Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

A SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION

Certain objections have been raised against the notion of existence of quiddities in the mind, in the sense that they exist there by themselves.

First Objection

The view that quiddities exist in the mind by themselves implies that a single thing should be both a substance and an accident at the same time, which is impossible. To explain, the substance (jawhar) intellected by the mind is a substance in accordance with the principle of retention of the essentials (dhatiyyât). However, the same substance is also an accident (‘arad), because it subsists through the soul in much the same way as an accident subsists, through its substratum (ma‘rûd). This is self-contradictory, because it implies that a thing be both independent of a subject (mawdû’) and depend on a subject at the same time.

Second Objection

The mental quiddity belongs to the category (maqûlah) of quality (kayf),’ in accordance with the view that the intelligible forms (al-suwar al-‘ilmiyyah) are qualities of the soul (kayfiyyât nafsâniyyah). When we conceive a substance, that conception would fall under the category of substance, on the basis of the principle of retention of the essentials (dhatiyyât). At the same time, as said, it falls under the category of quality, while the categories are mutually exclusive. This implies a contradiction in the essence of the mental existent. Similarly, when we conceive something belonging to a category other than that of substance, the conceived quiddity would fall under two categories. This is true also when the conception is that of a sensible quality (kayf mahsûs), for it will fall under the category of sensible quality as well as that of psychic quality (kayf nafsânî). In all these cases, a single thing falls under two mutually exclusive categories, which is logically impossible.

The philosophers who believe in mental existence admit that the second objection poses a greater difficulty than the first one. The idea that a single thing may be a substance as well as an accident does not pose much of a difficulty, because the essential difference between the categories is the one between substance, quality, quantity and so on. For the notion of accident - as something that subsists through its subject - is a general one that applies to the nine categories. It may validly include mental substance as well and apply to it. Moreover, in accordance with the definition of substance as ‘a quiddity which does not require a subject to exist externally,’ it may validly subsist in the mind through a subject, for it is while existing externally that it does, not require a subject. However, the falling of a single quiddity under two categories  - such as substance and quality or quantity and quality - is necessarily impossible, for the categories are mutually exclusive with respect to essence.

The Attempts to Address the Two Objections

In view of the above and similar objections, some (viz. al-Râzî) have been led to an outright denial of mental existence, holding that knowledge is

a relation between the soul and external reality. Accordingly, that which is known falls solely under the category of external entities. However, we have shown the inadmissibility of such a position. Some others have been led to hold that external quiddities existing in the mind are resemblances (asybâh), not the quiddities themselves. A thing’s resemblance is something other than and different from the thing itself. Hence the intellected forms are qualities of the soul, which do not retain the character of the external categories, and no difficulty arises on the basis of this view.

However, we have shown that this position implies a denial of the possibility of knowledge.

Several other attempts have been made to resolve the above-mentioned difficulties, which are as follow:

` (i) Some of them (viz. al-Qawshajî) have said that knowledge (‘ilm) is different from the known (ma’lûm). The cognition (hushûl) of an external quiddity by the mind involves two things. One is the intellected quiddity itself as it was in external reality. That is the known, and it does not subsist through the soul but is self-subsisting, being present in the mind like a thing present in space and time. The other is a quality present in the soul and subsisting through it. That is knowledge, and it is by virtue of it that ignorance is removed from the soul. Accordingly, the known - whether substance, quantity or something else - falls under an external category, whereas knowledge is a quality of the soul. Thus understood, the difficulty posed by coincidence of two categories or two kinds of one category does not arise.

However, such a description is contrary to what introspection reveals to us during cognition. The form of something present in the soul during cognition is exactly what relieves the soul of ignorance and afford us the knowledge of that thing.

(ii) Some others who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity (viz. al-Sayyid al-Sanad Shadr al-Dîn al-Syirâzî) have been led to hold that the forms intellected by the mind are divested from their corresponding external quiddities and transformed into qualities. To explain, since the external existence of quiddity is prior to the [mental existence of] quiddity itself, aside from existence there will be no quiddity at all. Mental existence and external existence are different from one another with a real difference, so that when existence is transformed through an external existent becoming a mental existent, there is no reason why quiddity too should not be transformed by the transformation of substance, quantity or any other category into the category of quality. Hence a thing itself has no definite reality with regard to itself. Rather, when a mental quality occurs in the external world it is either substance or some other category, and when an external substance occurs in the mind it becomes transformed into a mental quality. Given the difference between mental and external quiddities (as a result of the above-mentioned transformation), the claim that things themselves come into the mind requires that there should be a common principle between the two. To conceive such a principle, it is sufficient for the intellect to conceptualize something indefinite and common between the two - like the conception of a matter common to a material body and its

disintegrated form - so that what is in the mind should correspond to what is in external reality.

