Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

References

1. - One of the much-discussed issues among historians of religion is the question of whether, historically, monotheism predates polytheism or vice versa? According to religious references, indisputably after the appointment of the first prophet [the prophet Adam], monotheist belief existed among humans and after that, monotheism and polytheism endured in parallel and thus some people were monotheists and others were polytheists.

2. - Henotheism refers to belief in a superior god who has delegated a portion of the affairs of the universe to other gods and goddesses. Polytheism—general meaning intended—also encompasses this belief, but if we use polytheism in parallel to henotheism—with the particular meaning of belief in several gods—then these two definitions may be considered synonymous.

3. - Several recommended references for supplementary reading:

Eliade, Mircea, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, Trans. Philip Mairet. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Eliade, Mircea, History of Religions, University of Chicago, 1969.

Eliade, Mircea, The Encyclopedia of Religion, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

Nass, John B., The Comprehensive History of Religions.

Hume, Robert A., The World's Living Religions, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.

Tūqifī, Hussaīn, Āshnā’ī bā Adiyān-e Buzurg (Introduction to the Great Religions), Simat Foundation and Ṭāḥā Cultural Institute, Qum, AH 1372.

Hikmat, ‘Alī Asghar, Tārīkh-e Adiyān (History of Religions), Ibn Sīnā Publications, Tehran, AH 1345.

Zarrīn Kūb, 'Abdul Hussaīn, Dar Qalamruw-e Vijdān (In the Domain of Conscience), Surūsh Publications, Tehran, AH 1357.

4. - From long ago, Islamic philosophers [mutakallimīn] have emphasized two main principles that demonstrate the necessity of endeavoring to know and understand God.

Countering probable loss: Any wise person accepts the probability that they might be punished if they do not abide by religious teachings. Because reason demands the prevention of harm—albeit by possible punishment—it is absolutely necessary that humans inquire into the existence of God and His attributes so that if God truly exists and the call of the prophets is true, they can free themselves of divine punishment by following the divine teachings.

Necessity of thanking one's benefactor: There is no doubt that the many gifts and blessings that we enjoy have been given to us by a benefactor. Furthermore, logic dictates that we thank our benefactors. Because thanking others is not possible without first knowing who they are, reason demands that we endeavor to understand our true benefactor—i.e. God.

5. - It must be mentioned that this and similar classifications are categorized by taking into account the general methods that we realize God. However, if we consider the personal and individual attributes of these methods, it must be said that all persons are unique, and realize and understand their creator in their own distinctive way. According to this perspective, there are innumerable ways of realizing and understanding God.

6. - آن صفای آینه وصف دل است صورت بي منتها را قابل است

صورت بي صورت بي‌حد غیب زآينه دل تافت بر موسی ز جیب

گرچه این صورت نگنجد در فلك نی به عرش و فرش و دریا و سمك

زانكه محدود است و معدود است آن آينه دل را نباشد حدّ بدان

اهل صیقل رسته‌اند از بو و رنگ هر دمي بینند خوبی بي درنگ

عکس هر نقشی نتابد تا ابد جز ز دل هم بي‌عدد هم با عدد

تا نقوش هشت جنت تافته است لوح دل‌شان را پذیرا یافته است

برترند از عرش و كرسي و خلا ساکنان مقعد صدق خدا

صد نشان دارند و محو مطلق‌اند چه نشان بل عین ديدار حق‌اند

(دفتر اول)

7. - ميان عاشق و معشوق هیچ حايل نیست تو خود حجاب خودی حافظ از ميان برخیز

8. - Amīr al-Mu’minīn (meaning Commander of the Faithful) is the title of Imam ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālīb ('a). [trans.]

9. - Nahj ul-Balāghah, Sermon 179.

10. - The Prayer (du'ā) of the day of ‘Arafah.

11. - كي رفته‌اي ز دل كه تمنا كنم ترا كي بوده‌اي نهفته كه پيدا كنم ترا

12. - William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York: The Modern Library, 1902, p. 44.

13. - Reason and Religious Belief (‘Aql wa I'tiqādi Dīnī), p. 42.

14. - F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1928.

15. - Several recommended references for supplementary reading:

Peterson, Michael, et al, Reason and Religious Belief, Oxford University Press, chapter 2.

Proudfoot, Wayne, Religious Experience, University of California Press; Reprint edition, 1987.

Wainwright, William J., Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999), chapter 7, pp.120-141.

