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Philosophy and the Vision of Language  (Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy)

Philosophy and the Vision of Language (Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy)

Author:
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 10: 0415961149 or 13: 978-0415961141
English

This book is corrected and edited by Al-Hassanain (p) Institue for Islamic Heritage and Thought

I. EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

2. Frege on the Context Principle and Psychologism

The “context principle” articulated by Gottlob Frege, holding that a word has significance only in the context of the sentences in which it appears, has played a determinative role in the projects of analytic philosophy’s investigation of language and sense. It was in theGrundlagen der Arithmetik of 1884 that Gottlob Frege first formulated it; there, he describes it as crucial to his groundbreaking analysis of the logical articulation of the contents of thought. Such contents, Frege thought, must beobjective in the sense of being independent of subjective mental states and acts of individual thinkers or subjects of experience. It was particularly important to him, therefore, that the context principle could be used to help demonstrate the inadequacy of existingpsychologistic theories of content that accounted for it in terms of subjective states or events. In this chapter, I shall examine this connection between the context principle and Frege’s argument against psychologism in order to better understand its significance for the most characteristic methods and results of the analytic tradition as a whole. As is well known, the critique of psychologism that Frege began would also prove decisive for the projects of the philosophers that followed him in defining this tradition; for the young Wittgenstein as well as for Carnap, for instance, it was essential to the success of analysis that it adumbrate purelylogical relations owing nothing to psychological associations or connections. Later on, as has also sometimes been noted, the context principle would figure centrally within projects of analyzing or reflecting on theuse orpractice of a language as a whole.

I

Frege twice asserts in theGrundlagen that observing the context principle as a methodological guideline is practically necessary if we are to avoid falling into apsychologistic theory of meaning or content, according to which content is dependent on mental or psychological states or events. Thus formulated, the principle tells us that, rather than looking for the meaning of individualwords in isolation, we should begin by considering words only in the context of thesentences in which they figure. The first suggestion of a connection between it and antipsychologism comes near the beginning of theGrundlagen , where Frege lays out the “fundamental principles” of his investigation:

In this investigation I have adhered to the following fundamental principles:

There must be a sharp separation of the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective;

The meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation;

The distinction between concept and object must be kept in mind.

To comply with the first, I have used the word ‘idea’ [‘Vorstellung’] always in the psychological sense, and have distinguished ideas from both concepts and objects. If the second principle is not observed, then one is almost forced to take as the meaning of words mental images or acts of an individual mind, and thereby to offend against the first as well.[70]

At this point, the suggestion of a connection between the observance of the context principle and the avoidance of psychologism is only programmatic. Frege does not say, here,how the two are connected, orwhy we must think that seeking the meaning of words in isolation will “almost” force us into subjectivist psychologism. Frege’s second mention of the context principle in theGrundlagen provides more detail. It comes in the course of his attempt to define the concept of number, after he has already argued that numbers are independent, self-standing objects, and that each judgment about a number contains an assertion about a concept. Frege considers an objector who challenges the mind-independence and objecthood of numbers on psychological grounds. Such an objector may hold that the conception of numbers as objects cannot be sustained, since we have no idea or image of many numbers; numbers expressing very small or large quantities or magnitudes, for instance, routinely outstrip our ability to provide intuitive images in thought or imagination to represent them. Frege’s response does not dispute the truth of the psychological claim, but instead suggests the replacement of the psychologistic procedure with a logical one:

We are quite often led by our thought beyond the imaginable, without thereby losing the support for our inferences. Even if, as it seems to be, it is impossible for us as human beings to think without ideas, it may still be that their connection with thought is entirely inessential, arbitrary and conventional.

That no idea can be formed of the content of a word is therefore no reason for denying it any meaning or for excluding it from use. The appearance to the contrary doubtless arises because we consider the words in isolation and in asking for their meaning look only for an idea. A word for which we lack a corresponding mental picture thus appears to have no content. But one must always keep in mind a complete proposition. Only in a proposition do the words really have a meaning. The mental pictures that may pass before us need not correspond to the logical components of the judgment. It is enough if the proposition as a whole has a sense; its parts thereby also obtain their content.[71]

Our quantitative judgments about great distances, or about the size of objects, like the Earth, that are vastly larger or smaller than us, do not rest on our ability to form a mental image of anything accurately representative of the magnitudes involved. But this does not deprive our judgments of warrant or show that they do not concern genuine objects. Indeed, Frege avers, our temptation to think that these judgmentsmust be contentless arises from our temptation to identify the meanings of their constituent terms with the intuitive images or mental pictures that occur to us as we hear or consider them in succession. When, because of the inherent limitations of our intuitive faculties, we cannot supply a mental image for a particular term, for instance “the size of the Earth,” we may then be tempted to conclude that the term has no meaning. But we can, after all, make judgments about magnitudes even when they far exceed our intuitive grasp; and although we attach no intuitive content to the idea of there being 0 of any particular type of object, nevertheless our quantitative judgments involving 0 are unimpaired.

