Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

12.4. THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE NECESSARY BEING AND THE MEANING OF THEIR ATTRIBUTION

The Attributes of the Necessary Being are divided, first, into (i) the Attributes of Essence and (ii) the Attributes of Act. The Attributes of Essence are those that relate solely to the Essence, without the need to take into account anything extraneous to It such as Its life and Its knowledge of Itself. The Attributes of Act are those which cannot be ascribed to It without taking into account what is extraneous to It, such as creation, giving life and providing.

The Attributes of Act are many, which are abstracted in their multiplicity from Divine activity and are extraneous to the Divine Essence. Our discussion in these sections relates to the Attributes of Essence.

As we have seen above, the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of all existence and all existential perfections. It was established in the foregoing discussions that the creative cause of a thing possesses the reality of that thing to a higher and superior degree, for the giver cannot be devoid of what he gives. Hence He, the Glorious One, possesses, in some way or other, certain attributes of perfection such as knowledge, power and life.

As for the kinds of Attributes of Essence and His manner of possessing them, it may be observed that the Attributes are divided into (ia) the positive attributes (such as knowledge and power) and (ib) the negative attributes, the latter implying a negation. However, as we saw in the foregoing discussion, one may not negate any of the perfections in relation to God, the Exalted, for He is the source of all perfections. Hence His negative attributes signify the negation of deficiency (naqsh) and need (hâjah) in relation to Him, such as the negation of ignorance, incapacity and substantiality. Since deficiency and need imply the negation of perfection, a negative attribute signifies negation of the negation of perfection, which is affirmation of perfection. Hence the negation of ignorance means negation of the negation of knowledge, which implies affirmation of knowledge.

Further, the positive Attributes are divided into (ia 1) those that are ‘intrinsic’ (haqîqiyyah; lit., real), such as ‘the knowing,’ and (ia 2) those that are ‘relative’ (idhâfiyyah), such as ‘possessing power over’ and ‘possessing knowledge of.’ The intrinsic Attributes are in turn divided into (ia 1a) the ‘absolutely intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah mahdhah) such as life and (ia lb) the ‘relatively intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah dzât idhâfah) such as His knowledge of things other than Himself. There is no doubt that the relative Attributes are additional to the Divine Essence, for they are i’tibâri concepts and are not applicable to the Exalted Essence. The negative Attributes derive from the positive intrinsic Attributes, and that which applies to the latter is also true of them.

There are various views concerning the intrinsic Attributes, including the absolutely intrinsic and the relatively intrinsic attributes.

One of these views is that they are identical with the Essence and each of them is identical with the other [in respect of its referent].

A second view is that they are additional to the Essence and accompany It, being eternal like the Essence.

A third view holds that they are additional to the Essence, but not eternal.

A fourth view is that the meaning of the possession of the Attributes by the Essence is that Its acts are such as are performed by one who has these attributes. Thus, the statement ‘He is knowing’ means that His acts, in respect of their perfection, purposefulness, and precision are like the acts of someone who acts with knowledge. The same applies to the other attributes. Hence the Essence is represented in the Attributes.

The first view, which is ascribed to the philosophers, is the right one. As we have seen, the Exalted Essence is the source of every existential perfection, and the source of perfection cannot be devoid of it. Hence His Essence possesses the reality of every perfection emanating from Him, and this is what is meant by the identity of the Attributes and the Essence.

Further, as each of His Attributes of perfection is identical with the Essence, which possesses alb of them, It includes all the Attributes and is identical with them. Hence the Attributes differ from one another in regard to their meaning, but are one in respect to their referent, which is the Exalted Essence.

The view held by some that the cause of creation is His volition (masyiyyah) and will (irâdah), not His Essence, is of no consequence. For if the will be an attribute of the Essence and identical with It, the ascription of creation to will amounts to its ascription to the Essence, and this view has nothing enlightening to offer. If it be an attribute of Act (shifat al-fi’l), abstracted on the plane of Act, the Act would precede the will, and its dependence on the Act for coming into existence implies the precedence of the effect to the cause, which is impossible. Moreover, such a view implies that the ascription of creation and bringing into existence to God be metaphorical.

As to the second view, which is ascribed to the Ash’arites, the question arises whether or not these Attributes - which according to them are: life, power, knowledge, hearing, sight, will and speech - are caused by something. If they are not caused by anything and are self-existent and necessary in themselves, there would be eight necessary beings: the Essence and the seven Attributes. Such a view stands refuted by the proofs of the Unity of the Necessary Being.

