Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

References

1 By essence (dhāt ) is meant the thing itself, the reality of the thing. This is to be distinguished from the whatness or quiddity, which is the descriptive answer to the Aristotelian question, ‘What is it?’.

2 These words are commonly attributed to Imam Ḥusayn (‘a ) and are included in standard printings of his Supplication of the Day of ‘Arafah, although Muḥammad Bāqir Majlīsī (1037/1628 - 1110/1699) expresses doubts about the authenticity of this part of the supplication and opines that it is the work of a ṣūfī shaykh. See William Chittick, “A Shadhili Presence in Shi‘ite Islam”,Sophia Perennis, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1970, pp. 97-100, where it is pointed out that the section is from themunājāt attributed to Ibn ‘Aṭā’illāh (d. 709/1309), included in the translation by Victor Danner,Ṣūfī Aphorisms (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1985), p. 66, paragraph 19.

Lesson Fourteen: Acquired Knowledge

The Necessity for the Survey of Acquired Knowledge

We saw that knowledge by presence is the finding of reality itself, and that therefore there is no way to have doubt or scruple about it. But we know that the range of presentational knowledge is limited and by itself it cannot provide a solution to the problems of epistemology. If there were no way to ascertain facts by means of acquired knowledge, we would not logically be able to accept definite theories in any science, and even self-evident first principles would lose their definiteness and necessity, and only the name of self-evidence and necessity would remain with them. Therefore, it is necessary that we continue our endeavor to evaluate acquired knowledge and to obtain a criterion of truth for it. For the sake of this we shall survey the various kinds of acquired knowledge.

Idea and Affirmation

Logicians divide knowledge into two parts: idea (taṣawwur ) and affirmation (taṣdīq ). In fact, they have limited the common concept of knowledge to acquired knowledge, and on the other hand, they have extended it to include simple ideas.

The literal meaning oftaṣawwur is ‘to form an image’ and ‘to acquire a form,’ and in the terminology of the logicians it means a simple mental appearance which has the property of disclosing something beyond itself, such as the idea of Mount Damavand and the concept of mountain. The literal meaning of taṣdīq is ‘to consider true’ and ‘to acknowledge,’ and in the terminology of logicians and philosophers it is used with two similar meanings, and in this respect it is considered to be ambiguous:

a.  a logical proposition which in simple form includes the subject, predicate, and judgment of unity;

b.  the judgment itself which is a simple matter and shows one’s belief in the unity of the subject and predicate.

Some modern Western logicians imagine that affirmation (taṣdīq ) means the transference of the mind from one idea to another on the basis of the rules of the association of ideas. But this conception is incorrect, for neither is affirmation necessary everywhere there is an association of ideas, nor is an association of ideas required everywhere there is affirmation. Rather, affirmation rests on judgment, and this is the very difference between a proposition and several ideas accompanying each other and following one upon the other in the mind, pictured without any relation between them.

Elements of the Proposition

We know that ‘affirmation’ in the sense of judgment is something simple, but in the sense of proposition it is composed of several elements. Several different views have been expressed about the elements of the proposition.

Since it would require a lengthy discussion to survey all of them, and such a survey properly belongs to the subject of logic, we shall merely have a glance at them here. Some say that each predicative proposition (qaḍiyyah ḥamliyyah ) is composed of two elements: subject and predicate. Others add

the relation between these two as a third element. Yet others consider the judgment of the occurrence of the relationship or the lack of occurrence of the relationship to be a fourth element of the proposition.

Some distinguish between affirmative and negative propositions and say that with regard to negative propositions a judgment does not exist, but rather they consider it to be a case of the negation of judgment. Others deny the existence of the relation in simple existential propositions (halliyyah basīṭah ), i.e. propositions which assert the existence of the subject in the external world, and in primary predications, i.e. propositions in which the conceptual content of the subject and the predicate are the same, such as ‘Man is a rational animal.’ However, undoubtedly, in logic no proposition can be without either a relationship or judgment, for, as we said, affirmation rests on judgment, and judgment is with respect to two elements of the proposition. However, it is possible that one may have to recognize a difference among propositions from a philosophical and ontological point of view.

Divisions of Ideas

From one perspective, ideas can be divided into two types: universal and particular. A ‘universal idea’ is a concept which can represent numerous things or persons, such as the concept of man which applies to millions of individuals. A ‘particular idea’ is a mental form which only represents one existent, such as the mental form of Socrates.

