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Lesson Six: What is Philosophy?

The Relation between Subjects and Problems

We have thus far become acquainted with various philosophical terms, and now it is time to clarify the subject of discussion of this book, and to explain what we mean by philosophy and what problems are to be discussed in this book. Before defining philosophy and giving a brief introduction to its problems, it is good to provide some further explanation about “subject”, “problem” and “principles” of the sciences and the relations among them.

In the previous lessons we said that the term “science” according to four of the five mentioned meanings is applied to a collection of propositions which are considered to be interrelated. Furthermore, it became clear that different relations distinguish the separate sciences. It has also become evident that the best relation among different problems to be considered as a standard for distinguishing among the sciences is the relevance among their subjects, that is, the problems whose subjects comprise the parts of a whole or the particulars of a universal take the form of a single science.

Therefore, the problems of a science consist of propositions whose subjects are under the umbrella of an inclusive topic (whole or universal). The subject of a science is that very inclusive topic which embraces the subjects of its problems.

Here we had better mention that it is possible for a topic to be the subject of two or more sciences, and that the differences among them may be due to their goals or methods of research. However, another point must not be overlooked, which is that sometimes a topic which is considered for the subject of a science is not absolutely the subject of that science, and in reality it has a specific restriction, and the differences among these restrictions for a single subject causes the appearance of several sciences and the differences among them. For example, “matter”, with regard to its internal composition and characteristics related to synthesis and analysis of elements becomes the subject of the science of chemistry, and with regard to its outward changes and the characteristics appropriate to them it becomes the subject of the science of physics. Another example is “word”, which with regard to changes which occur in its construction becomes the subject of the science of morphology, and with regard to the changes in inflection it becomes the subject of the science of syntax.

Therefore, one should be careful about whether the inclusive topic is the subject of a certain science absolutely, or with specific restrictions and qualifications. How often an inclusive topic becomes the subject of a general science absolutely, and then with the addition of restrictions it takes the form of subjects for specific sciences. For example, in the well known classification of philosophy according to the ancients, body is the subject of all the natural sciences, and by adding restrictions it takes the form of the subjects of mineralogy, botany and zoology, etc. Regarding the quality of the branches of the sciences, it was indicated that some divisions are obtained by restricting the scope of a subject and by adding qualifications to the topic of the mother subject.

Among the possible qualifications to add to the topic of the subject is “the restriction of absoluteness” (qayd iṭlāq ), which means that in that science principles are discussed which are proved for the essence of the subject generally, or absolutely, without considering any specific characteristics. In conclusion, it is to include all individuals of the subject. For example, the principles and qualifications are established for body in general, absolutely, whether mineral or organic, whether vegetable or animal or human. In this way one can determine the subject to be “absolute body”, and this sort of problem may be further specified to specific sciences. The sages have thus specified the first section of physics to cover such principles with the namessamā‘ ṭabī‘ī (elementary general physics) andsamā‘ al-kiyān (elementary general astronomy), then they specified the groups of bodies for specific sciences such as cosmology, mineralogy, botany and zoology.

This same work can be done for more particular subdivisions of the sciences. For example, the problems related to all animals can be taken as a specific science whose subject is the animal, absolutely, or animal qua animal. Then specific principles may be discussed for each kind of animal in other more specialized sciences.

In this way, body in general makes up the subject matter for the section of ancient philosophy called natural science, and absolute body makes up the subject of the first part of physicssamā‘ ṭabī‘ī (elementary general physics). Each of the specific bodies, such as the cosmic bodies, the mineral bodies and living bodies make up the subjects of cosmology, mineralogy and biology. In the same way, living body in general makes up the subject of the science of general biology, and absolute living body makes up the subject of a science which discusses the principles of all living existents. and the kinds of living existents form the subjects of the particular branches of biology.

Here a question may be posed as to if a principle is common among several kinds of universal subjects, but does not include all of them, in which science should such principles be investigated? For example, if something is common among several kinds of living existents, it cannot be considered an accidental property of living body absolutely, for it does not include all living existents, but on the other hand, to abandon it to any of the relevant particular sciences would be repetitive. So, where must it be placed?