16. - Sūrah Rūm 30:30. (The Qur’anic translations in this book are derived from the Arbery translation of the Holy Qur’an.)

17. - Sūrah A‘rāf 7:172.

18. - The verse of Mīthāq has an immensely profound content and thus exegetes have interpreted it differently: Some believe it means that before creation of the natural world, God gathered all humans in another world—the world of Dharr—where He exposed His Lordship unto them. According to another interpretation, this verse speaks symbolically and states the fact that all humans, in the essences of their beings, possess a sort of personal—not general—and inherent—not acquired—awareness of God.

19. - Sūrah ‘Ankabūt 29:65; also see: Sūrah Luqmān 31:32, and Sūrah Naḥl 16:53-54.

20. - Kulaīnī, Uṣūl-e Kāfī, vol 1, p. 13.

21. - By calling this method experiential, we do not mean that it is free of all rational reasoning; rather, we mean that one of the basic rudiments of this method is observation of natural phenomena.

22. - Because the “argumentation of order” has been extensively discussed in previous textbooks we will refrain from discussing this argument.

23. - It must be said that there are several opinions regarding the interpretation of evidential understanding [shenākht-e Āyeh’ī] which have been derived from the Holy Qur’an. Some regard it as a preliminary to forming a rational argument—similar to what was said in explanation of the argumentation of order—concerning the existence of God and His Knowledge and Wisdom. According to another interpretation, the Qur’anic verses that call upon humans to contemplate natural phenomena, merely remind us of our innate understanding of God and have no significance other than notification and expunging neglect. The third opinion asserts that these verses are stated as a better disputation against polytheists; those who wrongly believe that their false idols and gods have a role in various worldly affairs and do not have a correct understanding of the Divine Unity of God. (For more information see: ‘Allāmih Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Al-Mīzān, vol 18, p. 154; Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Education in Beliefs [Āmūzish-e ‘Aqāyid], vol. 2-1, p. 68; and Javādī Āmulī, Explanation of the Arguments of God’s Existence [Tabyīn-e Barāhīn-e Ithbāt-e Khudā], p. 43.)

24. - Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 3:190.

25. - Sūrah Dhāriyāt 51:20-21. Also see: Sūrah Baqarah 2:164; Sūrah Jāthiyah 45:3-6; Sūrah Yūnus 10:100-101; and Sūrah Ibrāhīm 14:10.

26. - Verses that emphasize specific phenomena as signs can be categorized into several groups. Verses regarding the domain of human life are as follows:

1. The general order in the human genesis: Sūrah Jāthīyah 45:4; and Sūrah Rūm 30:20.

2. The order of development of the sperm and egg in the uterus: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 3:6; Sūrah Infiṭār 82:6-7; Sūrah Taghābun 64:3; Sūrah Ghāfir 40:64; Sūrah Ḥashr 59:24; and Sūrah Nūḥ 71:13-14.

3. The human cognitive system: Sūrah Naḥl 16:78.

4. Linguistic and racial differences: Sūrah Rūm 30:22; Sūrah Fāṭir 35:27-28.

5. Human livelihood: Sūrah Ghāfir 40:64; Sūrah Isrā’ 17:70; Sūrah Jāthīyah 45:5; Sūrah Fāṭir 35:3; Sūrah Rūm 30:4-5; Sūrah Saba’ 34:24; Sūrah Yūnus 10:31; Sūrah Naml 27:64; Sūrah Mulk 67:21; Sūrah Anfāl 8:26; Sūrah Baqarah 2:22, 2:172; and Sūrah Dhāriyāt 51:58.

6. The system of sleep: Sūrah Rūm 30:23; Sūrah Naml 27:86; Sūrah Furqān 25:47; Sūrah Naba’ 78:9; and Sūrah Zumar 39:42.

7. Clothing and beautification: Sūrah A‘rāf 7:26; Sūrah Naḥl 16:14, 16:81.

8. Residence: Sūrah Naḥl 16:80.

9. Marriage: Sūrah Rūm 30:21; Sūrah Shaūrā 42:11; Sūrah Fāṭir 35:11; Sūrah Najm 53:45; Sūrah Qīyāmah 75:39; Sūrah Naḥl 16:72; Sūrah Laīl 92:3; Sūrah Naba’ 78:8; and Sūrah A‘rāf 7:189.

27. - For more information, see: Nahj ul-Balāghah, sermon 186; Shaīkh Ṣadūq, At-Tawḥīd, vol. 2, chap. 2; and ‘Allāmah Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 3, pp. 61, 82, 130, 152.

