Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Lesson Twenty-Six: Introduction to the Fundamentality of Existence

A Brief Look at the History of the Problem

As was previously mentioned, prior to Fārābī almost all philosophical discussions were centered about whatnesses, or at least were unconsciously based on the fundamentality of whatness, and in statements reported from the Greek philosophers, no clear indications are to be found of any tendency toward the fundamentality of existence. But among the Islamic philosophers, such as Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Bahmanyār and Mīr Dāmād, not only is this tendency to found, but there are also declarations of position on the topic.

On the other hand, Shaykh al-Ishrāq [Suhravardī], who paid particular attention to intellectual concepts (i‘tibārāt ‘aqlī ), took up a position against the tendency toward the fundamentality of existence, and he sought by proofs for the respectival nature of the concept of existence to invalidate this tendency, although in his own statements points may be found which are more compatible with the fundamentality of existence, and which do not properly justify the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness.

In any case, Ṣadr al-Muta’ allihīn was the first to place this topic at the head of discussions of ontology, and he suggested solutions to other problems on this basis. He says: “At first I myself was a proponent of the fundamentality of whatness and I defended it vigorously until, by the grace of God, I found the truth of the matter.”1 He attributed the doctrine of the fundamentality of existence to the peripatetics and the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness to the illuminationists. However, since the topic of the fundamentality of existence had not previously been presented as an independent topic and the concept of it had not been previously explained, philosophers cannot easily be grouped specifically and definitively in relation to it, so as to characterize the peripatetics in terms of the doctrine of the fundamentality of existence and to consider the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness as a feature of the illuminationists. Supposing, however, that this classification is correct, one must not forget that the fundamentality of existence was not presented by the followers of the peripatetics in such a way that it could take its proper place among the problems of philosophy to shed light on the solution of other philosophical problems. Rather, the peripatetics often presented and explained philosophical problems in a way which was more compatible with the doctrine of the fundamentality of whatness.

Explanation of Terms

In order to clarify this topic and completely specify the area of controversy it is first necessary to provide explanations of the terms used regarding the problem, and then to precisely determine the purport of the topic and area of conflict.

This problem is usually presented by posing the question of whether existence is fundamental and whatness respectival or whether whatness is fundamental and existence respectival? However, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn

himself presented the problem in the following form. Existence possesses objective reality. The implicit purport of this is that whatness does not possess objective reality. Thus, the pivotal expressions of this topic are existence, whatness, fundamentality, respectival, and reality.

However, we have already explained the expression, ‘existence,’ which is sometimes used as an infinitive (maṣdar ) (to be), and sometimes as a verbal noun (ism-e maṣdar ) (being), and also sometimes it is used by logicians with a copulative meaning (is).

It is clear that in this philosophical discussion the copulative meaning is not under consideration, and likewise the infinitive which indicates a relation between subject and object is not meant. The meaning of the verbal noun, in the restricted sense of occurrence, is also not meant, unless the above restriction is removed so that it may be predicated of objective realities including the sacred Essence of God.

The expression ‘whatness’ (māhiyyah )which is a contrived infinitive (maṣdar ja‘lī ) derived from ‘What is it?’ (mā huwa? ) is used as a philosophic term in the form of a verbal noun (ism-e maṣdar , ‘what-is-it-ness’) but with the same condition of dissociation from the sense of occurrence, so that it may be predicated of an essence.

This term is used in philosophy in two senses, one of which is more general than the other. The specific sense is defined as “that which is said in answer to the question ‘What is it?’” and naturally it is applied in the case of an existent which can be known by the mind, in technical terms, that which possesses specific limits of existence, which are reflected in the mind in the form of primary intelligibles (whatish concepts). For this reason it is said that God the Almighty does not have a whatness: “There is no whatness of the Necessary Existent.” Proponents of the fundamentality of existence say with regard to the objective reality of existence, “Existence itself has no whatness,” and sometimes that “it does not have an intellectual form.” But the more general sense is defined as ‘that which the thing itself is.’ This includes both the objective reality of existence as well as the sacred Essence of God. It is in accordance with this meaning that it is said with regard to God Almighty, “The whatness of God is the same as His identity (innīyyah ).”

