Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Lesson Sixty-Four: The Unity of Divine Actions

Introduction

In the previous lesson we explained Unity (tawḥīd ) in the sense of the denial of partners in the necessity of existence, and also in the sense of the denial of multiplicity within the essence of God. Meanwhile, we indicated the denial of difference between the attributes and the essence of God, which will be explained in the discussion of the attributes of God. However, a polytheism (shirk ) which was and is common among different groups of polytheists is polytheism regarding creation, and especially regarding the management of the cosmos. The previous discussions are not sufficient to refute this, for it is possible that in accepting Unity in the previous sense one believes that the unique Necessary Existent created only one or several creatures and has no other role in the creation of other creatures and the management of their affairs, which is performed by those who are not themselves necessary existents, and that they are independent and needless of God for the creation and management of other phenomena. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss Unity in creation and lordship separately.

Unity in Creation and Lordship

In order to prove Unity in creation and to deny partners with God in the creation and management of the cosmos, the ancient philosophers reasoned that creation is not restricted to direct and immediate creation, and God, who creates the first creature directly and immediately, also creates its actions and creations by the mediation of it. Even if there are hundreds of intermediaries, all of them are also created by God through mediation. In philosophical terms: “the cause of the cause is also the cause, and the effect of the effect is also the effect.” In reality, by adding this premise to the demonstrations for the Necessary Existent, they established that the entire cosmos is His effect.

However, on the basis of the principles of transcendent theosophy, and especially regarding the principle of the dependence of the existence of the effect and lack of independence in relation to the creative cause, this issue becomes clearer and stronger. It is concluded that although every cause possesses a kind of relative independence in relation to its effect, all causes and effects in relation to Almighty God are poverty itself, dependence and need, and do not possess any sort of independence. Therefore, true and independent creativity is restricted to God Almighty, and all existents are in need of Him in all their own aspects and in all states and times. It is impossible for an existent to be needless of Him in any of its existential aspects or to be able to do anything independently.

This is one of the most brilliant and valuable outcomes of Islamic philosophy, which was presented to the world of philosophy in the blessed and radiant thought of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn.

Likewise, philosophers have constructed other demonstrations for unity in creation and lordship which are based on numerous theoretical premises, and in order to prevent prolongation of the discussion, they will be ignored. A demonstration from the Noble Qur’ān will suffice:

If there had been in them any gods except Allah, they [i.e. the heavens and earth] would both have certainly been in a state of disorder. (21:22).

This demonstration has been presented in several versions, and among the clearest and closest to the purport of the āyah is the one presented below:

This argument is composed of two premises:

1. The existence of every effect is dependent on its own cause. In other words, every effect obtains its existence with all its aspects and associations from its own creative cause. If it needs conditions or preparation their existence must also depend on its creative cause. Therefore, if two or several creative causes are assumed to be on the same level, the effects of each of them will be dependent on its own cause, and will not possess any sort of dependence on other causes or on their effects. In this way, there will be no relation or dependence among their effects.

2. The design of the observable world (the heavens and the earth and their phenomena) is a single design in which all phenomena, whether they are simultaneous or not, are related and dependent on each other. The relations among simultaneous phenomena are various mutual causal influences which cause changes and alterations in them, and these are absolutely undeniable. The relations among the phenomena of the past, present and future are such that the past phenomena prepare the ground for the appearance of the present phenomena, and the present phenomena, in turn, prepare the ground for the appearance of future phenomena. If the causal and preparatory relations among the phenomena of the cosmos were removed, no cosmos would remain at all, and no other phenomena could take place. Just as, if the relation between the existence of man with the air, light, water and nourishment were cut off, man would no longer survive. He would no longer be able to prepare the ground for the appearance of other men or other phenomena.

From the combination of these two premises it may be concluded that the design of this cosmos, which includes a collection of uncountable phenomena of the past, present and future, is the creation of a single Creator, and under the wise control of a single Lord. For if there were one or more other creators, there would be no relation among them, and no single design would be decreed by them. Rather, every creature would be brought about by its own creator, and would grow up with the help of other creatures of that same creator. In conclusion, numerous and independent designs would be brought about, and no relations would hold among them, while the present design of the cosmos is a single and interconnected design the connections among whose phenomena are observed.

