Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Lesson Sixty-Seven: Attributes of Action

Introduction

As was made clear in Lesson Sixty-Five, the criterion according to which an attribute is counted as an attribute of essence or an attribute of action is that if the concept of refers to an existence outside the essence, it will be an attribute of action, and otherwise it will be an attribute of essence.

Therefore, if we consider the concept of knowledge in such a way that it implies the existence of an external object of knowledge, it will be an attribute of action, as in verses of the following sort:

And verily We will try you until We know which of you are mujāhidīn (those who struggle) and patient. (47:31)

This verse refers to the occurrence of knowledge at a specific time, and so, the concept of knowledge contained in it bears the meaning of reference to something external to the essence, and its temporal qualification is due to the temporality of the object of knowledge.

On the other hand, if we consider the concept of an attribute of action in such a way that it does not imply an external existence, it becomes an attribute of essence, as is the case with the concept Creator which refers to the power to create.

Given this standard, we shall review several well-known attributes.

Hearing and Seeing

These two attributes are usually considered to be attributes of essence, while it seems that according to the above-mentioned standard, they should be considered to be attributes of action, for the concepts of audition and vision still refer to an awareness of audible and visible existents, even after one divests them of material requirements such as having ears, eyes and knowledge acquired through the senses. Their application to cases in which the objects of hearing and seeing do not have actual existence is contrary to ordinary language, although they can be so applied if they are interpreted as knowledge of audible and visible things or the ability for hearing and seeing, and the other attributes of action can be similarly interpreted.

Speaking

Speech (kalām ) in ordinary usage is a word which on the basis of convention refers to a determinate meaning, and a speaker (mutakallim ) uses it in order to convey his intentions to others. This requires the possession of a larynx, vocal chords, a mouth and the exhalation of air through the vocal tract, as well as the previous existence of conventions. No matter how we develop this concept and delete the characteristics of its instances we cannot ignore the properties of conveying a meaning to a person addressed. For example, gesticulation can also be considered a kind of speech, while it possesses none of the mentioned characteristics, and even creating a meaning in the mind of the person addressed can be considered a kind of speaking. But, if these properties are not considered, it will not agree with common parlance (‘urf ). Even though philosophical and intellectual truths are not subordinate to language and common understanding, here the

discussion is about the employment of concepts for divine attributes, which are defined by means of language.

It may be concluded that the concept of speaking includes the existence of the person addressed and the speech which is communicated to him, and hence it should be considered an attribute of action. However, one may interpret it as the power for speech, or as something else, so that it will also become an attribute of essence.

Will

Another of the most difficult problems of philosophical theology is that of God’s will, which has raised many differences of opinion among philosophers and sectarian differences among theologians and has brought about abundant debates and discussion, a complete review of which requires an independent book. On the one hand, one group considers the divine will to be an attribute of essence additional to the essence, while on the other hand, another group considers it to be the same as the essence itself, reducing it to knowledge of the best. Some have imagined it to be an accident of essence, like human will, which appears in the soul of man. Others have considered it to be the first creature of God, by means of which other creatures are brought into existence. Finally, some have considered it to be an attribute of action abstracted from the plane of action. There are other minor differences about such things as whether the divine will is one or many, created or pre-eternal, etc.

In order to solve this problem, first, the meaning of will should be explained precisely, and then its proper place among the attributes of essence and action should be determined and its principles and implications should be discovered.

The Concept of Will

As was explained in Lesson Thirty-Eight, the expression will (irādah ) is employed in at least two senses: one is wishing or desiring and the other is deciding to perform an action. The objects of a person’s desire and affection may be objective things, but may even be beyond the range of one’s power and ability, such as man’s affection for the beautiful and enjoyable things of the world (“you desire the frail goods of this world ” (8:67)), or they may be one’s own voluntary actions, such as loving the good and worthy deeds which one performs, called generative will (irādeh-ye takwīnī ), or they may be the voluntary actions of other people, such as desiring that another voluntary agent perform some deed by his own will, in which case they would be called cases of legislative will (irādeh-ye tashrī‘ī ). However, the will to order and to establish rules and regulations are in fact cases of the will to legislate rather than legislative will, and should be considered a kind of generative will. (Take note.)