In this discussion what is meant by the expression ‘whatness’ is the former meaning, not the concept represented by the wordwhatness itself in the sense of primary predication. Rather the discussion is about the instances of this concept, that is,whatness in the sense of common predication, such as ‘man’. For the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness also admit that this concept itself is a respectival concept.2 In other words, the discussion is about whatish concepts (mafāhīm māhuwī ), not the concept of whatness.

The expression ‘fundamentality’ (aṣālah )which is used with the literal meaning of being a root and is the opposite of ‘far‘iyyah ’ which has the meaning of being an offshoot in this context, is employed with a specific meaning as the opposite of ‘i‘tibārī ’ (respectival), and their precise meanings are jointly clarified.

In Lesson Fifteen several technical meanings of the expressioni‘tibārī (respectival) were mentioned, according to some of which, even the concept of existence was called a respectival concept. But in this context, the meaning ofi‘tibār , being the opposite ofaṣīl (fundamental), is different. The respectival nature of the concept of existence, according to the previous meaning, is compatible with the doctrine of the fundamentality of existence and the ‘respectival’ nature of whatness according to the meaning appropriate to this context.

What is meant by the two opposite concepts ofaṣīl and i‘tibārī here pertains to the question as to which of the two, the whatish concepts or the concept of existence, refers to entified reality in itself ( dhātan ) without mediation, in the precise philosophical sense. That is, after it is accepted that an objective reality is reflected in the mind in the form of a ‘simple existential proposition’ ( halliyyah basīṭah ), whose subject is a whatish concept and whose predicate is the concept of existence ( wujūd ) which by means of a [morphologically] derived predicate may be put in the form of the concept of ‘existent’ ( mawjūd ), so that each of these terms will be predicable of that entified reality, so that it may be said, for example, “This foreigner is human,” as it can be said, “This person is existent.” Neither of these is metaphorical from a common or literary point of view. At the same time, from a precise philosophic point of view, it may be asked—in view of the unity and simplicity of the entified reality and the multiplicity of these concepts and aspects, which is characteristic of the mental realm—whether the entified reality (of which the concept of existence is predicated with the special attention of the intellect and by mediation of the whatish concept, and which [i.e. the concept of existence] for this reason is a secondary and subordinate aspect) is to be identified with the whatish aspect, or whether the objective reality is that very aspect denoted by the concept of existence (so that the whatish concept is merely a mental reflection of the limits and framework of the reality and objective existence), and in fact it is the whatish concepts which are secondary and subordinate.

With regard to this question, if we take the first alternative and understand entified reality to be the unmediated instance of whatness, we would be upholding the fundamentality of whatness and the respectivalness of existence. And if we take the second alternative and understand entified reality to be the unmediated instance of the concept of existence, and we consider whatish concepts a mental framework setting the limits for finite realities, we will be proponents of the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness.

The expressionḥaqīqah employed by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn in discussing this problem is also an expression used in various senses, such as the following:

1.Ḥaqīqah [literal usage] is the use of a word in its literal meaning, as opposed tomajāz , its metaphorical usage, i.e., with another meaning with a sort of relation to the literal meaning. For example, the use of the word ‘lion’ in the sense of the well-known wild animal isḥaqīqah , while its use to mean a powerful man is a metaphor.

2.Ḥaqīqah [truth] also has the meaning of knowledge that corresponds to reality, as in the previous discussions of epistemology.

3.Ḥaqīqah may have the meaning of whatness, as when it is said of two individual humans that they are ‘muttafiq al-ḥaqīqah ’ [i.e., of a common reality].

4.Ḥaqīqah in the sense of entified reality.

5.Ḥaqīqah , in the terminology of mysticism (`irfān ), is used in the sense of absolute independent existence which is confined to God, the Supreme, and it is so used in contrast to the existence of creatures, which is said to be ‘metaphorical’ (majāzī ).

