Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

MASARYK UNIVERSITY IN BRNO

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN STUDIES

Direct and Indirect Speech Acts in English

Major Bachelor’s Thesis

Veronika Justová

Supervisor: Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph.D

Brno 2006

I hereby declare that I have worked on this Bachelor Thesis independently, using only primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

20th April 2006 in Brno:

I wish to express many thanks to my supervisor, Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph.D., for his kind and valuable advice, help and support.

Table of Contents

Introduction 5

1. Language, Speech Acts and Performatives 6

1.1. Explicit and Implicit Performatives 7

1.2. Felicity Conditions 8

2. The Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts 10

2.1. Locutionary Acts 10

2.2. Illocutionary Acts 11

2.3. Perlocutionary Acts 14

3. Indirectness 15

3.1. The Theory of Implicature, the Cooperative Principle and Maxims 15

4. Life x 3 18

4.1. Direct speech Acts As a Reaction to Direct Speech Acts 19

4.2. Indirect Speech As a Reaction to Direct Speech Acts 20

4.3. Direct Speech As a Reaction to Indirect Speech Acts 22

4.4. Indirect Speech As a Reaction to Indirect Speech Acts 24

4.5. Data Evaluation 26

Conclusion 27

Czech résumé 28

Bibliography 29

Appendix 31

Notes 37

Introduction

This thesis deals with the theory of speech acts and the issue of indirectness in English. It sums up and comments on theoretical definitions and assumptions concerning the theory of speech acts given by some linguists and language philosophers. This work further discusses the usage of speech acts in various conversational situations, putting the accent particularly on indirectness and its application in the language of drama.

In the first three chapters, I am going to deal with the theoretical approach towards the speech acts. I will comment on the types of speech acts, I will explain how it is possible that the hearer successfully decodes a non-literal, implied message, what conditions must be met in order that the hearer succeeds in this process of decoding and I will suggest why people use indirectness in everyday communication.

In the last chapter, I will then concentrate on indirectness in the discourse of drama. For my analysis, I have chosen the playLife x 3 by a contemporary French author Yasmina Reza whose pieces are often based rather on exchanges between the characters than on some kind of complicated plot.

In Life x 3, I have identified four types of exchanges:direct speech acts motivated bydirect speech acts ,indirect speech acts motivated bydirect speech acts ,direct speech acts motivated byindirect speech acts and finallyindirect speech acts motivated byindirect speech acts . They occur in various proportions, the most frequent being the direct-indirect exchanges and the least frequent being the indirect-direct exchanges.

Grounded on empirical data, I have found out that the play is based rather on indirectness since there are 62 exchanges out of which at least one is indirect, the total number of exchanges being 89.

Direct-direct, indirect-indirect and direct-indirect contributions are quite frequent throughout the play. It seems that the hearer in these exchanges accepts the strategy proposed by the speaker and chooses to pursue likewise, or in the case of direct-indirect exchanges, he decides to make his utterance more polite or evasive so that he does not offend the speaker. In direct-indirect exchanges, the hearer sometimes has more reasons to use indirectness (power, competing goals, desire to make his language more interesting).

On the other hand, indirect-direct strategy is somehow dispreferred as, based on this play, directness after an indirect utterance may initiate an argument between the speakers.

1. Language, Speech Acts and Performatives

Language is an inseparable part of our everyday lives. It is the main tool used to transmit messages, to communicate ideas, thoughts and opinions. It situates us in the society we live in; it is a social affair which creates and further determines our position in all kinds of various social networks and institutions.

In certain circumstances we are literally dependent on its appropriate usage and there are moments when we need to be understood quite correctly. Language is involved in nearly all fields of human activity and maybe that is why language and linguistic communication have become a widely discussed topic among linguists, lawyers, psychologists and philosophers.

According to an American language philosopher J.R. Searle speaking a language is performingspeech acts , acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions or making promises. Searle states that all linguistic communication involves linguistic (speech) acts. In other words, speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication. (1976, 16) They are not mere artificial linguistic constructs as it may seem, their understanding together with the acquaintance of context in which they are performed are often essential for decoding the whole utterance and its proper meaning. The speech acts are used in standard quotidian exchanges as well as in jokes or drama for instance.

