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Lesson Forty-Nine: The Reality of Knowledge

Introduction

Many issues, most of which have to do with epistemology, can be raised regarding knowledge, and in this book, as well, the most important of them were mentioned in the part on epistemology. However, other discussions of knowledge are also possible from an ontological perspective, and philosophers have mentioned these in various places in their philosophical discussions. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn has set discussions about knowledge as an independent topic. Among these discussions is that of the immateriality of knowledge and the knower, which is appropriate to discussion of the ‘immaterial and material,’ and for this reason we mention it in this section, and following this, we take up the problem of the unity of the knower and the known.

Regarding the ontology of knowledge several questions may be raised, such as, what is the reality of knowledge and whether all types of knowledge have a single whatness, or at the very least, whether they all belong to a single specific category, and whether all types of knowledge are immaterial or whether they are all material, or are some of them immaterial and others material?

In order to answer such questions it is first necessary to take a glance at the types of knowledge, which were discussed to some extent in the part on epistemology.

A Review of the Types of Knowledge

Awareness of an existent is either obtained without the intermediary of a form or concept, in which case it is called ‘presentational knowledge,’ or it occurs through the intermediary of a sensory or imaginary form or through a rational or prehensive (wahmī ) concept, in which case it is called ‘acquired knowledge’ and is specific to souls attached to matter. A level of the existence of the soul called ‘mind’ (dhin ) is considered to be like a receptacle for acquired knowledge, and mind is said to have various levels and aspects. Some of its levels oversee others, so that the lower levels obtain judgments concerning external reality in relation to the mind and another knowledge corresponding to this is then obtained, as discussed in Lesson Nineteen.

Human awareness of a single real state of affairs (nafs al-amr ) is reflected in the mind in the form of a proposition, the simplest form of which is a predicative proposition which in turn may be divided into simple existential propositions (halliyyah basīṭah ), compound propositions (halliyyah murakkabah ), and other sorts of propositions.

In a predicative proposition there are at least two mental concepts, one of which is the subject and the other the predicate, and man takes into consideration the relation between them and makes a judgment of establishment (thubūt ) for affirmative propositions ( qaḍiyyah mūjabah ) or of absence of establishment for negative propositions, although there are differences of opinion in this field which were indicated in Lesson Fourteen.

Judgment or assertion (in technical terms) is obtained when a person believes in the purport of the proposition, even if the belief is mere opinion.

The belief of a person does not always correspond to reality, and sometimes one may have beliefs about which one is convinced and definite but which are contrary to reality, cases of which are called compound ignorance.

Considering these points, acquired knowledge may be investigated along various lines, and each case may be discussed separately, but that which is usually taken up as a topic of discussion is the immateriality of perception, especially rational perception.

The Reality of Knowledge by Presence

In presentational knowledge, the essence of the known is present to the knower, and the knower perceives a entified existence, and this perceiving is not something external to the essence of the knower, but rather is an aspect of his existence, and is similar to the analytical accidents of a body which are considered to be aspects of its existence. In other words, just as extension is not something separate from the existence of a body, but is a concept which the mind obtains through its own analysis, so too, knowledge by presence does not have an existence separate from the existence of the knower. The concepts of knowledge and knower are obtained through mental analysis of the existence of the knower. An instance of it in the case of God Almighty is His Sacred Essence, which is neither substance nor accident, and in the case of creatures, is their rational or spiritual substance itself. Naturally, such knowledge will be neither an accident nor a quality.

Knowledge by presence may be divided into kinds, about some of which all of the Islamic philosophers are in agreement, and there is disagreement about others.

To explain, the known in presentational knowledge is sometimes the essence of the knower himself, such as self-knowledge in the case of souls and complete immaterial existents. In these cases the knower and the known do not have numerically different existences, and the difference between being the knower and being the known is respectival (i‘tibarī ) and will depend on mental respect. This is the kind of knowledge by presence about which there is general agreement among philosophers, including the Peripatetics and the Illuminationists. Sometimes the knower and known have numerically distinct existences, but not in the sense that one of them is completely separate and independent of the other, but is the very dependence and relation to the other, such as the knowledge of the existence-giving cause for its effect and vice versa. In this way two other kinds of presentational knowledge are obtained, one is the knowledge of the emanating cause for its effect and the other is the knowledge of the effect for the cause.