The above theory is fruitless, first because the belief in the transformation of quiddity and of a real difference between the two modes of existence (external and mental) is inconsistent with the doctrine subscribed to by its proponent, that quiddity is fundamentally real and existence is a derivative construct.

Second, since it implies an essential difference between the mental form and the external object known, it boils down to a theory of resemblances and skepticism.

(iii) Some others (viz. al-Dawwânî) have stated that since knowledge is essentially identical with the object of knowledge, it belongs to the same category as the known object. Thus if the latter happens to be a substance, the former is also a substance, and if the latter is a quantity it is also a quality, and so on. As to naming knowledge a ‘quality’ by the philosophers, it is based on a somewhat loose expression, similar to the common usage wherein an attribute representing a substance is called a quality when applied to something else. With this, they claim, the second difficulty is overcome concerning the falling of other categories under the category of quality.

As to the first difficulty, that a single thing should be a substance and accident simultaneously, its solution - as mentioned earlier - is that ‘accident’ in its general sense includes the nine accidental categories as well as mental substance. Hence it does not constitute any difficulty.

The difficulty inherent in this view is that the mere applicability of the concept of one of the categories to a thing, as we shall explain later, does not justify its being classed under that category.

Moreover, the philosophers are explicit in their statement that ‘acquired knowledge’ (al- ‘ilm al-hushûlî) is a psychic quality that really falls under the category of quality and there is no looseness of expression involved.

(iv) Then there is the theory of Shadr al-Muta’allihin - may God’s mercy be upon him - which has been set forth by him in his books. The theory is based on a distinction between two forms of predication (haml): ‘primary essential predication’ and ‘common predication.’ It is the second kind of predication that implies that the intelligible form falls under an external category. To explain, the mere inclusion of a generic or specific concept in the definition of a thing and its applicability to it does not require that thing to be classed under that genus or species. Such a classification depends on the thing’s possessing the properties possessed externally by that genus or species. Hence the mere inclusion of the concepts of ‘substance’ or ‘body,’ for instance, in the definition of the human being (according to which the human being is defined as ‘a substance that is a growing, sensate body capable of voluntarily motion and possess¬ing rationality) does not entail its falling under the category of substance, or under the genus ‘body,’ unless it occurs as a concrete substance, without needing a subject, or as a body possessing three dimensions.

Similarly, the inclusion of ‘quantity’ and ‘continuity’ in the definition of ‘surface’ (which is defined as ‘a static, two-dimensional continuous

quantity’) does not necessitate its inclusion under ‘quantity’ and ‘continuous extension,’ unless as a concrete quantity it is susceptible to division and possesses the property of continuity.

Were the mere correspondence of a concept to a thing to require its inclusion under the category of that thing, then every universal would itself be an individual, as it applies to itself through primary predication. Hence inclusion under a category requires the possession of external properties and it is obvious that such properties exist in external existence, not in mental existence.

This shows that mentaj forms do not fall under the categories to which they correspond, for they do not possess the [external] properties expected of them. However, though the mental form does not possess the properties of the corresponding external object known, as a state (hât) or habit (malakah) present for the soul, from which it dispels ignorance, it is an ‘external’ existent existing for the soul, which possesses it as an attribute. The definition of quality is applicable to it through common predication, as quality is therefore defined as “an accident which is not subject to division or relation.” Hence the mental form as such falls under the category of quality, though from the viewpoint of its being a mental existent corresponding to external reality it does not fall-due to the absence of external properties - under any category except perhaps the category of quality-by-accident.

The above explanation reveals the inadmissibility of the objection of some thinkers who have taken exception to the statement that knowledge is an essential quality (kayf bi al-dzâf) and the mental form an accidental quality (kayf bi al-‘arad). Their argument is that the very existence of those forms and their existence for the soul are one and the same. They argue that the existence and manifestation of the mental forms for the soul are nothing additional to their existence, so that they may be a quality in the soul, because their externality has ceased in its entirety; furthermore, their quiddities in themselves each belong to a particular category, while with regard to their mental existence they are neither substances nor accidents. Moreover, their manifestation for the soul is nothing but that quiddity and that existence, since the manifestation of a thing is not something additional to it, otherwise it would have a manifestation of itself, whereas there is nothing else. As to quality, it is of such a nature that it is predicated of its subject by inherence. If manifestation and existence for the soul were a categorical relation, the quiddity of knowledge would be relation not quality. But since it is an emanative relation (i.e. the creative relation between a cause and its effect) originating in the soul, it is existence. Therefore, knowledge is light and manifestation (zhuhûr), and the latter are both existence, and existence is not quiddity.