If these are caused, they are either caused by the Essence or by something else. If caused by something else, they would be necessary-by-something-else, and this necessity ultimately leads up to a being that is necessary-in-itself, other than the Necessary Being of whom they are attributes. This conclusion, like the former one, is also refuted by the proof of the Unity of the Necessary Being. Moreover, it implies that the Necessary Being stands in need of something else to possess its attributes of perfection, which is impossible.

The second case [i.e. if the Attributes are supposed to have been caused by the Essence] implies that their cause precedes them in terms of causality while it is itself devoid of the perfections emanating from it, which is impossible.

Moreover, this view implies that the Essence of the Necessary Being is devoid of the attributes of perfection, whereas, as mentioned earlier, It is

absolute existence, which is not devoid of existence or any existential perfection, and this involves a contradiction.

As to the third view, which is ascribed to the Karrâmiyyah, that the Attributes are additional and non-eternal, it implies that the Exalted Essence possesses a matter that receives these Attributes that come to exist in It. This implies that the Essence is composite - which is impossible - and in itself devoid of perfection, which is also impossible.

As to the fourth view - that the Essence is represented by the Attributes - which is ascribed to the Mu’tazilah, it also implies that the Essence is devoid of them, whereas, as we have seen, It is absolute existence, which cannot be devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence this view involves a contradiction.

الفصل الخامس في علمه تعالى

قد تقدم :أن لكل مجرد عن المادة علما بذاته لحضور ذاته عند ذاته و هو علمه بذاته.

و تقدم أيضا: أن ذاته المتعالية صرف الوجود الذي لا يحده حد و لا يشذ عنه وجود و لا كمال وجودي فما في تفاصيل الخلقة من وجود أو كمال وجودي بنظامها الوجودي فهو موجود عنده بنحو أعلى و أشرف غير متميز بعضها من بعض فهو معلوم عنده علما إجماليا في عين الكشف التفصيلي.

ثم إن الموجودات بما هي معاليل له قائمة الذوات به قيام الرابط بالمستقل حاضرة بوجوداتها عنده فهي معلومة له علما حضوريا في مرتبة وجوداتها المجردة منها بأنفسها و المادية منها بصورها المجردة.

فقد تحقق: أن للواجب تعالى علما حضوريا بذاته و علما حضوريا تفصيليا بالأشياء في مرتبة ذاته قبل إيجادها و هو عين ذاته و علما حضوريا تفصيليا بها في مرتبتها و هو خارج من ذاته و من المعلوم أن علمه بمعلولاته يستوجب العلم بما عندها من العلم.

تتمة

و لما كانت حقيقة السمع و البصر هي العلم بالمسموعات و المبصرات كانا من مطلق العلم و ثبتا فيه تعالى فهو تعالى سميع بصير كما أنه عليم خبير.

تنبيه و إشارة

للناس في علمه تعالى أقوال مختلفة و مسالك متشتتة أخر نشير إلى ما هو المعروف منها:

أحدها: أن لذاته تعالى علما بذاته دون معلولاته لأن الذات أزلية و لا معلول إلا حادثا.

و فيه: أن العلم بالمعلول في الأزل لا يستلزم وجوده في الأزل بوجوده الخاص به كما عرفت.

الثاني: ما نسب إلى المعتزلة أن للماهيات ثبوتا عينيا في العدم و هي التي تعلق بها علمه تعالى قبل الإيجاد.

و فيه: أنه تقدم بطلان القول بثبوت المعدومات.

الثالث :ما نسب إلى الصوفية أن للماهيات الممكنة ثبوتا علميا بتبع الأسماء و الصفات هو المتعلق لعلمه تعالى قبل الإيجاد.

و فيه: أن القول بأصالة الوجود و اعتبارية الماهيات ينفي أي ثبوت مفروض للماهية قبل وجودها العيني الخاص بها.

الرابع: ما نسب إلى أفلاطن أن علمه تعالى التفصيلي بالأشياء هو المفارقات النورية و المثل الإلهية التي تتجمع فيها كمالات الأنواع.

و فيه: أن ذلك على تقدير ثبوتها إنما يكفي لتصوير العلم التفصيلي بالأشياء في مرتبتها لا في مرتبة الذات فتبقى الذات خالية من الكمال العلمي و هو وجود صرف لا يشذ عنه كمال وجودي هذا خلف.

الخامس: ما نسب إلى شيخ الإشراق و تبعه جمع من المحققين أن الأشياء بأسرها من المجردات و الماديات حاضرة بوجودها عنده تعالى غير غائبة عنه و هو علمه التفصيلي بالأشياء.

و فيه: أن المادية لا تجامع الحضور كما تقدم في مباحث العلم و المعلوم على أنه إنما يكفي لتصوير العلم التفصيلي في مرتبة الأشياء فتبقى الذات خالية في نفسها عن الكمال العلمي كما في القول الرابع.