The problem of speech acts was pioneered by another American language philosopher J.L. Austin. His observations were delivered at Harvard University in 1955 as the William James Lectures which were posthumously published in his famous bookHow to Do Things with Words . It is Austin who introduces basic terms and areas to study and distinguishes locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. As Lyons puts it: Austin’s main purpose was to challenge the view that the only philosophically (and also linguistically) interesting function of language was that of making true or false statements.(Lyons, 173) Austin proves that there are undoubtedly more functions language can exercise. The theory of speech acts thus comes to being and Austin’s research becomes a cornerstone for his followers.

It is Austin who introduces basic terms and areas to study and he also comes up with a new category of utterances – the performatives.

Performatives are historically the first speech acts to be examined within the theory of speech acts. Austin defines a performative as an utterance which contains a special type of verb (a performative verb) by force of which it performs an action. In other words, in using a performative, a person is not just saying something but is actually doing something (Wardhaugh: 1992: 283). Austin further states that a performative, unlike a constative, cannot be true or false (it can only be felicitous or infelicitous) and that it does not describe, report or constate anything. He also claims that from the grammatical point of view, a performative is a first person indicative active sentence in the simple present tense. This criterion is ambiguous though and that is why, in order to distinguish the performative use from other possible uses of first person indicative active pattern, Austin introduces ahereby test since he finds out that performative verbs only can collocate with this adverb.

     1. a.I hereby resign from the post of the President of the Czech Republic.

    b.I hereby get up at seven o’clock in the morning every day.

While the first sentence would make sense under specific conditions, uttering of the second would be rather strange. From this it follows that (1a) is a performative, (1b) is not.

Having defined performatives, Austin then draws a basic distinction between them. He distinguishes two general groups -explicit andimplicit performatives .

1.1. Explicit and Implicit Performatives

An explicit performative is one in which the utterance inscription contains an expression that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed (Lyons, 1981: 175). An explicit performative includes a performative verb and mainly therefore, as Thomas (1995: 47) claims, it can be seen to be a mechanism which allows the speaker to remove any possibility of misunderstanding the force behind an utterance.

            2. a.I order you to leave.

                b.Will you leave?

In the first example, the speaker utters a sentence with an imperative proposition and with the purpose to make the hearer leave. The speaker uses a performative verb and thus completely avoids any possible misunderstanding. The message is clear here.

The second utterance (2b) is rather ambiguous without an appropriate context. It can be understood in two different ways: it can be either taken literally, as a yes/no question, or non-literally as an indirect request or even command to leave. The hearer can become confused and he does not always have to decode the speaker’s intention successfully. (2b) is an implicit or primary performative. Working on Lyon’s assumption, this is non-explicit, in terms of the definition given above, in that there is no expression in the utterance-inscription itself which makes explicit the fact that this is to be taken as a request rather than a yes/no question (Lyons, 1981: 176).

The explicit and implicit versions are not equivalent. Uttering the explicit performative version of a command has much more serious impact than uttering the implicit version (Yule, 1996: 52). Thomas adds to this that people therefore often avoid using an explicit performative since in many circumstances it seems to imply an unequal power relationship or particular set of rights on the part of the speaker (1995: 48). This can be seen in the following examples:

3. a.Speak. Who began this? On thy love, I charge thee. (Othello, 2.3.177)

    b.I dub thee knight.

In (3a) Othello speaks to his ensign Iago and asks him who initiated a recent fight. Othello addresses Iago from the position of strength and power and he therefore uses the explicit performative‘I charge thee’. Iago understands what is being communicated and carefully explains that he does not know who had started it.

In (3b) the situation is different. In this example it is rather the particular set of rights on the part of the speaker which enable him to use an explicit performative. Dubbing was the ceremony whereby the candidate’s initiation into knighthood was completed. It could only be carried out by the king or any entitled seigneur who shall strike the candidate three times with the flax of the blade, first upon the left shoulder, next upon the right shoulder and finally upon the top of the head while sayingI dub thee once.. I dub thee twice...I dub thee Knight. [1] The ceremony was completed when the knight received spurs and a belt as tokens of chivalry. Levinson (: 230) declares that  ‘performative sentences achieve their corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to institutional procedures’. The institutional procedures are not always the same, they differ considerably in different historical periods and cultures (e.g. the institution of marriage in western and eastern societies). Austin states that it is also necessary for the procedure and the performative to be executed in appropriate circumstances in order to be successful.