These two kinds are accepted by the Illuminationists and by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and his followers. All of them agree that the effect’s presentational knowledge of its cause is specific to immaterial effects, for material existence is diffusion itself in the realm of space and time, and has no presence by which to perceive the essence of its cause. However, with regard to the cause’s presentational knowledge of its effect, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and some of his followers believed that in this case as well, the effect must be immaterial, and that basically knowledge about material existence insofar as it is material is not obtained, for particulars diffused in

time and space have no presence that the essence of the knower might perceive. However, others such as Muḥaqqiq Sabzavārī, do not accept this condition for this kind of knowledge. They hold that the absence of material particulars from one another is not incompatible with their having a presence in relation to an existent which existentially encompasses them, as the diffusion of temporal existents in the realm of time is not incompatible with their collection in relation to the realm of perpetuity (dahr ) and the existents encompassing time, and this is the correct position.

A fourth kind of knowledge by presence is also imaginable, and this is the knowledge of one another of two immaterial effects at the same level, but to establish that there is such a kind of knowledge by proof is difficult. It is to be concluded that in all the kinds of knowledge by presence, knowledge is the essence of the knower himself and is immaterial, and naturally it is not a kind of psychic accident or quality, although it is possible for the known to be a substance or an accident, and according to the endorsed position, will be either immaterial or material.

The Nature of Acquired Knowledge

Without a doubt, knowledge in the sense of definite belief, as opposed to opinion and doubt, is nevertheless similar to opinion and doubt in that it is a mental state or quality, and like other types of mental qualities, it is devoid of matter, for it does not make sense to suppose that a material accident occurs in an immaterial subject. However, judgment about knowledge in the sense of logical propositions and their parts, requires further attention, for as was indicated, a proposition is composed of different parts which generally cannot all be considered psychic qualities. Perhaps the reason for differences of opinion among some philosophers is that in some cases they consider one part of a proposition and in other cases another.

In any case, the pillars of a predicative proposition, which are its subject and predicate, are two independent concepts, each of which is separately conceivable and without need of conceiving something else. But the case is different regarding relation and judgment, for they cannot occur without conceiving the subject and predicate, and their concepts have prepositional and relative meanings. On the other hand, the concept of subject and predicate refer to substances and accidents, essences and objective attributes and states of affairs (nafs al-amr ). However, relation is something related to the one who relates, and does not refer to an objective instance. Likewise, judgment is the activity of the one who judges, and can only refer to a kind of unity or union between the instance of the subject and the instance of the predicate, but it itself does not have an instance in the external world. (Take note. )

For this reason it may be said that relating something to another thing is a mental activity, and the soul is the creative agent of the relation. Likewise, the judgment upon which the strength of a proposition rests and by means of which an assertive proposition becomes distinct from a mere collection of ideas is the action of the soul. However, the idea of the subject or of the predicate does not depend on the action of the soul, and it is possible that it may appear in the mind involuntarily, although it requires a kind of attention of the soul.

It may be concluded that the dependence of relation and judgment on the soul is a ‘productive dependence’ (qiyām ṣudūrī ); however, the dependence of the idea of the subject and predicate may be considered a ‘dissolving dependence’ (qiyām ḥulūlī ), and their existence can be interpreted as a kind of ‘impression in the mind.’ However, it must be noted that this impression and engraving is not like the drawing of a picture on paper or some other material subject; rather it is a quality of the soul, and is immaterial. For material accidents have a relation of position to their subjects, are ostensible by the senses, and are divisible subordinate to their subjects, while such things are not possible for the soul and things pertaining to it.

The productive dependence of relation and judgment [on the soul], though by itself not a reason for their being immaterial, nevertheless, observing that existence is parasitic on the existence of the subject and predicate, their immateriality is also established. In addition to this, their indivisibility is the best reason for their being immaterial.