Finally, the point must be noted that creation and lordship are inseparable, and the nurture and control of a single existent is not separate from its creation and the creation of the things it needs. For example, providing for man is not something separate from creating his digestive system, the creation of nourishment and a livable environment. In other words, these kinds of concepts are abstracted from the relations between creatures and have no instances other than their creation. Therefore, by proving unity in [the act of] creation, Unity in controlling affairs and other aspects of lordship are established.

Unity in the Emanation of Existence

Likewise, another meaning of Unity is the restriction of independent influence and the emanation of existence to the sacred divine essence, for which there is much evidence in the verses of the Qur’ān and narrations from the Prophet (ṣ ) and Imams (‘a ), and this is established by attending to the demonstration which is formulated on the basis of the principles of transcendent theosophy for the Unity of creation and lordship. However, some misunderstandings exist in this area which must be attended to in order to keep from going to extremes.

On the one hand, a group of theologians (Ash‘arites) deny that intermediate causes have any efficacy at all, on the basis of the literal meaning of a group of verses of the Qur’ān and narrations from the Prophet (ṣ ). They basically deny the causality and effectiveness of these causes, and they consider God to be the direct agent of all phenomena. They hold that divine habits bring determinate phenomena into existence in certain circumstances, otherwise other things and conditions have no effect on their coming about.

On the other hand, another group of theologians (Mu‘tazilites) hold that there is a kind of independence in the effectiveness [of intermediate causes], especially for those agents which are considered to be voluntary. They consider it to be incorrect to relate the voluntary actions of man to God. This is one of the most basic differences between these two schools of thought.

Although philosophers considered it correct to relate phenomena through intermediaries—even the voluntary actions of man—to God, they justified it only on the basis of the fact that the Necessary Existent is the cause of all causes, until Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn provided the correct explanation of causal relations and proved that since intermediary causes themselves are the effects of God, they possess no independence, and basically, the emanation of existence, in the precise meaning of the word, is specific to God Almighty. Other causes are like the channels of the emanation of existence; possessing different levels they play the role of intermediaries between the main source of existence and other creatures. Therefore, the meaning of the famous expression, “There is no influence in existence but Allah,” will be that independent influence and emanation of existence is specific to God Almighty. It is this fact which is explained in the language of the verses of the Qur’ān and narrations from the Prophet (ṣ ) and Imams (‘a ) as the dependence of all things, even the voluntary actions of man, on the divine will, permission, decree and ordinance. In fact, these cases show the different stages which are considered by the intellect in order to trace phenomena to the sacred divine essence. In a sense, these explanations can be considered stages of teaching, for the understanding of the precise meaning of Unity in actions by those who are not sufficiently trained in intellectual problems is no easy matter, and the best method of teaching it is one which includes several stages.

The Refutation of Compulsion and Delegation

One of the problems which have caused the Mu‘tazilites to deny that the voluntary actions of man can be traced to God is that they have supposed

that otherwise man would have to be necessarily compelled in absolutely all his actions. In addition to the fact that it is counterintuitive and contrary to what is self-evident, this assumption leaves no room for duty and guidance nor reward and punishment. All of these would be empty notions. In this way the problem of compulsion and delegation has been presented in Islamic theology (kalām ). The two sides of the issue have been the subject of numerous discussions, a review of all of which would require an independent book. Here we shall review only that which is relevant to our discussion.

The mentioned problem can be presented in the following version. Every voluntary action has an agent which performs it by its own will and volition. It is impossible for a single action to be performed by two agents and to be dependent on the wills of each of them. Now, if the actions of man are dependent on his own will and volition, there will remain no room for them to depend on Almighty God, unless in the sense that God is the Creator of man, and if He had not created him and had not given him the power of will and volition, man’s voluntary actions would not occur. But if we consider them to be dependent on the divine will, we must deny their dependence on man’s will. Man will be considered as merely an involuntary subject for the occurrence of divine actions. This is compulsion, which is invalid and unacceptable.