This objection is not valid because though the cognitive form is existent for the soul and manifest for it, that is not on account of its being a mental existent corresponding to an external reality without possessing its properties, but due to its being a state or ‘habit’ for the soul that dispels privation (i.e. ignorance) from it, and as such it is a perfection (kamâl) for the soul, additional to it, and possessed by it as an attribute. That is an

extraneous effect produced on the soul. Since the soul is the subject for the cognitive form and independent of it in itself, the latter is its accident and the definition of quality is applicable to it. Hence the claim that there is nothing additional to the soul, which is united with it, is inadmissible.

Therefore, it is clear that the cognitive form, being a state or habit of the soul, is a quality in essence, and it is a quality by accidence due to its being a mental existent.

Third Objection:

The doctrine of mental existence and presence of the very (quiddities of) things in the mind implies that the soul, while conceiving heat and cold, width and length, motion and rest, triangle and rectangle, etc., should simultaneously become hot and cold, wide and long, triangular and rectangular and so on. That is because we do not call to mind anything hot or cold, wide or long, and so on, without the soul acquiring these opposite attributes, which subsist through it.

The answer is that such external notions like heat and cold and the like become present in the mind with their quiddities, not with their actual existences, and correspond to them in the sense of primary predication, not common predication. That which necessitates things becoming attributed with these qualities does so by acquiring them with their external existences and subsisting through their subjects, not by conceiving their quiddities and their subsistence in the sense of primary predication.

Fourth Objection

We conceive things that are essentially impossible, such as ‘God’s partner’ (sharîk al-Bârî), the simultaneous co-existence or non-existence of two contradictories, and the negation of a thing’s identity with itself. Should things be themselves present in the mind, such essential impossibilities would obtain subsistence.

The answer is that the essential impossibilities are present in the mind in the sense of primary predication, not in that of common predication. Hence ‘God’s partner’ is ‘God’s partner’ in the mind in the sense of primary predication, but from the viewpoint of common predication it is a contingent (mumkin), a quality of the soul, and a creature of God. The same applies to other impossibilities.

Fifth Objection

We do conceive the earth with its great expanse, its plains, mountains, continents and oceans, as well as the great distances of space together with the planets and the stars with their huge dimensions. The impression of these huge dimensions in the mind, or in a part of the nervous system - according to physiologists -  amounts to the impression of something big in something small, which is impossible. That which is said in response to this objection - that the receiving agent is infinitely divisible - is inadmissible, because a small area about that of one’s palm, though it should be infinitely divisible, cannot contain a mountain.

The answer to this objection is that the particular perceived forms are in fact immaterial, as will be discussed later on.’ Their immateriality is imaginal (mitsâlî), wherein such material properties as dimension, geometric form, etc., are retained, but not matter itself. Hence they are present in the soul on the plane of imaginal immateriality (tajarrud mitbâli) without being imprinted on a bodily organ or a faculty related to it. As to the actions and reactions that occur on a material plane during the process of sensation or perception, they are the preparatory means for the soul for apprehending the particular imaginal cognitive forms.

Sixth Objection

The physiologists state that sensation and perception involve the formation in the sense organs of impressions (shuwar) of physical bodies with all their external relations and characteristics. The sense organs modify the impressions in accordance with their particular nature and convey them to the brain. Man cognizes their sizes, dimensions, and shapes through a kind of comparison between the parts of the impressions apprehended. This description does not leave any room for the belief in presence of external quiddities themselves in the mind.

The answer is that the physiologists do indeed speak of certain physical actions and reactions involved in perception. However, these physical impressions, which differ from the external things perceived, are not what constitute the perceived form itself. Rather they constitute a preparatory stage that prepares the soul for the presence before it of the external quiddities with an imaginal (mitsâlî), not a material, existence. Otherwise the disparity between the impressions in the organs of sensation and perception and the external objects represented by these impressions will amount to negation of the possibility of knowledge.

In fact this is one of the strongest proofs of the immaterial presence of the quiddities themselves for the mind. That is because should we assume them to have some kind of material existence - in whatever manner - that cannot get rid of disparity between the apprehended forms and the external realities they represent, thus necessarily implying a denial of the possibility of knowledge.