The possibility of making such judgments meaningfully, Frege suggests, itself suffices to defend the objecthood of numbers against the envisaged objection. That they can be made at all shows that these judgments concern entities that do not depend on our particular intuitive abilities. Frege’s defense of the objecthood of numbers therefore rests, in this case, on a notion of content according to which judgments may have particular, well-defined contents even if some or all of their key terms cannot be supplied with representativeintuitive images. Given this notion of content, it will be possible to construe the possibility of content-bearing judgments as demonstrating the existence of the objects to which their terms refer. But this conclusion will itself, Frege claims, depend on our considering the contents of sentences as logically prior to the meanings of their individual terms. Beginning with sentence-level contents, we are to identify their real “logical components,” components which may not correspond to anything identifiable as the meanings of the sentence’s constituent words. It will be these true components of the judgment, rather than the mental accompaniments of individual words, that determine the actual existential commitments of the judgment as a whole.

Two sections later, Frege further specifies the sort of judgments we should begin with in order to determine the actual logical content and existential commitments of judgments involving numbers:

How, then, is a number to be given to us, if we cannot have any idea or intuition of it? Only in the context of a proposition do words mean something. It will therefore depend on defining the sense of a proposition in which a number word occurs. As it stands, this still leaves much undetermined. But we have already established that number words are to be understood as standing for independent objects. This gives us a class of propositions that must have a sense - propositions that express recognition [of a number as the same again]. If the symbola is to designate an object for us, then we must have a criterion that decides in all cases whetherb is the same asa , even if it is not always in our power to apply this criterion. In our case we must define the sense of the proposition

‘The number that belongs to the conceptF is the same as the number that belongs to the conceptG ”;

that is, we must represent the content of this proposition in another way, without using the expression

‘the Number that belongs to the conceptF .’

In doing so, we shall be giving a general criterion for the equality of numbers. When we have thus acquired a means of grasping a definite number and recognizing it as the same again, we can give it a number word as its proper name.[72]

Having already argued that numbers are objects and that judgments about number are judgments about concepts, Frege realizes that judgments of the equinumerosity of concepts are at the same time judgments that “express recognition” of particular numbers, that identify a number as the same again in a new case. Given this, the possibility of judgments of equinumerosity suffices to defend the objecthood of numbers against any objection based on the possible failure of intuition to provide images corresponding to them. The possibility of judging that the number belonging to one concept is the same as the number belonging to another provides what an intuitive image cannot: the identification of a particular number as an object, self-identical and re-identifiable in ever-new situations in our judgments of equinumerosity.

Frege’s general reason for requiring a distinctive kind of logically defined content that arises primarily at the level of sentences, then, seems clear. Only by recognizing such a level of content, he claims, will it be possible to underwrite the objectivity of judgment and the existence and mind-independence of its objects. This recognition moreover depends on our according priority in the practice of logical analysis to sentence-level contents. For considering words in isolation will debar us from recognizing their real logical contents and force us to construe their contents as consisting in their idiosyncratic psychological accompaniments. The application of the context principle in theGrundlagen thus requires that contents on the sentential level play a role not only in determining the meaning or content of sentences, but also the possibility of their terms making objective reference.[73] For Frege’s argument moves, as we have seen, from the recognition of the significance of judgments of equinumerosity to the ontological conclusion that number-terms refer to self-standing, independent objects. The general ontological conclusion would not follow if determinations of the meaning of sentences did not also provide general conclusions about the references of the terms which make them up.[74] The sort of content that shows up in the analytic practice that Frege suggests will belogical content, moreover, in that it is at least partly determined by inferential and deductive relationships between sentences in the language. Only this sort of content, because of its determination by logical relations, rather than intuitive or psychological ones, can legitimately participate in logically relevant judgments about the identity of referents. Accordingly, only this sort of content is qualified to ground thepossibility of objective reference.

One might wonder, however, what it is about the role of this kind of content in judgment that entitles it to enjoy this special claim to ground objective reference. Part of the answer lies in Frege’s conception of intuition not only as subjective but also as essentiallyprivate . In “The Thought,” for instance, he argues that intuitive images are not only subjective but also, because of the impossibility ofknowing the contents of another’s mind, strictly private and incommunicable.[75] If this is right, then reference to an intuitive image by itself will clearly be of no use in an argument attempting to establish the objectivity of what it represents. But even if this is the case, we may still wonder whylogical content, simply because it is related to and determined by logical relations of deduction and inference among sentences, should fare any better. For one thing, it is not at all obvious why intuitive contents, even if themselves private, could not at least provide abasis for the public, potentially objective judgments of equinumerosity to which Frege appeals. When Frege wrote, he was well aware that empiricists like Locke and Hume had provided detailed theories of abstraction to account for the possibility of meaningful judgments about mathematics and numbers even when these judgments exceed direct, intuitive support. And Frege’s conversant, Husserl, would soon provide a complex anti-psychologistic theory of abstraction that portrayed particular acts of numerical judgment asgrounded in individual intuitive acts.[76] On any of these theories, the judgments that Frege appeals to as lacking intuitive support, and so exemplifying an alternative sense of content that does not rely on intuition, are construed instead as arising from concrete, intuitive contents by way of a process of abstraction. If these theories of abstraction are at all plausible, Frege’s examples of judgments lacking in immediate intuitive support are not decisive. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the context principle could make the important difference that Frege says it does, if what is at issue is simply theprivacy of intuitive contents. For it is not initially clear why the contents of sentences should be anyless dependent on intuition than are the contents of words, taken alone; and if they are just as dependent on intuition, they must, on Frege’s view, be just as private, and hence just as incapable of grounding objective reference. Alternatively, if there is a distinctive, logically robust kind of content in virtue of which judgments are both public and potentially objective, it is far from obvious why single words, even “considered in isolation,” could not have content in this logically robust sense as well.