6.  Ḥaqīqah also has the meaning of core and inner reality (bāṭin ), as when it is said thatḥaqīqah of the Divine Essence cannot be fathomed by the intellect.

It is clear that the intended meaning ofḥaqīqah here is that of the fourth term.

Explanation of the Point of Contention

There is no doubt that every existent which has a whatish concept may be predicated by that concept, as the concept ‘human being’ may be predicated of persons in the external world. Likewise, there is no doubt that the concept of existence (in the form of derivative predication (ḥaml ishtiqāq ), e.g.,mawjūd , (existent), derived fromwujūd , (existence)) may be predicated of every existent in the external world, and even in the case of God, the Supreme, Who does not have a whatness, it may be said that He is existent. In other words, from an intellectual perspective every existent that has contingent existence has two aspects: one is the aspect of whatness, and the other is the aspect of existence. As the philosophers have said: “Every contingent thing is a composite duality, composed of whatness and existence.” This is the same matter which we have repeatedly indicated, namely that reflections of objective realities in the mind take the form of propositions which are usually (that is, for things with whatnesses) composed of a whatish concept and the concept of existence.

With regard to this matter, if it is supposed that for each of these two concepts there exists an objective entified aspect—that the whatish concept refers to one entified aspect and the concept of existence refers to the other entified aspect, which are joined together in the external world—or, in other words, an existent is composed of existence and whatness, and this composition is objective and entified, the meaning of this supposition would be that both whatness and existence are fundamental (aṣīl ).

But this supposition is not correct, for if each existent were to possess two entified aspects, each of them would be reflected in the mind in the form of a different proposition, which would include two concepts, and for each of them one would have to suppose another entified aspect, and this process would be continued without end, and the result of this would be that every simple existent should be composed of an infinite number of entified objective aspects! This is what is meant by the statement of the philosophers that the difference between existence and whatness is a mental difference: “Existence is an accident of whatness in conception, and they are united in identity.”

That is, the predication and characterization (‘urūḍ ) of existence to whatness, which requires each of them to be different from the other, obtains exclusively in the realm of mental conception, otherwise in external identity (huwiyyah ) they are one with each other. So, it cannot be that both whatness and existence are fundamental and considered to have entified reality. Likewise, both cannot be viewed as respectivals. For ultimately, it is that very simple proposition which denotes entified reality and which must include a concept corresponding to entified reality. So, there is a choice between whatness being fundamental and existence being respectival or vice versa. Therefore, the problem may be posed in the form of two hypotheses based on several principles:

1. The acceptance of the concept of existence as an independent substantival concept, in technical terms, the acceptance of ‘predicative existence’. For if the concept of existence is confined to the copulative meaning and is relational in propositions it would be impossible to suppose that it should refer to entified reality, and in the words of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, that it should possess entified reality (ḥaqīqah ‘ayniyyah ), and there would be no alternative but the fundamentality of whatness.

2. Acceptance of the analysis of contingent existents into two (concepts): the concept of existence and whatish concepts. That is, if someone imagines that the concept of existence is not something other than the concept of whatness, as has been reported of some of themutakallimīn , according to whom the meaning of existence in every proposition is the same as the meaning of the whatness which makes up its subject, on this assumption there remains no room for doubt between the fundamentality of whatness and the fundamentality of existence, and it would determine the fundamentality of whatness. But the invalidity of this supposition became clear in Lesson Twenty-Two.

3. Acceptance of the fact that the combination of existence and whatness is a mental combination, that in the context of the external world there do not exist two distinct aspects, one of which corresponds to the whatish concept and the other of which to the concept of existence, that is, the hypothesis of the fundamentality of both is incorrect, as explained.

4. On the basis of these three principles, the question may be presented in this form: Does entified reality principally correspond to the whatish concept, such that the concept of existence is predicated of it accidentally, or the reverse, does entified reality principally correspond to the concept of existence, such that the whatish concept is predicated of it accidentally? In other words: Is entified reality in itself an instance of whatness or existence? On the first hypothesis, knowledge of whatnesses and the principles pertaining to whatness is the same as knowledge of entified reality; but on the second hypothesis, knowledge of whatnesses means the knowledge of the framework of existents and their limits which are reflected in the mind, not knowledge of their entified contents.

