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Lesson Thirty-Four: The Causal Relation among Material Things

The Cause of Belief in the Causal Relation among Material Things

Sometimes it is said that the knowledge of the causal relation among all existents, including material existents, is an innate (fiṭrī ) knowledge with which the human intellect has been fashioned, and on the basis of which specific causes and effects are determined. However, as has been discussed in the lessons on epistemology, no acquired knowledge can be proven to be innate, and assuming that it occurs, there would be no guarantee of its correspondence with reality.

However, as has been mentioned in Lesson Twenty-Three, some knowledge is near to being self-evident (bidāhat ), and in a sense can be considered to be ‘innate’, such as knowledge of the existence of material realities, which really has its source in a hidden or semi-conscious reasoning. The knowledge of the existence of the causal relation and the dependence of some material existents on others is also of this sort.

The closer we get to the beginning of infancy, the more unconscious reasoning becomes, until it becomes similar to the instinctive perceptions of animals. To the extent that man’s consciousness develops, reasoning becomes more manifestly conscious, until it takes the form of logical reasoning. For example, when a child hears a sound simultaneously with the collision of two objects, he vaguely understands the dependence of the appearance of the noise on the collision. When he witnesses the lighting of a lamp along with the flipping of a switch, he understands there to be another dependence of the same sort. In brief, his soul becomes thus disposed to understand the existence of the causal relation among material phenomena. However, he is not able to understand this relation in the form of a logical proposition or to express it in exact terms. Eventually he develops sufficient powers of mental analysis to understand this subject in the form of a logical proposition, and to expound the hidden foundational reasoning in the form of a logical proof. Of course, it is possible that at the beginning of this process one will use a concept which is not sufficiently precise, or one will present an argument which from a logical point of view is fallacious. For example, one might speculate that everything depends upon something else, or that every existent appears in a specific time and place. However, these unfortunate generalizations and other inadequacies in the interpretation of percepts and reasonings, are effects of the weakness of the analytic powers of the mind, and to the extent that one develops and strengthens the above-mentioned powers by means of logical exercises and philosophical analysis one will make fewer such mistakes.

In any case, as we have explained repeatedly, the firmest foundation for belief in the existence of the causal relation is knowledge by presence. The discovery of instances of causes and effects within the self is considered to be the most sturdy basis for the abstraction of the universal concepts of cause and effect and prepares the ground for the conscious understanding of the principle of causation as a self-evident (badīhī ) proposition. However,

since material instances of cause and effect cannot be known through knowledge by presence, and on the other hand, as mentioned above, since it is unacceptable to consider the belief in the causal relation among material things to be innate, there is no alternative but to consider the source of such beliefs to lie in a kind of reasoning, which, at its inception was semi-conscious and spontaneous, and gradually takes the form of clear logical reasoning.

Since this belief is close to being self-evident it may be called, in a sense, innate. In order to evaluate this belief one must first state this proposition in an exact form, and then give a logical explanation of it.

An Evaluation of the Above-mentioned Belief

The causal relation among material things may be stated in several forms. One is: “Material existents are dependent upon one another.” This proposition, which is called ‘unquantified’ (muhmalah ) in logic, does not indicate the universality or particularity of this relation. That is, it does not mean that all material things have this relation with one another, nor that only some of them have such a relation. It is certain that there exists a causal relation among some of them, and really, it is evaluated as a particular affirmative proposition, the contradictory of a universal negative proposition, the absolute negation of causation among material things, which view is associated with the Ash‘arites.

The second form is: “All material existents have a causal relation with another material existent.” This means that no material existent is to be found which is neither a cause nor an effect of another material existent. This leaves open the possibility that one or more material existents are merely causes for some phenomena and that they themselves are not the effects of other material existents (although they may be the effects of supernatural causes), the possibility also is left open that they are merely effects of material causes, and that they themselves are not causes of other material phenomena.

The third form is: “Every material existent has a material cause,” and the fourth form is: “Every material existent is the cause of another material existent and is the effect of another material existent.” An implication of the third proposition is a backward stretching infinite regress of material causes. An implication of the fourth proposition is an infinite regress in both directions.

Among these propositions, the first is certain and close to being self-evident, and it is the one which may be called innate. However, regarding the other propositions, they have been more or less in dispute and subject to differences of opinion which are presented in detailed philosophical texts under various topics.

Just as the principle of the existence of material things is not self-evident and needs to be proven, the existence of the causal relation among material things is also not self-evident. The warrant for this belief is not at the same level as the belief in the universal principle of causation, in the form of a verity proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥaqīqiyyah ), nor is it on the level of the belief in the existence of the causal relation for the totality of existents, some of whose instances are known through knowledge by presence. Rather, its

logical warrant is at the level of speculative certainties (naẓariyyāt yaqīnī ), which on the one hand are based on the self-evident principle of causality, and on the other hand are based on empirical premises. That is, after the real existence of material existents is established, and idealistic doubts are refuted, then with the help of experiences which establish that some material phenomena do not occur without some others, it may be concluded that the causal relation in its general sense, that is, absolute dependency (not a dependency that is absolute), holds among material existents, and that the material existent, in addition to having a need for a creative cause at the core of its being, is also such that its changes and alterations depend on the fulfillment of various conditions which are provided by other material existents, conditions which, in reality, serve to prepare matter for the acquisition of new existential perfections, even if the previous perfection must then be abandoned.

The Way to the Knowledge of Material Causes

As was indicated, there are many ways with regard to the absolute knowledge of causes and effects, but the way to the knowledge of material causes and effects is limited to empirical proof, that is, proof in which empirical premises have also been employed.

It is sometimes imagined that the repeated observation of two successive phenomena is reason for the first phenomenon to be the cause of the second. That is, empirical premises are used for the establishment of the causation of one material existent for another, in the form: “This phenomenon repeatedly comes into existence following another phenomenon.” Then another premise must be added: “For every two existents which occur in this form, the first is the cause of the second.” The conclusion obtained is that in the case experienced, the first phenomenon is the cause of the second phenomenon. However, as has been shown time and time again, succession or simultaneity are more general than causation, and cannot be considered to be decisive reasons for causation, that is, the major premise of this syllogism is not certain, and therefore neither can its conclusion be certain.

Logicians, when discussing the validity of empirical propositions, have said that the mutual implication (talāzum ) of two phenomena, either constantly or in most cases, indicates the causal relation between them, for persistent or nearly persistent simultaneity cannot be accidental.

Regarding this statement it must be said that, first of all, this proposition implies that something accidental cannot be persistent or nearly persistent, or in technical terms, that compulsion (qaṣr ) which occurs persistently or nearly persistently is impossible. Secondly, it is nearly impossible to establish the persistent or nearly persistent mutual implication of two phenomena, and no experimenter can claim that he has subjected most occurrences of two phenomena to experiment.

Likewise, another principle is sometimes employed to complement this proof, that two similar things will have similar effects. (“Judgment regarding similar cases of what is permissible or impermissible is one.”) Therefore, regarding cases of experimentation, if one observes the occurrence of a phenomenon under certain conditions, one will know that in other conditions which are exactly the same, the above phenomenon will

also occur. In this way the causal relation between [the conditions and the phenomenon] is discovered. However, this principle is not of very much practical efficiency, for the establishment of the complete similarity of two circumstances is no easy task.

It thus seems that the only way to utilize experience in order to establish definitively the causal relation between two given phenomena is to control the conditions for the occurrence of one phenomenon and to observe which of the controlled elements and conditions when changed alters this phenomenon, and with the existence of which conditions the phenomenon remains the same. For example, if in the controlled environment of the laboratory one observes that only with the connection of two given wires, a light bulb is lit, and that it goes out when they are disconnected, one may conclude that the above connection is the condition for the appearance of light in the bulb (transforming the electrical energy into light). If the conditions are precisely controlled, the performance of an experiment a single time will be sufficient. However, since the precise control of the conditions is no easy task, in order to be sure, the experiment is often performed repeatedly.