Chapter 3: The Saqifah Union

وَمَا مُحَمَّدٌ إِلاَّ رَسُولٌ قَدْ خَلَتْ مِن قَبْلِهِ الرُّسُلُ أَفَإِنْ مَّاتَ أَوْ قُتِلَ إِنْقَلَبْتُمْ عَلَى أَعْقَابِكُمْ وَمَنْ يَنْقَلِبْ عَلَى عَقِبَيْهِ فَلَنْ يَضُرَّ اللهَ َشَيْئًا وَسَيَجْزِي اللهُ الشَّاكِرِين

Muhammad is no more than an apostle: many were the apostle that passed away before him. If he died or was slain, will you then turn back on your heels? If any did turn back on his heels, not the least harm will he do to Allah. But Allah (on the other hand) will swiftly reward those who (serve Him) with gratitude. (Holy Qur’an, 3:144)

Having faced hostile aggression, economic boycott and expulsion, an invitation was extended to the Prophet and his followers to uproot themselves from their homeland and migrate to the desert oasis of Yathrib (which was later renamed Madinah). The invitation came from the Ansar (Helpers) who were the inhabitants of Madinah.26 In the year 622 CE, the Prophet and the Muhajireen27 arrived in Madinah and along with the Ansar, they established the first official Muslim state.

Chronicles of Saqifah

On the 28th of Safar, 632 CE (11 ah), four days after the“Calamity of Thursday” occurred, Prophet Muhammad, the Seal of the Messengers passed away. The believing men, women, and children wandered in shock as if one of their own family members had died. At the same time, a select few were anxious to gain power. They knew that they could not simply declare themselves as the new guardians of the ummah because the Prophet had already explicitly declared ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib as his successor. Had they done so, even though the Muslims were still in a state of grief, they would have rejected them and their authority. Thus, they took a much more subtle approach.

As the Prophet’s body lay in wait, ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the immediate family of the Bani Hashim were busy preparing the Prophet’s body for burial. With the family of the Prophet being preoccupied, several members of the Ansar tribe arranged for a private meeting far away from the Prophet’s mosque at a place called Saqifah Bani Sa’idah. They had grown concerned about the leadership (khalifah) of the ummah and wanted to ensure a smooth transition of ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s office post.

Despite having welcomed the Muhajireen into their town, the Ansar had all along been fearful and cautious of their domination in Madinah; even more, they were fearful of the power their relatives maintained in Mecca. Concerned that the Muhajireen might make the initial move to secure leadership of the ummah, the Ansar took a pre-emptive measure to discuss and uphold their support of ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib. This was their initial plan; however, the meeting took a turn. Some members of the Ansar sensed that the leadership was going to slip away from ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib, hence they began to discuss the seizing of leadership for themselves.

Large in numbers and a formidable tribe to contend with, some of them felt that the Ansar had rights for leadership since they were the ones who had fully participated in the battles of Badr, Uhud, Khaybar, and Hunayn, as well as the two“Bayahs of Ridhwan.” 28 In addition, the Holy Prophet had

stated the following about the Ansar,“Only a believer loves the Ansar, and only a hypocrite dislikes them.” 29 Moreover, they were quite familiar with the old rivalry of the Quraysh tribe.

Envy and blood feud, although dormant, was deeply felt amongst the Quraysh tribe. In particular, their jealousy was directed against ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib for numerous reasons - including the fact that he stood as a stark reminder about the lives of the members of the Quraysh that he took away in defending Islam in the various battles.

In one battle alone, ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib took the lives of seventy elite members of the Quraysh. This was ingrained too deep into the memory of those Quraysh families to ignore and no matter how much they embraced Islam, the loss of their family members was far greater for some or too fresh in their memories to forget. The Ansar were quite familiar with this, but on the other hand, they did not have to contend with such animosity and rivalry - they had no loss of relatives that could be traced back to ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s valor and they had no township quarrels with the Quraysh tribe.

The shaded area of Saqifah belonged to Bani Sa’idah Ibn Ka’ab Ibn al-Khazraj from the tribe of Khazraj (from the Ansar of Madinah). The meeting location was not accidental, for it was there that the Khazraj, led by Sa’d Ibn Ibadah used to gather underneath the shaded canopy to legislate and resolve town matters.

That day, both tribes of the Ansar - the Khazraj and Aws were present at the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting, the following were in attendance: Sa’d Ibn Ibadah, Ibn al-Aas, Anas Ibn Malik, al-Mugheerah Ibn Shu’bah, Khalid Ibn al-Waleed, Abd al-Rahman Ibn Auf, Basheer Ibn Sa’d, Ma’adh Ibn Jabal, and Usayd Ibn Hudayr.30 Other individuals from the Muhajireen who found out about the meeting came later, such as Abu Bakr, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, and Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah.