The Benefits of the Discussion

It is possible that one may imagine that the discussion about the fundamentality of existence or whatness is an academic exercise and that it has no relevance to the solution of important philosophical problems, for

these problems have been solved both by the proponents of the fundamentality of existence as well as the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness. But this idea is incorrect, for, as will become clear in the course of future discussions, the solution of many of the important problems of philosophy depends on the fundamentality of existence, and the way of solving them through the fundamentality of whatness is unsatisfactory and leads to a dead end. As we have seen with regard to the problem of the individuation of whatnesses, there is no correct solution on the basis of the fundamentality of whatness. Of course, this problem, compared to more important problems [whose solutions are] based on the fundamentality of existence, is relatively minor. If we were to mention all such cases, our discussion would become too long. Furthermore, the explanation of the relation of these problems to the fundamentality of existence requires the presentation of these problems and reference to some sensitive points which must be explained in their appropriate place.

Here we will only mention two very important problems of philosophy, each of which in its own turn may serve as a basis for solving other valuable problems: one of them is the problem of causation and the reality of the relation between cause and effect, the conclusion of which, based on the fundamentality of existence, is the dependence of the effect on the ‘being- granting cause’ (‘illat-e hastī bakhsh ), on the basis of which very important problems can be solved, including the refutation ofjabr (predestination) andtafwīḍ (libertarianism) and [explanation of] the unity of [Divine] acts (tawḥīd af‘ālī ). Another problem is that of substantial motion, intensifying (ishtidādī ) and evolutionary (takāmulī ), whose interpretation depends on the acceptance of the fundamentality of existence, the elaboration of which will be presented in its proper place.

Therefore, the problem of the fundamentality of existence is one of the most serious and fundamental which is worthy of study, and must never be treated in a casual and offhand manner.

References

1Asfār, Vol. 1, p. 49.

2 Cf. Suhrawardī’sMuqāwamāt, p. 175;Muṭāraḥāt, p. 361, in Henry Corbin, ed.,Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi, Œuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques, Tome 1 (Tehran: Académie Impériale Iranienne de Philosophie, 1976).

Lesson Twenty-Seven: The Fundamentality of Existence

Arguments for the Fundamentality of Existence

Our aim is to know whether entified reality is the same as that which is denoted by whatish concepts or whether whatnesses only represent limits and frameworks for objective realities. If whatnesses only represent limits of existence, that which denotes the reality itself and the contents of a conceptual framework is the concept of existence which is considered to indicate reality itself. The mind, by means of the concept of existence, understands reality itself. In order to know whether whatness is fundamental or existence, there are various ways, of which the easiest is reflection upon these concepts themselves and their meanings.

When we focus upon a whatish concept, such as the concept of ‘man,’ we see that existence may be negated of it without changing its meaning, no matter how many external existents to which it applies, and of which it may be predicated, where this predication is literal, according to ordinary language, and not metaphorical. This is a matter upon which philosophers are agreed, namely, that whatness, in that it is whatness, is neither an existent nor a nonexistent. It neither requires existence nor nonexistence (al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya laysat illā hiya, lā mawjūdatun wa lā ma‘dūmah , i.e., Whatness as such is what it is [and only that], it is neither existent, nor nonexistent). It is for this same reason that whatness may be both the subject for existence and for nonexistence. Therefore, whatness in and of itself cannot represent objective reality, otherwise the predication ‘nonexistent’ to it would be considered the predication of one of a pair of contradictories to the other, such as is the case with the predication of existence to nothingness.

