Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

A Commentary on Theistic Arguments

Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli

Translated and Edited by Hassan Allahyari

Pulisher: Ansariyan Publications

2002

www.alhassanain.org/english

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Glory be to Him,

Who carried His servant by night

from the Holy Mosque to the farthest Mosque,

the precincts of which We have blessed,

that we might show him some of Our signs,

He is the Al-hearing, the Al-seeing.

The Noble Qur’an

Table of Contents

About the Author 6

Translator’s Word 7

Acknowledgements and Dedication 7

The Author’s Preface 8

Chapter One: Knowledge and Sophistry 11

Priority of Ontology over Epistemology 11

Metaphysical Sources of Knowledge 11

Open and Latent Skepticism 12

Incorporeality, Universality, Immutability, and Continuity of Knowledge 12

Corollaries of Knowledge 13

Knowledge and Mental Existence 14

Divisions of Knowledge 15

Knowledge, Faith, and Theoretical and Practical Reasons 16

Self-evident and Primary Cognitions 17

Necessary Truth of Primary Propositions 17

Difference between Epistemic Certitude and Psychological Certitude 18

Epistemic Certitude, Probability, and Social Conventions 19

Foundation of Discursive Propositions on Primary and Self-Evident Propositions 21

Primariness of the First Figure 21

The Principle of Non-Contradiction 22

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Validity of the First Figure 23

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and Multiplicity of Definite Propositions 24

The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Traditions 25

Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr’s Criticism of the Use of Syllogism 25

Intuitive Knowledge and its Categories 27

Soul and the Intuitive Knowledge thereof 29

Abstraction and Universalization of Causation 31

Knowledge and Epistemology 32

Philosophy in its General and Specific Senses 33

Philosophy and Particular Disciplines 34

Chapter Two: Faith and Reason 35

Sophistic Impartations and the Denial of Commensurability of Faith with Reason 36

The Mutual Existential Necessitation between Faith and Reason in the Islamic Traditions 37

The Ignorant Devout and the Unlearned Pious 39

First Knowledge is the Cognition of the Almighty 39

Disparagement of Acquired Knowledge and Mistrust of Theoretical Disciplines 40

The Commensurability of Religious Tenets with Philosophic Arguments 40

Rational Arguments in the Islamic Scriptures 41

The Legacy of Nahj al-Balāgha to the History of Islamic Thought 43

Non-questionability of Monotheism and Indemonstrability of Atheism 45

Difference between the Arguments of Divine Existence and the Arguments of His Attributes 47

Chapter Three: The Demonstration of Contingency and Necessity 50

Notions of Contingency and Necessity and Signs of Contingency 50

Argument from Contingents to the Necessary 51

Instrumentality of the Mediates and the Efficacy of the Necessary 53

Hudūth of the Mediates and Eternity of the Divine Grace 54

Criticisms and Evaluations 56

Evaluation of Hume’s Criticism 57

The Denial of Philosophic Meaning of Necessity and its Answer 58

Evaluation of the Epistemological Criticism 61

Chapter Four: The Arguments from Motion and Huduth 63

Premises of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth 63

Evaluation of the Argument from Causality 63

Limitations of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth 64

Evaluation of Criticisms of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth 66

Chapter Five: The Demonstration of Contingency of Impoverishment 68

Transition from Quidditative Contingency to Contingency of Impoverishment 68

Contingency of Impoverishment and the Essential Independence of the Necessary 70

Unique Qualities of the Demonstration of Contingency of Impoverishment 73

Chapter Six: The Ontological Argument of Anselm 75

Argument in the Form of Reductio ad Absurdum 75

Gaunilo’s Criticism and its Adduction 75

The Fundamental Flaw of Anselm’s Argument 76

Failure to Make Distinction between Concept and Extension in the Demonstrations of Gnostics 78

The Evaluation of Kant’s Tripartite Criticism of Anselm’s Argument 79

Addendum 84

Chapter Seven: The Demonstration of the Veracious 86

The Demonstration of the Veracious in Ibn Sīnā’s Works 86

The Demonstration of the Veracious in Transcendent Wisdom 86

The Demonstration of the Veracious in ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’i’s Works 88

Allamah Tabātabā’i’s Exposition of the Demonstration 91

The Qualities of the Demonstration of the Veracious 92

Chapter Eight: The Argument from Design 93

What is Order? 93

Does Order Exist? 94

Why does Order Exist? 96

The Argument from Design and the Noble Qur’ān 98

The Argument from Design and the Problem of Evil 100

Chapter Nine: The Argument from Miracles 101

Miracles in the View of Islamic Philosophers and Western Theologians 102

Extraordinary Events: Mu‛jiza, Karāma, I‛āna, and Ihāna 103

Miracles as Rational Proofs 103

Rational Possibility and Ordinary Impossibility of Miracles 104

Chapter Ten: The Argument from Religious Experience 106

Religious Experience and Demonstrative Reasoning 106

Definite and Indefinite Shuhūds 107

Deviation from Rational Cognition and Decline into Open and Latent Skepticism 108