السادس: ما نسب إلى ثاليس المطلي و هو أنه تعالى يعلم العقل الأول و هو المعلول الأول بحضور ذاته عنده و يعلم سائر الأشياء بارتسام صورها في العقل الأول.

و فيه: أنه يرد عليه ما ورد على سابقه.

السابع :قول بعضهم إن ذاته تعالى علم تفصيلي بالمعلول الأول و إجمالي بما دونه و ذات المعلول الأول علم تفصيلي بالمعلول الثاني و إجمال بما دونه و هكذا.

و فيه ما في سابقه.

الثامن :ما نسب إلى فرفوريوس أن علمه تعالى باتحاده مع المعقول.

و فيه: أنه إنما يكفي لبيان نحو تحقق العلم و أنه بالاتحاد دون العروض و نحوه و أما كونه علما تفصيليا بالأشياء قبل الإيجاد مثلا فلا ففيه ما في سابقه.

التاسع: ما نسب إلى أكثر المتأخرين أن علمه بذاته علم إجمالي بالأشياء فهو تعالى يعلم الأشياء كلها إجمالا بعلمه بذاته و أما علمه بالأشياء تفصيلا فبعد وجودها لأن العلم تابع للمعلوم و لا معلوم قبل وجود المعلوم.

و فيه: ما في سابقه على أن كون علمه تعالى على نحو الارتسام و الحصول ممنوع كما سيأتي.

العاشر: ما نسب إلى المشاءين أن علمه تعالى بالأشياء قبل إيجادها بحضور ماهياتها على النظام الموجود في الوجود لذاته تعالى لا على نحو الدخول فيها و الاتحاد بها بل على نحو قيامها بها بالثبوت الذهني على وجه الكلية بمعنى عدم تغير العلم بتغير المعلوم فهو علم عنائي

حصوله العلمي مستتبع لحصوله العيني و قد جرى على هذا القول أكثر المتكلمين و إن خطئوه و طعنوا فيه من حيث إثبات الكلية في العلم فإنهم جروا على كونه علما حصوليا قبل الإيجاد و أنه على حاله قبل وجود الأشياء و بعده.

و فيه: ما في سابقه على أن فيه إثبات العلم الحصولي لموجود مجرد ذاتا و فعلا و قد تقدم في مباحث العلم و المعلوم أن الموجود المجرد ذاتا و فعلا لا يتحقق فيه علم حصولي على أن فيه إثبات وجود ذهني من غير وجود عيني يقاس إليه و لازمه أن يعود وجودا عينيا آخر للموجود الخارجي قبل وجوده العيني الخاص به و منفصلا عنه تعالى و يرجع لا محالة إلى القول الرابع.

12.5. GOD’S KNOWLEDGE

It was mentioned earlier that every immaterial being has knowledge of itself, which is the presence of its essence for itself, or self-knowledge.

It was also mentioned that the Exalted Essence is absolute existence not bounded by any limit, nor is it devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence all the details of creation, of existence and existential perfections, with their existential order, exist in It in their highest and noblest form without being separate from one another. Hence he knows them with an undifferentiated knowledge, which at the same time discloses details (‘ilman ijmâliyyan fî ‘ayn al-kasyf al-tafshîlî).

Further, all existents, being Its effects, depend upon It with the dependence of something relative (râbith) on that which is independent, and they are present for It with their existence. Hence It knows them with an immediate knowledge on the plane of their existences, the immaterial among them with their very being and the material ones through their immaterial forms.

This establishes that the Exalted Necessary Being has an immediate knowledge (‘ilrn hudhârî) of Itself and a detailed immediate knowledge of the things before their creation on the plane of Its Essence, and that this knowledge is identical with Its Essence. It also has a detailed immediate knowledge of them on their own plane, extraneous to Its Essence. It is evident that Its knowledge of things implies also the knowledge of their knowledge [of themselves and other things].

A Supplementary Note

As hearing and seeing consist of the knowledge of that which is audible and visible, they are included in knowledge in general. Thus the attributes related to seeing and hearing have subsistence in God, the Exalted, who is the hearer and the seer in the same way as He is the knower.

Some Related Views

There are various views concerning Divine knowledge; we shall review some of the well known among them in the following:

(i) One of these views is that the Divine Being has knowledge of Its own Essence, not of Its effects, because Its Essence is pre-eternal (azalî) and the existence of every effect is preceded by its non-existence (hadîts).

This viewpoint, however, is not correct, because knowledge of the effect in pre-eternity does not imply that the effect existed in pre-eternity with it particular existence, as we saw above.