The answer is that taking a single action to depend on the will of two agents is impossible only in case both of the agents are assumed to influence its performance on the same level as each other, in technical terms, they would be ‘parallel agents.’ But if both agents are vertically related to each other, the dependence of an action on both of them is unproblematic. The dependence [of an action] on two agents which are vertically related does not merely mean that the principle of the existence of the immediate agent depends on a mediating agent, but in addition to this, that every aspect of the existence of the immediate agent depends on the creative agent, and that even in the performance of voluntary actions they are not without need of Him. At every moment they obtain their existences and all the aspects of their existences from Him. This is the correct meaning of the saying: “No compulsion and no delegation, but something in between these two things” (Lā jabr wa lā tafwīḍ, bal amr bayn al-amrayn ). As was earlier mentioned, the correct understanding of this saying is possible in the shadow of the correct understanding of the causal relation and the dependence of the existence of the effect, whose originality is one of the merits of the explanation given by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn.

Lesson Sixty-Five: The Divine Attributes

Introduction

Regarding the limits of human abilities to know God, and the attributes which can be attributed to the divine essence there are various tendencies, some of which go to one extreme and some to another. For example, relying on some ambiguous verses of the Qur’ān and narrations attributed to the Prophet (ṣ ), some relate attributes and actions of material existents, such as sadness, happiness, going and coming, and sitting and rising, to God the Supreme. They are called in technical termsmujassimah (those who believe in corporeal attributes) andmushabbihah (those who believe in the similarity between God and creatures). Others have absolutely denied the power of man to know the essence and attributes of Almighty God. They rely on another set of narrations and verses of the Qur’ān, and they take the attributes and actions related to God Almighty to be negative. For example, they have interpreted knowledge as the negation of ignorance and power as the negation of weakness. Some have even expressed the view that attribution of existence to God, the Supreme, does not mean anything but the denial of nothingness!

In the midst of this, there exists a third tendency which chooses a way between the extremes of similarity and abstraction. This tendency is agreeable to reason and is confirmed by the Immaculate Imams (Peace be upon them). We shall explain something about this tendency.

The Limits to Knowing God

It was previously said that knowledge of God, the Supreme, may be divided into two types: presentational intuitive knowledge, and acquired intellectual knowledge. Presentational knowledge has different levels, the lowest of which exists in every human being, and with the perfection of the soul and focusing the attention of the heart, it becomes strengthened, until it reaches the level of the knowledge possessed by the Friends of God (awliyā’ ) who see Him with the eye of the heart more clearly than any thing and prior to every thing. But, in any case, the presentational knowledge of any‘ārif (gnostic, mystic) is measured by his existential relation and the relation of his heart to God, the Supreme. No one is ever able to completely comprehend the divine essence and know Him as He Himself knows Himself. The reason for this is clear, because every existent other than the sacred divine essence is limited in its ontological level, even if it is infinite with respect to time or in some other ontological aspects. The comprehension of the infinite by the finite is impossible.

Acquired intellectual knowledge is obtained by mental concepts and its level is subordinate to the power of the mind to precisely analyze and understand subtle intellectual concepts. It is this kind of knowledge that can be perfected by learning the rational sciences. At the same time, the clarity of the soul, purification of the heart, refinement of morals and elimination of materialistic and animalistic pollutions play an important role in elevating this knowledge. Anyway, all intellectual and spiritual perfections are due to the grace of God.

The Role of Reason in Knowing God

Undoubtedly, the tools for the work of the intellect are mental concepts, and basically, the intellect is that power which understands universal concepts. As was explained in the section on epistemology, intellectual concepts are divided into two general groups: one group is that of whatish concepts or primary intelligibles, which are automatically abstracted from particular individual objects of perception, and which denote their ontological limits; another group is that of concepts which are obtained through the activities of the intellect itself, and although they may originate in some kind of individual and presentational perceptions, these concepts are not limited to the framework given by the perceptions, and they can be extended or limited.

All intellectual knowledge about existence and its levels and about everything which is not of whatness, and which is about metaphysics is obtained with the help of these concepts, just as the concepts of nothingness and negation are of this sort.

With this point it becomes clear that whatish concepts, which are representations of the limitations of contingent existents, are not applicable to God, but other intellectual concepts can be considered means for knowing the divine attributes and actions on the condition that they possess sufficient breadth and universality and are free from the taint of imperfection and contingency, as are the concepts of the Necessary Existent, the Creator, the Lord, and the other most beautiful divine names. It must be observed that these kinds of concepts are graded and possess multiple instances, and there is an incomparable and immeasurable difference between the instances of such concepts in the case of God and in the case of their other instances, for it is a difference between the finite and the infinite.

