Thoughts About A Science Of Evidence

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Bayes' Rule and the Force of Evidence

Reasoning from evidence is a dynamic process in which we revise our existing or prior beliefs about hypotheses or propositions on the basis of relevant evidence to form new or posterior beliefs about these hypotheses. There is a consequence called Bayes' rule that tells us how this dynamic process should occur when our beliefs are expressed probabilistically in accordance with three basic rules most of us learn in school. These rules are:

Probabilities are positive numbers or zero [i.e. there are no negative probabilities]

The probability of a "sure" event [one certain to happen] is 1.0,

If two or more events cannot happen together [i.e. they are mutually exclusive], the probability that one or the other of these events occurs is equal to the sum of their separate probabilities.

All probabilities are dependent, or conditional upon, what else we know or find out. Here is an event E whose probability we are interested in determining. But we also learn that event F has occurred; so we have an interest in determining the probability of E, given or conditional on F. Conditional probabilities obey the same three rules given above. There is a consequence of rules for conditional probabilities, called Bayes' rule, that tells us how much, and in what direction, we should revise orprior beliefs about some hypothesis based on new evidence we obtain. The result of this determination is what is called aposterior probability . This rule originated in the work of Thomas Bayes [1702 - 1761] a dissenting clergyman who lived in Tunbridge Wells. Those interested in finding more about Bayes can consult a recent biography of him[136]. Bayes' rule as been called the first mathematical canon for inductive reasoning.

Now, there are terms in Bayes' rule calledlikelihoods that wlll tell us by how much, and in what direction, we should revise our prior beliefs into posterior beliefs, given some new evidence. We often consider ratios of these likelihoods. In any case, these terms are indications of the inferential force of the evidence we have obtained. Figure 5 is a picture of what these likelihoods express. Suppose defendant Dick is on trial for shooting victim Vick. Here is an item of evidence received during Dick's trial: Dick owned the revolver used in the shooting of Vick.

The force of this evidence on whether Dick shot Vick is given by the ratio of Likelihood 1 to Likelihood 2. If you believe Likelihood 1 is greater than Likelihood 2, you are saying that this evidence favours the proposition that Dick shot Vick by an amount indicated by the size of this ratio. Likelihood ratios express both the inferential force and direction of evidence. If you said that this ratio was 5, you are saying that this evidence is five times more likely if Dick shot Vick than if he didn't shoot Vick. Directionally, this evidence points to Dick shooting Vick. Bayes' rule would say that you are entitled to increase your prior belief that Dick shot Vick by a factor of 5. Thus, in accordance with FRE 401, discussed above concerning relevance, this evidence would indeed be relevant since it allowed you to change your belief in the probability of a material or consequential issue. This is what Richard Lempert observed to be a virtue of the way Bayes' rule grades the inferential force of evidence[137].

For many years now I have studied likelihood ratio formulations for the force of every form and combination of evidence I could think of. I have reviewed many of these studies in another work[138]. Bayes' rule is a marvellous device for capturing a very wide array of evidential subtleties or complexities for study and analysis. Likelihood ratios can be expressed for collections of evidence and not only for individual items as shown in Figure 5. Bayes' rule incorporates a property calledconditional dependence that is the finest property I know of for capturing evidential subtleties or complexities. I will return to Bayes' rule again when I discuss the discovery of evidence. We normally view probability theories as being involved just in the inductive justification of hypotheses. But application of this rule can prompt us to ask questions we may never have thought of asking. These questions may open up new lines of inquiry and new lines of evidence. But as rich as it is, Bayes' rule does not have all there is to say about the force, weight or strength of evidence.

Evidential Support and Evidential Weight: Nonadditive Beliefs

The formal system leading to Bayes' rule rests on axioms taken by many to be self-evident. The person who first formed the three axioms I mentioned above was the Russian mathematician A. N. Kolmogorov[139]. In his works Kolmogorov makes clear that his axioms assume situations involving replicable events in which probabilities can be determined by counting. The two basic examples arealeatory probabilities in games of chance andrelative frequencies in statistics. But there are many situations in which we have doubt or uncertainty about events that are the result of processes that cannot be repeated and in which no counting is possible. I refer here to unique, singular, or one-of-a-kind events. These situations are very common in a variety of contexts such as history, law, intelligence analysis, and in everyday experience. I have my own belief about the probability that Nicola Sacco was guilty of killing Berardelli, but I cannot play the world over again 1000 times to observe the number of occasions on which he did it. Various attempts have been made to apply probabilistic concepts in these non-enumerative situations.

Many persons take the view that probabilities can be epistemic, subjective, or judgmental in form and rest on whatever information we happen to have that we believe to be relevant to an assessment of the probability of interest. Applications of Bayes' rule requires at least one epistemic probability; we need an initial prior probability in order to get the dynamic probability revision process started. Regarding some hypothesis or proposition H, we need to assess how likely is H before we begin to gather relevant evidence. Many persons have no hesitation in supplying epistemic judgments of prior probabilities and other ingredients of Bayes' rule, including likelihoods, provided that these probabilities conform to the Kolmogorov axioms. As I mentioned at the close of Section 3.2, this is what led Professor Mario Bunge to refer to colleagues as "charlatans", engaged in "pseudoscience", who are willing to assess the prior probability ingredients of Bayes rule in the form of epistemic or subjective judgements. In short, Bunge and others rejectany view of probability as making sense when we have nothing to count. Bunge would really come unstuck if he read the works of the person whose views of the force of evidence I now mention.

Professor Glenn Shafer [Rutgers University] has given very careful thought to epistemic or judgmental probabilities necessary in situations in which we have nothing to count[140]. He begins by denying the self-evident nature of the third of Kolmogorov's axioms; it is called theadditivity axiom . Recall that this axiom says that if event E and F cannot occur together, then the probability that one or the other occurs is always equal to the sum of their separate probabilities. But there is an added consequence of this axiom. When we have mutually exclusive events that are also exhaustive [one or the other must occur] then the sum of their probabilities is 1.0, in accordance with the second axiom for "sure" events. Thus, if we have two hypotheses H and not-H, their probabilities must sum to 1.0, a priori, or a posteriori, given any evidence. In short, if you believe the probability of H is p, you must also believe the probability of not-H is (1 - p). Thus, if you increase the probability if H, you must decease the probability of not-H. Shafer says this is an unfortunate property in many situations involving epistemic probability judgments. He offers several reasons why this additivity property causes trouble.