Chapter Eleven: The Moral Arguments 110

Discursive Arguments based on Moral Commands 110

The Common Criticism of the Moral Arguments 110

The Affirmation of Incorporeal Existence through Analysis of Reason 111

Kant’s Moral Arguments 112

The First Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument 112

The Second Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument 113

Chapter Twelve: The Demonstration of Primordial Nature 115

Usage of Reciprocity in the Demonstration of Primordial Nature 115

Two Expositions of the Demonstration of Primordial Nature 116

The Minor Premise of the Demonstration of Primordial Nature 117

A Criticism and Its Evaluation 119

The Demonstration of Primordial Nature in The Noble Qur’ān 120

Notes 122

About the Author

Āyatullah Abdullah Jawādī Āmulī was born in 1351 A.H. (1933 A.D.) into a religious family in Āmul, Iran. After completion of his rudimentary education under his father, a distinguished and pious scholar in Āmul, the author’s yearning for knowledge drew him to the local Islamic seminary. He stayed there for five years and studied under renowned teachers some of whom had been students of the late Ākhūnd al-Khurāsānī, the author of Kifāyat al-Usūl.

In 1369 A.H. (1942 A.D.), he migrated to Tehran and, as counseled by his father, referred to Āyatullah Shaykh Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī, who introduced him to the Marwī seminary in Tehran. There, the author studied advanced courses offiqh ,usūl ,hādith , philosophy, and other customary disciplines of the seminary. His stay at Tehran continued until 1374 A.H. (1947 A.D.), and during that period, he studiedSharh al-Mandhūma, al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt , and some parts ofAl-Asfār under prominent scholars such as Āyatullah Sha‛rānī and Āyatullah Ilāhī Qumsha’ī. In the mean time, he continued to study advanced levels offiqh under Āyatullah Shaykh Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī.

In the year 1374 A.H. (1947 A.D.), he joined the holy seminary of Qum, which was rapidly gaining reputation as a major center for Shiite learning. For a while, he attended lectures of the late Grand Āyatullah Burūjerdī. He went to the fiqh classes of Āyatullah al-Muhaqqiq al-Dāmād for thirteen years, and attended the lectures of usūl al-fiqh of the late Imam Khomeini, may Allah sanctify his tomb, for seven years. He also benefited from the renowned teacher of Divine gnosis and tafsīr, ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī, under whom he completed Al-Asfār, irfān, and other advanced courses in hadīth and tafsīr.

Translator’s Word

The objective of this book is to analyze, from the perspective of Transcendent Wisdom(al-Hikma al-Muta‛āliyya) , arguments that have been put forward for the existence of the Deity. Accordingly, familiarity with basic ontological perspectives of Transcendent Wisdom is imperative in order to fully benefit from these discussions.

Though I have tried to make this work as close to the academic parlance of the west as possible, a fastidious reader may still find many instances that can be further improved. I take responsibility for the mistakes that may have gone undetected, welcome suggestions, and request the reader to overlook my faults and show magnanimity and pardon with respect to my shortcomings.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

The efforts and encouragement of many people have contributed to the development of this translation. I appreciate the help and support provided by Syed Shiraz Agha, Jāved Akbarī, Kauthar Ali Khan, Syed Sulaymān Hasan, and many others.

I would like to thank in particular my mentor, the great ‛Allāmah and the possessor of the Tranquil Soul, Ghulām Redhā Fayyādhī, may Allah bless us with the length of his life, teacher of Divine gnosis at the holy seminary of Qum. His eminence graciously gave me the honor of being at his company and patiently responded to my queries. It has also been a pleasure to benefit from Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen, professor of philosophy at Imam Khomeini Research Institute of Qum, whose encouragement and vision have always been inspiring.

As a token of esteem, admiration, and deep affection, I would like to take the privilege to dedicate this humble work to those Shi‛a youth of the western world who are fond of Islamic intellectual disciplines. May the Imam of the Age, my soul and the souls of the world be the ransom of the dust of his steps, help us to be of service to Islamic doctrines. May God, the Glorified, accept this unworthy effort from me and may He make it of use to me and my brothers in faith.[1]

Hassan Allahyari

Qum, June, 1997

The Author’s Preface

Man’s life is founded on his beliefs and the central tenet of all religious beliefs is the existence of God. Failure to understand the conceptual and propositional foundations(al-mabādī al-tasawuriyya wa al-tasdīqiyya) of theism can evoke objections and doubts with respect to belief in the Deity.