It is for this reason that when they taught about the attributes of God, the Supreme, the immaculate Imams, Peace be upon them, used these concepts with the proviso of transcendence and denial of similarity to the attributes of created entities. For example, they said, “He is the Knower, but not as we know, the Powerful, but not as we are powerful,” and this is the meaning of the words of Almighty God:

There is nothing like Him. (42:11)

Positive and Negative Attributes

Concepts can be divided generally into the positive and the negative. Positive concepts sometimes denote limited existents or their aspects of limitation and deficiency, so that if their aspects of limitation and deficiency were neglected they would change into other concepts, such as all whatish concepts and a set of non-essential concepts which indicate the weakness of the level of existence and its deficiency and limitedness, such as the concepts of potentiality and disposition. It is self-evident that such concepts cannot be posited of God, the Supreme, but their negations can be considered as negative attributes, such as the negation of partners with God, composition, corporeality, and time and space.

Another set of positive concepts denote the perfection of existence, and do not include any aspect of deficiency or limitation, although it is possible

for them to be applied to limited instances, as well, like the concepts of knowledge, power and life. These kinds of concepts can be related to God, the Supreme, as positive attributes on the condition that the instance is considered devoid of limitation. Their negations would be incorrect because this would imply the negation of perfection of a perfect infinite existent.

Therefore, all of the concepts which denote ontological perfections and do not include a sense of deficiency or limitation can be established as positive attributes for God, the Supreme. Likewise, the negation of all concepts which include a kind of deficiency and limitation can be considered as negative attributes of the Necessary Existent. If the absence of the application of false names to God, the Supreme, is emphasized, this is for the sake of preventing the application of concepts which include a sense of deficiency or limitation.

Those who interpret the positive attributes of God, the Supreme, in a negative sense, have imagined that in this way they can achieve an absolute transcendence and prevent the relation to God of concepts which are applied to contingent existents, while, firstly, the negation of one of two contradictories is the affirmation of the other, and if they are not willing to commit themselves to the affirmation of one of these imperfections, they will have to allow that neither of two contradictories is true, and secondly, when, for example, knowledge is interpreted as the denial of ignorance, in fact, the sense of non-being in ignorance is negated from the divine arena, and the assumption of the sense of non-being is impossible without the assumption of its opposite, knowledge. Hence, they must have posited knowledge at a prior level.

Attributes of Essence and Attributes of Action

Attributes related to God, the Supreme, are either concepts which are abstracted from the divine essence by focusing on a kind of ontological perfection, such as knowledge, power and life, or they are concepts which are abstracted by the intellect through a comparison between the divine essence and His creatures, focusing on a kind of ontological relation, such as being the Creator or Lord. The first group of concepts are called attributes of essence, while the second group of concepts are called attributes of action. Sometimes the attributes of essence are defined as those attributes which are abstracted from the station of the essence, and the attributes of action are defined as attributes abstracted from the station of action.

Relating the attributes of essence to God, the Supreme, does not mean that there exists something other than the divine essence, within it or outside it, so that the essence could be considered separate from and in lack of these attributes, contrary to the case of material entities, for example, which can be imagined to lack some specific color, odor or shape. In other words, the divine attributes are not additional to nor other than the essence, but rather, when the intellect considers one of the ontological perfections, such as knowledge or power, it posits the highest level of this perfection for the divine essence, since His existence, in its very simplicity and unity, possesses all of the infinite perfections, and no perfection can be negated of Him. In a third sense, the attributes of essence of the Necessary Existent are intellectual concepts abstracted from a single instance without indicating

any kind of multiplicity or plurality for the divine essence. This fact is sometimes expressed in these words: ‘The perfection oftawḥīd is the denial of attributes for Him’ (Kamāl al-tawḥīd nafy al-ṣifāt ‘anhu ) as is narrated from the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Alī, Peace be with him.

In this field there are two extremist tendencies. On one hand there are the Ash‘arites who imagined that the divine attributes are entities outside the essence, and at the same time uncreated, so they held that there are ‘eight preeternal things’ (qudamā’ thamāniyyah ). On the other hand, the Mu‘tazilites held that attributes are to be negated, and that their attribution to God is figurative.