Shafer is well aware of some important ideas that have been around for a long time, such as Jakob Bernoulli's distinction between "mixed" and "pure" evidence that he described in his treatise:Ars Conjectandi in 1713. Mixed evidence offers some degree of support to every hypothesis being considered. But pure evidence says nothing about certain hypotheses and offers them no support at all. As an example of pure evidence, suppose that Tom, Dick and Harry are suspects in the theft of a valuable object from the home of the owner. There were no signs that the house had been broken into. Tom is found with a key to this house. This would be pure evidence since it offers support for Tom's having stolen the object; but it says nothing about Dick or Harry.

Shafer says we need a different measure of the support that evidence may provide hypotheses. So, he defines a measure ofevidential support, S, which he equates to theinferential weight of evidence. Like ordinary probabilities, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1.0. But S has a different meaning than do the likelihoods discussed above that indicate the force of evidence in Bayes' rule. When S = 0, all this means is that evidence provides no support to some hypotheses. But when a likelihood has zero value this means that this hypothesis is impossible. It says the the probability of the evidence we have is zero, given this hypothesis. Bayes' rule then assigns zero probability to this hypothesis. There is an entirely different meaning of the role of zero in ordinary probability and Shafer's S scale. On the ordinary probability scale, zero indicates impossibility ordisbelief , On the S scale, S = 0 meanslack of support or lack of belief . Our belief in hypothesis H can be revised away from zero when we do have evidence that supports it to some degree. But we cannot revise the probability of a hypothesis away from zero that has been determined to be impossible. Disbelief and lack of belief are different judgmental conditions.

There is a very important consequence associated with the manner in which Shafer support S is assigned. We are allowed towithhold support assigned to hypotheses in various ways when we cannot decide what the evidence means. As I will illustrate in an example, this characteristic of Shafer's system leads to conditions in which our beliefs are nonadditive, as they must be using Bayes' rule. Here is how S is assigned. Suppose we have some number n of hypotheses that are disjoint or mutually exclusive, but they are not necessarily exhaustive. We might think of others later on, or revise the ones we are considering at the moment. All the set of n hypotheses represents is how we see or inferential situation at the moment. Shafer call this collection of n hypotheses ourframe of discernment , F. We do not assign S to just these n hypotheses by themselves, as we must do in assigning likelihoods in Bayes' rule, but we assign S to subsets of these hypotheses in our frame F. When there are n hypotheses in F, then there are 2n possible subsets of hypotheses in our frame. The set of all 2n hypotheses is called apower set . Here is the simplest case in which we have two mutually excusive hypotheses that are also exhaustive, H and not-H. The power set of hypotheses in our frame F consists of: {H}, {not-H}, {H, not-H} and Ø, where Ø is the set of none of them [Ø is called the "empty set"]. Also, read the set {H, not-H} as: "either H or not-H". We are allowed to assign S in any way we please across the non-empty subsets of a power set, except that they must sum to 1.0 and with the additional provision that Ø always gets S = 0.

Here is an example of support assignment that involves a very good instance in which being indecisive about what evidence means, and being able to reflect our indecision in our beliefs, is a major virtue of Shafer's evidential reasoning system. This example involves William Twining's favorite law case:Rex v. Bywaters and Thompson , that was tried at the Old Bailey, on December 6 -11, 1922[141]. Edith Thompson was charged with either conspiring with Freddy Bywaters to kill her husband Percy Thompson on the particular occasion when he did it [October 3, 1922], or she incited Freddy to kill Percy whenever an occasion presented itself. A classic love triangle appears in this case. Freddy boarded in the Thompson's home; but he was frequently away; he worked aboard ships. Freddy and Edith became lovers and carried on their affair until the time of Percy's death. Edith and Freddy corresponded daily when Freddy was away, either through the mails or by what were then called Marconigrams. Freddy kept all of the correspondence he received from Edith, but Edith kept none of those she received from Freddy.

I have never encountered finer examples of ambiguous evidence than the letters Edith wrote to Freddy. What is clear is that these letters appear to have convinced the twelve male jurors of her guilt. She was hanged on January 9, 1923 at Holloway; Freddy was hanged the same day at Pentonville. Some of these letters mention poisons of various sorts, some mention broken glass, others contain comments suggesting that Edith had tried to kill Percy herself. Other letters seem to give the impression that Edith and Freddy had made plans to do away with Percy. But the Shakespearean scholar Professor Rene Weis [also at UCL] puts a different interpretation on her letters that he provides in a very careful analysis of Edith's case[142]. Twining and Weis agree that Edith was innocent but do so from different standpoints and using different methods[143]. Twining uses this case to give examples of the truly complex situations in which Wigmore's argument structuring methods can be employed.

Using Shafer's method for assigning evidential support, or weight, here is how I view Edith's letters as supporting her being guilty, G , or not guilty, not-G, as she was charged. Let SL represent the support I have assigned to the entire collection of her letters to Freddy. The power set of these hypotheses is: {G}, {not-G}. {G, not-G] and Ø

{G} {not-G} {G, not-G} Ø

SL: 0.3 0.2 0.4 0

Here is what my S assignment means. I think the letter evidence supports her guilt to degree 0.3, and her being not guilty to degree 0.2. But I am undecided to degree 0.4 about what this letter evidence says, and so I assign this amount to the set {G, not-G} because I cannot tell whether this ambiguous evidence specifically supports G or not-G. This setting of S represents the amount of support I have withheld from either {G} or {not-G}.

The above assignment of support corresponds to my beliefs [Bel] in a way that Shafers system allows I have Bel{G} = 0.3 and Bel{not-G} = 0.2. My beliefs in this case are non-additive since Bel{H} = 0.3 + Bel{not-G} = 0.2 = 0.5, which is less than 1.0. If I had used a Bayesian approach, I would be required to say that Bel{H} + Bel{not-G} = 1.0 since G and not-G are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In short, Bayes' rule does not allow me to be indecisive about what I think the evidence means.

Shafer's system, often called a system ofbelief functions , is very useful in capturing elements of our probabilistic beliefs that are difficult, or impossible to capture with ordinary probabilities. Because one of the Kolmogorov axioms is violated, Bayes' rule does not appear is Shafer's belief function system. It is replaced by what is calledDempster's rule , which allows us to combine support assessments S for successions of evidence. This rule allows to calculate what is called theorthogonal sum of S assignments for different items of evidence. This system has found application in a number of important contexts in which epistemic judgmental assessments are necessary in the reasoning tasks at hand.

