Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Nahjul-Balagha and the Notions of Kalam

While ascribing all the Attributes of perfection to Allah, the Exalted One,Nahjul-Balagha negates any separation of these Attributes from His Essence and does not consider them as an appendage of the Divine Essence. On the other hand, the Ash`arites, as we know, consider the Divine Attributes to be additional to the Essence, so the Mu`tazilites negate all Attributes.

An Ash`arite believes in the Separation [of the Attributes from the Essence]

A Mu`tazilite speaks of subservience [of the Attributes to the Essence]. This has led some people to imagine that the discourses found inNahjul-Balagha on this topic are fabrications of a later period under the influence of Mu`tazilite views whereas anyone with some insight can readily perceive that the Attributes negated byNahjul-Balagha with respect to the Divine Essence are qualities of imperfection and limitation: the Divine Essence, being infinite and limitless, necessitates identity of the Attributes with the Essence, not negation of the Attributes as professed by the Mu`tazilites. Had the Mu`tazilites reached such a notion, they would never have negated the Divine Attributes, considering them subservient to the Essence.

The same is true of the views on the creating or temporality (huduth ) of the Holy Qur’an insermon 184. One may imagine that these passages ofNahjul-Balagha relate to the latter heated controversies among the Islamic theologians (mutakallimun ) regarding the eternity (qidam ) or temporality (huduth ) of the Holy Qur’an and which might have been added toNahjul-Balagha during the latter centuries. However, a little reflection will reveal that the discourses ofNahjul-Balagha relevant to this issue have nothing to do with the debate on the Holy Qur’an being either created or uncreated, which was a meaningless controversy, but relevant to the creative command (amr takwini ), and to the Will of the Almighty. Ali (A.S)  says that Allah`s Will and Command represent the Divine Acts and, therefore, so areahadith posterior to the Essence, for if the Command and the Will were co-eternal and identical with His Essence, they will have, necessarily, to be considered His associates and equals. Ali (A.S)  says the following:

When He decrees the creation of a thing, He says to it, A Be, and it assumes existence; but not through an audible voice which strikes the ear or a cry that can be heard. Indeed the speech of Allah, glory be to Him, is but His created Act, which did not exist before [it came into existence]. Had it (The Divine speech) been itself eternal, it would be another god besides Him. (Sermon 186)

In addition, there are othermusnad traditions on this subject related from Ali (A.S) , only some of which have been collected inNahjul-Balagha , and can be traced back to his time. On this basis, there is no room for doubting their genuineness. If any superficial resemblance is observed between the statements made by Ali (A.S)  and some views held by the Mu`tazilites, the probability to be allowed in this connection is that some of his ideas were adopted by the Mu`tazilites.

The controversies of the Muslim theologians (mutakallimun ), both the Shi`a and the Sunni, the Ash`arites as well as the Mu`tazilites, generally revolved around the doctrine of rational basis of ethical judgment concerning good and evil (al-husn wa al-qubh al- > aqliyyan ). This doctrine, nothing but a practical principle operating in the human society, is considered by themutakallimun to be also applicable to the Divine sphere and govern the laws of creation; but we find no trace of it inNahjul-Balagha. Similarly, there is no sign of it in the Holy Qur’an. Had the ideas and beliefs of themutakallimun found their way intoNahjul-Balagha , first of all, the traces of this doctrine should have been found in that book.

Nahjul-Balagha and Philosophical Concepts

Some others, having come across certain words such as A existence (wujud ), A non-existence (>adam ), A temporality (huduth ) and A pre-eternity (qidam ) and so on inNahjul-Balagha , have been led to assume that these terms entered the Muslim intellectual world under the influence of the Greek philosophy and were inserted, intentionally or unintentionally, into the discourses of Ali (A.S) Had those who advocate this view gone deeper into the meanings of these words, they would not have heeded such a hypothesis. The method and approach adopted in the arguments ofNahjul-Balagha are completely different from thse of the philosophers who lived before Sayyid al- Radi or during his time, or even those born many centuries after the compilation ofNahjul-Balagha .

Presently, we shall not discuss the metaphysics of the Greek or of the Alexandrians (the neo-Platonic) philosophy but shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical views propounded by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Undoubtedly, Muslim philosophers introduced new challenges into philosophy under the influence of Islamic teachings which had not existed before, and in addition to them, introducing radically original ways of demonstration and inference to explain and argue their points with regard to some other problems. Nevertheless, what we learn fromNahjul-Balagha is obviously different from this approach. My teacher,`allama Tabataba`i, in the preface to his discourse on the traditions of Islamic scholarship, writes: A These statements help resolve a number of problems of theological philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not acquainted with these notions, and they were incomprehensible to the Arabs, basically there is no trace of them in the writings and statements of pre-Islamic philosophers whose books were translated into Arabic and, similarly, they do not appear in the works of Muslim philosophers, Arab or Persian. These problems remained obscure and unintelligible, and every commentator discussed them according to his own conjecture until the eleventh century of the Hijra (17th century A.D.). Only then were they properly understood for the first time, that is, the problem of the True Unity (al-wahda al-haqqa ) of the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud ) (a non-numerical unity) ; the problem that the proof of the existence of the Necessary Being is identical with the proof of His Unity (since the Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, His Being implies His Unity) ; the problem that the Necessary Existent is the One known-in-His-Essence (ma`lum bil dhat ) ; the Necessary Being is known directly without the need of an intermediary, and that the reality of everything else is known through the Necessary Being, notvice versa . [7]