At the meeting, the Ansar initially recruited Sa’d Ibn Ibadah for the leadership of the Muslim community, however on that day he was extremely ill to the point that he could barely speak or move.31 He was the only man other than ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib that the Quraysh group feared during the time of the Holy Prophet. Sa’d Ibn Ibadah was also popular amongst the Muslims - both the Muhajireen and the Ansar, due to the fact that during the battles he used to carry the flag of Islam until combat started, at which point he would pass it over to ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib.32

However, not everyone at the meeting agreed to his nomination. Some of those present began to bicker, hence the old rivalry between the two tribes surfaced. When they realized that a mutual consensus would not be reached, they resounded to the following statement,“We will never pay allegiance (to anyone) except to ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib.” 33

As the tension grew at the meeting, two members from the Aws tribe, Awaim Ibn Sa’ad and Maen Ibn Obed left the meeting unnoticed. Fearing that the leadership of the Muslim community would fall into the hands of their former rivals, the Khazraj, they sought to inform ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab about what was taking place.34

After the two men informed ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab about the private meeting, ‘Umar grew anxiously impatient. As it so happened, ‘Umar had

intended for Abu Bakr to be present when the death of the Holy Prophet would occur, but Abu Bakr was away in an outlying area of Madinah called al-Samh.

Hence, as the news of the Prophet’s death began to spread quickly and the shock and sadness amongst the Muslims grew, ‘Umar needed to react in order to buy some time to join the meeting - and there were two reasons for this. First, ‘Umar needed Abu Bakr to return so that both of them could attend the private meeting at Saqifah; and the other reason was to act as if the Prophet was not dead in order to delay the official appointment of ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib.

Thus, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab came out of the Prophet’s mosque and into the streets shouting and negating the news that the Prophet had died and even threatened to dismember anyone who said otherwise! ‘Umar cried out,“Verily, the Messenger of Allah - by Allah - has not died, and will never die.” 35 Although the Holy Prophet’s body lay in wait, ‘Umar continued to say that his soul had gone to Heaven like the soul of Prophet Isa36 and promised a resurrection by saying,“The Prophet will come back.” 37

Upon Abu Bakr’s return, ‘Umar informed him about the undisclosed meeting at Saqifah and both of them headed out, along with Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah, to the meeting.

The Saqifah meeting played out like a well-rehearsed theatrical production. Having been given some details about the meeting, ‘Umar and Abu Bakr entered and found the Ansar locked in a bitter dispute. Sensing that the leadership was about to fall into the hands of Sa’d Ibn Ibadah from the Tribe of Khazraj, Abu Bakr immediately began to play on the emotions of the Tribe of Aws to provoke them so that they would not pay allegiance to their opponent, however his ultimate intention was to put forward his own proposal.

After sympathizing with the Aws, Abu Bakr then turned the tables and said that they (the Quraysh) were better suited for leadership than any other group. Abu Bakr said,“We, the Muhajireen were the first to accept Islam; we possess the most notable pedigree; our abode is the most central; we have the best leaders; and we are nearest of kin to the Prophet of Allah.” Abu Bakr then appeased both tribes by saying that they too were worthy for some form of leadership of the ummah but that ultimate authority must reside with the Muhajireen. Abu Bakr continued his argument by quoting the words of the Prophet,“My successors are twelve…,” but instead of saying,“…and all of them are from Bani Hashim,” 38 he changed it and said,“…and all of them are from Quraysh.” 39 To which ‘Umar seconded his statement.

However, a member of the Ansar, al-Habbab Ibn al-Mandhar, saw through Abu Bakr’s facade. He realized the ploy being undertaken and quickly discredited their claim to leadership. Al-Habbab claimed that since the Ansar were the ones who approached the Prophet and supported him throughout his entire mission, that they had the first right for leadership.

After his statement, the tone of the meeting rapidly intensified as fiery words were exchanged between him and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, which eventually led to ‘Umar physically assaulting him and breaking his nose.

Abu Bakr immediately pacified the firestorm and proposed two candidates from the Quraysh for the position of caliph, Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Abu Bakr declared,“I advise you to choose one of those two men, so pay allegiance to whomsoever you like.”

By offering the caliphate to others, Abu Bakr absolved himself of any accusations that he might be seeking the caliphate for himself. However, Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah immediately declined the offer, and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab promptly interrupted Abu Bakr by taking up the Arab custom of respecting the elderly and stated,“God forbid that we do that, while you are alive amongst us,” to Abu Bakr.