Evidential Completeness and the Weight of Evidence in Baconian Probability

Francis Bacon [1561 - 1626] is usually credited with being the first to argue that we can never justify hypotheses about how nature works just by compiling instances that are favourable to them. What he argued was that negative instances are at least as informative as positive instances. In fact, what we should do in testing hypotheses is to perform experiments designed toeliminate possible hypotheses. The one or ones that resist our best efforts to eliminate any of the hypotheses we are considering are the ones in which we should have the most confidence. This view has been calledeliminative induction . But Bacon was never specific about what eliminative methods could be employed. As I noted in Section 3.1, John Stuart Mill is usually credited with being the first to identify methods designed to eliminate possible causes for the effects we observe in nature. But such methods were known much earlier to the four Oxford scholars I mentioned.

But there is another important element in the eliminative testing of hypotheses. The tests we perform must bevariative in the sense that we must establish the array of conditions under which we may expect a hypothesis to continue to remain valid. We cannot do this by performing the same test over and over again. The only thing this repetitive testing would accomplish is to increase our confidence in the reliability of this single test's results. The more varied are the conditions under which some hypothesis holds, the more confidence we can place in it. But this variative testing raises another important question, namely:how complete has been our eliminative testing of our hypotheses? There may be other important tests of our hypotheses that we have not performed whose results might serve to eliminate hypotheses we are still considering.

Neither Bacon, Mill, Popper, nor anyone else was successful in relating problems associated with the eliminative and variative testing of hypotheses to ordinary probabilistic concepts. The first person to study this relation was L. Jonathan Cohen [now emeritus, Queen's College, Oxford]. In a work that had a great influence on probabilistic thinking in law and philosophy, Cohen was the first to generate a theory of probability expressly congenial to the eliminative and variative testing of hypotheses[144]. He refers to this theory asBaconian probability to acknowledge its roots in the works of Francis Bacon. On occasion, he also calls it a theory ofinductive probability . In his works Cohen takes a decidedly ecumenical [or "polycriterial", as he calls it] view of probability in evidence-based reasoning. He allows that conventional views of probability make perfect sense in some but not all situations. He further argues that conventional views of evidence-based reasoning, such as Bayes' rule, overlookhow much evidence has been considered and how complete is this evidential coverage of matters believed to be relevant in the inference at hand. Eliminative and variative inference requires special considerations. In fact,evidential completeness , in Cohen's view, is the major factor associated with the weight of evidence.

In Figure 6 below is a diagram I have used to illustrate some of Cohen's key ideas in Baconian probability. I have tried my best to generate interest in the importance of Cohen's views among persons in a variety of contexts who should be aware of his ideas regarding evidential completeness. I have gone to great lengths in some contexts, but not always with any great success[145]. There are two basic questions that arise in Cohen's views about the weight of evidence: (i) How much uncounteracted favourable evidence do we have on some hypothesis that has arisen in answer to relevant questions we have asked?, and (ii) How many relevant questions, that we know about, remain for which we have no evidential answers? In short, the weight of evidence in Cohen's view depends not only on answers to questions we have asked, but also upon how many questions remain unanswered. Cohen's Baconian views about the weight and amount of evidence bring to mind ideas expressed by John M. Keynes in his very influential treatise on probability[146]. Keynes's ideas about the amount and the weight of evidence have often been misunderstood. Cohen has written on various questions that have arisen regarding the views of Keynes on the weight of evidence[147].

Here are some details of the cover story surrounding Figure 6. Some time ago we were asked to assess which of three hypotheses, H1, H2 and H3, is most likely because it will have an important bearing on a decision we must make. Initial evidence pointed very strongly to H1 being true, so we took an action based on H1. What we are now doing is engaging in a post mortem analysis trying to see what went wrong; H3 happened to occur and our decision miscarried. Our decision produced a disastrous result. Someone says: "How could we have gone wrong? We used Bayes' rule to aggregate what our assessments of likelihoods for the evidence we had, and we all agreed that the prior probabilities we were using made perfect sense. Bayes' rule said that the posterior probability of H1 was 0.997 based on the evidence we incorporated in our inference".

If Jonathan Cohen happened to be present during our post mortem, here is what he might have said: "You were out on an inferential limb that was much longer and more slender than you believed it to be, just based on the answers your existing evidence provided. How many relevant questions do you now realise to have been unanswered in your analysis?" We begin to make a list of questions we believe also relevant that we did not attempt to answer; this list grows quite large. It also contains questions we knew about at the time of our analysis. However, we believed the evidence we did take account of was sufficiently strong that we did not hesitate to conclude that H1 was true. Here is a picture of the actual inferential limb we were on.

Jonathan Cohen goes on to explain the two parts of this inferential limb on which we found ourselves. He says: "The strong part consists of the evidence you had that was favourably relevant to H1. The weak part consists of relevant questions that remained unanswered. What you did in concluding that H1 was true was to assume essentially that the answers to all of the questions that you did not ask would have been favourable to H1. The problem is that a very high Bayesian posterior probability is not a good indicator of the weight of evidence because it does not grade the completeness or sufficiency of evidence".

In another work I have compared Baconian and Bayesian approaches when we encounter chains of reasoning in arguments we construct[148]. There is nothing incompatible about these two approaches to evidence based reasoning. The reason is that they each respond to different, but equally important, considerations. Bayes' rule provides very useful measures of how strong is the evidence you do have, but Cohen's Baconian probabilities allow us to grade the completeness of our evidence. I ended up concluding that both forms of hedging conclusions would be necessary on many occasions.

Verbal Assessments of the Force of Evidence: Fuzzy Probabilities

In so many situations we talk about the force of evidence, and express the strength of our conclusions, in words rather than in numbers. There are no better examples than those occurring in the field of law. Forensic standards of proof such as, 'beyond reasonable doubt", "clear and convincing evidence", "probable cause", and so on, are verbal assessments that seem to defy efforts to translate them into numerical probabilities. In his analysis of what we now call inference networks, Wigmore understood perfectly well that the arrows linking evidence and probanda, such as those illustrated in Figure 2A, are probabilistic in nature. But he always used words rather than numbers to indicate the force with which one element of an argument is linked to others[149]. He used terms such as "strong force", "weak force", and "provisional force" to indicate the strength of these linkages. The use of words rather than numbers to indicate the force of evidence appears in many other contexts, especially when there is no attempt to employ and combine any of the views of evidential force described above.

