Discursive Theology Volume 1

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Discursive Theology Volume 1 Author:
Translator: Mansoor L. Limba
Publisher: Al-Mustafa International College
Category: General Books

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Discursive Theology Volume 1

Discursive Theology Volume 1

Author:
Publisher: Al-Mustafa International College
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought


1

Lesson 12: The Attributes of God

Name (ism) and Attribute (ṣifah)

The wordism has different applications. In its broadest function, it means any word which implies certain meanings. In this application,ism is synonymous withkalimah (word) and it also includesḥarf (particle) andfi‘l (verb) in the parlance of the Arabic grammarians.

The second application ofism is that which is used in Arabic syntax, and it is one of the types ofkalimah ,ḥarf andfi‘l being the other types.

Its third application is that which is intended in the parlance of the theologians (mutakallimūn ) and it means any word which indicates the very quiddity (māhiyyah ) or essence (dhāt ) of an attribute (ṣifah ) without considering its qualification (ittiṣāf ); examples are the wordssamā’ (heaven),arḍ (earth),rajul (man), andjidār (wall).

The wordṣifah has also different applications. The theosophers (ḥukamā’ ) call the origins of derivatives (mushtaqqāt ) asṣifah and the derivatives asism . According to them,‘ilm (knowledge) andqudrah (power) areṣifah while‘ālim or‘alīm (knowledgeable) andqādir orqadīr (powerful) areism . Meanwhile, the theologians call the derivatives asṣifāt (ṣifah s or attributes) and the origins of derivatives asma‘nā (concepts). For this matter,‘ilm andqudrah arema‘nā while‘ālim or‘alīm andqādir orqadīr areṣifāt . In other words, whenever we take into consideration the essence or quiddity in the sense that it is qualified by a specific quality (waṣf ) or meaning, the wordṣifah is used.1

اَلصِّفَةُ هِيَ الإسْمُ الدّالُّ عَلىٰ بَعْضِ أحْوالِ الذّاتِ، وَ ذٰلِكَ نَحْوَ طَويلٍ وَ قَصيرٍ وَ عاقِلٍ وَ غَيْرِها.

Ṣifah (attribute) is anism (noun) which indicates some states of thedhāt (essence), in the case ofṭawīl (long),qaṣīr (short),‘āqil (intelligent), and the like.”2

إنَّ الصِّفَةَ فِي الْحَقيقَةِ ما أنْبَأَتْ عَنْ مَعْنى مُسْتَفادٍ يَخُصُّ المَوْصوفَ وَ ما شارَكَهُ...

“In reality,ṣifah refers to the meaning which is exclusive to the qualified (mawṣūf ) and what shares with it [in the said description (waṣf )].”3

It must be noted that such technicalities are not much observed in practice, and they (ism andṣifah ) are used interchangeably.

The only word which has no descriptive meaning and is known as the exclusive Name of God is His Name of Glory (ism jalāluh ), i.e.Allāh , whereas other words such asAl-‘ālim (the All-learned),Al-qādir (the All-powerful),Al-ḥayy (the Ever-living),Al-rāziq (the Sustainer),Al-bāqī (the Everlasting), and the like are used both as Names and Attributes of God. For instance, in well-known traditions (aḥādīth ), it is said that God has Ninety-nine Names. With the exception of His Name of Glory, all are derivatives and attributes.

Classifications of the Divine Attributes

The Attributes (ṣifāt ) of Allah are classified in various ways:

1. The Attributes of Beauty and the Attributes of Glory

The Attributes of Beauty (ṣifāt al-jamāliyyah ) or the Positive Attributes (ṣifāt al-thubūtiyyah ) are attributes which indicate the Perfect Being of God; examples are‘ilm (knowledge) andAl-‘ālim (the All-knowing),qudrah (power) andAl-qādir (the All-powerful),khalq (creation) andAl-khāliq (the Creator),rizq (sustenance) andAl-rāziq (the Sustainer), and the like. The Attributes of Glory (ṣifāt al-jalāliyyah ) or the Negative Attributes (ṣifāt al-salabiyyah ) are attributes which indicate deficiency and lack of perfection and are thus negated from God. Examples are compositeness (tarkīb ), corporeality (jasmāniyyah ), space (makān ), direction (jahat ), oppression (ẓulm ), absurdity (‘abath ), and the like. In this regard, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn comments:

“These two terms (the Attributes of Beauty and Glory) are consistent with the expressiondhū ’l-jalāli wa ’l-ikrām (the Majestic and the Munificent) in the holy verse,“Blessed is the Name of your Lord, the Majestic and the Munificent!” 4 for the Attributes of Glory (ṣifāt al-jalāl ) are those attributes which make the Essence of God immune from similarities with others. And the Attributes of Munificence (ṣifāt al-akrām ) are those with which the Essence of God is adorned. Thus, God is described with the Attributes of Perfection, and immune from deficiency with the Attributes of Glory.”5

The Negative Attributes have another function, and that is, they are attributes which indicate God’s negation of deficiency; for example,Al-ghanī (the Self-sufficient),Al-wāḥid (the One),Al-quddūs (the All-holy),Al-ḥamīd (the Praiseworthy), and the like.6

2. The Attributes of Essence and the Attributes of Action

In dividing the Divine Attributes into the Attributes of Essence and the Attributes of Action, there are two terminologies and two views involved:

1. In abstracting an attribute from the Divine Essence or describing the Divine Essence with that attribute, whenever conception (taṣawwur ) of the Essence is sufficient and there is no need for any conception of God’s agency (fā‘iliyyah ), the said attribute is an Attribute of Essence or Essential Attribute; examples areḥayāh (life) andAl-hayy (the Ever-living),irādah (will) andmurīd (the Willing),‘ilm (knowledge) andAl-‘ālim (the All-knowing),qudrah (Power) andAl-qādir (the All-powerful). And whenever conception of God’s agency is needed [in abstracting an attribute], that attribute is called an Attribute of Action or Agency Attribute; examples arekhalq (creation) andAl-khāliq (the Creator),rizq (sustenance) andAl-rāziq (the Sustenainer),amātah (death) andAl-mumayyit (the Life-taker),aḥyā’ (living) andAl-muḥayyī (the Life-giver),maghfirah (forgiveness) andAl-ghāfir (the Forgiver),intiqām (vengeance) andAl-muntaqim (the Avenger), and the like.

2. Whenever the opposite or reverse of an attribute can be attributed to God, it is called an Attribute of Action and whenever the opposite or reverse of an attribute cannot be attributed to God, it is called an Attribute of Essence. Therefore, power, knowledge and life are among the Attributes of the Divine Essence, because God cannot be described with the opposites of these attributes as their opposites denote existential deficiency. But will (irādah ) is not one of the Attributes of Essence because describing God with

its opposite is not possible. For instance, it can be said that God does not will any form of injustice toward His servants:

﴿ وَمَا اللَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعِبَادِ ﴾

“And Allah does not desire any wrong for (His) servants.” 7

On this basis, justice (‘adl ) is one of the Attributes of the Divine Essence but according to the first terminology, it is one of the Attributes of Action.