  Shiffrin (1994: 51), commenting on Austin’s observations, adds:  “The circumstances allowing an act are varied: they include the existence of ‘an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect’, the presence of ‘particular persons and circumstances’, ‘the correct and complete execution of a procedure’, and (when appropriate to the act) ‘certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions’.”  These circumstances are more often calledfelicity conditions .

1.2. Felicity Conditions

The term of felicity conditions was proposed by Austin who defines them as follows (Austin, 1962: 14 – 15):

There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.

The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.

Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must intend so to conduct themselves, and further must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Linguistic literature concerning the theory of speech acts often deals with Austin’s example of marriage in connection with felicity conditions. Thomas for instance closely describes the institution of marriage and states that in western societies “this conventional procedure involves a man and a woman, who are not debarred from marrying for any reason, presenting themselves before an authorized person (minister of religion or registrar), in an authorized place (place of worship or registry place), at an approved time (certain days or times are excluded) accompanied by a minimum of two witnesses. They must go through a specified form of marriage: the marriage is not legal unless certain declarations are made and unless certain words have been spoken” (Thomas, 1995: 38). Only then are all the felicity conditions met and the act is considered valid.

However, this procedure is often not universal; the customs vary throughout countries and cultures. In Islamic world for example, the ceremony of marriage is considerably different. The bride cannot act herself, she needs a wali (male relative) to represent her in concluding the marital contract as without his presence the marriage would be invalid and illegal. The declarations and words spoken are also culture specific and thus different from the formulas common in Europe.[2]

For all that, there must exist a certain conventional procedure with appropriate circumstances and persons involved, it must be executed correctly and completely, the persons must have necessary thoughts, feelings and intentions and if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do it. (Thomas, 1995: 37) Generally, only with these felicity conditions met the act is fully valid.

The term of felicity conditions is still in use and it is not restricted only to performatives anymore. As Yule (Yule, 1996: 50) observes, felicity conditions cover expected or appropriate circumstances for the performance of a speech act to be recognized as intended. He then, working on originally Searle’s assumptions, proposes further classification of felicity conditions into five classes:general conditions ,content conditions ,preparatory conditions ,sincerity conditions andessential conditions . According to Yule (Yule,1996:50),general conditions presuppose the participants’ knowledge of the language being used and his non-playacting,content conditions concern the appropriate content of an utterance,preparatory conditions deal with differences of various illocutionary acts (e.g. those of promising or warning),sincerity conditions count with speaker’s intention to carry out a certain act andessential conditions ‘combine with a specification of what must be in the utterance content, the context, and the speaker’s intentions, in order for a specific act to be appropriately (felicitously) performed’.

In connection with felicity conditions as well, Austin later realizes that the category of performatives and constatives is not sufficient and thus, in an attempt to replace it by a general theory of speech acts, he ‘isolates three basic senses in which in saying something one is doing something, and hence three kinds of acts that are simultaneously performed’ (Levinson: 236):the locutionary ,illocutioanary andperlocutionary acts .

2. The Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts

The locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are, in fact, three basic components with the help of which a speech act is formed. Leech (Leech, 1983: 199) briefly defines them like this:

locutionary act:   performing an act of saying something

illocutionary act: performing an act in saying something

perlocutionary act: performing an act by saying something

The locutionary act can be viewed as a mere uttering of some words in certain language, while the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts convey a more complicated message for the hearer. An illocutionary act communicates the speaker’s intentions behind the locution and a perlocutionary act reveals the effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer.

This can be demonstrated on a simple example:

4. Would you close the door, please?

The surface form, and also the locutionary act, of this utterance is a question with a clear content (Close the door.) The illocutionary act conveys a request from the part of the speaker and the perlocutionary act expresses the speaker’s desire that the hearer should go and close the door.

But the individual elements cannot be always separated that easily. Bach and Harnish say that they are intimately related in a large measure (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 3). However, for better understanding of their function within a speech act, I am going to treat them individually first.