Each of the ideas, whether universal or particular, may be further divided by other divisions about which we shall provide a brief explanation.

Sensory Ideas : These are simple phenomena in the soul which result from the effects of the relations between the sensory organs and material realities, such as images of scenery which we see with the eyes, or sounds which we hear with the ears. The subsistence of this kind of idea depends on the subsistence of relations with the external world, and after being cut off from contact with the external world they vanish in a short period of time (such as one tenth of a second).

Imaginary Ideas : These are simple specific phenomena in the soul which are subsequent results of sensory ideas and links with the external world. But their subsistence does not depend upon links with the external world, such as the mental image of a view of a garden which remains in the mind even after the eyes are closed, and may be recalled even after years have gone by.

Ideas of Prehension ( Wahm ) :1 Many philosophers have mentioned another kind of particular idea which is related to particular meanings, and which is exemplified by the feeling of enmity which some animals have for some others, a feeling which requires them to flee. Some philosophers have extended this term to cover particular meanings in general, including the feelings of affection and enmity of man..

Undoubtedly, universal concepts of affection and enmity are a kind of universal ideas. They cannot be counted as types of particular ideas.

The perception of particular affections and enmities in the perceiver himself, that is the affection which a person finds in himself for another, or the enmity which he feels in himself for another, is really a kind of

presentational knowledge of qualities of the soul, and we cannot count them as kinds of acquired knowledge.

Our feeling of another person’s enmity, in fact, is not a direct feeling without intermediary, but it is a comparison between a state which a man has found within himself and attributed to another person in a similar condition. But judgments about the perceptions of animals require another discussion which we do not have the opportunity to pursue further here.

What can be accepted as a kind of specific idea is an idea which results from states of the soul, and is apt to be recalled, and which are like imaginary ideas with relation to sensory ideas, such as remembering a specific fear that appeared at a certain moment, or a specific affection which existed at a specific moment. It is necessary to mention that sometimes ideas ofwahm are spoken of as ideas that do not correspond to any reality and are sometimes referred to as ‘fantasy’.

Universal Ideas

We saw that in one respect ideas may be divided into two parts, universal and particular. The types of ideas which we have discussed until now have all been particular ideas. Universal ideas, which are called ‘concepts of the intellect’ or ‘intelligibles’ are the focus of important philosophical debates, and since long ago have been the subject of discussion.

From ancient times there have existed views according to which basically there are no universal concepts. The terms which are used to denote universal concepts are in reality like equivocal terms which denote various things. For example, the term ‘man’ which is used to designate many individuals is like some proper name used by several families to name their children, or like a family name which applies to all the members of a family.

Proponents of this theory are known as ‘nominalists.’ At the end of the Middle Ages, William of Ockham inclined toward this theory, and it was later accepted by Berkeley In modern times, positivists and some other schools must also be considered to hold this kind of position.2 The other theory which is similar to that which has been mentioned is that universal concepts are vague particular concepts, such that some features of particular and specific forms are omitted so that they may conform to other things or persons. For example, our idea of a specific person could be adapted to his brother by deleting some of its features. By deleting more features it could be applied to even more people, and by continuing in this way the idea becomes more general and applies to more and more people until at last it may even be applied to animals, or even plants and minerals, such as a phantom seen from afar, which because of its vagueness may conform to the idea of a stone, tree, animal or a man. This is why at first glance we doubt whether it is human or something else. The closer we get and the clearer we see it, the more restricted are the limits of probability, until finally, we determine a specific person or thing.

Hume had this sort of belief about universal concepts, and many others also have thought this way about universals. On the other hand, some ancient philosophers, such as Plato, insisted on the reality of universal concepts, and even considered them to have a kind of reality of their own outside the bounds of space and time. The knowledge of universals is

likened to a kind of observation of non-material entities and intellectual archetypes (Platonic Ideas). This theory has been interpreted in various ways and many theories have branched off from it.3 Thus some have held that the human spirit prior to acquiring a body had seen intellectual truths in the world of immaterial entities, and after acquiring a body it forgot them, and by seeing material individuals, the spirit becomes reminded of these immaterial truths and the perception of universals is this remembering. Others who do not subscribe to the spirit’s existence prior to its attachment with the body, understand sensory perception as a means to prepare the self to observe immaterial entities.