Of the two stated terminologies, the first is more popular and prevalent in the books of philosophy and theology. In hisAl-Kāfī , Muḥaddith al-Kulaynī has adopted the second terminology.8

The traditions which have regardedirādah (will or willpower) as one of the Attributes of the Divine Action have been interpreted on this basis. Sayyid Sharīf al-Gurgānī has also adopted this terminology in hisAl-Ta‘rīfāt .9

3. The Real and the Relative Attributes

The Attributes of Essence have been divided into Real (ḥaqīqī ) and Relative (iḍāfī ) Attributes. A Real Essential Attribute is that which can really be ascribed to the Divine Essence; for example, knowledge and power. A Relative Essential Attribute is that which can be abstracted from the Real Attributes, but it is in itself not really one of the Attributes of Essence; for example, the attributes of‘ālimiyyah (the state of being the All-knowing) andqādiriyyah (the state of being the All-powerful) which can be abstracted by taking into account the relation of knowledge and power to the Essence, and they have no reality beyond the Essence and the attributes of knowledge and power.

The Real Essential Attributes are divided into the Purely Real (ḥaqīqī-ye maḥḍ ) and the Relationally Essential Real (ḥaqīqī-ye dhāt al-iḍāfah ). The Purely Real is that which pertains to no other than God; for example, the attribute of life. The Relationally Essential Real is that which can also be applied to other than God; for example, knowledge and power.

4. The Transmitted Attributes

Some attributes are called the Transmitted Attributes (ṣifāt al-khabariyyah ).10 They are the attributes which have been transmitted in the Heavenly Account (the Qur’an and theSunnah ), and if they were not mentioned in the Heavenly Account, they could not have been established for God in a rational discourse. Meanwhile, if we subscribe to their outward meaning, it will be tantamount to [the belief in] anthropomorphism (tashbiyyah ) and incarnation (tajassum ).

In other words, such attributes are Attributes which are mentioned in allegorical Qur’anic verses and traditions about the Divine Attributes; for example,wajh (face),yadd (hand),istiwā’ (to settle) andmujī’ (advent) which are mentioned in the following verses:

﴿ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ ﴾

“Everything is to perish except His Face.” 11

﴿ يَدُ اللَّهِ فَوْقَ أَيْدِيهِمْ ﴾

“The hand of Allah is above their hands.” 12

﴿ الرَّحْمَنُ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ اسْتَوَى ﴾

“The All-beneficent settled on the Throne.” 13

﴿ وَجَاءَ رَبُّكَ وَالْمَلَكُ صَفًّا صَفًّا ﴾

“And your Lord and the angels arrive in ranks.” 14

Are the Names of Allah Tawqīfī?

The Names of Allah are said to betawqīfī when we apply to God the Names and Attributes which are mentioned in the religious sources (the Qur’an and theSunnah ) and we do not apply other names and attributes. Most Sunnī theologians and some of their Shī‘ah counterparts subscribe to this view, but others do not believe in the Names and Attributes of God to betawqīfī , considering it permissible to apply any name or attribute which denotes God’s existential perfection and does not ascribe any deficiency or fault to God.

Even in cases, therefore, where a name or attribute is mentioned in the Qur’an or traditions, yet its application to God without any qualification or indication bespeaks defect or fault, these are not permissible. For example, God is calledzāri‘ (planter or grower) in this noble verse:

﴿ أَأَنْتُمْ تَزْرَعُونَهُ أَمْ نَحْنُ الزَّارِعُونَ ﴾

“Is it you who make it grow, or are We the grower?” 15

This indicates God as the Originator of plantation and not its conventional meaning in human usage. However, since the use of this term without any qualification or indication suggests its conventional meaning which is not suitable to God, it is not permissible to apply it to Him. On the other hand, the use of such terms as ‘the Necessary Being by essence’ (wājib al-wujūd bi ’dh-dhāt ), ‘the Cause of causes’ (‘illat al-‘ilal ) and the like which are terms in theosophy, is permissible as they indicate the sense of God’s perfection and negate any defect or fault in Him.

Here, one may demand for elaboration, and that is, if the application of a name or attribute to God is in the context of an intellectual discussion or discourse and not in supplication or any act of worship, the contention of those who deny God’s Names and Attributes as beingtawqīfī is valid. In the context of supplication and any similar act of worship, it is safer to use the Names and Attributes mentioned in the Qur’an, traditions and transmitted supplications. In this regard, the late ‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī has some remarks which include the said elaboration:

اَلإحْتِياطُ فِي الدّينِ يَقْتَضى الإقْتِصارُ فِي التَّسْمِيَةِ بِما وَرَدَ مِنْ طَريقِ السَّمْعِ، وَأَمّا مُجَرَّدُ الاِجْراءِ وِالإطْلاقِ مِنْ دونِ التَّسْمِيَةِ فَالْأمْرُ فيهِ سَهْلٌ.

“Precaution in religion necessitates restriction in calling [God] to that which is received through transmission. However, if a name is applied to God without calling Him by it, making decision in it is easy.”16

In another place, the ‘Allāmah has regarded naming (tasmiyah ) and calling (nidā’ ) as among the supplements of worship (‘ibādah ):17

وَالتَّسْمِيَةُ وَالنِّداءُ مِنْ لَواحِقِ الْعِبادَةِ.

At any rate, a reliable proof on the Names of Allah beingtawqīfī has not been established. The main argument put forth by those who support that view is the noble verse 180 ofSūrat al-A‘rāf :

﴿ وَلِلَّهِ الأسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى فَادْعُوهُ بِهَا وَذَرُوا الَّذِينَ يُلْحِدُونَ فِي أَسْمَائِهِ سَيُجْزَوْنَ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ ﴾

“To Allah belong the Best Names, so supplicate Him by them, and abandon those who commit sacrilege in His names. Soon they shall be requited for what they used to do.” 18

That the noble verse implies how the Names of Allah aretawqīfī depends on two things. One is that the letterlām in the phraseal-asmā’ al-ḥusnā (the Best Names) islām ‘ahad ; these are the Names which are mentioned in the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions (aḥādīth ). Another is thatilḥād means violation of those Names and applying other names to God although those names or attributes denote perfection and do not imply any defect or fault.

Yet, none of these two points has been proved because the function of the [definite article]al in the first case is absorption (istighrāq ) and not‘ahad . And its purport in the holy verse is that all the names known to be the Best Names exclusively belong to God because there is no being more perfect and superior to Him.