The answer is that usually this sort of problem is also discussed in a science whose subject of discussion is absolute, and the principles of absolute subjects (‘awāriḍ dhātiyah , essential accidents) are defined as follows: a principle which is established for the essence of the subject before being modified by the qualifications of the particular sciences. Really, the looseness of this definition is preferable to the repetition of the problem. As in the case of first philosophy or metaphysics, some philosophers have said that in it precepts and accidents are discussed which are established for an absolute existent (or an existentqua existent), prior to being qualified by the qualification of ‘natural’ or ‘mathematical’.

The Principles of the Sciences and their Relationships with Subjects and Problems

We have found that in each science a series of appropriately related propositions, and in reality, the proximate aim and motivation for learning and teaching that science is to analyze those propositions, that is to prove that their predicates are true of their subjects. So, in every science it is assumed that a subject exists, and that predicates may be proved true of parts or individuals of this subject.

Therefore, before dealing with the presentation and analysis of the problems of any science, one needs to have prior knowledge of a series of things:

1. knowledge of the whatness and concept of the subject,

2. knowledge of the existence of the subject,

3. knowledge of principles by means of which the problems of that science are solved.

Such knowledge is sometimes self evident and without need of exposition or acquisition, in which case there would be no difficulty. But sometimes this knowledge is not self evident and needs exposition and proof. For example, it is possible that the existence of a subject (such as the spirit of man) is a matter of controversy, and it is considered possible that it is a fantasy and unreal, and in such a case its real existence must be proven. Likewise, it is possible for there to be some doubt about the principles on the basis of which the problems of a science are solved, and so it is necessary that these principles are first proven, otherwise the conclusions which are derived from them will not have scientific value and certainty.

These sorts of matters are called “the principles of the sciences” (mabādī ‘ulūm ), and they are divided into conceptual (taṣawwur ī ) principles and assertive (taṣdīqī ) principles.

The conceptual principles which consist of the definitions and expositions of the whatnesses of the things under discussion, are usually presented in the science itself in the form of an introduction. However, the assertive principles of a science are different. Often they are discussed in other sciences. As was previously indicated, the philosophy of each science is really another science which undertakes the explanation and establishment of the principles of that science. Finally, the most general principles of the sciences are discussed and investigated in first philosophy or metaphysics.

Among them, one may mention the “principle of causality ” which is relied upon by the scholars of all the empirical sciences. Basically, scientific research is done with the prior acceptance of this principle, for this research revolves around the discovery of causal relations among phenomena, but this principle itself is not provable in any empirical science, and the discussion of this principle takes place in philosophy.

The Subjects and Problems of Philosophy

From what has been said it follows that the best way to define a science is by specifying its subject, and if it has restrictions, they should be subject

to exact attention. Then the problems of that science may be introduced as propositions which revolve about the above mentioned subjects.

On the other hand, the specification of a subject and its qualifications depends on determining the problems which are intended for the exposition of a science, that is, it is to a certain extent dependent on convention and agreement. For example, if we consider the topic “existent”, which is the most general concept for a real thing, we will see that all the subjects of real problems come under its umbrella. If we consider the subject of science, it will include all the problems of the real sciences, and this science is philosophy itself, in the sense of the ancients.

The presentation of such an inclusive science is not compatible with the aims of the classification of the sciences. There is no choice but to consider the subjects in a more limited way in order to fulfill the mentioned goals. The ancient teachers first considered two groups of theoretical problems each of which revolved about its own specific set of issues. One group of them was called physics and the other was called mathematics. Then each of these was divided into more particular sciences. A third group of theoretical problems about God also could be presented, and it is called theology (ma‘rifat al-rubūbiyyah ). However, another group of theoretical intellectual problems remains, whose subjects go beyond those already mentioned, and it is not specified to any particular subject.

It seems that for these problems they did not find any particular name to be appropriate, and since it was discussed after physics it was called metaphysics (mā ba‘d al-ṭabī‘ah ). The position of these problems in relation to the other problems of the theoretical sciences is the same as the position of elementary physics with relation to the natural sciences, and just as the subject of the former is “the absolute body”, the subject of metaphysics is “the absolute existent” or “the existent qua existent”, so that only problems which are not specified to the subjects of any particular science are presented under it, although these problems (of metaphysics) do not include all existents.