However, at the same time, it is extremely difficult to establish that the effective cause of the appearance of a phenomenon is the very factors identified in the experimental environment and that no other unidentified and unperceived factor exists. Even more difficult than this is to establish that it is the only factor and is irreplaceable, for there is always the possibility that under other conditions the given phenomenon will occur by means of other factors. Newer and newer discoveries in physics and chemistry confirm this possibility. This is why empirical conclusions will never have the value of the self-evident, and basically cannot produce redoubled certainty (certain beliefs whose contrary is impossible). Hence, the achievements of the empirical sciences will never have the value of the conclusions of pure rational proofs.

We should note that the existence of the mentioned possibilities which prevent the acquisition of redoubled certainty in relation to the principles of the empirical sciences is of no harm for the certainty of the causal relation among material existents, for with simple experiments it can be established that by excluding one phenomenon, another phenomenon will be eliminated. This shows that the first phenomenon is a kind of incomplete cause of the second. For example, with the setting of the sun, the sky becomes dark; and with the absence of water, trees become dry. Thousands of other examples can be observed repeatedly in the daily lives of men. What is difficult is to determine precisely all the factors and conditions which have an effect on the occurrence of a material phenomenon. If one were able to precisely determine all of them, this would not imply a denial of the influence of a supernatural agent, for the performance of an experiment in the case of such an agent is not possible. The existence or nonexistence of a supernatural agent can only be established with pure rational proof.

Lesson Thirty-Five: The Dependence of the Effect on the Cause

The Mutual Implication of Cause and Effect

In consideration of the definitions of cause and effect it is easy to see that not only is the occurrence of the effect impossible without its internal causes (the parts that compose it), but it is impossible without the occurrence of any of the parts of the complete cause, for it is assumed that the existence of the effect is in need of all the parts of the complete cause, and to suppose that it could occur without one of them would mean that it was not in need of it. Of course, in cases where the cause is replaceable, the existence of any of its alternates would suffice, but the assumption of the existence of the effect without any of them is impossible. In cases in which it is imagined that an effect comes into existence without a cause (as in cases of miracles), what really happens is that an unusual, unknown cause replaces the usual and known cause.

On the other hand, in cases in which there is a complete cause, the existence of its effect will be necessitated, for the meaning of complete cause is that everything needed for the effect is satisfied, and the supposition that the effect does not occur would mean that its existence is in need of something else, which is contrary to the original supposition. The assumption that something prevents the occurrence of the effect signifies the absence of the completeness of the cause, for ‘the absence of an impediment’ is also a condition for the occurrence of the effect, and the assumption of the completeness of the cause includes this negative condition. That is, when we say that the complete cause of something has occurred, this means that in addition to the occurrence of the positive existing causes and conditions, an impediment to the occurrence of the effect does not exist.

Some scholastic theologians have imagined that this principle applies specifically to involuntary causes which do not act out of a will, and that in cases of free agents, however, after the occurrence of all the parts of the cause there is still room for the volition and choice of the agent. They fail to observe the fact that rational principles cannot be thus restricted, and that in cases of voluntary action, the will of the agent is one of the parts of the complete cause, and as long as there is no will to carry out the voluntary action, the complete cause is not realized, even if all the other conditions of existence and nonexistence should obtain.

The conclusion is that every cause, complete or incomplete, has relative necessity (wujūb bil-qiyās ) in relation to its effect, and similarly every effect has relative necessity in relation to its complete cause, and these two points may be together referred to as ‘the rule of mutual implication of cause and effect.’

The Simultaneity of Cause and Effect

From the principle of the mutual implication of cause and effect other principles may be derived, among which is the principle of the simultaneity of cause and effect, which may be described as follows. Whenever an effect

is a temporal existent and at least one of the parts of its complete cause is also temporal, the cause and effect will occur simultaneously, and the occurrence of the complete cause will have no temporal distance from the effect. For if it is supposed that some time, no matter how short, elapses after the occurrence of all the parts of the complete cause and the effect occurs after that, this would imply that the existence of the effect is not necessary at that very supposed time, while the implication of the relative necessity of the effect in relation to the complete cause is that the existence of the effect becomes necessary as soon as the cause is complete.

However, this principle does not apply to incomplete causes, for the existence of the effect will not be necessary with the existence of any of them. Rather, even if just one of the parts of the complete cause is absent, the existence of the effect will be impossible, for otherwise the effect would not need the said part.

However, if the cause and effect are immaterial, and neither of them is temporal, in that case their temporal simultaneity would be meaningless. The same goes for the case in which the effect is temporal but the cause is completely immaterial, for the meaning of temporal simultaneity is that two existents occur at the same time, while something completely immaterial does not occur in the temporal realm, and has no temporal relation to any existent. However, such an existent is existentially encompassing in relation to its own effect and present, and the absence of the effect from this cause would be impossible. This subject will become clearer by taking into account the relational character of the effect with regard to its creative cause.

On the other hand, the temporal priority of the effect to any cause, whether complete or incomplete, is impossible, for this would imply that the effect would not be in need of the above-mentioned cause at the moment it takes place, and that the existence of the cause in relation to the effect is not necessary. It is obvious that this principle is specific to temporal existents.

By taking this principle into account, it becomes completely clear that the interpretation of the causal relation as the succession of two phenomena is incorrect, for an implication of succession is the temporal priority of the.cause to the effect. Not only does this have no meaning for immaterial things and creative causes, but it is also impossible for complete causes that include non-temporal elements. The only case to which the principle of succession applies is that of incomplete temporal causes, for which their temporal priority to their effects is possible, such as the occurrence of a person prior to the performance of a task.

On the other hand, it has already been said that the regular succession of two phenomena is not specific to cause and effect, and many phenomena come into existence one after the other without there being any causal relation between them, such as day and night. So the relation between cases of causation and cases of succession is referred to in technical terms as one of ‘generality and specificity in some respects.’

Let it not be left unsaid that the simultaneity of two existents is not confined to causes and their effects. There are many phenomena that occur simultaneously without any causal relation between them. It is even possible

for two phenomena to be persistently simultaneous without any of them being the cause of the other. For example, if a cause brings about two effects, the given effects always come into existence together, while neither of them is the cause of the other. So, the relation between cases of causation and cases of simultaneity is also one of ‘generality and specificity in some respects,’ that is, in some cases there is both simultaneity and causation, such as the complete temporal cause and its effect; while in some other cases causality exists but simultaneity does not, such as immaterial causes and incomplete causes that exist before the occurrence of their effects. In some cases there is simultaneity without causality, such as the simultaneous appearance of light and heat in an electric lamp.

Therefore, the correct interpretation of causation is neither in terms of the succession of two phenomena nor in terms of the simultaneity of two phenomena. Succession and simultaneity cannot even be considered to be implications of cause and effect, nor can the interpretation of causation in terms of them be considered a kind of ‘specific necessity’ for neither of them is specific to cause and effect. Likewise, one cannot consider the interpretation of causation in terms of them to be a kind of ‘general necessity’, for neither of them is true of all cases of cause and effect.  Furthermore, it is basically incorrect to define something in terms of something more general, for such a definition in no way specifies the object defined.

The Persistence of the Effect is also in Need of a Cause

Another principle which can be derived from the mutual implication of cause and effect is that the complete cause must persist for the duration of the effect, for if the effect persists after the destruction of the complete cause, or even after the destruction of one of the parts of the complete cause, this would imply that the existence of the effect would not be in need of its cause during its persistence, while this need is an essential requirement of the existence of the effect of which it can never be divested.

This principle has long been a topic of discussion among philosophers and theologians. The philosophers have always emphasized that the persistence of an effect is also in need of a cause. They have reasoned that the criterion of the need for a cause by an effect is the effect’s whatish contingency, and the whatness of the effect can never be divested of this property. Therefore, it will always be in need of a cause.