In every sort of perfection, therefore, its highest level belongs to God andilḥād (violation) here may possibly mean that the polytheists have committed sacrilege with regards to the Names of God and through a slight change of terminology, they would apply those Names to the idols. For example, they would change the wordAllāh intoAl-lāt and name one of their idols with it. They would alter the wordAl-‘aẓīz (the Most High) intoAl-‘uzzā and call another of their idols with it.19

Another possibility of committing sacrilege against the Names of Allah is that some ignorant individuals would call God with names which are below His Sublime Stations; for example, invocative phrases such asYā aba ’l-makārim (O father of generosities!) andYā abyaḍ al-wajh (O white-faced!).20

Review Questions

1. Write down the meanings and applications ofism andṣifah .

2. Elucidate the Attributes of Beauty and Glory of God.

3. Write down the remarks of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn regarding the Attributes of Beauty and Glory of God.

4. Explain the two views regarding the division of the Divine Attributes into the Attributes of Essence and the Attributes of Action.

5. State the Real and Relative Attributes of God.

6. What is meant by the Declarative Attributes (ṣifāt al-khabariyyah )?

7. Explain how the Divine Names are beingtawqīfī .

References

1. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ Asmā’ Allāh al-Ḥusnā, p. 27.

2. Sayyid Sharīf Gurgānī, Al-Ta‘rīfāt, p. 95.

3. Shaykh al-Mufīd, Awā’il al-Maqālāt, p. 61.

4. Sūrat al-Raḥmān 55:78. [Trans.]

5. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 6, p. 18.

6. Amīn al-Islām al-Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān, vol. 3, p. 503.

7. Sūrat Ghāfir (or al-Mu’min) 40:31.

8. Muḥaddith al-Kulaynī, Uṣūl al-Kāfī, vol. 1, section (bāb) on willpower (irādah), p. 86.

9. Sayyid Sharīf al-Gurgānī, Al-Ta‘rifāt, p. 95.

10. ‘Abd al-Karīm Shahristānī, Al-Milal wa ’n-Nihal, vol. 1, p. 92.

11. Sūrat al-Qaṣaṣ 28:88.

12. Sūrat al-Fatḥ 48:10.

13. Sūrat Ṭā Hā 20:5.

14. Sūrat al-Fajr 89:22.

15. Sūrat al-Wāqi‘ah 56:64.

16. Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 8, p. 354.

17. Ibid., p. 345.

18. Sūrat al-A‘rāf 7:180.

19. Ṭabarsī, Majma‘ al-Bayān, vol. 3, p. 503.

20. Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, vol. 2, p. 180.

Lesson 13: The Knowledge of God

Knowledge is one of the attributes of beauty and perfection, and there is no doubt at all that this attribute is confirmed for God. Muslim philosophers and theologians (nay, all theists) have a consensus of opinions on this issue, although there is a difference of views and opinions on the quality and limits of the knowledge of God.

The knowledge of God can be discussed in three levels, viz.

(1) God’s knowledge of His Essence,

(2) God’s knowledge of the creatures prior to their creation (knowledge about the things in the realm of essence, or essential knowledge), and

(3) God’s knowledge of the creatures after their being created (knowledge about the things in the realm of action, or active knowledge).

1. God’s Knowledge of His Essence

God’s knowledge of His Essence is an intuitive knowledge or knowledge by presence (‘ilm-e ḥuḍūrī ); so is the human being’s knowledge of himself. Basically, knowledge means the presence of the known (ma‘lūm ) before the knower (‘ālim ).

If the creature is devoid of corporeality, the reality of that creature is undoubtedly present to himself, for that which hinders the presence of such a thing to himself is its corporeality and changeability, and since God is free from corporeality and changeability, His Essence is present in Himself and He has knowledge of His Essence.

2. God’s Essential Knowledge of the Creatures

As to the nature of God’s Essential knowledge of the creatures, different views have been transmitted. These views are related to three issues. One is whether God’s Essential and prior knowledge of the creatures is intuitive (ḥuḍūrī ) or acquired (ḥuṣūlī ). Another [issue] is whether God’s prior knowledge of the things is general (ijmālī ) or detailed (tafṣīlī ). And the third [issue] is whether God’s prior knowledge pertains to the existence (wujūd ) or the quiddity (māhiyyah ) of things.

2.1. Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s View

God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is intuitive (ḥuḍūrī ) and general (ijmālī ) and pertains to their existence (wujūd ). This view has been adopted by Shaykh al-Ishrāq1 and his followers. According to this view, since God is knowledgeable of His Essence, and on the other hand, the Essence of God is the Cause behind the coming into existence of the creatures and knowledge of the Cause leads to the knowledge of the effect in general, it follows that God is essentially knowledgeable of all the things in the universe and His knowledge is intuitive and general.

The problem with this view is that detailed knowledge is superior to general knowledge. In this case, based on the said view, God’s Essential knowledge of the creatures cannot be the most perfect knowledge. This is so while the Essence of God possesses all perfections in the highest degree possible:

﴿ وَلِلَّهِ الأسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَى ﴾

“To Allah belong the Best Names.” 2

2.2. Mu‘tazilah View

God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is acquired (ḥuṣūlī ) and detailed (tafṣīlī ) and pertains to their quiddity, because prior to being created, their quiddity possesses a sort of subsistence (thubūt ) (māhiyyāt-e ma‘dūmah or non-existential quiddities) and subsistence includes existence (wujūd ). This view has been ascribed to the Mu‘tazilah who subscribe to the notion of pre-eternity subsistents (thābitāt-e azaliyyah ).

In addition to the fact that as will be proved later, there is no place for acquired knowledge in God, the problem with this view is that subsistence (thubūt ) is equal to existence (wujūd ) and anything which does not exist has no objective subsistence. Therefore, belief in the pre-eternity subsistents is basically incorrect.

2.3. Ibn Sīnā’s View

God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is a detailed and acquired knowledge which pertains to the mental existence of the quiddities. For instance, when a person wants to do certain things, prior to their realization, he has detailed knowledge of them and this knowledge pertains to the mental existence of the quiddities of his actions. Ibn Sīnā and his followers have adopted this view.

The problem with this view is that acquired knowledge is related to the creatures which are in contact with matter in their essences or actions. By means of their faculties of sensory perception, they develop perception of the corporeal beings and present in themselves the quiddities of those beings and have knowledge of them. And through those mental quiddities, they also become knowledgeable of the actual existence of the things.3 And since God is immune from corporeality in terms of both Essence and Action, acquired knowledge has no place in him. God’s knowledge of His Essence or His Actions is an intuitive knowledge.

2.4. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s View

God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is an intuitive knowledge and as to whether it is general or detailed, it is general as well as detailed, because in Essence, God is straightforwardly entitled to the existential perfections of all the creatures. Since existence is a single reality and has different levels, the highest level of existence is no other than God’s Being. It is evident that every perfect [being] has deficient existential levels in addition to a level of perfection which has no deficiency.

