Chapter Two: Faith and Reason
As put by the Divine sage al-Sabzawārī, inquiry about God, the hereafter, and the path that guarantees man’s eternal felicity and gives its elaborate details, that is, the revelation, brings forth questions that do not leave man, even if he should desire to ignore them, and pique his curiosity from inside. As the existence and nonexistence of these phenomena are contradictory to each other, they are either true or false. The branch of knowledge that is concerned with this inquiry is the first philosophy. Though shuhūdi ecstasies in relation to these realities are sufficient to satisfy the fastidious curiosity of a Gnostic, until transferred into the conceptual framework and given the form of rational arguments, they will fail to pass cognitive judgments to persuade others. This is because if reason does not play any role in the cognition of central religious doctrines and mystical experiences are the sole criterion of truth in the field, rational defense of faith and enjoining others towards it will be out of question. Moreover, when the criterion of rationality, which is the common language of all humanity, is considered futile, everyone will be entitled to have his own favorite religious claim, and consequently, as one mystical experimenter may report the existence of many gods, the other might call others to monotheism. The result of such agnostic or fideistic mistrust of reason and unreliability of acquired knowledge - as put by Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, Divine peace be with him, in a conversation with an atheist that has been narrated by Hishām ibn al-Hakam - is that the gateway to theism will be closed and the call to believe in one God will lack relevance.
Hishām narrates that an atheist inquired from Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, Divine blessings be with him, about God, the Exalted. The Imam mentioned some of His positive and negative attributes and described Him as the Deity who deserves absolute human devotion and worship. He said, “My saying ‘Allah’ is not the affirmation of these letters, ‘alif, lām, hā’; rather I intend the extension(misdāq)
Who is the Creator of things and is their Crafter. These letters indicate Him, and He is the agent Who is called Allah, the Benevolent, the Merciful, the Ever-Prevalent, and names similar to these; He is the Deity.”
The atheist responded, “We find not a concept but it is a creature.”
“Were it as you say,” replied the Imam, “then it would have not been required from us to believe in one God. We have not been obliged to believe in something non-conceptualized, but rather, we say, everything that is perceived by the senses is physical, therefore, what is found and conceptualized by the senses is an artifact, and the Crafter must be proved.”
In the above conversation, first the Imam, peace be with him, explains that what is meant by these names and attributes is their real and external extension(al-misdāq al-khārijī)
. In response to the Imam, the atheist tries to block the medium of debate and dialogue and states that concepts do not represent reality and what appear in our minds and thoughts are our own artifacts. In response, the Imam, peace be with him, says if this were true, then necessity of belief in monotheism would be absurd, since monotheism obliges man to believe in an actual, external, and non-fantasized single God; whereas man’s thoughts are figments of his imagination that been have created in specific conditions and will be destroyed in the other. Therefore, how could someone who lives in the confines of concepts and does not view the true unity(tawhīd)
of God and His most beautiful names be obliged to believe in Him?
After pointing out the corrupt corollary of the atheist’s assertion, the Imam presents a rational argument to prove the existence of God and considers his rational argument, which traces the existence of sensible crafts to an insensible Crafter, sufficient for this purpose.
The question of God’s existence, the answer to which is of utmost importance in the formation of human identity and how he views the world, is a question that is imprinted on man’s heart and soul and cannot be satisfied with anything less than certitude. God and the hereafter are not things that “do not cause loss to him who knows them not; and do not benefit him who knows them.”
Rather, they are realities whose knowledge is “the mighty tiding”
and ignorance towards them is enormously risky. Because even should the existence of the hereafter be improbable, the event that is at stake here is eternal heavenly bliss or everlasting torments. The practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
obliges one to ensure the forestallment of an eternal condemnation even if it is not highly probable. This call of the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
, as it has been used by Imam al-Sādiq, peace be with him, against ‛Abdul Karim ibn Abī al-‛Awjā,
does not warrant one to dismiss these doctrines as meaningless and reject them ahead of any kind of cogitation.
Sophistic Impartations and the Denial of Commensurability of Faith with Reason
Thinkers, who are influenced by latent sophistic persuasions or biased by the openly skeptical contemporary thought, remain devoid of rational cognition of metaphysical realities and religious tenets. Moreover, in order to defend the illegitimate and corrupt ideological ramifications of their experiential perspectives, they hastily evince contempt towards the philosophic and civilized thought that is fostered in the orchard of reason and watered from the heavens of revelation.
Ironically, while such a person himself is fully engrossed in conceptual discussions and is dependent on things that are not external to the realm of notions, he tries to dismiss the conformity of concepts to external realities and religious doctrines.