However, the first position implies that, God forbid, either they accept partnership in the necessity of existence, or they believe in the existence of existents which are neither necessary nor contingent existence!

The second position implies that the divine essence lacks ontological perfections, unless their statements are interpreted as arising from inadequacy of expression and they are taken to have meant the negation of attributes being additional to the essence.

Likewise, ascribing attributes of action to God does not mean that aside from the existence of God and that of His creatures, there are other entified things called attributes of action and that they are attributed to God, the Supreme. Rather, all of these attributes are additional concepts which are abstracted by the intellect by a special comparison between the existence of God, the Supreme, and the existence of His creatures. For example, when the dependence of the existence of creatures on God is considered, the concepts of the Creator, the Originator, and the Initiator are abstracted from a certain perspective.

Therefore, the characteristic of the attributes of action is that in order to abstract them, the existence of creatures must be taken into consideration from a certain perspective. In other words, these attributes rest on a relation and the consideration of the connection between God and creatures. This relation rests on both its terms and with the negation of one of them it would not occur. Therefore, sometimes these attributes are called relational attributes (ṣifāt iḍāfiyyah ).

It may be concluded that the attributes of action cannot be considered the same as the divine essence, just as they cannot be considered specific entified entities.

A noteworthy point is that material phenomena possess temporal and spatial limits and conditions, and these limits and conditions influence the relations which are taken to hold between them and God, and as a result, the actions which are dependent on them are in one sense conditioned by time and space. For example, it is said that God, the Supreme, created the existentx at timet and locationl , but these conditions and limits in fact refer to creatures and are considered to be the receptacle for the occurrence of the creature and its aspects. They do not imply the ascription of time and space to God.

In other words, divine actions, which are dependent on time and space, possess two aspects: one is the aspect relating to creatures, due to which time and space are attributed to them; the other aspect is related to God, the

Supreme, with respect to which the actions of God are free of time and space. This point is worthy of much attention, and is the key to the solution of many problems.

Another point is that if the attributes of action are considered in terms of their source, and, for example, by the ‘Creator’ is meant one who has the power to create (Kawn al-wājib ḥayth yakhluq idhā shā’ ), but not one who has performed the act of creation, in that case, they will be reduced to attributes of essence.

Lesson Sixty-Six: Attributes of Essence

Introduction

As indicated in the previous lesson, the concepts which refer to ontological perfections and do not denote any kind of deficiency or limitation are applicable to the sacred divine essence. All of them can be considered to be attributes of the divine essence, such as Light (nūr ), Magnificence (bahā’ ), Beauty (jamāl ), Perfection (kamāl ), Love (ḥubb ), Bliss (bahjah ), and other Names and attributes which are presented in the noble verses of the Qur’ān, the sacred narrations and the supplications of the Infallible Ones (‘a ), which do not refer to the station of action.

However, what are usually mentioned as attributes of essence are Life (ḥayāt ), Knowledge ( ‘ilm ) and Power ( qudrah ), and most mutakallamīn have added other attributes, such as Hearing ( samī‘ ), Seeing ( baṣīr ), Willing ( murīd ) and Speaking ( mutakallim ). There are discussions about whether these concepts are attributes of essence or attributes of action, which would require a very lengthy review. Here we shall present a discussion of the threefold attributes of essence, followed by a discussion of some of the other well known attributes.

Life

Existents which are familiar to man may be divided into two general groups, the living and the non-living. The attribute called life (ḥayāt ) is attributed to living existents which are conscious and possess voluntary movement, and in the Arabic language the wordḥayawān (animate) is appropriately applied to living existents. However, if we are precise, it becomes clear that the application of the attribute life to material existents is a kind of ‘waṣf bi ḥāl muta‘allaq ’ (description of something in terms of another thing on which it is dependent), and actually, life is an essential description of their souls, and is accidentally related to their bodies.

After learning that animal souls have a degree of immateriality (tajarrud ) (although this is an imaginal immateriality), we come to the conclusion that life implies immateriality, and furthermore that life is more expressive than immateriality, because immateriality, as was previously indicated, is a negative concept.

In other words, just as extension is an essential characteristic of material existents, life is an essential characteristic of immaterial existence. Likewise, knowledge and will, which are also implied by life, are immaterial.