Due to the fact, therefore, that God is not devoid of any of the levels of existential perfection, He automatically and solely possesses all the existential perfections which diversely and pluralistically exist in the creatures. From this perspective, therefore, God’s Essential knowledge of the creatures is a general (ijmālī ) knowledge (ijmāl in the sense of simplicity and oneness in contrast totafṣīl in the sense of multiplicity and plurality).

Meanwhile, after the coming into existence of the things, nothing shall be added to the knowledge of God, because no change takes place in the Divine Essence. From this perspective, God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures is general as well as detailed.

If we assume that a person is knowledgeable of all the issues within a field of science in the sense that he has mastery of that field in that he has prior knowledge and answer to any question within that field and that the answers he gives do not add anything to his knowledge, in this case the existence of multiplicity with respect to the answers he gives does not cause any change in his knowledge. He has knowledge of all the issues before and after giving his answers.

That which changes is the existence of answers which have general existence (simple and identical) in the essence of the knower, while having detailed existence (multiple and diverse) in his action. Yet, no change has found its way in the essence of the knower and his knowledge. Once it occurs that such an assumption is possible in the case of the human being, why is it not acceptable with respect to God who is the Necessary Being in essence?

This view has been put forth by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and accepted by all followers of the Transcendental School of Philosophy (ḥikmat al-muta’āliyah ), and it is the best interpretation ever presented to explain God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures. Traditions (aḥādith ) also confirm this view. For instance, it is thus stated in some traditions:

عِلمُهُ بِهِ قَبْلَ كَوْنِهِ كَعِلْمِهِ بِهِ بَعْدَ كَوْنِهِ.

“His knowledge of it prior to its existence is like His knowledge of it after its existence.”4

Ayyūb ibn Nūḥ asked Imām al-Ḥādī (‘a ) in a letter, thus: “Was God knowledgeable of the creatures prior to their creation, or not?”

The Imām (‘a ) thus wrote in reply to him: “God was knowledgeable of the creatures before creating them, just as He has knowledge of them after their creation.”5

As such, God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of essence prior to their creation necessitates God’s knowledge of His Essence, just as the existence of the creatures depends on the existence of the Divine Essence:6

فَكانَ عِلْمُهُ بِجَميعِ ما عَداهُ لازِمًا لِعِلْمِهِ لِذاتِهِ، كَما أنَّ وُجودَ ما عَداهُ تابِعٌ لِوُجودِ ذاتِهِ

God’s Present Knowledge of the Creatures in the Present

God’s knowledge of the creatures after creating them - or, God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of action - is a detailed intuitive knowledge, but it is not identical with God’s Essence because the assumption is that this knowledge is in the realm of action and action is outside the essence. Here, the reality of the creatures is that they are God’s action and His knowledge as well.

As an analogy, it can be likened to the human being’s knowledge of the mental forms he creates. The reality of these forms is also his action as well as his knowledge. That is, the said mental forms by themselves are present in him, and at the same time, they are his action and effect. Interpreting God’s present knowledge of the creatures in this way is one of the initiatives of Shaykh al-Ishrāq. On this basis, there is no difference between the immaterial and material beings, for all of them are an effect and action of

God, and their reality is the link itself to the Divine Being, and they are all in the presence of God.7

The Divine Proofs

From the explanation of the three levels of God’s knowledge, the proofs of God’s knowledge can also be inferred. The proof of God’s knowledge of His Essence is indeed the immunity of the Sacred Divine Essence from materiality and physical properties. Since the immaterial being is the very presence (ḥudur ), whenever that Being is self-existent and does not depend on other beings, His existence is present for Himself. The reality of knowledge is also nothing except presence (ḥudūr ) and exposure (inkishāf ).

The proof of God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of essence (prior to their creation) is that the Essence of God is the Cause of the creatures and He has knowledge also of His Essence. Therefore, He has knowledge of the creatures and knowledge of the cause necessitates knowledge of the effect; hence, God has knowledge of the creatures.

Moreover, the creatures are actions of God, the Exalted, and at the same time, they have rules and stability, order and harmony, and once an action has such characteristics, it is a proof of its agent’s knowledge and awareness. The rules and stability of the universe, therefore, is a proof of God’s prior knowledge of it [and its components].

The proof of God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of action (knowledge after creating them) is that the creatures are actions and effects of God, and the essence of action is nothing but the link and attachment to the essence of its agent (fā‘il ), and as a result, it is present before its agent and cause. The reality of the universe, therefore, is present before God and He has intuitive knowledge of it.

In hisTajrīd al-I‘tiqād , Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī has expressed the said argument in these words:

ألأحْكامُ وَالتَّجَرُّدُ، وَإسْتِنادُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ إلَيْهِ دَلائِلُ العِلْمِ.

That is to say that the laws and stability of the universe, the immateriality of the Divine Essence and emanation of the existence of all beings from God are proofs of God’s knowledge [of His Essence and the creatures].8

The All-hearing, the All-seeing and the Perceiver

In many verses of the Qur’an, God is described as the All-hearing (al-samī‘ ) and the All-seeing (al-baṣīr ).9 These descriptions have also been mentioned in the traditions as God’s Attributes of Beauty. There are two views concerning the the meaning ofal-samī‘ andal-baṣīr . One is that they refer to God’s knowledge of audible and visible things, and the other is that they are separate Attributes.10

The first view which is adopted by the philosophers and erudite theologians is acceptable. And perhaps the reason whyal-samī‘ andal-baṣīr have been specifically mentioned in the Qur’an and traditions is that these two faculties of sensory perception have more prominent role in the knowledge of human being and he who usually expresses his knowledge by seeing and hearing. For this reason, once it is said that God is All-seeing and All-hearing, one can imagine better the all-pervasive knowledge of God in

relation to himself and his actions, and as a result, this will contribute much in his further training.

The attribute ofidrāk (apprehension) oral-mudrik (the Perceiver) has not been mentioned in verses of the Qur’an as an Attribute of God, but in view of the holy verse,“Yet He apprehends the sights,” 11 which ascribes the action of apprehension to God,12 theologians have abstracted from it the attributeal-mudrik . There is also a difference of opinions on the meaning ofidrāk . Some have considered it an attribute distinct from‘ilm (knowledge) while others have interpreted it to mean knowledge of the details. And the latter opinion is acceptable.13

Review Questions

1. Write down the three levels of God’s knowledge.

2. Is God’s knowledge of His Essence intuitive (ḥudūrī ) or acquired (ḥuṣūlī )? Why?

3. Write down the view of Shaykh al-Ishrāq about God’s prior knowledge along with the criticism to it.

4. Write down the view attributed to the Mu‘tazilah about God’s prior knowledge along with the criticism to it.

5. What is Ibn Sīnā’s view about God’s prior knowledge? And what is the problem with it?

6. Write down Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s view about God’s prior knowledge.

7. Explain God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures by citing a tradition (ḥadīth ).

8. What type of knowledge is God’s knowledge of the creatures after creating them?

9. Write down two proofs of God’s knowledge.

10. What is the meaning of God’s being the All-hearing (al-sami‘ ) and the All-seeing (al-baṣīr )?

References

1. Shaykh al-Ishraq refers to Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (b. 1155), a towering figure of the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) School of Islamic Philosophy. [Trans.]