The denial of commensurability of faith with reason, which is common in the western philosophy of religion, is an old paradox. It is based on the evidence that many people, who have scholarly and demonstrative cognition of religious doctrines, do not have any commitment to religious faith and exhibit atheistic and blasphemous behavior; and on the other side of the spectrum, many devout people are incapable of demonstrating their faith.
The implausibility of this discourse becomes clear from our previous discussion about theoretical(al-‛aql al-nadharī)
and practical reasons(al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
. Propositions are made as a result of a relationship formulated in the mind between their subjects and predicates, which is expressed their copulas, and it is the theoretical reason(al-‛aql al-nadharī)
that discerns these relationships. Faith is the nexus of the soul with the object of its perception; and practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
is the agency, which establishes this relationship.
The human being’s theoretical knowledge pertains to sensation(ehsās)
, memory(hāfidha)
, imagination(khiyāl)
, estimation(wahm)
, and ratiocination(ta‛aqqul)
; and his faith and practical inclinations, with all of their perceivable levels, are proportional to his theoretical perceptions. However, as explained earlier, by differentiating between faith and knowledge - that is, in the levels in which separation between faith and knowledge is perceivable - four classes, each one of which may include further subclasses, emerge. These four classes are: the learned faithful, the learned infidel, the ignorant faithful, and the ignorant infidel.
It can be inferred from this discourse that the separation of faith and knowledge that occurs in certain levels of man’s religious journey does not indicate a separation that is due to incapacity of reason in knowing religious tenets and metaphysical realities. Rather, from this vantage point, it can be seen that for the people who are devoid of shuhūdi cognition of reality, reason is the only way of assessing the veridicality of the various religious faiths. Because if the practical reason(al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
embraces perceptions the veridicality of which has been ascertained, the religious belief, in this case, is a faith that has cognitive respectability. And if faith is proportioned to things the truth of which has not been authenticated, it is blind faith. For the same reason, if reality is well-known to an individual, yet he still does not have faith in it, his knowledge is associated with infidelity and corruption. And if reality is neither known nor believed in, this ignorance is mingled with infidelity and corruption.
Given that faith is the propensity of the human soul, it is true when it is proportioned towards a real object and false when directed to something unreal. Therefore, should rational assessment of metaphysical realities and religious doctrines be impossible, even if the perpetual dominance of faith over human civilization is accepted, there still will be no means of authenticating the many religious faiths the contradictory claims of which range from the insane lordships of diverse natural deities to the divinity of a Single Almighty God.
The Mutual Existential Necessitation between Faith and Reason in the Islamic Traditions
Although there is no mutual non-existential necessitation(al-talāzum al-‛adamī)
between faith and reason, because reason has the ability to authenticate religious creeds, and therefore, can play an instrumental role in fostering a veridical faith, there is a mutual existential necessitation(al-talāzum al-wujūdī)
between faith and reason. Therefore, numerous traditions narrated from the Beneficent Prophet and his holy legatees, peace be with them all, measure the value of piety and religious devotion of individuals in proportion to their reasonability and knowledge.
“Verily fear God only those of His servants induced with knowledge.”
“One does not have faith until he makes use of reason.”
“The ignorant worshipper is like a mill-donkey, which circumambulates but cuts no distance.”
“A person’s knowledge and reason denote his value.”
“One’s religiosity is in proportion to one’s reason.”
Likewise, in the traditions, a knowledge that is not coupled with faith and practice is the subject of scorn.
“The hearth of the Hell in the Day of Judgment is every wealthy who is avaricious of his wealth with respect to the destitute, and every scholar who sells his religion for worldly gains.”
“The most detested of the servants before Allah, is the corrupt scholar.”
“How abundant are evil scholars and ignorant pious! Fear the evil among the scholars and the ignorant among the pious.”
While differentiating between knowledge and faith, the last tradition is denouncing a knowledge, which is not coupled with faith; and condemning a faith, which is not accompanied by knowledge; and decreeing both of them be shunned.
In another set of traditions, knowledge has been called the best companion of faith: “How noble a companion is knowledge for faith.”
In some traditions, the noblest form of knowledge has been named a knowledge that is illustrated in actions and displayed by organs.
“The most beneficial knowledge is that which is practiced.”
“The best knowledge is that which is with practice”
“The noblest knowledge is that which is manifested in the organs and body parts.”
Similarly, a knowledge, which has not been put into practice, has been regarded the worst.
“Knowledge without practice is heinousness.”
“The curse of knowledge is to abandon its practice.”
“The worst knowledge is the one that is not implemented.”
“Knowledge without practice is a warrant for God against the servant.”
These traditions illustrate that despite the absence of a mutual non-existential necessitation, there is a mutual existential necessitation between faith and knowledge. It follows that faith is veridical only when it pertains to a real entity and is coupled with definite cognition thereof and that faith without cognition invites nothing but mischief and vice.