The arguments of early Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, such as the discussions on the Divine Essence and Attributes like Unity, Simplicity (basata ), Self-Sufficiency, Knowledge, Power, Will, Providence, and so on, revolve around the conception of the necessity of existence (wujub al-wujud ), from which all of them are derived, and the necessity of existence itself is indirectly deduced. In this fashion, it is demonstrated that the existence of all possible existent beings (mumkinat ) cannot be explained without assuming the existence of the Necessary Being. Although the argument used for proving the truth of this argument cannot be called a demonstration of the impossible (burhan khulf ), in view of its indirect mode of inference, it resemblesburhan khulf and, hence, it fails to provide a completely satisfactory demonstration, for it does not explain the necessity of the existence of the Necessary Being. Ibn Sina, in hisAl- > Isharat, claims that he has succeeded in discovering the A Why? (lima ) of it and, hence, chooses to call his argument Aburhan al-siddiqin (burhan limmi , i.e. causal proof). However, the latter philosophers considered his exposition of A the Why? (lima ) as insufficient.

InNahjul-Balagha , the necessity of existence is never used to explain the existence of possible beings (mumkinat ). That on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of the necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and the pure being of the Divine Essence.

`Allama Tabataba’i, in the above-mentioned work, while explaining onehadith by Ali (A.S) , found inAl-Tawhid of Sheikh al-Saduq, says the following: A The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that the Divine Being is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever. Because Allah, the Most Exalted, is the Absolute Reality from Whom the existence of all other beings is derived within the ontological limits and characteristics peculiar to themselves, and their existence depends on that of this Absolute Being. [8]

InNahjul-Balagha, the very basis of all discussions revolving on the Divine Essence rests on the position that Allah is the Absolute and Infinite Being Who transcends all limits and finitude. No point of space time, or anything at all is devoid of Him. He is with everything, in everything, yet nothing is with Him or in Him. Since He is the Absolute and the Infinite, He transcends time, number, limit and proximity (all kinds of quiddities). That is, time and space, number and limit are applicable to a lower stage, i.e. the stage of the Divine actions and of creation. Everything is from Him and returns to Him. He is the First of the first and the Last of the last. He precedes everything and succeeds everything.

This is the idea that forms the axis of all discourses ofNahjul-Balagha and of which there is no trace in the works of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.

As pointed out by`allama Tabataba`i, these profound discussions of theology proper (ilahiyyat bil-ma`na al- > akhass ) are based on a series of inter-related problems which have been posited in metaphysics (al- > umur al- > ammah ). [9] An elaborate discussion of those theological problems and their relevant issues mentioned above is outside the scope of our present discussion.

There are two reasons for rejecting the claims that the theological discussions ofNahjul-Balagha were inventions of later writers familiar with philosophical notions. Firstly, the kind of problems discussed inNahjul-Balagha were not at all raised by any philosopher till the time of Sayyid al-Radhi, compiler ofNahjul-Balagha . That the Unity of the Necessary Being is not of the numerical kind and that the Divine Essence precedes number, that the existence of the Necessary Being implies Its Unity; the simple reality of the Necessary Being; His immanence and other such notions were not known to philosophy during or before Sayyid al-Radhi`s times. Secondly, the axes of arguments presented in this book are altogether different from the axes of philosophical discussions which have been prevalent throughout history until the present day.

Nahjul-Balagha and Western Philosophic Yought

Nahjul-Balagha has played a great role in the history of Eastern Philosophy. Mulla Sadra, who brought a revolution in theological thought (al-hikmat al- > ilahiyya ), was under the profound influence of Ali`s discourses. His method of argument with regard to the problems ofTawhid is the method of inferring the Essence from the Essence, and also deducing the Attributes and Acts from the Essence, and all these arguments are based on the belief that there exists the Necessary Being only. These arguments are based on radically different general principles which are elaborated in his system of metaphysics.

Eastern theological thought (al-hikmat al- > ilahiyya ) attained fruition and strength from the sources of Islamic teachings and was firmly established on inviolable foundations. However, theological philosophy in the West remained deprived of such a source of inspiration. The widespread philosophical malaise of inclination towards materialism in the West has many causes whose discussion is outside the scope of our discourse. But we believe that the major cause of this phenomenon is the weakness and insufficiency of theological conceptions of Western religious thought. [10] Anyone interested in making a comparative study of the approaches pointed out in these chapters should first study the arguments advanced by Western philosophers such as Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and others for proving the existence of Allah and their discussions about acceptance or rejection of various arguments, then he should compare them with theburhan al-siddiqin argument advanced by Mulla Sadra under the inspiration of Ali’s words. He would see for himself the wide chasm that separates one from the other.