Another reason that whatness does not represent entified reality is that in order to denote an objective reality we have no choice but to employ a proposition which includes the concept of existence, and until we predicate existence of a whatness we will not have spoken of its real occurrence. And this very point is the best reason for claiming that it is the concept of existence which denotes entified reality. According to Bahmanyār, in the bookAl-Taḥṣīl , “How can existence not possess entified truth when its meaning is nothing but real occurrence?”1

Some of the advocates of the fundamentality of whatness have said: “It is true that whatness itself in itself lacks existence and nothingness, and does not demand either of them, and in this sense can be considered respectival, but when it is related to the Maker (Jā‘il ) it obtains objective reality. And it is with regard to this matter that it is said that whatness is fundamental.”

It is clear that a relation which accompanies the occurrence of whatness in reality is due to causing it to exist, that is, the granting of existence to it, and this shows that its reality is that very existence which is granted to it.

Another reason for the respectivalness of whatness is that basically the analysis of entified reality into two aspects, whatness and existence, occurs only in the mind through acquired knowledge. In presentational knowledge no trace of whatness is found. So, if whatness were fundamental, then it

would have to be realized through presentational knowledge, as well, for it is in knowledge by presence that entified reality itself is perceived or observed internally without the intermediary of any mental form or concept.

It is possible that to this argument the objection will be raised that just as there is no trace of whatish concepts in knowledge by presence, we see no trace in it of the concept of existence. In other words, just as whatish concepts are obtained by mental analysis, the concept of existence also occurs in the realm of mental analysis. Therefore, it cannot be said that existence is also fundamental.

In response to this objection, it must be said that there is no doubt that the two aspects, whatness and existence, can be distinguished from one another only in the realm of the mind. Their duality is specific to the realm of mental analysis, and for the same reason the concept of existence also, insofar as it is a mental concept, is not the same as objective reality, and is not fundamental. But, nevertheless, this same concept is a means for denoting that which has objective reality, from which the whatish concept is abstracted, and this is what is meant by the fundamentality of existence and its having entified reality.

In addition to this, it became clear in the previous lecture that the choice between the fundamentality of existence and that of whatness is exhaustive, so that with the invalidity of the fundamentality of whatness, the fundamentality of existence is established.

Another argument for the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness is that, as was mentioned in Lesson Twenty-Five, an essential aspect of whatness is that it is not an individuating aspect, while the whatish aspect of external realities is an individuating aspect and is not universal, applicable to [different] individuals, and no external realities as such can be subjects of the attribute of universality and the lack of individuality. In other words, individuality and particularity can only be applied to a whatness when it has external existence. From this it is to be understood that whatish aspects are those conceptual and mental aspects that have the capability of being applied to countless individuals, and entified reality is specific to existence, that is, entified reality is the essential instance of existence.

Another argument for the fundamentality of existence also can be raised, based on that which is accepted by the philosophers, that the sacred Divine Essence is free of any limitation which could be denoted by whatish concepts; that is, there is no question of Its having a whatness, and He is the most fundamental of realities and is the bestower of reality to all existents. If external reality were an essential instance of whatness, then the reality of the Divine Essence would also have to be a whatness like other whatnesses.

Of course, this argument is based on a premise which must be proved in the section on theology, but since this is accepted by the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness also, it can also be used here, and at the very least may be used in argument with them as ‘sound dialectic’.2

Philosophical Metaphor

Here it is possible that a doubt will come to mind according to which the basis of the fundamentality of existence is that entified reality is an essential

instance of existence, which implies that it will accidentally be an instance of whatness. This means that the predication of a whatness, such as man, to individuals external to it will be accidental and by occurrence (‘uruḍ ), and the characterization (ittiṣāf ) of this concept will be metaphorical, which can be negated. Therefore, it must be that the negation of the concept of man of its individuals in the external world is correct, and this is nothing but sophistry.

The answer is that just as in the first argument [for the fundamentality of existence] we mentioned that the predication of every whatness to individuals external to it, from the ordinary viewpoint and from that of grammar, is a true predication without any figure of speech; however, precise philosophical precepts do not follow those of ordinary [language] and grammar with respect to the literal and the metaphorical. So the key to their understanding cannot be sought among the rules related to language. Often these rules will be employed in such a way that with respect to grammar something will be literal, while with respect to philosophy, it will be metaphorical, and vice versa.