The mutual existential necessitation between faith and reason indicates that transcendent levels of faith cannot be attained if one does not possess superior levels of cognition. Therefore, in the search of a veridical faith, there is no alternative to reason and knowledge and citing examples of the ignorant pious and blasphemous scholars are not adequate disproof of this assertion.
The putative failure of philosophers in proving the existence of God does not justify the dismissal of rationality and the assertion that Divine Books have called for religious experience or mere sensation of Divine existence, or that religious language is either meaningless or transrational.
Although not every person who is wiser and more knowledgeable is necessarily more faithful and pious, and there are a good many erudite atheists, this does not indicate that reason is satanic, worldly, and misleading, because the examples of separation and mutual non-existential necessitation between faith and reason do not negate their mutual existential necessitation.
The Ignorant Devout and the Unlearned Pious
Lack of attention to the mutual existential necessitation between faith and reason has led some to consider reason and acquired knowledge as a defective or supplementary way for affirming religious doctrines. They have asserted that the use of reason - which as instanced by, “One’s religiosity is in proportion to one’s reason,”
is the criterion of the veridicality of one’s faith - is inspired by fanatic and professional impulses.
This trend reflects the position of contemporary western theology. After submission to sensationalism bidding rationality farewell, and turning away from the religion that is in total commensurability with rational principles, this theology wants to defend religion as a dimension of human civilization.
The philosophic worth of sensory cognition of religious tenets and metaphysical realities is not more than sophism and skepticism(shakkākiyya)
. Theologians who depend on this medium justify religious tendencies as mere introspective propensities. Indeed, the sort of people who are raised in this agnostic or fidiestic tradition, which denies the nexus of faith with reason, are the ignorant devout and unlearned pious who want to have faith even if it flies in the face of every rational principle known to mankind. Such a person can hardly be participant of a rational dialogue.
When reason is considered an improper medium of reaching religious tenets, and metaphysical propositions are regarded as equivocal and meaningless, there is little that knowledge can do to differentiate between veridical religious doctrines and false claims. Rather, in this case, there is little difference between faith in God and belief in the devil; and consequently faith remains blind and perplexed about choosing its object of worship from among the favorite deities of diverse religions. In the light of this, it can be stated that the worst determent inflicted at faith is the denial of the possibility of its rational defense.
First Knowledge is the Cognition of the Almighty
If it is admitted that reason can yield knowledge to the Almighty God - as it has been echoed by the tradition, “The first knowledge is the cognition of the Almighty”
- it will follow that reason has the capacity to differentiate veridical religious doctrines from false ones; and therefore, the most essential discipline is the branch of knowledge, which applies to this inquiry. Imam Ali, peace be with him, says, “The most compulsory knowledge is the one which leads you to the good of your faith, and illuminates its wrong.”
If reason, which constitutes the humanness of the human being and of which everyone has a just share, has the capacity to render judgment on the validity and invalidity of religious tenets, then its application to faith is not irreverence. Rather, it ought to be regarded as a reliable medium towards bliss, as indicated by these traditions:
“Reason is the apostle of truth.”
“Reason is a definite friend.”
“The friend of every individual is his reason, and his enemy is his ignorance.”
Reflecting on the excellences of reason, Imam Ali, peace be with him, says, “God, the Glorified, has not distributed among His servants anything better than reason.”
Disparagement of Acquired Knowledge and Mistrust of Theoretical Disciplines
An important point worth noticing here is that the disparagement of acquired knowledge(al-‛ilm al-husūlī)
and theoretical disciplines(al-‛ulūm al-‛aqliyya)
, which is ubiquitous in the works of the Gnostics(‛urafā’)
who witness the Deity and the hereafter by shuhūd, is not identical to the mistrust of rationality in contemporary sensationalism and western theology. The genuine Gnosticism(‛irfān)
decrees that although reason is not sufficient, it is necessary.
In the initial phases, acquired knowledge and rational cognition is the criterion of veridicality of religious doctrines; because “Nothing rectifies religiosity save reason.”
However, in the higher phases - that is, after having faith and performing virtuous deeds - reason yields its place to shuhūd, where what was previously known by the medium of concepts is exposed to shuhūdi visualization without any mediates. This phase of cognition has some characteristics and corollaries, which though compatible with rational principles, are not within the radius of reason’s reach. This fact is acknowledged by reason itself, since the truth of shuhūdi cognition as well as the exaltedness of God’s Essence from being reached by the rational arguments of philosophers and mystical experiences of Gnostics are demonstratively proved. Thus if “Reason is the paramount human excellence,”
the paramount excellence of reason is not invalidating it, but knowing its limits and realization of meta-rational realities. “Admission of ignorance is the farthest limit of one’s reason.”