The theologians, who for the most part consider the criterion of the need for a cause to be coming into existence (ḥudūth ), or contingency and coming into existence jointly, do not consider the persistence of an effect to be in need of a cause, and it is even reported that some of them held that if it were also possible for God, the Exalted, to perish, this would be of no harm to the existence of the world!! In order to support their position, they have resorted to cases of the persistence of effects after the destruction of their causes, such as the remaining alive of a child after the death of its father, or the remaining of a building after the death of its builder.

In response to them, the philosophers say that the only criterion of the need for a cause by an effect is contingency, not coming into existence and not a combination of contingency and coming into existence. In order to

establish this point, they set forth the following rational analysis: Coming into existence is an attribute of the existence of the effect, and from a rationally analytic point of view, this is posterior to its existence. Existence is subordinate to creation, and creation (ījād ) is posterior to necessity (wujūb ) and being made necessary (ījāb ). Being made necessary pertains to a thing which lacks existence, that is, which has contingent existence. This contingency is the very attribution which is abstracted from the whatness itself, for it is whatness which is equal with respect to existence and nonexistence, and does not have a preponderance for either of them. Hence, the only thing which can be the criterion for the need for a cause is this essential contingency itself, which is inseparable from whatness. For this reason the need of an effect will also be persistent, and the effect will never be without need for a cause.

However, this position, as was indicated earlier, is in conformity with the fundamentality of whatness, and with regard to the fundamentality of existence the criterion for the need for a cause must be sought in the existential characteristics of the effect, that is, as was stated by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, the criterion for the need of an effect for a cause is essential poverty (faqr-e dhātī ) and dependence, in other words, the weakness of its existential level which is inseparable from it. With regard to the cases which the theologians used as evidence for the persisting of an effect after the destruction of its cause, it should be said that that which is destroyed or whose effects are terminated is not a real cause ( ḥaqīqī ), but merely a preparatory cause which in reality is merely an accidental cause for the mentioned effects.

This may be further explained as follows. The building which persists after the death of its builder has a set of real causes, including: the existence-giving cause, internal causes (matter and form), conditions for the existence of the building, such as the arrangement of the building materials in a specific shape and configuration, and a lack of impediments which could result in the separation of these materials. As long as this set of causes persists, the building will also persist. However, if the divine will is not in accord with the persistence of the building, or if the building materials, due to external factors, should decay, or if the conditions which are necessary for the maintenance of the shape of the building should change, then, without a doubt, the building will be ruined. The builder who puts together the building materials is really the preparatory cause for the appearance of this particular situation regarding the building materials. That which is a condition for the existence and persistence of the building is this very particular situation and not the person who by the movement of his hands causes the transference of the building materials and the appearance of the above-mentioned situation. The agency which is superficially related to the building is merely an accidental agency, and the builder’s real agency is with respect to the movement of his own hands, which obey his will. In the absence of the will, the movement would come to a standstill, and naturally, with his own destruction there would be no possibility of its continuation. Likewise, the existence of the child is an effect of its own real causes, which besides the existence-giving cause include specific organic materials with

special qualities which make the body disposed to possess a spirit, and as long as the necessary conditions for the possession of a spirit by the body persist, its life will continue. The father and mother have no role in the persistence of these causes, factors, and conditions. Even their agency in relation to the transference of the sperm and its establishment in the womb is also an accidental agency.

Likewise, the movement of a body, in reality, is the effect of some specific energy, which comes into existence in it, and as long as this agent persists, the motion will also continue. Relating the movement of the body to an external mover is like relating an effect to its preparatory agent which plays no other role than transferring the energy to the body. Moreover, it has become clear that preparatory agents of this kind, which are really accidental agents, are not considered to be parts of the complete cause, and the complete cause is composed of the existence-giving agent, internal causes, and conditions of existence and nonexistence.

Lesson Thirty-Six: The Relations of Cause and Effect

The Homogeneity (Sinkhiyyah) of Cause and Effect

Undoubtedly, not just any effect comes into existence with any cause. Even among successive or simultaneous phenomena there is not always a causal relation. Causation is rather a specific relation among certain existents. In other words, between the cause and effect there must exist a specific relation, which can be termed the homogeneity (sinkhiyyah ) of cause and effect. This principle is also an intuitive proposition which is close to being self-evident, which may be demonstrated by the simplest of internal and external experiences.

However, there is a difference between homogeneity and the relation which is necessary between cause and effect in cases of existence-giving causes on the one hand and material and preparatory causes on the other. In the first case, the characteristics of this homogeneity can be established by rational proof, and its demonstration is as follows: Since the existence of the effect is emanated by the existence-giving cause, which can be put roughly by saying that it gives existence to its own effect, it itself must have that existence which it can then give to its effect. If it did not possess that, it could not grant or emanate it (one who gives something cannot lack it). Noting that granting existence to an effect does not diminish the granter of anything, it becomes clear that it possesses the above-mentioned existence in a more complete form, such that the existence of the effect can be considered its radiance and luminescence.

So, the homogeneity between the existence-giving cause and its effect means that this cause has the perfection of the effect in a more perfect form. If a cause in its own essence did not possess a kind of existential perfection, it would never be able to grant this perfection to its effect. In other words, every effect is produced by its cause which has the perfection of its effect in a more perfect form. This subject becomes more clear with regard to the relational nature of the effect with respect to its existence-giving cause and the special gradation between them, which were established in the previous chapters.

Homogeneity does not exist between material or preparatory causes and their effects, for such causes do not grant or emanate existence. Their influence is limited to alterations in the existence of their effects. With regard to the fact that not just anything can bring about any kind of change, it is summarily obtained that some sort of relation and homogeneity is also necessary between such causes and effects. However, the characteristics of this sort of homogeneity cannot be established by rational proof, rather, it is only through experience that one can discern what sort of things can be the source of what changes, and under what conditions and with the aid of what things these changes are produced.

For example, reason, by means of conceptual analysis, would never be able to discover whether water is simple or is composed of other elements, and if the latter, of what and how many elements it is composed. What conditions are necessary for such a composition? Are these supposed conditions replaceable or not? Hence, it is only by means of experience that

it is possible to establish that water is composed in a special way of two elements, oxygen and hydrogen, that this composition requires a certain temperature and pressure and that an electrical current can speed the process of composition.

The Removal of a Doubt

We have stated that it follows from a rational proof that every existence- giving cause must possess the perfection of its effect, for it is absurd to suppose that the granter lacks that which it grants to another.

With regard to this topic, the following problem may be raised, that an implication of this principle is that existence-giving agents have material existences and their perfections, while an existence-giving agent can only be an immaterial existent which does not have matter or the specific attributes of matter. So how can something emanate that which it itself does not possess?

The answer to this problem is that what is meant by possessing the perfection of an effect is having a more perfect and higher level than the existence of the effect, such that the existence of the effect is considered to be the radiance of the cause, not that the limits of the existence of the effect are exactly preserved in the cause, and not that the cause has the same whatness as the effect. It is clear that the greater perfection of the existence of the cause than the level of the existence of the effect is not compatible with their whatish unity. One can never abstract a single whatness from two existents which have specific gradation, one of which is considered a plane of the existence of the other and its radiance, because what it means for two existents to have a single whatness is that their existential limits correspond to one another. This is impossible in the case of two levels of existence one of which is more perfect than the other, having fewer limitations and imperfections. However, lacking the whatness of the effect and the limits of its existence does not mean lacking its existential perfection. That which is necessary in the case of the existence-giving cause is having the existential perfections of the effect in a more perfect and higher form, not possessing its imperfections and limitations. If the concept of a body and its implications, such as being spatial and temporal, being capable of movement and change, are not true of God, the Exalted, and completely immaterial things, this is because the above-mentioned concepts imply the imperfections and limitations of material existents rather than their perfections.