The Reality of Will

Will, in the sense of wanting and loving, are psychic qualities of animals and men, but in the sense abstracted from this, it denotes aspects of the existence of immaterial things which may also be related to completely immaterial entities and to God, the Supreme. As was previously indicated,

love can be considered one of the essential attributes of God, which is basically directed toward the essence itself, and subordinate to this, to the effects of the essence in that they are good and perfect. Therefore, in this sense will can be considered an attribute of essence the reality of which is nothing but divine love, which is identical to His essence.

Will in the sense of making decisions is a passive quality in souls attached to matter, or one of the actions of the soul, and in either case, it is a created thing in the soul, originating in idea and assertion and desire. Such a thing cannot be attributed to completely immaterial things, especially not to God, the Supreme, for the sacred divine Being is free of the occurrence of accidents and psychic qualities. However, it can be considered to apply to God, the Supreme, as a relational attribute of action (such as creation, providence, and ordering, etc.) which is abstracted by comparing the actions of creatures to the divine essence in that He possesses love of good and perfection. Since one of the terms of the relation possesses temporal and spatial qualifications, these qualifications can be considered to apply to the divine will, as well, from the viewpoint of the objects of the will. As was explained in Lesson Sixty-Six, expressions such as: “His command when He wills a thing is only to say to it, Be, so it is ” (36:82), bear the same sort of meaning as was given for knowledge of created things.

It is to be concluded that divine generative will can be taken in two senses: one in the sense of love directed toward His own voluntary actions, which is a single pre-eternal essential attribute identical to the essence, whose relation to actions and objective entities is like essential knowledge, which basically is of the sacred divine essence, and subordinately of His effects and manifestations. Likewise, divine love basically is directed toward His own sacred essence and subordinately toward the effects of His existence in that they overflow from the divine goodness and perfection, and this is why it is called will.

The second sense of generative will is a relational attribute which is abstracted by comparison between divine actions and His attributes of essence, and because it is subordinate to the newness (ḥudūth ) and multiplicity of actions, temporality and multiplicity are attributed to it.

Likewise, the divine legislative will which is directed to the production of good deeds by voluntary agents, will be an attribute of essence in the sense of liking these actions because of their goodness, which is a manifestation of the goodness of the divine essence; it will be an attribute of action and be temporal in the sense of relation of legislation, which occurs in the temporal realm, by essential love.

Wisdom and the Best Order

Another of the divine attributes of action is the attribute of wisdom, whose essential origin is love of goodness and perfection, and knowledge of them. That is, since God, the Supreme, loves goodness and perfection, and also is aware of the aspects of goodness and perfection of existents,1 He creates creatures in such a way that they may possess as much goodness and perfection as possible. Of course, divine love is fundamentally directed to His own sacred essence, and subordinately to His creatures. The same fundamental and subordinate relations exist among creatures, as well, that

is, a creature without any imperfection other than that of being contingent and created and possessing all contingent perfections characterized by unity and simplicity, will be in the first rank of being loved and favored, and other creatures will be in the succeeding ranks according to their ontological ranks and perfections, until the level of material things is reached, where there is conflict among their ontological perfections. On the one hand, the continuation of existents that exist at a specific time slice conflicts with the appearance of the succeeding existents, and on the other hand, the perfection of some of them depends on the transformation and obliteration of others, as the growth and development of an animal or man is obtained by means of nourishment by vegetables and some other animals. The more perfect an existent is the more favored it will be.

It is here that divine wisdom requires an order that causes the occurrence of more and higher ontological perfections, that is, the chain of material causes and effects is created in such a way that to the extent possible the maximum number of creatures partake of the best perfections. This is what is called ‘the best order’ (niẓām-e aḥsan ) in the language of philosophy, and the attribute which necessitates this is called ‘providence’ (‘ināyah ).

The divine sages have proved that the order of creation is the best in two ways: one is from cause to effect (limmī ): divine love for perfection and goodness requires that the order of creation possess maximum perfection and goodness and that the imperfections and corruptions which are necessary for a material world and the interferences among corporeal existents be reduced to a minimum. In other words, it can be said that if God, the Supreme, had not created the world with the best order, this would be due to the fact that He lacked knowledge of the best order, or because He did not like it, or because He lacked the power to create it, or because He was stingy. In the case of God, the Wise and Gracious, none of these assumptions is correct. So, it is proven that the world possesses the best order.