This observation which is obtained by this capacity is observation from afar, and the perception of universals is this same observation of non-material realities from afar, in contrast to gnostic disclosures, which are obtained by a different kind of preparation and are observed from up close.

Some Islamic philosophers, like Mulla Ṣadr and the late ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, accepted this interpretation.

The most famous theory of universal concepts is that they are a special kind of mental concept realized with the attribute of universality in a special stage (martabah ) of the mind. Hence, in one of its definitions the intellect is termed as the faculty for the apprehension of universal mental concepts. This theory is ascribed to Aristotle and has been accepted by most Islamic philosophers.

Noting that the first and second theory in fact imply the denial of intellectual perception, which is a rallying point for the destruction of metaphysics and its depreciation to philological discussion and linguistic analysis, it is necessary to delve further on this issue in order to find a firm foundation for our future discussions.

A Study of Universal Concepts

As has been pointed out, the nominalists held that general terms involve a kind of equivocation or something similar so that they may refer to numerous individuals. For this reason, in order to provide a decisive answer to them it is necessary to explain ambiguity, wherein a common expression is used for different things (mushtarak lafẓī ), and common meanings (mushtarak ma’nawī ).

Ambiguity (mushtarak lafẓī ) occurs when a word is given several designations or is used to designate different meanings through multiple conventions, 4 as ‘spring’ is used for a coil, a season, a fountain, and a leap. However, common meaning ( mushtarak ma’nawī ) occurs when an expression by a single convention designates a common aspect of numerous cases, and with a single meaning corresponds to all of them. The most important differences between ambiguity and common meaning are as follows:

(1) Ambiguity requires numerous initial conventions, whereas common meaning requires no more than one initial convention.

(2) Common meaning is true of a potentially infinite number of individuals or instances, whereas ambiguity is only true of a set number of meanings.

(3) Common meaning is a single general meaning which is understood without a need for comparison, whereas ambiguity involves several meanings the determination of which require determining indications [that fix the meaning].

Now, with regard to these distinctions, we shall resume our discussion of such expressions as ‘man,’ ‘animal,’ etc., to find whether each of these expressions can be understood as having a single meaning without need for a determining indication, or whether several meanings come to mind when one hears them and if there is no determining indication we remain puzzled about which of them the speaker meant. Undoubtedly, we do not take Muḥammad, ‘Alī, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn to be the meanings of the word ‘man’; therefore, when we hear this expression we are not in doubt about the sense of this expression, asking which of these meanings it has. Rather we know that this expression has a single meaning which is common among these individuals and other men. Hence, it is not ambiguous.

Now let us see if this kind of expression has limited instances or whether it is true of an infinite number of individuals. It is obvious that the meaning of this expression does not accept any sort of limit on the number of its instances, but may be truly applied to infinite individuals.

Finally, we see that none of these expressions has an infinite number of designating conventions. No one is able to imagine in his mind an infinite number of individuals, while specifying an infinite number of designating conventions for a single expression. On the other hand, we see that we ourselves can designate a single expression in such a way that it conforms to an infinite number of individuals. Hence, universals do not require an infinite number of designating conventions.

Consequently, universal terms are a kind of those which have common meaning, not of those which are ambiguous.

One may object that this explanation is not sufficient to explain the impossibility of numerous designating conventions, for it is possible that the one who designates may imagine one instance (and not an infinity of instances) in his mind, and designate an expression for all similar individuals.

We know that this person must imagine the meanings of ‘all’ and ‘individual’ and ‘similar’ in order to make such a convention. Hence the question returns to how these expressions are designated. How can they be applied to an infinite number of cases? We have no choice but to posit that the mind has the ability to conceive concepts which apply to an unlimited number of cases. Hence it is not possible for such concepts to be designated one at a time for an infinite number of instances, for this is not feasible for any human.

A Response to a Doubt

Nominalists, in order to deny the reality of universal concepts, have raised the following doubt: every concept which occurs in a mind is a particular and specific concept which differs from concepts of the same kind which occur in other minds. Even if a person conceives the same concept at another time, it will be another concept. So, how can it be said that universal concepts occur in the mind with the attributes of universality and unity?