In this way the specific science called metaphysics came to exist, and later was called “the universal science” (‘ilm kullī ) or “first philosophy” (falsafah ūlā ).

As we previously indicated, during the Islamic era the problems of metaphysics were assimilated to the problems of theology and was called divinity in the general sense (ilāhiyyāt bi al-ma`nā al-a‘m ). Oc- casionally other problems, such as those of resurrection and the means to man’s eternal felicity, and even some problems concerning prophecy and imamate also are appended to it, as is seen in the section on divinity in (Ibn Sīnā ’s) Shifā‘ . If all of these problems are considered to be the main problems of one science, and none of them are impositions or digressions, then the subject of this science would have to be considered very broadly. The determination of a single subject for such various problems would be no easy task. For the same reason, various attempts have been made to determine the subject and to explain that all of these predicates are essential properties ( awāriḍ dhātiyyah ) of it, though it has not been very successful.

Anyway, there are three alternatives: either, theoretical problems other than physics and mathematics may be considered as a single science with a single affected subject, or the standards and criteria of their coherence and unity is to be taken as the unity of their aims and ends, or every group of problems which has a specific subject is to be taken as a specific science, including the universal problems of existence, which are discussed under “first philosophy”, according to one of the specific senses of “philosophy”.

It seems that this last is the most suitable of the alternatives, and that therefore the various problems in Islamic philosophy which are presented as philosophy andḥikmat , are considered to be several specific sciences. In other words, we will have a series of philosophical sciences all of which share a rational method, but we will apply the term absolute philosophy to “first philosophy”, and the main purpose of this book is to present the problems of first philosophy. However, since their solutions depend on the problems of knowledge, we must first present epistemology and then we may review the problems of ontology and metaphysics.

The Definition of Philosophy

Considering that philosophy is equivalent to first philosophy or metaphysics, and its subject is the absolute existent (not the existent absolutely), we can define it as follows: a science which discusses the states of the absolute existent; or a science which addresses the general states of existence; or a set of propositions and problems regarding the existent in so far as it is an existent.

Several characteristics of philosophy have been mentioned, among the most important of which are the following.

1. Contrary to the empirical and narrative sciences, the method for solving the problems of philosophy is the rational method, although this method is also employed in logic, theology, philosophical psychology and some other sciences such as ethics, and even in mathematics. Therefore, this method is not particular to first philosophy.

2. Philosophy undertakes to prove the assertions which are the principles of the other sciences, and this is one of the ways in which the other sciences stand in need of philosophy. Hence, philosophy is called the mother of the sciences.

3. In philosophy a criterion is obtained for distinguishing true states of affairs from imaginary and spurious ones, and hence, the main purpose of philosophy is sometimes considered to be knowledge of true states of affairs and the distinction of them from illusion, but it is better to consider this as the purpose of epistemology.

4. The characteristic of philosophical concepts is that they are not obtained from the senses or experience, such as the concepts of cause and effect, necessary and contingent, material and immaterial. These concepts are technically called philosophical secondary intelligibles, and they are explained in the section on epistemology.

In view of these characteristics one can find out why philosophical problems only can be proved by the rational method, and why philosophical laws are not obtained by way of generalizing from the laws of the empirical sciences.

Lesson Seven: The Position of Philosophy

The Essence of the Problems of Philosophy

In the previous lesson a definition of philosophy was presented, and it was concluded in brief that this science discusses the general states of existence. However, this is not sufficient to discover the essence of philosophical problems. Of course, the exact understanding of these problems is achieved when they are in practice investigated in detail, and naturally, the more deeply one delves into them and comprehends them, the better one will know the truth about them. However, before beginning, if we are able to obtain a clearer view of the problems of philosophy, we will be better able to understand the benefits of philosophy, we will proceed with more insight and vision and with increased eagerness and interest.

For this purpose, we begin by mentioning some examples of other problems of the philosophical sciences, indicated the difference between them and the problems of other sciences. Finally, we will deal with the explanation of the essence of first philosophy and the characteristics of its problems.