The second way is from effect to cause (innī ): through the study of creation and inquiry into the secrets and wisdom and exigencies which are observed in their qualities and quantities. To the extent that human knowledge increases, awareness of the wisdom of creation also increases.

In view of divine wisdom, it becomes clear why the divine will is directed to specific cases, and in conclusion, the realm of things that are willed is more limited than the realm of things within divine power. This was the question which was raised at the end of the previous lesson. The answer is that only the cases within the perimeter of the best order are objects of divine will. This topic will become clearer in subsequent lessons. The position of those who have claimed that the divine will is only directed to those things which possess exigency, and that it is exigency which limits the divine will, should be interpreted in this way, otherwise, exigency is not an objective and entified thing to have an effect on the divine will, and the effects of an action cannot have an influence on its cause. Also, those who say that divine power, mercy, and will are conditioned by His wisdom should be interpreted in this way, otherwise, in the sacred divine essence it

does not make sense to say that there is a plurality of faculties or an interference among the attributes.

Reference

1 Cf., Lesson Thirty-Nine, in which there was an explanation of goodness and perfection.

Lesson Sixty-Eight: The Purpose of Creation

Introduction

One of the important problems of metaphysics and theology (kalām ) is the problem of the purpose of creation, which has been the subject of discussions and different views. On the one hand, some experts have denied that divine deeds have a purpose or final cause. On the other hand, there are those who consider the divine purpose to be to profit creatures; and there is a third group which believe in the unity of the efficient and final cause of immaterial entities.

In general, in this area there have been many views the citation and critique of which would become overlong. Therefore, first we will explain the concept of purpose and other similar philosophical expressions, then we will mention some useful introductory points in order to explain the problem and remove doubts about it, and finally, we will explain the correct meaning of divine purposefulness.

Purpose and Final Cause

The literal meaning of the wordhadaf (purpose) is target. In common conversation, it means the result of a voluntary action which is the aim of a voluntary agent from the beginning and for the sake of which the action is performed, so that if the result of the action had not been taken into account, the action would not have been performed.

The result of an action is called the end (ghāyah ) insofar as it is the terminus of the action; it is called the purpose (hadaf orgharaḍ ) insofar as it is taken into consideration and intended by the agent from the beginning; and it is called the final cause (‘illat-e ghā’ī ) insofar as the result of the action is desired and this desire is the cause for the will of the agent to be directed toward the performance of the action. However, that which really influences the performance of the action is knowledge and the love of the result, not its objective existence; rather, the objective result is the effect of the action, not its cause.

The termghāyah (end) is usually used in the sense of the terminus of a motion, and the relation between its instances and those of hadaf (purpose) is that of partial overlapping ( ‘umūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajh ), for, on the one hand, in natural motion no purpose can be considered for a natural agent, while the application of the concept of ghāyah to its terminus is correct. On the other hand, in creative acts in which there is no motion, the concept of final cause and effect can be correctly applied although there is no place here for ghāyah to have the sense of a terminus of motion. However, sometimes it is used in the sense of the final cause, and here one must take care not to confuse these two senses, and not to relate the characteristics of one to the other.

The relation between agent, action and result has been the topic of numerous philosophical discussions, some of which are presented in Lesson Thirty-Nine. Now we shall begin to explain some issues pertaining to the present discussion and which are useful for explaining the correct meaning of the divine purpose of creation.

Some Points

1. Usually, the voluntary actions of human beings are performed in this way: first, there appears the idea of the action and its result, an assent of the priority of the act for obtaining the result and the benefit accruing therefrom, followed by a yearning in the soul for the good, perfection and benefit resulting from that act. When requisite conditions obtain and obstacles are removed, one decides to perform the action, and, in fact, the main factor and stimulus for the performance of an action is the yearning for its benefits. Therefore, the final cause must be considered to be this yearning. That to which the yearning is directed is figuratively and accidentally called the final cause.