For example, the scholars of grammar and theoretical jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh ) say that the literal meaning of ‘derivatives’ (mushtaqqāt ) is something possessing the whatness of the source of derivation (ishtiqāq ) (“The essential meaning ofmushtaqq [derivative] is something with an established source”); for instance,‘ālim (knower) means someone who has‘ilm (knowledge) andmawjūd (existent) means something which haswujūd (existence). So, if the expressionmawjūd (existent) is used for entified existence (wujūd ) itself, then from the point of view of grammar, this would have to be a metaphorical usage, but from the point of view of philosophy, it is not.

The same point applies here. From the viewpoint of ordinary usage, there is no separation between the limit and the limited, and just as a limited existent is considered to be a real thing, its limits are also construed to be real entified things, while from the point of view of philosophy this is not the case, and the limits of existents, in fact, are abstracted from matters relating to nonexistence. Their being considered as real is metaphorical and respectival.

In order to make this clearer to the mind, the following example is given. If we take a piece of paper and from it we cut the various shapes of a triangle, a square, etc., we will have bits of paper, each of which, in addition to being paper, will have another attribute by the name of triangle, or square, etc., such that prior to cutting the paper they did not have these attributes.

The ordinary construal of this case is that specific forms and attributes came into existence in the paper, and that aspects of existence were added to the paper, while nothing came into existence in the mentioned paper except for edges which are aspects relating to nonexistence.

In other words, the edges which form the limits and bounds of various shapes are nothing but the ultimate ends of the surface of various bits of paper, and even the surface itself is really the ultimate end of the thickness of the paper. However, these limits and bounds which have the nature of nonexistence, are construed from the ordinary superficial perspective as

existing things and entified attributes, and the negation of their existence is considered a sort of denial of what is self-evident.

We should add that the same is true of the whatish concept (like paper in the example) in relation to entified reality; that is, it refers to specific limits of reality (of course, conceptual limits, not geometrical limits), limits which are considered as the empty molds for realities, and their contents are composed of entified reality. Whatnesses are nothing but these very conceptual molds for external reality. But since they are the means and mirrors for the knowledge of external existents and cannot be viewed independently, they are construed as external realities themselves. This is the meaning of the respectivalness of whatness, that is, whatnesses are supposed to be realities, or the concepts are considered as the external instances themselves. Thus, the mind may be compared to a mirror the reflections appearing in which are whatish concepts by means of which we are informed of the limits of external realities and kinds of existence. In this view, [wherein the mind plays the function of] an instrument and mirror, we do not notice the reflections themselves independently, but rather by way of them our attention is directed to that which is reflected, that is, the entified reality. For this reason we suppose that the reflections are that which is reflected. Likewise, when one looks at one’ s reflection in a mirror one supposes that one is looking at oneself while that which is seen in the mirror is a reflection of the colors and contours of one’ s face, that is, a reflection of limits and not of that which is limited itself. However, from a superficial point of view we can say that that which we see in the mirror is our own faces.

The predication of whatnesses to existents is of the same sort. However much from the ordinary way of looking at things it is considered to be a true predication, from the exact perspective of philosophy, it becomes clear that it is only a reflection of their molds, not of them themselves. That is why Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn repeatedly emphasized in his books that `whatness is a phantom of the mind or intellectual mold for entified reality.’3

With these explanations it has become clear that the real locus of whatnesses, insofar as they are whatnesses, is only the mind, and its entified occurrence is its individual existence. From the exact perspective of philosophy, the whatness is never in itself that which entifiedly occurs [that is, as an entity]. So, the existence of mixed whatnesses, and consequently, the existence of natural universals in the external world, may also only be accepted as respectival, as was indicated at the end of Lesson Twenty-Five.

Hence, it may be said that to claim true existence for natural universals is the same as holding the position of the fundamentality of whatness, and to claim that the existence of natural universals is accidental and that individuals are the means of the occurrence (‘urūḍ ) of existence for natural universals is really the same position as the fundamentality of existence; that is, natural universals, which are the same as whatnesses, are respectival things. Their relation to existence and occurrence in the external world is accidental and a kind of philosophical metaphor.