(ii) A second view, which is attributed to the Mu’tazilah, is that quiddities do have a kind of objective subsistence (tsubût ‘aynî) daring their non-existence (‘adam), and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before their coming into being.

However, as discussed earlier, the notion of subsistence of non-existents is an invalid idea.

(iii) The third view, which has been ascribed to the Sufis, is that the contingent quiddities (al-mâhiyyât al-mumkinah) have an epistemic subsistence (tsubût ‘ilmî) subsumed in the Names and the Attributes, and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before creation.

However, the view that existence is fundamental and quiddities are derivative precludes the assumption of any kind of subsistence for quiddity prior to its particular external existence.

(iv) The fourth view is ascribed to Plato, who held that God’s detailed knowledge of things consists of immaterial Ideas and divine archetypes that possess all the perfections of the species.

This view is also inadequate, because even if such archetypes are assumed to exist, that only helps in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, not on the plane of the Essence, leaving It devoid of knowledge, whereas God is absolute existence, which is not without any existential perfection. Hence it leads to contradiction.

(v) The fifth view is attributed to Suhrawardî, who is followed by a number of authorities in holding it. According to it, all things, material and immaterial, are present with their very existence for God, the Exalted, not being hidden from Him. This constitutes His detailed knowledge of things.

The problem with this view is that presence is inconsistent with materiality, as mentioned in the discussion on knowledge and the known. Moreover, it helps solely in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, and, like the fourth theory, it leaves the Essence devoid of the perfection of knowledge.

(vi) The sixth view, which is ascribed to Thales of Miletus, holds that God knows the First Intellect, which is the first effect, by virtue of the presence of its essence for Him. Other things are known to Him through the reflection of their forms in the First Intellect.

The objections mentioned in relation with the previous theory apply to this view also.

(vii) The seventh view holds that God’s essence has a detailed knowledge of the first effect and a non-detailed knowledge (‘ilm ijmâlî) of things below it. The essence of the first effect has a detailed knowledge of the second effect and a non-detailed knowledge of things below it, and so on. The above-mentioned objections apply here also.

(viii) The eighth view, which has been attributed to Porphyry, is that God’s knowledge is through His union (ittihâd) with the known.

The problem with this theory is that it only explains the manner in which God’s knowledge is realized, namely, that it involves union, not accidence (‘urûdh) or something of the kind. But it does not explain God’s detailed knowledge of things prior to their creation. Hence it suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories.

(ix) The ninth theory, which is ascribed to most of the later philosophers, is that God’s knowledge of His own Essence is as well a non-detailed knowledge of things. Hence He knows all things in a non-detailed manner through His knowledge of His own Essence. His detailed knowledge of things is posterior to their existence, for knowledge is incident to the known and there is nothing to be known prior to the existence of the known.

This theory also suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories. Moreover, as will be explained later on, it is inadmissible to regard God’s knowledge as acquired, and obtained through perceived forms.

(x) The tenth theory, which is ascribed to the Peripatetics, states that God’s knowledge of things prior to their creation is by presence in His Essence of their quiddities, as per the existing order of being, not in the manner of a union (ittihâd) or penetration (dukhûl), but as universals sustained by the Essence through a mental subsistence. It is universal in the sense that it does not

change with the changes of the known thing. Hence it is a fore-knowledge (‘ilm ‘inâ’î) wherein cognitive apprehension is accompanied by its objective realization. This view is subscribed to by

most of the theologians (mutakallimûn), though they have [erroneously] faulted it in respect of its assertion of universality in Divine knowledge [due to their misunderstanding of the term ‘universal’].

Thus they hold God’s knowledge to be an acquired one prior to creation, remaining unchanged before and after the existence of things.

This theory suffers from the inadequacies of the previous ones, in addition to the fact that it ascribes acquired knowledge to an existent that is immaterial in essence and actuality. However, as mentioned in the discussions on knowledge and the known, an existent that is immaterial in its essence and in actuality cannot have acquired knowledge. Moreover, this view posits mental existence without there being any external existent to which it should correspond, which entails another objective existence of the external existent prior to its particular objective existence separate, from God. Hence it boils down to the fourth view mentioned above.

الفصل السادس في قدرته تعالى

قد تقدم: أن القدرة كون الشي‏ء مصدرا للفعل عن علم و من المعلوم أن الذي ينتهي إليه الموجودات الممكنة هو ذاته المتعالية إذ لا يبقى وراء الوجود الممكن إلا الوجود الواجبي من غير قيد و شرط فهو المصدر للجميع و علمه عين ذاته التي هي المبدأ لصدور المعاليل الممكنة فله القدرة و هي عين ذاته.