2.1. Locutionary Acts

This component of the speech act is probably the least ambiguous. Bach and Harnish (Bach and Harnish 1979: 19), commenting on Austin’s work, point out that Austin distinguishes three aspects of the locutionary act.

Austin claims that to say anything is:

always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a phonetic act)

always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words ( a phatic act)

generally to perform the act of using that [sentence] or its constituents with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ and a more or less definite ‘reference’, which together are equivalent to ‘meaning’ (rhetic act)

From this division it follows that the locutionary act comprises other three “sub-acts”: phonetic, phatic and rhetic. This distinction as well as the notion of locutionary act in general was often criticized by Austin’s followers. Searle even completely rejects Austin’s division and proposes his own instead (Searle, 1968: 405). Searle (Searle, 1968: 412) warns that Austin’s rhetic act is nothing else but a reformulated description of the illocutionary act and he therefore suggests another term, the so-called propositional act which expresses the proposition (a neutral phrase without illocutionary force). In other words, a proposition is the content of the utterance.

Wardhaugh offers this explanation. Propositional acts are those matters having to do with referring and predicating: we use language to refer to matters in the world and to make predictions about such matters (Wardhaugh, 1992: 285). Propositional acts cannot occur alone since the speech act would not be complete. The proposition is thus expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. What is essential to note here is that not all illocutionary acts must necessarily have a proposition (utterances expressing states such as ‘Ouch!’ or ‘Damn!’ are “propositionless” as Searle observes (Searle 1976:30)).  Having defined the proposition and propositional acts, Searle modifies Austin’s ideas and states that there are utterance acts (utterance acts are similar to Austin’s phonetic and phatic “sub-acts”, Searle (1976:24) defines them as mere uttering morphemes, words and sentences), propositional acts and illocutionary acts.

Utterance acts together with propositional acts are an inherent part of the theory of speech acts but what linguists concentrate on the most is undoubtedly the issue ofillocutionary acts .

2.2. Illocutionary Acts

Illocutionary acts are considered the core of the theory of speech acts. As already suggested above, an illocutionary act is the action performed by the speaker in producing a given utterance. The illocutionary act is closely connected with speaker’s intentions, e.g. stating, questioning, promising, requesting, giving commands, threatening and many others. As Yule (Yule, 1996: 48) claims, the illocutionary act is thus performed via the communicative force of an utterance which is also generally known as illocutionary force of the utterance. Basically, the illocutionary act indicates how the whole utterance is to be taken in the conversation.

Sometimes it is not easy to determine what kind of illocutionary act the speaker performs. To hint his intentions and to show how the proposition should be taken the speaker uses many indications, ranging from the most obvious ones, such as unambiguous performative verbs, to the more opaque ones, among which mainly various paralinguistic features (stress, timbre and intonation) and word order should be mentioned. All these hints or let’s say factors influencing the meaning of the utterance are called Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices, or IFID as Yule, referring to previous Searle’ s work, calls them (Yule, 1996: 49).

In order to correctly decode the illocutionary act performed by the speaker, it is also necessary for the hearer to be acquainted with the context the speech act occurs in. Mey (Mey, 1993: 139) says that one should not believe a speech act to be taking place, before one has considered, or possibly created, the appropriate context.

Another important thing, which should not be forgotten while encoding or decoding speech acts, is that certain speech acts can be culture-specific and that is why they cannot be employed universally. Mey shows this on French and American conventions. He uses a French sentence to demonstrate the cultural differences.

5.Mais vous ne comperenez pas! (literally, ‘But you don’t understand!’)

While a Frenchman considers this sentence fully acceptable, an American could be offended if addressed in similar way as he could take it as a taunt aimed at the level of his comprehension or intelligence (Mey, 1993: 133). The interpretation of speech acts differs throughout the cultures and the illocutionary act performed by the speaker can be easily misinterpreted by a member of different cultural background.

From this it also follows that ‘the illocutionary speech act is communicatively successful only if the speaker’s illocutionary intention is recognized by the hearer. These intentions are essentially communicative because the fulfillement of illocutionary intentions consists in hearer’s understanding. Not only are such intentions reflexive. Their fulfillment consists in their recognition’(Bach and Harnish, 1979: 15).

