Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

POETICS

Aristotle

ARISTOTLE ON

THE ART OF POETRY

Translator: Ingram Bywater

Witha a Preface by: Gilber Murray

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS FIRST PUBLISHED 1920 REPRINTED 1925, 1928, 1932, 1938, 1945, 1947 1951, 1954, 1959.  1962 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

Aristotle's Poetics aims to give an account of poetry.  Aristotle does this by attempting to explain poetry through first principles, and by classifying poetry into its different genres and component parts. 

The centerpiece of Aristotle's work is his examination of tragedy.  This occurs in Chapter 6 of "Poetics:" "Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions."

Table of Contents

PREFACE. 4

Notes 10

ARISTOTLE ON THE ART OF POETRY  11

[Section One] 12

I. 12

II. 13

III. 14

[Section Two] 17

I. 17

II. 18

[Section Three] 33

I. 33

II. 34

[Section Four] 37

I. 37

II. 38

III. 39

PREFACE

In the tenth book of the “Republic”, when Plato has completed his final burning denunciation of Poetry, the false Siren, the imitator of things which themselves are shadows, the ally of all that is low and weak in the soul against that which is high and strong, who makes us feed the things we ought to starve and serve the things we ought to rule, he ends with a touch of compunction: 'We will give her champions, not poets themselves but poet-lovers, an opportunity to make her defence in plain prose and show that she is not only sweet--as we well know--but also helpful to society and the life of man, and we will listen in a kindly spirit.  For we shall be gainers, I take it, if this can be proved.'  Aristotle certainly knew the passage, and it looks as if his treatise on poetry was an answer to Plato's challenge.

Few of the great works of ancient Greek literature are easy reading.  They nearly all need study and comment, and at times help from a good teacher, before they yield up their secret.  And the _Poetics_ cannot be accounted an exception.  For one thing the treatise is fragmentary.  It originally consisted of two books, one dealing with Tragedy and Epic, the other with Comedy and other subjects.  We possess only the first.  For another, even the book we have seems to be unrevised and unfinished.  The style, though luminous, vivid, and in its broader division systematic, is not that of a book intended for publication.  Like most of Aristotle's extant writing, it suggests the MS. of an experienced lecturer, full of jottings and adscripts, with occasional phrases written carefully out, but never revised as a whole for the general reader.  Even to accomplished scholars the meaning is often obscure, as may be seen by a comparison of the three editions recently published in England, all the work of savants of the first eminence,[1] or, still more strikingly, by a study of the long series of misunderstandings and overstatements and corrections which form the history of the _Poetics_ since the Renaissance.

But it is of another cause of misunderstanding that I wish principally to speak in this preface.  The great edition from which the present translation is taken was the fruit of prolonged study by one of the greatest Aristotelians of the nineteenth century, and is itself a classic among works of scholarship.  In the hands of a student who knows even a little Greek, the translation, backed by the commentary, may lead deep into the mind of Aristotle.  But when the translation is used, as it doubtless will be, by readers who are quite without the clue provided by a knowledge of the general habits of the Greek language, there must arise a number of new difficulties or misconceptions.

To understand a great foreign book by means of a translation is possible enough where the two languages concerned operate with a common stock of ideas, and belong to the same period of civilization.  But between ancient Greece and modern England there yawn immense gulfs of human history; the establishment and the partial failure of a common European religion, the barbarian invasions, the feudal system, the regrouping of modern Europe, the age of mechanical invention, and the industrial revolution.  In an average page of French or German philosophy nearly all the nouns can be translated directly into exact equivalents in English; but in Greek that is not so.  Scarcely one in ten of the nouns on the first few pages of the _Poetics_ has

an exact English equivalent.  Every proposition has to be reduced to its lowest terms of thought and then re-built.  This is a difficulty which no translation can quite deal with; it must be left to a teacher who knows Greek.  And there is a kindred difficulty which flows from it.  Where words can be translated into equivalent words, the style of an original can be closely followed; but no translation which aims at being written in normal English can reproduce the style of Aristotle.  I have sometimes played with the idea that a ruthlessly literal translation, helped out by bold punctuation, might be the best.  For instance, premising that the words _poesis_, _poetes_ mean originally 'making' and 'maker', one might translate the first paragraph of the _Poetics_ thus:--

MAKING: kinds of making: function of each, and how the Myths ought to be put together if the Making is to go right.