Therefore, the concept of life denotes an ontological perfection, which can be extended to existents which are not attached to matter. Hence, all immaterial things possess the essential attribute of life, the highest level of which is specific to the sacred divine essence. Hence, given that the divine essence is immaterial, there is no need for further demonstration to establish that life is one of the essential attributes of God, the Supreme.

Here, several points should be mentioned.

One is that sometimeslife andliving are used in another sense, which includes plants, but this sense includes an aspect of imperfection, for it

implies growth and reproduction which are characteristics of material things, and in this discussion such a sense is not intended.

Another point is that although life in the intended sense implies knowledge, will and power, this implication does not entail conceptual identity. The best evidence for this is that life is a self-contained concept without any sort of relation, as opposed to the other concepts mentioned for which there is a relation to their own objects (the known, the willed, that over which one has power), which are considered concepts involving relation. Therefore, if life is defined as knowledge, power and will, this will be a definition in terms of its implications.

The third point is that it is possible that the life of God, the Supreme, may be established in this way: life is one of the ontological perfections of creatures, and it is impossible for the creative cause to lack a perfection which emanates to its own creatures, but rather, the creative cause should necessarily possess that perfection in a more perfect form. Furthermore, after knowledge and power are established for God, the Supreme, life, which is implied by them, will also be established.

Knowledge

The discussion of the knowledge of God is one of the most difficult in metaphysics, and it is for this reason that philosophers andmutakallimīn have many differences of opinion in this area, which are presented, discussed and criticized in the detailed works ofkalām and philosophy. For example, some philosophers consider both knowledge of His essence and knowledge of His creatures to be the same as the divine essence. Others consider knowledge of the essence to be the same as the essence, but knowledge of creatures to be forms dependent on but external to the essence. Yet others, have considered knowledge of creatures to be the same as their existences. Various and sometimes strange views have been narrated from themutakallimīn , some even denying God’s knowledge of His own sacred essence! The fact is that the divine essence in its very unity and simplicity is both the same as His knowledge of His own essence and knowledge of all creatures, including the immaterial and material ones.

Knowledge of Essence

One who is aware of the incorporeality and immateriality of the divine essence can easily understand that His sacred essence is the same as His knowledge of Himself, just as is true for every independent immaterial (non-accidental) existent.

If one has any doubt about the necessity of knowledge of one’s essence for all immaterial existents, in the case of God, the Supreme, the following argument can be employed. Knowledge of essence is an ontological perfection which can be found in some existents, such as man, and God, the Supreme, possesses all ontological perfections infinitely; so He also possesses this one in its highest level.

Anyway, the demonstration of God’s knowledge of His sacred essence on the basis of the principles of transcendent theosophy (ḥikmat muta‘āliyah ) is an easy task.

Knowledge of Creatures

The demonstration of knowledge of creatures, especially prior to their appearance, and its philosophical explanation is not so easy. In this regard there are various positions and views, the most important of which are the following:

1. The position of the Peripatetics is based on the idea that knowledge of creatures is by means of intellectual forms, which are concomitants (lawāzim ) of the divine essence.

This position has some notable problems, for, if these forms are assumed to be the same as the divine essence, this implies the existence of multiplicity in the simple divine essence. If they are external to the essence—as is understood from the expressionlawāzim al-dhāt (concomitants of essence)—then they will be unavoidably the effects and creatures of God, the Supreme. This implies that, aside from these intellectual forms, the divine existence at the station of His essence, does not possess knowledge of His creatures and He has created these forms without any knowledge!

Moreover, the knowledge obtained through intellectual forms will be acquired knowledge. The establishment of such knowledge for God, the Supreme, would imply the establishment of a mind in the divine essence, while mind and acquired knowledge are specific to souls attached to matter.

2. The position of the Illuminationists (Ishārqiyyin ) is based on the idea that divine knowledge of creatures is the same as their existence, and the relation of creatures to the divine essence is like the relation of mental forms to the soul, whose existence is the same as the knowledge of them.

Although this position does not imply relating acquired knowledge to God, the Supreme, with the previous position it shares the difficulty of the denial of detailed divine knowledge at the station of essence.