The Commensurability of Religious Tenets with Philosophic Arguments
After pessimism with respect to the affirmation of religious tenets and metaphysical realities through the rational approach and considering it either futile or supplementary, the nexus of faith and reason is rejected in another way. It is argued that in religions generally, and in the scriptures of the monotheistic tradition of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam specially, the traditional rational and philosophic proofs of theism have not been used. It is further argued that many theologians and philosophers have demurred from presenting rational arguments for the existence of God, considering them useless and inconclusive, or even, as in the case of Paul Tillich, blasphemous and irreverent to the pious expediency.
According to the verses of the Noble Qur’ān, the Divine visage is evident in every atom of existence. “And God’s is the East and the West, therefore whithersoever ye turn ye find the face of God.”
And the Divine existence as expressed by, “What! About God is there any doubt?”
has been considered axiomatic and indubitable. According to the verse, “Is it not sufficient for thy Lord that He is a witness over all things,”
His existence has been described as more manifest than and antecedent to everything else.
In response to this opinion one cannot help but to say that, indeed, it is not surprising that rationality has failed to prove a Deity who is an anthropomorphic body of light hidden in the unseen, or is like a griffin in a fairyland.
Rational Arguments in the Islamic Scriptures
The above argument centers on the idea that in religions in general and in the Holy Qur’ān in particular, there has not been any serious effort to prove the existence of God through traditional philosophical proofs. This discourse, however, at least with respect to Qur’ān, is untenable for many reasons.
First, at the time when the Noble Qur’ān was revealed, it addressed the people of the Book and polytheists(mushrikīn)
. These people did not reject the Divine existence. The fundamental challenge to the Prophet of Islam, and rather to all of the ancient prophets, was idol-worship, dualism, and so forth. The Noble Qur’ān describes the people who were addressed by the Prophet and were antagonistic towards him as acknowledging God and the fact that He is the Creator.
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the earth and made subservient the sun and the moon?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who sendeth down from the heaven the water, and giveth life with unto the earth after its death?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”
“And if thou askest them ‘Who created the heavens and the earth?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the earth?’ Certainly will they say, ‘Created them the All-Mighty, the All-Knowing.’”
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created them?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”
The fundamental obstacle for the idolaters of Hijāz in accepting the new Divine religion was not the existence of God or the fact that He is the Creator; rather their real difficulty was in al-tawhīd al-rubūbī
. They worshipped idols, which they believed decided their lives, gave their sustenance, and were the means of attaining proximity to God. The Noble Qur’ān relates their explanation of their idolatrous conduct as follows:
“We worship them not save [in order] that they may make us near to God.”
“And they worship besides God, that which can neither hurt them nor profit them and they say, ‘These are our intercessors with God.’”
It is obvious that when addressing such people, the Noble Qur’ān does not need to prove the existence of God. Rather, it calls their belief indemonstrable and presents rational proofs for al-tawhīd al-rubūbī.
Second, it was not just these people who were addressed by the Noble Qur’ān. On many other occasions, the Holy Qur’ān names the belief of those who reject God and the hereafter as indemonstrable and devoid of proof. It denounces them for relying on surmise and presents demonstrations(barāhīn)
for the existence of the Deity.
When the Noble Qur’ān addresses atheists who consider their lives and deaths determined by the nature, it introduces profound demonstrations,(barāhīn)
inquiry into which will add new chapters to philosophy.
In response to this last group - whose opinion about life and death has been outlined in this way: “And say they, ‘It is not save our life in this world; we die and live, and destroys us not but time,’”
- the Qur’ān says, “For them there is no knowledge of that; they do but merely guess.”
That is, they do not have certainty about their claim and they merely surmise. It can be inferred from this discourse that the Qur’ānic criterion for the assessment of truth of religious doctrines is nothing other than knowledge and rationality.
In the blessed chapter of The Mountain, as an indication to the existence of the Creator of the world, the Noble Qur’ān says, “Or were they created by nothing? Or are they themselves the creators? Or did they create the heavens and the earth? Nay! They have no certainty.”
The first verse is a demonstration(burhān)
for the existence of man’s creator, summing as, either he has a creator or he does not. Given that the latter is an evident impossibility, due to the impossibility of haphazardness, then he must have a creator. It follows that his creator is either he himself or someone else. The former - due to the obvious impossibility of circular causation(al-‛illiyya al-dauriyya)
, which yields to conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain)
- is impossible. Therefore, his creator is an agency other than himself. One need not be reminded that the “other” that the Majestic Qur’ān introduces here is certainly not man’s recipient cause(al-‛illa al-qābiliyya)
. Since, first, the existence of the recipient cause does not undermine the atheist position, as they do not demur from acknowledging its existence, and second, it is not the Noble Qur’ān’s objective here to prove the existence of the recipient cause.