It must not be imagined that this process is necessary in all voluntary actions nor that if an agent lacks acquired knowledge and a yearning of the soul, his action will not be voluntary or lack a final cause. Rather, what is necessary in any voluntary action is knowledge and yearning in general, regardless of whether the knowledge is by presence or acquired, and whether the yearning is added to the essence or is the essence itself.

Therefore, the final cause of complete immaterial things is the same as the love of their own essences, which is subordinately directed to their effects as well, a love which is identical to the essence of its agent.

Therefore, for such cases, the efficient cause and the final cause is the essence of the agent.

2. As was indicated, an action is desired subordinate to the desire of the goodness and perfection that result from it. Therefore, the desirability of the purpose is prior to the desirability of the act, and the desirability of the act is subordinate and respectival.

However, the purpose taken into consideration in performing an action may itself be a preliminary for the achievement of a higher purpose and its desirability may take shape in the radiance of the desirability of another thing. But, ultimately, every agent will have a final and fundamental purpose and the intermediary and proximate purposes, and the preliminaries and means, all obtain their desirability in its radiance.

Anyway, the desirability of an action is subordinate and respectival, while the priority of purpose depends on the view, intention and motivation of the agent such that it is possible for a determined purpose to be intermediary for one agent and to be the final and fundamental purpose of another agent.

3. The fundamental desirability of a purpose, and the respectival desirability of an action and means appear in the form of a yearning in the soul, and the object of this yearning is an absent perfection realizable as an effect of the action. However, for completely immaterial entities, all of whose possible perfections actually exist, no lack of goodness or perfection can be imagined which might be attained by means of an action. In reality, it is the love of the existent perfections which is directed subordinately to its effects which causes the emanation of these effects, that is, it causes the performance of a creative action. Hence, the desirability of action of immaterial existents is respectival and subordinate, but subordinate to an existent perfection not to the desirability of an absent perfection.

4. The deeds one performs may have numerous effects, not all of which one is conscious of or motivated to acquire. Therefore, one usually performs an action in order to acquire one of its effects or results, although it is also possible that a deed may be performed for several parallel purposes.

However, in the case of completely immaterial entities, every good effect which results from an action is considered and desired, although the desirability of each of them may be subordinate to the desirability of an existent perfection in it. But it is possible that among the subordinate desirabilities there is a relation of relative priority and subordination. For example, although the existence of the cosmos and the existence of man, insofar as they are radiances from divine perfection, are subordinately desired by God, the Supreme, since man possesses more and higher perfections and the appearance of the cosmos is a preparation for man’s appearance, therefore, the desirability of man can be considered fundamental in relation to the desirability of the cosmos.

The Purposefulness of God, the Supreme

Given the points already made, it becomes clear that the existence of a final cause for every voluntary action is necessary, whether it is creative or preparatory, whether it is instantaneous or gradual, and whether the agency is intentional, by agreement, providential or manifesting.

In reality, the final cause is something in the essence of the agent, not an external result of the deed, and the application of the concept of final cause to an external result is figurative and accidental, because the love, satisfaction or yearning of the agent is directed toward the obtaining of it, and the finality of the external result of preparatory gradual deed, in the sense of being the terminus of motion, has no relation to a final cause. The essential end of motion is not the same as the essential final cause. (Take note.)

Therefore, divine deeds, insofar as they are voluntary, possess final causes and the fact that the divine Being is free of acquired knowledge and yearnings of the soul does not imply that the divine essence is without final causes. Likewise, this does not imply any lack of knowledge or love in the divine essence.

In other words, the denial of a motive and final cause additional to the essence for completely immaterial entities and for agents by providence, by agreement, and by manifestation, does not mean the absolute denial of purpose for them, nor that purpose is to be restricted to intentional agents. Just as the intellect obtains concepts from the attributes of the perfections of creatures, and after divesting them of their limitations and their material and contingent implications relates them to God, the Supreme, as positive attributes, the intellect also abstracts love of the good and perfection after divesting them of imperfection and contingency and establishes them for the divine essence and considers them final causes for His actions. Since all the divine attributes of essence are the same as His sacred essence, this attribute of love which is considered to be the final cause for creation and the source of His actual will, is the same as His essence, and, in conclusion, the efficient cause and the final cause for divine actions are the very same as His sacred essence.