This doubt originates from confusion between the respect of conception and the respect of existence, in other words, confusion between the principles of logic and the principles of philosophy. We have no doubt that each concept, in so far as it exists, is particular, in philosophical language, “existence is equivalent to particularity.” When it is imagined again, it will have another existence, but its conceptual universality and singularity are not due to its existence but owing to its conceptual respect, that is, the same representative aspect in relation to various people and instances.

In other words, when our minds look at a concept from the point of view of its instrumental, mirroring capacity (and not independently) and examine its capacity for correspondence in various instances, the property of universality is abstracted from it. To the contrary, when its existence is considered in the mind, it is a case of particularity.

A Survey of Other Views

Those who imagine that a universal concept is a particular vague idea, and that general terms designate these same vague and pale forms [as though the particularity had been bleached out of them], will not be able to find the truth about universals. The best way to make clear their error is to draw attention to concepts which either do not have any real instances in the external world at all, such as ‘non-existent’ or ‘impossible,’ or which do not have material or sensible instances, such as ْthe concepts of God, angel, and the spirit, or which are conformable to both material and non-material instances, such as the concepts of cause and effect. For with regard to these concepts it cannot be said that these are particular pale forms. Also, concerning concepts which are true of opposite things, such as the concept of color, which applies both to black and to white, it cannot be said that the color white has become so vague that it takes the absolute form of color and so is also true of black, or that the color black has become so weak and pale that it may also be truly applied to white.5 Platonists also have such difficulties, for most universal concepts, such as the concept of the non-existent and the impossible, do not have intelligible archetypes, so they cannot hold that the perception of universals is the observation of such intellectual and non-material truths. Therefore, the correct position is that held by most of the Islamic philosophers and the rationalists, that man possesses a special cognitive faculty called the intellect, whose function is intellection of universal mental concepts, whether they have sensible instances or not.

References

1See Parviz Morewedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 321f.

2 In fact, while nominalism has attracted some positivists and their students, the official position of such logical positivists as Rudolf Carnap was that the entire debate about the existence of universals is meaningless. This claim was subsequently shown to be based on an inadequate theory of meaning. (Tr.)

3 The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl should be considered as being derived from this theory.

4 ‘Convention’ is used here in much the same way that Kripke uses ‘initial baptism’ for the social agreement by which a word is applied to a given kind of object. (Tr.)

5 The idea seems to be that particular vague ideas should group together things that are similar within the limits of the vagueness, as the concept of grey may be vague enough to allow for various shades. But concepts which apply to opposites do not function in this way, for black and white are not shades of color analogous to the shades of grey. Black and white are opposites, and not similar within some vague limits. (Tr.)

Lesson Fifteen: Types of Universal Concepts

Types of Intelligibles

Universal concepts which are employed in the intellectual sciences1 are divided into three groups: (1) whatish concepts or first intelligibles such as the concept of man and the concept of whiteness; (2) philosophical concepts or secondary philosophical intelligibles, such as the concept of cause and the concept of effect; and (3) logical concepts or secondary logical intelligibles, such as conversion (‘aks mustawī ) and contraposition (‘aks naqīḍ ).

We should remember that there are other types of universal concepts which are used in ethics and law, and later we shall refer to them.

This tripartite division which was originated by Islamic philosophers has many uses with which we shall become familiar in future discussions. Lack of precision in recognizing and distinguishing them from one another causes confusion and many difficulties in philosophical discussions. Most of the lapses of Western philosophers are due to confusing these concepts, examples of which can be found in the words of Hegel and Kant. Therefore it is necessary to provide some explanations about them.

Universal concepts are either predicable of entified (‘aynī ) things, in which case, in technical terms, it is said that they have external characterization (ittiṣāf khārijī ), as the concept of man which is predicated of Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, and so on, and it is said, “Ḥasan is a man,” or, they are not predicable of entified things but only to concepts and mental forms, in which case they are technically said to have mental characterization (ittiṣāf dhinī ), such as the concepts universal and particular (in logical terms), the first of which is an attribute of ‘the concept man’ and the second of which is an attribute of ‘the mental form of Ḥasan’. The [concepts of the] second group which are applied only to mental things are called ‘logical concepts’ or ‘secondary logical intelligibles’.

Concepts which are predicated of external things are divided into two groups: one group is of those concepts which the mind acquires automatically from specific cases, that is to say, when one or several individual perceptions are obtained by means of the external senses or internal intuitions, immediately the intellect acquires a universal concept of them, such as the universal concept of ‘whiteness’, which is acquired after seeing one or several white things, or the universal concept of ‘fear’, which is acquired after the appearance of specific feelings once or several times. Such concepts are called whatish concepts or first intelligibles.