Then ‘Umar, as if on cue, abruptly held out his hand towards Abu Bakr and said,“Stretch out your hand, and I will pay allegiance to you.” Some of the Ansar agreed, namely: Ma’adh Ibn Jabal, Usayd Ibn Hudayr, Basheer Ibn Sa’d, and Zayd Ibn Thabit. They stood up and declared (on the grounds that the Prophet was from the Muhajireen, hence his successor should also be from the Muhajireen),“As we supported the Prophet, we will support his successor.” 40

Upon seeing the members of the Ansar offer allegiance to Abu Bakr, ‘Umar related,“My heart was strengthened and others followed them.” 41 Hence, that ended the nomination process by confirming Abu Bakr as the khalifah of the ummah.42 Abu Bakr accepted gracefully saying,“May Allah reward you with goodness, O people of the Ansar.” 43 Afterwards, in his own words, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab stated,“The Quraysh examined [the situation] and chose a leader for themselves, and they were successful in their choice.” 44

However, it can be seen that the caliphate was predetermined and confined to three people: Abu Bakr, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, and Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah - hence, their conversation was not spontaneous.

As mentioned earlier, the members of the Quraysh, in particular: Abu Bakr, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, Abu Ubaydah Ibn al-Jarrah, al-Mugheerah Ibn Shu’bah, Abd al-Rahman Ibn Auf, Khalid Ibn al-Waleed, Muhammad Ibn Muslim, Ma’adh Ibn Jabal, Basheer Ibn Sa’d, and Usayd Ibn Hudayr had already agreed to this sequence of events long before the Saqifah meeting occurred, just like they had agreed that Abu Bakr would take control on behalf of the Tribe of Taym first.

Most of the others present followed ‘Umar in giving their allegiance to Abu Bakr,45 but the core of the Ansar who supported ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib refused, maintaining,“We will not pay allegiance to anyone except ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib.” 46 The only leader of the Ansar who remained steadfast and refused to pay allegiance to Abu Bakr was Sa’d Ibn Ibadah, who was ill and unable to move.

He told ‘Umar,“By Allah, if I was able to stand, you would have heard from me a roaring which would have filled the streets and alleyways of Madinah and would have been painful to you and your companions.” 47 He then turned to Abu Bakr and said,“I will never pay allegiance to you! Even if ‘Ali pays allegiance, I still will not do so.” In return, despite his illness, ‘Umar assaulted him just as he had accosted al-Habbab Ibn al-Mandhar.48

Later on ‘Umar recounted,“We attacked Sa’d Ibn Ibadah, and he was then trampled and the people said, ‘Sa’d has been killed.’” Therefore, ‘Umar said,“May Allah kill Sa’d.” Perceiving him as a threat, ‘Umar accused Sa’d Ibn Ibadah of hypocrisy and wanting the leadership for himself and hence wanted to kill him, but Abu Bakr restrained him.49

If Sa’d Ibn Ibadah had really sought leadership, he could have obtained it easily since the Saqifah (shaded area) was his home territory and he was favored among the Muslims. Most likely, he would have obtained the caliphate much easier than Abu Bakr, but like ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib later said, Sa’d Ibn Ibadah was upset when he saw the people giving allegiance to Abu Bakr, not because he wanted the leadership for himself, but because he wanted the leadership to go to ‘Ali, as the Prophet had dictated. Thereafter, Sa’d Ibn Ibadah rode to Huran in Syria, where after the death of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar determined his fate by sending Muhammad Ibn Muslim to kill him.50 &51

The events of Saqifah did not end on that day. ‘Umar’s primary concern was not to channel the political leadership towards Abu Bakr, but rather to keep it away from ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib. ‘Umar sought to prevent ‘Ali and the Bani Hashim from reaching the khalifah by any means possible. Thus after he became khalifah, ‘Umar ensured that ‘Uthman would succeed him, despite knowing that he would bring his tribesmen from the Bani Umayyah to power.

‘Umar later said to ‘Uthman, “‘Uthman, what keeps me from appointing you is your bigotry (asabiyah ), and the preference that you give to your family and clan over other Muslims.”52 Still, ‘Umar handed the rein of khalifah to ‘Uthman, who as ‘Umar had predicted, ruled by nepotism and favoritism until a defiant faction of the Muslims murdered him.

Overall, as Ibn Abil Hadid says,53 “It was ‘Umar who stood strongly behind Abu Bakr and paved the way for him to assume the leadership. If he had not backed him, it would have been impossible for Abu Bakr to reach where he reached [thekhalifah ].” Nonetheless, the fate of the ummah was sealed on that day, a day which ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab himself later called, “One of the errors of pre-Islamic times (Faltah 54 minfalataat al-jahiliyyah ).”55 Even more he said, “Whoever goes back to it [the same method used to select Abu Bakr as thekhalifah ], then kill him.”56 ‘Umar also admitted his mistake by saying,“God protected the Muslims from the dangers and risks of this immense error [meaning having elected Abu Bakr].” 57

Nonetheless, the effects of Saqifah are felt even today. Had the Saqifah not happened and had the Muslims followed the Prophet’s command, then most likely, there would be no Sunni or Shi’a Muslim. The Muslims would have been united under the banner of obedience to Allah and the leadership that Allah Himself ordained. Instead, once others obtained power, they held it firmly and did not allow anyone else outside their circle to share in it. As a result, they held absolute control over the ummah until the fall of the Bani Umayyah.