Nevertheless, as already pointed out in the previous example, there are cases when the hearer fails to recognize the speaker’s intentions and he therefore wrongly interprets the speaker’s utterance. This misunderstanding may lead to funny situations and hence it is often an unfailing source for various jokes.

I have chosen one illustrative example to comment on a bit more.

Figure 1.[3]

This picture suggests that the speaker (the man in this case) has uttered a question asking how the woman’s day was. The context and other circumstances are not specified, but let’s suppose that their conversation takes place somewhere in the office and that they are colleagues. The man obviously meant his question just as a polite conventional formula with a rather phatic function, not wanting to know any other details. The woman takes him aback a bit since she starts giving him a lot of unsolicited information. She obviously did not catch the intentions behind his words and therefore the man, surprised at her extensive answer, carefully reminds her that she was only supposed to say ‘Fine.’ The communication is uncomfortable for him. The illocutionary act he uttered was not recognized by the woman. The question we should logically ask is ‘Why?’.

Talbot (1998: 140) declares that men and women happen to have different interactional styles and misunderstandings occur because they are not aware of them. She even compares the differences in the way men and women talk to already discussed cross-cultural differences. And thus it is possible to see this example as an analogy to that French-American interpretation of the ‘Mais vous ne comperenez pas!’ case. The woman is as if from different cultural milieu and she therefore misinterprets the man’s question.

It should be clear by now that the issue of illocutionary acts is sometimes quite complicated because one and the same utterance can have more illocutionary forces (meanings) depending on the IFIDs, the context, the conventions and other factors.

6.The door is there.

This simple declarative sentence (6) in the form of statement can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can be either understood literally as a reply to the question ‘Where is the way out?’ or possibly ‘Where is the door?’ or it can be taken as an indirect request to ask somebody to leave. The sentence has thus two illocutionary forces which, even if they are different, have a common proposition (content). The former case is called adirect speech act , the latter anindirect speech act . It depends on the speaker and on the contextual situation which one he will choose to convey in his speech.

Similarly, one illocutionary act can have more utterance acts (or locutionary acts according to Austin) as in:

7. a.Can you close the door?

    b.Will you close the door?

    c.Could you close the door?

    d.Would you close the door?

    e.Can’t you close the door?

    f.Won’t you close the door? (Hernandez, 2002: 262)

All the utterances in (7) are indirect requests, they all have a common illocutionary force, that of requesting.

There are hundreds or thousands of illocutionary acts and that is why, for better understanding and orientation, some linguists proposed their classification. The classification which is the most cited in the linguistic literature is that of Searle who divides illocutionary (speech) acts into five major categories (to define them, I will use Levinson’s explanations (Levinson, )):

Representatives are such utterances which commit the hearer to the truth of the expressed proposition (e.g. asserting, concluding)

8.The name of the British queen is Elizabeth .       

Directives are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (e.g. ordering, requesting)

9.Would you make me a cup of tea?

Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action (e.g. promising, offering)

10.I promise to come at eight and cook a nice dinner for you.

Expressives express a psychological state (e.g. thanking, congratulating)

11.Thank you for your kind offer.

Declarations effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (e.g. christening, declaring war)

12.I bequeath all my property to my beloved fiancee .

Searle’s classification is not exhaustive and according to Levinson (Levinson, 1983: 240), it lacks a principled basis. Yet, Searle’s classification helped to become aware of basic types of illocutionary acts and their potentialperlocutionary effect on the hearer.

2.3. Perlocutionary Acts

Perlocutionary acts, Austin’s last element in the three-fold definition of speech acts, are performed with the intention of producing a further effect on the hearer. Sometimes it may seem that perlocutionary acts do not differ from illocutionary acts very much, yet there is one important feature which tells them apart. There are two levels of success in performing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts which can be best explained on a simple example.

13.Would you close the door?

Considered merely as an illocutionary act (a request in this case), the act is successful if the hearer recognizes that he should close the door, but as a perlocutionary act it succeeds only if he actually closes it.

There are many utterances with the purpose to effect the hearer in some way or other, some convey the information directly, others are more careful or polite and they useindirectness to transmit the message.