3. The position of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn is based on the idea that knowledge of the essence is identical to presentational knowledge of creatures. The most important principle for the explanation of this position is the principle of the specific gradation of existence, according to which the existence of an effect is considered to be the radiance and unveiling of the existence of the cause, and the existence-granting cause in its own essence possesses the perfection of its effects, therefore, the presence of the essence to itself will be identical to their presence.

However, he believes that there can be no direct knowledge of material existence, and just as immateriality is the condition for being a knower, it is also a condition for being known in essence (ma‘lūm bil-dhāt ). But as was indicated in Lesson Forty-Nine, the hiddenness of spatial and temporal parts of material entities from one another does not contradict the presence of all of them for their existence-granting cause.1 Therefore, God, the Supreme, possesses presentational knowledge of all creatures, including immaterial and material ones, a knowledge which is the same as His sacred essence.

A point which should be mentioned here is that there is no way for time and space to enter into the arena of divine holiness. The sacred divine existence encompasses all times and spaces, and in relation to Him, past, present and future are the same. Therefore, just as the priority of His

existence to creatures cannot be considered as a kind of temporal priority, the priority of His knowledge to the existence of creatures cannot be considered to be a temporal priority. Rather, what is meant by the priority of His knowledge is an eternal priority (taqaddum sarmadī ), just as the existence and knowledge of other immaterial things in relation to the material world have a perpetual priority ( taqaddum dahrī ). 2

Power

An existent which lacks a certain perfection cannot give it to another; in other words, the production of an action by an agent which does not have ontological homogeneity (sinkhiyyat ) with it is impossible. But the production of an action by an agent which possesses its perfection will be possible, and in the case of such an agent, it is said that it possesses the power and ability for performing the action (i.e., the power of agency (quwwah f‘ilī )). When this concept is restricted to a living agent (possessing consciousness and will) and these are limited to voluntary agents (intentional agents, providential agents, agents by agreement, and agents by self-disclosure), the concept of power is obtained. Therefore, power means a living voluntary agent being the origin (mabda’iyyat ) of its actions. If such an agent possesses infinite perfections, it will possess infinite power. Given this analysis, there is no need for another demonstration to establish the infinite power of the sacred divine essence.

According to this explanation, power is a graded concept whose instances possess different levels. This concept includes the power of animals, men, completely immaterial entities, and the power of God, and the same goes for the concepts of existence, life and knowledge, etc., which were previously mentioned. It was previously indicated that the application of these kinds of concepts to God, the Supreme, does not mean that the concomitants (lawāzim ) of their imperfect instances are also established for the sacred divine essence. Rather, the concepts should be abstracted in such a way that these concomitants are omitted.

For example, the power of animals and men to perform their voluntary actions (i.e., agency (mabda’iyyat f‘ilī )) is conditioned by idea ( taṣawwur ), assertion ( taṣdīq ), and the appearance of psychological motivation for the performance of the act. However, these sorts of cases are inseparable attributes of souls attached to matter, and none of these things—acquired knowledge, idea, assertion and motive—are found in addition to essence at the station of completely immaterial entities, especially the divine Being. However, that which is valid in all cases of power is the existence of knowledge and love in their general senses, the most highest instances of which are the knowledge and love which are identical to the sacred divine essence.

A point that must be mentioned here is that the establishment of power for God, the Supreme, requires the affirmation of volition, for power, as was indicated, implies knowledge and volition, and is restricted to living voluntary agents. It was explained in Lesson Thirty-Eight that the highest level of volition is specific to the sacred divine essence which is not influenced by any internal or external factor.

Another point is that the power of God is infinite, and includes all contingent beings, but being within the power of God does not imply occurrence, and the only things which occur are those whose creation is willed. In other words, the meaning of the Omnipotent (qādir ) is not that He performs everything He is able to do; rather, it means that He performs everything He wants to do. Therefore, essentially impossible things are outside the ambit of things His power can bring about. The question of whether the power of God covers these things is incorrect. On the other hand, not all the things within His power will be subjects of the divine will to be brought into existence. Hence, the domain of the objects of His will and of existence will be smaller than that of the objects of His power. However, the reason why the divine will does not cover some contingents will be clarified in future chapters.

References

1 Cf., Lesson Forty-Nine.

2 Cf., Lesson Forty-Three.