2. Sūrat al-A‘rāf 7:180.

3. Refer to the discussion on knowledge, knower and known in the books of philosophy.

4. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-Tawḥīd,” section (bāb) on the Attributes of the Essence, ḥadīth 2.

5. Ibid., ḥadīth 4.

6. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 6, p. 179. For further information in this regard, see ‘Alī Rabbānī Gulpāygānī, Ayḍāḥ al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 544-547.

7. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and ‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī have made a distinction between immaterial and material beings. Accordingly, the presence of the immaterial beings is by themselves without any medium while the presence of the material beings is through the medium of the presence of their immaterial forms in the immaterial world. That which is stated in the text is the pertinent viewpoint of Ḥakīm Sabziwārī which seems to be stronger. See Ayḍāḥ al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 547-548.

8. Kashf al-Murād, station (maqṣad) 3, chap. 2, issue 2.

9. The descriptions al-samī‘ and al-baṣīr as Attributes of God have been mentioned 41 and 42 times, respectively, in the Qur’an.

10. Qawā’id al-Murād, p. 90.

11. Sūrat al-An‘ām 6:103.

12. Fāḍil Miqdād, Irshād al-Ṭālibīn, pp. 206-207.

13. Ibid.

Lesson 2: The Ways of Knowing God

Before embarking on the discussion about the proofs of the existence of God and an examination of the Divine Attributes, it is necessary to answer this important and key question: can the human being know God or not? And in case he can, what is the way of doing so? This is because if the answer to this question is negative, any sort of discussion and discourse about theology is vain and useless.

Here, two general outlooks have been put forth, i.e. those of the affirmatives and the negatives. The rationalists and intuitionists regard God as knowable and the way of knowing Him as open to mankind. The sensationalists and literalists give a negative reply, however, to the above question and consider mankind incapable of knowing God. Now, we shall examine and elucidate these outlooks.

The Rationalists

The rationalists refer to the group of thinkers who have accepted the authority and credibility of reason or intellect (‘aql ) in knowledge [or the process of knowing], regarding the rational principles and fundamentals as the foundations of knowledge. They are of the opinion that without formally acknowledging the intellect and rational principles, no knowledge can be attained about the human being and even sensory and external pieces of knowledge are based on rational foundations, let alone empirical scientific pieces of knowledge and those pieces of information which are substantiated by the text and outward meanings of the revelation (wahy ).

Aristotle1 and his followers in Ancient Greece, Descartes2 and his followers in the West, Fārābī,3 Ibn Sīnā,4 and all Imāmiyyah and Mu‘tazilite theologians (mutakallimīn ) have been proponents of this outlook. Reason also occupies a high position in Māturīdiyyah theology. For the Ash‘arites,5 however, reason (‘aql ) is theoretically valid to some extent but not so in practice.6

At any rate, the philosophers and theologians in the Muslim world believe that God can be known through rational thinking, although there is a difference of opinions on the limit of the intellect’s capability. For example, the proofs presented to prove the existence of God and the methods adopted to discuss the Attributes of God are not the same.

The proponents of this viewpoint have emphasized that adopting the rational way of attaining knowledge about God and understanding metaphysical truths is not an easy job and it requires special skill, talent and ability; otherwise, the desirable result will not be obtained and in many instances, it may even lead to deviation.

In this regard,Shahīd Muṭahharī7 has said:

“The limitedness of the meanings of words and expressions, on one hand, and the minds’ familiarity with tangible and physical concepts, on the other hand, make it difficult to think and reflect on metahphysical issues. In order to be prepared for metaphysical reflections, the mind gradually undergoes certain processes… No doubt, when the meanings and concepts of the Divine wisdom want to manifest in the realm of philosophical intellects, it requires a particular mental acumen and intellectual capacity which is totally

different from literary, technological, natural or mathematical acumen. The mind must develop in a particular dimension or aspect so as to acquire acumen for such ideas.”8

The Holy Qur’an and traditions (aḥādīth ) endorse this method, and the proofs and pieces of evidence in criticizing the viewpoint of the literalists will be stated. Here, we suffice ourselves with quoting the following verse which regards reflection (tafakkur ) on the system of creation as one of the characteristics of those who possess intellects (ūli’l-albāb ) for which they are praised:

﴿ إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلاَفِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لآيَاتٍ لِّأُوْلِي الألْبَابِ ٭ الَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللّهَ قِيَامًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلَىَ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذا بَاطِلاً سُبْحَانَكَ فَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ ﴾

“Indeed in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day, there are signs for those who possess intellects. Those who remember Allah standing, sitting, and lying on their sides, and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth [and say] ‘Our Lord, You have not created this in vain! Immaculate are You. Save us from the punishment of the Fire.” 9

The Intuitionists

The intuitionists are of the opinion that the existence of God and metaphysical realities are knowable by the human being, but not through the agency of reason and the method of reflection (tafakkur ) and intellection (ta‘aqqul ); rather, through the agency of the heart and the method of illumination (ishrāq ) and inner intuition or witnessing (shuhūd-e durūnī ).

Some intuitionists have regarded reason as totally incapable of knowing God, but other intuitionists do not consider it sufficient although they have stressed its being essential and they have also acknowledged its ability to some extent. Muslim and non-Muslim mystics advocate the method of mystical intuition (shuhūd-e ‘irfānī ) in knowing God. Some modern Western philosophers and religious psychologists and psychoanalysts have also opted for this method.

Assessment

Although it is acceptable in knowing God and has an important function, this method still needs the rational method. Firstly, in intuitive perceptions, there is always the possibility of satanic tricks and insinuations, and to detect them would require rational principles and rules. Secondly, intuitive method is personal in nature and incapable of being proved to others, except through rational method and philosophical principles.