The Immateriality of Perception

Reviewing the types of knowledge and observing the unity of knowledge by presence with the essence of the immaterial knower, and that knowledge, in the sense of belief and mental forms and concepts, is a psychic quality, and observing that relation and judgment play the role of intermediaries among them, the immateriality of all the types of knowledge becomes clear. In reality, their immateriality is proven by way of the immateriality of the knower. However, there are also other ways of proving the immateriality of knowledge and perception, some of which will be mentioned. But first, we should point out that the terms knowledge and perception in these discussions are used as synonyms and include sensation, imagination and reasoning.

1. The first argument for the immateriality of perception, namely, ‘the argument of the impossibility of impressing the larger in the smaller,’ is famous, and one version of it is the following.

Sensory vision is the lowest kind of perception which is imagined to be material, and materialists have interpreted it as physio-chemical and physiological actions and reactions. However, by paying precise attention to this very kind of perception it becomes clear that the perception itself cannot be considered to be material, and the material actions and reactions can be accepted only as preparatory conditions, for we see large forms which cover an area of dozens of square meters which are several times larger than the area of our entire bodies, let alone the visual organs or the brain! If these perceptual forms were material and projected in the organs of vision or other organs of the body, these forms could never be larger than the size of their locations, for material projection and impression without correspondence to a location is impossible. Observing that we see these perceptual forms within ourselves, we cannot but accept that they are related to a plane of the soul (martabah-ye mithālī-ye nafs , the imaginal plane of the soul), and in this way, both their own immateriality and that of the soul are proven.

Some materialists have replied that what we see are little pictures like microfilms which come into existence in the nervous system, and that with the help of context and making relative comparisons we find out their real

sizes. But this nostrum will not solve the problem, for, first of all, knowing the size of that which is represented by a form is different from seeing a large form, and secondly, assuming that the visible form is very little, and that we enlarge it with skills obtained from experience and through the use of context and by making relative comparisons, as if they were put under a magnifying glass of the mind, finally we still find the enlarged form in the mind, and the above-mentioned reason would be exactly repeated regarding this mental or imaginary form.

2. Another argument is that if sensory perception were a kind of material action and reaction, it would always occur whenever the material conditions were satisfied, while most of the time despite the satisfaction of the material conditions, the perception does not occur because of the attention of the soul to another matter. Hence, it may be concluded that having perceptions depends on the attention of the soul and cannot be considered a kind of material action and reaction, even though these actions and reactions play an introductory role for the occurrence of perception, and as a result of the attachment of the soul to the body, the soul is in need of material grounds and preparatory conditions.

3. The third argument is that we can perceive two visible forms together and compare them with each other, so as to find, for example, that they are distinct, similar or identical to each other, or that one is larger than the other. Assuming that each of them is impressed in a part of the body, and that their perception is that very impression, this implies that every part of the perceptual organ perceives that very form impressed in itself and is unaware of the other forms. So, what perceptual faculty perceives them together and compares them? If it is assumed that there is another material organ which perceives them together, the same problem will be repeated, for each material organ possesses parts, and if perception means the impression of forms in a material location each part will perceive the form impressed in it, and in conclusion, no comparison will be performed. So, there is no other alternative but to accept that a simple perceptual faculty perceives both of them, and finds both of them with its own unity and simplicity. Such a faculty can be neither a material substance nor a material accident

Therefore, perception will not be the impression of a form in a material location. With this argument, it is also proved that perception and the perceiver are both immaterial.

4. The fourth argument is that we sometimes perceive something and remember it after the passage of many years. If it is assumed that past perception is a special sort of material effect in one of the organs of the body, then after the passage of dozens of years it would have to be erased or changed, especially given the fact that the cells of the body change every so many years. Even if the cells remained, due to metabolism and the absorption of new nutrients, they will have changed, so how can we remember exactly that very form, or compare a new form with it, and perceive their similarities?