There are algorithms for combining numerical probabilities, such as Bayes' rule and Dempster's rule, but how do we combine assessments of the force of evidence that are given in words? Wigmore gave no hint about how we should combine his verbal assignments of evidential force in order to grade the force of an overall mass of evidence. Verbal assessments of probabilities in grading the force of evidence, and in stating the strength of an overall conclusion, are today referred to asfuzzy probabilities , in part to acknowledge their imprecision. But thanks to the work of Lotfi Zadeh and his many colleagues worldwide, there is a logic that underlies the expression and combination of verbal or fuzzy probabilities[150]. This system of fuzzy logic and probabilities has found wide acceptance in many situations in which persons must perform a variety of tasks based on fuzzy or imprecise ingredients. But it does have its detractors[151].

I have now completed my comments on the essential properties or credentials of evidence: relevance, credibility, and inferential force, weight, or strength. I have taken some care in discussing these properties in order to illustrate how study of them involves the classificatory, comparative, and quantitative concepts that both Poincaré and Carnap said were involved in science. I next comment on the uses of evidence and will show how these same concepts arise.

4.3 On the Uses of Evidence

We all use evidence every day of our lives in connection with our inferences and decisions, whatever their substance and objectives might be. William Twining has provided a characterization of evidence that seems to cover the use of evidence in any context you can think of. He says[152]:

'Evidence' is a word of relation used in the context of argumentation (A is evidence of B). In that context information has a potential role as relevant evidence if it tends to support or tends to negate, directly or indirectly, a hypothesis or probandum. One draws inferences from evidence in order to prove or disprove a hypothesis or probandum. The framework is argument, the process is proof, the engine is inferential reasoning.

I am going to provide two examples of uses of evidence. The first will illustrate Poincaré's assertion that science relies upon classifications and is the study of relations, some of which can be expressed in quantitative terms. The second involves Carnap's comparative and quantitative concepts and their importance in science and in our everyday lives.

IS BASSMALA A QURANIC VERSE? IS IT TO BE RECITED IN PRAYERS?

The Muslim scholars disagreed on this matter.[31]Malik and al-Awza’iy thought that it was not a part of the Quran and they prohibited their followers from reciting it in the prayers whether it was in the beginning of sura of Hamd[32]or in the beginning of the second sura and whether it was recited loudly or softly but they permitted to be recited in nafila.[33]

Abu Haneefa, ath-Thawri and their followers recited bassmala with sura of Hamd but they said that it must be recited softly even in the loud-recited prayers.[34]This showed that they agreed with Malik and al-Awza’iy. We didn’t find any evidence justifying that except that they didn’t consider it as part of the Quran.

Ash-Shafi’iy recited bassmala loudly in loud-recited prayers and softly in soft-recited prayers and considered it as a verse of sura of Hamd. So was the thought of Ahmed bin Hanbal, Abu Thour and Abu Obayd.

Different sayings were mentioned about the thought of ash-Shafi’iy concerning bassmala; whether he believed that it was a part of every sura except Bara’a[35](9) or it was not a verse except in sura of Hamd. But his companions agreed upon that bassmala was a verse of all the suras[36]and justified the two different sayings mentioned about their Imam’s thought.[37]

As for us-the Shia-we agreed, according to our infallible imams, upon that bassmala was a complete Quranic verse of every sura except Bara’a and whoever left reciting it in the prayer intendedly, his prayer would be vain whether the prayer was wajib (obligatory) or mustahab. It must be recited loudly in loud-recited prayers and it was desirable (mustahab) to be recited loudly in soft-recited prayers.[38]It was a piece of a verse in sura of an-Naml. The traditions of our infallible imams were clear in denying the sayings of their opponents. Imam Sadiq (s) said: “What?! They attacked the greatest verse of the Book of Allah the Almighty and they pretended that it was a heresy and then they spread their heresy about the verse(In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful). [39]

Our evidence from the Sunni side is the traditions mentioned in their Sihah and how many they are!

1. Ibn Jurayj narrated from his father from Sa’eed bin Jubayr that ibn Abbas when talking about the Quranic verse(And certainly We have given you seven of the oft-repeated (verses) and the grand Quran 15:87) had said: “It is the Fatiha[40]of the Book;In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds…etc.). Ibn Jurayj said: “I asked my father: Did Sa’eed tell you that ibn Abbas had said that(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) was a Quranic verse? He said: Yes!”[41]

2. Ibn Abbas said: “The Prophet (s), whenever Gabriel came to him and recitedin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful , knew that it was a sura.”[42]

3. Ibn Abbas said: “The Prophet (s) didn’t know that a sura was completed until a newin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful was revealed to him.”[43]

4. Ibn Abbas said: “The Muslims didn’t know that a sura was completed untilin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful was revealed. When it was revealed, they became certain that the previous sura was completed.”[44]

5. Umm Salama said: “The Prophet (s) used to recite(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds…etc.) and scanned it verse by verse.”[45]

Umm Salama said in another way: “The Prophet (s) recited in the prayer(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) and counted it as the first verse and then recited(All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds) and counted it as the second, then (The Beneficent, the Merciful) as the third, (Master of the Day of Judgment) as the fourth, then(Thee do we serve and Thee do we beseech for help) and gathered his five fingers.”[46]

6. Na’eem al-Mujammir said: “I was behind Abu Hurayra (in offering the prayer) when he recited(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) then he recited al-Fatiha until he finished it and said amen and the people said amen! When he finished the prayer, he said: “I swear by Him, in Whose hand my soul is, that I am the most similar to the Prophet (s) in offering the prayer.”[47]

Abu Hurayra said: “The Prophet (s) used to recite(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) loudly in the prayers.”[48]

7. Anass bin Malik said: “Once Mo’awiya offered a prayer in Medina and he recited(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) loudly for al-Fatiha but he didn’t recite it for the second sura. When he finished the prayer, some of the Muhajireen and the Ansar,[49]who heard him, shouted at him: “O Mo’awiya! Did you steal the prayer or forget?” When he offered the prayer after that, he recited bassmala for the second sura.” Al-Hakim mentioned this tradition in his Mustadrak and considered it true according to (Imam) Muslim’s conditions.[50]The tradition was mentioned by others like Imam ash-Shafi’iy,[51]who commented on it. It would be better to quote his comment. He said: “Mo’awiya was a very powerful ruler, so unless reciting bassmala loudly was a certain verdict among all the companions of the Muhajireen and the Ansar, they wouldn’t dare to object to him when he didn’t recite bassmala.”[52]

I would like to comment on this tradition to draw the attention of every researcher to the evidence this tradition had that confirmed our thought (the Shia’s thought) about bassmala in the prayer and that it was not permissible to recite bassmala with al-Fatiha only and not to recite it with the second sura, otherwise the companions wouldn’t have objected to Mo’awiya unless the matter of bassmala had been like the Shia’s thought.