There is another group of concepts whose abstraction requires mental effort and comparison of things with one another, such as the concepts of cause and effect, which is abstracted by attending to the relevant relation after comparing two things such that the existence of one depends on the other. For example, when we compare fire with the heat which comes from it, we notice the dependence of the heat on the fire. The intellect abstracts the concept of cause from the fire and the concept of effect from the heat. If there were no attention and comparison, these kinds of concepts would never be obtained. If fire were seen thousands of times, and in the same way

if heat were felt thousands of times, but no comparison were made between them, but the appearance of one from the other were not noticed, the concepts of cause and effect would never be obtained. These kinds of concepts are called ‘philosophical concepts’ or ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles,’ and in technical terms it is said:

The occurrence (‘arūḍ ) and characterization (ittiṣāf ) of first intelligibles are both external.2

The occurrence (‘arūḍ ) is mental but the characterization (ittiṣāf ) is external for secondary philosophical intelligibles.

The occurrence (‘arūḍ ) and characterization ( ittiṣāf ) of secondary logical intelligibles are both mental.

The definitions and applications of the expressions ‘mental occurrence’ and ‘external occurrence’ and likewise the designations ‘philosophical concepts’ and ‘secondary intelligibles’ are controversial. We consider these only as technical terms and justify them as was mentioned.

Characteristics of Each of the Types of Intelligibles

1. The characteristic of logical concepts is that they apply only to mental concepts and forms, and consequently they are completely recognized with a little attention. All the basic concepts of logic are of this group.

2. The characteristic of whatish concepts is that they describe the whatnesses of things and specify the limits of their existence and are like empty frameworks for existents, and therefore they may be defined as conceptual frameworks. These concepts are employed in various true sciences.

3. The characteristic of philosophical concepts is that they are not obtained without comparison and intellectual analysis. When they are applied to existents they describe types of existents (not their whatish limits), such as the concept of cause, which corresponds to fire but never specifies its specific essence, but describes the kind of relation it has with fire, which is the relation of having an effect, a relation which also exists among other things. Sometimes this characteristic is interpreted in such a way that philosophical concepts have no entified referents, or their occurrence is mental, although this interpretation is controversial and requires justification and explication. All pure philosophical concepts are of this group.

4. Another characteristic of philosophical concepts is that there are no particular concepts or ideas for them. For example, it is not the case that in our minds there is a particular form of causality and a universal concept, and likewise for the concept of effect, and other philosophical concepts. On the other hand, every universal concept for which there is a sensory, imaginary, or prehensive (wahmī ) idea, such that the difference between them is only in universality and particularity, then it will be a whatish concept, not a philosophical concept. It is to be noted that the opposite of this characteristic does not generally hold of whatish concepts, that is, it is not the case that for every whatish concept there is a sensory, imaginary or prehensive form. For example, the concept ‘soul’ is a species concept and a whatish concept, there is no particular mental form of it, and its instance can only be intuited by presentational knowledge.

Respectival (I‘tibārī) Concepts

The termi‘tibārī (respectival) , which frequently encountered in philosophical discussions, is employed with various meanings and is really equivocal. One must take care to distinguish among its meanings so as not to confuse them or make mistakes.

In one sense, all secondary intelligibles, whether logical or philosophical, are calledi‘tibārī , and even the concept of existence is counted asi‘tibārī . This term is used extensively by Shaykh al-Ishrāq, and in various books of his he uses ‘intellectuali‘tibārī’ with this meaning.

Another sense ofi‘tibārī is specified for legal and ethical concepts, which in the language of recent scholars are called ‘value concepts’. In a third sense, only concepts which have no external or mental instances and which are constructed with the help of the faculty of imagination are calledi‘tibārī , such as the concept of a ghoul. These concepts are also called ‘fantastic’.I‘tibārī also has another sense to be contrasted with fundamentality (aṣālat ) which is employed in discussions of the fundamentality of existence (aṣālat wujūd ) or fundamentality of whatness (aṣālat māhuwiyāt ), and which will be mentioned in its proper place.

Here it is appropriate to explaini‘tibārī in the sense of value, although detailed discussion of the subject must be sought in the philosophy of ethics or the philosophy of law. We shall provide here only a brief explanation as is appropriate.

