the compiler of theNahj al-balaghah , of Persian origin? Were theFatimids of Egypt of Persian descent?

Why was philosophic thought revived in Egypt with the inception of Fatimid rule and why did it decline with their fall? And why was it revived later, after a long interval, only through the influence of an IranianShi'ah ?

The truth is that the Imams of theAhl al-Bayt ('a) were the only real dynamic force behind this mode of thinking and this kind of approach. All scholars of theAhl al-Sunnah admit that among the Prophet's Companions only 'Ali ('a) was a man of philosophic wisdom, who had an altogether distinct rational approach. Abu 'Aliibn Sina is quoted as having remarked:

'Ali's position among the Companions of Muhammad (S), was that of the “rational” in the midst of the “corporeal.”

Obviously, the intellectual approach of the followers of such an Imam as 'Ali ('a) should be expected to be radically different from that of those who followed others. Moreover, AhmadAmin and others have been susceptible to another similar misunderstanding. They express doubts with regard to the authenticity of ascription of such philosophic statements [as exist in theNahj al-balaghah ] to 'Ali ('a).

They say that the Arabs were not familiar with such kind of issues and such arguments and elaborate analyses as are found in theNahj al-balaghah before their acquaintance with Greek philosophy, and evidently, according to them, these discourses should have been composed by some later scholars familiar with Greek philosophy, and were attributed to Imam 'Aliibn Abi Talib ('a).

We also accept that the Arabs were not familiar with such ideas and notions. Not only the Arabs, the non-Arabs, too, were not acquainted with them, nor were those notions familiar to the Greeks and Greek philosophy.

AhmadAmin first brings down 'Ali ('a) to the level of such Arabs like AbuJahl and AbuSufyan and then he postulates his minor and major premises and bases his conclusion on them: The Arabs were unfamiliar with philosophical notions; 'Ali was an Arab: therefore 'Ali was also unfamiliar with philosophical notions. One should ask him whether the Arabs of theJahiliyyah were familiar with the ideas and concepts that were propounded in the Qur’an.

Had not 'Ali ('a) been brought up and trained by the Messenger of Allah himself? Didn't the Prophet (S) introduce 'Ali ('a) to his Companions as the most learned and knowledgeable amongst them? Why should we deny the high spiritual status of someone who enriched his inner self by drawing on the bounteous wealth of Islam in order to protect the prestige of some of the Prophet's Companions who could never rise above the ordinary level?

AhmadAmin says that before acquaintance with Greek philosophy the people of Arabia were not familiar with the ideas and concepts found in theNahj al-balaghah . The answer to this is that the Arabs did not become acquainted with the ideas and notions propounded in theNahj al-balaghah even after centuries of familiarity with Greek philosophy.

Not only the Arabs, even the non-Arab Muslims were not acquainted with these ideas, for the simple reason that there is no trace of them in Greek philosophy itself! These ideas are exclusively special to Islamic philosophy. The Islamic philosophers gradually picked these ideas up from the basic Islamic sources and incorporated them in their thought under the guidance of revelation.

Philosophical Notions Concerning Metaphysics

As mentioned before, theNahj al-balaghah adopts two kinds of approach to the problems of theology. The first kind of approach calls attention to the sensible world and its phenomena as a mirror reflecting the Knowledge and Perfection of the Creator. The second approach involves purely rationalistic and philosophical reflections. The latter approach accounts for the greater part of the theological discussions of theNahj al-balaghah . Moreover, it is the only approach adopted in regard to the discussion about the Divine Essence and Attributes.

As we know, the value of such discussions and the legitimacy of such reflections have been always questioned by those who consider them improper from the viewpoint of reason or canon, or both. In our own times, a certain group claims that this kind of analysis and inference does not agree with the spirit of Islam and that the Muslims were initiated into such kind of speculations under the influence of Greek philosophy and not as a result of any inspiration or guidance effused from the Qur’an.

They say that if the Muslims had adhered closely to theQur’anic teachings they would not have entangled themselves with these tortuousclebates . For the same reason, they view with suspicion the authenticity of such speculations found in theNahj al-balaghah and their ascription to Imam 'Ali ('a).

In the second and third centuries a group of people opposed such kind of discussions and questioned their legitimacy, raising doctrinal objections. They insisted that it is obligatory for Muslims to be satisfied with the literal and commonly understood meaning of the words of the Qur’an, and regarded every kind of inquiry into the meaning of the Qur’an as an innovation (bid'ah ) in religion.

For instance, if someone inquired about the meaning of theQur’anic verse “The All-compassionate sat Himself upon the Throne“ [ 20:5], he was confronted by the displeasure of those who regarded such questions as not only improper but distasteful. He would be told: “The exact meaning is unknown and questioning is heresy”.3

During the 3rd/9th century, this group, which later came to be calledAsh'arites , overwhelmed theMu'tazilites , who considered such speculations to be within the bounds of legitimacy. This victory of theAsharites delivered a severe blow to the intellectual life of Islam.

TheAkhbaris , who were aShi'i school which flourished during the period between the 10th/16th and the 14th/20th centuries-and particularly during the 10th/16th and 11th/17th centuries-followed theAsha'irah in their ideas and beliefs. They raised doctrinal objections against ratiocination. Now we shall proceed to discuss the objections raised from a rationalist point of view.

As a result of the triumph of the empirical and experimental method over the deductive approach in Europe, especially in the physical sciences, the view began to prevail that rational speculation was unreliable not only in the physical sciences but also in all scientific disciplines and that the only reliable method was that of empirical philosophy. The result of it was thattne problems of theology were viewed with doubt and suspicion, because they lay beyond the domain of experimental and empirical observation.

The past victories of theAsh'arites , on the one hand, and the amazing triumphs of the empirical method, which followed one another in quick succession, on the other hand, drove some non-Shi'ite Muslim writers to the extremes of excitement.

The outcome was the eclectic opinion that from the religious (Shar'i ) as well as the rational point of view the use of deductive method even in problems of theology should be discarded. From theShar'i viewpoint, they made the claim that according to the outlook of the Qur’an the only approach valid in theology was the empirical and experimental method and the study of the natural phenomena and the system of creation; the rest, they declared, is no more than an exercise in futility.

They pointed out that in scores of its verses, the Qur’an in most unequivocal terms has invited human beings to study the phenomena of nature; it considers the keys to the secrets of the origin and workings of the universe to be concealed within nature itself. In this way they echoed, in their writings and speeches, the ideas expressed by the European proponents of empiricalphilosophy .

Farid al-Wajdi in his book 'Alaatlal al-madhhab al-maddi (On the Ruins of Materialism), andSayyid Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi , in hisMadha khasira al-'alam bi-inhitat al-Muslimin (“What the World Lost Through the Decline of Muslims”) and the writers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin ) such asSayyid Qutb and others, have supported this view, vehemently attacking the opposite viewpoint.

Al-Nadawi , in his above-mentioned book, says:

The prophets informed men about the existence of God and His Attributes and informed them about the origin and beginning of the world and the ultimate destiny of man, putting this free information at his disposal.

They relieved him of the need to understand and discuss these problems the basics of which lie beyond our reach (because these problems belong to the sphere of the supra-sensible and our knowledge and experience is limited to the physical and the sensible). But men did not value this blessing and entangled themselves in debates and speculations about these problems, and strode into the dark regions of the hidden and the unknowable.4

The same author, in another chapter of the same book, where he discusses the causes of the decline of Muslims, under the heading “The Neglect of Useful Sciences,” criticizes themuslim 'ulama ' in these words:

The Muslim scholars and thinkers did not give as much importance to practical and experimental sciences as they gave to debating about metaphysics, which they had learnt from Greek philosophy.

The Greek metaphysics and theology is nothing more than Greek's polytheistic mythology presented in a philosophical outfit, and is no more than a series of meaningless conjectures expressed in an absurd jargon. God has exempted Muslims from debate, speculation and analysis in these matters, which are not much different from the analytic pursuits of the Alchemists. But out of ingratitude for this great blessing, the Muslims wasted their energy and genius in problems of this sort.5

Without doubt, the views of the like ofFarid al-Wajd ; and al-Nadawi should be regarded as a kind of return toAsh'arism , though dressed in contemporary style akin to the language of empirical philosophy.

Here, we cannot enter into a philosophic discussion about the value of philosophic reflection. In the chapters entitled “The Value of Information” and “Origin of Multiplicity in Perception” of the book The Principles and Method of Realism, we have discussed the matter in sufficient detail. Here, we shall confine ourselves to theQur’anic aspect of this problem, and investigate whether the Holy Qur’an considers the study of nature to be the only valid method of inquiry into theological problems, or whether it allows for another approach besides the above-mentioned.

However, it is essential to point out that the disagreement between theAsh'arites and the non-Ash'arites is not about the legitimacy of the use of the Book and theSunnah as sources in the problems of theology; rather, the disagreement concerns the manner of their utilization. According to theAsh'arites , their application should not exceed mute acceptance.

According to them, we assign the various Attributes like Unity, Omniscience, Omnipotence and the rest to God because they have been ascribed to Him by theShar'iah , otherwise we would not know whether God is such or not, because the basic principles and essentials dealing with God are beyond our reach.

Therefore, according to them, we are forced to accept God as such, but we cannot know or understand that God is such. The role of the religious texts is that they prescribe for us the way we ought to think and believe so that we may follow it in our thought and beliefs.

According to the contestants of this view, these issues are amenable to human understanding, like any other rational concept or idea. That is, there exist certain principles and essentials which if known properly enable man to understand them.

The role of the religious texts lies in their capacity to inspire, motivate, and guide human reason by putting understandable principles and essentials at its disposal. Basically servitude in intellectual matters is absurd. It is like ordering one to think in a certain fashion, and asking him to derive certain prescribed conclusions.

It is like ordering someone to see a thing in a certain fashion and then asking him, “How do you see it? Is it big or small?black or white?” Servitude in thinking does not mean anything other than absence of thinking and acceptance without reflection.

In short, the question is not whether it is possible for man to go beyond the teachings of the Revelation. God be our refuge, there is nothing that lies beyond them; because that which has reached us through Revelation and the Household of the Revelation (i.e. theAhl al-Bayt [A]) is the utmost limit of perfection concerning knowledge of the Divine.

Here our debatecentres upon the capacity of human thought and reason, whether it can, when supplied with the basic principles and essentials, undertake an intellectual journey through the world of theological problems6 or not.

As to the invitation of the Qur’an to study and inquiry about the phenomena of creation, and its emphasis on nature as a means for attaining the knowledge of God and the supra-natural, it should be said that it is, indubitably, a basic principle of theQur’anic teachings. It is with extraordinary insistence that the Qur’an asks human beings to inquire into the nature of the earth, the sky, the plants and animals, and man himself, and urges them to study them scientifically.

It is also indubitable that the Muslims did not take enough worthy steps in this direction. Perhaps the real reason behind it was Greek philosophy, which was deductive and based on pure speculation, and they used this approach even in the field of the physical sciences. Nevertheless, as the history of science bears testimony, themuslim scientists did not altogether abandon the experimental method in their studies like the Greeks.

The Muslims were the pioneers of the experimental method, not the Europeans, as is commonly thought, who followed on the tracks first laid by the Muslims.

The Value of Study of the Natural Phenomena

Aside from all of this, the question worthy of consideration is whether the Qur’an, besides its emphasis on the study of the creatures of earth, water, and air, allows other ways of approaching the issue, or if it closes all other doors.

The question is whether the Qur’an, even as it invites people to study the signs of God (ayat ), also welcomes other modes of intellectualendeavour . Basically, what is the value of inquiry into the works of creation (an inquiry which the Qur’an urges us, explicitly or implicitly, to undertake), from the viewpoint of initiating us into the awareness and consciousness which this heavenly Book aims to cultivate?

The truth is that the measure of assistance provided by the study of the works of the creation in understanding the problems explicitly pointed out by the Holy Qur’an is quite restricted. The Qur’an has propounded certain problems of theology which are by no means understandable through the study of the created world or nature.

The value of study of the system of creation is limited only to the extent to which it proves that the world is governed by a Power which knows, designs, plans, and administers it. The world is a mirror, open to empirical experiment, only to the extent that it points towards something that lies beyond nature and discloses the existence of a Mighty Hand which runs nature's cosmic wheels.

But the Qur’an is not content that man should only know that a Mighty, Knowing, and Wise Power administers this universe. This may perhaps be true of other heavenly scriptures, but is by no means true of the Holy Qur’an, which is the final and ultimate heavenly message and has a great deal to say about God and the reality transcending nature.

Purely Rationalistic Problems

The most basic problem to which the mere study of the world of creation fails to provide an answer is the necessity of existence anduncreatedness of the Power which transcends nature. The world is a mirror in the sense that it indicates the existence of a Mighty Hand and a Wise Power, but it does not tell us anything more aboutIts nature. It does not tell us whether that Power is subservient to something else or not, or if it is self-subsisting. And if it is subject to something else, what is that?

The objective of the Qur’an is not only that we should know that a Mighty Hand administers the world, but that we may know that that Administrator is “Allah” and that “Allah” is the indefinable: (There is nothing like Him), whose Essence encompasses all perfection, or in other words, that “Allah” signifies Absolute Perfection and is the referent of, (His is the loftiest likeness). How can the study of nature give us an understanding of such notions and concepts?

The second problem is that of the Unity of God. The Qur’an has stated this issue in a logical form and used a syllogistic argument to explain it. The method of argument it has employed in this regard is what is called 'exclusive syllogism' or 'reductio ad impossible' (burhan al-tamanu '). On occasion it eliminates the possibility of multiplicity in the efficient cause as in the following verse:7

“If there had been (multiple) gods in them (i.e. the earth and the heaven) other than God, they would surely go to ruin ...” (21:22)

At other times it argues by eliminating the possibility of multiplicity in the final cause:

“God has not taken to Himself any son, nor is there any god besides Him; for then each god would have taken off that he created and some of them would have risen up over others ...” (23:91)

The Qur’an never suggests that the study of the system of creation can lead us to the knowledge of the Unity of the Godhead so as to imply that the essential knowledge of the transcendental Creator be considered attainable from that source. Moreover, such a suggestion would not have been correct.

The Qur’an alludes to various problems as indicated by the following examples:

“No thing is like Him ...” (42:11) “And God's is the loftiest likeness ...” (16:60) “To Him belong the Names most Beautiful.” (20:8) “And His is the loftiest likeness in the heavens and the earth ...” (30:27) “He is God, there is no god but He. He is the King, the All-holy,the All-peaceable. the All-faithful, the All-preserver, the All-mighty, the All-compeller, the All-sublime ...” (59:23) “And to God belong the East and the West; whither so ever you turn, there is the Face of God ...” (2:115) “And He is God in the heavens and the earth; He knows your secrets, and what you publish ...” (6:3) “He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward; He has knowledge of everything.” (57:3) “He is the Living, the Everlasting ...” (2:255) “God, is the Everlasting, [Who] has not begotten, and has not been begotten and equal to Him is not any one.” (112:2-4)

Why does the Qur’an raise such issues? Is it for the sake of propounding mysterious matters incomprehensible to man, who, according to al-Nadawi , lacks the knowledge of its essential principles, and then asking him to accept them without comprehending their meaning? Or, the Qur’an actually does want him to know God through the attributes and descriptions that have come in it? And, if this is true, what reliable approach does it recommend?

How is it possible to acquire this knowledge through the study of the natural phenomena? The study of the creation teaches us that God has knowledge of the things; that is, the things that He has made were created knowingly and wisely. But the Qur’an expects us not only to know this, but also stresses that:

“Indeed God has the knowledge of everything.” (2:231) “And not so much as the weight of an atom in earth or heaven escapes from thy Lord, neither is aught smaller than that, or greater, but in a Manifest Book.” (10:61) “Say: If the sea were ink for the Words of my Lord, the sea would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, thoughWe brought replenishment the like of it. “ (18:109)

This means that God's knowledge is infinite and so is His power. How and wherefore is it possible through perception and observation of the world of creation to reach the conclusion that the Creator's Knowledge and Power are infinite? The Qur’an, similarly, propounds numerous other problems of the kind.

For instance, it mentions al-lawh al-mahfuz (the Protected Tablet),lawh al-mahw wa al-'ithbat (The Tablet of Expunction and Affirmation),jabr andikhtiyar (determinism and free will),wahy (revelation) andilham (intuition), etc.; none of which are susceptible to inquiry through the empirical study of the world of creation.

It must be admitted that the Qur’an, definitely, has raised these problems in the form of a series of lessons and has emphasized their importance through advice and exhortation. The following verses of the Qur’an may be quoted in this connection:

“What, do they not meditate in the Qur’an? Or is it that there are locks upon their hearts? ....” (47:24) “(This is) a Scripture that We have revealed unto thee, full of blessing, that they may ponder its revelations, and that men of understanding may reflect.” (38:29)

Inevitably, we are forced to accept that the Qur’an assumes the existence of a reliable method for understanding the meaning of these truths, which have not been revealed as a series of obscureincomprehensibles which lie beyond the reach of the human mind.

The scope of problems propounded by the Qur’an in the sphere of metaphysics is far greater than what can be resolved or be answered through the study of physical creation. This is the reason why the Muslims have pursued these problems, at times through spiritual andgnostic efforts, and at other times through speculative and rational approach.

I wonder whether those who claim that the Qur’an considers the study of nature as the sole, sufficient means for the solution of metaphysical problems, can give a satisfying answer in regard to the multifarious problems propounded by it, a characteristic which is special to this great heavenly Book.

'Ali's sole source of inspiration in his exposition of the problems mentioned in the previous chapters is the Holy Qur’an, and the sole motive behind his discourses is exegetical. Perhaps, had it not been for 'Ali ('a) the rationalistic and speculative aspects of the Qur’an would have forever remaineduninterpreted .

After these brief introductory remarks on the value of these issues, we shall go on to cite some relevant examples from theNahj al-balaghah .

The Divine Essence and Attributes

In this section we shall cite some examples of theNahj al-balaghah's treatment of the problems of theology related with Divine Essence and Attributes. Later we shall make a brief comparative study of the issue in various schools and conclude our discussion on this aspect of theNahj al-balaghah .

However, before proceeding further, I ask for the reader's pardon that the discussion in the last three sections became a bit technical and philosophical, which is not very welcome for those not used to it. But what is the remedy?

Discussion on a book such as theNahj al-balaghah does entail such ups and downs. For this reason, we shall limit ourselves to giving only a few examples from the book on this subject, and refrain from any elaborate discussion. Because, if we were to comment on every sentence of theNahj al-balaghah , the result will be, as is said:

Mymathnawi requires seventymaunds of paper.