فإن قلت: أفعال الإنسان الاختيارية مخلوقة لنفس الإنسان لأنها منوطة باختياره إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل و لو كانت مخلوقة لله سبحانه مقدورة له كان الإنسان مجبرا على الفعل لا مختارا فيه فأفعال الإنسان الاختيارية خارجة عن تعلق القدرة فالقدرة لا تعم كل شي‏ء.

قلت: ليس معنى كون الفعل اختياريا تساوى نسبته إلى الوجود و العدم حتى حين الصدور فمن المحال صدور الممكن من غير ترجح و تعين لأحد جانبي وجوده و عدمه بل الفعل الاختياري لكونه ممكنا في ذاته يحتاج في وجوده إلى علة تامة لا يتخلف عنها نسبته إليها نسبة الوجوب و أما نسبته إلى الإنسان الذي هو جزء من أجزاء علته التامة فبالإمكان كسائر الأجزاء التي لها من المادة القابلة و سائر الشرائط الزمانية و المكانية و غيرها.

فالفعل الاختياري لا يقع إلا واجبا بالغير كسائر المعلولات و من المعلوم أن الوجوب بالغير لا يتحقق إلا بالانتهاء إلى واجب بالذات و لا واجب بالذات إلا هو تعالى فقدرته تعالى عامة حتى للأفعال الاختيارية.

و من طريق آخر: الأفعال كغيرها من الممكنات معلولة و قد تقدم في مرحلة العلة و المعلول أن وجود المعلول رابط بالنسبة إلى علته و لا يتحقق وجود رابط إلا بالقيام بمستقل يقومه و لا مستقل بالذات إلا الواجب بالذات فهو مبدأ أول لصدور كل معلول متعلق الوجود بعلة و هو على كل شي‏ء قدير.

فإن قلت: الالتزام بعموم القدرة للأفعال الاختيارية التزام بكونها جبرية فإن لازمه القول بتعلق الإرادة الإلهية بالفعل الاختياري و هي لا تتخلف عن المراد فيكون ضروري الوقوع و يكون الإنسان مجبرا عليه لا مختارا فيه و بوجه آخر ما وقع من الفعل متعلق لعلمه تعالى فوقوعه ضروري و إلا عاد علمه جهلا تعالى عن ذلك فالفعل جبري لا اختياري.

قلت: كلا فالإرادة الإلهية إنما تعلقت بالفعل على ما هو عليه في نفسه و الذي عليه الفعل هو أنه منسوب إلى الإنسان الذي هو جزء علته التامة بالإمكان و لا يتغير بتعلق

الإرادة عما هو عليه فقد تعلقت الإرادة بالفعل من طريق اختيار الإنسان و مراده تعالى أن يفعل الإنسان الفعل الفلاني باختياره و من المحال أن يتخلف مراده تعالى عن إرادته.

و الجواب عن الاحتجاج بتعلق العلم الأزلي بالفعل كالجواب عن تعلق الإرادة به فالعلم إنما تعلق بالفعل على ما هو عليه و هو أنه فعل اختياري يتمكن الإنسان منه و من تركه و لا يخرج العلم المعلوم عن حقيقته فلو لم يقع اختياريا كان علمه تعالى جهلا.

فإن قلت: السلوك إلى بيان عموم القدرة من طريق توقف وجود المعلول الممكن على وجوبه بالغير و انتهاء ذلك إلى الواجب بالذات ينتج خلاف المطلوب فإن كون فعله تعالى واجبا يستلزم كونه تعالى موجبا بفتح الجيم أي واجبا عليه الفعل ممتنعا عليه الترك و لا معنى لعموم القدرة حينئذ.

قلت: الوجوب كما تعلم منتزع من الوجود فكما أن وجود المعلول من ناحية العلة كذلك وجوبه بالغير من ناحيتها و من المحال أن يعود الأثر المترتب على وجود الشي‏ء مؤثرا في وجود مؤثرة فالإيجاب الجائي من ناحيته تعالى إلى فعله يستحيل أن يرجع فيوجب عليه تعالى فعله و يسلب عنه بذلك عموم القدرة و هي عين ذاته.

و يتبين بما تقدم: أنه تعالى مختار بالذات إذ لا إجبار إلا من أمر وراء الفاعل يحمله على خلاف ما يقتضيه أو على ما لا يقتضيه و ليس وراءه تعالى إلا فعله و الفعل ملائم لفاعله فما فعله من فعل هو الذي تقتضيه ذاته و يختاره بنفسه.

12.6. THE ATTRIBUTE OF POWER

As mentioned earlier, the attribute of power means that an entity be a knowing source of its acts. It is known that contingent existents derive from the Divine Essence, for there is nothing beyond contingent existents except the unconditioned Necessary Being. Hence God is the source of everything and His knowledge is identical with His Essence, which is the source of contingent effects. He has power and it is identical with His Essence.