For every man, this basic and vital question is presented: Is his life ended with death, and after it is there nothing left but the decayed parts of his body, or is there a life after death?

It is clear that the answer to this question cannot be obtained from any of the empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry, geology, botany, biology, and others like them. Likewise the calculations of mathematics and the equations of algebra contain no answers to these questions. Hence, another science is needed to investigate these and similar problems with its own methodology, and to clarify whether man is merely this physical body or whether he has another reality which cannot be sensed called the spirit. On the hypothesis that there is a spirit, is it able to persist after death or not?

It is obvious that the investigation of this sort of problem is not possible by the methods of the empirical sciences. Rather, one should use rational methods to solve such problems. Naturally, another science is needed to investigate such nonempirical problems. This is‘ilm al-nafs , or philosophical psychology.

Likewise, other problems, such as those of the will, and volition which are the basis of human responsibility, must be established in this science.

The existence of such a science and the value of the ways of solving problems presented in it depend upon the proof of the existence of the reason and the value of rational knowledge. Therefore, another science is needed to investigate the sorts of knowledge and to evaluate them until it becomes known what intellectual perceptions are, and what value they may have, and what problems they can solve. This is also another philosophical science called epistemology.

Regarding the practical sciences, such as morals and politics, there are also basic and important problems which the empirical sciences cannot solve, including the recognition of the truth of moral good and evil, virtue and vice, and the standards for determining and distinguishing praiseworthy

and blameworthy deeds. Inquiry into this sort of question needs a specific philosophical science or sciences, which in turn are in need of epistemology.

With more careful attention it becomes clear that these problems are interrelated, and as a whole are related to the problems of theology, the study of the God Who has created the body and spirit of man and all existents of the world; the God Who manages the cosmos with a special order; the God Who causes people to die and again will raise them to life to be rewarded or punished for their good and bad deeds, good and bad deeds which are performed with volition and free will, etc..

Knowledge of God the Almighty and His attributes and deeds form a series of problems which will be investigated in the science of theology (divinity in the specific sense).

All of these problems are based on a series of more general and more universal problems, whose scope also embraces sensory and material affairs, such as the following.

Existents are in need of one another for their generation and persistence, and among them there are passive and active relations, actions and reactions, and causes and effects. All existents which are within the range of man’s sense and experience are perishable, but there must be another existent which is imperishable, and rather for which nothingness and imperfection are barred. The arena of being is not restricted to material and sensible existents, nor is it restricted to changing, altering and moving existents, rather there are other kinds of existents which do not have these characteristics and are not in need of time and place.

The discussion about whether change, alteration, perishability and dependency are implications of being, in other words whether there is a stable, fixed, imperishable and independent existent, is a discussion whose positive resolution leads to a classification of existents into the material and the immaterial, the stable and changing, the Necessary Existence and contingent existence, etc.. Until this sort of problem is solved, for example, until necessary existence and immaterial existences are established, sciences such as theology, philosophical psychology and the like will have no basis or foundation. It is not only the solution to such problems which requires rational argument, but if one wishes to disprove these matters this also requires the employment of rational methods, for just as sensation and experience by themselves are unable to prove these things, they are also unable to disprove or deny them.

In this way, it has become clear that there is a series of important and basic problems for man which cannot be answered by any of the specific sciences, not even by the specific philosophical sciences. There must be another science by which to inquire into them, and this is metaphysics, the general science, first philosophy whose subject is not specific to a kind of existent or determined and particular essence. Inevitably, its subject must be the most universal concept which is applicable to all real and objective things, and this is the term “existent”. Of course, what is meant is not existent in that respect in which it is material, and not in that respect in which it is immaterial, but rather in that respect in which it is an existent,

that is, the absolute existent, or existent in so far as it is an existent. Such a science has the position of being what is called “the mother of the sciences”.

The Principles of Philosophy

In the previous lesson it was said that before beginning to solve the problems of any science, one should recognize the principles of that science. So, we may now ask, “What are the principles of philosophy?” “And in what science should these be determined?”