The best way to reach God, Whose Being is more apparent and obvious than any other thing and Whose presence is nearer to everything than any other thing, is, verily, to dust the trail of knowledge off the blinders of ego and vanity. God’s invisibility is due to the severity of His manifestation, and His remoteness is because of His extreme proximity. If an entity’s manifestation were to be more evident than knowledge, notion, and knower, and it were to be so near that even nearer than a thing is to itself, such a keen manifestation necessarily creates invisibility, and such extreme proximity causes distance. This invisibility and distance is, however, prevalent with respect to the eyes which are veiled; because someone who sees himself, he cannot see God. However, by resisting the temptations of ego and liberation from the iniquities of conceit, man’s and inability can be reversed, and then in proportion to his ontological capacity(si‛a al-wujūdiyya) , he may view God. And by admitting, “We know Thee not, the knowing Thou deserve”,[2] he may refine His gnosis to perfection.

Given their denial of incorporeal existence and viewing the reality restricted to the physical world, the rejecters of monotheism and revelation question things that are not perceivable through sensation(ehsās) . So eloquently does the Noble Qur’ān narrate this naturalist perspective of a group of Israelites who refused to believe in anything beyond their immediate sensation: “O’ Moses, never will we believe in thee until we see God manifestly.”[3] And about the idolaters of Hijāz, the Divine book says, “And say those who hope not of Our meeting, ‘Why have not angels been sent down upon us, or see we not our Lord?’ Indeed they think too high of themselves and have exceeded a great excess.”[4]

The Noble Qur’ān states that all along history, hearts of those who maintain naturalistic worldview have been alike. “And say those who know not: ‘Why speaketh not God unto us or why cometh not unto us a sign’; Even so spoke those before them; their hearts are alike. We have indeed made clear the signs to people who are certainly sure.”[5] In view of the fact that their hearts are alike, most of the interrogatories and objections of materialist skeptics are the same which have been projected time and again since the antiquity, and first, Divine Apostles have offered profound answers to them and after them, their followers, namely the religious theosophers and the mutakellimūn, have defined and expanded on these answers. However, the interrogatories of every age reflect that age’s specific ideological trends and predilections; and accordingly, the answers are proffered in a manner that is prudent and proportionate to that time. History bears witness to individuals who were submissive to truth and in its path they did not confuse lunacy for lucidity. They managed to extract liberty from the confinements of ego and embrace and believe in the truth. It also testifies to individuals who succumbed to their ego and failed to reach the reality, and if they were able to discover it, their sordid disposition did not permit them to believe in it. Pharaoh and his courtiers realized the authenticity of Moses’ miracles, but “denied them in inequity and arrogance while their hearts were convinced.”[6] In response to their denial, says Moses, “Indeed, you know that none hath sent these down save the Lord of heavens and the earth.”[7] Therefore, one has to be alert to certain indirect fallacies such as the accusations of being primitive, reiterating ancient dogmas and tales, and the futility of this answer and that answer; and given the similarity of hearts and identity of doubts, the very same profound and cogent answers of revelation and scripture that have been expanded on and clarified by theosophers, have to be proffered in a manner adorned with the expediencies of the time.

This book is a compendium of lectures that were delivered during 1413 A.H. (1992 A.D.) to an erudite audience in the holy seminary of Qum. We are most appreciative of Hujjat al-Islam Hamīd Pārsāniyā for his toils in rewriting and editing these lectures.

It ought to be stated that many of the book’s analyses of thinkers outside the real of Islamic intellectual tradition are based on the translations in the field of philosophy of religion from European languages. The accuracy of these translations is solely the responsibility of the translators.

The arguments for the existence of the Almighty Necessary(al-Wājib Ta‛ālā) can be divided into three categories:

1. Arguments that are defective, devoid of logical tenability, and cannot yield certitude.

2. Arguments that do not lack logical tenability; nevertheless, do not lead to the existence of the Necessary either. In fact, this category of arguments only indicates one of the Deity’s attributes and names. In order to prove the existence of the Necessary, such arguments need be adduced by other arguments. For instance, even if the common flaws in some versions of the arguments of motion and hudūth are avoided, they remain incapable of proving the Necessary.

3. Arguments, which are cogent and conclusive, such as the demonstration of the veracious(burhān al-siddīqīn) .

Most of theistic arguments which have been criticized are either devoid of a valid syllogistic form or the critic has chosen one of its weak versions. Some of them, like Anselm’s ontological argument and the moral arguments, are corrupt and defective. Others, such as the arguments from motion and hudūth, even if stated in a manner avoiding the prevalent flaws in their common expositions, even so they fail to prove the objective.

Each chapter of this work is devoted to the analysis of a certain argument and given that great many criticisms leveled against theistic arguments are founded on some epistemological perspectives that question the reliability of knowledge, the first two chapters inquire into man’s epistemic capacities.

Finally, it is appropriate to echo the prayer of the Sacred Messenger of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin, “O’ God, show us things the way they truly are,” and supplicate to Him not to deprive us of His most beautiful theophony(tajallī) , so that in the light of His gnosis, we may know His Prophet, in the light of whose guidance, we may know His Hujja, and by knowing the Hujja, we may avoid religious misguidance.