Just as divine knowledge applies fundamentally to His sacred essence and subordinately to His creatures, which are aspects of His existence with differences in level and grade, divine love also applies fundamentally to His sacred essence and subordinately to the good and perfection of His creatures, and among them there is also a relative priority and subordination in being loved and desired. That is, the divine love for creatures applies in the first degree to the most perfect of them which is the first creature and then to other creatures, the most perfect [love] for the most perfect [creature],al-akmal fal-akmal . Even among material and corporeal entities among which there is no specific gradation, one may consider the more perfect to be the purpose for the creation of the less perfect, and conversely, one may consider material things to be preparatory to the appearance of man, “It is He who created for you all that is in the earth. ” (2:29) Finally, one can consider the love for the Perfect Man to be the final cause for the creation of the material cosmos. In this sense, it may be said that God, the Supreme, has created the material world for the perfection of corporeal existents and for the attainment of their actual good and perfection, for every existent which possesses different levels of perfection and imperfection, the most perfect level has a relative priority in being loved and desired. However, this does not imply that imperfect existents or the levels that are less perfect than the existence of some existent have no level of desirability at all.

In this way, one may consider there to be vertical purposes for the creation of man. That is, the final purpose is the attainment of the ultimate level of perfection, nearness to God, benefiting from the highest and most lasting emanation, eternal mercy and God’s pleasure. The intermediary purpose is the realization of worship of and obedience to God, the Supreme, which are means to the attainment of the higher stations and final purpose. The proximate purpose is the preparation of the material and social conditions and realization of the necessary knowledge for free choice of the right way of life and the spread of the worship of God in society.

For this reason, after emphasis that the creation of man and the world are not vain and absurd, and possess wisdom of purpose,1 one finds in the Qur’ān that, on the one hand, the purpose of the creation of the cosmos is to prepare the grounds for the free choice and trial of man,2 and on the other hand, the purpose of the creation of man is declared to be the worship of God, the Supreme.3 Finally, the ultimate purpose is considered to be proximity to the divine mercy and to benefit from eternal triumph, welfare and felicity.4

Considering that which has been said, a common approach among the three mentioned positions may be formulated. That is, what is meant by those who consider the final cause to be only the sacred divine essence is that the essential and fundamental object of desire for God, the Supreme, is nothing but His sacred essence which is absolute goodness and possesses infinite perfections. And what is meant by those who deny that divine actions have final causes is that the motive for them is not something additional to the essence, and His agency is not a kind of intentional agency. And what is meant by those who declare that the final cause and the purpose

of creation is the welfare of creatures or their perfection is that they wanted to explain the respectival and subordinate purposes. It may be concluded that one who holds any of these positions may interpret the other two in a way that is acceptable.

A point which must be indicated at the end of this lesson is that in discussions of will, wisdom, and the purpose of creation, we have relied upon the aspects of goodness and perfection of creatures. For this reason, the question arises as to how to justify their evils and imperfections. The answer to this question will be found in the last lesson of this section.

References

1 See 3:191; 38:27; 21:16-17; 44:38-39; 45:22; 14:19; 15:85; 16:3; 29:44; 30:8; 23:115.

2 See 11:7; 67:2; 18:7.

3 See 51:56; 36:61.

4 See 11:108, 119; 45:22; 3:15; 9:72.

Lesson Sixty-Nine: Divine Decree and Destiny

Introduction

One of the problems raised in heavenly religions, especially in the sacred religion of Islam, in the field of theology, which has been explained intellectually and philosophically by theologians (mutakallimīn ) and metaphysicians, is the problem of decree and destiny (qaḍā’ wa qadar ), which is one of the most complicated problems in theology and at the core of whose complexity is its relation to man’s free will in his voluntary actions, that is, how can one believe in divine decree and destiny while accepting the free will of man and man’s role in determining his own destiny?

Here, some have accepted the inclusiveness of the divine decree and destiny with respect to the voluntary actions of man but have denied true human freedom. Others have restricted the scope of decree and destiny to involuntary matters, and they consider the voluntary actions of man to be outside the limits of destiny and decree. A third group has tried to combine the inclusion of the voluntary actions of man in destiny and decree with a demonstration of man’s freedom and volition in choosing his own destiny. They have presented different views the review of which would require an independent book.