Now if someone were to say that a human being’s voluntary actions are a creation of the human soul, for they are incident to his will - he performs them if he likes and refrains from performing them if he so wills. Had they been created by God and determined by Him, man would be compelled (mujbir) in his acts, not a free actor who acts out of his free choice (mukhtâr). Hence man’s voluntary acts (al-af’âl al-ikhtiyâriyyah) lie outside the ambit of Divine power, which does not encompass everything.

The answer to this is that the meaning of the voluntary character of an act is not that it remains neutral in its relation to existence and non-existence until its coming into being; for it is impossible for a contingent to come into being without there being a preponderant on the side of existence or that of non-existence. Rather, by virtue of its essential contingency, a voluntary action requires a complete cause for coming into existence. Hence when the cause exists it cannot fail to exist, for its relation to the cause is one of necessity. However, its relation to man - who is a part from among the parts of a complete cause - is one of contingency, similar to that of its other parts such as a receptive matter, other temporal and spatial conditions and so on.

Hence the voluntary act does occur without becoming necessary-by-something-else, like all other effects, and it is evident that something that is necessary-by-something-else does not actuate without ultimately terminating in that which is necessary-by-itself. There is nothing necessary-by-itself except God, the Exalted. Hence His power is all-encompassing and includes even the acts of free will.

Considering the same problem from another angle, voluntary acts, like other contingents, are caused, and, as mentioned in the chapter on cause and effect,’ the existence of an effect is relative (râbith) in relation to its cause, and is not realized except through dependence on something independent that may sustain it. There is nothing that is independent-in-itself except that which is necessary-in-itself. Hence God is the primary source of all effects dependent for their existence on a cause, and He has power over all things.

Now if someone were to say: that if the acts of free will were subject to Divine power it would imply that they are compelled (jabarî); for it means that voluntary actions depend on the Divine will, which is never frustrated. Hence their occurrence is necessary, and, as a result, man is compelled in his voluntary acts and not free.

Also, considering the issue from yet another angle, since God has prior knowledge of every act that takes place, its occurrence is necessary; for otherwise it would not be knowledge but ignorance, which is far from God’s station. Hence the voluntary acts are compelled, not free.

Our answer is that the case is indeed not such, because the Divine will relates to man’s actions as they are in themselves, and as such they remain

attributed to the person who is part of the complete cause. Their being subject to the Divine will does not change what they are. Hence the subjection of the actions to the Divine will is through man’s free choice. It was God’s will that man should perform such and such acts out of his own free will, and it is impossible for His will to be frustrated.

A similar answer may be given to the objection based on the subjection of voluntary acts to God’s pre-eternal knowledge. For acts of free will are subject to God’s knowledge as they are, that is, as voluntary actions which one can perform or refrain from performing, and the knowledge of something does not alter its reality. Hence, if the act were to occur without the exercise of free will, that would imply ignorance on God’s behalf.

Someone might say that this explanation of Divine power - i.e. on the basis of the dependence of the existence of a contingent effect on its becoming necessary-by-something-else and the termination of this necessity in that which is necessary-in-itself -  leads to a conclusion contrary to what was intended. That is because the necessity of God’s acts implies that He is compelled by necessity. In other words, His acts are forced upon Him by necessity and it is impossible for Him not to carry them out. In view of this, Divine omnipotence becomes meaningless.

The answer to this is that necessity, as we know, is abstracted from existence. In the same way as the effect’s existence is derived from the cause, so also its necessity-by-something-else derives from the cause, and it is impossible that a property characterizing a thing’s existence should in turn affect the existence of the cause that creates the property in it. Hence it is impossible that the necessity that God’s acts derive from Him should in turn make the act necessary upon Him and deprive Him of His omnipotence, which is identical with His Essence.

From what has been said, it becomes clear that God, the Exalted, is a free actor by essence; for there can be no compulsion except from something extraneous to an agent that may force it to act contrary to its will, and there is nothing extraneous to God except His Act, which is in harmony with the agent. Hence, His Acts are what His Essence requires and chooses.

الفصل السابع في حياته تعالى

الحي عندنا هو الدراك الفعال فالحياة مبدأ الإدراك و الفعل أي مبدأ العلم و القدرة أو أمر يلازمه العلم و القدرة و إذ كانت الحياة تحمل علينا و العلم و القدرة فينا زائدتان على الذات فحملها على ما كانتا فيه موجودتين للذات على نحو العينية كالذات الواجبة الوجود بالذات أولى و أحق فهو تعالى حياة و حي بالذات.