It is possible that it will be said that every cell, or every new material part inherits the effects of the previous parts and retains them. But even under

this assumption the question will remain as to what faculty perceives the unity or similarity of the previous and present forms.

It is clear that without this comparison and perception, remembrance and recognition could not take place. This argument becomes clearer with attention to the doctrines of substantial motion and the continual passing away of material things, and in one respect is similar to the argument given in Lesson Forty-Four, where scientific and empirical premises were employed for the establishment of the immateriality of the soul.

Lesson Fifty: The Union of the Knower and the Known

Introduction

In his books theShifā 1 and theIshārāt ,2 Shaykh al-Ra’īs (Ibn Sīnā) quotes several Greek philosophers to the effect that when a rational existent apprehends something it becomes united with it. He also reports that Porphyry has written an essay on the topic. However, he himself criticizes this theory and takes it to be impossible.

On the other hand, in hisAsfār and other works, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn confirms it and insists on the correctness of this theory, and he generalizes it to include all kinds of knowledge, even sensory perception.

This strange disagreement between the two great philosophers on this topic naturally arouses one’s curiosity and interest in solving the problem and deciding between the two sides of the conflict. For this reason, at the end of this section we devote a lesson to this topic.

The Controversy

In the previous lesson we learned that in presentational knowledge of the self there is no numerical difference or distinction between the knower and the known. For this reason it should be called the unity (waḥdat ) of knowledge, knower and known. It was indicated that this knowledge by presence is accepted by the Peripatetics, including Ibn Sīnā. Hence, there can be no disagreement about the union (ittiḥād ) of the knower and the known concerning this case, especially as the expression ‘union,’ as opposed to the expression ‘unity’ (waḥdat ), is used in places where there is a kind of numerical difference and duality, though in the knowledge of the self there is no sort of numerical difference whatsoever, except for conceptual respect (i‘tibār ).

Apparently, Ibn Sīnā holds that those who accept the union of knower and known confine the discussion to intellection, as opposed to imagination (takhayyul ) and sensation. At the most it can be extended to knowledge by presence, for in the language of the philosophers, the term ‘intellect’ ( ‘aql ) and its respectivals are used repeatedly with regard to knowledge by presence. However, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn expanded the scope of the discussion to include knowledge and perception without qualification, including acquired as well as presential knowledge, and including reasoning, imagination and sensation, and in all these cases he subscribed to the union of knower and known.

Explanation of the Topic

Before dealing with the core of the problem, the concept of ‘union’ (ittiḥād ) must be made clear. We must see precisely what is intended by those who accept the union of the rational agent (‘āqil ) with the intelligible (ma‘qūl ) or the union of the knower with the known. Perhaps the correct perception of this meaning will provide considerable help in solving the problem.

The union of two existents will be either a union with respect to their whatnesses or with respect to their existences, or with respect to the

existence of one and the whatness of the other. However, the union of two complete whatnesses implies a transformation in whatness which is a contradiction, for the assumption of a complete whatness is the assumption of a specific conceptual mold which does not correspond to any other conceptual mold, and the union of two complete whatnesses would imply the correspondence of two distinct molds, such as the union of a circle and a triangle, to use an example of sensibles to illustrate the case regarding intelligibles.

The union of a complete specific whatness with an incomplete whatness (genus and difference), according to Aristotle’s apparatus of genus and difference, is unobjectionable and ubiquitous, but this has no relation to intellection and perception. In intellection, such union does not occur. In addition, sometimes man intellects a whatness completely distinct from the whatness of man and such that there is no shared whatish property between them.

Therefore, if one were to believe that in perception the whatness of the perceiving existent becomes united with the whatness of the perceived existent, and, for example, that the whatness of man becomes one with the whatness of a tree or an animal, this would be contradictory and impossible.

Likewise, the union of the existence of the perceiver with the whatness of the perceived and the reverse are also impossible, and even if the union between existence and whatness is in some sense correct, it is the union of the existence of a single existent with its own whatness, not with the whatness of another existent. Hence, the only hypothesis that can be maintained regarding the union of the subject and object of intellection is that of the union of their existences. Now we must see whether the union between two existences is possible or not. If it is possible, in how many ways can it occur?