Number of parts: nature of parts: rest of same inquiry.

Begin in order of nature from first principles.

Epos-making, tragedy-making (also comedy), dithyramb-making (and most fluting and harping), taken as a whole, are really not Makings but Imitations.  They differ in three points; they imitate (a) different objects, (b) by different means, (c) differently (i.e. different manner).

Some artists imitate (i.e. depict) by shapes and colours.  (Obs.  Sometimes by art, sometimes by habit.)  Some by voice.  Similarly the above arts all imitate by rhythm, language, and tune, and these either

(1) separate or (2) mixed.

Rhythm and tune alone, harping, fluting, and other arts with same effect--e.g. panpipes.

Rhythm without tune: dancing.  (Dancers imitate characters, emotions, and experiences by means of rhythms expressed in form.)

Language alone (whether prose or verse, and one form of verse or many): this art has no name up to the present (i.e. there is no name to cover mimes and dialogues and any similar imitation made in iambics, elegiacs, &c.  Commonly people attach the 'making' to the metre and say 'elegiac-makers', 'hexameter-makers,' giving them a common class-name by their metre, as if it was not their imitation that makes them 'makers').

Such an experiment would doubtless be a little absurd, but it would give an English reader some help in understanding both Aristotle's style and his meaning.

For example, there i.e.lightenment in the literal phrase, 'how the myths ought to be put together.'  The higher Greek poetry did not make up fictitious plots; its business was to express the heroic saga, the myths.  Again, the literal translation of _poetes_, poet, as 'maker', helps to explain a term that otherwise seems a puzzle in the _Poetics_.  If we wonder why Aristotle, and Plato before him, should lay such stress on the theory that art is imitation, it is a help to realize that common language called it 'making', and it was clearly not 'making' in the ordinary sense.  The poet who was 'maker' of a Fall of Troy clearly did not make the real Fall of Troy.  He made an imitation Fall of Troy.  An artist who 'painted Pericles' really 'made an imitation Pericles by means of shapes and colours'.  Hence we get started upon a theory of art which, whether finally satisfactory or not, is of

immense importance, and are saved from the error of complaining that Aristotle did not understand the 'creative power' of art.

As a rule, no doubt, the difficulty, even though merely verbal, lies beyond the reach of so simple a tool as literal translation.  To say that tragedy 'imitate.g.od men' while comedy 'imitates bad men' strikes a modern reader as almost meaningless.  The truth is that neither 'good' nor 'bad' is an exact equivalent of the Greek.  It would be nearer perhaps to say that, relatively speaking, you look up to the characters of tragedy, and down upon those of comedy.  High or low, serious or trivial, many other pairs of words would have to be called in, in order to cover the wide range of the common Greek words.  And the point is important, because we have to consider whether in Chapter VI Aristotle really lays it down that tragedy, so far from being the story of un-happiness that we think it, is properly an imitation of _eudaimonia_--a word often translated 'happiness', but meaning something more like 'high life' or 'blessedness'.[2]

Another difficult word which constantly recurs in the _Poetics_ is _prattein_ or _praxis_, generally translated 'to act' or 'action'.  But _prattein_, like our 'do', also has an intransitive meaning 'to fare' either well or ill; and Professor Margoliouth has pointed out that it seems more true to say that tragedy shows how men 'fare' than how they 'act'.  It shows thei.e.periences or fortunes rather than merely their deeds.  But one must not draw the line too bluntly.  I should doubt whether a classical Greek writer was ordinarily conscious of the distinction between the two meanings.  Certainly it i.e.sier to regard happiness as a way of faring than as a form of action.  Yet Aristotle can use the passive of _prattein_ for things 'done' or 'gone through' (e.g. 52a, 22, 29: 55a, 25).