8. It was narrated from another way that Anass had said: “I heard the Prophet (s) reciting(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) loudly in the prayer.”[53]

9. Muhammad bin as-Sariy al-Asqalani said: “I offered Fajr and Maghrib prayers behind al-Mu’tamir bin Sulayman innumerable times. He recited(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) loudly before al-Fatiha and before the second sura. I heard al-Mu’tamir saying: I haven’t failed to imitate my father’s prayer and my father said: I haven’t failed to imitate Anass’ prayer and Anass said: I haven’t failed to imitate the Prophet’s prayer.”[54]

This tradition and other traditions showed that they (the Sunnis) used to recite bassmala with the second sura after al-Fatiha in the prayers like the Shia. Many other traditions confirmed this matter.[55]

Qatada said: “Anass bin Malik was asked that how the Prophet (s) recited in his prayers. He said: “He used to stress his reciting.” Then he recited (bismillahir-rahmanir-raheem)[56]and he stressed ar-rahman (the Beneficent) and ar-raheem (the Merciful).”

Hameed at-Taweel narrated that Anass bin Malik had said: “I offered prayers behind the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali. All of them recited bassmala loudly.”

All the previous traditions were mentioned by Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Hakim an-Nayssaboori in his Mustadrak. He said after the last tradition: “I mentioned this tradition to be evidence for the previous traditions. These traditions showed clear objection to the tradition narrated by Qatada that Anass had said: “I offered prayers behind the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman and I didn’t hear any of them reciting(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful). ”

Then al-Hakim said: “Many other traditions narrated by Othman, Ali, Talha bin Obaydillah, Jabir bin Abdullah, Abdullah bin Omar, al-Hakam bin Omayr ath-Thimali, an-Nu’man bin Basheer, Samra bin Jundub, Burayda al-Aslami and Aa’isha bint Abu Bakr concerning this subject. I didn’t mention them in order not to overburden the reader with them. I chose from among what might fit this chapter. Also I mentioned in this chapter those, who recited bassmala loudly in their prayers, of the companions, the successors and the successors’ successors.”[57]

Ar-Razi mentioned in his at-Tafseer al-Kabeer [58]that al-Bayhaqi had mentioned in hisSunan some traditions about reciting bassmala loudly in the prayer narrated by Omar bin al-Khattab, ibn Abbas, ibn Omar and ibn az-Zubayr. Then ar-Razi said: “As for Ali bin Abu Talib (may Allah be pleased with him), it was proved recurrently that he recited bassmala loudly in his prayers and whoever imitated Ali bin Abu Talib in his religion, would be guided. The evidence for that was the saying of the Prophet (s): “O Allah! Turn the rightness with Ali wherever he turns.”

It would be a sufficient evidence for bassmala to be a Quranic verse in the beginning of every sura except Bara’a, that all the companions, their successors and the successors’ successors of every generation of the umma had agreed unanimously, since the Quran had been written down until nowadays, upon writing down bassmala at the beginning of every sura except Bara’a.

They wrote it down as they wrote every other Quranic verse without any difference between them whereas they had agreed unanimously upon not writing anything that was not of the holy Quran unless they would put a distinguishing mark in order not to be mixed up with the Quranic words. Didn’t you see how they distinguished the names of the suras, the symbols of the sections, the parts…etc. and put them out of the text of the Quran in order to be known that they were not of the Quran so that the Quran would be protected as it had been revealed? You knew well that the umma had never agreed unanimously upon any matter as it had agreed upon this matter and this was enough evidence proving that bassmala was independent Quranic verse coming at the beginning of every sura written by the ancestors and the successors.

It was mentioned that the Prophet (s) had said: “Every important task that doesn’t begin with (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) will be amputated.”[59] and: “Every important task that doesn’t begin with (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) will be amputated or mutilated.”[60]

It is certain that the holy Quran is the best of what Allah, the Almighty has revealed to His apostles and prophets and that every sura in it is important and great that Allah has challenged all the people, who failed to produce a sura like the Quranic suras. So would it be possible for the Quran to be amputated? Allah, His Quran and its suras be exalted highly above any raving!

The prayer is the success and the best of doings as it is announced from above the minbars and the minarets. It is known by everyone. Nothing is to be compared with it after believing in Allah, His prophets and the Day of Resurrection. Then is it possible for Allah to legislate the prayer so amputated and mutilated? Neither a pious nor a dissolute one dares to say so but the pious imams Malik, al-Awza’iy and Abu Haneefa (may Allah be pleased with them) were distracted from these necessities; and every mujtahid would be rewarded and not to be blamed whether being right or wrong when trying his best to deduce his conclusion from the legal evidences.

The excuse of our opponents

They justified the matter with some excuses:

First: if bassmala was a verse of al-Fatiha and was a part of every sura of the Quran, then repeating(the Beneficent, the Merciful) [61]would be necessary to be repeated one hundred and thirteen times throughout the Quran.

The answer: the situation might require repeating if it was to pay much attention to some great affairs in order to be taken in consideration with much carefulness. The holy Quran had many examples of this thing; for example in sura of ar-Rahman (55), al-Mursalat (77) and al-Kafiroon (109). Was there anything of the affairs of this life and the afterlife deserving utmost attention and greatest carefulness like the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful? Were the prophets delegated, the angels sent down and the Books revealed without in the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful or His guidance? Were the heavens and the earths constructed but with in the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful?[62]

(O men! call to mind the favor of Allah on you; is there any creator besides Allah who gives you sustenance from the heaven and the earth? There is no god but He; whence are you then turned away) 35:3.