It should be noted that the solution to this problem became possible by virtue of the fundamentality of existence, and that on the basis of the fundamentality of whatness there would be no correct solution for it, because an implication of the fundamentality of whatness is that that which is in fact emanated from the cause is the external whatness of the effect, and according to this principle the cause must be in possession of this whatness. It cannot be said that the cause has the whatness of the effect in a more perfect form, for such graduation, especially the specific graduation among whatnesses, is meaningless. As was mentioned in Lesson Twenty-Eight, all immaterial whatnesses, especially simple whatnesses, are disparate from one

another. Furthermore, the supposition of a whatness in the case of God, the Exalted, is incorrect.

Unity of an Effect for Unity of a Cause

According to a well-known philosophical principle, from a single cause nothing can be produced but a single effect, (“The one produces nothing other than the one”). However, there are disagreements about the purport of this principle and the cases to which it applies. Among these disagreements is whether by unity of cause is meant individual unity or unity of kind, and whether by unity of cause is meant complete simplicity. For example, there is the meaning chosen by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn in his “Journey of the Soul” in theAsfār , on the basis of which the above-mentioned principle is considered to be specific to the sacred divine essence in the existence of whose essence there is not even analytic complexity, such that the immediate effect of it can only be one existent, and other creatures must be produced by means of one or several intermediaries from this first effect.

Other philosophers have understood this principle to cover other cases more or less as well. Likewise, regarding the concept of ‘production’ (ṣudūr ) there are also differences, such as whether it is true of all causal relations, even conditions and preparatory causes, or whether it is restricted to efficient causes, or whether it is limited to existence-giving causes. In other words, can it be said on the basis of the principle that a preparatory agent cannot have more than one effect, that one condition will have no more than one consequence, and that one natural agent will have no more than one action?

In order to determine the cases to which this principle applies, one should examine carefully the reasons in support of it to discover why it is required. Philosophers have given different kinds of reasons for this principle, but the most clear and at the same time firmest of these is a reason which originates in the principle of homogeneity between cause and effect, which may be expressed as follows: According to the principle of the homogeneity of cause and effect, the cause must possess that which it gives to the effect in a more perfect form. Now, if it is supposed that the cause possesses just onesinkh (root) of existential perfection (i.e., a homogeneity making factor between cause and effect), naturally its effect will possess a lower level of that perfection, not another perfection. If we suppose that two different effects are produced from one such cause, then, according to the mentioned principle, the cause must possess two roots of perfection, while it was assumed that it only possesses one root of existential perfections.

Several conclusions may be derived from a careful study of this argument.

1. This principle is specific to existence-giving causes, since, as was mentioned, this feature, that the cause must possess the perfection of its effect, is specific to existence-giving causes. Therefore, on the basis of this principle one cannot establish that natural agents, that is the reasons for changes and alterations in material things, each have a single effect, or that, for example, there is only one thing which is the condition for the effect of an agent, or that there is only one thing which is the preparatory condition for a capability. For example, heat is a condition for various chemical

actions and reactions, and heat itself comes into existence by means of various natural factors.

2. This principle is not limited to a single individual, for the above reason also includes unity of kind, and if we suppose that one kind of existence- giving cause has several individuals, and that they all possess one root of existential perfection, then naturally, their effects will all be of one kind.

3. This principle is limited to causes which possess only one root of perfection. However, if an existent has several kinds of existential perfection, or all existential perfections in a simple form, that is, if its existence possesses the above perfections with that same unity and simplicity, then this argument will not cover it.

Therefore, the above-mentioned principle does not establish anything more than the principle of the homogeneity between an existence-giving cause and its effect. The unity of the first thing produced cannot be established merely on the basis of this principle, although there is another way to establish this, which will be presented at the appropriate point.

Unity of Cause for Unity of Effect

Another well-known principle is that a single effect cannot be produced by more than a single cause, (“The one is not produced by other than the one”).

Regarding this principle, despite differences, all philosophers agree that a single effect can be produced from a compound cause. So, what is meant by the unity of the cause in the above principle is not simplicity and lack of composition. Furthermore, the production of an effect by several vertical causes, such that each of them is the cause of another, is undeniable. In other words: neither the multiplicity of mediated effects, each of which is the effect of another, nor the multiplicity of mediated causes is contrary to the above principle.

On the other hand, all philosophers agree that an individual effect will have no more than one complete cause; in technical terms, the conjunction of several complete causes for a single effect is impossible, for if all these causes were effective, then necessarily numerous effects would be brought into existence by them, so the effect would not be one. If some of these causes were not effective, this would be contrary to the principle of the mutual implication of cause and effect or the relative necessity (wujūb bil-qiyās ) of the effect with respect to its complete cause.

That over which differences arise regarding this principle is whether one kind of effect must always be produced by one kind of cause, or whether it is possible that some individual cases of a kind of effect may be produced by one kind of cause, while other individual cases of the same kind of effect are produced by another kind of cause. It is here that most people who consider this principle to include unities of kind as well as individual unities, explicitly state that several kinds of causes may effect the appearance of a single type of effect, such as heat, which is sometimes the effect of the radiance of the sun, sometimes of the burning of fire, and sometimes the effect of motion and friction.

However, with regard to what was said about the principle of homogeneity, the existence of the effect may be produced only by a cause

which possesses that samesinkh (root) , an existential perfection at a higher level [than that exhibited by the effect]. An effect will never be produced by an existence-giving cause which lacks thesinkh (root) which is the perfection of the effect. Therefore, in the case of an existence-giving cause and its effect it must be said that not only is it impossible for an individual effect to be produced by two or more individual existence-giving causes, but a single type of effect also cannot be brought into existence by two or more types of existence-giving causes. But in the case of material or preparatory causes, since there is no rational proof for the quality of their homogeneity with their effects, it cannot be established that one kind of effect must have one kind of cause. It is rationally possible that several kinds of material or preparatory causes should have a single kind of effect, as the number of conditions and their determinations cannot be established by rational proof, and all of them depend on experience.

Lesson Eleven: Introduction to Epistemology

The Importance of Epistemology

There is a series of fundamental problems that confront man as a conscious being whose activities spring from his consciousness; and if man becomes negligent and remiss in his efforts to find correct answers to these problems, he will find instead that he has crossed the boundary between humanity and bestiality. Remaining in doubt and hesitation, in addition to the inability to satisfy his truth-seeking conscience, will not enable man to dispel anxieties about his likely responsibilities. He will be left to languish or, as occasionally happens, turn into a dangerous creature. Since mistaken and deviant solutions, such as materialism and nihilism, cannot provide psychological comfort or social well-being. One should look for the fundamental cause of individual and social corruption in aberrant views and thoughts. Hence, there is no alternative but to seek answers to these problems with firm and unflagging resolution. We may spare no effort until we establish a basis for our own human lives and in this way assist others as well, and arrest the influence in society of incorrect thoughts and the deviant teachings which are current.

Now that the necessity of an intellectual and philosophical endeavor has become clear and no room has been left for doubt or uncertainty or hesitancy, it remains for us to take the first step in the mandatory and unavoidable journey upon which we have resolved by facing up to the following question: Is the human intellect able to solve these problems?

This query forms the nucleus about which the problems of epistemology are centered. Until we solve the problems of this branch of philosophy, we will neither be able to be arrive at solutions to the problems of ontology nor to those of the other branches of philosophy. Until the value of intellectual knowledge is determined, claims presented as actual solutions to such problems will be pointless and unacceptable. There will always remain such questions concerning how the intellect can provide a correct solution to these problems.

It is here that many of the well-known figures of Western philosophy, such as Hume, Kant, Auguste Compte, and all of the positivists have blundered. With their incorrect views they have mislaid the cultural foundations of Western societies, and even the scholars of other sciences, especially the behaviorists among psychologists, have been misled by them.  Unfortunately, the battering and ruinous waves of such teachings also have spread to other parts of the world, and apart from the lofty summits and unimpregnable cliffs that rest on the stable and firm grounds of divine philosophy, all else more or less has come under their influence.