The fact is that much misunderstanding is often caused by our modern attempts to limit too strictly the meaning of a Greek word.  Greek was very much a live language, and a language still unconscious of grammar, not, like ours, dominated by definitions and trained upon dictionaries.  An instance is provided by Aristotle's famous saying that the typical tragic hero is one who falls from high state or fame, not through vice or depravity, but by some great _hamartia_.  _Hamartia_ means originally a 'bad shot' or 'error', but is currently used for 'offence' or 'sin'.  Aristotle clearly means that the typical hero is a great man with 'something wrong' in his life or character; but I think it is a mistake of method to argue whether he means 'an intellectual error' or 'a moral flaw'.  The word is not so precise.

Similarly, when Aristotle says that a deed of strife or disaster is more tragic when it occurs 'amid affections' or 'among people who love each other', no doubt the phrase, as Aristotle's own examples show, would primarily suggest to a Greek feuds between near relations.  Yet some of the meaning is lost if one translates simply 'within the family'.

There is another series of obscurities or confusions in the _Poetics_ which, unless I am mistaken, arises from the fact that Aristotle was writing at a time when the great age of Greek tragedy was long past, and was using language formed in previous generations.  The words and phrases remained in the tradition, but the forms of art and activity which they denoted had sometimes changed in the interval.  If we date the _Poetics_ about the year

330 B.C., as seems probable, that is more than two hundred years after the first tragedy of Thespis was produced in Athens, and more than seventy after the death of the last great masters of the tragic stage.  When we remember that a training in music and poetry formed a prominent part of the education of every wellborn Athenian, we cannot be surprised at finding in Aristotle, and to a less extent in Plato, considerable traces of a tradition of technical language and even of aesthetic theory.

It is doubtless one of Aristotle's great services that he conceived so clearly the truth that literature is a thing that grows and has a history.  But no writer, certainly no ancient writer, is always vigilant.  Sometimes Aristotle analyses his terms, but very often he takes them for granted; and in the latter case, I think, he is sometimes deceived by them.  Thus there seem to be cases where he has been affected in his conceptions of fifth-century tragedy by the practice of his own day, when the only living form of drama was the New Comedy.

For example, as we have noticed above, true Tragedy had always taken its material from the sacred myths, or heroic sagas, which to the classical Greek constituted history.  But the New Comedy was in the habit of inventing its plots.  Consequently Aristotle falls into using the word _mythos_ practically in the sense of 'plot', and writing otherwise in a way that is unsuited to the tragedy of the fifth century.  He says that tragedy adheres to 'the historical names' for an aesthetic reason, because what has happened is obviously possible and therefore convincing.  The real reason was that the drama and the myth were simply two different expressions of the same religious kernel (p.44) .  Again, he says of the Chorus (p.  65) that it should be an integral part of the play, which is true; but he also says that it' should be regarded as one of the actors', which shows to what an extent the Chorus in his day was dead and its technique forgotten.  He had lost the sense of what the Chorus was in the hands of the great masters, say in the Bacchae or the Eumenides.  He mistakes, again, the use of that epiphany of a God which is frequent at the end of the single plays of Euripides, and which seems to have been equally so at the end of the trilogies of Aeschylus.  Having lost the living tradition, he sees neither the ritual origin nor the dramatic value of these divine epiphanies.  He thinks of the convenient gods and abstractions who sometimes spoke the prologues of the New Comedy, and imagines that the God appears in order to unravel the plot.  As a matter of fact, in one play which he often quotes, the _Iphigenia Taurica_, the plot is actually distorted at the very end in order to give an opportunity for the epiphany.[3]