For this reason, great mystics and philosophers have highlighted the mystical method’s need for rational and philosophical method which has a higher and more perfect state. Regarding mysticism’s need for intellection (ta‘aqqul) and reasoning (istidlāl ), Ḥakīm Lāhījī has said:

“The human being has two ways to [know] God, the Exalted. One is the outward way and the other is inward. The outward way is the path of reasoning (istidlāl) while the inward way is the path of spiritual wayfaring

(sulūk). The path of reasoning takes precedence over the path of spiritual wayfaring, for as long as one does not know what spiritual station (manzil ) is, he will not be able to seek the way leading to the spiritual station.” 10

Elsewhere, he has also said, “Prior to the stabilization of theosophy (ḥikmah) and scholastic theology (‘ilm al-kalām ), Sufi claims are [nothing but] demagoguery and fraud.” 11

The Sensualists

The sensualists are those who regard the way of knowing realities as limited to sensory observation and experiment. Sensualism has a long precedence in the history of human thought. The Skeptics of Ancient Greece upheld the primacy of experience and opposed rational philosophy. The new form of empiricism can be traced to the 17th century.

Scholars and philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes,12 Pierre Gassendi13 and David Hume14 were among the prominent proponents of sensualism. The notion that sensory perception is the fountainhead and criterion for knowledge has been the ultimate product of their intellectual activity.15

Since perception and sensory experience are only through the five senses, the existence and Attributes of God cannot be proved or disproved on the basis of the foundations of sensualism. As such, they oppose both the theists and materialists, because according to them, there is no way of proving or disproving for mankind the metaphysical world.

Assessment

Sensory empiricism (primacy of the sensory perception) is unacceptable because there is a set of epistemological concepts and principles which cannot be understood by sensory perception and at the same time, they cannot be denied; that is, without them, sensory perceptions are also impossible. Of the concepts used in scientific and non-scientific discourses, the concepts of necessity or essential (ḍarūrah), refusal or abstention (imtinā‘ ) and probable (iḥtimāl ) play a vital role, and none of them can be perceived by the senses.

The law of causation (causality) is another principle which the sensualists have regarded as definite. This is so while the cause-and-effect relationship - as Hume has also acknowledged - is not something tangible or sensible. Causation means an existent’s dependence on another existent, and not succession (tawālī) or symmetry (taqārun ) of phenomena.

The principle of non-contradiction16 is one of the most fundamental intellectual principles of man, and no idea or opinion, no matter how likely it may be, cannot be formulated without this principle. The said principle can never be perceived by the senses. Felicien Robert Challaye,17 who is himself a prominent empiricist, has regarded two principles as the basis of inducement of empirical sciences:

1. Nature has order and law, and accident or chance does not happen in them (law of causation), and

2. Every cause always brings about the same effect given a unified set of conditions (the principle of harmony in nature or harmony between the cause and the effect).18

Moreover, it is true that every experiment depends on the observation of particular steps, which is discussed by the likes of Francis Bacon19 and Stuart Mill20 in a bid to know the real cause of every happening, but the element of experiment has not guaranteed the correctness or validity of those steps (methods). They thus have no option but to establish the correctness or validity of those steps through a sort of rational proof which they deny.21

The Literalists

A group of Muslim traditionists (muḥaddithūn) does not regard reason and rational thinking as authoritative and permissible bases in knowing the religion, and they are of the opinion that the only means of knowing religious facts - whether pertaining to the roots or branches of religion - are the scriptural texts.

The Ḥanbalīs andAhl al-Ḥadīth from among the Sunnīs and theAkhbarī s from among the Shī‘ah have subscribed to this idea, vehemently opposing rational (philosophical and theological) discussions of the issues on beliefs.

There is a well known story that someone asked Mālik ibn Anas (93-179 AH) about the meaning of “Allah’s settlement on the Throne” as mentioned in this verse:

﴿ ٱلرَّحْمَٰنُ عَلَى ٱلْعَرْشِ ٱسْتَوَىٰ ﴾

“The All-beneficent, settled on the Throne.” 22

In reply, Ibn Anas said:

اَلْاِسْتِواءُ مَعْلومٌ وَالْكِيْفِيَّةُ مَجْهولَةٌ وَالْايمانُ بِهِ واجِبٌ وَالسُّؤالُ عَنْهُ بِدْعَةٌ.

“The settlement is known; how God settles on the Throne is unknown; to believe in it is obligatory and to ask about it isbid‘ah (innovation in religion).” 23

Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah24 (died 198 AH) is reported to have said that the Attributes of God mentioned in the Qur’an must not be interpreted and a study about their meanings must not be done. Instead, they must be recited and one must keep silent about their meanings.

A group of the Akhbārīs from among the Shī‘ah who lived during the 10th and 11th centuries AH were also of the same belief. In his introduction toAl-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn (Mullā Ṣadrā) 25 expressed extreme regret for the way of thinking of these people, saying:

“Indeed we are afflicted by a group whose viewpoint fails to perceive the lights and secrets of wisdom. They have regarded as heresy to reflect on celestial matters, divine knowledge and the glorious verses [of the Qur’an]. They treat as deviation any opposition to common beliefs. It is as if they were traditionalist Ḥanbalīs for whom the questions of obligatory (wājib ) and possible (mumkin), eternal (qadīm ) and contingent (ḥādith ) are dubious. Their thinking does not go beyond what is tangible.” 26

After stating the beliefs of theAhl al-Ḥadīth and Ḥanbalīs, Professor Muṭahharī has said:

“The view of Ḥanbalī and the Ahl al-Ḥadīth has still gained following, and some Shī‘ahḥadīth scholars in the latter periods have explicitly stated that even the question of the Oneness of God is totally a heavenly

(devotional) issue and intellectually, there is no sufficient proof for it, and it is only through obedience to the dictate of religion that we are bound to believe that God is One.”27

Assessment

Firstly, even assuming that heavenly truths must be known through “heavenly means and power”, this principle has no contradiction with knowing these truths by means of reason because it (reason) is also a “heavenly element”. As mentioned in traditions (aḥādīth ), reason or intellect (‘aql ) is inward proof (ḥujjat-e bāṭinī ) of God for mankind while the prophets are His outward proofs (ḥujaj-e ẓāhirī ).28

It is true that reason cannot discern all religious truths, but it is not totally incapable of knowing religious truths. In this regard, Imām ‘Alī (‘a ) says:

لَمْ يُطْلِعِ الْعُقُولَ عَلَى تَحْدِيدِ صِفَتِهِ، ولَمْ يَحْجُبْهَا عَنْ وَاجِبِ مَعْرِفَتِهِ.

“He has not informed (human) wit about the limits of His qualities. Nevertheless, He has not prevented it from securing essential knowledge of Him.” 29

Secondly, by denying rational knowledge and its validity, there is no way of proving the [reality of]sharī‘ah . In such a case, there is no room for the Qur’an and Sunnah through which we could know the principles and branches of religion.