Types of Union of Existence

The union of two or more entified existences, in the sense of a kind of dependence or interdependence between them, is possible, and may occur in several ways.

a. The union of substance and accident, in view of the fact that an accident is dependent on a substance and cannot be independent of its subject. This union may be more firmly established on the basis the position of those who hold that an accident is an aspect or level of the existence of the substance.

b. The union of matter and form, for the form cannot be separated from its locus and continue independently with its own existence. This kind of union is sometimes generalized to body and soul, given that it is not possible for the soul to come about without a body, although it may survive independently.

c. The union of several matters in the shadow of a unitary form to which they are attached, such as the union of the elements which compose a plant or animal. This kind of union is really an accidental union, and a true union would only be obtained with the union of each element with the form.

d. The union of prime matter, assumed to lack any sort of actuality, with the form which grants it actuality. Sometimes this kind of union is

considered to be a real union. However, with the rejection of prime matter as a entified substance lacking actuality, there is no room left for this kind of union.

e. Another kind of union can be held to occur between two effects of a single emanating cause, considering each of them to be united with the cause, such that separation between them is not possible, although calling such relations ‘union’ is not without imprecision.

f. The union between the existence-granting cause and its effect which is the relation itself and dependence on it. There is a specific sort of gradation between such a cause and its effects. This sort of union, according to the fundamentality of existence and its gradation, is called the ‘union of the real with the diluted’ (ittiḥād ḥaqīqah wa raqīqah ).

It must be noted that the union under discussion is a union obtained as a result of perception, and this is the union of the knower with the existence of the known-in-itself (ma’lūm bi al-dhāt ), that is, the very perceptual form which occurs in the mind, not union with an objective existent. Therefore, the union of matter and form, or objective substance and accident is irrelevant to this problem.

Considering the kinds of union and that philosophers hold acquired knowledge to be a psychic quality, it is easy to accept the first kind of union, and, naturally, those like Ibn Sīnā would not deny this sort of union. However, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn did not like this kind of union and he tried to prove another kind similar to the union of matter and form; that is, he considers the relation between the soul and perceptual forms to be like that of prime matter and its forms. Just as the actuality of prime matter is obtained in the shadow of its union with a form, actual intellection occurs for the soul in the shadow of union with intellectual forms.

A Review of the Theory of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn

In order to make clear the theory of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, an excerpt from his own words is presented here:

The existence of the form which is actually intellected is the same as the existence of the intellecting faculty (‘āqiliyyah ) for the soul (and in technical terms, its existence-in-itself is the same as its existence-for-the-other), and if it is supposed that the perceptual form has another existence, and that the relation of it to the perceiving existent in only the relation of an object and its locus, then one would have to be able to posit that each of them has an existence independent of the other, while the intellected form does not have an existence apart from this very aspect of being intellected, an aspect which is its very essence itself, whether or not the one who intellects it is outside of this essence. Previously we said that correlatives (and among them the subject and object of intellection) are partners with respect to the degree of their existence. This judgment also holds for sensible forms.

…Others say: Psychic substance has a passive state in relation to intellectual form and that intellection is nothing other than this passivity. However, how can something essentially devoid of intellectual light perceive the intellectual form that essentially possesses the property of being intellected? Is it possible for a blind eye to see something?!

…In reality, the actual intellecting faculty (‘āqiliyyah ) of the soul is like the actualization of prime matter by means of a corporeal form, and just as matter in and of itself is not determinate, the soul in and of itself does not intellect, and becomes an actual subject of intellection in the shadow of union with the intellectual form.3

There are several controversial points in this explanation:

1. Regarding his statement, “if the relation between the perceptual form and the perceiver is a relation of an object and its locus, then it must be possible to consider separate existences for each of them,” it may be asked what is meant by ‘separate existences.’ If what is meant is that the perceptual form can exist without a location, this implication would be incorrect because no accident or form which is in need of a location can occur without it. If what is meant is that the intellect can consider them separately, this is also possible in the case of perceptual forms. In addition to this, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn himself considers the existence of accidents to be aspects of the existence of substance, and he does not accept their independent existence. So, what would be wrong with considering knowledge a kind of accident and an aspect of the existence of the knower?