28. - By naming this method intellectual, we do not mean that it is based only on the intellect; rather, we mean that logical premises and methods are implemented.

29. - This is not contradictory to the “generality” of the intellectual method; because by generality we mean relative generality as opposed to idiosyncrasy. In other words, this method is not specific to any single person; rather, numerous people can take advantage of it.

30. - This method is especially useful for those who are deprived of inner intuition and spiritual observation of Almighty God. According to Maūlānā:

چشم اگر داري كورانه ميا ور نداري چشم، دست آور عصا

آن عصاي حزم و استدلال را چون نداري ديد، مي كن پيشوا

If you have [spiritual] eyes, come not blind;

And if you have no eyes, lay hold to a cane.

The cane of wisdom and reasoning;

Whilst you have no sight, make your guide.

(Book III, pp. 275, 276)

31. - There are two main forms of this argument: the modal form and the temporal form. The form described in this text is the temporal kalām cosmological argument, which is based upon the fact that the universe has a beginning in time. [trans.]

32. - In more simple terms, a necessary being is a being that cannot possibly fail to exist. In contrast, a contingent being is a being that can fail to exist. In other words, we can imagine its inexistence. [trans.]

33. - Notice that there is no other possible case, because the only other assumption is that the existence of the object is impossible. This assumption is exempt from our discussion because an object whose existence is impossible can never become existent, while this discussion concerns existent objects. In other words, our categorization only covers extant objects.

34. - Of course, as it has been discussed in technical Islamic philosophy regarding necessity, the necessity of the existence of a necessary being is an “eternal necessity”, while the necessity of sweetness for sugar is an “inherent necessity”. According to this, there is a discrete difference between the example of sugar and sweetness and our discussion.

35. - Those who practice kalām are known as mutakallimūn.

36. - Here by cause, we mean a being that causes the existence of another being (i.e. the effect). In philosophical discussions, this cause is called “Efficient cause”.

37. - According to philosophers, in order for a sequence (regress) to be impossible it must meet these three conditions.

There must be an infinite number of elements in the sequence

The elements of the sequence must all exist simultaneously (temporal)

The existence of each element must be based upon the previous element. That is, each element must be caused by the previous element (causal).

Therefore, a finite sequence of causes and effects (for not meeting the first condition), an infinite sequence of numbers or an infinite sequence of events taken place from Creation until now (for not meeting the second condition), and an infinite set of objects that do not have a causal relationship such as an infinite line of people (for not meeting the third condition) are not [philosophically] impossible.

38. - This argument has been presented by Fārābī. By reflecting upon its content, it is clear that with minor alterations, it can be used as an argument proving the existence of a necessary being. Among Moslem philosophers, other arguments have also been presented proving the impossibility of an infinite regress, such as the argument of “Extremity and Centre” (Ṭaraf wa Wasaṭ) and the argument of “Conformation” (Taṭbīq). Complete accounts of these argumentations can be found in most books on Islamic Philosophy.

39. - It must be said that circularity is not limited to circular causes; rather, it is conceivable in other areas such as definition or reasoning. If definition “A” is defined using definition “B” and definition “B” is defined using definition “A”, we would have a “circular definition”. Similarly, if we use statement “A” to prove statement “B”, while statement “B” is proved using statement “A”, we would have a “circular argument”. Obviously, a circular definition of a term or a circular argument attempting to prove a statement would not be successful in attaining the purpose of the definition or reasoning.

40. - Of course it should be noted that the antecedence of a cause in respect to its effect is not “temporal” rather, it is “essential”. If we assume that the impact of a rock was the cause for shattering a window, there is no time interval between impact of the rock (cause) and the window shattering (effect); even so, we can say that impact of the rock antecedes the window breaking. Meaning that until the rock impacts upon the window, the window will not break. (However, the opposite is not true; in other words, it cannot be said that until the window breaks, the rock will not impact upon it.) This example somewhat elucidates the meaning of essential antecedence of a cause over its effect.

41. - This is because the relationship of “antecedence” possesses the attribute of “transitivity”. In explanation, a relationship is transitive if “A” and “B”, and “B” and “C” are related, then “A” and “C” are also similarly related. For example, if “A” is greater than “B” and “B” is greater than “C”, then “A” is greater than “C”. However, the relationship of “doubleness” is not transitive, because if “A” is double “B” and “B” is double “C”, “A” is not double “C”.

42. - Sūrah Fāṭir 35:15.

43. - Sūrah Ṭūr 52:35.