Just as the analysis of a single principle of the Principles of Jurisprudence(usūl al-fiqh)
, “Certitude is not infringed by doubt,”
brings forth the detailed discussions of istishāb and creates many long chapters in the named discipline, a profound and meticulous investigation of this brief verse can be the source of many new epistemic chapters about man’s origin and his Creator. Each one of the above propositions is divided into two propositions based on the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories. In the first proposition, the reason for the impossibility of man’s not having a creator is the fact that existence is not included in his essence, and attribution of existence to his essence without a cause invites preponderance without a preponderant(tarjīh bilā murajjeh)
. This is because an entity that existence and nonexistence are not included in its essence as its essential parts, is equidistant(mutasāwī al-nisba)
in relation to existence and nonexistence; and the attribution of existence or nonexistence in this situation, without an external cause, amounts to conjunction of equidistance and non-equidistance. It follows that since equidistance and non-equidistance are contradictories, the attribution of existence to the human being without taking into consideration the causal efficacy of an external agency results in conjunction of contradictories, which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for the human being not to have a creator.
Furthermore, it can be proved that the suggestion of man being his own creator is untenable, since it translates into circularity(daur)
, which translates into conjunction of contradictories(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain)
, which is impossible. Therefore, man is not his own creator and his creator is someone other than himself.
Likewise, a similar argument from cosmic creation to the existence of God can be inferred from the second verse, which speaks about the creation of the heavens and the earth. Thus, inquiry into the existence of human being and the world can be pursued on the avenue of the many similar Qur’ānic verses.
Third, there is an abundant supply of explicit demonstrations(barāhīn)
and detailed rational arguments in the traditions. In Al-Tawhīd of al-Shaykh al-Sadūq and Usūl al-Kāfi, a discourse similar to the above verses has been elaborated as follows: “You did not create yourself, nor were you created by someone similar to yourself.”
The Legacy of Nahj al-Balāgha to the History of Islamic Thought
The sermons of Nahj al-Balāgha are full of the riches of rational wisdom that all along the history of Islamic thought have inspired and enriched the works of the mutakellimūn, philosophers, and Gnostics alike. For instance, sermon 185 declares:
Praise belongs to Allah, Who is such that senses cannot perceive Him, places cannot contain Him, eyes cannot see Him, and veils cannot cover Him. The One Who proves His eternity by the hudūth of His creation; and the hudūth of His creation indicates His existence, and their analogousness establishes that there is nothing similar to Him. The One Who is true in His promise, exalted from oppressing His servants, upholds equity in His creation, and practices justice in His rule. The One Who attests by the hudūth of things to His eternity, by their marks of incapability to His power, and by their powerlessness against destruction to His everlastingness.
This sermon contains rational inference of God’s existence, eternity, and everlastingness, from the hudūth of the world. It traces the weakness and neediness of creatures to the omnipotence of God. Along the history of Islamic thought, these arguments with their particular expressions have guided and given a sense of direction to kalām, philosophy, and Gnosticism. Later, this sermon clearly mentions the principle of causation, cause and effect, contingency(imkān)
and necessity(wujūb)
, and the perfection of creation.
Imam Ali, may the benedictions of Allah be for him, after presenting numerous evidences for the existence of God says,
Then woe unto them who deny the Ordainer and reject the Ruler! They have assumed that they are like grass having neither any cultivator nor any maker for the diversity of their forms. They have not relied on rationality for their assertion, nor on any research for what they have heard. Can there be any structure without a constructor? Or an offence without an offender?
This section of the sermon, by relying on the principle of causation and the effects’ need to the cause, traces the existence of the various forms to the existence of the cause that bestows these forms.
Moreover, it mentions the rational theophony(al-tajallī al-‛aqlī)
- that is, the Divine manifestation in the reason - and that reason is incapable of reaching God’s Essence and that it has the capacity to discern this shortcoming of hers.
In sermon 186, about which the compiler of Nahj al-Balāgha, al-Syed al-Radhī says, “[This sermon is] about monotheism, and this sermon encompasses such principles of gnosis that no other sermon contains”, it is stated:
Everything that is known through itself has been created, and everything that exists by virtue of another thing is an effect. He works but not with the help of instruments; He fixes measures but not with the activity of cogitation; He is rich but not through acquisition. Epochs do not keep company with Him and implements do not help Him. His Being precedes time. His Existence precedes nonexistence and His eternity precedes beginning.
It will not be an overstatement to say that philosophy has evolved along the lines of inquiry and analysis of the first two points of the above discourse. Inquiry of causation and usage of terms such as causation(al-‛illiyya)
, causal efficacy(al-fā‛iliyya)
, causedness(al-ma‛lūliyya)
, and scrutiny of existence and nonexistence and so forth are central philosophical themes that have been used in this and other sermons.