3. Indirectness

Indirectness is a widely used conversational strategy. People tend to use indirect speech acts mainly in connection with politeness (Leech, 1983: 108) since they thus diminish the  unpleasant message contained in requests and orders for instance. Therefore similar utterances as in (14) are often employed.

14. It’s very hot in here.

In this example the speaker explains or even excuses the reason why he makes a request (Open the window!). Ardissono argues that the speakers often prefer indirect speech acts so that they do not infringe the hearer’s face, which might be the case here too. Ardissono claims that sometimes direct addresses may even appear impolite as in ‘Would you lend me some money?’ and ‘Lend me some money!’ The latter variant would be absolutely unacceptable in some contexts.

However, politeness is not the only motivation for indirectness.  People also use indirect strategies when they want to make their speech more interesting, when they want to reach goals different from their partners’ or when they want to increase the force of the message communicated (Thomas, 1995: 143). These factors will be further discussed in chapter five when analyzing Yasmina Reza’s play Life x 3.

The motivation for indirectness seems to be more or less clear but the question most linguists deal with is: How is it possible that the hearer understands what the speaker actually communicates by his utterance?

To answer this cardinal question, the theory of implicature and the cooperative principle have been developed.

3.1. The Theory of Implicature, the Cooperative Principle and Maxims

The author of this theory, an English language philosopher Paul Grice, scientifically clarifies the subject of mutual speaker-hearer understanding and says that we are able to converse with one another because we recognize common goals in conversation and specific ways of achieving these goals. In any conversation, only certain kinds of moves are possible at any particular time because of the constraints that operate to govern exchanges (Wardahaugh, 1992: 289).

Grice comes up with the theory of implicature in which he tries to explain in detail how the hearer gets from what is said to what is meant. According to Grice, there is a set of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation which arise from basic rational consideration (Levinson, 1983: 101). Levinson also adds to this that the assumptions can be understood as guidelines leading the course of the conversation (Levinson, 1983: 101). Grice calls them maxims and states that they together form the cooperative principle: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’  (taken from Schiffrin, 1994: 194).

Grice distinguishes four basic maxims:

Maxim of Quantity:

Make you contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

Do not say what you believe to be false.

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly. (Schiffrin, 1994: 194)

What can be derived from the cooperative principle is the fact that maxims should be theoretically involved in every conversation. However, in everyday communication, the conversational situation is not always ideal and that is why the maxims are often not fully observed. There are several ways in which the speaker can fail to observe one or more maxims. These are flouting (the speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim), violating (unostentatious non-observance of a maxim), infringing (the speaker fails to observe a maxim without any intentions), suspending and opting out (the speaker indicates unwillingness to cooperate in the way the maxim requires) of a maxim (Thomas, 1995: 64).

As a result consequent upon non-observance of certain maxims, the speaker’s utterance may communicate something completely different from what was said. In other words, the utterance can imply something.

This finding helps to explain and comprehend indirect contributions. Although seeming inappropriate at the first sight, the hearer presupposes that the speaker has in mind and maintains the cooperative principle. The hearer, and sometimes also the speaker, thus understands what is actually being said.

This can be demonstrated on the following example:

15. A: Wouldn’t you want to be able to hunt later on the first day of hunting?

      B: I said Saturday, so obviously that’s the day I prefer. (Tannen, 1990: 159)

This exchange is taken from an interview going on between husband and wife who are planning a dinner for their friends. A is trying to set the date while B gives reasons why he is busy. A loses patience and makes an indirect request in the form of a yes/no question. B decodes it and also reacts indirectly. A flouts the maxim of Manner and B flouts the maxim of Quantity (A is not brief, B is more informative than required).

Even though this exchange may seem strange as B does not utter a response relevant to a yes/no question, the message is clear for A as she relies on B’s conversational cooperation. She knows hence that B’s response must have some sort of interrelationship towards her utterance and she looks for non-literal, indirect meaning.

  The cooperative principle, together with other contextual circumstances, helps in establishing the actual meaning of the utterance.

Indirectness is thus not an uncommon conversational strategy. On the contrary, it is widely used not only in everyday communication or jokes as we saw earlier, but also in literature and drama in the first place.

The employment of indirect strategies can be observed for example in Life x 3, a play by contemporary French author Yasmina Reza, I have chosen for my analysis.