It can be argued that the issue of political leadership is solely a political issue and something to be left, buried in the past. Nevertheless, the influence

of the ruling group extended beyond politics because for nearly 100 years they banned the transcription of the Prophet’s sayings for fear that the narrations referring to the right and merits of ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib to the caliphate spread among the masses.

As a result of not recording the hadith until centuries later, scholars had to argue over which statements of the Holy Prophet were authentic and which were fabrications and this led to the need to develop the Science of Hadith. Perhaps the most damaging of all was that the ummah was deprived from a valuable source of Divinely inspired guidance.

Given the severe calamity that the shift in leadership brought, one might ask: Why did ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib not fight for his right to lead the ummah? The answer is best given in his own words:

O Allah! I beseech Thee to take revenge on the Quraysh and those who are assisting them, for they have cut asunder my kinship and overturned my cup and have collaborated to contest a right to which I was entitled more than anyone else. They said to me, ‘If you get your right, that will be just, but if you are denied the right that too will be just.

Endure it with sadness or kill yourself in grief.’ I looked around but found no one to shield me, protect me, or help me except the members of my family. I refrained from flinging them into death and therefore closed my eyes despite the dust; kept swallowing saliva despite the suffocation of grief; and endured pangs of anger although it was bitterer than colocynth and more grievous than the bite of knives.58

Although ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib knew that the ummah would suffer without his leadership, he also knew that it would destroy itself if he attempted to take the leadership by force; and thus he abstained from the caliphate until the murder of ‘Uthman. Even then, he was still hesitant, but at that moment in time, Islam was on the brink of annihilation and there was no one else to save it except for him. However, the extent of the damage done by the group, unfortunately, had already severely crippled the Muslim ummah.

Chapter 4: Political Policies of Quraysh

وَالَّذِينَ اسْتَجَابُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلاَةَ وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورىٰ بَيْنَهُمْ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنفِقُونَ

Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what We bestow on them for sustenance. (Holy Qur’an, 42:38)

Political Practices of the Quraysh Group

After securing the caliphate, the Quraysh group turned its attention to seizing authority of the various regions. Thus, whoever posed a threat or was uncooperative with the new powers was quickly removed from their positions. This meant the removal of competent and experienced people, including members of their own families, such as the removal of ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab’s two sons, Zayd Ibn al-Khattab and Ubaydallah Ibn al-Khattab, as well as the removal of Abu Bakr’s son, Abdul Rahman Ibn Abu Bakr.

In their place, ‘Umar appointed more conforming men, such as Sa’d Ibn Abi al-Waqqas to govern Kufa, Abu Musa al-Ashari to govern Basra, and Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan to govern Shaam (Syria). By including non-Quraysh members into the administration, the party reflected an illusionary bi-partisan government.

Before assuming the role of the third caliph, ‘Uthman Ibn al-Affan had agreed to follow all of the policies of his predecessors, Abu Bakr and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab; however, after becoming caliph, he reverted to the pre-Islamic Arab custom of nepotism.

Fully aware of ‘Uthman’s tendencies to backslide and knowing that the masses despised favoritism, ‘Umar warned him that the Quraysh would lose their power if he did not refrain from nepotism,59 however ‘Uthman did not heed his warning. Unlike Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, ‘Uthman filled the official positions with his own tribesmen - people who were undeniably incompetent individuals, such as Abu Sufyan, Marwan Ibn al-Hakam, Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan, Al-Waleed Ibn Uqbah, Abdullah Ibn Abi Sarh, and Sa’ed Ibn al-Aas.

In doing so, he incensed many companions of the Prophet - even those who had previously sided with the Quraysh such as Lady Aishah, the wife of the Prophet. Particularly upset were those who lost power - not because of their incompetence, but rather, due to ‘Uthman’s nepotism - people such as ‘Amr Ibn al-Aas, who lost Egypt; al-Mugheerah Ibn Shu’bah, who lost Kufa; and Abu Musa al-Ashari, who lost Basra. To replace them, ‘Uthman appointed other inept and corrupt individuals from the Bani Umayyah.

As a result, some of those townships revolted, and in Kufa for example, the people ousted ‘Uthman’s choice and reinstated Abu Musa al-Ashari.60 It appears that ‘Uthman was not interested in restoring order and credibility to the government, but rather, to fill the offices with his own family members, even though they had no qualification, experience, or integrity.

‘Uthman’s nepotism eventually led to his assassination and the awaited succession of ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib to the caliphate in 35 ah. After the Khawarij murdered ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib during his caliphate, the power base once again shifted to the Quraysh group under the rule of Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan.

Learning from ‘Uthman’s errors, Mu’awiyah balanced political office by incorporating tribal groups and making use of ‘Umar’s practice of appointing allies from outside his tribe to official positions. Hence, ‘Amr Ibn al-Aas, al-Mugheerah Ibn al-Shu’bah, Abu Huraira, al-Numan Ibn Basheer, and Abdul Rahman Ibn Khalid all found places in the new administration of Mu’awiyah. He went as far as learning how to appease Lady Aishah, a woman who was known to voice her opposition against those whom she deemed as a roadblock in the way of her own objectives, such as ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib and ‘Uthman Ibn al-Affan.