Some interpreters of Nahj al-Balāgha have considered it likely that what al-Syed al-Radhī has narrated here is part of sermon 179, which has been delivered in reply to the inquisition of Dhi‛leb al-Yamānī, and al-Radhī has separated them for literary considerations.
Dhi‛leb asks Imam Ali, peace be with him, “O’ Commander of the Faithful, have you seen your Lord?”
“Do I worship someone I have not seen?” replies the Imam.
Dhi‛leb asks again, “How have you seen Him?”
“Eyes do not see Him through sensual perception,” responded the Imam, “but rather hearts find Him through serenity of faith. He is close to things but not [physically] contiguous. He is far from them but not [physically] separate.”
Statements similar to this sermon - such as “Every manifest thing other than Him is hidden, and every hidden thing other than Him is invisible,”
“Praises be to Allah, Who is Manifest before His creatures because of His creation,”
or “He, the Glorified, manifested before them in His Book,”
that have come in other sermons - and excerpts from the chapter of Sincerity(sūra al-Ikhlās)
and verses like, “He is the Beginning and the End, and the Manifest and the Hidden,”
and “He is with you wherever ye may be,”
and words in the books of supplications, have enriched and inspired the philosophic and Gnostic tradition of Islam in the form poem and prose over the centuries.
In a worldview where the Divine Essence is behind the curtain of the all-unseen so much so that “The height of mental courage cannot appreciate Him and the profundities of reason cannot reach Him,”
reason and knowledge are His first Essential manifestation
, and universal intellect(al-‛aql al-kullī)
is His first actual and factual theophony in the external world. That is, the “immutable entities”(al-a‛yān al-thābita)
of things manifest in the Divine cognitive presence(al-hadhra al-‛ilmiyya)
through His Essential knowledge(al-‛ilm al-dhātī)
and their external beings(al-a‛yān al-khārijiyya)
appear in the external world through the emanation of grace(ifādha)
by the Intellect. “The first thing that God created is the Intellect.”
And if it is such that in the arc of descent(qaus al-nuzūl)
, the Divine grace passes through knowledge and Intellect and reaches the world of nature, likewise in the arc of ascent(qaus al-su‛ūd)
one can reach the Divine threshold only through assistance of the Intellect and knowledge, since “It is the Intellect through which the All-Merciful is worshiped and the Paradises attained.”
As explained earlier, in this consonant and harmonious tradition the tenets of which support each other, the disparagement of reason by those lost in “effacement”(fanā’)
does not indicate total and absolute rejection of rationality. In this realm, whose dwellers have abandoned the pleasures of this world and the hereafter for the sake of annihilation in the Absolute Beauty, it is not only reason that is belittled, but even the angels, for not bearing the sin of love, are out of the circle of communion(wisāl)
.
Indeed, it is odd that despite expressions and texts like the ones quoted here, rationalistic approach towards religious tenets and Gnostic claims is denied on grounds of their incommensurability with the demands of piety.
The reason behind all of this is the dominance of sophism and skepticism(shakkākiyya)
over the simplistic minds of people who, prematurely and ahead of adequate familiarity with philosophic insights, have been exposed to the paradoxes of theologians who, in order to justify their impure and polytheistic religiosity, have deviated from rationality and have compromised with sensualistic perspectives and whose corrupt and void faith cannot be maintained except by declaring rationality blasphemous and incompatible with faith. Obviously, the maintenance of the superficial faith in spite of its opposition to reason, has left no choice for trans-rationalist theologians but to reduce religious tenets to a minimum. Thus, as on one hand the acceptability of antireligious ethos was maximized; on the other, it was insured that the Excellent Religious State(al-Madīna al-Fādhila al-Dīniyya)
, or the state of the people - that is, the democratic rule - as well as individual and social norms, be based to liberal interpretations of permissibility and freedom.
Non-questionability of Monotheism and Indemonstrability of Atheism
The verses of the Majestic Qur’ān, which declare the existence of God as axiomatic and indubitable,
and those verses, which describe polytheism as indemonstrable and without proof,
do not suggest that the gateway of reason to discern the Divine existence is closed and that it is impossible to discover the necessity of God’s existence through the rational approach, and therefore, one has to accept His existence “as a matter of faith.”
Perhaps the non-questionability of God’s existence in these verses owes to the fact that the proofs of Divine existence and negation of polytheism are undeniable. For instance, it can be inferred from the verse, “What! in God is there any doubt, the Originator of the heavens and the earth?”
that since the entire cosmos bears the marks of its Creator, to doubt His existence is nonsensical and indefensible.