Therefore, we must endeavor to take the first steady step by laying the foundations of our house of philosophical ideas solidly and sturdily until, with the help of Almighty God, we are worthy to tread through other stages and arrive at our desired goal.

A Brief Overview of the History of Epistemology

Although epistemology as a branch of philosophy does not have a long history as a separate science, it may be said that the problem of the value of

knowledge, which forms its central axis, has been somehow raised since the most ancient periods of philosophy. Perhaps the attention of thinkers was first drawn to this problem by the discovery of the flaws and defects in the disclosure of external events by the sense organs. This very matter prompted the Eleatics to distrust sensory perception and to rely more heavily on rational knowledge. On the other hand, differences among thinkers pertaining to rational problems and the contradictory proofs set forth by each group to substantiate and corroborate their own ideas and views provided the Sophists with the opportunity to deny the value of rational knowledge. They go so far in this way as basically to doubt and even to deny external realities. After that, the problem of knowledge was not raised seriously until Aristotle compiled the principles of logic as standards for correct thinking and for evaluating proofs. After twenty some odd centuries these principles are still useful. Even the Marxists, after battling for years against it, have finally accepted the human need for a part of this logic.

After the centuries during which Greek philosophy flourished, oscillations appeared in the evaluation of sensory and rational knowledge. There were two other occasions when Europe was faced with the crisis of skepticism. After the period of the Renaissance and the development of the empirical sciences, empiricism gradually came to prevail. At the present empiricism is still the dominant school of thought, although in the midst of this prominent rationalists do appear from time to time.  Virtually the first systematic investigations in epistemology were performed by Leibniz on the continent of Europe, and in England by John Locke In this way an independent branch of philosophy took shape. Locke’s investigations were followed by those of his successors, Berkeley and Hume  Their philosophy of empiricism won fame and gradually the position of the rationalists was weakened to such an extent that Kant, a rationalist, was actually very deeply influenced by the ideas of Hume.

Kant declared the evaluation of knowledge and the ability of reason to be one of the most important duties of philosophy. However, he only accepted the value of the conclusions of theoretical reason within the limits of the empirical sciences, mathematics, and areas subordinate to them. The first blow from among the rationalists was struck against metaphysics, although earlier Hume, a prominent figure amongst the empiricists, had begun a severe attack which would later be followed in a more serious form by the positivists. In this way the precise influence of epistemology in the other fields of philosophy and the reasons underlying the decline of Western philosophy come to light.

Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy

In contrast to the oscillations and crises that developed for Western philosophy, especially in the field of epistemology, such that after the passage of the twenty-five centuries of its lifetime it not only has not acquired a firm and sturdy foundation, but rather it can be said that its support has become ever more unsteady, Islamic philosophy, to the contrary, has continually retained its strength and stability, and has never become the victim of shakiness, upheaval or crisis. Despite some contrary tendencies which have occasionally posed a challenge for Islamic

philosophers, they have maintained their doctrine that the intellect is fundamental for the solution of metaphysical problems.  Without underestimating the importance of the experience of the senses or denying that of the experimental method in the natural sciences, they have persisted in the application of the rational method to philosophical problems. Confrontation with those of opposing views and wrestling with critics, far from making Islamic philosophers weak, has only served to strengthen and increase their abilities. For this reason, the tree of Islamic philosophy has flourished and become more fruitful daily, and has even become resistant and immune to the attacks of its enemies. It is now completely capable of defending its rightful positions and defeating its competitors.

The trends that have more or less been opposed to philosophy have had two main sources. From one quarter there are those who have considered some current philosophical views to conflict with literal interpretations of Scripture and Tradition (sunnah ), and fearing that the propagation of philosophy would weaken religious belief among the people, have opposed such views. On the other hand, the‘urafā (gnostics) have emphasized the importance of the spiritual way, and have feared that philosophical tendencies would lead to the neglect of the path of gnosis and lack of progress on the way of the heart.Hence, they ignored it, claiming that rationalists had wooden feet. 1

One must realize that a true religion like the manifest religion of Islam will never be threatened by the thoughts of the philosophers. Despite whatever shortcomings or deviations they may have, with philosophical development and maturity and after passage from a raw and naive phase, the verities of Islam will come to the fore and its truth will become ever more manifest. Philosophy turns out to be a worthy and an irreplaceable servant [of Islam] on the one hand by explaining its lofty teachings, and on the other hand by defending it from perverse and hostile schools of thought, as it has done and shall continue to do in an ever improved manner, God willing.

Spiritual and gnostic wayfaring is by no means in conflict with divine philosophy; rather it has been assisted [by such philosophy] and has also profited from it. It must be admitted that on the whole this sort of conflict has been useful for preventing one-sidedness and extremism, and for demarcating the bounds of each of them.

Because of the sturdy, steadfast and unshakable position of the intellect in Islamic philosophy, no need has arisen for a detailed examination of the problems of knowledge in a methodical and systematic form as an independent branch of philosophy. Merely a few scattered issues pertaining to knowledge, addressed in various chapters of logic and philosophy, have sufficed, for example, in one section pertaining to the teachings of the Sophists where their invalidity is pointed out, and in another section where the divisions of the sciences and their principles are explained. Even the problem of mental existence, which is one of the topics germane to the problems of knowledge, was not advanced as an independent topic until Ibn Sīnā Even after that, all angles and sides of the issue have not been comprehensively examined and researched.

Now, considering the current conditions, when Western thought has almost penetrated our cultural environs raising questions about many of the axioms of divine philosophy, philosophical questions can no longer be limited to their former framework, and the discussion can no longer be carried on in the traditional manner. Since this manner has not only prevented the development of philosophy through interchange with other schools of thought, but also has made our intellectuals, who inevitably have become and will continue to become familiar with Western thought, pessimistic about Islamic philosophy, bringing about the illusion that Islamic philosophy has lost its effectiveness and is unable to compete with other philosophical schools. Hence, day by day, their tendency toward foreign culture increases, with disastrous results. This situation could be seen during the previous regime in our universities.

To repay our debt to the Islamic Revolution and the sacred blood which has been shed for it, and to fulfill our divine responsibility we should increase our efforts to explain the foundations of philosophy and propagate them in such a way that they may answer the doubts posed by the perverted and atheistic schools of thought, and we should support the current needs for belief and make it available to young seekers of truth and investigators, so that the education of Islamic philosophy can spread, and so Islamic culture may be insured against the encroachments of alien·ideas.

The Definition of Epistemology

Before we begin to define epistemology (shinākht shināsī ) it is necessary to comment on the wordshinākht (knowledge).2 This word, which is equivalent toma‘rifah in Arabic, has various usages. Its most general meaning is knowledge in general, awareness and information. Sometimes it is used for particular perception, and sometimes for recognition. Sometimes it is employed for science which corresponds to reality with certainty. There are some debates in philology and etymology about the foreign synonyms which need not be mentioned here.

Knowledge as the subject of the science of epistemology may be understood as having any of these meanings or any other. In fact, it is based on convention. But since the goal of surveying epistemological problems is not particular to any specific kind of knowledge, it is better to use that general meaning which is equivalent to knowledge in a general sense.

The concept of knowledge is one of the clearest and most self-evident concepts, so that it not only is in need of no definition, but its definition is impossible, since there are no more obvious terms by which to define it.

The phrases and statements which are used in philosophical and logical books as definitions of knowledge and science are not genuine definitions. The purpose of mentioning them is to specify its instances in some specific science or field of study. For example, logicians define knowledge as “the obtaining of the form of something in the mind,” and the purpose of this definition is to specify their intended instance which is “acquired knowledge”. Or it refers to the view concerning certain problems of ontology of some philosophers who define knowledge as “the presence of a non-material being to another non-material being,” or “the presence of a thing to a non-material existent.” The purpose of these definitions is to state

their view about the non-material nature of knowledge and the knowing subject.