One can see the effect of the tradition also in his treatment of the terms Anagnorisis and Peripeteia, which Professor Bywater translates as 'Discovery and Peripety' and Professor Butcher as 'Recognition and Reversal of Fortune'.  Aristotle assumes that these two elements are normally present in any tragedy, except those which he calls 'simple'; we may say, roughly, in any tragedy that really has a plot.  This strikes a modern reader as a very arbitrary assumption.  Reversals of Fortune of some sort are perhaps usual in any varied plot, but surely not Recognitions?  The clue to the puzzle lies, it can scarcely be doubted, in the historical origin of

tragedy.  Tragedy, according to Greek tradition, is originally the ritual play of Dionysus, performed at his festival, and representing, as Herodotus tells us, the 'sufferings' or 'passion' of that God.  We are never directly told what these 'sufferings' were which were so represented; but Herodotus remarks that he found in Egypt a ritual that was 'in almost all points the same'.[4] This was the well-known ritual of Osiris, in which the god was torn in pieces, lamented, searched for, discovered or recognized, and the mourning by a sudden Reversal turned into joy.  In any tragedy which still retained the stamp of its Dionysiac origin, this Discovery and Peripety might normally be expected to occur, and to occur together.  I have tried to show elsewhere how many of our extant tragedies do, as a matter of fact, show the marks of this ritual.[5]

I hope it is not rash to surmise that the much-debated word __katharsis__, 'purification' or 'purgation', may have come into Aristotle's mouth from the same source.  It has all the appearance of being an old word which is accepted and re-interpreted by Aristotle rather than a word freely chosen by him to denote the exact phenomenon he wishes to describe.  At any rate the Dionysus ritual itself was a _katharmos_ or _katharsis_--a purification of the community from the taints and poisons of the past year, the old contagion of sin and death.  And the words of Aristotle's definition of tragedy in Chapter VI might have been used in the days of Thespis in a much cruder and less metaphorical sense.  According to primitive ideas, the mimic representation on the stage of 'incidents arousing pity and fear' did act as a _katharsis_ of such 'passions' or 'sufferings' in real life.  (For the word _pathemata_ means 'sufferings' as well as 'passions'.)  It is worth remembering that in the year 361 B.C., during Aristotle's lifetime, Greek tragedies were introduced into Rome, not on artistic but on superstitious grounds, as a _katharmos_ against a pestilence (Livy vii.  2).  One cannot but suspect that in his account of the purpose of tragedy Aristotle may be using an old traditional formula, and consciously or unconsciously investing it with a new meaning, much as he has done with the word _mythos_.

Apart from these historical causes of misunderstanding, a good teacher who uses this book with a class will hardly fail to point out numerous points on which two equally good Greek scholars may well differ in the mere interpretation of the words.  What, for instance, are the 'two natural causes' in Chapter IV which have given birth to Poetry?  Are they, as our translator takes them, (1) that man is imitative, and (2) that people delight in imitations?  Or are they (1) that man is imitative and people delight in imitations, and (2) the instinct for rhythm, as Professor Butcher prefers?  Is it a 'creature' a thousand miles long, or a 'picture' a thousand miles long which raises some trouble in Chapter VII?  The word _zoon_ means equally 'picture' and 'animal'.  Did the older poets make their characters speak like 'statesmen', _politikoi_, or merely like ordinary citizens, _politai_, while the moderns made theirs like 'professors of rhetoric'?  (Chapter VI, p. 38; cf.  Margoliouth's note and glossary).

It may seem as if the large uncertainties which we have indicated detract in a ruinous manner from the value of the _Poetics_ to us as a work of criticism.  Certainly if any young writer took this book as a manual of rules

by which to 'commence poet', he would find himself embarrassed.  But, if the book is properly read, not as a dogmatic text-book but as a first attempt, made by a man of astounding genius, to build up in the region of creative art a rational order like that which he established in logic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, psychology, and almost every department of knowledge that existed in his day, then the uncertainties become rather a help than a discouragement.  The.g.ve us occasion to think and use our imagination.  They make us, to the best of our powers, try really to follow and criticize closely the bold gropings of an extraordinary thinker; and it is in this process, and not in any mere collection of dogmatic results, that we shall find the true value and beauty of the _Poetics_.