In Nahj al-Balāgha, Imam Ali, Divine benedictions be with him, expresses his astonishment at a person who observes the creation and still doubts its Creator: “I wonder at him who doubts God, yet he sees His creation.”
Moreover, even if these verses were not substantiated by these proofs, they have no indication on the epistemic worthlessness or futility of reason in knowing central religious tenets like God and the hereafter. Rather, they magnify the tenability and reliability of rational knowledge about them, because in this case, the verses indicate that God is a reality whose existence is not only self-evident(badīhī)
, but primary(awwalī)
.
Primary concepts and judgments are those concepts and judgments that the entirety of the human being’s cognition is dependent upon them, while on the contrary their cognitive worth is not indebted to another knowledge. It is obvious that such independence does not indicate an imperfection or defect on their side, but it rather enhances their epistemic respectability. The primary knowledge of the human being comprises concepts and propositions that it is impossible for him not to understand and acknowledge and he relies on their conceptual comprehension and propositional acknowledgement in every situation - even when he is inattentive of them or denies their primariness(awwaliyya)
.
Although primary knowledge does not depend on any knowledge antecedent to itself - and therefore, its conception or acknowledgement is not rendered through other cognitions, and they rather manifest on their own - primariness(awwaliyya)
is not part of their meaning and is discerned by scrutiny of their essences. Therefore, it is possible that their primariness be subject to inattention or denial, as it is possible that one would clarify or draw attention(tanbīh)
towards it.
One example of such primary knowledge is the acknowledgement of basic reality. As mentioned earlier, the human being’s knowledge respecting the basic reality, which is the boundary between sophistry and realism, is primary(awwalī)
, since every effort to establish reality through rational argument or to express doubt, ambiguity, or denial about it presupposes the existence of reality. Otherwise, the premises will not have any objective meaning.
Thus, the existence of reality is indemonstrable; and what can be done in this regard is to draw one’s attention(tanbīh)
. However, drawing attention, on its own right, does not reveal a new proposition, and it merely calls attention to one of its attributes, that is, its primariness(awwaliyya)
. In other words, the course of drawing attention(tanbīh)
to the acknowledgement of basic reality is not a route from not knowing to knowing; it is a route from inattentiveness to attentiveness.
Drawing attention toward the existence of reality is drawing attention towards an actuality that one has known from the beginning and has simply been inattentive towards it.
Similar to the primariness(awwaliyya)
of man’s knowledge of the existence of reality - which does not undermine its epistemic worth in the conceptual framework, but rather by lending credence to the acquired knowledge, places it at the zenith of this category of knowledge - the primariness(awwaliyya)
and non-questionability of man’s cognition with regard to God is a claim that does not rest on discrediting acquired knowledge.
The argument devoted to substantiate this claim is the Demonstration of the Veracious(burhān al-siddiqīn)
, which, as will come, is not an argument that intends to prove the Divine existence. Rather, it calls attention towards the fact that He is a reality Who is axiomatic in all conditions, and “therefore, wherever you turn there is the face of God,”
“and He is with you wherever you be.”
It draws attention to the fact that although His essence is hidden from everything, He is more evident than any other thing in all stages and worlds, including the world of concepts; and this theophony(tajallī)
is in such an extreme manifestation that the clarity and meaningfulness of all other concepts owes to Him.
The journey of inquiry towards God in the demonstration of the veracious is not a journey from ignorance towards knowledge; rather, it is a journey from inattentiveness to attentiveness. This demonstration(burhān)
draws attention towards the necessity of veridicality of a proposition that relates the existence of God and acknowledges that the veridicality of other discursive, self-evident, or even primary necessities is indebted to this eternal necessity.
In the light of this discourse, how is it possible to infer the futility of acquired knowledge and exaltedness and superiority of God from the horizon of concepts from the verses, which as attested by the brilliant insights of the Islamic philosophers, call toward the demonstration of the veracious and speak of an open and manifest theophony(tajallī)
in the human being’s reasonability?
Difference between the Arguments of Divine Existence and the Arguments of His Attributes
The difference between the notions of God’s existence and the notions that indicate His attributes makes it possible for His existence to be proved with arguments other than the ones that prove His attributes such as unity(tawhīd)
, life(hayāt)
, knowledge(‛ilm)
, power(qudra)
, wisdom(hikma)
, and so forth. Additionally, it also makes it possible for the arguments, which demonstrate the identity(‛ayniyya)
of His Essential attributes, to differ from the arguments, which indicate the identity of His attributes and Essence.
Lack of attention to this point has led many theologians to define God by some of His Essential and even practical attributes; and this has further checked them from discriminating between the arguments that prove the Divine Essence and the ones that prove His attributes.