If we are to explain knowledge, it is better to say that it is the presence of the thing itself or its particular form or its general concept in a non-material existent. In addition, we should say that it is not necessary for knowledge that the knower always should be other than the object known. It is possible, as in the case of awareness of one’s own self, that there be no difference between the knower and the object of knowledge. In fact in such casesunity is the most perfect instance ofpresence .· By the definition we have presented of the wordknowledge we may define epistemology as ‘the science which discusses human knowledge and the evaluation of its types and the criteria of their validity.’

References

1 The way of the rationalists, according to the sūfīs, such as Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207-1273), is artificial, like that of one who would walk with crutches, or like that of the blind man who walks with a cane. See theMathnavī , Bk. 1, 2128. (Tr.)

2 The Fārsī word used for epistemology in this text isshinākht-shināsī , both halves of which are derived from the verbshinākhtan , which means ‘to know’ in the sense of being acquainted with, as in the Germankennen , as opposed towissen . Today, the termma‘rifat shināsī has gained wider currency in Iran. (Tr.)

Lesson Twelve: The Self-Evidence of the Principles of Epistemology

The Nature of the Dependence of Philosophy on Epistemology

Understanding the concept of knowledge in a broad sense which includes every kind of awareness and perception, many topics of epistemology could be presented, some of which do not formally come under this science, such as those concerning revelation, inspiration, and the kinds of mystical disclosure and intuition. However, one problem which is usually included for discussion in this branch of philosophy pivots about the senses and the intellect. But we cannot discuss all of these issues here, for our principal aim is to explain the value of intellectual perception and to affirm the truth of philosophy and the validity of its rational methods. For this reason, we shall only present those topics which are useful for metaphysics and theology, and incidentally for some other areas of philosophy such as philosophical psychology and philosophical ethics.

At this point it is possible to raise the question of what are the basic premises which support epistemology, and in what way they can be confirmed. The answer is that epistemology is in no need of borrowed axioms for its subjects, for its issues can be clarified solely on self-evident primary grounds (badīhiyyāt awwaliyyah ).

Another question which may be raised is this: If the solutions to the problems of ontology and other sciences which are arrived at by rational methods depend upon whether or not the intellect has the capacity to solve these sorts of problems, doesn’t that imply that first philosophy [metaphysics] also is in need of the science of epistemology to provide the basic axioms of philosophy, although it is said that philosophy has no need for any other science?

Elsewhere we have indicated the answer to this question. Here we present a more precise answer. First, the premises directly needed by metaphysics are really self-evident judgments and have no need of proof, and the explanations regarding these judgments given in the science of logic or epistemology are in truth expository, clarifying rather than argumentative. That is, they are a means to direct the attention of the mind toward a truth which the intellect understands without need for reasons. The reason for discussing this kind of judgment in these sciences is that misconceptions have arisen about them which turn into doubts, as in the case of the most self-evident of judgments, that is, the impossibility of contradiction, leading some even to imagine that contradiction is not only not impossible, but that it underlies all reality!

Doubts which have arisen about the value of rational knowledge are cut from the same cloth. It is to address these doubts and to remove these misconceptions from the mind that these discussions are undertaken. Really, the inclusion of these judgments among the topics of logic or epistemology is a digression, an indulgence, or condescension for the sake of those who harbor suspicions. If someone did not accept the value of rational knowledge, albeit unconsciously, how could one argue with him on the

basis of rational proof?! Even the arguments advanced in favor of such doubts would be of a rational nature (note carefully).

Secondly, the need of philosophy for the principles of logic and epistemology is an application of knowledge to knowledge. To explain, someone whose mind has not been poisoned by doubt can reason to a certain conclusion with respect to most topics, and his reasoning would be in accord with logical principles without the need for attending to them and without knowing, for instance, that his reasoning accords with the first form of the syllogism and the conditions that govern it, or without being aware that there is an intellect which understands these premises and which accepts the validity of the conclusion that follow from them. On the other hand, it is possible that some, in order to refute rationalism or metaphysics may employ reasoning and be unaware of the rational metaphysical premises they use, or in order to refute the rules of logic they may base their reasoning on the rules of logic, or even in order to invalidate the inviolability of the law of contradiction, they may resort to this very principle without being aware of it, and if they were told, ‘This reasoning of yours is both valid and invalid,’ they would become annoyed and regard this as mockery.

Thus, in reality, the dependence of philosophical reasoning on the principles of logic or the principles of epistemology is not the sort of need that the sciences have for the posited principles of their subjects. Rather it is a secondary need involving the dependence of the principles of these sciences upon themselves; that is, it is the need for reconfirmation in science, for acquiring further confirmation for these judgments, as in the case of the self-evident propositions concerning which it is said that they depend on the impossibility of a contradiction. It is clear that the dependence of self-evident propositions on this principle is not of the same kind as the dependence of speculative propositions on self-evident propositions, otherwise the difference between self-evident and speculative propositions would not remain, and at least one proposition, the principle of non-contradiction, has to be accepted as being self-evident.

The Possibility of Knowledge

Every rational person is of the belief that he does know things, and that he can know things. Hence he makes an effort to acquire information concerning matters of his needs or interests, and the best sign of this sort of effort is what scientists and philosophers have done by bringing about the various fields of the sciences and philosophy. Hence the possibility and actuality of science is not something that any rational person whose mind has not been confounded by doubt would deny or even have reservations about. That which is open to discussion or examination and which it is reasonable to disagree about is identification of the frontiers of human knowledge and specification of the means of acquiring certain knowledge, and the way to distinguish correct from incorrect thought, and matters of this kind.

As has been indicated in previous discussions, in Europe, dangerous waves of skepticism have repeatedly appeared, and even great thinkers have been swallowed by it. The history of philosophy remembers schools of

thought which absolutely have denied knowledge, such as sophism, skepticism, and agnosticism. The best explanation of the absolute denial of knowledge (if this charge is correct) is that its victims were afflicted by a severe form of over scrupulousness, a state which affects some people with regard to various other matters as well. Actually it should be considered a kind of mental illness. In any event, without going into a historical investigation concerning the existence of such people and inquiring into the motivation behind such views or the verity of their ascription to those who are claimed to have held them, we take them as doubts or questions that require an answer suitable to philosophical discussion, leaving the subject of historical fact to be decided by historical research.

A Survey of the Claims of the Skeptics

That which has been reported of the statements of the sophists and the skeptics may be divided from one angle into two parts: one having to do with what they have said about existence and being, and the other concerning what they have expressed about science and knowledge. That ْis, their statements have two aspects: one aspect concerns the subject of ontology, while the other pertains to epistemology. For example, the remark is attributed to one of the most extreme of the sophists, Gorgias : “Nothing exists, and if there were anything, it could not be known, and even there were knowledge of being, this knowledge could not be communicated to others.” The first phrase of this remark is about being, which must be discussed in the section on ontology, but the second phrase is relevant to the present discussion, epistemology, and so, naturally, it is this second phrase which we shall proceed to discuss, while the first phrase will be examined in the discussions of ontology.

First, this point must be mentioned: all who would doubt everything will not be able to doubt their own existence, the existence of their doubt, nor their perceptual faculties, such as the power of sight and hearing, and the existence of mental forms and their own psychological states. If someone even expresses doubts about these cases, he is either sick, and must be cured, or he is lying and expresses evil intentions, and so must be corrected and reprimanded. Likewise, someone who speaks and discusses or writes books cannot doubt the existence of a party to the discussion, or the existence of the paper or the pen with which he writes. At the extreme it might be said that I perceive all these things within myself but I doubt their existence in the external world. As would appear from the statements of Berkeley and some other idealists, they accepted all objects of perception as mere forms within the mind, and denied their external existence. However, they accepted the existence of other people who have minds and perceptions. This view is not an absolute denial of knowledge and existence, but a denial of material existents, and their doubt amounts to one in relation to some of the objects of knowledge.