For this reason, here we shall first present a short explanation of the concept of decree and destiny, and then provide a philosophical analysis and explanation of the relation between destiny and man’s voluntary actions. Finally, we will explain the benefits of this discussion and the reasons for its emphasis in divine religions.

The Concepts of Destiny and Decree

The termqaḍā’ (decree) means passing, bringing to an end, finishing, and also means judgment (which, figuratively, is a kind of finishing). The termsqadar andtaqdīr mean measurement and measuring and building something to a determinate size. Sometimesqaḍā’ andqadar are used as synonyms in the sense of [the Persian]sarnevesht , destiny. It seems that the reason why the termnevesht (written) is used in the translation of the Arabic terms is that, according to religious teachings, the destinies (qaḍā’ wa qadar ) of existents are written in a book or tablet.

Regarding the difference between the literal meanings ofqaḍā’ and qadar , one can consider the stage of qadar to be prior to qaḍā’ , because until the measure of something is determined it does not come to completion, and this is the point which is indicated in many noble aḥādīth .

A Philosophical Explanation of Destiny and Decree

Some of the great scholars have identified destiny and decree with the causal relation among existents and have consideredqadar to be ‘the contingent relation between a thing and its incomplete causes,’ andqaḍā’ to be ‘the necessary relation between and effect and its complete cause.’ That is, when an effect is compared with each of the parts of its complete cause or with all of them, except for the last part, the relation will be one of contingency by analogy (imkān bil-qiyās ), and when it is compared to the

entire complete cause, the relation will be one of necessity by analogy (ḍarūrat bil-qiyās ), the former being calledqadar and the latterqaḍā’ .

Although in itself this identification is acceptable, that which requires more attention here is the relation of causes and effects to God, the Supreme, forqaḍā’ and qadar are basically divine attributes of action, and must be discussed as such.

In order to clarify the place of these attributes among the divine attributes, some points must be made about the levels which the intellect considers for the realization of an action.

Levels of Action

Whenever the intellect considers an whatness which does not have to exist or not exist, in other words, whose relations to existence and nothingness are equal, it judges that in order to escape this indifference another existent is needed, which is called its cause. This is the issue about which the philosophers have said, ‘the criterion of the need for a cause by an effect is whatish contingency (imkān-e māhuwī ).’ It was previously said that according to the fundamentality of existence, contingency of whatness must be replaced by ontological poverty (faqr wujūdī ).

If a cause is compounded of several things, all of its parts must be obtained in order for the effect to occur, for the assumption of the occurrence of an effect without one of the parts of its complete cause would mean the lack of efficiency of the absent part, and this would be contrary to the assumption that it is a part of the complete cause. Hence, when all the parts of a complete cause obtain, the existence of the effect due to its cause becomes “necessary by another” (wujūb bil-ghayr ), and it is here that the cause creates its effect and the effect comes into existence.

These stages, all of which are obtained by means of rational analysis, are explained in the language of the philosophers as follows: “Whatness is contingent, then in need, then is made necessary, then becomes necessary, then is made to exist, then comes to exist” (al-māhiyyatu amkanat, fa’ḥtājat, fa-ūjibat, fa-wajibat, fa-ūjidat, fa-wujidat ). The succession of stages of each of these concepts is distinguished by the “then” ( fa ) of succession.

On the other hand, we know that in intentional agents, the will of the agent is the last part of the complete cause, that is, although all the preparations for an action may be provided, the deed will not be performed until the agent wills to perform it. The occurrence of will depends on ideas and assertions and the acquisition of a fundamental yearning for the conclusion of the deed and a secondary yearning for the deed itself. Therefore, here a succession may be posited of idea, assertion, yearning for the conclusion, yearning for the deed, and finally the decision to perform the action, in which the idea and assertion include considering the characteristics, limits and preparations for the deed.

Although this succession in the origination of the will is specific to intentional agents, by divesting it of the aspects of imperfection it can be considered to be a rational succession including knowledge, fundamental love for the result and secondary love for the action in any voluntary agent. It can be concluded that every voluntary agent has knowledge of his own

action and its characteristics, and likes its consequence, and because of them performs the action.

Now, if we consider a deed which must be performed gradually and by bringing about causes and means and making preparations, it is necessary to consider the relation between the action and its preparations and temporal and spatial conditions. The preparations must be arranged in such a way that the action is performed with specific limits and characteristics so the desired result is obtained.

This review, evaluation, and estimation and the determination of limits and characteristics may be called the determination of the action (taqdīr-e kār ), which in the realm of knowledge is called epistemic- determination (taqdīr-e ‘ilmī ), and in the realm of the external world is called objective determination (taqdīr-e ‘aynī ). Likewise, the final stage may be called ‘decree’ (qaḍā’ ), which in the realm of knowledge is called ‘epistemic-decree’ and in the realm of the external world is called ‘objective decree’.

Given these introductory remarks, we should heed the following noble verse: “When He decrees an affair He only says to it, ‘Be’ and then it is ” (2:117). In this noble verse, the existence of every creature, which is denoted by the sentence “then it is,” succeeds the command “Be” of the Supreme Creator, which is similar to the succession of existence ( wujūd ) after being made existent ( ījād ) in the words of the divine sages. Likewise, making existent ( ījād ) succeeds the divine decree, which naturally will result in being the object of decree, and these two concepts (decreeing and becoming the object of the decree) may be compared to the terms ‘being made necessary’ and ‘becoming necessary.’ Since making necessary depends on the completion of the cause, and the last part of the cause of a voluntary action is the will of the agent, the level of will must be considered to be prior to the level of decree. “ His command, when He wills anything, is only to say to it: ‘Be,’ then it is ” (36:82).

The point to be noticed here is that, as was explained in previous chapters, action and the attributes of action, insofar as they are related to God, the Supreme, are free from temporal and spatial restrictions, but these restrictions are attributed to actions and attributes of actions insofar as they are related to temporal, gradual, material creatures. Therefore, there is no contradiction in saying that divine bringing into existence is instantaneous and without duration, but the existence of creatures is gradual and temporal. (Note carefully.)

In this way, a series of attributes of action is obtained at the head of which is knowledge and then will, then decree and finally making existent (ījād ) (imḍā’ , execution). The position of permission (idhn ) and divine will (mashiyyat ) can be considered as being between knowledge and will, just astaqdīr (destining) can be inserted between will and decree, and this accords with the noble narrations [from the Prophet and Imams (‘a )]. It should be added that determination of the term (temporal limits of existents) is also considered a part of destiny.

Given that the real bringing into existence is specific to God, the Supreme, and the existence of every existent is ultimately traced back to Him, we may conclude that everything (even man’s voluntary actions) is

included in divine decree and destiny, and here the main problem displays itself, that is, how can one combine decree and destiny with human volition?

The Relation of Destiny and Decree to Human Volition:

The problem of how to combine divine destiny and decree with human volition is the same problem which is raised with even greater intensity with regard to the unity of divine acts (tawḥīd af‘ālī ) in the sense of unity in the emanation of existence, whose solution was dealt with in Lesson Sixty-Four.

The conclusion drawn from the answer to this problem was that tracing an action to a proximate and direct agent and to God, the Supreme, has two levels, and divine agency is placed in a vertical position above man’s agency. It is not the case that the actions done by humans must either be traced to them or to God, the Supreme, but rather these actions, while they are traced to the will and volition of man, at a higher level, are traced to God, the Supreme. If it were not for the divine will, there would be no humans, no knowledge or power, no will or volition, and no action or consequence of any action. The existence of all of them in relation to God, the Supreme, is their very relation and attachment and dependency on Him. None of them has any sort of independence of their own.

In other words, the voluntary actions of man, with the attribution of being voluntary, are objects of divine decree (qaḍā’ ), and their being voluntary is part of characteristics and aspects of their being destined (taqdīr ). Hence, if they occur deterministically, that would be a violation of the divine decree.

The main source of the problem is that it is imagined that if a deed depends on divine decree and destiny, there will be no room for the agent’s volition and choice, while a voluntary action, disregarding the agent’s will, will not become necessary, and every effect depends upon divine decree and destiny only through its own causes.