Second: the tradition narrated by Abu Hurayra that the Prophet (s) had said: “Allah the Almighty says: I have divided the prayer between Me and My servant into two halves. If the servant says:All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. Allah says: My servant praises Me. If he says:The Beneficent, the Merciful. Allah says: My servant thanks Me. If he says:Master of the Day of Judgment. Allah says: My servant glorifies Me. If he says:Thee do we serve and Thee do we beseech for help. Allah says: this is between Me and My servant…etc.”

Their evidence in this tradition was that he didn’t mention(in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) with the verses of al-Fatiha. They said that if it was a verse of al-Fatiha, he would mention it.

The answer: this tradition was contradicted by a tradition narrated by ibn Abbas when saying: “Allah says: I have divided the prayer between Me and My servant. If the servant says:in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful . Allah says: My servant calls me…etc.”[63]The tradition was too long but our evidence was that it included bassmala and so it contradicted Abu Hurayra’s tradition. In fact Abu Hurayra himself narrated a tradition that the Prophet (s) used to recite bassmala loudly in the prayer and that he himself used to recite it loudly in his prayer. He said: “I am the most of you in imitating the Prophet’s prayer.” This tradition was mentioned previously.

Third: the tradition narrated by Aa’isha that the Prophet (s) began his prayer with takbeer[64]and reciting (al hamdu lillahi rabbil aalameen).[65]

The answer: this couldn’t be an evidence for them because Aa’isha made (al hamdu lillahi rabbil aalameen) as a name for this sura exactly as when one said: “I recited (qul huwal-lahu ahad)”[66]to mean that he recited sura of al-Ikhlass or when saying that someone recited (inna fatahna laka fathan mubeena)[67]to mean that someone recited sura of al-Fat~h and so on. So the meaning of the tradition was that the Prophet (s) began his prayer with takbeer and reciting this sura, whose beginning wasin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. [68]

Fourth: the tradition narrated by ibn Mughaffal when saying: “My father heard me recitingin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. He said to me: “O my son! Beware of changing the Sunna! I offered prayers with the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman. I didn’t hear any of them reciting it (bassmala).”[69]

The answer: the scholars of jarh and ta’deel[70]didn’t know who ibn Mugaffal was. They didn’t mention any of his traditions. Ibn Rushd mentioned him when talking about bassmala in his book Bidayatul Mujtahid[71]and brushed him away when quoting the saying of Abu Omar bin Abdul Birr that ibn Mughaffal was unknown man.

Fifth: Shu’ba narrated from Qatada that Anass bin Malik had said: “I offered prayers with the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman. I didn’t hear any of them recitingin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful .”[72]Another one narrated by Hameed at-Taweel that Anass said: “I offered prayers behind Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman. All of them didn’t recitein the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful .”[73]

The answer: you found in our evidence mentioned previously true traditions narrated by Anass contradicting these two traditions. You might refer to them.

Imam ar-Razi mentioned this tradition of Anass in hisTafseer and said: “The answer to this tradition is in many ways;

First: Sheikh Abu Hamid al-Isfarayeeni said: “Six traditions were narrated from Anass in this concern. The Hanafites narrated from him three traditions. One of them was his saying: I offered prayers behind the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman. They began the prayer with(All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds).

The other was his saying: …they didn’t mentionin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

The third saying: …I didn’t hear any of them recitingin the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

These three traditions agreed with the thought of the Hanafites and there were three other traditions contradicting this thought;

one of them was his tradition about Mo’awiya, who didn’t recite bassmala in the prayer and then the Muhajireen and the Ansar objected to him and this showed that reciting bassmala loudly in the prayer was a certain matter, which was agreed upon unanimously among them.

The other one: Abu Qulaba narrated from Anass that the Prophet (s), Abu Bakr and Omar used to recite bassmala loudly in the prayers.[74]

The third one: that Anass was asked about reciting bassmala loudly or softly and he answered: “I don’t know about this matter.” Ar-Razi said: “It was clear that Anass’ traditions about this matter became so confused and contradictory and hence we had to depend upon other evidences…and also there was another suspicion in his traditions that Ali (s) exaggerated in reciting bassmala loudly but when the Umayyads seized the rule, they exaggerated in forbidding from reciting bassmala loudly in order to remove everything referring to Ali (s).[75]Anass might be afraid of the Umayyads; therefore his sayings became confused.

Whatever we doubted about something, we would never doubt about that if there was a contradiction between the sayings of persons like Anass and ibn al-Mughaffal and the sayings of Ali bin Abu Talib (s), who kept on that until the end of his life, certainly depending upon the sayings of Ali would be better. This was a final answer…and whoever took Ali as the imam of his religion, would certainly lay hold on the firmest handle of religion and life…etc.”[76]

All praise is due to Allah Who guided us to this, and we would not have found the way had it not been that Allah had guided us.

RECITING QURAN IN THE PRAYER

The jurisprudents disagreed upon reciting Quranic suras in the prayer. Abu Bakr al-Assamm, Isma’eel bin Olya, Sufyan bin Oyayna and al-Hasan bin Salih thought that reciting Quran in the prayer was not wajib but it was mustahab.

This was irregularity in thinking, contradicting the evidences and violating the consensus of the umma.

They depended upon a tradition narrated by Abu Salama and Muhammad bin Ali that once Omar bin al-Khattab had offered the maghrib prayer and he didn’t recite the suras in it. He was asked about that. He said: “How about the ruku’ and sujood?”[77]They said: “Alright.” He said: “Never mind then!”

This was Omar’s own thought and he didn’t ascribe it to the Prophet (s). He might think that leaving reciting the suras inattentively wouldn’t invalidate the prayer. Allah is the most aware.

Al-Hasan al-Basri and others thought that reciting suras was obligatory (wajib) in one rak’a.[78]This was like the previous thought in its irregularity and violating the consensus.

They justified their thought by interpreting the Prophet’s saying: “No prayer (will be correct) except with (reciting) al-Fatiha.” They thought that if al-Fatiha was recited in the prayer even one time, the prayer would be correct.

The answer: this tradition didn’t regard the prayer when it was offered with al-Fatiha and didn’t decide whether it was valid or not but it regarded it when it was without al-Fatiha and decided that it was not a prayer like the Prophet’s saying: “No prayer (is accepted) without wudu’ (or tayammum).” The tradition “No prayer (will be correct) except with (reciting) al-Fatiha” showed the obligation of reciting al-Fatiha in the prayer. Al-Fatiha was a necessary part of the prayer whereas wudu’ was a condition determining the validity of the prayer.