2. Regarding his claim, “Being actually intellected is an essential property of intellectual forms, whether or not there is an intellect outside of its essence,” it must be said that the terms ‘being known’ and ‘being intellected’ are relational, and the supposition of one without the supposition of an existent which is knower is impossible. At most it may be said that these two terms may at times apply to a single existent, such as knowledge of the self, and sometimes the term knower corresponds to an existent outside of the essence of the known. The mere applicability of the term ‘object of intellection’ (ma‘qūl ) to something is no reason to suppose that the term ‘subject of intellection’ (‘āqil ) is also true of the whatness or existence of that very thing. In other words, the additional concept of ‘object of intellection’ cannot be considered to be essential for something (whether ‘essential’ is understood in accordance with theIsagoge , or in accordance with theKitāb al-Burhān [Aristotle’s logic]) so that with the help of the principle of ‘the equality of correlatives’ the property of being ‘subject of intellection’ may be established for its essence. Moreover, a requirement of the above-mentioned principle, as Shaykh al-Ra’īs (Ibn Sīnā ) states in hisTa‘līqāt , is ‘equality in implication, not in the level of existence. ’4

It may be concluded that the actuality of the property of being an object of intellection for a perceptual form does not require anything beyond that it possess an actual intellecting subject, whether in its own essence or outside of it.

3. As to the analogy between the passivity of the soul for perceptual forms and a blind eye, it must be said that, firstly, it is possible for a person to consider the soul the agent of the perceptual form, as in the cases of judgment and abstracted concepts and all logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles; secondly, why not compare the soul with a seeing eye which obtains actual vision when faced with a visible object?

As for the analogy between the soul and prime matter, according to the accepted theory, which denies prime matter that lacks actuality, there is no need for further explanation of it.

Inquiry into a Problem

Careful attention to the points mentioned makes clear that the relation between the knower and the known cannot be explained in one way for all cases; rather, giving due consideration to the kinds of knowledge involved, each case must be reviewed separately to determine the relation. We now list the conclusions reached thus far:

1. In the case of presentational knowledge of an essence, the knowledge, the knower, and the known have a single existence, and there is no sort of numerical difference to be found among them, except according to differences in rational respects. If the expression ‘union’ (ittiḥād ) is applied in such cases it is because of the numerical differences among the respects suggested; otherwise, we would have to use the expression ‘unity’ (waḥdat ). And there is general agreement on the unity of the knower and the known in this case.

2. What is meant by those who believe in the union of the knower and the known is not the union of the knower and the accidentally known (ma‘lūm bi al-‘araḍ ), but the union of the knower and the known-by-essence ( ma‘lūm bi al-dhāt ; i.e., the perceptual form).

3. Likewise, what they mean is not the union of the whatnesses of the knower and known, for this would require a change in whatness, a contradiction in terms.

4. The union of the existence of one thing with the whatness of another is also obviously incorrect.

5. In the knowledge by presence that the emanating cause has of its effect and vice versa, a ‘union of the real with the diluted,’ or, in other words, a graded union of levels of existence, is obtained, for the existence of one of them is the very relation and dependence on the other and is not independent in itself.

6. The knowledge by presence that two immaterial effects have of one another, assuming that there is such knowledge, can be considered an accidental union between the knower and the known, for each of them has an essential union with its emanating cause.

7. In acquired knowledge of the type which is considered to be the action of the soul, in which the soul is considered to be an agent by self-disclosure (f‘il bi al-tajjalī ), an agent by agreement (f‘il bi al-riḍā ) or an agent by foreknowledge (f‘il bi al-‘ināyah ), the union here may also be taken to be a kind of graded union of levels of existence.

8. In the type of acquired knowledge which is considered to be a quality of the soul, the sort of union which holds between that which is known-by-essence—a specific quality of the soul—and the substance of the soul is one between a substance and accident.