It may be concluded that destiny and decree in the realm of knowledge are two levels of actual knowledge, one of which (epistemic-destiny) is abstracted from the discovery of the relation between the effect and its incomplete causes. The other (epistemic-decree) is abstracted from the discovery of the relation between the effect and its complete cause, and according to what is inferred from the verses of the Qur’ān andaḥādīth , the level of epistemic-destiny is related to ‘the tablet of clearing and establishing’ (lawḥ maḥw wa ithbāt ), and the level of epistemic-decree is related to ‘the guarded tablet’ (lawḥ maḥfūẓ ), and those who are able to become aware of these tablets will be aware of the knowledge related to them.

Objective destiny (taqdīr-e ‘aynī ) is the regulation of creatures so that they will be subject to specific phenomena and effects, and naturally, this destiny will be different for phenomena according to their proximity and distance, just as it will be different in relation to genus, species, individuals, and the states of individuals. For example, the destiny of the human species is to live on the earth from a determined time of origin to a determinate termination. The destiny of every individual is such that he comes into existence from a determinate mother and father in a limited slice of time. Likewise, the destinies of his livelihood and the various aspects of his life,

and his voluntary actions, amount to the availability of specific conditions for each of them.

The objective decree (qaḍā’-e ‘aynī ) is the attainment of every effect to the limits of ontological necessity through the occurrence of its complete cause, including the attainment of voluntary actions to their limits of necessity, by means of the will of their proximate agents. Since no creature is independent in existence and its ontological effects, naturally the necessitation of all phenomena may be traced back to God, the Supreme, Who possesses absolute self-sufficience and independence.

It must be noted that decree (qaḍā’ ), in this sense, is unchangeable. Therefore, that which is stated in some noble narrations about the change in ‘decree,’ means that the word ‘decree’ is used for destiny (taqdīr ), whose decisiveness is relative.

Meanwhile, it has become clear that the objective destiny, insofar as it is related to special relations among phenomena, is changeable. It is this sort of change in destinies which, in religious texts, is calledbadā’ (surprise). 1 It is related to the tablet of clearing and establishing: “ Allah clears away and establishes what He wills, and with Him is the Mother of the Book. ” (13:39). Subordinate to objective destiny, epistemic-destiny is also changeable, for epistemic-destiny is knowledge of contingent relations and the conditional occurrence of phenomena, not knowledge of necessary relations and the absolute occurrence of phenomena.

The Benefits of this Discussion

Given the emphasis which is placed on decree and destiny in religious teachings, the question arises as to why so much emphasis is placed on it.

The answer is that the belief in decree and destiny has two important benefits, theoretical and practical. Its theoretical benefit is an increase in the level of man’s spiritual knowledge with respect to the divine plan of things, and a preparation to understand the unity of divine actions in the sense of unity in the emanation of existence, and attention to the divine presence in the ordering of all aspects of the cosmos and man. The effects of this understanding are profound in the perfection of the soul in its intellectual dimension. Basically, the deeper and firmer man’s knowledge of divine attributes and actions is, the more perfect the soul is.

From the practical aspect, there are two important benefits to this doctrine: one is that when man knows that all the events of the cosmos appear on the basis of decree and destiny, and the wise ordering of God, he will bear with difficulties and hardships more easily, and will not give up in calamity and crisis, but he will be well prepared to acquire virtuous characteristics such as patience, gratitude, reliance on God, contentedness and submission.

Secondly, he will not become inebriated and conceited with the pleasures and joys of life, and he will not be enamored or infatuated with worldly pleasures and negligence of God. “So that you may not grieve for what has escaped you, nor be exultant at what He has given you; and Allah does not love any arrogant boaster ” (57:23).

Anyway, care must be taken so that the problem of decree and destiny is not incorrectly interpreted so as to provide an excuse for laziness,

complacency and a negation of one’s responsibilities, for this sort of misinterpretation of religious knowledge is the ultimate desire of the satans among men and genies. It causes one to fall into the deepest and most dangerous valleys of wretchedness in the world and in the hereafter. Perhaps it is for this reason that according to many narrations, entrance into this sort of problem for those who are incapable is forbidden.