Imam Abu Haneefa and his companions though that reciting al-Fatiha was not wajib in the prayer. They thought that reciting anything of the Quran would be enough. Abu Haneefa was satisfied with reciting one verse of the Quran even if it was one word like (“Mudhammatan 55:64”: both inclining to blackness) but his companions Abu Yousuf and Muhammad bin al-Hasan ash-Shaybani were satisfied with three short verses like(Then he looked. Then he frowned and scowled. Then he turned back and was big with pride. 74:21-23) or with one verse that was as equal as three short verses or a little more. The Hanafites kept to this in their prayers.[79]

Abu Haneefa permitted translating the Quran that was to be recited in the prayer into any foreign language for those, who couldn’t speak Arabic well,[80]but his two companions permitted translating just for those, who were unable to speak Arabic, not for those, who could speak bad Arabic.

Reciting the Quran in the prayer was wajib according to their doctrine in the two rak’as-prayers like Fajr prayer, Friday prayer and the traveler’s prayers (Qasr)[81]but as for three or four-rak’as prayers, reciting the Quran was wajib in any two rak’as of the prayer. The prayer had the option to choose between the first two rak’as, the last two rak’as, the first and the third, the first and the fourth, the second and the third or the second and the fourth. If a prayer recited the Quran in the first two rak’as, he would be free in the last two rak’as whether to recite the Quran, recite tasbeeh[82]or to be silent as long as the time of one tasbeeh.

They depended upon a tradition narrated by Abu Hurayra when saying: “One day the Prophet (s) entered the mosque. A man came in, offered the prayer and then came to greet the Prophet (s). The Prophet (s) replied his greeting and said to him: “Go back and offer your prayer because you didn’t offer it (correctly).” The man came back and offered his prayer as same as the first one. Then he came to the Prophet (s) and greeted him. The Prophet (s) replied his greeting and said to him: “Go back and offer your prayer because you didn’t offer it.” He did that for three times. The man said to the Prophet (s): “I swear by Him, Who has sent you with rightness! I don’t know more than this. Please teach me!” The Prophet (s) said: “When you stand up to offer the prayer, say Takbeer then recite what is easy of the Quran as possible as you can, then bow then stand erect then prostrate yourself then sit. Do this throughout your prayer.”

They depended upon the Prophet’s saying (recite what is easy of the Quran as possible as you can) as their evidence in this matter.

Neither Abu Hurayra nor his traditions had any value near us. He was not trusted or reliable. We detailed all the facts about him in a book called (Abu Hurayra). Whoever liked to know the shiny truth, let refer to it.

This tradition might be not true because it was confused and not clear. We examined the tradition and didn’t find any clear explanation that might fit the prophets (s). The tradition lacked many necessary things that the umma had agreed upon unanimously. It didn’t mention anything about the intention of the prayer, sitting during the last tashahhud[83], saying (blessing and peace be upon Muhammad and his progeny), tasleem[84]and other things. It didn’t fit the Prophet (s) with his high morals to let that man offer invalid prayer for three times and that might not be permissible for him (s).

Abu Dawood mentioned this story narrated by Rifa’a bin Rafi’ al-Ansari[85]that the Prophet (s) had said to the man, who didn’t offer his prayer correctly: “When you stand up towards the Qibla, say takbeer and then recite al-Fatiha and whatever you like to recite.”

Ahmad bin Hanbal and ibn Habban mentioned this story narrated by Rifa’a that the Prophet (s) had said to the man, who didn’t offer his prayer correctly: “…then recite al-Fatiha and then recite whatever you like.”[86]

It was certain that Abu Hurayra would never equal Rifa’a whether in his doings or sayings. When there was any contradiction, the traditions of Rifa’a would certainly be preferred to the traditions narrated by Abu Hurayra. Therefore we found that al-Qastlani when explaining the tradition of Abu Hurayra in his book Fat~hul Bari tried his best to interpret the tradition to be in accordance with the tradition of Rifa’a.

Whoever looked for the sayings of the ancestors and the successors when talking about Abu Hurayra’s tradition, would find them all, except the Hanafites, either refuting[87]or interpreting[88]the tradition to be in accordance with their thoughts. Refer toSharh Sahih al-Bukhari andSharh Sahih Muslim to see their sayings about Abu Hurayra’s tradition in details.[89]

Abu Hurayra himself contradicted his tradition when he narrated other traditions saying: “I heard the Prophet (s) saying: The prayer won’t be correct unless al-Fatiha is recited in it.”[90]Abu Hurayra also said: “The Prophet (s) ordered me to announce in Medina that no prayer (would be correct) without (reciting some of the) Quran, even if it was al-Fatiha and something more.”[91]He also said: “I heard the Prophet (s) saying: Whoever offers a prayer without reciting al-Fatiha, his prayer is aborted, his prayer is aborted, his prayer is aborted, his prayer is aborted.”[92]

Then why did the Hanafites depend upon the outward meaning of the saying (recite what is easy of the Quran as possible as you can) mentioned in Abu Hurayra’s tradition and give up the clear and true prophetic traditions talking about the prayer? In fact they depended upon what contradicted the many true traditions and objected to all the other sects of the Muslims and what they gave up was confirmed by the true prophetic traditions and by all the other sects of the Muslims.

The Hanafites might depend upon the Quranic verse(therefore read what is easy of the Quran 73:20) as their evidence for this matter.

The answer: this verse had nothing to do with the subject of reciting Quranic suras in the prayer at all. The interpreters had explained this verse clearly. Let him, who wants to see its real meaning, refer the interpretations of the Quran.

The Hanafites justified the permissibility of reciting the translation of the Quran in the prayer according to some sayings;

First: Ibn Mass’ood recited to some foreigners:(Surely the tree of the Zaqqum is (ta’am al-atheem)the food of the sinful 44:43-4). One of the foreigners recited (ta’am al-atheem) as (ta’am al-yateem; the orphan). Ibn Mas’ood said to him: “Say: Ta’am al-fajir).[93]Then ibn Mass’ood said: “It is no mistake to recite (al-hakeem; wise) instead of (al-aleem; aware). The mistake is to put a verse of mercy instead of a verse of torment.”

The answer: this was too far from our subject and if the saying was true, it would just show ibn Mass’ood’s own thought and it would never be taken as evidence.