Seventh Objection

The doctrine of mental existence implies that a single thing should simultaneously be a particular and a universal. This is obviously inadmissible. To explain, the intellected quiddity of ‘man,’ for instance, is a universal in so far as it is applicable to a multiplicity of persons. At the same time it is a particular in so far as it is present in a particular soul through which it subsists, thus becoming particularized through its particularity, being different from the quiddity of ‘man’ intellected by other souls. Hence it is simultaneously a particular and a universal.

The answer is that there are two different aspects (jihât) involved here. The intellected quiddity is a universal in so far as it is a mental existent corresponding to external reality and applicable to a multiplicity of objects.

And in so far as it is a quality of the soul - aside from its correspondence to external reality - it is a particular.

المرحلة الثالثة في انقسام الوجود إلى ما في نفسه و ما في غيره و انقسام ما في نفسه إلى ما لنفسه و ما لغيره

و فيها ثلاثة فصول

CHAPTER THREE: The Division of Existence into Existence-in-itself and Existence-in-something-else, and of Existence-in-itself into Existence-for-itself and Existence-for-something-else

3 Units

الفصل الأول الوجود في نفسه و الوجود في غيره

من الوجود ما هو في غيره و منه خلافه و ذلك أنا إذا اعتبرنا القضايا الصادقة كقولنا الإنسان ضاحك وجدنا فيها وراء الموضوع و المحمول أمرا آخر به يرتبط و يتصل بعضهما إلى بعض ليس يوجد إذا اعتبر الموضوع وحده و لا المحمول وحده و لا إذا اعتبر كل منهما مع غير الآخر فله وجود ثم إن وجوده ليس ثالثا لهما واقعا بينهما مستقلا عنهما و إلا احتاج إلى رابطين آخرين يربطانه بالطرفين فكان المفروض ثلاثة خمسة ثم الخمسة تسعة و هلم جرا و هو باطل.

فوجوده قائم بالطرفين موجود فيهما غير خارج منهما و لا مستقل بوجه عنهما لا معنى له مستقلا بالمفهومية و نسميه الوجود الرابط و ما كان بخلافه كوجود الموضوع و المحمول و هو الذي له معنى مستقل بالمفهومية نسميه الوجود المحمولي و الوجود المستقل فإذن الوجود منقسم إلى مستقل و رابط و هو المطلوب.

و يظهر مما تقدم

أولا أن الوجودات الرابطة لا ماهية لها لأن الماهية ما يقال في جواب ما هو فلها لا محالة وجود محمولي ذو معنى مستقل بالمفهومية و الرابط ليس كذلك.

و ثانيا أن تحقق الوجود الرابط بين أمرين يستلزم اتحادا ما بينهما لكونه واحدا غير خارج من وجودهما.

و ثالثا أن الرابط إنما يتحقق في مطابق الهليات المركبة التي تتضمن ثبوت شي‏ء لشي‏ء و أما الهليات البسيطة التي لا تتضمن إلا ثبوت الشي‏ء و هو ثبوت موضوعها فلا رابط في مطابقها إذ لا معنى لارتباط الشي‏ء بنفسه و نسبته إليها

3.1. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-IN-SOMETHING-ELSE

Existence is either existence-in-something-else or its opposite [i.e. existence-in-itself]. To explain, when we consider a true proposition, for instance, ‘Man is a biped,’ we find that there is something in it [i.e. the verb “to be” used as a copula] besides the subject and the predicate that relates them to each other. This relation is absent when we consider solely the subject or the predicate, or when each of them is conceived along with some other thing. Hence that something has existence. Moreover, its existence is not something additional to the existence of the two sides, or something situated between them and existing independently of them, for otherwise it would require two other copulas to relate it to each of the two sides. Then the three would become five and the five would similarly become nine and so on ad infinitum.

Hence its existence inheres in the two sides and depends on them, not being extraneous to or independent of them. It has no independent meaning of its own as a concept. We call it “copulative existence” (al-wujûd al-râbith). That which is not such - such as the existence of the subject and that of the predicate - and has an independent meaning as a concept, is called “substantive existence” (al-wujûd al-mahmûlî, lit. predicative existence) or “independent existence” (al-wujud al-mustaqil). Hence existence is divisible into independent and copulative as stated.