References

1 Cf.,Al-Shifā , ‘Ṭabī‘āt,’ fann 6, maqālah 5, bāb 6.

2 Cf.,Ishārāt, namaṭ 7.

3 Cf.,Asfār, Vol. 3, pp. 313-320; Vol. 6, pp. 165-168.

4 Cf.,Ta‘līqāt, pp. 76, 91, 95.

Part VI: The Immutable and the Changing

Lesson Fifty-One: The Immutable and the Changing

Introduction

Among the primary divisions which can be made for existence is that between the immutable and the changing. The immutable includes the Necessary Existent and completely immaterial beings. The changing includes all material existents and souls that are attached to matter. Changes may be divided into two kinds: sudden and gradual. The gradual is that which is called ‘motion’ in philosophical terminology, and opposed to this is the concept of being stationary, which is its relative complement (‘adam malikah ); that is, it is not the case that everything which lacks motion necessarily has the attribute of being stationary, but those things which have the capacity for motion but in actuality are not in a state of motion will be stationary. Therefore, completely immaterial existents cannot be called stationary. From this, the difference between the concept of being stationary and that of being immutable is clear: the former is the relative complement of motion, while the latter is the contradictory of change.

In this part, we will first give an explanation of the immutable and the changing and the types of change and alteration, then we will discuss motion, prove the existence of motion, and present the implications and kinds of motion. Along the way we shall explain the concepts of potentiality and actuality, and the relation between these and change and motion. Finally, this part, which is the last part on first philosophy, will be brought to an end with a discussion of substantial motion.

An Explanation Regarding Change and Immutability

In Arabic, the word for change,taghayyur , is derived from the word for other,ghayr , and means becoming another, or becoming different. Change is a concept whose abstraction requires the consideration of two things or states, or two parts of one thing, one of which vanishes and is replaced by the other. Even the obliteration of something may be called a change since its existence changes to nonexistence, that is, it becomes annihilated, although nonexistence has no reality, and temporal coming into existence (ḥudūth ) also can be called change, for the previous nonexistence is changed into existence.

Alteration and change in state (taḥawwul ) are also close to change, but since taḥawwul is derived from ḥāll (state), it is more suitable to confine its use to changes in state. From this it may be observed that the concept of change is not a whatish concept for which genus and difference may be given, and it is only with difficulty that a clearer intellectual concept may be found which could be used to explain it, and for this reason it must be considered a self-evident concept.

Likewise, the concept of immutability, which is the contradictory of change, does not need any definition or explanation, and since it is abstracted from a single entified existence, it may be considered a positive concept and change a negative one. Perhaps for this sort of opposite abstracted concepts, either of them may be considered positive and the other negative.

The existence of the changing is also self-evident, and at the very least every person finds changes within his own internal states by presentational knowledge. However, immutable existence, which is not the object of any sort of change or alteration, must be established by proof. And in the previous part we became acquainted with some such proofs.

Types of Change

Given the breadth of the concept of change, various kinds of change may be posited:

1. The appearance of a substantial existent without previous matter, and in technical terms, creation (ibdā‘ī ). An instance of this posit is the first material existent, for those who accept the temporal beginning of the material universe.

2. The complete destruction of a substantial existent, and an instance of it is the last material existent, according to the position of those who believe that the material universe will have a temporal end.

3. The complete destruction of a substantial existent and the appearance of a new substantial existent in its place. The occurrence of this posit is considered impossible by most philosophers, and at the very least it may be said that among ordinary phenomena no instances of this sort of change are to be found.

4. The appearance of a substantial existent as an actual part of another substantial existent. A clear instance of this is vegetable forms, according to the position of those who consider vegetable forms to be substantial, and their materials to be actual existents.

5. The destruction of a part of a substantial existent without being replaced by another part, such as the death of a plant and its decomposition, according to the above-mentioned position.

6. The destruction of an actual part of a substantial existent and the appearance of another part in place of it, a clear instance of which is ‘generation and corruption’ such as the transformation of one component into another.