The book is of permanent value as a mere intellectual achievement; as a store of information about Greek literature; and as an original or first-hand statement of what we may call the classical view of artistic criticism.  It does not regard poetry as a matter of unanalysed inspiration; it makes no concession to personal whims or fashion or _ennui_.  It tries by rational methods to find out what is good in art and what makes it good, accepting the belief that there is just as truly a good way, and many bad ways, in poetry as in morals or in playing billiards.  This is no place to try to sum up its main conclusions.  But it is characteristic of the classical view that Aristotle lays his greatest stress, first, on the need for Unity in the work of art, the need that each part should subserve the whole, while irrelevancies, however brilliant in themselves, should be cast away; and next, on the demand that great art must have for its subject the great way of living.  These judgements have often been misunderstood, but the truth in them is profound and goes near to the heart of things.

Characteristic, too, is the observation that different kinds of art grow and develop, but not indefinitely; they develop until they 'attain their natural form'; also the rule that each form of art should produce 'not every sort of pleasure but its proper pleasure'; and the sober language in which Aristotle, instead of speaking about the sequence of events in a tragedy being 'inevitable', as we bombastic moderns do, merely recommends that they should be 'either necessary or probable' and 'appear to happen because of one another'.

Conceptions and attitudes of mind such as these constitute what we may call the classical faith in matters of art and poetry; a faith which is never perhaps fully accepted in any age, yet, unlike others, is never forgotten but lives by being constantly criticized, re-asserted, and rebelled against.  For the fashions of the ages vary in this direction and that, but they vary for the most part from a central road which was struck out by the imagination of Greece.

G. M

Notes

[1] Prof.  Butcher, 1895 and 1898; Prof.  Bywater, 1909; and Prof.  Margoliouth, 1911.

[2] See Margoliouth, p. 121.  By water, with most editors, emends the text.

[3] See my _Euripides and his Age_, pp.  221-45.

[4] Cf.  Hdt.  Ii.  48; cf.  42,144.  The name of Dionysus must not be openly mentioned in connexion with mourning (ib.  61, 132, 86).  This may help to explain the transference of the tragic shows to other heroes.

[5] In Miss Harrison's _Themis_, pp.  341-63.

ARISTOTLE ON THE ART OF POETRY

Our subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry.  Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.

Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation.  But at the same time they differ from one another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or by differences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations.

[Section One]

I.

Just as form and colour are used as means by some, who (whether by art or constant practice) imitate and portray many things by their aid, and the voice is used by others; so also in the above-mentioned group of arts, the means with them as a whole are rhythm, language, and harmony--used, however, either singly or in certain combinations.  A combination of rhythm and harmony alone is the means in flute-playing and lyre-playing, and any other arts there may be of the same description, e.g. imitative piping.  Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means in the dancer's imitations; for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may represent men's characters, as well as what they do and suffer.  There is further an art which imitates by language alone, without harmony, in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some one or in a plurality of metres.  This form of imitation is to this day without a name.  We have no common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and a Socratic Conversation; and we should still be without one even if the imitation in the two instances were in trimeters or elegiacs or some other kind of verse--though it is the way with people to tack on 'poet' to the name of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call them poets not by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they write in.  Even if a theory of medicine or physical philosophy be put forth in a metrical form, it is usual to describe the writer in this way; Homer and Empedocles, however, have really nothing in common apart from their metre; so that, if the one is to be called a poet, the other should be termed a physicist rather than a poet.  We should be in the same position also, if the imitation in these instances were in all the metres, like the _Centaur_ (a rhapsody in a medley of all metres) of Chaeremon; and Chaeremon one has to recognize as a poet.  So much, then, as to these arts.  There are, lastly, certain other arts, which combine all the means enumerated, rhythm, melody, and verse, e.g. Dithyrambic and Nomic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy; with this difference, however, that the three kinds of means are in some of them all employed together, and in others brought in separately, one after the other.  These elements of difference in the above arts I term the means of their imitation.