From what has been said, it becomes clear that:

(i) copulative existents have no quiddity; for the quiddity of a thing is what is mentioned in answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Quiddity has a substantive existence and independent meaning as a concept. Copulative existence is not such.

(ii) Second, the occurrence of a copulative existent between two things necessitates a unity between them, for it is united with them and is not external to their existence.

(iii) Third, the copulative existent occurs in facts corresponding to “composite propositions” (al-halliyyât al-murakkabah, i.e. propositions of the type ‘A is B’) wherein a thing is affirmed of another thing. Às to “simple propositions” (al-halliyyât al-basîthah, i.e. propositions of the type ‘A is’ or ‘A exists’), in which merely the subsistence of the subject is affirmed, there occurs no copulative existence in the corresponding fact, for there is no sense in a thing’s relation with itself.

الفصل الثاني كيفية اختلاف الرابط و المستقل

اختلفوا في أن الاختلاف بين الوجود الرابط و المستقل هل هو اختلاف نوعي بمعنى أن الوجود الرابط ذو معنى تعلقي لا يمكن تعقله على الاستقلال و يستحيل أن يسلخ عنه ذلك الشأن فيعود معنى اسميا بتوجيه الالتفات إليه بعد ما كان معنى حرفيا أو لا اختلاف نوعيا بينهما.

و الحق هو الثاني لما سيأتي في مرحلة العلة و المعلول أن وجودات المعاليل رابطة بالنسبة إلى عللها و من المعلوم أن منها ما وجوده جوهري و منها ما وجوده عرضي و هي جميعا وجودات محمولية مستقلة تختلف حالها بالقياس إلى عللها و أخذها في نفسها فهي بالنظر إلى عللها وجودات رابطة و بالنظر إلى أنفسها وجودات مستقلة فإذن المطلوب ثابت.

و يظهر مما تقدم أن المفهوم تابع في استقلاله بالمفهومية و عدمه لوجوده الذي ينتزع منه و ليس له من نفسه إلا الإبهام

3.2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COPULATIVE AND INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE

The metaphysicians differ concerning the character of the difference between copulative and independent existence, as to whether it is a specific difference. That is, is copulative existence a relational concept inconceivable as a substantive and independent notion, in the sense that it is impossible to divest it of this character by conceiving it as a substantive after its being a non-substantive notion (ma’nî harfî)? Or is it the case that there is no specific difference between it and independent existence?

The truth lies with the latter position, for, as will be seen later on in the chapter on cause and effect, the existence of the effect is copulative (râbith) in relation to its cause, although, as we know, effects consist of substances and accidents, both of which have predicative and independent existence. They are copulative existents when viewed in relation to their causes, but are independent existents when considered by themselves.

It becomes clear from what has been said that every concept is subject in the independence of its meaning, or the lack of it, to the existence from which it is abstracted, and is in itself indefinite.

الفصل الثالث من الوجود في نفسه ما هو لغيره و منه ما هو لنفسه

و المراد بكون وجود الشي‏ء لغيره أن يكون الوجود الذي له في نفسه و هو الذي يطرد عن ماهيته العدم هو بعينه يطرد عدما عن شي‏ء آخر لا عدم ذاته و ماهيته و إلا كان لوجود واحد ماهيتان و هو كثرة الواحد بل عدما زائدا على ذاته و ماهيته له نوع مقارنة له كالعلم الذي يطرد بوجوده العدم عن ماهيته الكيفية و يطرد به بعينه عن موضوعه الجهل الذي هو نوع من العدم يقارنه و كالقدرة فإنها كما تطرد عن ماهية نفسها العدم تطرد بعينها عن موضوعها العجز.

و الدليل على تحقق هذا القسم وجودات الأعراض فإن كلا منها كما يطرد عن ماهية نفسه العدم يطرد بعينه عن موضوعه نوعا من العدم و كذلك الصور النوعية الجوهرية فإن لها نوع حصول لموادها تكملها و تطرد عنها نقصا جوهريا و هذا النوع من الطرد هو المراد بكون الوجود لغيره و كونه ناعتا.

و يقابله ما كان طاردا لعدم نفسه فحسب كالأنواع التامة الجوهرية كالإنسان و الفرس و يسمى هذا النوع من الوجود وجودا لنفسه فإذن المطلوب ثابت و ذلك ما أردناه.

و ربما يقسم الوجود لذاته إلى الوجود بذاته و الوجود بغيره و هو بالحقيقة راجع إلى العلية و المعلولية و سيأتي البحث عنهما.