على: أنه تعالى مفيض لحياة كل حي و معطي الشي‏ء غير فاقد له.

12.7. THE ATTRIBUTE OF LIFE

For us something ‘living’ means a conscious agent (al-darrâk al-fa’’âl). That is, life is the source of consciousness and activity, or the source of knowledge and power, or anything associated with knowledge and power. If the predicate ‘living’ is applicable to us as human beings, while knowledge and power are additional to our essences, it is predicable, with greater reason, of the Essence of the Necessary Being in whom they exist with their very reality. Hence God, the Exalted, is Life and is the Living One by virtue of His Essence.

Moreover, God, the Exalted, is the source of the life of every living being, and the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it.

الفصل الثامن في إرادته تعالى و كلامه

قالوا: إرادته تعالى علمه بالنظام الأصلح و بعبارة أخرى علمه بكون الفعل خيرا فهي وجه من وجوه علمه تعالى كما أن السمع بمعنى العلم بالمسموعات و البصر بمعنى العلم بالمبصرات وجهان من وجوه علمه فهو عين ذاته تعالى.

و قالوا: الكلام فيما نتعارفه لفظ دال على ما في الضمير كاشف عنه فهناك موجود اعتباري و هو اللفظ الموضوع يدل دلالة وضعية اعتبارية على موجود آخر و هو الذي في الذهن و لو كان هناك موجود حقيقي دال بالدلالة الطبعية على موجود آخر كذلك كالأثر الدال على مؤثره و صفة الكمال في المعلول الكاشفة عن الكمال الأتم في علته كان أولى و أحق بأن يسمى كلاما لقوة دلالته و لو كان هناك موجود أحدي الذات ذو صفات كمال في ذاته بحيث يكشف بتفاصيل كماله و ما يترتب عليه من الآثار عن وجوده الأحدي و هو الواجب تعالى كان أولى و أحق باسم الكلام و هو متكلم لوجود ذاته لذاته.

أقول: فيه إرجاع تحليلي لمعنيي الإرادة و الكلام إلى وجه من وجوه العلم و القدرة فلا ضرورة تدعو إلى إفرادهما عن العلم و القدرة و ما نسب إليه تعالى في الكتاب و السنة من الإرادة و الكلام أريد به صفة الفعل بالمعنى الذي سيأتي إن شاء الله

12.8. THE ATTRIBUTES OF WILL AND SPEECH

The metaphysicians state that God’s will (irâdah) is His knowledge of the best [possible] order of the universe. In other words, it is His knowledge that a certain act is good. Hence in the same way as His being the ‘hearer’ and the ‘seer’ (i.e. having knowledge of that which is audible and visible) are two aspects of His knowledge, His will is also an aspect of His knowledge, which is identical with His Essence.

It is also said that speech, as we know it, consists of words, which signify meanings in one’s mind. Hence a word is a ‘conventional existent’ (mawjûd i’tibârî), which by virtue of conventional signification (dalâlah wad’iyyah) signifies another existent in the mind. Should there be a real existent that signifies another existent with a ‘natural’ signification (dalâlah thab’iyyah) - such as an effect, which signifies its own cause - and should its attribute of perfection manifest the consummate perfection of its cause, then it can be called a ‘word’ (kalâm) with greater reason due to the strength of its signification. If it were a being unitary in its essence (ahadî al-dzât)P whose essential attributes of perfection, which by virtue of the details of its perfection and effects (âtsâr) manifest that unitary being, which is the Necessary Being, it is worthier of being called a ‘speaker.’ Hence He is the ‘Speaker’ (mutakallim) by virtue of the existence of His Essence for Himself.

I say: In this view, the concepts of Divine will and speech are reduced to an aspect of knowledge and power. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider them in separation from knowledge and power. As to the will and speech that are attributed to God, the Exalted, in the Qur’ân and the Sunnah, they refer to the attributes of Act, in the sense to be explained shortly, God willing.

الفصل التاسع في فعله تعالى و انقساماته

لفعله تعالى بمعنى المفعول و هو الوجود الفائض منه انقسامات بحسب ما تحصل من الأبحاث السابقة كانقسامه إلى مجرد و مادي و انقسامه إلى ثابت و سيال و إلى غير ذلك و المراد في هذا الفصل الإشارة إلى ما تقدم سابقا أن العوالم الكلية ثلاثة عالم العقل و عالم المثال و عالم المادة.

فعالم العقل مجرد عن المادة و آثارها.