II.

The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad--the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since the line between virtue and vice is one dividing the whole of mankind.  It follows, therefore, that the agents represented must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves.  It is clear that each of the above-mentioned arts will admit of these differences, and that it will become a separate art by representing objects with this point of difference.  Even in dancing, flute-playing, and lyre-playing such diversities are possible; and they are also possible in the nameless art that uses language, prose or verse without harmony, as its means; Homer's personages, for instance, are better than we are; Cleophon's are on our own level; and those of Hegemon of Thasos, the first writer of parodies, and Nicochares, the author of the _Diliad_, are beneath it.  The same is true of the Dithyramb and the Nome: the personages may be presented in them with the difference exemplified in the of and Argas, and in the Cyclopses of Timotheus and Philoxenus.  This difference it is that distinguishes Tragedy and Comedy also; the one would make its personages worse, and the other better, than the men of the present day.

III.

A third difference in these arts is in the manner in which each kind of object is represented.  Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either

(1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as Homer does; or

(2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or

(3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.

As we said at the beginning, therefore, the differences in the imitation of these arts come under three heads, their means, their objects, and their manner.

So that as an imitator Sophocles will be on one side akin to Homer, both portraying good men; and on another to Aristophanes, since both present their personages as acting and doing.  This in fact, according to some, is the reason for plays being termed dramas, because in a play the personages act the story.  Hence too both Tragedy and Comedy are claimed by the Dorians as their discoveries; Comedy by the Megarians--by those in Greece as having arisen when Megara became a democracy, and by the Sicilian Megarians on the ground that the poet Epicharmus was of their country, and a good deal earlier than Chionides and Magnes; even Tragedy also is claimed by certain of the Peloponnesian Dorians.  In support of this claim they point to the words 'comedy' and 'drama'.  Their word for the outlying hamlets, they say, is comae, whereas Athenians call them demes--thus assuming that comedians got the name not from their _comoe_ or revels, but from their strolling from hamlet to hamlet, lack of appreciation keeping them out of the city.  Their word also for 'to act', they say, is _dran_, whereas Athenians use _prattein_.So much, then, as to the number and nature of the points of difference in the imitation of these arts.

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two causes, each of them part of human nature.  Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation.  And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation.  The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies.  The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning--gathering the meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thing before, one's pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some similar cause.  Imitation, then, being natural to us--as also the sense of harmony and rhythm, the metres being obviously species of rhythms--it was through their original aptitude, and by a series of improvements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they created poetry out of their improvisations.

Poetry, however, soon broke up into two kinds according to the differences of character in the individual poets; for the graver among them would represent noble actions, and those of noble personages; and the meaner sort the actions of the ignoble.  The latter class produced invectives at first, just as others did hymns and panegyrics.  We know of no such poem by any of the pre-Homeric poets, though there were probably many such writers among them; instances, however, may be found from Homer downwards, e.g. his _Margites_, and the similar poems of others.  In this poetry of invective its natural fitness brought an iambic metre into use; hence our present term 'iambic', because it was the metre of their 'iambs' or invectives against one another.  The result was that the old poets became some of them writers of heroic and others of iambic verse.  Homer's position, however, is peculiar: just as he was in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations, so too he was the first to outline for us the general forms of Comedy by producing not a dramatic invective, but a dramatic picture of the Ridiculous; his _Margites_ in fact stands in the same relation to our comedies as the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_ to our tragedies.  As soon, however, as Tragedy and Comedy appeared in the field, those naturally drawn to the one line of poetry became writers of comedies instead of iambs, and those naturally drawn to the other, writers of tragedies instead of epics, because these new modes of art were grander and of more esteem than the old.

If it be asked whether Tragedy is now all that it need be in its formative elements, to consider that, and decide it theoretically and in relation to the theatres, is a matter for another inquiry.