Now, if someone claims that no certain knowledge is possible, the question will be put to him as to whether he knows this, or whether he also has some doubt about it. If he says that he knows it, then at least one thing that is certainly known has been admitted, and his own claim has been

violated. If he says that he does not know it, this means that it is possible that he grants the likelihood of certain knowledge. In other words, his own speech has been shown to be invalid. However, if someone says that he has doubts about the possibility of knowledge and definite knowledge claims, it will be asked of him whether he knows that he has such doubts or not. If he answers that he knows that he has such doubts, then not only the possibility but the ْactuality of knowledge has been admitted. If, however, he says that he also has doubts about his very own doubts, this very speech is either caused by illness or bad intention, and requires a non-theoretical response.

In response to those who advocate the relativity of all knowledge, who claim that no proposition is valid absolutely, universally and eternally, one may ask such a person whether that claim itself is valid absolutely, universally and eternally, or whether it is relative, particular, and temporary. If it holds always, and in all cases, and with no qualification or condition, then it is true. Then at least one proposition which is absolute, universal and eternal has been proved. If this knowledge itself is also relative this means that in some cases it is not valid, and in the cases where it does not hold there are propositions which are absolute, universal and eternal.

The Rejection of the Doubts of the Skeptics

One of the doubts upon which the sophists and skeptics rely and which they have expressed in various forms and by presenting different examples is the following: Sometimes one acquires certainty about the existence of something by means of the senses, but afterwards he comes to realize that a mistake has been made. Thus one comes to know that sensory perception is not necessarily reliable. It follows that the likelihood arises that my other sensory perceptions may also be mistaken, and the day may come when their error will also become apparent. Likewise sometimes a person finds a principle to be certain on rational grounds, but afterwards he finds that his reasoning was incorrect, and his certainty is transformed into doubt. Thus it becomes known that intellectual reasoning is also not necessarily reliable. In the same way the probability of error infects other intellectual perceptions. The conclusion is that neither sensation nor reason are reliable. Nothing remains for man but doubt.

The response would be as follows:

1. The purpose of this argument is to arrive at the validity of skepticism and the knowledge of its truth through reasoning, and at least to get the other party to the discussion to accept your point, that is, you expect that he will attain knowledge of the validity of your claims, while you maintain that the attainment of knowledge is absolutely impossible.

2. The discovery of error in sensory and intellectual perceptions implies the knowledge that these perceptions do not conform to reality. This necessarily implies that we accept the existence of knowledge of the error of perception.

3. Another implication is that we know that there is a reality with which our mistaken perception does not accord, otherwise there would be no concept of the error of perception.

4. Another implication is that it must be known to us that the mistaken perception itself and its mental form are contrary to actuality.

5. Finally, the existence of the one who errs, as well as his senses and intellect must be accepted.

6. This reasoning itself is a rational argument (however fallacious) and to rely upon it is to consider the intellect and its perceptions to be reliable.

7. In addition to this, other knowledge is assumed here, and that is that mistaken perceptions, being in error, cannot be true. So, the skeptic’s argument itself implies the acceptance of several instances of knowledge, and so how can one deny the possibility of knowledge absolutely, or even doubt it?!

All of these answers refute the argument of the skeptics. In analyzing it and exposing its fallacy we prove the validity and error of sensory perception by the help of reasoning. However, as has also been said, it is not true that the discovery of error in intellectual perceptions also infects all other intellectual perceptions, because the possibility of error may only enter speculative, or other than self-evident, perceptions. But the self-evident propositions of the intellect which are the basis of philosophical proofs do not admit of error at all, and the explanation of their infallibility will be presented in Chapter Lesson Nineteen.

Lesson Thirteen: The Divisions of Knowledge

In Search of the Cornerstone of Knowledge

It was mentioned in the previous lesson that some knowledge and perceptions are completely indubitable. Furthermore, the reasons given by the skeptics to justify their perverted views based on their absolute denial of knowledge embody and necessitate several instances of knowledge. On the other hand, we know that not all our ‘knowledge’ and beliefs are true or correspond to reality, and furthermore, in many cases we ourselves notice some falsehoods. In view of these two points, the questions arise as to the differences among the varieties of human perceptions, such that some of them are infallible and indubitable while others are fallible and doubtable, and how we might distinguish between them. It is a well-known matter that Descartes tried to found an unshakable philosophy in order to combat skepticism, and he used the indubitability of doubt itself as the cornerstone of his philosophy. Furthermore, the existence of the ego of the doubter and thinker is a corollary based on that foundation. He introduced clarity and distinctness as the criterion of indubitability, which he made a standard for distinguishing correct from incorrect ideas. He also attempted to employ a mathematical approach to philosophy, and in fact sought to introduce a new logic..

We are not presently in a position to evaluate Descartes’ philosophy, or to examine the degree to which he was successful at the task he set for himself. We shall only mention the point that to begin with doubt as a starting point for arguing with the skeptics is reasonable, as was seen in the previous lesson. However, if someone were to imagine that nothing is quite so clear and certain, and that even the existence of the doubter must be inferred from the doubt, this would not be valid. Rather the existence of the aware and thinking ego is at least as clear and indubitable as the existence of the doubt itself which is one of its states..

Likewise, ‘clarity and distinctness’ cannot be considered the major criterion for distinguishing correct from incorrect ideas, for this criterion by itself is not sufficiently clear and distinct and free from ambiguity, and is not a serious and crucial measure, and consequently cannot divulge the secret of the infallibility of certain kinds of perceptions. To be sure, other views of Descartes could be argued at great length, but such an examination would be outside the scope of the present study..

The First Division of Science

The first division of knowledge to be considered is that between (1) the knowledge which is known directly of the essence (dhāt )1 of the known object, in which the real and genuine existence of the object of knowledge is disclosed to the knowing subject or the percipient, and (2) the knowledge in which the external existence of its object is not observed and witnessed by the knower; rather he becomes aware of it by the mediation of something which represents it, which is termed its ‘form’ (ṣūrat ) or ‘mental concept’ (mafhūm dhihnī ). The first kind is called ‘presentational knowledge’ or ‘knowledge by presence’ (‘ilm ḥuḍūrī ) and the second kind is called

‘acquired knowledge’ (‘ilm ḥuṣūlī ), [that is, knowledge acquired by conceptual representation].

The division of knowledge into these two kinds is rational, comprehensive and exclusive, and in this regard no third state can be supposed besides these two; that is, there is no knowledge other than knowledge which is of these two kinds. Either there is an intermediary between the person who knows and the essence of the known object, by means of which the awareness is obtained, in which case the knowledge is called ‘acquired,’ or such an intermediary does not exit, and in that case there will be ‘knowledge by presence.’ However, the existence of these two kinds of knowledge in man needs to be explained.

Knowledge by Presence

The knowledge and awareness that every one has of himself as a perceiving existent is a knowledge which cannot be denied. Even the sophists who considered man to be the measure of all things did not deny the existence of man himself and the knowledge man has of himself.

Of course, this means that man himself, his very ego, is a perceiver, a thinker, who by internal witnessing (shuhūd ) is aware of himself, not by means of sensation or experience nor by forms or mental concepts. In other words, he himself is the knowledge, and in this knowledge and awareness there is no plurality or otherness between knowledge, the knower, and the known object. As was previously mentioned, ‘the unity of the knower and the known’ is the most perfect instance of ‘the presence of the known object to the knower’. However, awareness of man by color, shape, and other characteristics of the body is not like this, but is acquired through sight, touch, and the other senses, and by means of mental forms.

Within the body there are numerous internal organs of which we are not aware, unless we come to know of them by means of their signs and effects, or we become aware of them by learning anatomy, physiology, and other biological sciences.

Likewise, this means that such knowledge is simple and unanalyzable, not such as the propositions, “I am,” or “I exist,” which are composed of several concepts. Thus, the meaning of ‘self-knowledge’ is this very intuitive, simple and direct awareness of our own souls. This knowledge and awareness is an essential characteristic of this ‘self-knowledge’. This is proved in its own appropriate place [in this book], that the soul is immaterial, and that every non-material substance is aware of itself. These topics are related to ontology and philosophical psychology, consequently this is not the place to discuss them.