و عالم المثال مجرد عن المادة دون آثارها من الأبعاد و الأشكال و الأوضاع و غيرها ففيه أشباح جسمانية متمثلة في صفة الأجسام التي في عالم المادة على نظام يشبه نظامها في عالم المادة غير أن تعقب بعضها لبعض بالترتب الوجودي بينها لا بتغير صورة إلى صورة أو حال إلى حال بالخروج من القوة إلى الفعل من طريق الحركة على ما هو الشأن في عالم المادة فحال الصور المثالية في ترتب بعضها على بعض حال الصور الخيالية من الحركة و التغير و العلم مجرد لا قوة فيه و لا تغير فهو علم بالتغير لا تغير في العلم

و عالم المادة بجواهرها و أعراضها مقارن للمادة.

و العوالم الثلاثة مترتبة وجودا فعالم العقل قبل عالم المثال و عالم المثال قبل عالم المادة وجودا و ذلك لأن الفعلية المحضة التي لا تشوبها قوة أقوى و أشد وجودا مما هو بالقوة محضا أو تشوبه قوة فالمفارق قبل المقارن للمادة ثم العقل المفارق أقل حدودا و قيودا و أوسع و أبسط وجودا من المثال المجرد و كلما كان الوجود أقوى و أوسع كانت مرتبته في السلسلة المترتبة من حقيقة الوجود المشككة أقدم و من المبدإ الأول الذي هو وجود صرف ليس له حد يحده و لا كمال يفقده أقرب فعالم العقل أقدم وجودا من الجميع و يليه عالم المثال و يليه عالم المادة.

و يتبين بما ذكر: أن الترتيب المذكور ترتيب في العلية أي إن عالم العقل علة مفيضة لعالم المثال و عالم المثال علة مفيضة لعالم المادة.

و يتبين أيضا بمعونة ما تقدم من أن العلة مشتملة على كمال المعلول بنحو أعلى و أشرف أن العوالم الثلاثة متطابقة متوافقة ففي عالم المثال نظام مثالي يضاهي النظام المادي و هو أشرف منه و في عالم العقل ما يطابقه لكنه موجود بنحو أبسط و أجمل و يطابقه النظام الربوبي الموجود في علم الواجب تعالى.

12.9. THE DIVINE ACT AND ITS DIVISIONS

God’s Act (i.e. creation), in the sense of existence emanating from Him, has various divisions in accordance with the conclusions of the previous discussions, such as its division into material and immaterial, changeable and unchangeable, and so on.

Our purpose here is to make a passing reference to that which has already been mentioned,’ that there are three realms: the realm of the Intellect (‘âlam al-’aql), the imaginal realm (‘âlam al-mitsâl), and the material realm (‘âlam al-mâddah).

The realm of the Intellect is immaterial and without matter and its properties (âtsâr).

The imaginal world is also devoid of matter without, however, being devoid of its properties, such as spatial dimension, shape, configuration and so on. It contains bodily images (asbbdh) which are analogous in their characteristics to bodies in the material realm and with an order that is similar to their order in the material world. But they do not succeed one another in respect of existence, nor do they change from one form to another or from one state to another by passing from potentiality to actuality by motion, as is the case in the material world. Thus the imaginal forms in their succeeding one another are similar to the subjective imaginary forms in respect of change and motion. As knowledge is immaterial and there is no potentiality or change in it, it is knowledge of change, not change of knowledge.

The material world, together with its substances and accidents, is associated with matter.

These threefold realms stand in an existential hierarchy. Thus the realm of the Intellect existentially precedes the imaginal world, and the imaginal world existentially precedes the material world.

That is because absolute actuality, without any trace of potentiality, is existentially stronger and more powerful than that which has either pure potentiality or traces of potentiality in it. Hence that which is immaterial has existential precedence over that which is associated with matter.

Further, the immaterial Intellect is least bound by limits and conditions and is existentially more expansive and simpler than the immaterial imaginal form (al-mitsâl al-mujarrad). Whenever an existent is stronger and more expansive, its precedence is greater in the graded hierarchy of existence and it is nearer to the First Source, which is absolute existence, without any limits and not lacking any perfection. Hence the world of the Intellect existentially precedes all being, and below it is the imaginal world, below which is the material world.

From what has been said it becomes clear that the above-mentioned hierarchy is one based on causality. That is, the world of the Intellect is the emanating cause (mufîdh) of the imaginal world and the imaginal world is the emanating cause of the material world.

It also becomes clear from that which was stated earlier - that the cause possesses the perfection of its effect to a higher and superior degree - that the threefold worlds correspond to one another. Thus the imaginal world has an imaginal order corresponding to the material order while being superior

to it, and the world of Intellect has an order corresponding to it while being simpler and more undifferentiated (ajmal), and to it corresponds the divine order (al-nizhâm al-rabawî) that exists in the knowledge of the Exalted Necessary Being.