7. The destruction of a potential part of a substance and the appearance of another potential part in place of it. An instance of this posit is the substantial motion of bodies, which incessantly occurs with the destruction of one part and its replacement by another, parts which become existent by fluid existence and in which no actual part is to be found. In future lessons this will be further explained.

8. The coming about of a new accident in a substantial subject, of which there are numerous instances.

9. The destruction of an accident without another accident taking its place, such as the fading of the color of a body and its becoming colorless.

10. The destruction of an accident and the appearance of a different accident in its place, an instance of which is the succession of contrary accidents, such as the colors black and white.

11. The destruction of an actual part of an accident. An instance of this is the reduction of the number of something, according to those who consider number to be a real accident possessing actual parts.

12. The addition of an actual part to an accident, such as the augmentation of the number of something according to the above-mentioned view.

13. The destruction of a potential part of an accident and the appearance of another potential part, such as all accidental motion.

14. The attachment of one substantial existent to another, such as the attachment of the soul to the body and its coming to life.

15. The detachment of one substantial existent from another, such as the death of an animal or human being.

Observing the features of the above-mentioned types of change, it is clear that only the seventh and the thirteenth types are gradual and are examples of motion. The other types must be considered instantaneous changes, for between the prior and latter conditions there is a specific boundary, and there is no temporal gap between them, although it is possible for each of the above-mentioned conditions to possess a kind of gradualness. For example, a change in the temperature of water occurs gradually, although the transformation of water into steam occurs in a single moment, or a zygote gradually becomes complete, but a spirit becomes attached to it in a single moment.

Given this point, changes can be divided into two general types: instantaneous and gradual.

Another point is that for every kind of gradual change (types seven and thirteen) three subtypes can be considered: one is that in which the earlier parts are like the later parts, such a motion at a constant speed without acceleration; the second subtype is that in which the later parts are more intense and stronger than the earlier parts, such as intensifying motion and speeding up; and the third subtype is that in which the later parts are weaker than the earlier parts as in decelerating motion and slowing down. However, there is some controversy about this which will be indicated later.

The Positions of the Philosophers Regarding the Types of Change

A review of the statements of the philosophers regarding each of the mentioned types of change would take too long; however, five positions in this area may be indicated.

1. The well-known position of the philosophers who consider the appearance of every material phenomenon to be necessarily preceded by matter and time, and as for the material world, they hold that it does not have a temporal beginning or end, and for this reason they deny the first three types of change.

2. The position of those who hold that numbers are respectival is naturally that changes in number are not real changes, and this position was previously confirmed. Therefore, changes of types eleven and twelve must be considered respectival.

3. The position of those who do not consider motion to be gradual, and who imagine all changes to be instantaneous. Accordingly they deny the seventh and thirteenth types. Since the concept of change is an abstract concept, and has no example other than prior and later existence and

nonexistence, and nonexistence is pure nullity, for this reason they considered existence to be equal to immutability, such as some of the Eleatics of ancient Greece.

4. The position of those who accept the existence of motion but would restrict it to accidents, and as a result they deny the seventh type of motion.

5. The position of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and others who believe in substantial motion.

Given that which was stated in Lesson Forty-Seven about number, where it was proved that number is respectival, there is no further need for discussion of changes in number. However, regarding the other positions, several problems should be discussed.

The first problem is that of whether material phenomena must necessarily originate in previously existing matter, so that it would follow that the chain of material events stretches from pre-eternity infinitely and without beginning, or whether they must originate in an existent which is at the head of a chain of material phenomena so that the chain of material events has a temporal beginning.

The second problem is whether motion, as a continuous gradual thing, exists in the external world or whether that which is called motion is a collection of fixed things which are brought about in succession and destroyed, so that the mind of man abstracts the concept of motion from their collection. In other words, are all changes instantaneous, or are there also gradual changes?

The third problem, after establishing that there is motion, is whether gradual change occurs only in accidents, or whether there can also be motion, or motions, in substance itself.