Our awareness of our psychological states, sentiments and passions are cases of direct presentational knowledge. When we become frightened we become directly aware of this psychological state without any intermediary, without the mediation of any form or mental concept. When we are affectionate toward someone or something, we find this inclination within ourselves. When we make a decision to do something, we are aware of our decision and will. To be afraid of something, or to like something, or to decide to do something without awareness of the fear, or affection, or will is meaningless. For the same reason, the existence of our doubts or

suppositions is undeniable. No one can claim that he is unaware of his own doubt, and that he doubts the existence of his doubt!

Another instance of knowledge by presence is the knowledge the self has of its perceptive and motor faculties. The awareness the self has of its ability to think or imagine or of its motor abilities is presentational knowledge and is direct. These things are not known by means of forms or mental concepts. For this reason one never makes a mistake about their employment. For example, one never uses the perceptive faculty instead of one’s motor abilities, and one never uses one’s ability to move instead of thinking about something. Among the things known by presence are the forms and mental concepts themselves, which are not known to the self through the mediation of other forms and concepts. If it were necessary for knowledge of anything to be obtained by means of forms and mental concepts, one would have to know every mental form by means of some other form, and knowledge of that form also by means of another form. In this way, for everything you knew you would have to know an infinite number of other things and have an infinite number of other mental forms.

It is possible that a question might be raised here, for if presentational knowledge is the thing known itself, then it becomes necessary that mental forms will be both presentational knowledge and acquired knowledge. For these forms in one respect will be known by presence, so they themselves will be knowledge by presence itself. In another respect, it is supposed that they are cases of acquired knowledge of external things. So, how is it possible that one knowledge can be both presentational knowledge and acquired knowledge?

The answer is that mental forms have the property of mirroring outer forms and representing external things, and as they are means for knowing external things, they are considered as cases of acquired knowledge. With respect to the fact that they are present before the self, and the self is directly aware of them, they count as presentational knowledge. These two respects are different from one another: the respect of their being present is the self’s direct awareness of them, and the respect of their being acquired is their representing external things.

In order to explain this further we shall attend to the analogy of the mirror. We are able to observe a mirror in two independent ways. One way is that of one who wants to buy a mirror, who looks at both sides of it to see that it is not broken or defective. The other way is that of one who uses the mirror, as when we look at the mirror to see our face, and although we look at the mirror, our attention is to our own face, not to the mirror.

Mental forms can also be independently attended to by the self, and in this case we say that they are perceived by presentational knowledge. They can also be a means by which external things or persons may be known, and in this case we say that they are cases of acquired knowledge. It should be noted that the point of this explanation is not to distinguish the two cases temporally; rather the point is to distinguish two respects, without entailing that a mental concept, in so far as it is a case of acquired knowledge of an external object, should not also be known by the self or lack the respect of presence to the self.

The Reason Behind the Infallibility of Presentational Knowledge:

By attending to the explanation given about presentational knowledge and acquired knowledge and the difference between them, it becomes known why the knowledge of the self and knowledge of the states of the self and likewise other cases of knowledge by presence are fundamentally infallible, for in these cases it is the reality itself which is observed. To the contrary, in cases of acquired knowledge, forms and mental concepts play an intermediate role, and possibly there may not be complete correspondence with external things and persons.

In other words, error in perception is imaginable when there is an intermediary between the perceiving person and the perceived entity, and knowledge is realized by means of it. In this case the question arises as to whether this form or concept which mediates between the perceiving subject and the perceived object and plays the role of reflecting the perceived object represents the perceived object precisely and corresponds to it perfectly or not. Unless it is proved that this form and concept corresponds precisely to the perceived object certainty will not be acquired with respect to the validity of the perception. However, in the case that the thing or person perceived is present before the perceiver without any intermediary with its own very existence, or is united with it, no error can be supposed, and one cannot ask whether the knowledge corresponds with what is known or not, for in this case the knowledge is the known itself.

Furthermore, the meaning of truth and error in perception now become clear. Truth is the perception which corresponds to reality and completely reveals it. Error is the belief which does not correspond to reality.

The Concomitance of Acquired Knowledge with Presentational Knowledge

Here we should mention an important point, namely that the mind always takes a picture of what is present to it like an automatic machine. From these it gets specific forms and concepts and then analyzes and interprets them. For example, when one becomes afraid his mind takes a photo of the state of fear which it can remember after the state has left. Furthermore, it apprehends its universal concept and by appending other concepts projects it as a proposition such as ‘I am afraid,’ or ‘I have fear,’ or ‘Fear exists in me.’ It interprets the appearance of this psychological state with a marvelous alacrity on the basis of its previous knowledge and identifies its cause.

This entire mental process, which is accomplished so quickly, is distinct from the state of fear and its presentational knowledge. However, simultaneity with knowledge by presence is often the source of a mistake, and one fancies that since he finds fear with knowledge by presence he also comes to know its cause with knowledge by presence, but that which was apprehended with knowledge by presence is simple, without any form or concept and also devoid of any interpretation whatsoever, and that is why it allows no room for error. To the contrary, the simultaneous interpretation is from acquired perceptions which by themselves provide no guarantee of truth and correspondence to reality. With this explanation it becomes clear

why and how mistakes occur in some cases of acquired knowledge. For example, a person feels hungry and thinks that he needs food, but this is a false appetite and he does not really need to have a meal. The reason is that that which has been perceived with the infallible presentational knowledge was that specific feeling, which was accompanied by a mental interpretation based on comparison with previous feelings according to which the cause of the feeling must be a need for food. This comparison, however, is incorrect and because of it an error occurs in specifying the cause and providing a mental interpretation. The errors which occur in gnostic disclosures are also of this sort. Hence, it is necessary to be completely precise in specifying presentational knowledge and to distinguish it from its accompanying mental interpretations in order not to err as a result of this confusion.

Gradation in Knowledge by Presence

Another noteworthy point is that all cases of presentational knowledge are not equal with respect to intensity or weakness. Rather, sometimes knowledge by presence is adequately powerful and intense to come to one’s consciousness, while at other times it is so weak and pale that one is only semiconscious or even unconscious of it..

Sometimes the difference among the levels of knowledge by presence are caused by difference in the levels of existence of the perceiving subjects, that is, to the extent that the self is weak with respect to the degree of existence, his presentational knowledge will also be weak and pale.

To the extent that the degree of his existence is more perfect, his knowledge by presence will be more perfect and more conscious. This explanation depends on explanation of the gradation of existence and of the degrees of perfection of the self, which are to be proved in another area of philosophy, but here we can accept that on the basis of these two principles it is possible for presentational knowledge to be intense or weak.

Knowledge by presence of psychological states also can have other forms of intensity and weakness. For example, when a sick person who is suffering from pain and who perceives this pain with knowledge by presence, sees a close friend and turns his attention to him, he no longer perceives the pain. To the contrary, in times of solitude, and especially in the dark of night in which there is nothing else to which he can pay attention, he feels the pain more intensely, and the cause of this is the intensity of his attention.

Differences in the degrees of presentational knowledge may effect the mental interpretations associated with the degrees of intensity and weakness. For example, although a self at the lowest levels has presentational knowledge of itself, it is possible that due to the weakness of this knowledge it may imagine that the relation between the self and the body is the relation of identity, concluding that the reality of the self is this very material body or the phenomena related to it, but when a more perfect degree of knowledge by presence is achieved, and in other words, when the substance of the self is perfected, such a mistake will no longer occur.

Likewise, in its proper place it is proved that man has presentational knowledge of his Creator, but due to weakness of the degree of existence and also due to the attention given to the body and material things, this

knowledge becomes unconscious. However, with the perfection of the self and decrease in attention to the body and material things and the strengthening of attention of the heart to God, the Exalted, this same knowledge will reach the stage of clarity and consciousness, until one says: “Is there any manifestation of [something] other than You and not of You?”2