Second: the Quranic verses(And most surely the same is in the scriptures of the ancients 26:196) and(Most surely this is in the earlier scriptures; the scriptures of Ibrahim and Musa 87:18-9).

Their evidence out of these verses was that the umma agreed upon that the Quran had not been in its Arabic wordings whether in the scriptures of the ancients or the scriptures of Abraham and Moses but it was its meanings that had been mentioned in those scriptures in Hebrew and Syriac.

The answer: this was like the previous justification in not having anything to do with the subject. In fact it was much farther than that one.

Third: the Quranic verse(…and this Quran has been revealed to me that with it I may warn you. 6:19) and the foreigners didn’t understand Arabic unless the meaning would be translated to them into their language; therefore the warning was to be in their language.

The answer: this would be possible as evidence for the permissibility of translating the holy Quran into the foreigners’ languages so that they could make use of its maxims, morals, orders and prohibitions. This was something and jargoning in the prayer would be something else. Would any Arab or foreigner not understand that reciting al-Fatiha did mean to recite the sura as it had been revealed with its original wording written down in the holy Quran? Would any one of good tact not feel that the spirit of the Quran would be deprived of if it was recited in a foreign language whether eastern or western?

I didn’t think that Imam Abu Haneefa would fail in his justifications to a degree that he might fall down to the bottom! It was because he relied upon analogy and approval in deducing the legal verdicts. Hence he found that it would be nice for the foreigners if the Quran was translated into their languages in order to be recited in their prayers. He found that it would be easier for them to understand the meanings and to be more submissive in their prayers. He compared the foreigner’s reciting the Quran in his language with his listening to the sermons and learning the lessons in his language. This was the theory of Atatürk in offering the prayer. He didn’t take it from Abu Haneefa but it was just telepathy! What helped Atatürk with this theory that he didn’t appreciate the legal evidences; in fact he didn’t know them and didn’t want to know them. He determined what he approved. If the Sharia had something leading to the permissibility of acting according to the approval, they would justify their thought but how far!

Ash-Shafi’iy, Malik, Ahmed and others thought that reciting al-Fatiha in all wajib and mustahab prayers in Arabic was obligatory. Their evidence for that was Abu Hurayra’s tradition talking about the story of the nomad, who couldn’t offer his prayer correctly and then the Prophet (s) taught him how to offer the prayer, ordered him to recite some of the Quran in his prayer and then said to him: “Do this in all of your prayers.”[94]

You already knew our thought about this tradition when we said that we had brushed it aside and that it had no value near us.

The Shia believed, according to their infallible imams, that reciting al-Fatiha in correct Arabic was obligatory in the first two rak’as of every wajib and mustahab prayer[95]for the single prayer (one, who offers a prayer alone) and for the imam (one who leads the others in offering the prayer).

As for the ma’moom,[96]he didn’t have to recite al-Fatiha because the imam[97]would undertake that instead of him. As for the last two rak’as, it would be obligatory for the ma’moom either to recite the sura or to recite tassbeeh.[98]The imam was not to undertake reciting the sura or tassbeeh instead of the ma’moom in the last two rak’as.

Our evidence (the Shia’s evidence) in all of that was the sayings of our infallible imams, who were the equal of the Quran.

Reciting al-Fatiha by the Prophet (s) in the first two rak’as of the prayer was confirmed by all the Sihah and Musnads (the books of Hadith) according to the tradition narrated by Abu Qatada al-Harth bin Rib’iy and others.

What the Prophet (s) used to do in his prayer would be obligatory[99]for the all because he had said: “Offer the prayer as you saw me offering it.” As it was proved that the Prophet (s) had recited al-Fatiha in the last two rak’as, it was also proved that he had recited tassbeeh in them. The wording of tassbeeh was as the following (subhanal-lah wel hamdu lillah wela ilaha illallah wel-lahu akbar) according to the imams of the Prophet’s progeny (s). The tradition, narrated by Sa’d bin Abu Waqqass and mentioned in al-Bukhari’sSahih and other Sihah and Musnads, confirmed this.

The people of Kufa complained to Omar against Sa’d until they said to him that Sa’d hadn’t offered the prayer correctly. Sa’d said: “By Allah, I offered the prayer in a way like the prayer of the Prophet (s) without a bit of difference. I expatiated (on reciting al-Fatiha and the other sura) in the first two rak’as and I lightened in the last two rak’as (hastening in them by only reciting tassbeeh or al-Fatiha alone without the second sura).” Allah is the most aware!

TAKBEERATUL IHRAM

The Shia agreed, according to their pure imams, unanimously upon thattakbeeratul ihram [100]was a necessary pillar of every wajib and mustahab prayer. Withouttakbeeratul ihram the prayer would be invalid. The only form oftakbeeratul ihram was (Allahu akbar). If the prayer began his prayer with anything else than Allahu akbar even if it had the same meaning, his prayer would be invalid. Also saying it in any language other than Arabic would invalidate the prayer. It was enough for us thattakbeeratul ihram was obligatory that the Prophet (s) had never begun any of his prayers except with it. You already knew that the Prophet (s) had said: “Offer the prayer as you saw me offering it.”

The obligation oftakbeeratul ihram was confirmed by the Quran, the Sunna and the consensus of the umma. Allah said:(And your Lord do magnify 74:3). [101]The consensus of the umma agreed upon that the verse referred totakbeeratul ihram and the orders of Allah were to be obeyed obligatorily. According to the consensus of the umma too that other than saying (Allahu akbar) at the beginning of the prayer was not obligatory. The Prophet (s) said: “The key of the prayer is the tahoor,[102]its tahreem[103]is saying Allahu akbar and its tahleel[104]is by saying tasleem.”[105]This tradition was mentioned by Abu Dawood in hisSunan .

The Hanafites said that tahreem was not a pillar of the prayer but it was related to standing up towards the qibla. They said that it was not necessary to saytakbeeratul ihram in Arabic and they permitted translating it into any language the prayer liked whether he was able or unable to speak Arabic. They said thattakbeeratul ihram would be valid if the prayer said instead of (Allahu akbar) (subhanallah) or (la ilaha illallah) or any of the attributes of Allah the Almighty on condition that it was not to be said more than the attribute of Allah. The prayer could say (Allah), (ar-Rahman; the Beneficent) or any one of the other attributes of Allah to begin his prayer. This was their belief and their evidence for that was only approval!