It certainly began in improvisations--as did also Comedy; the one originating with the authors of the Dithyramb, the other with those of the phallic songs, which still survive as institutions in many of our cities.  And its advance after that was little by little, through their improving on whatever they had before them at each stage.  It was in fact only after a long series of changes that the movement of Tragedy stopped on its attaining to its natural form.  (1) The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue, or spoken portion, take the leading part in the play.  (2) A third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles. (3) Tragedy acquired also its magnitude.  Discarding short stories and a ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, it assumed, though only at a late point in its progress, a tone of dignity; and its metre changed then from trochaic to iambic.  The reason for their original use of the trochaic tetrameter was that their poetry was satyric and more connected with dancing than it now is.  As soon, however, as a spoken part came in, nature herself found the appropriate metre.  The iambic, we know, is the most speakable of metres, as is shown by the fact that we very often fall into it in conversation, whereas we rarely talk hexameters, and only when we depart from the speaking tone of voice.  (4) Another change was a plurality of episodes or acts.  As for the remaining matters, the superadded embellishments and the

account of their introduction, these must be taken as said, as it would probably be a long piece of work to go through the details.

As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly.  The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.

Though the successive changes in Tragedy and their authors are not unknown, we cannot say the same of Comedy; its early stages passed unnoticed, because it was not as yet taken up in a serious way.  It was only at a late point in its progress that a chorus of comedians was officially granted by the archon; they used to be mere volunteers.  It had also already certain definite forms at the time when the record of those termed comic poets begins.  Who it was who supplied it with masks, or prologues, or a plurality of actors and the like, has remained unknown.  The invented Fable, or Plot, however, originated in Sicily, with Epicharmus and Phormis; of Athenian poets Crates was the first to drop the Comedy of invective and frame stories of a general and non-personal nature, in other words, Fables or Plots.

Epic poetry, then, has been seen to agree with Tragedy to thi.e.tent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in a grand kind of verse.  It differs from it, however, (1) in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and (2) in its length--which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that.  This, I say, is another point of difference between them, though at first the practice in this respect was just the same in tragedies as i.e.ic poems.  They differ also (3) in their constituents, some being common to both and others peculiar to Tragedy--hence a judge of good and bad in Tragedy is a judge of that i. e.ic poetry also.  All the parts of an epic are included in Tragedy; but those of Tragedy are not all of them to be found in the Epic.

Reserving hexameter poetry and Comedy for consideration hereafter, let us proceed now to the discussion of Tragedy; before doing so, however, we must gather up the definition resulting from what has been said.  A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.  Here by 'language with pleasurable accessories' I mean that with rhythm and harmony or song superadded; and by 'the kinds separately' I mean that some portions are worked out with verse only, and others in turn with song.

[Section Two]

I.

As they act the stories, it follows that in the first place the Spectacle (or stage-appearance of the actors) must be some part of the whole; and in the second Melody and Diction, these two being the means of their imitation.  Here by 'Diction' I mean merely this, the composition of the verses; and by 'Melody', what is too completely understood to require explanation.  But further: the subject represented also is an action; and the action involves agents, who must necessarily have their distinctive qualities both of character and thought, since it is from these that we ascribe certain qualities to their actions.  There are in the natural order of things, therefore, two causes, Character and Thought, of their actions, and consequently of their success or failure in their lives.  Now the action (that which was done) is represented in the play by the Fable or Plot.  The Fable, in our present sense of the term, is simply this, the combination of the incidents, or things done in the story; whereas Character is what makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents; and Thought is shown in all they say when proving a particular point or, it may be, enunciating a general truth.  There are six parts consequently of every tragedy, as a whole, that is, of such or such quality, viz.  A Fable or Plot, Characters, Diction, Thought, Spectacle and Melody; two of them arising from the means, one from the manner, and three from the objects of the dramatic imitation; and there is nothing else besides these six.  Of these, its formative elements, then, not a few of the dramatists have made due use, as every play, one may say, admits of Spectacle, Character, Fable, Diction, Melody, and Thought.