The Resolution of Two Doubts

The proponents of the fundamentality of whatness have raised certain doubts, among which two of the most important are:

First Objection: If existence were basic and possessed entified reality, it would have to be predicable by the concept ‘existent,’ and this would mean that existence possesses existence. So, another entified existence would have to be posited for it, which in turn would become the subject of ‘existent.’ This process would continue without end. This implies that every existent possesses infinite existences! From this it is to be understood that existence is respectival, and that the repeated predication of ‘existent’ to it is a product of this mental derivation.

Answer: The origin of this fallacy is reliance on grammatical rules according to which the word ‘existent’ (mawjūd ) with regard to its being a derivative (mushtaqq ), refers to an ‘essence’ which is posited for the source of the derivation (mabdā’ ishtiqāq ) (existence, orwujūd in this case). This implies the plurality of essence and source (mabdā’ ). Thus, when the concept ‘existent’ is predicated of entified existence, it must be supposed that it is an essence for which is established the source of derivation, which is something else, and so on and so forth.

However, we have repeatedly warned that philosophical problems cannot be solved or settled on the basis of linguistic rules of grammar and syntax. The concept of ‘existent’ in philosophical usage is merely an indicator of entified objective occurrence, regardless of whether the aspect of objective occurrence in the realm of mental analysis is other than an aspect of the subject of the proposition or not. For example, when this concept [i.e., existent] is predicated of a whatness, there is considered to be a plurality and difference between the subject and predicate, but when it is predicated of entified existence itself, this means that objective existence is the very aspect of its being existent.

In other words, the predication of a derivative (mushtaqq ) to an essence is not always an indication of plurality and difference between the essence and the source of the derivation. Rather, sometimes it indicates their unity. From this it is to be concluded that the meaning of the predication of ‘existent’ to entified existence is that it itself is that very being existent and entified reality and source of abstraction of the concept ‘existent,’ not that it becomes an existent by means of some other existence.

Second Objection: The other fallacy is the claim that if entified reality is an essential instance of existence this would mean that every reality exists by itself. This implies that every objective reality would be a necessary existent (wājib al-wujūd ), while only God, the Supreme, is existent-by-Himself.

Answer: The origin of this fallacy is a confusion between two senses of ‘essentially’ (bi al-dhāt ), and it is really an error of equivocation.

To explain, the expression ‘essentially’ (bi al-dhāt , i.e.,essentially orby itself ) is sometimes used as the opposite of ‘by another’ (bi al-ghayr ), meaning that it has no intermediary by which it is established, as it is said with respect to God, the Supreme, that He is ‘existent-by-Himself’ (mawjūd bi al-dhāt ) or ‘necessarily existent-by-Himself,’ that is, not through something else, and He is not caused by any creator. To put it differently,

the predication of ‘existent’ or ‘necessary existent’ to Him does not need any intermediary by which it would be established.

The same expression,essentially ( bi al-dhāt ), is sometimes also used as the opposite of accidentally ( bi al-‘araḍ ), meaning that the predication of the predicate does not need an intermediary in its occurrence ( ‘urūḍ ), even if it does need an intermediary in its establishment ( thubūt ), as, in accordance with the fundamentality of existence, we say: “Entified reality is an ‘essential’ instance of existent, but whatness is an accidental instance of it.”

According to the second sense, both the existence of God, the Supreme, which has no intermediary in its establishment and according to the first sense is also ‘essential,’ is an essential instance of existence, and also the existence of creatures, which is established by an intermediary, caused by the Creator. This means that being an existent is the true attribute of their existence, not the attribute of their whatness. From a philosophical point of view, existence is accidentally attributed to whatnesses.

References

1 Cf.Al-Taḥṣīl , p. 286

2 Sound dialectic,jadal aḥsan , is argument based on premises that are not only accepted by toth sides but are also correct. [Tr.]

3 Cf.Al-Asfār , Vol. 1, p. 198; Vol. 2, p. 236.