Selection of the First Six Caliphs

Somewhere along the line of Muslim history, a misconception arose that the caliphate was first instituted by shura (free and popular election). Although, this misconception concurs very well with contemporary democratic theories and promotes Islam as being a conventional and democratic religion, the truth of the matter is that the office of“caliphate” was not brought into being by a popular vote, nor was it supposed to be. The office of the caliph, like the governance of prophethood, is not one to be determined by consultation, but rather by Divine ordination.

In Islam, governance encompasses all facets of life - social, religious, political, economical, judicial, etc. and thus, it is based on Allah’s laws and instructions. Hence, the notion that a democratic process (an assembly of men“chosen” by the people) occurred in the appointment of Abu Bakr’s leadership is not accurate.

As mentioned earlier, the first caliph was decided by two people: ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab and Abu Ubayd Ibn al-Jarrah who both declined their bid for election and instead nominated Abu Bakr and coaxed the others to follow suit at Saqifah.

After Saqifah, ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib said to ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab,“Today you are consolidating and supporting Abu Bakr so that tomorrow he will support you and bring you as his successor.” 61 His words rang true since two and a half years later, ‘Umar reaped the benefits of his stance when Abu Bakr appointed him as his successor before his death. Their pact did not escape going unnoticed by others because even Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan concluded,“They agreed upon that and there was harmony between them.” 62

The selection of the third caliph, ‘Uthman Ibn al-Affan also tends to be a subject of some misconception. As the death of the second caliph ‘Umar neared, he called on a council of six people to determine the next leader. On the surface, this may seem like a semi-electoral body; however, ‘Umar instructed his son Abdullah,“If they appoint ‘Uthman as their leader, they will get the most out of it.” 63

Earlier, when Hudayfah, a scribe of the Qur’an asked ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab who would succeed him, ‘Umar said,“‘Uthman Ibn al-Affan.” 64 As in the previous accord of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, ‘Uthman Ibn al-Affan allied with his cousin, Abdul Rahman Ibn Auf to mutually support each other for the position of the caliphate during the six council“election” meeting.

As ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib narrates,“There was a council of six, and the Muslims were supposed to choose one out of those six, but Abdul Rahman

Ibn Auf favored ‘Uthman, so that tomorrow ‘Uthman would favor him and make him his successor.” 65

After the appointment of ‘Uthman, and later into his office, Abdul Rahman incited the people to revolt against ‘Uthman, and thus ‘Uthman excluded him from ever being appointed as caliph, which severed their relationship to the point where they never spoke to one another throughout the remainder of their lives.66

Due to the subtleties of this arrangement, the appointment of ‘Uthman to the caliphate continues until today to be seen as a form of election by some. History is clear that when Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan came into power, he reserved the caliphate exclusively for his own son and began the first dynasty in the history of Islam.

What history reports less of is that he also maintained the same political ties as the Quraysh group who had diverted the flow of political power to their advantage. To that end, he made pacts with ‘Amr Ibn al-Aas, Talha Ibn Ubaydillah,67 Zubayr Ibn al-Awam,68 and Abu Musa al-Ashari, all of whom disfavored ‘Ali, by offering them governorships in exchange for service.

When he asked ‘Amr Ibn al-Aas to fight against ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib for him, ‘Amr Ibn al-Aas replied,“I will not sell my faith to you unless you give me something in this world here.” Hence, Mu’awiyah appointed him as the governor of Egypt.69

Similarly, Mu’awiyah enlisted Talha and Zubayr in the fight against Imam ‘Ali in return for rule over some of the other states.70 Mu’awiyah also promised Abu Musa al-Ashari,“If you pay allegiance to me and support my position, I will utilize your two sons; one of them will be the governor of Kufa, and the other will be the governor of Basra.” 71 In this way, Mu’awiyah continued the work that his predecessors had begun in channeling the political authority and wealth of the Muslims into a pre-determined and selected group of hands.

Although the caliphate was the main prize, the Quraysh group did not limit their efforts to it. After installing Abu Bakr as the first caliph, they slowly began acquiring governorships of the outlying provinces. As is the case in the modus operandi of the Quraysh, they appointed their political allies to the governorships. The main objective of their appointments was to enlist individuals that did not oppose them and any inclination of strife towards their leadership would be met with expulsion, even at the expense of their own relatives.

As noted earlier, ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab’s two sons, Zayd Ibn al-Khattab and Ubaydallah Ibn al-Khattab were both ostracized, as was Abdul Rahman Ibn Abu Bakr, the son of Abu Bakr. Instead, ‘Umar appointed Sa’d Ibn Abi al-Waqqas to govern Kufa, Abu Musa al-Ashari to govern Basra, and Mu’awiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan to govern Syria. Their true intention was to maintain control of the rapidly expanding Muslim empire among themselves. The issue was not one of election or selection; it was one of maintaining political hegemony within a select group of people.

Harmony or otherwise, the important fact to note is that ‘Umar was appointed by Abu Bakr, not elected to the caliphate, unlike the case with Abu Bakr.