For instance, in the definition of God, which is of course a lexical definition(al-ta‛rīf al-lafdhī)
, attributes such as unity(tawhīd)
, knowledge(‛ilm)
, autonomy(ikhtiyār)
, or even things such as good and evil that pertain to God’s practical attributes, have been mentioned. Then without any consideration to the arguments that bear the responsibility of proving or negating these attributes, the demonstrations(barāhīn)
that are solely concerned with the affirmation of God’s existence and do not indicate His attributes have been criticized for proving a deity who does not fit their definition. This has led many to presume that the Deity, which is proved through philosophical and rational arguments, is not the same Deity that is the object of religious worship.
This lack of differentiation between the notion of God’s existence and the notions, which denote His attributes further leads to a fresh complication: On the grounds of the differences of various societies and faiths regarding the attributes of the Deity, their consensus on the existence of the Deity is negated.
If the difference between the notion of Divine existence and notions of His Essential or practical attributes is acknowledged, first, the common tenets shared across diverse religious faiths can be traced; and secondly, the axis of dialogue and argument on the issues of disagreement can be identified. This is because it is possible that many people have a complete consensus and a common veridical opinion with regard to a phenomenon, while differing about its attributes and accidents, with some of them being right and some wrong.
Islamic philosophers demonstratively prove extensional identity(al-‛ainiyya al-misdāqiyya)
of Divine attributes and further hold that these attributes are identical with the Divine Essence; nevertheless, they have differentiated between the notion of Divine Essence and the notions of His attributes and have established specific demonstrations(barāhīn)
for each instance. Therefore, they have not confused the differences of the various religious faiths regarding the attributes of the Necessary with their consensus regarding the existence of His Essence.
The philosophical and kalāmi terms, which are used to refer to the Divine existence, have primary(awwalī)
and self-evident(badīhī)
meanings. For instance, the term Necessary Existent(al-Wājib al-Wujūd)
is derived from the words necessity and existence, which have primary concepts; that is, they cannot be defined by words that would have more clarity than themselves, and the human being abstracts them by the intuitive discernment(al-idrāk al-hudhūrī)
of his own reality.
The meaning of necessity is “must” which like the meaning of existence is known to everyone, and is a comparable dyad of possibility, which corresponds to “perhaps”.
Something for which existence is necessary is a necessary existent(al-wājib al-wujūd)
and is in contrast to something for which existence is not necessary. Something for which existence is not necessary, either nonexistence(‛adam)
is necessary for it, or neither existence nor nonexistence is necessary for it. The former is an impossible existent(al-mumtani‛ al-wujūd)
, and the later is a contingent existent(al-mumkin al-wujūd)
.
If the notion of the necessary existent has an external extension, it reflects a reality which, as put by Imam Ali, peace be with him, in Nahj al-Balāgha, is neither dependent upon another entity nor caused by it; and evidently, such an entity will possess numerous positive(al-sifāt al-thubūtiyya)
and negative attributes(al-sifāt al-salbiyya)
, which have to be investigated in the discussions of His attributes.
Among the first attributes, which are proved for the Necessary(al-Wājib)
after the affirmation of His existence, is His unity(tawhīd)
; and a monotheist is a person who, in addition to the acceptance of God’s existence, acknowledges and believes in His unity.
The existence of the Necessary as an actual external entity is proved by demonstrations, which attest to His ontological reality; and unity(tawhīd)
, infinitude(lā mahdūdiyya)
, omnipotence(qudra)
, autonomy(ikhtiyār)
, will(irāda)
, life(hayāt)
, justice(‛adl)
, and the like are His Essential and practical attributes which are proved through arguments other than the arguments of His existence.
Someone who witnesses the necessary and infinite existence of Allah through shuhūd can adjust his faith based on his shuhūd. However, if despite the comprehensive Divine presence, he is unable to view that expansive factuality, which realizes the reality of the world, including his own, then in order to believe in God, he has no option but to take recourse to the rational approach.
First, such a person has to discern the concepts of existence(wujūd)
, nonexistence(‛adam)
, necessity(dharūra)
, contingency(imkān)
, and so forth, and through them conceive the notion of the Necessary, and then rationally deduce the existence of His extension. Nevertheless, reason will eventually disclose to him that the acknowledgement of an entity, which has eternal necessity, has always been with him and he has been simply inattentive towards it. At this stage, it becomes clear to him that these arguments played little role other than mere elimination of inattention, and in reality, they have proved the primariness(awwaliyya)
of his cognition with respect to a reality Whose Essence and the Essential knowledge is the nafs al-amr
of all knowledge, and all propositions including the principle of non-contradiction owe their necessity to His eternal necessity(al-dharūra al-azaliyya)
.
0%
Author: Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli
