Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Before Essence and Existence:

al-Kindi's Conception of Being

Peter Adamson

Table of Contents

Introduction. 3

1. Terminology. 4

2. Simple Being. 5

3. An Objection: Unlimited Being. 9

4. Complex Being. 11

5. Reconciling the Two Conceptions 13

6. Does Al-kindi Anticipate the Distinction Between Essence and Existence?  15

Endnotes 18

Introduction

In the person of al-Kindi (died ca. 870 A.D.), the Arabic tradition had its first self-consciously "philosophical" thinker. Those familiar with al-Kindi may know him chiefly because of his role in the transmission of Greek philosophy, though it is his transformation of the ideas he inherited that will interest us most here. While it is not clear whether al-Kindi himself could read Greek,1 it is well documented that he guided the efforts of several important early translators. These included Ustath, translator of Aristotle'sMetaphysics ; Yahya b. al-Bitriq, who paraphrased several Platonic dialogues as well as translated Aristotle'sDe Caelo ; and Ibn Na'ima al-Himsi. Al-Himsi translated logical works of Aristotle and parts of theEnneads of Plotinus, the latter in a paraphrase that has come down to us as a group of three texts dominated by the so-calledTheology of Aristotle .2 (I will refer below to these three texts collectively as the Arabic Plotinus.) Al-Kindi's circle of translators also produced a similar paraphrase of Proclus'sElements of Theology , which went first by the nameBook on the Pure Good in its Arabic version and later, in its Latin version, by the titleLiber de Causis . Translations in the Baghdad circle were made from both Greek and Syriac, and were supported by the 'Abbasid caliphs al-Ma'mun[End Page 297] (reigned 813-33) and al-Mu'tasim (reigned 833-42).3 In his own works, many of which are letters addressed to al-Mu'tasim's son Ahmad, al-Kindi repeated and developed ideas and terminology from the philosophical works he read in translation, often in answer to questions posed by the recipient.

It would appear that al-Kindi considered the study of metaphysics to be primary in his endeavor to reconstruct Greek thought. His most significant remaining work,On First Philosophy , assimilates metaphysics or "first philosophy" to theology, the study of "the First Truth Who is the Cause of every truth."4 His survey of the works of Aristotle likewise confirms that theMetaphysics studies God, His names and His status as the First Cause.5 A similar conception underlies the Prologue to theTheology of Aristotle , which claims to "complete the whole of [Aristotelian] philosophy," and promises a "discussion of the First Divinity . and that it is the Cause of causes."6 The Prologue also seems to portray this project as continuous with that of theMetaphysics . We might suspect, then, that al-Kindi took Aristotle's aim in theMetaphysics of studying "beingqua being" as central to his own undertaking, and indeed as central to an adequate philosophical understanding of God.

In this paper I shall try to confirm this suspicion through a study of al-Kindi's corpus, focusing specifically on his conception of being, or, rather, on hisconceptions of being; for as we shall see there are two competing treatments of being in al-Kindi. First, in common with the Arabic Plotinus and the Liber de Causis , he has a conception that emphasizes the simplicity of being, and opposes being to predication. Second, he has a complex conception of being indebted to Aristotle. These [End Page 298] two conceptions can be reconciled: simple being, I will argue, is prior to and underlies complex being. Finally, I will suggest that al-Kindi's simple conception of being anticipates Avicenna's distinction between existence and essence, but only to a limited extent.

1. Terminology

Before embarking on this examination of being it may be helpful to provide a brief discussion of the terminology used for "being" by al-Kindi and his translators. I will be examining passages from three main sources: first, the aforementionedBook on the Pure Good orLiber de Causis ;7 second, the Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus produced in al-Kindi's circle;8 and third, al-Kindi's best-known work, entitledOn First Philosophy (hereafter FP). Part of the purpose of such texts was to establish technical terms for use in philosophy. Toward this end neologisms were invented, often for use in rendering Greek technical terms in Arabic. This is the case with three terms we find used to mean "being":anniyya ,huwiyya , andays .

Of these three, the one that has received the most attention isanniyya . Even in medieval times Arabic scholars speculated on the derivation of the word, offering sometimes fanciful etymologies.9 Though my argument does not turn on any particular etymology, the most likely derivation seems to be that suggested by Gerhard Endress: it is a substantification of the Arabicanna , which means "that" (as in "it is truethat al-Kindi is a philosopher").10 It makes its first appearance in Arabic literature at the time of al-Kindi's circle, and is prominent in the Arabic Plotinus and theLiber de Causis . The same goes for the wordhuwiyya , which later acquires a different, technical meaning in al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, but in our texts is treated as a synonym foranniyya . (The exception is a passage in the Arabic Plotinus wherehuwiyya is used to translate Plotinus'stautotes , "identity."11 This led the scholar Geoffrey Lewis mistakenly to renderhuwiyya as "identity" throughout his groundbreaking translation of the Arabic Plotinus.12 ) In the plural bothhuwiyyat andanniyyat are used as synonyms of the Greekonta , "beings."13 These terminological[End Page 299] features are carried over into al-Kindi's own works, so thathuwiyya andanniyya seem to be accepted technical terms for the Greekeinai andon in all the texts we will be considering.14

The termays is more unusual, and to my knowledge appears at this time only in al-Kindi's own writings and in the translations produced within his circle. 15 Al-Kindi seems to have coined the word by imaginatively splitting the Arabic laysa , "is not," into la ("not") and ays ("being"). He also uses lays as a noun meaning "not-being." Like anniyya and huwiyya , the neologism ays can refer to a particular existent, with lays meaning a non-being (this usage appears repeatedly in a long passage to be examined below, FP 123.3-124.16 [RJ 41.3-43.7]). But like anniyya and huwiyya , ays can also signify being abstractly considered; as we will see below, for al-Kindi a thing can go from lays , non-being, to ays , being. 16

2. Simple Being

With these terminological considerations in mind, we may now turn to a philosophical analysis of the texts. Let us begin with theLiber de Causis :

(A)Liber de Causis , Proposition 1: And we give as an example of this being (anniyya ), living, and man, because it must be that the thing is first being, then living, then man. Living is the proximate cause of the man, and being is its remote cause. Thus being is more a cause for the man than living, because it [sc. being] is the cause of living, which is the cause of the man. Likewise, when you posit rationality as cause of the man, being is more a cause for the man than rationality, because it is the cause of its cause. The proof of this is that, when you remove the rational power from the man, he does not remain man, but he remains living, ensouled, [and] sensitive. And when you remove living from him, he does not remain living, but he remains a being (anniyya ), because being was not removed from him, but rather living, for the cause is not removed through the removal of its effect. Thus, the man remains a being. So when the individual is not a man, it is a living thing, and [when] not a living thing, it is only a being (anniyya faqat ).17

The passage suggests a thought experiment, in which we strip away the features or attributes from man. Of particular interest to us is that when all the attributes have been removed, what remains isanniyya faqat , "only a being" or "being alone."

Compare this with the following passage, from the Arabic Plotinus:

(B)Sayings of the Greek Sage I.10-11: The intellect became all things because its Originator is not like anything. The First Originator does not resemble anything, because all things are from Him, and because He has no shape and no proper form attached to Him. For the[End Page 300] First Originator is one by Himself, I mean that He is only being (anniyya faqat ), having no attribute (sifa) suitable to Him, because all the attributes are scattered forth from Him.

Just as in passage (A), the phraseanniyya faqat is used here to refer to the pure being that remains when all determinate features, or "attributes" (sifat ), are removed. This is what I mean by saying that for both authors, being alone is "simple": it is free of attributes or predicates. The difference is that in the Arabic Plotinus, pure being is not the outcome of a thought experiment, but is God Himself, the First Originator who is equated with Plotinus's One and hence is also said to be the cause of Intellect. That the author of the Plotinian paraphrase should call God "being alone" has occasioned comment elsewhere.18 The historical and philosophical importance of the claim is heightened by the fact that it is contrary to Plotinus's statements that the One is, in the words of Plato'sRepublic ,epekeina tês ousias , "beyond being."19

Now, it is tempting to take the claim that God is being alone or "being itself" as tantamount to the claim that God is pure actuality, as Aristotle holds in theMetaphysics . Such later medieval writers as Ibn Sina and Thomas Aquinas explicitly take this over from Aristotle. Nor is such an understanding of God as actuality foreign to the Arabic Plotinus, since we find there a remarkable passage where the author writes that God "is the

thing existing truly in act. Nay rather, He is pure act" (huwa al-shay' al-ka'in bi-'l-fi'l haqqan, bal huwa al-fi'l al-mahd ).20 While this passage does most likely represent an Aristotelian influence on the Plotinus paraphrase, it is an isolated example of that influence. (The thought that God is actuality may also account for al-Kindi's frequent descriptions of God as an "Agent" or the "First Agent."21 ) It is much more frequent to find the paraphrase calling God "being alone" because of His lack of attributes.22 Thus when the author says in passage (B) and elsewhere that God isanniyya faqat , he seems above all to have in mind God's absolute simplicity, and His resulting lack of attributes. It is likely that this concern with simplicity and the exclusion of attributes is related to contemporaneous debates over divine attributes (sifat ), which already raged in the ninth century, when the Arabic Plotinus was composed.23

It is significant for our understanding of passage (A) that we find the same conception of God in theLiber de Causis . In Proposition 4, the author of that paraphrase writes that God is "the pure being, the One, the True, in whom there is no multiplicity in any way" ( al-anniyya mahda, al-wahid, al-haqq, alladhilaysa fihi [End Page 301] kathra min al-jihat al-ashkhas ). As in the Arabic Plotinus, God is nothing but being, because He is simple. Being is contrasted to attributes, because the being of a thing is distinct from the multiple features that are predicated of that thing. Of course it is essential to created things like humans that they have their predicated features, because something cannot be a human without being alive, rational, and so on. But being is not just another of these predicates, essential or accidental. Rather, it is prior to the predicates.

What sort of priority is this? An answer is suggested by a remark of al-Kindi's:

(C) FP 113.11-13 [RJ 27.17-19]: Corruption is only the changing of the predicate, not of the first bearer of predication. As for the first bearer of predication, which is being (ays ), it does not change, because for something corrupted, its corruption has nothing to do with the "making be" (ta'yis ) of its being (aysiyyatihi ).

This passage is not particularly clear, but it does explicitly make the point thatays , "being," is the "first bearer of predication" (al-hamil al-awwal ). The meaning of this assertion becomes clearer against the background of texts (A) and (B). Being is prior to the predicates of a thing, for example "living" and "rational" in the case of a human, because it is thesubject of predication .

If this is right, then "being" is treated as analogous to Aristotelian matter. The analogy is suggested by both passages (A) and (C).24 Passage (A) is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion in theMetaphysics where, on one traditional interpretation, he describes matter as the ultimate subject of predication that underlies all the features of a thing.25 Also like Aristotelian matter, being subsists through change, as becomes clear in passage (C) when al-Kindi says that being "does not change." The point is an intelligible one: even in the case of substantial corruption (such as death in the case of a human), there is not an absolute destruction of being but merely of the way the thing is. This is why the corpse that remains when the human is no

longer alive is yet something thatexists . Finally, like Aristotelian matter, mere being must be simple, where "simple" again means without predicates. For, as the ultimate subject of predication, being itself cannot be further analyzed into a complex of subject and predicates. The analogy does break down insofar as matter is associated with potentiality, whereas being (according to the Arabic Plotinus, as we saw above) is more aptly associated with actuality.

As in the Neoplatonic translations, for al-Kindi this analysis of being in the case of complex, created things is linked to a conception of God. Al-Kindi follows the authors of the two paraphrases in saying that God is being. For example, he[End Page 302] says that God is "the true Being" (al-anniyya al-haqq ),26 and asserts that God creates "through His being" (bi-huwiyyatihi ).27 Moreover, he follows them in emphasizing that God is being because He is simple, or one:

(D) FP 161.10-14 [RJ 95.24-96.3]: The cause of unity in unified things is the True, First One, and everything that receives unity is caused. For every one that is not truly the One is one metaphorically, not in truth. And every one of the effects of unity goes from [God's] unity to what is other than [God's] being (huwiyya ), I mean that [God] is not multiple with respect to existing (min hayth yujadu ). [The effect] is multiple, not absolutely one, and by "absolutely one" I mean not multiple at all, so that His unity is nothing other than His being (wa-laysa wahdatuhu shay'an ghayr huwiyyatihi ).

It is clear from the end of this passage that for al-Kindi, unity is convertible with being in the case of God,28 and that unity is here to be understood as excluding multiplicity. Indeed text (D) is the culmination of al-Kindi's efforts in the final surviving chapter of FP to argue that God has no attributes. This fits well with text (C) and the opposition it makes between being and attributes. So it would seem that the notion of God in FP is the same as the one we discerned in the Neoplatonic paraphrases: God is being, which is to say that He has no multiplicity of attributes distinct from His being.29

We now need to make sense of the notion that this simple being is the subject of predication in complex things. We can do this by bearing in mind that complex things are created things. Hence the contrast in passage (D) is between God, a simple and ineffable First Cause who is identical with His own being, and the complex things that arenot identical with their own being. Yet the being of those created things is in itself simple, as we see in passages (A) and (C), for it is distinct from or prior to the predicates. Furthermore, the simple being of a created thing is the direct effect of God. Indeed this is what creation amounts to: the bestowal of the simple being upon which the created thing's complexity is founded. Thus the Liber de Causis asserts that "the first of originated things is being" and that created being then "receives multiplicity." 30 The Neoplatonic lineaments of the [End Page 303] theory are clear enough: createdness amounts to receiving simple being from a simple One that is the principle of being, or pure being. 31

It is in this sense that God's creating something is God's making that thing exist. Thus al-Kindi uses the same terminology of "being alone" in the following context:

FP 101.5-7: There are four scientific inquiries: [. .] "whether" (hal ), "what," "which" and "why" [. .] and "whether" is an investigation of being alone ('an anniyya faqat ).

Here al-Kindi is drawing on Aristotle, who differentiates questions regarding "whether" (to hoti ) from those regarding what a thing is ( to ti estin ) in Posterior Analytics II.1. Al-Kindi's explicit discussions of creation bear out the equivalence of being created and receiving being. In general, the generation of any given thing is a "coming-to-be of being ( ays ) from non-being ( 'an lays )" (FP 118.18 [RJ 33.25]). And in particular, "origination" ( al-ibda' ) or creation is "the manifestation ( izhar ) of the thing from non-being ( 'an lays )." 32 Such passages are further evidence that al-Kindi could use terms meaning "being" to refer to the sheer existence of something, the fact that it is: to hoti , in Aristotle's terminology. This act of existing will be distinct from the predicates true of the created thing; indeed, it will be ontologically prior to those predicates as their subject.

3. An Objection: Unlimited Being

It might be objected that I am ascribing a remarkably impoverished view of God and being to al-Kindi. Why think, this objector might say, that simple being has to exclude attributes, instead of containing them all implicitly? We might suppose that, on the contrary, God is the fullness of Being, containing all things as a unity within Himself, so that in a sense He has all attributes rather than none. His proper effect would still be created being, which like God would virtually contain all predicates until it becamespecified as a certain sort of thing. Perhaps, then, we should talk of God as "unlimited" being rather than "simple" being: as the Principle and Cause of all things, God would in fact have all the attributes as a simultaneous unity, much in the manner of Plotiniannous .

Our imaginary objector would find support in the Neoplatonic paraphrases cited above. The Arabic Plotinus entertains the notion that God must possess the same attributes as His effects, but in a more eminent way, rather than excluding all attributes.33 In a discussion of God as cause of the virtues, the author also suggests that God's being isidentical with the divine attributes:[End Page 304]

ThA IX.71 [B 130.9-10]: The virtues are in the First Cause in the manner of a cause. Not that it is in the position of a receptacle for the virtues; rather its entirety is a being (anniyya ) that is all the virtues.

Here the emphasis on God's not being a "receptacle" (wi'a ') for the virtues is intended to stress that there is no distinction between God and the virtues. Even prior to al-Kindi's translation circle, a similar position was taken by the Kalam thinker Abu 'l-Hudhayl, who is said to have claimed that "[God] is knowing in an act of knowing that is He and is powerful in a power of efficient causality that is He and is living in a life that is He."34

We can illustrate the difference between "simple" and "unlimited" being by distinguishing two ways in which a subject can relate to its predicate. Take, for example, the statements "al-Kindi is rational" and "al-Kindi is the first Arabic philosopher." In the former, the subject and predicate are distinct, so that al-Kindi is not the same thing as his rationality, whereas in the latter the subject is being identified with the predicate.35 If we apply this to the case of God we have the difference between simple and unlimited being. A believer in simple being holds that a subject must be distinct from its predicate, as al-Kindi is distinct from his rationality. The insight behind the notion of being as unlimited is that if the subject isidentical with the predicate, then predication need not imply multiplicity. In the divine case, we may say that "God is just" and "God is wise," but He is not three things (justice, wisdom, and the subject of justice and wisdom). Rather, God, His justice, and His wisdom are all identical. God will still be simple, if "simple" means not multiple, but He will not be simple in the stricter sense of lacking all attributes.[End Page 305]

However, there are good reasons for supposing that al-Kindi, as well as the authors of the Neoplatonic translations we have considered, usually supposed that a subject must be distinct from its predicate, so that being must lack all predicates if it is to be simple. This comes out most obviously in the final surviving section of FP, where al-Kindi argues at length that

nothing can be predicated of God. After systematically showing that every kind of predicate is incompatible with the divine unity, he concludes: "therefore [God] is only and purely unity (wahda faqat mahd ), I mean nothing other than unity" (FP 160.16-17 [RJ 95.13-14]). Similarly, the most explicit statement on divine predication in the Arabic Neoplatonic texts is the thoroughly negative one in Liber de Causis , Proposition 5. Further consideration of passage (C) above yields the same result. Here al-Kindi not only says that being is the subject of predication, but also that the predicate can change while the subject remains. This makes clear that being, the subject, is not identical to the predicate. Rather, we saw that as "the first bearer of predication" being in itself lacks predicates, after the fashion of Aristotelian matter. Likewise, passage (A) from the Liber de Causis envisions "only being" as the result of removing predicates, not as a richer principle that implicitly contains or is identical to all predicates. Thus the passages considered so far presuppose that subject and predicate are distinct, and draw the conclusion that being (in the case of both God and created things) is simple in the sense of lacking attributes. Yet we will now see that al-Kindi does have a notion of being that includes complexity and attributes. This "complex" being is appropriate only to created things, and presupposes "simple" being.

4. Complex Being

Others, such as Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny,36 have noted a double meaning ofanniyya in the texts produced by al-Kindi's circle. One the one hand, as we have seen,anniyya can refer to mere existence. On the other hand, it can include the actual nature or essence of a thing: notthat it is, butwhat it is. In the case of a human, for example, being in this complex sense would mean "being a human." This equivocation on the meaning ofanniyya is already prominent in Ustath's translation of Aristotle'sMetaphysics , which usesanniyya to translate botheinai ("to be" or "being" in the broadest sense) andto ti en einai ("essence").37

The complex conception of being is illustrated in passages like the following:

FP 117.3-5 [RJ 31.22-24]: If time is limited, then the being (anniyya ) of the body [of the universe] is limited, since time is not an existent (bi-mawjud ), and there is no body without time, since time is the number of motion.

FP 120.3-4 [RJ 35.21-22]: Body is not prior to time, so it is not possible that the body of the universe have no limit, because of its being (li-anniyyatihi ). So the being (anniyya ) of the body of the universe is necessarily limited.

Such passages actually play on the double meaning ofanniyya . The simple conception is employed here insofar as al-Kindi is indeed talking about the sheer[End Page 306] existence of the world, and whether that existence is eternal. But the complex conception is also evident, because he says in the second passage that theanniyya of the body of the universe causes it to have a limited, temporal existence.38 Here it would be more natural to understandanniyya as "nature" or "essence." Indeed, at one point he makes a remark that equateshuwiyya , "being," withma huwa , "what a thing is" (FP 119.15-16 [RJ 35.14-15]).

The complex conception seems to underlie another frequent usage of the wordsanniyya andays , where they mean "a being." Thusanniyyat andaysat can mean "beings,"onta , as mentioned briefly above in our terminological survey. A typical instance in al-Kindi can be found in his treatiseOn the First True Agent , where he writes that God's creative act is a "bringing-to-be (ta'yis ) of beings (aysat ) from non-being (lays )" (FP 182.7 [RJ 169.6]). Herelays seems to be the opposite ofays in the simple sense, so that "non-being" means simple non-existence. Likewise the verbal nounta'yis seems to be based on simple being, much in the spirit of the definitions of creation cited above at the end of section 2. But the pluralaysat seems more likely to mean "beings" in the sense of fully constituted entities.39 These will be beings of a particular sort, complete with the predicated features that are excluded from simple being.

The same is true for a more extended meditation on being and essence at the beginning of the third section of FP, where al-Kindi gives a lengthy argument designed to show that a thing cannot be the cause of its own essence. In typical Kindian style, he proceeds with an exhaustive consideration of four possibilities. First, that neither the thing nor its essence (dhat ) are "a being" (ays ), that is, that they do not exist. Second, that the

thing is non-existent and its essence is existent; third, that the thing exists but its essence is non-existent; and fourth and finally, that both the thing and its essence exist. He shows that, on any of these assumptions, the thing could not cause its own essence. The key to the argument is the repeated insistence that the thing and its essence are not distinct. For example, on the second assumption, the thing's

essence would be distinct from it, because distinct things are those for which it is possible that something happen to one without happening to the other. Therefore, if it happens to it that it be a non-being, and it happens to its essence that it be a being, then its essence will not be it. But the essence of every thing is itself [wa-kull shay' fa-dhatuhu hiya huwa ]. (FP 123.18-124.3 [RJ 41.16-18])

At first glance this argument seems to be using exclusively the simple conception of being, since it considers merely whether a thing or its essence exists. But[End Page 307] the overall thrust of the argument is that the being of a thing is the same as the being of its essence. This seems explicitly to reject the simple conception of being. For the whole point of the simple conception is that we can think about the being of a thing in abstraction from thinking about the thing's attributes, some of which will constitute its essence. Instead, al-Kindi insists here that we cannot consider a thing to exist, to be "a being," without simultaneously considering it to be identical with its essence. His argument turns on the double meaning of dhat , which can signify "self" as well as "essence," so that al-shay' ghayr dhatihi means both "the thing is distinct from its essence" and "the thing is distinct from itself." 40 And the latter, of course, would be absurd. By insisting on this point, al-Kindi is insisting on the complex notion of being, on which we cannot distinguish being from having a certain essence.

5. Reconciling the Two Conceptions

We have, then, found traces of two conflicting notions of being in al-Kindi's writings. When he speaks of "being alone," he means the mere act of existing that is prior to, and the subject of, the existent's essence and other predicates. But he also speaks of "a being," by which he means a fully constituted being that is already considered to have an essence. On this latter notion, the being of each thing will be distinct from the being of anything else; on the former notion, being is mere existence and belongs to anything that God has seen fit to create. I think we can, however, discern a coherent philosophical position that would bring the two conceptions together.

Consider first what al-Kindi has to say about the Aristotelian notion of substance. In his treatise on definitions, al-Kindi defines substance as follows:

On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things 166.7: "Substance" (jawhar ) is what subsists through itself (bi-nafsihi ). It is the bearer (hamil) for accidents, and its essence (dhat ) does not undergo alteration.

Notice how similar the role of substance here is to that of "being" (ays ) in text (C), which first introduced us to the simple notion of being in al-Kindi. We have the same terminology, hamil, this time used to express the fact that substance underlies accidents in the way thatays was in passage (C) said to underlie any predicate (mahmul ). Notice also the emphasis on the fact that it can be the bearer of predication because it remains unchanged in itself, just as the "being" of passage (C) was said to subsist through a corruption.

But note too the difference between "substance" in this definition andays in passage (C). For one thing, al-Kindi says not that substance underlies all predication, but only accidental predication. In another treatise, al-Kindi makes the same[End Page 308] point more emphatically in a very similar definition: "[one must] know the adjuncts of the substance that distinguish it from everything else, namely that it is subsisting through its essence (bi-dhatihi ). ., [that it is] the bearer (al-hamil ) for diversity, and is . unchanging."41 Here the phrase "subsisting through its essence" shows that the being of a substance is complex being, where "to be" is to have an essence of a certain kind. Another difference is that, though both of these definitions make the point that substance cannot change, we know that a substance can in fact corrupt (e.g., when a man dies). So substance will not be unchanging in the strongest sense; rather, the point must be that substance remains unchanged in itself throughaccidental change. The being of passage (C), on the other hand, remains unaltered even through "corruption" (fasad ), which I take to refer even (perhaps especially) to substantial corruption.42

With these contrasts in mind, we can see that the superficial similarity between substance and (simple) being is due to the fact that the two are analogous. The being appropriate to substance is complex; it involves reference to what is essential to the substance. Thus, as we have just seen, substance is even said to "subsist through its essence." This complex, essential, or substantial being is then the subject of accidental predication. Being in the sense employed in passage (C), on the other hand, is simple; it is the subject of all predication, and thus can be called the "first bearer of

predication." Al-Kindi obscures the difference between the two by referring to both simple being and substance asanniyya orays . But the equivocation does not lead to any incoherency in al-Kindi's thought, for the two conceptions operate at different levels. Simple being, or "being alone," underlies all, and perhaps especially essential,43 predicates. Complex being, or substance, results when an essence is predicated of simple being, and it underlies accidents.

The complex notion of being accurately, if roughly, represents the sort of being expounded in Aristotle'sMetaphysics . Aristotle stresses that to be is to be a certain sort or kind of thing, and says that of the many ways "being" is said, the primary sense is that associated with a substance of a specific kind. 44 As we saw, the [End Page 309] simple notion of being also derives partly from Aristotle, whose Posterior Analytics distinguishes between what a thing is and that it is. But the fact that al-Kindi's treatment of simple being is ontological, as well as epistemic, seems more at home in a Neoplatonic framework. For example, as suggested above, the account is Neoplatonic insofar as it portrays createdness as a sort of participation in being, and insofar as it recognizes a principle that is absolute Being.