3.3. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-SOMETHING-ELSE

By ‘existence for something else’ is meant an existent by itself that in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity, removes a non-being from another thing, though not from its essence and quiddity; for otherwise one existent will possess two quiddities, which implies the multiplicity of that which is one. Hence the non-being removed is one that is extraneous to the thing’s essence and quiddity, having a kind of association with it. An example of it is knowledge, whose existence, in addition to removing non-being from its quiddity, removes ignorance from its subject, ignorance being a kind of non-being associated with the subject. Similar is ability, which in addition to removing non-being from its own quiddity removes disability from its subject.

The evidence for this kind of existent is provided by accidents (a’râdh), each one of which dispels a kind of non-being from its subject, in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity. The same is true of each of the substantial specific forms (al-shuwar al-naw’iyyah al-jawhariyyah), which in a way actualize their matters (mawâdd), complete them and dispel their substantial deficiency. This is the kind of removal of non-being that is meant by ‘existence for something else’ (al-wujûd li ghayrih) and its being ‘attributive.’

It stands opposed to what is called ‘existence for itself (wujûd li nafsih), which dispels non-being solely from itself, like the various kinds of complete specific substances, such as man, horse, etc.

Often metaphysicians divide existence for itself further into that which is existence by itself and existence by something else, but this division relates to causality, which will be discussed later.

المرحلة الرابعة في المواد الثلاث الوجوب و الإمكان و الامتناع

و البحث عنها في الحقيقة بحث عن انقسام الوجود إلى الواجب و الممكن و البحث عن الممتنع تبعي

و فيها تسعة فصول

CHAPTER FOUR: The Three Modes: Necessity, Contingency and Impossibility

9 Units

الفصل الأول في تعريف المواد الثلاث و انحصارها فيها

كل مفهوم إذا قيس إلى الوجود, فإما أن يجب له فهو الواجب; أو يمتنع, و هو الممتنع; أو لا يجب له و لا يمتنع, و هو الممكن; فإنه إما أن يكون الوجود له ضروريا, و هو الأول; أو يكون العدم له ضروريا, و هو الثاني; و إما أن لا يكون شي‏ء منهما له ضروريا, و هو الثالث.

و أما احتمال كون الوجود و العدم كليهما ضروريين, فمرتفع بأدنى التفات.

و هي بينة المعاني, لكونها من المعاني العامة التي لا يخلو عن أحدها مفهوم من المفاهيم; و لذا كانت لا تعرف إلا بتعريفات دورية; كتعريف الواجب ب “ما يلزم من فرض عدمه محال” ثم تعريف المحال و هو الممتنع ب “ما يجب أن لا يكون” أو “ما ليس بممكن و لا واجب” و تعريف الممكن ب “ما لا يمتنع وجوده و عدمه.”

4.1. THE THREEFOLD MODES AND THEIR DEFINITIONS

Every idea when considered from the viewpoint of existence is either necessary (wâjib), impossible (mumtani’), or contingent (mumkin), i.e. neither necessary nor impossible. In the first case, existence is a necessity; in the second, non-existence is a necessity; in the third, neither existence nor non-existence is a necessity.

The meaning of these three modes is self-evident and they are so pervasive that no idea is devoid of any one of them. Hence they cannot be defined, and the definitions that have been offered are circular (like the one that defines the necessary as “a thing the supposition of whose non-existence entails an impossibility,” the impossible as “that whose non-existence is necessary” or “that which is neither possible nor necessary,” and the contingent as “that whose existence or non-existence is not impossible”).

الفصل الثاني انقسام كل من المواد إلى ما بالذات و ما بالغير و ما بالقياس

كل واحدة من المواد ثلاثة أقسام: ما بالذات, و ما بالغير, و ما بالقياس إلى الغير; إلا الإمكان, فلا إمكان بالغير و المراد بما بالذات: أن يكون وضع الذات كافيا في تحققه, و إن قطع النظر عن كل ما سواه; و بما بالغير; ما يتعلق بالغير; و بما بالقياس إلى الغير: أنه إذا قيس إلى الغير كان من الواجب أن يتصف به.

فالوجوب بالذات كما في الواجب الوجود, تعالى, فإن ذاته بذاته يكفي في ضرورة الوجود له من غير حاجة إلى شي‏ء غيره.

و الوجوب بالغير كما في الممكن الموجود الواجب وجوده بعلته

.