The answer is that the recognition of the conceptual principles of the sciences, that is, the knowledge of the concept and essence of the subject of the science, and the concepts of the subjects of the problems of the science usually are obtained in that very science itself. In this way, the definition of the subject is presented in the introduction to the text, and the definitions of the particular subjects of the problems are defined in the introductions to each discussion. However, the subject of philosophy (existent) and its concept are self-evident and in no need of definition. Therefore, philosophy has no need for these conceptual principles. However, the subjects of its problems, as in other sciences, are defined at the beginning of every discussion.

The assertive principles of the sciences are divided into two groups: one is the affirmation of the existence of the subject, and the other is the principles which are employed for the establishment and determination of the problems of the science. However, the existence of the subject of philosophy has no need of being established, for the principle of being is self-evident, and is undeniable by any rational person. At least every one is aware of the existence of themselves, and this suffices for knowing that the concept of “existent” has an instance. Hence, other instances may be discussed and investigated. In this way a problem appears for philosophy about which the sophists, skeptics and idealists on the one hand, and other philosophers on the other hand have disagreed.

As for the second group of assertive principles, that is the principles which are the basis for solving problems, these are divided into two groups: one is the theoretical principles (i.e., not self-evident), which must be proved in another science, and are called the conventional principles, and as was previously indicated the most general conventional principles are established in first philosophy, that is, some of the philosophical problems are used to establish the conventional principles of other sciences. First philosophy itself basically has no need for such conventional principles, although it is possible that in other philosophical sciences, such as theology, philosophical psychology, and ethics, principles may be employed which are established in first philosophy or in some other philosophical science, or even in an empirical science.

The second group of principles are self-evident propositions which have no need to be proven or explained, such as the proposition of the impossibility of a contradiction. The problems of first philosophy need nothing more than such principles, and these principles do not need to be proven, let alone to be proven in another science. Therefore, first philosophy has no need for any other science, whether rational or empirical or narrative. This is one of the most important characteristics of this science, although

logic and epistemology are exceptions, because the reasoning for the establishment of philosophical problems is on the basis of the principles of logic, and it is on this basis that philosophical truths are capable of being known rationally, that is, the existence of the intellect and its ability to solve the problems of philosophy be settled. But it may be said that what is basically needed by philosophy are the self-evident principles of logic and epistemology, which cannot really be considered “problems” and to be in need of proving, and the explanation which are given of them are really explanations for admonition. Further explanation of this is to be found in Lesson Eleven.

The Aim of Philosophy

The proximate and immediate aim of any science is the awareness of man of the problems which are presented in that science, and the quenching of man’s innate thirst for understanding the truth. For one of the basic human instincts is the instinct to search for the truth or unquenchable limitless curiosity. The satisfaction of this instinct fulfills one of man’s psychological needs, although this instinct is not equally active and animated in all individuals, but in no individual is it completely dormant and ineffective.

Normally every science has indirect benefits and consequences which somehow influence man’s material and spiritual life and fulfills man’s other natural and innate desires. For example, the natural sciences prepare the ground for the greater exploitation of nature and a better material life, and are related by a single intermediary to man’s natural and animal life. The mathematical sciences are two removes from these aims, although they may also have influence in another way on the spiritual life and human dimension of man, and this is when they are mingled with knowledge of philosophy and divinity and gnostic (‘irfānī ) attention of the heart, and when they present the phenomena of nature in the form of effects of the power, greatness, wisdom and mercy of God.

The relation of the spiritual and human dimensions of man to the philosophical sciences is closer than the relation to the natural sciences, and, as was indicated, the natural sciences are also related to the human dimension of man with the aid of the philosophical sciences. This relation is manifested in theology and then in philosophical psychology and ethics more than in others. For divine philosophy acquaints us with God, the Supreme, and we become aware of the attributes of beauty and majesty, which prepares the ground for our relation to the source of infinite knowledge, power and beauty. The philosophical science of the soul (‘ilm al-nafs ) facilitates knowledge of the spirit and its attributes and characteristics, and makes us aware of the essence ( jawhar ) of humanity, and extends our vision in relation to the truth of our own selves, and leads us beyond nature and beyond the limited bounds of time and place, and it brings us to understand that man’s life is not limited and restricted to narrow dark framework of worldly and material life. Ethics and morals show the general way to the adornment and trimming of the spirit and heart, and the acquisition of eternal felicity and ultimate perfection.