Ethical and Legal Concepts

Every ethical or legal topic which we consider consists of concepts such asought andought not ,is required andis prohibited , and the like, which may be the predicates of propositions. Likewise other concepts, such as justice and injustice, trustworthiness and treachery can be the subjects of propositions.

When we consider these concepts we see that they are not whatish concepts, for they have no entified (‘aynī ) instances, hence they are calledi‘tibārī . For example, the concepts ofthief orusurper happen to be attributes of people, but not because they pertain to the quiddity of a person, but because the person has taken someone’s property. When we consider the concept of property, we see that even if it is applied to gold and silver, it is not because they are metals of a specific kind, but because they are desired by people and they can be a means for meeting their needs. From another perspective, the acquisition of property by a person is the sign of another concept called ‘possession’ which also has no external instance, that is, to credit (i‘tibār ) someone with the title ‘possessor’ and to credit the gold with the title ‘possession’ does not change the essence of the person nor the essence of the gold. In conclusion, expressions of this kind have special features which must be discussed from several different perspectives.

One of these perspectives is linguistic and literary, that is, for what meaning was the term originally coined, and how has the meaning changed to have acquired its present form? Is the application of this meaning literal or figurative? Likewise one may discuss prescriptive and descriptive terms, and what the purport of prescription is, and whether ethical and legal terms

refer to prescriptions or descriptions. Discussions of this kind are related to branches of linguistics and literature, and scholars of the science of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh ) also have made a great many researches and investigations into these matters.

Another aspect of discussions about these concepts is related to the ways in which these concepts are perceived, and the mechanism of transference of the mind from one concept to another, which must be examined in the psychology of mind.

Finally, another aspect of discussions about these concepts is related to their relations with objective realities, and whether these concepts have been invented by the mind and have no relation to external realities. For example, are ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ and other value concepts completely independent of other kinds of concepts which are constructed by means of a special mental power, or are they are merely descriptive of individual or social desires and inclinations, or are these concepts related to objective realities or somehow abstracted from them? Are ethical and legal propositions descriptive? Do they have truth values? Can they be correct or in error? Are they prescriptive so that correctness and incorrectness are meaningless for them. In the case that truth values are imagined of them, what would be the criteria for truth and falsehood? By what standards may their truth and error be recognized? This part of the discussion is related to epistemology, and this is the area in which it must be explained.

Here we shall provide a brief explanation of the simple concepts of ethics and law, and in the final portion of the discussion of epistemology we shall deal with the evaluation of value propositions, and at the same time we shall indicate the difference between ethical and legal propositions.

Ought and Ought Not

The words ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ which are used for cases of commands and prohibitions, in some languages are expressed by a single particle (as in Arabic, in which the letterlām indicates the command form and the wordlā indicates prohibition). In every language about which we have information, we may replace the command and prohibition forms, such as ‘You ought to say it’ replaces ‘Say it’, and ‘You ought not to say it’ replaces ‘Do not say it’. However, sometimes they are used in the form of independent concepts with the meaning of ‘obligation’ and ‘prohibition’, as when we employ the descriptive sentence, ‘It is obligatory for you to say it’ instead of the prescriptive expression, ‘Say it.’

These rhetorical devices exist in many languages, but they cannot be considered as the key to solving philosophical problems. One cannot define legal expressions as those which are prescriptive, for, as has been mentioned, in place of prescriptive statements one may use descriptive sentences.

The expression ‘ought’, whether expressed as a particle or as an independent noun, and also equivalent expressions such as ‘obligatory’ and ‘necessary’, which are sometimes used in propositions which by no means express values, such as when a teacher in a laboratory says to a student, “You ought to mix sodium with chlorine to make salt,” or when a physician tells a patient, “You ought to take this medicine until you become well.”

Undoubtedly, the purport of such expressions is nothing but the exhibition of the relation between the production of a chemical substance and the action and reaction, or cause and effect, during the combining of two elements, or between taking some medicine and recovering. In philosophical terms the ‘ought’ in these cases expresses the deductive necessity between the reason and its result or cause and effect, that is to say, if a specific event (cause) does not occur, its result (effect) will not occur.