و الوجوب بالقياس إلى الغير كما في وجود أحد المتضائفين إذا قيس إلى وجود الآخر, فإن وجود العلو إذا قيس إليه وجود السفل يأبى إلا أن يكون للسفل وجود, فلوجود السفل وجوب بالقياس إلى وجود العلو, وراء وجوبه بعلته.

و الامتناع بالذات, كما في المحالات الذاتية, كشريك الباري, و اجتماع النقيضين; و الامتناع بالغير, كما في وجود المعلول الممتنع لعدم علته, و عدمه الممتنع لوجود علته, و الامتناع بالقياس إلى الغير, كما في وجود أحد المتضائفين إذا قيس إلى عدم الآخر, و في عدمه إذا قيس إلى وجود الآخر.

و الإمكان بالذات, كما في الماهيات الإمكانية, فإنها في ذاتها لا تقتضي ضرورة الوجود و لا ضرورة العدم; و الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير, كما في الواجبين بالذات المفروضين, ففرض وجود أحدهما لا يأبى وجود الآخر و لا عدمه, إذ ليس بينهما علية و معلولية و لا هما معلولا علة ثالثة.

و أما الإمكان بالغير فمستحيل, لأنا إذا فرضنا ممكنا بالغير, فهو في ذاته إما واجب بالذات, أو ممتنع بالذات, أو ممكن بالذات, إذ المواد منحصرة في الثلاث, و الأولان يوجبان الانقلاب, و الثالث يوجب كون اعتبار الإمكان بالغير لغوا.

4.2. THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF EACH OF THE MODES

Each of the three modes is divisible into three kinds: (i) essential (bi al-dzât), i.e., that which is such (i.e. necessary, contingent or impossible) by-itself, (ii) accidental (bi al-ghayr), i.e., that which is such by something else, and (iii) relative (bi al-qiyâs ila al-ghayr), i.e., that which is such in relation to something else. An exception here is the ‘contingent,’ for which there is no such subdivision as ‘contingent by something else.’

The exalted Necessary Being, whose existence is necessary by itself, without standing in need of anything else, represents essential necessity.

By ‘accidentally contingent’ is meant the contingent whose existence becomes necessary upon the existence of its cause.

Relative necessity applies to the existence of each of two correlatives (mutadhâ‘afayn), whose existence is necessary in relation to that of the other correlative, like the higher one and the lower one, the existence of each of which is necessary in relation to that of the other, apart from the necessity arising from their cause.

Examples of the essentially impossible are such essential impossibilities as God’s partner (sharîk al-Bârî) and the coming together of two contradictories (ijtimâ’ al-naqidhayn). An example of accidental impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of an effect arising from the non-existence of its cause, and the impossibility of its non-existence upon the existence of its cause. An example of relative impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of one of the two correlatives in relation to non-existence of the other, and that of its non-existence in relation to existence of the other correlative.

As to essential contingency (imkân dzâtt), it applies to the contingent quiddities, which in themselves are neither necessarily existent nor necessarily non-existent. As to relative contingency, it applies to two hypothetical necessary beings each of which is essentially necessary, because the supposition of one of them does not preclude the existence or non-existence of the other; for there is neither any relation of causality between them, nor are they effects of a third cause.

As to accidental contingency, it is impossible; for if we assume something that is accidentally contingent, it should itself be either: (i) essentially necessary; (ii) essentially impossible; or (iii) essentially contingent, for here the modes are confined to these three. The first two assumptions entail a violation of the law of identity, and the third leads to the absurdity of considering what is essentially contingent as being accidentally contingent.

الفصل الثالث واجب الوجود ماهيته إنيته

واجب الوجود ماهيته إنيته بمعنى أن لا ماهية له وراء وجوده الخاص به; و ذلك أنه لو كانت له ماهية و ذات وراء وجوده الخاص به, لكان وجوده زائدا على ذاته عرضيا له, و كل عرضي معلل بالضرورة, فوجوده معلل.

و علته إما ماهيته أو غيرها, فإن كانت علته ماهيته -و العلة متقدمة على معلولها بالوجود بالضرورة- كانت الماهية متقدمة عليه بالوجود; و تقدمها عليه إما بهذا الوجود, و لازمه تقدم الشي‏ء على نفسه و هو محال; و إما بوجود آخر, و ننقل الكلام إليه و يتسلسل; و إن كانت علته غير ماهيته, فيكون معلولا لغيره و ذلك ينافي وجوب الوجود بالذات. و قد تبين بذلك: أن الوجوب بذاته وصف منتزع من حاق وجود الواجب, كاشف عن كون وجوده بحتا في غاية الشدة غير مشتمل على جهة عدمية, إذ لو اشتمل على شي‏ء من الأعدام, حرم الكمال الوجودي الذي في مقابله; فكانت ذاته مقيدة بعدمه, فلم يكن واجبا بالذات صرفا له كل كمال.