As was previously indicated, in order to obtain all of this valuable knowledge, the problems of epistemology and ontology must be solved. Hence, first philosophy is the key to these precious and unending treasures which promise felicity and eternal benefits. It is the blessed root of the “good tree” which produced the fruits of various spiritual and intellectual virtues and boundless spiritual and divine perfections. It plays the largest role in preparing the ground for human perfection and sublimity.

In addition to this, philosophy provides worthy help with the avoidance of Satanic temptations and the rejection of materialism and atheism. It safeguards one from intellectual perversions, lapses and deviations. It provides one with undefeatable arms in the arena of the combat of ideas. It enables one to defend correct views and tendencies and to attack and charge invalid and incorrect thoughts.

Therefore, in addition to playing a positive and uniquely constructive role, philosophy also has an irreplaceable defensive and combative role. In the expansion of Islamic culture and the destruction of anti-Islamic cultures, it is highly effective.

Lesson Eight: The Method of Philosophical Inquiry

The Evaluation of the Rational Method

In the previous lessons it has been repeatedly said that philosophical problems must be investigated by the rational method, and that the empirical method is of no use in this area. However, those who have come more or less under the influence of positivist thinking imagine that this is reason for the imperfection and worthlessness of philosophical thought, because they think that the empirical method is the only sure and scientific method and that no certain conclusions can be obtained by the rational method.

On this basis, some imagine that philosophy is the infancy of the sciences and they consider it to be the duty of philosophy to present hypotheses for solving scientific problems, and even Karl Jaspers, the German existentialist philosopher, writes: “Philosophy yields no certain knowledge... and as soon as knowledge is accepted by all as certain with decisive reasons, then that knowledge cannot be considered philosophical, but rather, it at once becomes transformed into scientific knowledge.”

Others who have been intimidated by Western industrial and scientific progress reason that Western scientists have achieved bewildering and daily increasing scientific progress only when they abandoned the deductive and rational methods and began to employ the inductive and empirical methods. Evolutionary progress was especially hastened since the time of Francis Bacon, who emphasized the empirical method. This is the best reason for the superiority of the empirical method to the rational method.

Unfortunately, some of the new Muslim thinkers and imitators who accept this reason would hang a medal of honor on the chest of Muslim scholars as if they had been inspired by the Noble Qur’an to confront and challenge Greek culture and to replace the deductive and rational method by the inductive and empirical method, so that later, the influence of Islamic culture in Europe would cause the awakening of Western scientists and their awareness of this victorious method.

This fantasy has gone so far that some of the ignorant imagine that the research method which is presented by the Noble Qur’an for solving all problems is none other than the empirical and positivist method. They even imagine that the problems of theology,fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and morals must be investigated by this method!

Of course, it should come as no surprise that those whose eyes are fixed on that which is given by the senses, who have closed their eyes to that which is beyond sensory perception, who have denied the power of reason and rational understanding and who consider rational and metaphysical concepts to be invalid and meaningless(!) should also deny any place for philosophy among the human sciences. They consider it to have no role but explaining some terms current in languages, and that its dignity must be reduced to that of linguistics. They present its function to be that of offering hypotheses for the solution of the problems of the sciences. This is most unfortunate, that someone who calls himself a Muslim, who is acquainted with the Qur’an, should relate such intellectual perversions and decadence

to the Noble Qur’an. They consider this to be cause for the honor of Islam and for Muslim scholars.

Here, we do not intend to criticize positivist ideas, which are the basis of such fantasies, and in comparative discussions these will become more or less familiar. However, we consider it necessary to explain more about the rational and empirical methods so that the weakness of the arguments which have been made in this area become clear.

Analogy, Induction and Deduction

Attempts to discover what is unknown on the basis of what is known are of three forms:

1. Inference from particulars to another particular, that is, when two subjects are similar to one another and a judgment about one of them is known, we may infer the same judgment about the other, on the basis of the similarity which exists between the two of them. For example, if two people are similar and one of them is intelligent, we say that the other is also intelligent. In logical terms this is calledtamthīl (analogy) and in the terminology offiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) it is calledqiyās . It is obvious that the mere similarity of two things does not imply that the common judgment about them is certain, and thus, analogy is of no use for obtaining certainty and has no scientific worth.

2. Inference from particulars to a universal, that is, when we investigate the individuals of one essence and it is found that they share a common property, we may infer that this property holds of the essence, and that it occurs in all of its instances. In logical terms this is called induction, and it is divided into two kinds: complete induction and incomplete induction.

In complete induction it is assumed that all the individuals under consideration are investigated and that their common property is observed in all of them. It is clear that in practice this is impossible, for even if all the present instances of a whatness could be investigated, there would be no way to investigate all past and future instances. At the very least, the possibility would remain that in the past or in the future there could be instances of that essence.

Incomplete induction occurs when many of the instances of a whatness are observed and a property common to them is attributed to all individuals of that essence. But this intellectual inference will not lead to certainty, for there will always be the possibility, no matter how weak, that some of the individuals which have not been investigated lack this property.

Therefore, in practice, certain and indubitable conclusions cannot be obtained by induction.

3. Inference from universals to a particular, that is, first a predicate is proved for a universal subject and on the basis of this the judgment about the particulars of that subject becomes clear. In logic this sort of intellectual inference is calledqiyās (deduction), and it yields certainty under the conditions that its premises are certain and the deduction also has a valid form. Logicians have allocated an important section of classical logic to the explanation of the material and formal conditions of certain deduction, proof.

There is a famous problem which has been raised regarding deduction. If a judgment is known to hold generally, the application of that judgment to all instances of the subject will also be known. But then there would be no need for the formulation of a deductive argument. The scholars of logic have answered that a judgment for a major premise may be known in summary form, but in the conclusion it becomes known in detail. Meditation on the problems of mathematics and the ways of solving them shows how useful deduction is, for the method of mathematics is that of deduction, and if this method were not useful, none of the problems of mathematics could be solved on the basis of mathematical principles.

A point which must be mentioned here is that in analogy and induction there is a hidden form of deduction, but nevertheless, in the cases of analogy and incomplete induction this deduction does not constitute a proof and is of no use for obtaining certainty. If, however, this sort of hidden deduction did not exist, there could be no form of inference at all, no matter how speculative. The hidden deduction of analogy is this: this judgment is true for one of the similar objects, and every judgment which is true of one of a pair of similar objects is also true of the other. It is to be noted that the major premise of this deduction is not certain. In incomplete induction there is a similar speculative deduction, that is, there is a suppressed major premise in it such as: “Every judgment which is proved for many individuals of a whatness is proven for all the individuals of that essence.” Even if induction is considered valid by way of the probability calculus, it will still need deduction. Likewise, empirical propositions are in need of deduction if they are to take the form of universal propositions, as is explained in the books of logic.

It is to be concluded that reasoning about a problem always must take the form of an inference from universal to particular, although this intellectual inference will sometimes be performed explicitly and clearly, as in logical deduction, and sometimes in a hidden form, as in analogy and induction. Sometimes it yields certainty, as in deductive proofs and complete induction, and sometimes it does not bring certainty, as in rhetorical and polemical deductions, analogy and incomplete induction.

Rational Method and Empirical Method

As was previously mentioned, deduction brings certainty when in addition to having a valid form, and satisfies logical conditions, each of its premises is also certain. If certain propositions themselves are not self-evident, inevitably they should lead to self-evident ones, that is they should be inferred from propositions which have no need of rational proof.

Logicians have divided self-evident propositions (badīhiyyāt ) into two general groups: primary self-evident propositions and secondary self-evident propositions. One of the types of secondary self-evident propositions is considered to be “empirical” (mujarrabāt ), that is, propositions which are obtained by experience. According to them the experience is not a method which is the opposite of the deductive method, and it not only includes the deductive method but it may also serve as one of the premises in another deduction. Therefore, it is not proper to equate induction and experience nor to take deduction and experience as opposites!

Of course, experience has a variety of other meanings, but this is not the proper place to discuss them. However, taking the empirical method to be the opposite of the rational method is based on considering the rational method to be limited to the deductive method where the only premises are those of pure reason. These premises are those which are either primary self-evident propositions or are implied by them (not merely by empirical propositions), such as all of the syllogistic proofs which are employed in first philosophy, mathematics and for many of the problems of the philosophical sciences. The difference between this and the empirical method is not that one of them employs deduction and the other induction. Rather, the difference is that the rational method is supported solely by primary self-evidence while the empirical method is supported by empirical premises, which are considered to be secondary self-evident propositions. Far from being a flaw in the rational method this is the greatest distinction of the rational method.

Conclusions

With the points which have been mentioned here in summary form, it becomes clear how weak and far from the truth are the positions mentioned [of the positivists], because:

Firstly, it is not correct to equate experience and induction.

Secondly, it is incorrect to consider the empirical method as the opposite of the deductive method.

Thirdly, neither induction nor experience is without need of deduction.

Fourthly, both the rational and empirical methods are deductive, and the distinction of the rational method is that it relies upon primary self-evident propositions, contrary to the empirical method which relies upon empirical propositions, premises whose value never reaches the level of the value of primary self-evident propositions.

It should be noted that this topic requires further explanation and investigation; and some of principles of classical logic are debatable, while we have merely indicated the materials necessary to the extent required to dispel some fantasies in this regard.

The Scope of the Rational and Empirical Methods

Despite the advantages which the rational method has over the empirical method, it is not applicable to all sciences, and likewise, the empirical method has its own specific scope and cannot be applied to philosophy and mathematics.

Of course, this division between the ranges of these methods is not conventional, but is required by the nature of the problems of the sciences. The kind of problem in the natural sciences requires that they be solved by the empirical method and from premises obtained by sensory experience, for the concepts which are used in these sciences and which make up the subjects and predicates of their propositions are those which are obtained from sensible things. Naturally, sensory experiences are also required to prove them.

For example, merely by using philosophical and rational analysis, no philosopher, no matter how much mental effort he makes, can discover that

bodies are composed of molecules and atoms, or what elements must be combined to form a given chemical matter and what properties it will have, or what living existents are composed of, and under what material conditions they survive, and what things cause sickness in animals and humans, and how various diseases may be cured and treated, so this sort of problem and thousands of others like them can only be solved by the empirical method.

On the other hand, the problems which are related to immaterial things can never be solved by means of sensory experience, nor can they be denied by the empirical sciences. For example, with what sensory experience, and in what laboratory, and by means of what scientific instruments can the spirit and immaterial things be discovered or their absence be established? Furthermore, it is the propositions of first philosophy which are composed of secondary philosophical intelligibles, that is, of concepts which are obtained by means of mental effort and rational analysis. It is only possible to prove or disprove their relations or unity by means of reason. This sort of problem must be solved by the rational method and by reliance on rational self-evident propositions.

From this, it becomes clear how weak the position is of those who confuse the ranges of the empirical and rational methods and who try to establish the superiority of the empirical method over the rational method, and who imagine that the ancient philosophers only used the rational method, and that it is for this reason that they were unable to make successful scientific discoveries. However, the ancients also used the empirical method in the natural sciences, and among them Aristotle, with the help of Alexander of Macedonia prepared a large garden in Athens, and grew various kinds of plants and animals there, and he himself observed their states and characteristics. The rapid advance of modern scientists must be considered to be the result of the discovery of new scientific instruments, their endeavors to solve natural and material problems, and the focusing of their thoughts and ideas on discovery and invention, not a result of a turning of their backs on the rational method and its replacement by the empirical method.

Let it not remain unsaid that in cases in which the means and instruments of experience were insufficient for solving a given problem, the ancient philosophers tried to compensate for this deficiency by postulating hypotheses, and probably, in order to confirm or explain these hypotheses they sought the help of the rational method. However, this was due to the immaturity of their philosophical thought and the inadequacy of their empirical instruments, not an indication of their failure to heed or underestimation of the empirical method, and this is no reason to think that the function of philosophy is to provide hypotheses and the function of science to confirm them by scientific methods. Basically, in that period, there was no distinction between science and philosophy, and all of the empirical sciences were also considered to be parts of philosophy.