When these expressions are used as legal or ethical terms, they gain an evaluative aspect. Here, various views are presented about them, one of which is that the purport of such terms is to express individual or social desires and their objects regarding an action. If it is expressed in the form of a descriptive sentence, it will have no other meaning than desirability.

The correct view is this, that such terms do not directly indicate the object of desire but rather the value and the object of desire of an action is understood by a conditional indication. The main purport is the very expression of the relation of causality which exists between the action and the goal of ethics or law. For example, when a lawyer says, ‘The criminal must be punished,’ even though the aim of this action is not mentioned, in reality he wants to present the relation between punishment and the goal or one of the goals of the law, that is, security for the society.

Likewise, when a moral trainer says, “A loan ought to be repaid to the creditor,” he really wants to describe the relation between this action and the goal of morality, such as the ultimate perfection of man, or eternal felicity. For the same reason, if we ask a lawyer, “Why ought criminals to be punished?”, the answer would be, “Because if criminals were not punished, chaos and anarchy would be imposed on the society.” Also, if we asked a moral trainer, “Why ought loans to be repaid to their creditors?”, an answer will be given appropriate to the standards accepted in ethical philosophy.

Therefore, the kind of concept of ought and moral and legal obligation is also that of the secondary philosophical intelligibles. If it is possible for other meanings to be included, or if they may be used in another way, it will be in a kind of figure of speech.

Legal and Ethical Subjects

As was mentioned, another group of concepts are used in legal and ethical propositions which include the subjects of these propositions, such as justice and injustice, ownership and marriage. There are also discussions from the point of view of lexicography and etymology, about these concepts and the changes in literal and figurative meanings, which are related to literature and linguistics. In brief, it can be said that most of them are borrowed from whatish and philosophical concepts and used with conventional meanings in accord with the practical needs of man in individual and social contexts. For example, for the sake of controlling desires and putting limits on behavior, in general, limits are assigned the violation of which is called injustice and despotism. The opposite is called justice and fairness, as with respect to the necessity of limiting man’s domination over property acquired in a special way; contractual domination over some pieces of property are considered as ownership.

‏What is noteworthy from the epistemological point of view, is whether these concepts are only based on the desires of groups or individuals and have no relation to objective truth independent of the inclinations of social groups and individuals. Consequently, either these concepts are not susceptible to intellectual analysis, or one can search for a basis for them among objective truths and external realities, and they can be analyzed and explained on the basis of cause and effect.

In this context the correct view is this. These concepts, although they are conventional andrespectival in a specific sense, they are not generally without relation to external reality and outside the realm of the law of cause and effect. Their validity is based on the recognized needs of man to attain felicity and his own perfection. This recognition, as in other cases, sometimes is correct and corresponds with reality, and sometimes is in error and opposed to reality. Possibly, one may put forth legislation for his own personal interests, and may even impose it on a society by force. However, even then, it cannot be considered as being done capriciously and without standard. It is for the same reason these things can be examined critically, and some conventions may be confirmed and some may be rejected. For each of them reasons and arguments can be given. If this legislation were merely an expression of personal inclinations, like a matter of individual taste in the choice of the color of one’s clothing, it would never have been worthy of praise or blame. Approval and disapproval would otherwise have no meaning but agreement or disagreement in taste.

Consequently, the worth of these concepts, although dependent on convention and contract, is considered as a symbol of objectively true relations between man’s actions and their results, relations which must be discovered in the behavior of man. In truth, these contractual and conventional concepts are grounded on existential relations and true welfare.

References

1 The intellectual sciences (‘ulūm ‘aqlī ), derived from reason, are contrasted with the transmitted sciences (‘ulūm naqlī ), the revealed or literally,narrated sciences. (Tr.)

2 Mohaghegh and Izutsu translate‘arūḍ as ‘occurrence’ andittiṣāf as ‘qualification’, inThe Metaphysics of Sabzavari (Tehran: Iran University Press, 1983), p. 67. Both concepts pertain to the relation between the concept and the object to which it applies, but‘arūḍ refers to the application of the predicate concept to the object, a relational property of the predicate concept, whileittiṣāf refers to the qualification of the object by the concept. Any translation of these terms is bound to be artificial, but as a memory aid theittiṣāf will be called the characterization and the‘arūḍ will be called the occurrence, indicating that the former pertains to the character of the object while the latter to the manner in which the predicate concept occurs to one who applies it to the object, in keeping with the author’s explanation.