Thirdly, rational thinking has been encouraged and emphasized in the Holy Qur’an. The Qur’an has described those who do not use their minds as the worst of beasts:

﴿ إِنَّ شَرَّ الدَّوَابِّ عِندَ اللّهِ الصُّمُّ الْبُكْمُ الَّذِينَ لاَ يَعْقِلُونَ ﴾

“Indeed the worst of beasts in Allah’s sight are the deaf and the dumb who do not apply reason.” 30

﴿ وَيَجْعَلُ الرِّجْسَ عَلَى الَّذِينَ لا يَعْقِلُونَ ﴾

“And He lays defilement on those who do not apply reason.” 31

In many instances, the Holy Qur’an has made use of rational thinking, engaging in intellectual discussion and argumentation. For example, by means of two rational arguments, it has proved the Oneness of God, saying:

﴿ لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا ﴾

“Had there been gods in them other than Allah, they would surely have fallen apart.” 32

﴿ وَمَا كَانَ مَعَهُ مِنْ إِلَهٍ إِذًا لَذَهَبَ كُلُّ إِلَهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلا بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ ﴾

“Neither is there any god besides Him, for then each god would take away what he created, and some of them would surely rise up against others.” 33

In refuting the notion of those who think that God has a son, it is thus stated:

﴿ وَقَالُوا اتَّخَذَ اللَّهُ وَلَدًا سُبْحَانَهُ بَلْ لَهُ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالأرْضِ كُلٌّ لَهُ قَانِتُونَ ٭ بَدِيعُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالأرْضِ وَإِذَا قَضَى أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ ﴾

“And they say, ‘Allah has taken a son.’ Immaculate is He! Rather to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth. All are obedient to Him, the Originator of the heavens and the earth; and when He decides on a matter, He just says to it, ‘Be!’ and it is.” 34

These two verses speak about two rational proofs in refuting the belief in God having an offspring. One is based on the essence oftawḥīd and God’s immunity from any similitude or partner, and the other is based on God’s immunity from change (taghyīr ) and quantization (tadrīj ).35

Fourthly, in theSunnah of the Holy Prophet ( ) and the sayings and conduct of theAhl al-Bayt (‘a ), the credibility and authority of reason has been emphasized and actually utilized by them. By taking a glance atNahj al-Balaghah ,36 Usul al-Kafi ,37 Al-Ṭawḥid by Shaykh al-Ṣadūq,38 Al-Iḥtijāj by Ṭabarsī,39 and other Shī‘ah sources, one will clearly find out this fact. As we have said earlier, in the school of theAhl al-Bayt (‘a ) reason has been recognized as the inward proof of God. Imām al-Ṣādiq (‘a ) has regarded reason as the human being’s guide in knowing God as well as in knowing the principles of what is good and what is evil:

فَبِالْعَقلِ عَرَفَ الْعِبادُ خالِقَهُم وَأَنَّهُمْ مَخْلوقونَ، وَأَنَّهُ المُدَبِّرُ لَهُمْ وَأَنَّهُمْ المُدَبَّرونَ... وَعَرَفوا بِهِ الْحَسَنَ مِنَ القَبيحِ...

“By means of reason, the servants recognize their Creator and that they are creatures and that He is their Governor and that they are governed… and they distinguished the good from the evil…” 40

According to Imām ‘Alī (‘a ), one of the goals of the mission of the prophets is “to unveil before them (people) the hidden virtues of wisdom”:41

لِيُثيروا لَهُمْ دَفائِنَ العُقولِ

Fifthly, the Holy Qur’an and traditions (aḥādīth ) have a set of sublime knowledge which is beyond sensory perception and common understanding and comprehension. For example, God is the Dominant One (al-Ghālib ). He is the First and the Last (al-Awwal wa ’l-Ākhir ). He is the Inward and the Outward (al-Baṭin wa ’ẓ-Ẓāhir ).

He encompasses everything (al-Muḥīṭ ). His Unity is not numerical oneness. He is with everything without being parallel with it in time and space. He is outside everything but not in the sense of detachment and separation (infiṣāl ). Everything comes from Him and shall return to Him. His Word is identical with His Action, and so on and so forth.

Now, this question is raised: what is the reason behind mentioning these facts in the Book (Qur’an) and theSunnah ? Is it to lay down a set of lessons for reflection, intellection, understanding, and inspiration and to guide the minds while swimming in the boundless ocean of divine knowledge? Or, is it to present issues and problems without solution and beyond comprehension so as to persuade the minds to submission, silence and blind following?!

These pieces of knowledge are not instructions, commands or orders. There is no point in reasoning out, therefore, that “Our duty is to obey what is commanded and nothing else!” They are a set of theoretical issues. If they

are beyond comprehension and understanding, what is the benefit in mentioning them? It is a like a Grade One teacher who teaches a college level subject [such as calculus or statistics] to his pupils and tells them to accept whatever she tells them although they could not comprehend it!

God could be known, therefore, and at the same time, man can know Him through reason and reflection on the signs in the horizon and in himself, although

(1) his knowledge of the Divine Essence and Attributes is limited and his understanding of the Divine Essence and Attributes (as they are) is beyond the power of the human mind or intellect - “He has not informed (human) wit about the limits of His qualities”42 - and

(2) to follow this path is not that easy and simple as it needs special intellectual agility and efforts.

This is not to suggest, however, that it is possible for everybody to understand all levels of rational and philosophical discussions about all issues related to theology. Definitely, this is not so. And there are many limitations, prerequisites and impediments along the way. The point is that this way is open for the human being, and there have always been people who have been able to examine metaphysical issues pertaining to theology through the correct use of reason and rational thinking.

In conclusion, let us state once again that the point is not to limit the way of knowing God to the rational means and method, because one can also know God through mystical intuition (shuhūd ). And after proving [the genuineness of] revelation (waḥyi ), one can also know issues pertaining to the Unseen through revelation. But even these two are based on rational knowledge, and denial of reason and rational knowledge is tantamount to the denial of both intuition and revelation.

Review Questions

1. Who are the rationalists? Write their viewpoint about knowing God.

2. Write the statement of Professor Muṭahharī about knowing God through the intellect.

3. As far as knowing God through the intellect is concerned, state the pieces of evidence about this from the Holy Qur’an.

4. Write the view of the intuitionists about knowing God and the objection to it.

5. Write the view of the sensualists about knowing God and the objection to it.

6. Write the summary of the sensualists’ view about knowing God and the objection to it.

References

1. Aristotle (384-322 BCE): a Greek philosopher, a student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. He wrote on many subjects, including physics, metaphysics, poetry, theater, music, logic, rhetoric, politics, government, ethics, biology, and zoology. Together with Plato and Socrates (Plato’s teacher), Aristotle is one of the most important founding figures in Western philosophy. [Trans.]

2. René Descartes (1596-1650): French mathematician and the founding father of modern philosophy. His theory of knowledge starts with the quest for certainty, for an indubitable starting-point or foundation on the basis alone of which progress is possible. This is eventually found in his celebrated ‘Cogito ergo sum’ which means “I think therefore I am.” His main writings are Discourse on Method, The Meditations, Principles of Philosophy, The Passions of the Soul and Ruler for the Direction of the Mind. [Trans.]

3. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (known in the West as Alpharabius) (c. 872-950/951 CE): a Muslim polymath (in the fields of cosmology, logic, music, psychology, and sociology) and one of the greatest scientists and philosophers of the world during his time. [Trans.]

4. Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā Balkhī, known as Abū ‘Alī Sīnā Balkhī or Ibn Sīnā and commonly known in English by his Latinized name “Avicenna” (c. 980-1037) was a Persian polymath and the foremost physician and philosopher of his time. He was also an astronomer, chemist, geologist, logician, paleontologist, mathematician, physicist, poet, psychologist, scientist, and teacher. His important works include Al-Shifā’ (an encyclopedic work covering, among other things, logic, physics and metaphysics), Al-Najāt (a summary of Al-Shifā’), and Al-Ishārāt or in full, Al-Ishārāt wa ’t-Tanbīhāt (a latter work consisting of four parts, viz. logic, physics, metaphysics, and mysticism). [Trans.]

5. Ash‘arites (‘ashā‘irah): followers of Abū ’-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (died 330 AH).

6. For further information in this regard, see the book Darāmadī bar ‘Ilm-e Kalām (An Introduction to Scholastic Theology) by the author.

7. Murtada Mutahhari (1920-79) was a leading theoretician of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. As an accomplished scholar of Islamic sciences, he played a pivotal role in forming the modern Islamic discourse which served as the foundation of the revolution. With close to ninety works on different subjects to his credit, he is considered one of the leading thinkers of the global Islamic movement in the twentieth century.

8. Uṣūl-e Falsafeh wa Rawish-e Realism, vol. 5, pp. 33-34 (Introduction).

9. Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān 3:190-191.

10. Ḥakīm Lahījī, Gawhar-e Murād, p. 34.

11. Ibid., p. 38. In this regard, see Āyatullāh Jawādī ‘Āmulī, Shinākht dar Qur’ān (Knowledge in the Qur’an), pp. 379-380.

12. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): English philosopher, mathematician and linguist who was one of the main philosophers that founded materialism. [Trans.]

13. Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655): French Catholic priest, philosopher and astronomer. [Trans.]

14. David Hume (1711-1776), Scottish historian and philosopher, who influenced the development of skepticism and empiricism, is considered one of the greatest skeptics in the history of philosophy. Hume thought that one’s subjective perceptions never provide true knowledge of reality and one can know nothing outside of experience. Accordingly, even the law of cause and effect was an unjustified belief. [Trans.]

15. Paul Foulkes, Falsafeh-ye ‘Umūmī (General Philosophy), trans. Yaḥyā Mahdawī, pp. 130-131; Hans Reichenbach, Pidāyesh-ye Falsafeh-ye ‘Ilmī (The Rise of Scientific Philosophy), trans. Mūsā Akramī, pp. 106-107.

16. Principle or law of non-contradiction: the law of logic that it is not the case that p and not-p. Contradiction is the final logical stopping point in that if a contradiction can be derived from a set of premises, then at least one of them is false. [Trans.]

17. Felicien Robert Challaye (1875-1967): an anti-colonialist French philosopher and journalist. [Trans.]

18. Felicien Robert Challaye, Shinākht-e Rawishhā-ye ‘Ulūm (Knowledge of the Scientific Methods), trans. Yaḥyā Mahdawī, p. 116.

19. Francis Bacon (1561-1626): an English philosopher, statesman, scientist, lawyer, jurist, and author who established and popularized an inductive methodology for scientific inquiry, often called the Baconian method or simply, the scientific method. [Trans.]

20. John Stuart Mill (1806-73): a British philosopher, civil servant and an influential contributor to social theory, political theory, and political economy. [Trans.]

21. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Uṣūl-e Falsafeh wa Rawish-e Realism (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism), vol. 2, p. 97.

22. Sūrat Ṭā Hā 20:5.

23. Shahristānī, Al-Milal wa n-Nihal, vol. 1, p. 93.

24. Abū Muḥammad Sufyān ibn ‘Uyaynah ibn Maymūn al-Hilālī al-Kūfī (725-815 CE): a prominent Sunnī religious scholar in Makkah from the third generation of Muslims referred to as the Tābi‘u al-Tābi‘īn (the Followers of the Followers). [Trans.]

25. SadrṢadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (1572-1641), better known as Mullā Ṣadrā or S al-Muta’allihīn: the foremost representative of the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) School of Islamic philosophy whose magnum opus is Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah (The Four Journeys). [Trans.]

26. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 1, introduction.

27. Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Uṣūl-e Falsafeh wa Rawish-e Realism, vol. 5, p. 11.

28. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-‘Aql wa ’l-Jahl,” ḥadīth 12.

29. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 49.

30. Sūrat al-Anfāl 8:22.

31. Sūrat Yūnus 10:100.

32. Sūrat al-Anbiyā’ 21:22.

33. Sūrat al-Mu’minūn 23:91.

34. Sūrat al-Baqarah 2:116-117.

35. See Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, vol. 11, p. 361.

36. Nahj al-Balāghah (The Peak of Eloquence) is a collection of speeches, sayings and letters of the Commander of the Faithful, Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (‘a) compiled by Sharīf al-Raḍī Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 406 AH/1016). Its contents concern the three essential topics of God, man and the universe, and include comments on scientific, literary, social, ethical, and political issues. [Trans.]

37. Al-Kāfi: more fully, Al-Kāfi fī ’l-Hadīth, one of the most important Shī‘ah collections of hadīth, compiled by Shaykh Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kulaynī (d. 329 AH/941 CE) and divided into three sections: ah al-Kāfī consisting of 34 books, ūl al-Kāfī, Furū‘ al-Kāfī and Rawd Us 326 sections, and over 16,000 ahādīth that can be traced back to the Prophet and his family by an unbroken chain of transmission. [Trans.]

38. Shaykh aṣ-Ṣadūq: also known as Ibn Babūyah, one of the most important of the early Shī‘ah scholars who died in 381 AH/991 CE. For his short biography and works, see the introduction of Shaykh aṣ-Ṣadūq, I’tiqādātu ’l-Imāmiyyah: A Shī‘ite Creed, 3rd Ed., trans. Asaf A. A. Fyzee (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1999), pp. 6-23. [Trans.]

39. Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib al-Ṭabarsī (d. circa 620 AH): a great Shī‘ah scholar, jurisprudent, traditionist (muḥaddith), and historian of the sixth and early seventh century AH. Among his works are Al-Iḥtijāj, Al-Kāfī fī ’l-Fiqh, Tārīkh al-A’immah and Kitāb al-Ṣalāh. [Trans.]

40. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-‘Aql wa ’l-Jahl,” ḥadīth 35.

41. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 1.

42. Nahj al-Balāghah, Sermon 49. [Trans.]


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