4.3. QUIDDITY AND THE NECESSARY BEING

The essence of the Necessary Being is Its existence, in the sense that It has no quiddity besides Its particular existence; for were It to have a quiddity besides Its particular existence, its existence would be additional and accidental to Its essence. Since everything accidental is necessarily caused (ma’lûl), Its existence too would be something caused, its cause being either Its quiddity or something else.

Were Its quiddity Its cause, that quiddity would precede It in existence, as the cause is necessarily prior to its effect in terms of existence. This priority of Its quiddity to Its existence would be either with this existence or with another. The first alternative necessarily entails a thing being prior to itself, which is impossible. The second leads to an infinite regress when the same argument is shifted to it.

Were Its cause something other than Its quiddity, It would be an effect of something else, which contradicts Its essential necessity.

The above discussion reveals that essential necessity is a characteristic derived from the very reality of the Necessary Being, which shows that It is absolute existence, at the extreme of splendour, without possessing any aspect of privation (non-being). For did It possess any kind of privation, it would be devoid of the existential perfection that stands opposed to such a privation, and Its essence would be limited by the absence of that perfection and, consequently, it would not be essentially necessary and absolute, possessing every kind of perfection.

الفصل الرابع واجب الوجود بالذات واجب الوجود من جميع الجهات

إذ لو كان غير واجب بالنسبة إلى شي‏ء من الكمالات التي تمكن له بالإمكان العام, كان ذا جهة إمكانية بالنسبة إليه, فكان خاليا في ذاته عنه متساوية نسبته إلى وجوده و عدمه, و معناه تقيد ذاته بجهة عدمية و قد عرفت في الفصل السابق استحالته.

4.4. THE NECESSARY BEING IS NECESSARY IN ALL RESPECTS

If the Necessary Being were to have a relation of non-necessity with anything pertaining to Its possible perfections, It would have an aspect of contingency in relation to it. That is, in Itself It would be devoid of it, being indifferent to its existence and non-existence. This entails a limit involving privation for Its essence, which is impossible as shown in the preceding section.

الفصل الخامس في أن الشي‏ء ما لم يجب لم يوجد و بطلان القول بالأولوية

لا ريب أن الممكن, الذي يتساوى نسبته إلى الوجود و العدم عقلا, يتوقف وجوده على شي‏ء يسمى علة و عدمه على عدمها.

و هل يتوقف وجود الممكن على أن يوجب العلة وجوده, و هو الوجوب بالغير؟ أو أنه يوجد بالخروج عن حد الاستواء, و إن لم يصل إلى حد الوجوب؟ و كذا القول في جانب العدم, و هو المسمى بالأولوية; و قد قسموها إلى الأولوية الذاتية و هي التي يقتضيها ذات الممكن و ماهيته, و غير الذاتية و هي خلافها, و قسموا كلا منهما إلى “كافية” في تحقق الممكن و “غير كافية.”

و الأولوية بأقسامها باطلة:

أما الأولوية الذاتية فلأن الماهية قبل الوجود باطلة الذات لا شيئية لها حتى تقتضي أولوية الوجود كافية أو غير كافية; و بعبارة أخرى: الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي, لا موجودة و لا معدومة و لا أي شي‏ء آخر.

و أما الأولوية الغيرية, و هي التي تأتي من ناحية العلة, فلأنها لما لم تصل إلى حد الوجوب لا يخرج بها الممكن من حد الاستواء, و لا يتعين بها له الوجود أو العدم, و لا ينقطع بها السؤال: إنه لم وقع هذا دون ذاك؟; و هو الدليل على أنه لم تتم بعد للعلة عليتها.

فتحصل: أن الترجيح إنما هو بإيجاب العلة وجود المعلول, بحيث يتعين له الوجود و يستحيل عليه العدم, أو إيجابها عدمه; فالشي‏ء -أعني الممكن- ما لم يجب لم يوجد.

خاتمة

ما تقدم من الوجوب هو الذي يأتي الممكن من ناحية علته; و له وجوب آخر يلحقه بعد تحقق الوجود أو العدم, و هو المسمى بالضرورة بشرط المحمول; فالممكن الموجود محفوف بالضرورتين: السابقة و اللاحقة.