Despite the sheer number of hadith in both Sunni and Shi’a sources, which declared ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib to be the rightful political successor to the Prophet, still many opponents of the Ahlul Bayt in modern times object to the concept of an appointed successor on the basis that it is nepotistic and undemocratic. If so, then how do they explain and accept the fact that none of the first three caliphs arrived at the caliphate through a“democratic” election?

Muslim history has noted that the Saqifah meeting in itself turned into an ad-hoc assembly, and that the explicit appointment of the three caliphs was a premeditated maneuver by a group to bypass the leadership of ‘Ali. Yet still, they argued against the Prophet appointing ‘Ali.

Furthermore, if nepotism is cited (because ‘Ali was a relative of the Prophet) then the same argument can be posed when ‘Uthman’s relatives, such as Mu’awiyah, Yazid, and others were chosen as caliphs. Hence, it would be unfounded to claim that the caliphate was first instituted by shura (consultation).

Dialogue between Abdullah Ibn al-Abbas and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab

Abdullah Ibn al-Abbas (who is from the tribe of Bani Hashim and was the first cousin of ‘Ali and the Prophet) and ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab held many discussions. On one occasion, during the caliphate of ‘Umar they debated whether the Bani Hashim should hold the caliphate. This dialogue is of particular interest, since it highlights the issues at hand.71

‘Umar,“Do you know why the people did not elect you [the family of the Prophet] to the caliphate?”

Ibn Abbas,“No, I do not know.”

‘Umar,“I know what the reason was.”

Ibn Abbas,“What was it?”

‘Umar,“The Quraysh hated to see the prophethood and caliphate vested in one house. If that would have happened, you would have wronged the people!”

Ibn Abbas,“Can Amir al-Mumineen (‘Umar) control his anger if I want to say something?”

‘Umar,“Feel free to say whatever you want to say.”

Ibn Abbas, “If you say that Quraysh hated to see this [prophethood and caliphate vested in one family] then (know that) in the Qur’an, Allah has said about some of the companions [who had lived during the time of the Prophet],

“That is because they hate the revelation of Allah, so He has made their deeds fruitless.” 73

And if you say that we [Bani Hashim] will do injustice if both the prophethood and caliphate are vested in our family, then if we are supposed to do mischief, we will do mischief even without being caliphs or successors, simply because we are the family of the Prophet and the closest people to him. However, we will not do that because our stance, morality, and attitude mirror the attitude of the Prophet, about whom Allah says,

“Verily, you stand on an exalted standard of character.” 74

Also Allah said, “Lower your wing to the believers who follow you.” 75

We will not depart from him (the Prophet), so why are you worried that if we become caliphs we will do mischief? If you say,“The Quraysh chose Abu Bakr and ‘Umar,” then Allah answers,

“Your Lord creates and chooses as He pleases. No choices have they in the matter.” 76

Plus you know ‘Umar, that Allah has chosen certain people from among His creatures to lead humanity. If the Quraysh had joined their vision with the plan of Allah, then the community would have been prosperous and successful.”

‘Umar,“Calm down Ibn Abbas. You members of the Bani Hashim, your heart only wanted to deceive the Quraysh permanently, and you hold perpetual hatred and animosity towards the Quraysh.”

Ibn Abbas, “Calm down ‘Umar, do not say that the hearts of Bani Hashim are deceitful. Their hearts are part of the heart of the Messenger of Allah. It is the same heart of the Messenger of Allah that Allah has cleansed and purified, and they are the family of the Prophet whom Allah describes as,

“Allah only wishes to remove all abomination from you, O members of the family of the Prophet, and to make you pure and immaculate.” 77

If you speak about animosity and grudges in our hearts, this would be natural given that our right has been usurped from us and it is in the hands of a transgressor.”

‘Umar,“What are you saying Ibn Abbas? I have heard some bad things about you, and if I mention them to you, I would lose respect for you in my eyes.”

Ibn Abbas,“What have you heard about me? Tell me. If it is false, I will defend myself. If it is true, I will never lose respect for you in my eyes.”

‘Umar,“I have heard you telling people that this issue [the khalifah] was taken from the family of the Prophet out of jealousy and by way of injustice.”

Ibn Abbas,“Regarding jealousy, yes it is true because Iblis (Satan) was jealous of Adam and forced him out of Paradise. We are the children of Adam, and there is always jealousy among us. If you say “transgression,” you know better who has the right in this matter [the khalifah], and you ‘Umar are the best person to answer this question.

Did you not say that the Arabs are closer to the non-Arabs to the Prophet, and did you not say that the Quraysh are closer than the other tribes are to the Prophet? If you have said that and if you come to the Quraysh, then who among them is closest to the Prophet? Of course, they are the Bani Hashim. I am using the same analogy that you used. We have more right to the caliphate than anyone from the Quraysh.”

‘Umar,“Stand up and go home.”

Ibn Abbas stood up and as he was leaving ‘Umar said,“You who are leaving, come back! Despite what has happened between us, you are still respected in my eyes.”

Ibn Abbas answered,“You who are the caliph now, we also have to preserve your right.”

After Ibn Abbas left, ‘Umar turned to the people around him and said,“I never saw Ibn Abbas discuss something with anyone and not defeat him.”


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